ML23152A142

PR-050,073 - 49FR30726 - Access Authorization Program (Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants)

ML23152A142
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/01/1984
From:	Chilk S NRC/SECY
To:
References
PR-050, PR-073, 49FR30726
Download: ML23152A142 (1)

Text

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 08/01/1984 TITLE: PR-050,073 - 49FR30726 - ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM (PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS)

CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-050,073 49FR30726 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

DOCKET FILE INVENTORY Docket No. PR-50, 73 (49 FR 30726)

In the Matter of ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM VOLUME 1 Document Docket Date of Title or No. Date Document Descrietion of Document 01 07/30/84 07/27/84 Federal Register Notice - Proposed rule (published 08/01/84) 02 09/06/84 09/04/84 Comments Stearns Catalytic Corporation (Lastowka) (1) 03 09/13/84 08/28/84 Corrnnenta National Association of Social Workers, Inc. (Whiting) (2) 04 09/14/84 09/11/84 Comments E.I. De Pont De Nemours &

Company (Poda) (3) 05 09/27/84 09/26/84 Ltr KMC, Inc. (Knuth) regarding request for comment period extension for ins ider ru l e package and associated regulatory guides 06 10/11/84 10/09/84 Comments Marvin I. Lewis (4) 07 10/11/84 10/08/84 Ltr Baltimore Gas &Electric (Bowmaker) requesting extension of comment period for Regulatory Guide, Task SG-301-4 08 10/29/84 10/25/84 Comments Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station (Fraser) (5) 09 10/31/84 10/26/84 Comments Harvard Medical School (Borofsky) (6) 10 10/31/84 10/29/84 Comments Associated Maintenance Contractors (Braceland) (7) 11 11/01/84 10/25/84 Comments Pomona College (Vogler) (8) 12 11/02/84 10/28/84 Comments Stanton G. Schwartz, M.D. (9) 13 11/02/84 10/30/84 Comments Publ ic Service Electric and Gas Company (Liden) (10) 14 11/05/84 10/29/84 Comments Unuversity of California, Irvine (McGuire) (11) 15 11/08/84 11/02/84 Comments IBEW Local Union 2150 (Arnold)

(12) 16 11/08/84 11/05/84 Comments Magnaflux (Blankenship) (13) 17 11/13/84 11/07/84 Comments Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. (Most) ( 14) 18 11/13/84 11/05/84 Comments Suzanne Brumer, Ph.D. (15) 19 11/14/84 11/10/84 Comments Nathan Most (16) 20 11/14/84 11/10/84 Comments Ms. Lecy Benke (17)

PR-50, 73 (49 FR 30726}

21 11/15/84 11/08/84 Comments John J. Brownfain, Ph.D. (18) 22 11/16/84 11/15/84 Comments Edison Electric Institute (Kearney) (19) 23 11/19/84 11/07 /84 Comments Sue, Alper &Associates (Alper)

(20) 24 11/19/84 11/14/84 Comments University of Colorado Health Sciences Center (Zimet) (20A) 25 11/19/84 11/02/84 Comments IBEW Local Union 2150 (Arnold)

(21) 26 11/19/84 11/14/84 Ltr Washington Public Power Supply System (Sorensen) requesting an extension of comment period 27 11/20/84 11/14/84 Comments George C. Rosenwald, Ph.D. (22) 28 11/20/84 11/16/84 Comments Peter R. Russell, Ph.D. (23) 29 11/23/84 11/19/84 Comments Fifth Avenue Center for Counseling and Psychotherapy {Graham)

(24) 30 11/23/84 11/17 /84 Comments Roger W. Sward (25) 31 11/23/84 11/16/84 Comments University of Minnesota Department of Psychiatry (Schofield)

(26) 32 11/23/84 11/15/84 Ltr Virginia Electric &Power Company (Stewart) will be providing comments for Draft Regulatory Guide and proposed rule by 12/07/84 33 11/27/84 11/15/84 Ltr Florida Power Corporation {Simpson) requesting extension of comment period 34 11/28/84 11/26/84 Comments Fordham University (Anastasi)

(27) 35 11/30/84 10/29/84 Comments Robert L. Sieben, M.D. (28) 36 11/30/84 11/26/84 Comments Robert E. Barton, Ph.D. (29) 37 11/30/84 11/27/84 Comments International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Pillard) (30) 38 11/30/84 11/26/84 Comments CES Associates (Tiktinsky) (31) 39 11/30/84 11/26/84 Comments George T. Mannen, Ph.D. (32) 40 11/30/84 11/28/84 Comments Stanley Moldawsky, Ph.D. (33) 41 11/30/84 undated Comments Randall Weingarten, M.O. (34) 42 12/03/84 11/27/84 Comments Anne E. Grycz (35) 43 11/29/84 11/24/84 Comments Jack P. Edelstein , M.D. (36) 44 12/03/84 11/19/84 Ltr Baltimore Gas and Electric (Bowmaker) requesting extension on comment period 45 12/03/84 11/28/84 Comments John S. Kelly, Ph.D. (37) 46 12/03/84 11/28/84 Comments Society for Industrial Organizational Psychology (38) 47 12/03/84 11/28/84 Comments Lisa Yates (39) 48 12/03/84 11/29/84 Comments Wright State University (Bare 1ay) (40 )

49 12/04/84 11/28/84 Comments Hilson Research, Inc. (Inwald)

(41) 50 12/04/84 11/30/84 Comments Pacific Graduate School of Psychology (Berghausen) {42) 51 12/06/84 12/06/84 Federal Register Notice - Proposed Rule:

Extension of Comment Period

PR-50, 73 (49 FR 30726)

VOLUME 2 01 12/06/84 12/03/84 Comments Consumers Power Company (VandeWalle) (43) 02 12/06/84 12/05/84 Comments Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, Inc. (Madsen) (44) 03 12/06/84 11/29/84 Comments Clinical Psychology (Bartz)

(45) 04 12/06/84 12/04/84 Comments Gasser Associates (Toth) (46) 05 12/06/84 12/03/84 Comments Jack G. Wiggins, Ph.D. (47) 06 12/06/84 12/01/84 Comme nts Philip H. Heersema, M.D. (48) 07 12/06/84 11/27/84 Comments Gary M. Olson, Ph.D. (49) 08 12/06/84 11/30/84 Comments John D. and Catherine T.

MacArthur Foundation (Bevan) (50) 09 12/06/84 11/30/84 Comments E. Clayne Arthur (51) 10 12/06/84 12/01/84 Comments Wright State University -

School of Professional Psychology (Fox) ( 52) 11 12/06/84 12/03/84 Comments Helen Schulman (53) 12 12/06/84 12/03/84 Comments Richard Caruso, Ph.D. (54) 13 12/06/84 12/03/84 Comments James N. Butcher, Ph.D. (55) 14 12/07/84 12/05/84 Ltr Florida Power & Light Company (Williams) requesting an extension to respond to proposed rules 15 12/07/84 12/06/84 Comments Behaviordyne Psychological Corporation (Schultz) (56) 16 12/07/84 12/07/84 Comments Bahavior Analysts &Consultants (Johnson) ( 57) 17 12/07/84 12/05/84 Comments Personnel Decisions, Inc.

(Hellervik) (58) 18 12/07/84 12/05/84 Comments Affiliated Psychological Services, P.C. (Donk) (59) 19 12/07/84 undated Comments Occupational Health Law Program

{Rothstein) (60) 20 12/07/84 12/03/84 Comments Boston Edison Copany (Harrington) (61) 21 12/07/84 12/06/84 Comments London House, Inc. (Scruggs)

(62) 22 12/07/84 12/07/84 Comments American Psychological Association (Spence/Pallak/Perloff)

(63) 23 12/07/84 12/05/84 Comments Morris Roseman, Ph.D., P.A.

(64) 24 12/07/84 11/30/84 Comments Central California Psychological Services (Abou-Ghorra)

(65) 25 12/07/84 12/06/84 Comments Corporate StressControl Services, Inc. (Glazer) (66) 26 12/07/84 12/06/84 Comments Equifax Services (Grazzini)

(67) 27 12/07/84 12/05/84 Comments Sheet Metal Workers' International Association (Car1ough)

(68) 28 12/07/84 12/07/84 Comments United Brotherhood of Carpenters &Joiners of America (Krieger) ( 69)

PR-50, 73 (49 FR 30726) 29 12/07/84 12/03/84 Comments Duquesne Light {Sieber) (70) 30 12/10/84 12/03/84 Comments William J. Feister, Ph.D. (71) 31 12/10/84 11/27/84 Comments California State Psychological Association (Wright) (72) 32 12/10/84 11/30/84 Comments Arthur M. Bodin, Ph.D. (73) 33 12/10/84 12/04/84 Comments Association for the Advancement of Psychology (Martin) (74) 34 12/10/84 12/02/84 Comments Ivan B. Gendzel, M.D. (75) 35 12/10/84 12/04/84 Comments Terry A. Beeves (76) 36 12/10/84 12/04/84 Comme nts University of California ,

Berkeley - Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (Gough) (77) 37 12/10/84 12/05/84 Comments Sheet Metal Workers' International Association (Carlough)

(78) 38 12/10/84 12/03/84 Comments Pacific Graduate School of Psychology (Chapman) (79) 39 12/10/84 12/06/84 Comments The Prince George's County Government (Goldstein) (80) 40 12/10/84 12/03/84 Comments Washington Public Power Supply System (Sorensen) (81) 41 12/10/84 12/04/84 Comments Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation (Kober) (82) 42 12/11/84 12/08/84 Comments Adele Shotzoff (83) 43 12/11/84 12/04/84 Comments Kino Community Hospital (Russel 1} (84)

- 44 12/13/84 12/10/84 Comments Houston Light & Power (Wisenburg) (85) 45 12/13/84 12/10/84 Comments Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nardi) (86) 46 11/09/84 10/30/84 Comments Public Service of New Hampshire (DeVincentis) (87) 47 11/16/84 11/14/84 Comme nts International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Pillard) (88) 48 11/29/84 11/28/84 Comments Psychological Resources, Inc.

(Hibler/Levinson) (89) 49 11/29/84 11/24/84 Comments Jack P. Edelstein, M. D. (90) 50 12/03/84 11/26/84 Comments Robert T. Flint, Ph.D. (91}

51 12/06/84 12/01/84 Comments Catherine L. Flanagan, Ph.D.

( 92 )

52 12/10/84 12/05/84 Comments Tennessee Valley Authority (Hufham) (93) 53 12/12/84 12/10/84 Comments Chem-Nuclear Systems, Jnc.

(Flynn) (94) 54 12/14/84 12/07/84 Comments Human Factors &Organizational Systems Laboratory (Blanchard) (95) 55 12/17/84 12/14/84 Comments Consultin1 Psychologists Press, Inc. (Black) (96 56 12/17/84 12/10/84 Comme nts Hanford Environmental Hea l th Foundation (Cooper) (97) 57 12/17/84 12/12/84 Comments Leigh Sills (98) 58 12/17/84 12/07/84 Comments Robert N. Meyer (99) 59 12/18/84 12/13/84 Comments Donald Ehrman, Ph.D. (100)

PR-50, 73 (49 FR 30726)

VOLUME 3 01 12/28/84 12/17/84 Comme nts Westinghouse International Projects Company (Meyer) (101) 02 01/11/85 01/07/85 Comments Tennessee Valley Authority (Hufham) (102) 03 02/04/85 01/30/85 Comments Equifax Services (Grazzini)

(103) 04 02/04/85 01/30/85 Comments Buford Kesler, Psychologist

( 104) 05 02/19/85 02/13/85 Comments Catalytic , Inc. (Lastowka)

(105) 06 03/04/85 02/27/85 Comments Behaviordyne Psychological Corporation (Schultz) (106) 07 03/06/85 03/05/85 Comments !RM Energy , Inc. (Bach) (107) 08 03/06/85 03/05/85 Comments Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

(Williams) (108) 09 03/06/85 03/05/85 Comments Baltimore Gas and Electric (Bowmaker) ( 109) 10 03/07/85 03/07/85 Comments Edison Electric Institute (Kearney) ( 11) 11 03/07/85 03/07/85 Comments Physical Security Coordinating Group (Silberg) (111) 12 03/07/85 03/05/85 Comments Kansas Gas and Electric Company (Koester) (112) 13 03/07/85 03/06/85 Comments Commonwealth Edison (Alexander)

( 11 3) 14 03/08/85 03/07/85 Comments Niagara Mohawk (Sunser) (114) 15 03/03/85 03/01/85 Comments Bechtel Power Corporation

( Ka rpa ) ( 115 )

16 03/08/85 03/06/85 Comments Baltimore Gas and Electric (Lundvall) (116) 17 03/08/85 03/07/85 Comments Northeast Utilities (Counsil/Sears) (117) 18 03/11/85 03/06/85 Comments Southern California Edison Company (Medford) ( 118) 19 03/11/85 03/05/85 Comments Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Cassidy) (119) 20 03/11/85 03/07/85 Comments Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Curtis) (120)

VOLUME 4 01 03/11/85 03/07/85 Comments Duke Power Company (Tucker)

(121) 02 03/11/85 03/05/85 Comments Florida Power Corporation (Westafer) (122) 03 03/11/85 undated Comments Florida Power & Light Company (W i l liams) (123) 04 03/11/85 03/07/85 Comments South Carolina Electric &Gas Comp any (Dixon) (124)

PR-50, 73 (49 FR 30726) 05 03/11/85 03/07/85 Comme nts Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Shiffer) (125) 06 03/11/85 03/06/85 Comments GPU Nuclear Corporation (Murray} (126) 07 03/11/85 03/06/85 Comments Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Helfrich} (129) 08 03/11/85 03/05/85 Comments Alabama Power (McDonald} {130}

09 03/12/85 03/12/85 Note to Receipients - Comments No. 131 from IRM Energy, Inc. (Bach) duplicate of comment No . 107. This number will be used again 10 03/11/85 03/07/85 Comments Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources Committee (Miller)

(131) 11 03/12/85 03/06/85 Comments Northern States Power Company (Mu solf) (132) 12 03/12/85 03/07/85 Comments Louisiana Power &Light (Leddick) (133) 13 03/13/85 03/08/85 Comments Iowa Electric Light and Power Company (McGaughy) (134) 14 03/13/84 03/08/85 Comments Vir(inia Power Company (Stewart) 135) 15 03/13/85 03/06/85 Comments Stone &Webster Engineering Corporation (Bradbury) (136) 16 03/14/85 03/11/85 Comments Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (Hintz) (137) 17 03/14/85 03/07/85 Comments Northeast Utili ties (Counsil/Sears) (138) 18 03/14/85 03/11/85 Comments Carolina Power &Light Company (Zimmerman) (139) 19 03/15/85 03/05/85 Comments Public Service Company of Colorado (Gahm) (140) 20 03/18/85 03/15/85 Comments Portland General Electric Company (Withers) (141) 21 03/18/85 03/12/85 Comments Arkansas Power &Light Company (Enos) ( 142) 22 07/05/85 09/27/84 Comments Office of Management and Budget (Bivens) (143)

-MAR 27 '86 17:04 PPL TOWER 16 P02 OQOOl'l<~-:WP -!J?J,73 e__w Pennsylvania Power & Ught Co- yF£ &17~)

Two No,th Ninth Street

• Allentown, PA ,e,01

• 215 / 0 March 27 1 Bruce D. Kenyan Senior Vice Frealdent*Nuclear 215/710-4194 Mr. Nunz1o J. Pa11ad1no, Chainnan U. S, Nue1ear Regulatory Comn1ss1on Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Pa11ad1no:

This letter provides the Conrn1ss1on with additional 1nfonnation regarding the access authorization issue. In the absence of an opportunity for NUMARC to address the Comnission regarding NUMARC's aeeess authorization guidelines as a preferred alternative to the proposed access authorization rule, the attached deta11ed 1nfonnat1on 1s provided. This 1nfonnat1on is consistent with wh~t was presented by NUMARC to the ACRS on February 14, 1986.

As NUMARC discussed in its February 26, 1986 meeting with the Cormiission, the NUMARC gu1del1ne5 on access authorization were deve1oped through considerable discussions .between the NUMARC Working Grpup on Security and the NRC Division of Safeguards. In these meetings, NRC personne1 discussed the reasons for and the security value of various proposed ru1e requirements. Working Group personne1 discussed those proposed rule and implementing regu1atory guide prov1s1ons which were part1cular1y 1mpract1ca1 or difficult to imp1ement. Both NUMARC and NRC personnel worked s1ncere1y to ee on elements of an eccess authorization program which would prov1de the

~ssent1al security features and cou1d be reasonably implemented. As a consequence of this process, the resulting guidelines provide a superior appro~ch to access authoriiation, Through NUMARC, a11 nuclear uti1it1es have conrnitted to revise the1r security p1ans, as ne~essary, to meet or exceed all the elements of the NUMARC guidelines 1f the Comniss1on accepts the guidelines 1n lieu of the rule. By so doing, the access authorization program for each utility would be subject to inspeet1on and enforcement by the NRC. Also, the gu1de11nes are strongly supported by EEI, AIF, and the ICMC Physical Security Group. On February 14, 1986, t he guidelines were presented to the ACRS. Subsequently, ACRS endorsed the guidelines as *preferable to the rule. Recently, the Office of Management and Budget issued a letter objecting to portions of the proposed rule and reco1T1T1ending that this matter be handled through an industry 1n1t1at1ve.

A concern of the NRC's* Office of the Executive Leg~1 Director has been the need for an NRC required appeal process for those who are denied access author1zat1on. NUMARC agrees that individuals who have been denied access authorization and who perceive that such denial may have infringed on their legal rights should have avenues of appeal. However. we believe that appropriate appeal mechanisms currently are afforded through existing federal

~nd state laws and that an addit1ona1 appeal process 1s neither warranted nor n, , I .-.J* <J ~ t3rd. ~f.~. ~- ...1~~-~1

CJ . s. Nllfl CJ: ~ -,* ,..,,... . , ,,, c;s10N oor*:- . l 0

MAR 27 '86 17:05 PPL TOWER is P03 Mr. N. J. Palladino March 27, 1986 Page 2 required. We strong1y object to the highly prescriptive and onerous appeal process proposed by the ru1e package.

The Conmission fs urged to approve t he adoption of the NUMARC guidelines on access authorization fn lieu of the rule. As fs further detailed in the attachment to th1s 1etter, we not only be11eve that the guidelines are a far superior approach to access authorization, but also believe that the proposed rule package conta1ns many s1gnff1cant1y deficient and troublesome provfs1ons. While the NUHARC guidelines and the rule share many comnon elements, we believe the gu1de1ines fulfill . the perfonnance of those elements 1n a more flexible, less prescriptive, and more cost effective manner without sacr1f1c1ng the qua11ty that 1s contained 1n the sp1r1t and intent of the access authorization program.

As a1ready stated, there is overwhelming support for the NUMARC guidelines. The staff has acknowledged the acceptab11fty of the gu1de11nes even th~ugh it continues to prefer the rule for reasons* we be1ieve are not particu1ar1y compelling. In our opinion. a1 1 substantive issues have been acceptably d1spos1t1oned. Consequently, we do not foresee a basis for *the C0111111ssion to reject the NUMARC gu1de11nes. It is emphasized that NUMARC's guidelines are not 1n opposition to the NRC's regulatory respons1bi11t1es, but rather they are a proposal to achieve a better program.

l would be pleased to meet 1nd1v1dually with any of the Comnissfoners who desire clarification or amplification of NUMARC's position on access authorization, or NUMARC would be p1eased to address the Comnfss1on.

Your careful consideration of this matter 1s appreciated.

~o/*

~~

Chai rman, NUMARC Working Group on Security BDK:sgf Attachment

[bdk/dr7J cc: Mr. James. K. Asselst1ne. NRC Mr. Frederick M. Berntha1, NRC

~r. Thomas M. Roberts, NRC Mr. Lando W. Zech, Jr., NRC Mr. Samue1 J. Chilk, NRC Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., NRC

MAR 27 '86 17:06 PPL TOWER 16 P04 Attachment to letter dated March 27, 1986 Page 1 of 5 NUMARC GUIDELINES VERSUS INSIDER RULE There are many important differences between the NUMARC proposed guidelines on access author1zat1on and the staff's proposed 1ns1der rule. Our connents are grouped under the fo1lowfng headings: (1) Concern for Ind1v1dua1s, (2) Correction of S1gn1f1cant Def1c1enc1es. (3) Guideline Requirements Whfch Exceed the Requirements of the Rule, (4) Cost/Benefit Considerations, and (5) Additiona1 Provfs1ons. These comparisons are based on the ru1e as pub1ished for c011111ent in August of 1984 and the ~RC staff presentation to the ACRS on February 14, 1986. We have not been pennitted to review the ru1e package as current1y proposed to the Coffll'lissfoners; however.

based on the staff's presentation to the ACRS, we do not believe NUMARC's concerns with the ru1e package have been s1gn1ficant1y mitigated.

- 1. Concern for Indfv1dua1s The gufde11nes provide important considerations for 1nd1viduals as fo11ows:

(a) The gu1de1ines are a consent based program. The pennission of the ind1v1dua1 seeking unescorted access 1s required prior to conducting A background invest1gat1on or psychological evaluation whereas the proposed rule does not require the 1ndfv1dua1's consent.

(b) The guidelines provide greater cons1deratfon for transient workers.

The ru1e .requ1res ver1fy1ng a11 employment for the previous f1ve years. Because many transfent workers are unable to reca11 all employment over a five-year period, the guidelines require

,MAR 27 '86 17:07 PP L TOWER 16 P05 March 27. 1986 Page 2 of 5 endeavor1ng to verify employment over the previous five years but accepting a ver1f1cat1on of not 1ess than three years, (c} The gu1de11nes m1n1mize the potentia1 undenn1n1ng of emp1oyee assistance programs. The rule requires employees to report occurrences which may have a bear1ng on the 1nd1v1dual's access authorization. In contrast, many utilities have emp1oyee assistance programs which 1nc1ude a requirement that if an employee seeks help through the program, the program admfn1strators are prohibited from reporting the employee's problems to company management. We are very concerned that the *self incr1m1nat10n° requirement of the rule will cause many employees not to seek help rather than report their problems to management. Accordingly, the guidelines 11m1t self reporting to any arrests which may 1mpact on trustworthiness. Other matters whfch may affect behavior or judgement fn the work environment are subject to reporting by supervisors under other provisions of the Continua1 Behav1ar Observation Program.

2, Correction of S1gn1f1cant Defic1enc1es e In our opfn1on. the proposed rule package contains or fails to address certain prov1s1ons wh1ch are serious def1c1enc1es. The guidelines correct these def1e1ene1es 1n a manner which 1s acceptable to the NRC D1v1sion of Safeguards as fo11ows:

(a) It 1s essential that licensees have a reasonable capab111ty to grant temporary clearances to craft or vendor technical personnel on re1at1vely short not1ce 1n order to support plant outages and equipment repairs. The gu1de1ines provide a viable temporary clearance process whereas the ru1e allows a interim clearance which 1s virtually useless as a means to grant workers unescorted access on short not1ce.

MA~ 27 ~as 17:08 PPL TOWER 16 POS March 27, 1986 Page 3 cf 5 (b) The guidelines provide latitude for transient workers as described in i(b) whereas the ru1e does not.

(c) By limiting the se1f reporting provision as discussed in 1(c). the gu1de11nes m1n1m1ze the potential undermining of employee assistance programs.

(d) The guidelines pennit grandfathering all individuals who have a valid access authorization at the time the gufde11nes are effective whereas the rul e 11m1ts grandfathering to personne1 previously cleared under an industry standard program. presumably ANSI 18.17 or ANS 3.3.

Consequently, the ru1e would require the rescreening of many fnd1vidua1s who have had access authorization without any problems end which may have been previously approved by the NRC staff 1n the licensee's security plan.

• 3. Guideline Regufrements Which Exceed the Requirements of the Rule In developing the guidelines, we belfeve 1t was appropriate to exceed the rule requirements fn certafn areas. These are as follows:

(a) The rule requires verifying a11 education w1th1n a five-year retrospective period whereas the gufdal1nes add1t1ona11y require verifying the highest 1eve1 of post high school education obtained, regard1ess of how long ego.

(b) The gu1delfnes require .two 11sted references as well as the two developed references required by the rule.

(c) Both the rule and the gu1de1fnes require en annua1 eva1uat1on of contractor programs fn support af access authortzat1on and, 1n addition, the gu1de11nes require an independent evaluation of the uti11ty program every two years.

MAR 27 '86 17:08 PPL TOWER 16 P07 March 27, 1986 Page 4 of S

4. Cost/Benefit Cons1darat1ons In our op1-n1-0n, certain proposed requirements or their specifi ed 1mp1ementat1on are particularly difficult to achieve and are of marginal security value which does not justify the associated cost, Aeeord1ng1y, the gu1de11nes contain the following mod1 f1tat1ons to rule requirements which, for purposes of the gu1de1ines, have been accepted by the NRC D1v1sion of Safeguards:

(a) It 1s not necessary to verify c1ai med emp1oyment of less than 30 days or o1der than 5 years.

(b) A time consuming military records check 1s not required 1f (1} no m11itary service 1s claimed or (2) 1f the m111tary service was longer than 5 years ago.

(c) On1y one psychological test backed up by a clinical evaluation. 1f necessary, is required.

s. Add1t1ona1 Provisions The gu1de11nes contain additional provisions which are not addressed in the proposed ru1e package and which are necessary to facf11tate the fmp1ementation of access authorization requirements as fo11ows:

(a) The guidelines pennft a utf11ty to reinstate unescorted access authorization if ft was previously terminated urider favorab1e circumstances w1th1n the previous 365 days.

(b) The gufdel1nes provide common criteria for the auditing of contractors ut11ized in support of the access authorization program.

This provides for and promotes the sharing of audit resu1ts so as to

• greatly reduce or el1mfnate dup11catfve audits.

.M A R 2 7 ' 86 17 : 10 PPL T O WE R 1 6 P08 March 27, 1986 Page 5 of 6 (e) The gu1de11nes pennit the transferring of a11 va11d clearances I

' I, (excluding temporary) by severa1 means 1nc1ud1ng electronic whereas the rule 11m1ts the transferring of clearances for non-11censee employees and only by means of document transfer. Consequently. the guidelines are supportive of and fac111tate the Nuc1ear Employee Data System (NEDS).

3/27/B6 (bdk/drS]

00(.;KETEO USNP C

'86 HAR 31 Pi :31 KMC, Inc.

801 18TH STREET, N W Off lC t 0;: , . .

SUITE 300 OOCK£rn1u ~ .:i[ r- 'I 1 BRANCH WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-4200 March 31, 1986 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Additional Comments to Commissioners on Proposed Access Authorization Program

Dear Sir:

The Commissioners currently have under consideration for possible vote a proposed Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants. The Physical Security Coordinating Group, con-sisting of 26 utilities, urges Commission consideration of these additional comments. The Group previously provided comments on the proposed rule in March of 1985.

Two possible options for this program are apparently de-scribed in SECY 85-381, the NRC staf f paper currently before the Commission; one would be an NRC rule, the other would be a decision that all utilities should incorporate the NUMARC guidelines in their security plans. Although SECY 85-381 has not been publicly released, NRC staff testimony before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards identified the options and indicated that they are very similar with one important exception

- the need f or an NRC mandated and approved employee appeals process.

The purpose of this letter is to clarify for the Commission the Physical Security Coordinating Group's position on whether or not t he proposed rule should be issued. We understand that SECY 85-381 indicates that the group favors issuance of the proposed rule. That conclusion was based upon our March 7, 1985 comments.

It does not, however, reflect our current position. Developments which have occurred since our comments were filed lead us to conclude that the proposed rule should not be issued.

Since March, 1985, NUMARC has completed the f ormulation of its guidelines and has obtained the commitment of all nuclear utilities to incorporate in their security plans access authori-zation programs which meet the NUMARC guidelines. Such incorpor-ation would give the NRC enforcement authority over the access authorization program and would assure that changes in the pro-c r* AP. R.3. *** t~et ft

.* ~SION Po~ ,

C.

grams which might significantly reduce their effectiveness receive prior NRG approval (see 10 C.F . R. §50 . 54{p)) . This commitment by all nuclear utilities is, we understand, conditioned on acceptance by the Commission of the NUMARC initiative, i . e., a determination by the Commission not to issue a final access authorization rule.

With the NUMARC initiative, no NRC rule is needed. Nor is it necessary that the Commission issue a policy statement. NUMARC's role will assure that all nuclear utilities adopt the guidelines.

With this background, we believe that the Commission will understand why the Physical Security Coordinating Group no longer supports the issuance of an access authorization rule. Without the promulgation of a rule, the Commission would not be required to deal with the legal issue of whether or not such action man-dates the imposition of a Commission-required appeals process.

While it is the position of the Group that no such legal require-ment exists - based upon such recent Supreme Court decisions as Blum v . Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) - the NUMARC initiative aIIows the appeals issue to be resolved in accordance with the existing legal doctrines governing employee relations. The NRC should simply not become involved in these issues. The NUMARC initiative gives the Commission the opportunity to avoid this unnecessary entanglement.

We urge the Commission to accept the NUMARC approach on this issue which we believe all nuclear utilities and industry groups fully endorse .

Sincerely, Donald F. Knuth President

.... EX ECUTIVE OFFICE . OF THE PRESIDENT OFFlCE OF MANAGEMENT AN O BUDGET

• _: WASHINGTON, o.c.* 2050)

SEP 2 7 1984_

Ms. Patricia G. Norry Director, Office of Adm1nistrati6n ll(;KETEe USNRC U -~. N.ucleai *Regulatory Commission Washington,_ .D.C *. __ 20555

• as JUL -5 All :14

Dear Ms. Norry:

• CFF ICE 0°F SECR CTAi We have completed our review of your request for app

• ow~ ~~~ sthee f:

many reporting and recordkeeping requi rements needed to i=ntpl~~ent t:he Nuclear Regulatory Commission's "I nsi"der Safeguards Rules" (amen~uents to 10 CFR Parts 50 -and 73, proposed August 1, 1984,

~ FR 30726-30739). The following are our public comments 9lbmitted to you in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.13(c).

While 0MB supports the implementation of NRC' *s efforts to ensure the trustworthiness and suitability of persons granted unescorted access to protec_ted areas and vital islan:ds at nuclear power plants; we find that the psychological assessment and behavioral observation aspects of t!lis proposed system do not ~eet criteria for approval. under the Pap*erwork Reduc:tion Act.

In* the enclosed October 30, 1981 letter to Chairman Palladino, approving the recordkeeping and reporting requirements in .

10 CFR 50, we outlined the Paperwo~k Reduction Act criteria of practical util.ity and burderr- reduction. We stated that NRC snould be collecting, or requiring licensees to retain, . only that

..J..eveJ*. -2£ detail. of information -needed; and NRC should be

. eci~ely defining information collections and recordkeeping reauirements,

• 1

• based on likely.periods .

of actual use and inspection.

• Our first problem relates to the E.,tactical utilitv of the proposed psychological assessment.* It is to Se usee to ~redict whether the licensee's employees or contractor personnel have fta potential for committing acts that are inimical to *the public health and safety ' or present a danger to life or property* (49 FR 30733). To be useful, the psychologicai assessment bas to have a valiC: ;J ted h1storv of sn,.. 1ess at predicting the chai:acteristics

~~ugn~ ~o oe identified.

l.rhe proposed ru l e neither specifies the psychological asseasment tests to be~~sed, nor defines the psychological characteristics to be identified, nor explains how any identified characteristics are to be weighed in determining empl oyee trustworthiness.

~_,.,twdfld by llflf . ....JUL,., ...- p, ...*1985 ~

r:*

~l~

Db~k , EAi\... r,rr.1_ ,, ' T("'Y r MMISSION 0~

• KET rt- r; ' * , ,... c-ECTION 0 OFFI o r ~

- .Y

2

. r * '**,

As Chalrman Palladino asked, when the Commission was discussing the proposed r~le on October 4, 1983:

"But has psychological testing been used for the purposes that we are trying to use it right now, and does it have any history of success?" (Transcript,

p. 55) .

NRC staff responded, *"We were unable t6 validate any data base*

• . that this tes~ was used for the purpose that we would try to *.

adapt it to.* An expert at the National Institute of Mental Health wroce us *recently tnat, "It must be recognized that.the-M.~I (the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), or any other persona1ity measure that might be used, has questionable predictive va1ue for behavior of concern to the NRC.a (Enclosed*

September 7, 1984 NIMH memorandum by Lyle Bivens, p. 1.) The collection and ret ntion of unvalidated data appears to lack practical utility. 3 * ~

ur second problem relates to the bdrdens that would be imposed y u g ropose psyc o ogica assessment forte poses

-statea in the proposed rule. ro the extent the data collections and recordkeeping requirements_ are unvalidated, the regulation would impose an undue burden. In a~61tiom the NRC analysis appears to understate the. burdens to be imposed. The Value/Impact Statement prepared for the rule (SECY-83-311A, September 15, 1983, Atta~hment 3) suggests the psychological 2ouote. at_page 55. As Chairman Palladino stated ~ater in the

.ommission meeting: ,

"I just am quite significantly concerned about the psychological testing in that I am not confident what it can do and what it can't do.a (Transcript, p. 81) 3The NRC ~ackground Information on this proposed rule _

(SECY-~4-72, February 9, 1984, Enclosure B, p. 2) repeated this concern, "potential inconsistencies in test interpretation, and inability to always predict future behavior from the test results." We understand, moreover, that the American Psychological Association requires through its Ethical Principles of Psychologists (America~ Psychologist, June ~981, pp. 633-638) that member psychologists exercise caution in using personality assessment devices beyond their designated purposes (clinical/diagnostic applications). Although the Association does not sp~~ifically ban the pse of the ~evices for screening purposes, it does emphasize that the results of personality measurement tests may be deficient in both validity and reliability when the tests are applied in this manner.

... 3 0

assessments would ~osf for each license~ only $26,000 to'ias:ooo in the first year. Yet we understand it is industry practice to hire employees, and then conduct any background and psycnological checks; however, during this time employees would not have unescorted access to the restricted areas. To the extent this is so, the costfestimates fail°Co include the cost of idle .

employees, awaiting access.'to the work site,' and the cost of .... ***

~scorts wh~ .wou1d:_ have *to be* constantly with"* the *uncleared *

• personnel. .

Our third problem relates* to the nature of the-continual behavioral observation program. As Chairman Palladino stated:

"I am very concerned *about the behavioral observation. I just do not feel comfortable working in an organization where it is mandated that people look at me daily to see if my behavior bas so changed- that I worry aboqt whether I am doing

- the job right.* {Transcript,* p. 81)

It certainly m!kes sense for industry management to oversee its employees. ANS! S,:.andard 3.3, the industry**s voluntary guideline, suggests the need for continued observ~tion of employees by supervisory personnel. Th~ September 1983 draft regulatory guide for this proposed rule*repeats this by suggesting that neach licensee_should develo~ a behavior.

observation training program for supervisorsn (SECY-83-311A,.

September

. 15, 1983, Attachment

. 2 to Enclosure A, p. 25). .

l To use federal regulation to prescribe in ~engthi detail how industry should conduct this management ove~sight, however, may not be administratively practical or efficient. For examp~e, to have supervisors, p~esumably not t ~ h o l o g i s t s , evaluate whether an employee is *preoccupied with death or* suddenly ereligious" or "acts naive or innocent* {49 FR 30730) may be i~posing an unworkable data collection fnd record retention likely to lead to inconsistent results. As the NIMEI expert put it, nI do not believe that the extensive guidelines fo~ shift supervisors can be fairly and adequately applied.n (Biv~ns, p. 1) we realize there is a need to balance carefully-the potential Q...

ij problems with security as.sessment procedures against the serious nature of the diners these one eeking to *avert.

ess, we suggest the NRC reconsider both the scope and detail proposed by the nxµsider Safeguards Rules." We have no 4

As stated. in the Ethical Principles of Psychologists, wpsychologi~ts do not encourage or promote the use of psychological assessment techniques by inappropriately trained or.

otherwise unqualified persons through teaching, sponsorship, or supervision." (p. 637)

... 4

~ t objection to nuclear licensees*coliecting and.evaluating **

objective facts and past history to determine .the trustworthiness of employees and contractor personnel. The collection and retention of highly subjective, unvalidated psychological evaluations, however, in part by untrained personnel, may only lead to inconsistencies in employee relations, an unfair violation of privacy, and unjustified admini-strative burden. ** *-*

• • Before we could approve the information ~ollections and .

recordkeeping requ~rements needed to implement 1;.hese aspects of the "Insider Safeguards Rules,* we need to receive far more detailed justification, both in terms of practical utility and burden reduction. If you have any questions, ple~se contact me or the NRC Desk Officer, Jefferson Bill (395-7340}.

oali ,~~

ory Policy-Branch Enclosures

\

• EXEC_tJTIVE OFFICE. OF T!-iE PRESIDENT OFFJC£ OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET

/ WASHINGTON, D.C.. 20S03 ..

• October 30, 1981

_;;"l .....

B6norab1e:Nunzio J *. Palladino Chairman . _ _. ._

Nuc1ear Regu1atory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Pa1ladino:

On.August 5, the Nuclear Regu1atocy Commission (NRC) submitted 10 CFR Part SO, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Failities, £or our review under the Paperwork Reduction Act.

Sllrrtly thereafter, Vice President Bush identified nuclear licensing as one specific a.rea in which reporting and paperwork

• burdens placed on the public could be reduced*. Just recently, President Reagan~si:.:!:essed the need to improve the nuclear

_regulatory and 1icensing process. ~

' \

In seeking 0MB approval o;*the recordkeepirig and reporting requirements authorized by*Part 50, RRC has made a significant effort to avoid duplication and reduce burden on respondents *

• NRC has pub1ished a comprehensive -:revision to Regulatory Guide 10~1,. "Compi1ation of Reporting ReQ_uirements, n that will reduce the required number of copies for most reports.to three or fewer, and a Standard Review Plan, simplifying and conso1idating the criteria NRC staff wi11 use in reviewing applicaticns to c:4tstruct or operate nuc1ear power 'plants.

NRC has just created the Generic Requirements Review Commi~tee to integrate and control the issuance of new (as well as back-fitting) regulatory requirements, and requests for information from licensees. I. understand NRC bas efforts olanned to .*reduce the number of amendments required for changes to technical.

specif~cations, to limit certain kinds of reporting to important safety items, and to permit facilities to submit information in a master microform, instead of multiple hard copies.

Because we believe NRC has been taking significant steps to resolve information collection problems, we are approving the NRC request to continue to use the information collections authorized by Part 50. This approval expires April 30, 1982, and should be identified~ use of 0MB No. 3150-0011. However, this approval is conditional on certain efforts to reduce these burdens.

For 0!1.B to grant further approval of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements authorized by Part 50, NRC's needs and the practical utility of the data must be balanced more effectively.

against the burdens .and costs involved. We *fully appreciate that

2 f * *

• J:!RC reso-l:1tion o*f the nu1!1erous' safe\y and other regulatory issues involved in Part 50 requires access to considerable amounts of information from licensees, contractors, operators, and others who would be engaged in nuclear activities. At the same time,* ..

NRC needs to improve its information collection activities to.

meet these needs. . .

Assuring the. practical 1:itflfty of* th~. !n.forma:t"ion* for NRC. will .. ; . . .

help. minimize burden on licensees and applicants. This means NRC .. ***

_should. be collecting* only such data as it can use: seeking* only.

that level of detail needed: having it submitted no sooner* th.an the likely time of actual use~ and precisely.defining record~

keeping requirements and retention periods, based- on likely . _

periods of actual inspection and use. Once the data is obtained, NRC should be actua~ly using it, following up promptly and ..

• conclusively with the respondent, as necessary. . . .

I r!~ Co:rn:mission recently pointed out to NRC staff,.bowever~

NRC staff coIOlDunications with *1icensees (bulletins, generic letters,, circulars, notices, rule changes, NUREGs, and*.

Regulatory Guidej)...Q_ave not be~n subject to central NRC revie~ _

an9 coordination. Licensees and representatives of industry have complained that this lack of central coordination and centre+ bas resulted in duplicative and burdensome recordkeeping and reporting requirements--the submission of the same data both monthly and annually, the submission of aggregate data and the

• raw data itself, the submission of highly detailed data that is never reviewed. Most of this is subject to 0MB review authority and approval under the Paperwork ~duction_ Act..

• To work with you further in this effort to control paperwork,* we llquest submission to us, by January 15, 1982, of*a detailed work

~ to implement needed improvements. T'ne work plan should include projects, staff, organization, planned target dates, and a schedule for reporting progress and accomplishments to us.

As a matter of 0!1.B reports clearance, NRC should assure that notices, bulletins, and.other documents c~lling for recordkeeping ana reporting be made avai1ab1e and submitted for 0MB review.

0MB apDroval of the use of the information collections set forth

• .in 10 CTR Part 50 does not include approval of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements called for by any other NRC communications implementing Part 50 unless 0MB has so agreed.

To permit the public ~nd 0MB to review the total impact involved in related information collections, NRC should attempt to review such collections simultaneously rather than one after anot~er.

To try to solve specific public complaint~ concerning information collection, NRC staff should be encouraged to continue to work with the Nuclear Record Management Association, and equivalent groups, to the extent they can be of assista~ce.

As a matter of NRC central control~ we urge you to have the Generic Requirements Review Committee (GRRC) assure that any

- * *- llllll 111!!' _ _ ,_ __ ----*"'l-..L.--* _A,,,..,,:,._iflttr. __ ~~f!!4

. have practical* utility for -the NRC, *and do*no_t duplicate othe*rs in place. To help do this, it appears that NRC also needs to adopt a more systematic methodology for evaluating the burden, timing and methods of implementation of an information collection--including a review of whether recordkeeping or reporting is the best means of implementation--and the -

\

• I . ** * * **

appropriate _degree* of foI:1Dal~ty and*detail

. to.be

. imposed.

.. We look* forward to **continuing to work with yo_u and your staff on .

this** importa,nt. eft'pJ;t. _. * -.

Sincerely,

~-1/~-

Christopher DeMutb Administrator for Inf9rmation and Regulatory Affairs

~~-- ur:.1.'I\K.l ITT.C.l'i .l ur n.c.~i...a O o,;. nv1un1 .. *"'-"" *'-..... I ........... ,,vw,u, _w, .. ,_

'...:_Jfj. ~-~-----------

-~

• Alcohol. Drug Abuse, end

~ r * ~entat Heenh Admini5tration National Institute of Mental Haalth Rockville MD 20857 Septec.ber 12, 1984

... NO'IE TO JEFF JllLL:

Lan:y Silver, M.D., Acting Director of the Nat.ional Institute of Mental

• Health, asked that my Office coordinate the response of yoUT.note to him of September 5 about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed rulemaki.ng on access nuthoriutiou programs.

~e have shared your note and proposed rulema.k.ing with the experts in the

. National Institute of Mental Health. ! Their observatious have been reviewed by myself and Dr. Silver and are attached for your information and cous ideration.

As to your question of whether.the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission consulted ritb the National Insti~ute of Mental Health.prior to the development of your proposed rul~, to the best of*our knowledge no such conta~t was established.

Should you vi.sh further information, please do not hesitate to give ma a call at 443-3175.

f.:.J~* Cin/J,. *-

Lindsley lilillia:ms Director

-Office of Policy Development,

• Planning, and Evaluation Attachments

~ - .- DEPARTMENT. OF H1:Af-'. &. HuMAN.sL'lYJ':5 Public Health Service

~ . . ., * *

• Memorandum Date

• September 12. l98t From Deputy Chief 8,V-G-, 7Z.

Center for Studies of Antisocial and Vjolent Behavior

~*Subject OMS R~uest*for ..Review.~f NRC

, .. Prop~~ed*Rule

. of l~cess.Author1z~tion I

• To Director, OPDPE Here are the quick corrrnents that you requested. They.were developed main1y by rqy colleague, pr. James Breiling. whose training is in psychology.

Dr. Bivens has already prepared a response.to the 0MB request that addresses the scientific concerns quite nicely. As he states. the MMPI and the other.

proposed assessment measures.have limited predictive value. As he points out, there are serious and quite possibly unresolvable problems involved in trying to estimate the probabilities of Type land Type 11 errors.

It needs also to be borne in mind that the NRC's concerns with respect to establishing ad'equate coptrols for. unescort~d access to nuclear facilities are analogous to security concerns of the nation's military and intelligence agencies which also hav~-responsibi1ities in the nuclear area: .

Consequently; if it has not done so already. 0MB should seek additiohal comments on the NRC proposed rule from security offices and personnel psychologists in selected other government agencies and components thereof (e.g., Strategic Air Command,. Navy.nuclear submarine corrmand, Army missile*

commands).

Consultation with military ang int~lligence agencies seems particularly important in view of the fact that the value of background checks declines with the age of the checks in question. =rhus, ,while we would agree with Dr.

Bivens tha~ good background check procedures can be initia11y superior to psycho1ogica1 assessment. ~here may well be need for some other procedure for monitoring employee reliability on an ongoing basis. It may be

• questioned whether mere on-the-job observation is likely to be sufficient for-this purpose. *-

The consultation with other agencies should also include examination of how these agencies have balanced the problems with assessment procedures (e.g **

intrusiveness, erroneous assessments) against the seriousness of the dangers these measures seek to avert.

~~* .-------------------------------

• ~ . *

• Memorandum Date

• Septe:mber 7, 19.84 t.

From Deputy Director, DERP Subject CMB Request for Review of NRC Propos~ Rule on Access Authorization*

-. . ~

To Acting Director, NIMH rm::u: Director,. .OEDPE _ . .

To my knowl.edge, the NRC did not consult with NOO in developing the proposed psychological assessment and behavioral observation sections of the proposed rule. The psychological assessment procedures, consisting of a written 11 personality' test and a cHni cal int.ervit:W for persons ~howing "inconclusive"

• or ."abnormal" test results, could provide sane useful information about the emotional stability of persons given access to a nuclear power. plant operating enviornment. However, the proposed proc:.edures do not specify which w.ritten tests will be used. The most useful one would probably_ be the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (l.MPI), which provides a series of scales rating a variety of personality characteristics and which has a capability *to detect deliberate "fald.ng" or distortion by the test-taker. Norms have been established for this test, *and it would be fe~ible to interview persons who score outside of these nonns on selected scales. If the proposed rule is adopted, the written portion of the psychological assessment should be

• standardized so that all sc:reeners use the same test.

It must be recognized that the J.MPI, or a::r:ry other personality measure that might be used, has questionable predictive value for behaviors of concern to NRC. In fact, peI:Scnality testing would be milikely to add significantly to information obtained in a thorough background check. In view of the violation of privacy issues raised by mandatory p~sonali ty testing, the NRC may want to reconsider this proposal. . \

With regard to the continued. behavioral observation program, I do not belie-1e that the extensive guidelines for shift supervisors can be fairly and .

adequately applied. Nor do these guidelines contribute anything. beyond wt a.*

ccmpeten.t supervisor* would observe in bis or her daily contact with Employees. I would much prefer to see a-program -whereby supervisors are given periodic trainjng in identifying ~loyee health and mental health problems, incluUng drug and alcohol abuse. The aura created by a "continuous behavioral observation" program can only be detrimental to staff morale, and such a program is no more likely to identify behaviors detri:mental to plant or public safety than. an active plant safety program. coupled with informed and

• ccmpetent supervision.

• In the proposed rule, the Carmission identifies 11 specific questions for public re~ponse. All of them relate to the psychological assessment or behavioral ...observation procedures proposed. Data to respond to many of them can only* cane frcm the nuclear power industry itself (e.g., to what extent are the proposed procedures already being used?). Many of the questions address issues for which there is inadequate data to provide an objective answer. For example, question 5 asks:

• "What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to redud ng the risk of radiologi~ sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and *

. ~ II errors) can be expected £ran* using the NRC proposeo

, psycliologiQ.l .assessment pr:ocedure?

• ke*more~ective pro-*

1 ....

"""' . cedures

.

• available ~ practlcal ?". * * * ** . .. *

• Although a clinical psychological assessment mighJridentify hostile* attitudes_*. .

or an active psychosis that would pose a safety eat, it is also likely not * .

to. There is no data on. which to base a statement regarding the probability of Type I or 'type II errors. _ *

• Question 6 asks:

"Can the use of psychological assessment in the camnerid.al nuclear jndustry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any,* of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliilbility_ prograil'!S?1 1

• \ * . I

\ *

• a To my knowledge, there is I)0 way to objectively answer this question. The relative risk reduction produced. by psychological screening. backgrotmd.

information checks, or behavioral observation is .i:mpo.ssible to assess, given the current state of lmowledge in the psychological and behavioral assessment field. My own opinion is that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, so I would suggest that bacXground check procedures would be superior to the psychological assessment or behavioral observation procedures proposed.

In sumiary, I do not believe that the proposed procedures will add anything in the way of ~edicting behaviors that pose a public safety ha%ard. 'lbe ethical and morale issues :raised by implementing the programs far outweigh their potential usefulness. -Finally, many of the specific questions posed by the Ccmnission are simply unanswerable, ar;d implementation- of this c;mple.x and burdensane program. could be justifi-ed only on the basis of. opinion, not objective fact.

• Bivens, Ph.D.

t I

HtKETED USN~C ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 1i HAR 18 A10 :58 POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000 March 12, 1985 F =-1cc c:; S[ ':Rf p (HI .I(~ IN:i & SE: C:

0CAN038506

~'W::PR-~~

4q FR .Eon,;~

--=;~-73'J0

-r;rF7i"3tJ7~s'f<:5V Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

• ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Comments on Proposed Access Authorization Rule and 10CFR73 AP&L supports the Commission 1 s proposed Access Authorizati on Rule and the associated miscellaneous amendments to 10CFR73 with certain exceptions and comments which are attached. We believe the proposed changes in general will contribute to the overall safe operation of the facilities. We concur with the Commission that background investigations, psychological assessments, and continued behavioral observation are viable means of reasonably assuring employee reliability and trustworthiness . In fact, AP&L has already implemented these techniques at Arkansas Nuclear One. AP&L also supports the vital island concept. We see no benefit in compartmentalizing vital equipment and, as the Commission has noted, there is a potential for adversely affect the safe operation of the facility by impeding operations personnel when time may be critical to preserve the public health and safety.

AP&L also supports in general, the Commi ssion's proposed changes pertaining to search requirements . Advancements in electronic search equipment precludes the need for hands-on-searches.

MEMBER MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM

U.S. NJQ!A~ lEGUl.ATORY COMMISSIOli D0CKtflNG & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE Of THE SECRET ARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics

March 12, 1985 While AP&L supports the proposed Access Authorization rule we do not believe background i nvestigations can successfully be carried out without the access to complete and accurate criminal records. In our opinion there is on ly one source of such information and that is the Federal Government. We therefore solicit the NRC 1 s help in obtaining this information, for without it, that portion of the Access Authorization rule will be impossible to comply with.

Very truly yours, A~~

[A;_Ted Enos Manager Licensing JTE:DEJ Attachment

Attac hment Searches of Individuals 10 CFR Part 73.55(d)(l) page 30739 When firearm and/or explosive detection equipment at a portal are out of service or not operating satisfact orily, the licensee may exempt persons granted unescorted access from pat-down search for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If either firearm or explosive detection equipment is not operational after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> a random 10% pat-down search of persons granted unescorted access shall be instituted until such time as the either firearms or explosive detection equipment is operational. Personal not screened for unescorted access would be subject to a pat-down search when ever the search equipment is not functioning properly. The 100% search requirement in the event of equipment failure would result in unnecessary long delays and associated problems. The proposed screening requirement for unescorted access should establish a high degree of reliability in those employees granted unescorted access and therefore a 100% search of these personal is unnecessary.

Background Investigation 73.56(c) page 30733 It is impossible for a licensee to "verify an individual's true identity" as is proposed by 10CFR73.56(c). AP&L is particularly concerned that a rigid interpretation like that found in the associated Reg Guide, on page 5, may be applied. The Reg Guide states that the licensee must 11 ensure 11 (guarantee) "that the applicant is who he or she purports to be 11 through a fingerprint check with law enforcement or a photograph to be positively identified by at least two individuals. To 11 guarantee 11 true identity through the use of a fingerprint check or photo is impossible. Civilian fingerprint cards do not normally exist unless the individual has a police record. Thus, it will be impossible to check a large portion of the population using this method. The matching of an applicant's prints with those of a criminal may also not 11 guarantee 11 "true identity" as the name on the criminal card may be incorrect or false. The same logic may be applied to the use of photographs. Witho~t first knowing the true identity of the individual, one can only verify that the individual is who he claimed to be when the picture was taken.

It is suggested, therefore, that the wo rd 11 verify 11 in the rule and the word 11 ensure 11 in the Reg Guide text be replaced with 11 document 11 and "take reasonable steps. 11 This will ensure that reasonable steps will be taken to verify name, aliases, Social Security number, etc. through the evaluation of documents, (to include photographs ) and the cumulative results of the background investigation. The limitation of verification to fingerprints and photographs should be eliminated.

The proposed regulation requires a 5 year background investigation. It is AP&L's opinion that a 3 year background investigation, in accordance with ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982, is adequate.

Credit checks, while frequently a source of substantial information, should be eliminated from the minimum standard as poor credit history is not mentioned in the rule's consideration for denial of access.

It is proposed that the essential elements of the background investigation be as follows:

Take reasonable steps to verify true identity Account for time and establish a past history of trustworthiness and reliability by verifying the following for a retrospective time period of 3 years :

Employment History Education Criminal History Military History (To be considered when listed or when surfaced by other investigative steps as an employment regulation inferred that military records will have to be checked whether listed or not)

Character and Reputation - to include two references not supplied by applicant As was previously pointed out, background investigations can be far more thorough if access to Federal Government records are available, particularly full criminal records, not just convictions .

It is recommended that provision be included in the regulation to permit Interim Unescorted Access for the Protected Area only for a period of 90 days upon completion of psychological assessment pending completion of a full background investigation (A similar philosophy is used by the NRC with its own employees).

The Commission should also note that in many cases it may be virtually impossible to obtain the detailed information which is the "primary intent" of the employment and educational checks, such as disciplinary actions, safety/ accident records, medical/psychological records, etc . due to liability concerns and restrictive disclosure postures of most educational institutions and employers.

Background Investigation Evaluation Criteria, 73 . 56(b)(3)

As some state laws, specifically Wisconsin Section III,335(c), Wis. Stats.,

may be in conflict with the regulation; i.e., it is an act of employment discrimination to refuse to employ, to bar or terminate from employment any individual because of his/her conviction record unless the offense substantially relates to the circumstances of the particular job, the NRC should clarify the legal authority of its regulations as they may relate to state statutes.

Psychological Accessment 73. 56(d)

AP&L supports the use of a psychological assessment as part of the Access Authorization program. In fact, AP&L currently uses psychological assessment

as part of our Access Authorization program at Arkansas Nuclear One. The Commission noted in the proposed access authorization rule a particular interest in receiving public response to eleven questions. AP&L has reviewed the response prepared by the Edi son Electrical Institute to these questions and concur with their responses.

Continual Behavioral Observation 73.56(e ) page 30734 The section on continual behavioral observation program in the proposed access authorization rule is adequately written, however, some comments are made below. The Supervisor's inclusion of Appendix C in the proposed rule gives a misleading impression as to the nature of a behavioral reliability program; it implies or suggests that supervisors are to evaluate unsignificant and incidental behaviors to pass judgement on one's behavioral reliability. This is not the case. In fact, the training program outlined in NUREG/CR-2076 instructs supervisors to avoid falling into the role of an amateur psychologist. They are taught to observe behavior and to pass on important information to qualified professionals.

Section (1) states that supervisors detecting a pattern of abnormal behavior shall refer the matter to 11 senior 11 licensee management. We recommend that 11 senior 11 be deleted and that licensees be permitted to develop their own internal procedures for reporting.

Section F(l) Non-Licensee Employees. Said employees with an absence of more than 365 days from employment in a licensed nuclear power reactor must be investigated. We interpret this to mean an investigation update.

While we concur with the requirement for a continual behavioral observation program, we caution against being unduly prescriptive.

Appeals Process/Review Procedure 73.56( g) page 30734 We recommend that this section be deleted in its entirety for the following reasons:

Ample recourse for the redress of grievances already exists in civil law.

The NRC is attempting to create new law through its imposition of 11 due process 11

• This is unnecessary and beyond the scope of NRC regulatory authority.

Protection of Information (h) Protectio n of Information page 30734 Revisions are recommended as follows:

Revise 73.45(h)(2) as follows: 11 The licensee . . . shall not disclose the personal information collected . . . to persons other than the subject individual, or his representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process of granting or denying access to protected areas and vital islands or any legal actions stemming therefrom. 11 Legal actions stemming from future security clearance denials are a certainty. The proposed revision

recognizes that licensee legal staff may require access to screening records in order to represent the licensee in such cases.

Permit the exchange of information from one licensee to another to reduce, somewhat, the potential for liability exposure.

Access Record Log 73.55(d)(7)(A), page 30737 The proposed rule requires the establishment of "access lists" for each vital island. The term "list" may imply that a written log for each vital island is required.

At present, the names of the personnel who are authorized access to a vital area are entered into the access control system computer and physical controls to the vital areas are maintained via the ID/card reader issued to each authorized person.

We recommend change wording to ref lect that either a procedure (i.e. sign-in log) or computer controlled system are required to meet the intent of the rule:

11 (A) Establish current authorization procedures or systems for each vital island. The procedures or systems must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least every 31 days.

The licensee shall include in the procedure or system only . . . "

11 (B) Positively control, in accordance with the procedure or system establish. . . 11 The Reg Guide that goes with this portion of the rule recommends that licensees keep a log that indicates, among other things, the reason for entry into the vital island. Recording the reason for entering the vital island each time is unnecessary and would be an impossible task even considering the use of computers. The remaining information recommended by the Reg Guide; name, badge number, time of entry and exit is all the information necessary to determine who went where in the plant and when. The fact that the individual was granted unescorted access shows his trustworthiness.

Physical barriers 73.55(c)(l)

This portion of the rule requires the licensee to protect as independent vital islands, onsite alternating and direct current emergency power sources (excludi ng electrical distribution systems) required to permit functioning of structures, system and components important to safety, primary reactor containment, the reactor control room, central alarm station, and onsite water supplies (excluding piping) required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standby. It would appear adequate that if these facilities fell within a larger vital island that they would not need to be placed in independent vital islands. By declaring them independent vital islands we would be compartmentalizing them, something the propose rule strived to do away with. This comment is mostly applicable to emergency power sources and water sources.

Detection aids 73.SS(e)

It does not appear necessary to place onsite secondary power supply systems for security alarms and nonportable commu nications equipment inside a vital island. Adequate protection has been provided for years by having this equipment located within the protected area. Adequate contingency measures also exist should this equipment be rendered inoperable.

Employee self-reporting 73.56(c)

It is AP&L's opinion that such a requirement is unrealistic and is impossible to audit. This position also appears to be in direct conflict with the NRC's position with regard to employee assistance programs. The Reg Guide on this subject, for example, states that an employee assistance program should "provide complete confidentiality to employees."

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BRANCH Trojan ~u.c lear Plant Docket 50- 344 License BPF- 1 I

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Portland General Electric Comments On the Proposed Insider Rules Package Portland General Electric Company (PGE) offers the following comments on the proposed Insider Rule Package published in the Federal Register of August 1, 1984 (49 FR 30726- 30739). our comments are grouped according to the three categories presented in the Federal Register. Additional comments, prepared by a licensed psychologist, are presented in the attachment in response to the "Questions for Specific Public Comment" section of the proposed rules notice .

Access Authorization Program

1. The words "grievance review procedures" should be deleted from the proposed Section 50.54(h). A requirement that grievance review procedures be included in access authorization plans is overly restrictive and inappropriate . Licensee employees are adequately protected against excessive restrictions, such as revocation of unescorted access authorization, by existing grievance procedures.

Submittal of such procedures for NRC review should not be required.

Similarly, proposed Section 73 . 56(g), Review Procedures, should be deleted in its entirety. our union grievance practices are included in the union contract and are subject to change during future negotia-tions. Adding the complication of NRC approval to labor union contract changes would be unduly burdensome. The proposed 73.56(g) recognizes that existing collective bargaining agreements probably meet the appeal procedure requirement. In addition, the licensee provides review procedures within the intent of federal and state laws for our non- union employees .

2. The proposed 73.56(d) should be reworded to allow opti onal use of a clinical interview in lieu of a written personal ity test for evaluati ng the prospective employee's major personality traits.

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3. In proposed Section 73.56(c), Background Investigations, the words "credit history" should be deleted. Credit history information does not directly relate to personnel reliability, and the use of credit history information as a basis for granting unescorted access authori-zation can be shown to be discriminatory since minority groups in general have relatively poorer credit histories. Also, this section should be revised to permit licensees to accept five years of continuous trustworthy employment in lieu of background investigations, and to allow licensees to grant interim access authorizations while background investigations are in progress. Such interim authoriza-tions, granted for protected area access only and for a time period not to exceed 180 days, would provide needed and valuable flexibility, particularly during maintenance and refueling activities. In addition, the sentence concerning self- reporting of subsequent occurrences should be deleted. Such a requirement would be unenforceable, since the individual would have no incentive to report occurrences that might lead to loss of his access authorization and employment.

4. The recordkeeping requirements for the continual behavior observation program required by proposed Section 73.56(e) should be deleted.

Retention of such records is unnecessary and could present a difficulty with respect to invasion of privacy criteria.

Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants

1. The introductory paragraph in the proposed Section 73.55 implies that licensees will be required to submit security plan amendments that describe how vital island designation and protection requirements will be met. The vital island concept should be optional for all licensees, based on unique balance of Plant layouts and barriers inherent to the Plant design. It is not appropriate to require that the vital island concept be adopted. Licensees who elect to do so should be allowed to submit such changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).

2. The periodic review of physical security plans, contingency plans, and procedures required by proposed Section 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B) to evaluate their potential impact on plant and personnel safety will require a significant commitment of resources from various disciplines. We feel that such a review should be conducted on a two- year frequency, similar to the frequency of technical procedure reviews.

3. The proposed Section 73.56(d)(9) requirement to change keys, locks, and combinations whenever an individual's access authorization is revoked due to inadequate work performance should be deleted. Experience indicates that nearly all individuals terminated for inadequate work performance have been determined not to be security risks. The rule should allow licensees to evaluate individuals whose access authori-zation is revoked on a case- by- case basis. Locks, keys, and

Portland General Electric Qm)any Secretary of the Commission March 15, 1985 Page 3 combinations need only be changed if the evaluation indicates the existence of a security risk.

4. The proposed Section 73.55(e)(l) should be clarified to specifically indicate how the requirement for locating onsite secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator and nonportable communications equipment within vital islands applies to the power supply system cables, raceways, and conduit. Presumably, the electrical distribution system's exclusion in proposed Section 73.SS(c)(l) also applies in this section.

Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities

1. We support the provision in proposed Section 73.SS(d)(l) that allows equipment search for all personnel entering the protected area.

Existing requirements for pat-down searches for all visitors and for random pat- down searches for licensee personnel are cumbersome and unwarranted.

2. In the event that metal or explosives detectors are out of service, the proposed rule would require pat- down searches for all personnel entering the protected area. This requirement is excessive and will significantly delay personnel access during peak periods such as shift changes. Pat- down searches of 10 percent of screened licensee employees, randomly selected, and 100 percent of visitors would be reasonable. Also, licensees should be allowed to delay implementing pat- down search requirements for up to four hours after metal and explosives detector breakdowns.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these proposed rules.

Bart D. Withe rs Vice President Nuclear Attachment

Secretary of the Commission March 15, 1985 Attachment Page 1 of 2 Comments on Psychological Assessment and Behavioral Observation Programs In Response to the llIRC's Questions for Specific Public Comment Employee screening programs have become generally accepted at the Trojan Nuclear Plant. Employee participation in the design and operation of the program, as well as company assurance that the screening program is completely confidential, involves no hidden agenda, and is completely separate from management controls and personnel administration, were essential elements in obtaining that acceptance. Experience at Trojan has demonstrated that a well-designed and properly administered psycho-logical assessment program and a behavioral observation program that is supported by management and administration can also be useful and cost effective. Psychological assessment programs provide the ability to identify and screen out applicants who clearly demonstrate security-risk behavior. Applicants with mental or emotional disorders or with tendencies toward sociopathy and psychopathy can also be effectively and humanely screened out. This not only assures a more secure workplace for workers and management, but can improve morale and productivity as well by excluding the security risks who are frequently disruptive in their impact on their co-workers. Also, managers and supervisors at Trojan have indicated that the human relations training they received for behavioral observation programs has helped them in becoming better managers and has increased their understanding of human relations in general.

Among the methods of determining who should be excluded from nuclear plant employment are: (a) Reliance on a comprehensive knowledge of a person's previous behavior to predict his future behavior. This method is somewhat flawed because people change over time. (b) Attempt to identify the external influences that may affect a person's behavior.

This methodology is more cautious but its results are often more reliable since behavior is time and place dependent, and people react differently in different situations. Cc) A third approach is concerned with personality or character structure and dynamics and relies on symptoms of ongoing processes to make future predictions. Written psychological exams such as the MMPI are examples of this method.

Insofar as it is possible to test for character traits such as trust-worthiness and reliability, the validity of the MMPI has been established through years of experience. Psychologists do not have large groups of saboteurs or unacceptable security risks against which to validate their tests, however. Also, many widely used tests were not designed to measure the motivational factors associated with security risks. Even the MHPI, with its built-in validation scales, is very limited in its ability to predict the possibility of a worker committing sabotage some time in the future. It was not designed for that function; it was only

Secretary of the Commission March 15, 1985 Attachment Page 2 of 2 intended to be a psychiatric diagnostic aid. Among its shortcomings are its outdated social values and terminology, the inherent danger of an untrained person using its clinical scales to interpret the test results, and the fact that results of psychological evaluations are, at best, a snapshot of a person's trustworthiness.

When psychological assessments are based on the results of written examinations, the importance of a qualified professional (psychologist or psychiatrist) evaluating the test results should be emphasized. At Trojan, there are examples of psychological test results that were misleading and inaccurate because of situational stress, annoyance, fatigue, or extreme motivation. Any evaluation system whose conclusions are based on test scores alone is very prone to errors, and it is the professional and social responsibility of the employer to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as fairly as resources permit. While the written test may be of a type that can be manually graded by clerical staff, or graded mechanically, the acceptable range of scores must be established by a person qualified in psycho-diagnostic techniques. If a candidate's scores fall outside the acceptable range, then he/she should be automatically scheduled for an interview. In addition, because of localized influences, the acceptable range of test scores should be established on an individual licensee basis. Certain craft unions and occupational groups, for example, display common characteristics that would result in a large number of Type II errors (mistakenly rejecting candidates who should be accepted) if "normal" scores were applied on a national basis and strictly adhered to. Moreover, even localized group norms should be continuously refined, updated, and validated to account for ideas, attitudes, and philosophies changing with time.

Since people change over time, routine and continuing behavior observa-tion programs are essential. There is a subtle difference, however, between the continuous observation elements of access-authorization and fitness-for-duty programs. The programs address separate aspects of a worker's behavior: his capacity or fitness (ie, ~ he do his job in a responsible manner?) and his motivation for sabotage (ie, will he do his job in a responsible manner?). Also, a continuous observation program that seeks to identify psychological impairments (which could affect a worker's performance relative to safety) would be inadequate unless it also strives to identify the presence of psychological factors indicating a motivation for sabotage. It should be noted that very few nuclear employees have developed psychological impairments after their initial employment.

The NRC should consider sponsoring a research effort, utilizing a team of expert psychologists, devoted to developing better assessment methods or instruments for identifying nuclear plant security risks.

ARA/3sje 0135G28.385

March 5, 1985 Fort St. Vrain Unit #1 P-85074 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Docket No .

SUBJECT:

50-267 Proposed Rule, Personnel Access Author i zation Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, 10 CFR 73.56, Vol. 49, NO. 149 Federa l Reg i ster 30732 August 1, 1984.

Dear Sir:

The Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) submits the following comments in response to the Proposed Rule and Draft Regulatory Guide of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) entitled "Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Plants. 11 Vol. 49, NO. 149 Federal Register 30732 (August 1, 1984). PSCo is an investor owned Electric and Gas utility that operates the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station near Pl atteville, Colorado.

PSCo supports the general objectives of the proposed rule and shares the NRC's concern that personne l granted unescorted access to Protected and Vi tal areas do not possess behavioral traits with the potential for comm i tting acts that are inimical to the public health and safety or pose a threat to life or property. Because of this concern, PSCo had developed programs to include employment screening of all personnel granted unescorted access to Fort St. Vrain.

Included in this screening is verification of all periods of employment and unemployment for three years or to age 18, which ever is less. In addition a formal behavior observation program to include management and supervisory training is being developed to enhance detection of behavioral change. Psychological testing for Contractor personnel has been utilized by PSCo since 1977. Company policy statements addressing the use of alcohol and drugs have been implemented to ensure employees are cognizant of their responsibilities.

U.S.. NUCt.EAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOJII DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF TH ~~T ARY OF THE COM ISS IO N Pottmark o~,e Coplet P Add'I C

It is the intent of this correspondence to identify areas of concern to not only the NRC and the utility but to the individual and the overall working environment of the nuclear industry.

The intent of the Background Investigation, as proposed, requires the licensee to conduct or make arrangements for investigations that provide assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to Protected areas and Vital islands are reliable, trustworthy and would act in a manner that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. As a minimum, this Background Investigation must verify an individual 1 s true identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation .

• The regulation and guidance provided in the Draft Reg. Guide require true identity be established through either finger prints identification by use of a photograph. Obviously some individuals do not have finger prints on file with the Federal Investigation.

Bureau of Subsequently, very few police departments have or personnel qualified to make the determination of true identity and thus, rely on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to process them.

The photograph can be used, however, as in the case of transient workers, the availability of trained personnel in the applicable geographical area could present serious time delays and severe economic impact.

The type of information that can be obtained through industry initiated employment checks is limited more often to dates of employment and category of work. Employers are hesitant to release details of disciplinary action or items that would impeach an individual's character. Some latitude should be considered for responses of this type. Experience in conducting Background Investigations has resulted in many instances of not making contact with previous employers. Records are not available for many reasons including business failures, mergers and the simple lack of requirements to retain the specifics addressed in the proposed rule.

Credit history is obviously subjective by nature and while it can indicate some potential for concern is not conclusive. In addition,

_many employees are transient in nature. The regulation is specific to a five year check of credit. This could be interpreted to require, for example, checks in numerous areas both nationally and possibly internationally. The logistics and timely response appear monumental at best. 73.56 (b)(3) does not include credit history as disqualifying and should either be eliminated or included as applicable with specific criteria.

The criteria addressed under educational history appears to infringe on privileged information in some cases. Experience indicates that institutions are hesitant to release any information pertaining to psychological, medical, or even disciplinary problems to the private sector. This situation may be achieved in some cases with a specific, notarized waiver executed by the applicant. As stated above, regarding employment history, the exceptions that are not retrievable should be addressed.

PSC0 1 s concerns regarding criminal history center around the type of information that may be received. Specifically, should we receive the total Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal history sheet, it will include not only convictions but arrests without disposition.

Pending cases will obviously require follow up by some means. In addition, the possession and storage of such records becomes very sensitive. The guidance provided regarding circumstances of criminal behavior appears to be open ended unless a requirement is imposed on the individual to furnish case files. Again, possession and storage of this type of documentation tends to be a sensitive issue.

The Interim access provision, pending receipt of criminal history, appears to be vague concerning the time element. A clarification should be made to address inclusive time on site. Many transient workers are on site for short periods of time, leave and return some months later. The utility, in most cases cannot predict this situation, but would be required to continue to complete a Background Investigation on individuals that could possibly leave the site permanently prior to the six months allowed having elapsed. The guidance here also indicates the licensee is responsible for reviewing this information and determining suitability for unescorted access. 73.56 (a)(4) appears to provide means to delegate these responsibilities to contractors and vendors providing audits by the licensee are conducted.

Military service, dependent on time frame, may be part of the five year employment history. This retrospective period should be consistent with any and all employment history. The criteria for employment and educational history should apply to military history if it is to be required. It appears that receipt of military documents should, at a minimum, be verification for date of birth, place of birth, social security number, and educational history. The Draft Regulatory Guide indicates that the licensee asks less from the military than from the private sector.

The verification of an integrated behavioral profile tends to assume that the investigator, in all instances, has the perception and communication skills to detect and then accurately convey this information. In addition, the geographic problems and the availability of human resources to complete such an investigation are major economic concerns in view of the licensee investigator training

- requirements.

The requirement to have individuals report any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have bearing on such individual's continued access authorization may in fact be desireable, but in reality appears to be unenforceable.

Conflicts with privileged information and the due process of law appear evident. Economic impact experienced as the result of litigation could be major since unescorted access may in fact be the sole criteria for employment.

In summary of our comments to the Background Investigation, it appears that the assumption has been made that all nuclear utilities have available resources compared to Federal Agencies to complete such investigations. Public Service Company of Colorado is confronted with developing an additional organization to meet these requirements or to attempt to locate a vendor with the national capability to ensure compliance. Based on past experience with vendors contracting Background Investigations, the confidence level required with a program as proposed in 10 CFR 73.56 is not available.

The restrictions placed on the licensee to ensure investigators are fully trained and qualified becowes a major task in itself.

Secondly, numerous areas appear to be unachievable by investigators in the private sector. The lack of State or Federal credentials will no doubt make the investigations extremely time consuming and difficult at best. The working relationship between the vendor or licensee and the various agencies must be developed to realize timely results. In the case of interstate investigations, complications with various state laws will have to be dealt with in addition to the multitude of local requirements for waivers and fees. It appears unreasonable to assume all agencies will respond to, or use forms developed at the utility.

10CFR 73.56 does not specify, as does the Draft Regulatory Guide, the tlme frame that the Background Investigation should include. If the rule is going to be published, it should be specific to time frame, and to acceptable or unacceptable criteria regarding the various elements of the investigation. The current draft appears to utilize subjective concepts that infringe on individual rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and substantiated by case law. In one instance, utilities are warned to deal with individual actions, not beliefs, in determining unescorted access privileges, yet the next section, psychological testing, is obviously an instrument of self perception rather than demonstrated physical actions.

Should the Commission choose to publish this portion of the rule, we strongly support modification of the time frame to three years. In addition, all areas of the background check should be reviewed to ascertain the availability of the information desired to the private sector. The economic impact of the program should also be given consideration in view of the good track record established by the industry with regards to minimizing security related problems.

The psychological assessment portion of the rule addresses requirements such as 11 a proven high degree of reliability and shall have been proven to be valid". Specific criteria should be outlined as acceptable or unacceptable if such testing instruments are available. To be considered a validated test for the Nuclear industry, it would appear that a scientifically administered program be conducted nationally to ensure, with documented evidence, that the test is in fact valid.

The guidance provided in the draft regulatory guide indicates the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory is considered to be acceptable. We understand several variations of this test exist. In addition, a second personality test, The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire is considered as acceptable. If these two instruments have been validated for the industry, the acceptable standard deviations should be included in the guidance to ensure consistency.

Enclosed as Attachment Number 1 is an analysis of a continual observation program PSCo requested from a psychologist retained to implement the Fort St. Vrain Supervisory Training Program. Your attention is directed to paragraph 1, page 2, which discusses the pitfalls of the training of supervisory personnel. Further serious concerns are addressed in the text, specifically the time alloted to reinstate an individual in twenty working days, and the lack of adequate information to make such a decision. Some alternatives are discussed that may warrant review.

The rule requires clinical interviews for personnel falling into categories that indicate inconclusive or abnormal personality traits.

In addition, written follow up to senior licensee management, addressing suitability, is required from the psychologist or psychiatrist. This requirement also seems to eliminate the capability to impose the concept of the rule on a contractor, permissible in 73.56 (a)(4).

73.56 (F)(2) is specific to unescorted access to USNRC personnel without further investigation and the receipt of a 11 Good Guy 11 letter.

The section does not address 11 Continual Observation 11 as part of the rule. Specific reference to the licensees responsibilities in this situation should be made .

In summary of the proposed rule, it appears the Background Investigation, requires that numerous items be collected and verified that may not be retrievable by the private sector. Conflicts seem to appear in various areas as to whether or not the requirements of the rule can be met by contractor organizations and coordinated appropriately. Specifically, a contractor's psychologist is required to provide, in writing, an analysis of an individuals suitability for unescorted access to a senior licensee management member. This appears to negate the permissibility of the contractor performing an independent function .

The economic impact of the rule could be major in nature, not only in actual costs incurred as the result of investigations and psychological testing, but time delays resulting in additional escort services being required. Based on the safety record and the number of USNRC 11 L11 Clearances at Fort St. Vrain, the Rule and Regulatory Guide appear to be excessive and cumbersome. Should the Commission determine the Rule is necessary, a review of the objectives and administrative burdens appears to be justified. Public Service Company of Colorado endorses Background Investigations that are objective and relavent. We strongly support a continuing observation program and consider the objectives of the rule can be achieved through fully trainied personnel in the management and supervisory levels .

Sincerely,

/~

/~:i* Gahm Manager, Nuclear Production Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station JWG:DRA/mlt ENC: One

ATTACHMENT NUMBER 1 Behavioral Observation Procra~

Review of Draft Regulatory Guide Thia report will revie~ and co~~ent upon the NRC Draft Regulatory Guide on access authorization, specifically upon the behavioral ob5er-vat1on progra~. The report will address auch general considerations as the expected progra~ obJectives, supervisory training, ad~inistration, and e~ployee and supervisory iaaues ~hich ~ay i~pair the progra~*5 effec-tiveness.

E~oecteo Progra~ Re3ults The regulatory guide reco~~enda extensive pree~ploy~ent screening to eli~1nate unstable individuals fro~ being hired. With this screening, a behavioral observation progra~ ~ay aee~ like an unnecessary 5afeguard.

But hu~an behavior is dyna~ic, not static, and changes over ti"e. Workers with a history of reliability ~ay exhibit serious work deterioration when faced ~1th extre-f'le stress. This deterioration May be evidenced in faulty judQ~ent, e~otional outbursts, carelesanesa, and intentional acts a9ainst the plant which, in the extre~e, ~ay affect public health and safety.

Because of the dyna~ic nature of behavior, then, pree~ploy~ent screening 1s only partially effective. Thus, a behavioral observation progra~ ia necessary to identify troubleso~e e~ployees before their work perfor~ance 1s significantly affected.

When functioning ideally, a behavioral observation progra~ can ~eet these cbj~ctivea. But in reality, prediction of hul'\an behavior is very inexact, especially when predicting a wide range of behavior with ~any different people. This 1a COf'lpounded by the fact that the observers in thia prograM have their expertise in technical fields, such as engineerinQ or health physics, and are generally only slightly trained in dealing with people. Thus, the outcoMe of the behavioral observation prograM-detect1ng e~ployeea who Might pose a risk to the plant--will be very approxi~ate. Many people ~ay be identified aa a possible risk who pose no threat and other ~ore dangerou~ e~ployees will pass undetected. Wit~

highly trained observers, the prediction rate would i~prove but would still be-short of perfection.

The NRC regulatory Quidelines have addressed the5e issues as best as possible and have designed a prograM that is co~plete and carefully planned. They appear to understand the wide range of probleMs and probleM people that could be of risk to a nuclear plant and have established guidelines to at least acquaint superv15ors with the necessary inforMation to iMple~ent the prograM. In addition, the NRC has addressed soMe i5sues outside of supervisory training, auch a5 eMployee confidentiality, which will i~pact the effectivness of the proQraM. Despite the well planned guidelines, several coMponents Muat be evaluated to increase the prograM effectiveness.

1

Jraininc The topic areas included in the supervisory train1nQ are all necessary to teach behavioral observation skills. Considerable training t1~e will be required to acquaint supervisors with* identifying proble~

behaviors, behavior change, and sy~pto~s of alcohol and che~ical abuse.

In addition, the tra1n1ng addresses possible obstacles to supervisory identification, such as co~~on excuses for not taking action with e~ployees and how to confront e~ployees. In addition, the teach1T1Q aids required are effective training ~ethods includ1nQ fil~s and the inclusion of 5 behavioral scientist. However, it should be stressed that the NRC is expecting a rather sophisticated level of expertise in Just a few days training t1~e. Again, experts 1n behavioral observation and prediction have ~oderate success 1n identifying such e~ployees, after years of training. Thus, what the NRC expects fro~ its supervisors with just a few days training 1s so~ewhat unrealistic. In addition, the training, by*

necessity, includes a wide range of infor~ation, Much of it likely to be

_unfa~ilier to supervisors. Consequently, this infor~ation overload May reduce what supervisors retain of this i~portant infor~ation .

• A ~ore effective training for~at ~ight include several short training periods interspersed over aeveral ~onths, each dealing with only a few of the training co~ponents. For instance, one shortened workshop

~ight teach behavioral change identification; another could address dealing with the troubled e~ployee; another i~proving the work environ~ent to reduce e~ployee proble~s. With this for~at, supervisors would have the opportunity to focus on one i~portant co~ponent of the pro~ra~ and i~ple~ent it, before learning other co~ponents. This will result in greater retention of the training ~aterial and greater supervi&ory expertise as well.

Regardless of the training forMat, a follow-up workshop shoulcf occur a few ~onths after the training. Because of the variabilities in h1JJ11ans and hu~an behavior, it should be anticipated that supervisors will not be able to successfully i~ple~ent such a co~plex progra~ without consid-

• erable probleMs and questions. It would be far ~ore effective to address these proble~s in a follow-up training session rather than question licensee ManaaeMent, who May be Just as confused. Ideally, a very shortened version of the training prograM should occur eve~y few years.

Learning research has found that inforMation is ~uch More likely to be retained with periodic review. This is especially true for inforMation which is out of the rel~ of expertise, as this is for ~any plant ~anagers.

~Supervisor~ Guide to Observing Behavioral Changes*

A Major coMponent of the training prograM is~ rather lengthy checklist entitled the *supervisor's Guide to Observing Behavioral Changes* (Appendix C}. This checklist is designed to acquaint supervisors with the Myriad of behavioral syMptoMs which May be of concern. In eddition, the guide is organized in categories which aid the supervisor in 2

locating target behaviors. The guide 1& very coMplete and will likely be very helpful. It presents Many probleMat1c syMptoMs 1n specific descriptive terMs which Make theM easily recognized by aupervisors.

The cnecklist is designed to present behaviors which are syMptoMatic of soMe very different psychologic5l conditions all of which ~ay present possible risk. Theae conditions ~ight include stress disorder~,

psychoses, eMotional probleMs, and alcohol and cheMical dependencies.

Because of the range of conditions, Many of the syMptoMs presented are very diverse and May aeeM contradictory. For instance, an eMployee who talks slower and less frequently May be suffering froM depression. While depressed, he or she will show iMpaired concentration, distractibility, faulty ~eMory, and poor judgeMent. Any of these May create significant work probleMs. Likew1ae, an eMployee whose speech has speeded up and talks More nay be exhibiting signs of stress or anxiety, or More severely, a

~anic condition. Either of these May result in siMilar work iMpairMerit.

Thus, the contradictory nature of the guide is because it 1s desiQned to detect Many different conditions. The syMptoMs May be very different but the work 1MpairMent May be siMilar .

• The training Must stress to supervisors that they should be alert to.

behavior changes and behavior extreMeS. Thus, an eMployee who always talks slowly May not be of concern. But if the slow talking 1s a change froM his or her norAal state, it should be noted. Likewise, a slight slow do~n of the speech rate 1s not i~portant; only if the retardation is extreMe.

Despite these QUidelines, supervisors will need More specific indications on how ~any sy~ptons or which syMptoMs are of significant concern. It 1s unrealistic to expect a supervisor to note change~ in e~ployees hobbies or to report such a change to ~anageMent. Supervisors will be disinclined to use the checklist unless they are given veryr specific inforMation about how ~any synptOM5 are necessary to reporf ihe e~ployee, or ~hich syMptOMS indicate severe probleMs. Thus, the training needs to present this inforMation so that supervisors feel reasonably coMfortable using the guide .

• AdMini5tr~tion of the PrograM At severe! points 1n the regulatory Qu1de, it is suggested that eMployees be referred to an eMployee assistance prograM or to outside counselinQ. A reasonable concern to plant ManageMent is how effective counseling is for a troubled eMployee. In general, counseling and psychotherap~ is quite effective in reducing eMotional distress.- Like-wise, work adMinistered alcohol rehabilitation prograMs are also quite effective. Most reliable eMployees who suddently show significant behavioral chances are likely to be dealing with soMe sort of severe stress 1n their lives. This May include, for instance~ Marital or financial probleMs, death in the faMily, or significant probleMs at work.

On occasion, the cause of the eMployee stress May not be as obvious as those listed above. Counselinc is Most efffective in dealing with individuals who have an acute eMotional probleM. It is less effective for 3

those w1th long ter~, chron1c ~ental proble~s. Most e~ployees will be suffer1nQ fro~ acute proble~s and will be quickly !~proved with counselin~. However, the prognosis 1s ~ore Quarded and therapy will be

~ore lengthy 1f 1 for instance, a supervisor suggests counseling to an e~ployee 1n hopes of changing hi~ or her froM in irresponsible, lack luster worker to a star eMployee.

The regulatory guidelines propose that a decision on eMployee reinstateMent be ~ade in twenty working days after pl5nt access is denied.

This ~ay potentially pose a serious proble~. Despite the fact that coun-seling will work Quickly to restore an e~ployee to his or her previous level of functioning, twenty days ~ay be an unrealistic tiMe fraMe. With weekly therBpy sessions, the eMployee will have only ~et four ti~es with a counselor. Therefore, twenty days ~ay be an appropriate tiMe to review an eMployee's progress but ~ay not be a realistic deadline.

At this point, the welfare of the coMpany and the welfare of the eMployee May coMe into conflict. The co~pany is endorsing the reha-bilitation of the eMployee, yet at a possibly prohibitive cost to theM-selves. For Aost eMployees,* their jobs occur in controlled areas and they

• will be unable to perfor~ productively when denied access to these areas

• Thus, the coMpany is in a position of paying a salary when little or no work is being acco~plished. Because of the very real financial consider-ations, the coMpany cannot afford to rehabilitate eMployees with signi-ficant probleMs and disMissal May be warranted.

Although review occurs in twenty working day~, a decision will be difficult because, as the NRC indicates, Manage~ent cannot confer with the eMployee's therapist. Any collaboration between ~anageMent and therapist will seriously haMper the therapeutic relationship and May ~ake the coun-seling ineffective. Thus, the co~pany 1s required to Make a decision about eMployees' readiness to return to work with virtually no infor~ation about the!r curre~t ~t~tue er he~ long treatMent is likely to continue.

This.r.~i~5e ~eri~us. q.!.leeticns about the reinstet~Ment procedure. If access is suspended upon the recoM~endation of a psychologist or ~~ychi-

• atrist, then an obvious step ~ay be a reevaluation by the sa~e individual when deciding about reinstateMent. Yet the best predictor of future behavior is recent past behavior in a siMilar situation.

need inforMation about how the eMployee 1s working.

So to truely effectively evaluate the e~ployee, the psychologist or psychiatrist would Naturally, this inforMation is probably unavailable as the eMployee May be unable to work with suspended access.

Perhaps the best solution for reinstate~ent would involve an evaluation by the p3ychologist or psychiatrist. If 1MproveMent is noted, the eMployee's access should be returned on a probationary basis only.

The eMployee's behavior would be Monitored and in an appropriate length of t1Me, another review should occur using the updated work perforMance inforMation.

4

Another consideration in the ad~instration of the proQra~ is the effect of the auspension procedure on- the counselinQ process. Nu~erous ele~ents are necessary for counseling to be effective including the "otivation of the client and the honest open relBtionship between the e~ployee and counselor. For soAe eAployees, they ~ay feel forced into the counselinQ proce5s. Thi& ~ay significantly reduce their ~otivation.

However, so~e of the disadvantages of this situation ~ay be reduced by a sensitive approach by the supervisor and an experienced counselor. The behavioral observation training should teach aupervisors the best way to handle this situation.

An additional, but unavoidable, disadvantage of the progreA is that access suspension will greatly increase the e~ployee's ~ental distress.

He or she will be well aware that their Job is potentially on the line.

Consequently, they will feel very deter~ined to resolve their proble~s i~~ediately and will put great pressure upon the~selves to do so.

Unfortunately, the opposite effect is likely to h~ppen with counseling taking longer because of the added stress and pressure upon the e~ployee .

• A final detri~ent to the counseling process will be that e~ployees

~ay be unlikely to believe that the counselor will not be reporting to coMpany manag~ent. It Aay see~ very innocuous for ~anage~ent to ask the therapist how long therapy is expected to continue. Yet if the e~loyee k.nows the ther~pist is riiakin~ this judgel!lent, he or she will b.e lik.e-ly to present the best possible ii-iage to ther therapist and avoid talking about 3ny real concerns in order to appear healthier. Therapy is dependent upon an open tru~t1ng attitude between therapist and e~ployee. Ask.ing for infor~ation fro~ the therapist turns their role into a judg~ent~l one and therapy ~ill be Qreatly he~pered.

These therapeutic prcble~s can be reduced if the e~plcyee receive~

counselinQ before he or she pose~ a substantial risk. Under these conditions, there are nc ti~e fra~es for the therapy, the e~ployee will not heve the increased stress of know1nQ the!r Job is on the line, and

• therapists would have no need to confer with plant ~anage~ent. Although the e~ployee still ~ay feel forced to receive counseling and resistant to treat~ent, this can usually be re~edied by an experienced therapist. The section of this report entitled Supervisory Issues will address how to encourage supervisors to suggest preventive counseling.

A final ad~in1strat1ve question regards the overall effectiveness of the progra~. The NRC requires an evaluation of the training to exaMine its effectiveness. Although supervisors ~ay be tested, following the training, to deterMine their ability to detect proble~ behavior~ this will not reflect the effectiveness.of the entire prograM. There are a

~ult1tiude of variables in a behavioral observation prograM, over and ebove behavior detection, which will iMpact its usefulness. Unfor-tunately, the overall obJective of the prograM--to eli~inate eMployee created plant probleMs--i5 alMost iMpossible to judge. It cannot be deterM1ned if those eMployees whose acce~s i5 revoked would have gone on to coMMit potential probleMs. Likewise, it is not known if danQerous 5

eMployees undetected bye behavioral observation progre~ would not have also QOne undetected prior to the progre~. It is possible to coMpare the rates of eMployee caused probl9MS before and after, the progra~. But because of the a~all nuMber of these incidents occurring currently, this coMperison will not be very useful. Therefore, if the NRC 1s requ1rin~

such an evaluation, they ~ust be ~ore specific aa to how they suggest this be done.

ProbleM§ in !MpleMentation Supervisory training end adM1nistration 1s only one coMponent of e _

behavioral observation progreM. The proQra~ is coMplex end can be very aensitive. To so~e, behavioral observation May seeM like co~pany endorsed spying or behavioral control by the coMpany. Because of that, ~any supervisors and e~ployeea May be unco~fortable with the progra~. Yet the prograA depends upon the cooperat1on of these workers for its success.

Thus, certain eMployee and supervisory issues Must be stressed to ensure the success of the progra~ .

• The progra~ is likely to be controversial. EMployees, under-standably, will be reluctant to endorse any prograM which ~ay question and criticize their personal behavior. For that reason, the co~pany l'Wst endorse the attitude that they will aid and assist ~Mployees in reha-bilitation whenever possible. Although the NRC reco~~ende the use of an e~ployee aseistance prograM, they are leas epecific about rehabilitation for c0Mpen1es without an EAP. Private couneelors and therapists are available but their services ~ay be expensive. Medical insurance ~ay only cover a portion of the cost, usually fifty percent. There is so~e*ques~

tion about the appropriateness of requiring e~ployees to seek assistance without adequately covering the charge. Understandably, such a-situation May create significant diagruntleMent 1n the e~ployee. Thus, the co~pany insurance policy should be evaluated and possibly revised. Anotherf solution ~ight be plac1nQ e therapist on retainer. ~

Aa indicated by the NRC, the confidentiality of the e~ployee records 1s necessary to the progra~. In addition, an appeal process is an iMportant co~ponent. But how the co~pany regards the appeal process and Manages 1t can greatly underMine its utility. T~re is an *1~portant difference between an appeal which ie seen as the e~ployee's right end one which is regarded as another indication of the e~ployee's proble~

behavior. This is particularly iMportant when dealinQ with psychological issues. For instance, a supervisor ~ay revoke an e~ployee's access, partly because of the e~ployee's argu~entative natue and objection to following or!krs. The appeal, then, ~ust be viewed obJectively but could easily be seen as another aiQn of the e~ployee's resistance to authority.

EMployees ~ust be encouraged in the appeal process since the whole purpose of the prograM is to ~ake accurate judg~ents and the appeal process can aid in accuracy and fairness.

6

The supervisor is the key ele~ent in the behavioral observation progra~. ~ithout his or her cooperation the progra~ will not succeed.

Training 1s only one consideration. Supervisors ~ay be exceptionally well trained in detecting aberrant behavior. But the progra~ will not be effective if the supervisor i~ not willing to report e~ployees. This is an extre~ely i~portant issue. The co~pany ~ust be aware of sources of supervisory reluct~nce, and be willing to ~odify the pro~ra~ to address these issues. If not, it is doubtful that the progra~ will have any utility.

As indicated earlier, the co~pany cannot afford to sustain e~ployees for long when their access has been suspended. Most e~ployees will be able to provide only l1~ited service for the co~pany when they are unable to enter the plant. While ~any psychological proble~s can be qu1ckly re~edied, it still ~ay take a few ~onths of treat~ent. This i3 too long of a period for the co~pany to carry an e~ployee. Because of that,

• rehabilitation is an unreasonable Qoal, at least part of the ti~e, and the e~ployee will likely be disMissed.

Supervisors are aware of this likelihood. For that reason, they will be quite reluctant to report e~ployees. The regulatory guide reco~~ends consultation with ~anage~ent in these situations. But this is not likely to be effective because, regardless of ~anage~ent's intent, they are still in charge of the co~pany and cannot truely provide a bias free consultation. In reality, consultation with ~anageMent ~ay instigate the suspension procedure. Although no action Might be taken by ~anage-

~ent, the supervisor understands that he or she is breeching the confi-dentiality of the eMployee and that ~anageMent will be observing that r e~ployee carefully, and possibly taking ad~inistrative act1on.

• 1 Given these adMinistrative procedures, the supervisor is unlikely to confer with Manag~ent about a suspicious e~ployee until the supervisor 1s certain the eMployee poses a risk. This certainty will not occur unless the eMployee is acting in a very extre~e or bizzare fashion or has already caused a security probleM. In this situation, the behavioral observation progra~ will be useless. Security proble~s w1ll not be avoided before access is suspended. In addition, supervisors will probably not need any training to recognize the severly disturbed behavior that e~ployees Must display before they ~ill be reported.

The coMpany Must ~ake revisions in this procedure. Because of ManageMent's role and because of the consequences of reporting an eMployee, supervisors will need assistance in deciding which eMployees are a substantial risk. This assistance can only be useful if it is outside of the Manage~ent of the plant and if 5upervisors can use the assistance 7

anony~oualy. The best alternative ia likely to be an independent psycholoQ1st or psychiatrist on retainer by the co~pany. This individual could confer with supervisors anony~ously in the initial stages of the proble~. The consultant could indicate 1f the e~ployee 1s not a threat, if they could benefit fro~ counselng, or if they ~ust be reported 1~~ed1ately. In this ~anner, e~ployees would ideally be reported before they created safety or security proble~s. Also, supervisors would not fear the needless loss of a well trained, experienced e"ployee.

Retaining a psychologist or psychiatrist as a supervisory consultant will involve extra expense for the co~pany. But without their eervice, the behavioral observation progra~ ~ay not be ~eaningful. An added benefit is that the focus of the progra~ will beco~e ~ore rehabilitative in nature. This is because superv1sors, at the suggestion of the consultant, will be likely to reco~~end counseling to their e~ployees before serious deterioration occurs. In this ~anner, serious ~ental proble~s will be prevented and the co~pany will rfitain its well trained, experienced e~ployees.

Another reason to support the use of outside consultants in the

• preli~inary stages of the progra~ is to curtail supervisory bias. The behavioral observation progra~ depends pr1~arily upon the observations and judg~ents of the supervisor on very subjective criteria. Questions regardinQ e~ployees' JudgMent, work attitude, cooperation, and virtually every behavior on the *supervisor's Guide to Observing Behavioral Changes*

involves the opinion of the superv1sor. Despite their training or their intentions, supervisors are unable to be entirely objective in their ratings of eMployees. They are ~uch ~ore likely to observe suspicious behavior in e~ployees they dislike rather than in those they like. Even in a subJect as specific and verifiable as attendance, research has shown that supervisors will greatly overesti~ate the attendance of their favored e~ployees and greatly underesti~ate the attendance of _less favorabl~

e~ployees. These biased judg~ents will likely be greatly co~pounded- in dealing with such subjective criterea as work attitude, for instanc~

Supervisory bias ~ay best be reduced by guarding for its presence at

• several stages in the process. Again, consultation with a trained 1ndependent will help curtail an access suspension very early, if it is unwarranted and based on bias. This type of biased reporting needs to be avoided very early on as the consequences of suspension to the e~ployee can be significant. Manage~ent also needs to be aware of bias and should request specific behavioral inforMation about the e~ployee to support the supervisor's clai~. Nevertheless, ManageMent Must be very careful to review the supervisor's clai~s as obJectively as possible. They ~ust guard against the teMptation to agree with the supervisor si~ply to avoid a conflict or to ~aintain a harMonious Manage~ent-supervfsory rela-tionship. After the independent judgMent of licensee ManageMent, the final decision should still be ~ade by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist, after a face to face interview with the eMployee.

8

Su~~ary and Conclusions The behavioral observation progra~ is designed to identify those e~ployees wno ~ay pose a eubstant1al risk to a nuclear power plant.

Behavior prediction is very inexact, even for experts, and will be expec1ally inexact when used by those whose expertise lies in other area5.

Despite these liMitations, the training designed by the NRC 1s coMplete and well thought out Nevertheless, training is not the only consideration in the progrs~'s success. It 1s a controversial and sensitive progra~ with far reaching consequences. In order for the prcQra~ to fulfill its obJectives, the co~pany 111Ust address various issues. The for~at of the training progra~ May need rev1s1on with short seesions on each topic, reviews, and ~ost 1~portantly, a follow-up session. The re1nstate~ent policy Must be specified clearly and ~anageMent needs to be aware that the progra~ will i~pact counseling effectiveness.

Most iMportantly, the co~pany ~ust acknowledge that e~ployee

• rehabilitation May be unrealistic, given the cost to the COfllpany, and so~e reported eMployees will be disA1ssed. This result will seriously deter supervisors frOf'I reporting et11ployees until serious proble~a are noted.

Outside anonyMous consultation with psychologists or psychiatrists and with supervisors seeMs the best way to resolve the proble~.

It ~ust be e~phasized that the behavioral observation progra~ is very co~plex and therefore, the COf'lpany should regard the progra~ as a flexible one, with opportunities available for revision if nece5sary.

Because of the nu~erous difficulties inherent in the syste~, for both supervisors and e~ployees, discussions and reviews Must be instituted periodi~ally to address e~ployee and supervisory concerns. Proble~s in the prograM should be anticipated and ~odif1cat1ons instituted acco,.:_

dingly: With dil1gen~ ~anage~ent and attention to these iAportant '.

considerat1ons, the progra~ can effectively deter~ine troubled e~plqyees and assist the~, and the co~pany, in creating a productive work

• environMent .

9

@ CP&L Mr. S. J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Servicing Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Carolina Power & Light Company has reviewed the NRC's notices of proposed rulemakings (10 CFR, Parts 50 and 73) regarding the access authorization program (49 FR 30726), the miscellaneous amendments concerning physical protection of nuclear power plants (49 FR 30735), searches of individuals at power reactor facilities (49 FR 30738). The NRC's Draft Regulatory Guide, "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants," has also been reviewed by the Company.

The Company supports adoption and currently employs a comprehensive personnel reliability program which includes background investigatilMI, psychological evaluation, and continual behavioral observation program. The attached comments, regarding the proposed rules and the draft regulatory guide, are provided for your consideration in the rulemakings.

The Company appreciates the opportunity for involvement in the early stages of the development of these regulatory positions. Please call me at (919) 836-6242 if you have any questions concerning our comments.

Yours very truly,

• 1372~~

S. R ~ e rman Manager Nuclear Licensing Section DJK/ccc (824SNP)

Attachments (4) 411 Fayetteville Street

• P. 0 . Box 1551

• Raleigh , N. C. 27602

l:t.S. NUCLEAR REGUI.ATO~Y COMMISSl08 DOCKFTING & scR 'IC r;r I N OFF ~ OF HIE er '>.Y OF T~I E COM I ~ .JN Document Stalls I I cs Po,tmark Date Copl.. Rec-!;, 1 j

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Attachment 1 Page 1 of 8 CP&L'S COMMENTS CONCERNING THE PROPOSED RULE, ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM (10 CFR, PARTS SO AND 73)

CP&L COMMENTS CONCERNING COMMISSIONER ROBERT'S SEPARATE VIEW The Company believes that psychological assessment and behavioral observation are useful tools in ensuring employee suitability and trustworthiness. These elements should be included in the proposed rule.

CP&L COMMENTS CONCERNING COMMISSIONER GILINSKY'S SEPARATE VIEW Based on more than a decade of experience of behavioral observation by supervisors in operating nuclear power plants, the Company has not experienced any abuses by supervisors. Supervisors are trained not to attempt to make inferences concerning emotional stability. The Company supports the use and inclusion in this rule of a continual behavioral observation program.

Behavioral observation is a sound management technique.

QUESTIONS FOR SPECIFIC PUBLIC COMMENT Question 1:

To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry?

To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

CP&L Response:

The Company employs a personnel screening program which includes psychological

• assessment, background investigation (employment including military history if service occurred during the retrospective investigative period, listed and developed references, financial responsibility, education, criminal records and true identity) and behavioral observation. Psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs are integral and important elements of our employee screening program.

Question 2:

What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

CP&L Response:

Psychological assessment is employed to identify those individuals who may be unsuitable for employment in a nuclear plant. Psychological assessment, along with the other elements of the personnel screening program, provide a reasonable indication that the individuals granted unescorted access are stable, reliable and trustworthy. Psychological assessment is used to address (824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 2 of 8 both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage. Inasmuch as there have been to our knowledge no identified cases of radiological sabotage in operating nuclear plant and therefore no empirical data upon which to correlate psychological testing and radiological sabotage, the Company cannot unequivocally maintain that such testing'will identify a potential radiological saboteur. The Company does, however, believe that psychological testing is a valuable tool in identifying an individual who might either intentionally or accidentally inflict damage to our facilities.

Question 3:

What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives

• CP&L Response:

The Company does not believe that the proposed personnel screening program constitutes infringement (violates law or the rights of another) since the individual involved gives prior consent to the conduct of the program.

Further, the Company must concern itself that the employees in its facilities can and will perform their duties in a manner which will not place the safety of themselves or others in jeopardy.

Question 4:

What evidence does or does not support the use of obj~ctive diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a

• consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted assess to commercial nuclear power reactors?

CP&L Response:

The MMPI has been used for many years to identify individuals who have potential for or are exhibiting aberrant behavior. The MMPI has been used widely in nuclear power industry. Many research studies support its content and construct validity.

Question 5:

What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? .What percentage of false positive (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 3 of 8 CP&L Response:

Psychological assessment is helpful in assessing the following types of behavior:

1. Argumentative, hostility toward authority

2. Irresponsibility and impulsivity

3. Emotional instability .

4. Hostile and destructive behavior

5. Inability to handle stressful and/or emergency situations

6. Inability to develop defenses

7. Substance abuse For the one year period April 1, 1983 through March 31, 1984 a total of 1,872 people were administered the MMPI at Carolina Power & Light Company. Of these 172 were denied access because of dysfunctional behavior of the type mentioned above. This constitutes a 9.2% rejection rate *

• The rejections were categorized into the following diagnostic behavior patterns:

1.

Categories Psychopathic Deviate

2. Disturbed 7 Multi-Classification

3. Alcohol and Drug Abuse

4. Bi-Polar Mood Disorder

5. Schizophrenia

6. Hypomania

7. Paranoia

8. Anxiety States

9. Manic Depressive

10. Depression

11. Hysterical Behavior

• The standards for interpreting MMPI's at Carolina Power & Light Company are tight; therefore, the percentage of false negatives (Type II error) is high.

Therefore, it is apparent that Type I error is quite low. Type II error reflects the number of people who have been screened out who may cause no problems on the job. By maintaining tight standards, this will help screen out the individual who has potential for or is already exhibiting dysfunctional behavior. The finding of 31.4% in the psychopathic deviate category tends to support the effectiveness of the MMPI and accomplish desired results.

Question 6:

Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage?

Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 4 of 8 CP&L Response:

If the threat posed in 10 CFR 73.1 is valid, and in the absence of other instruments to detect the insider, the Company believes that the use of psychological assessment is justified. Further, the use of psychological assessment provides a method of identifying personnel who for reasons other than radiological sabotage may not be suitable for employment in a nuclear power plant. The dearth of data relative to the incidence of radiological sabotage makes it difficult if not impossible to assess the reduction of risk supplied by the personnel screening process. The Company has no evidence which may be used to quantify risk reduction; however, the Company believes that psychological assessment will help identify individuals that have the potential for instigating radiological and other acts of sabotage. Several NRC research efforts report support of this conclusion.

Question 7:

Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

CP&L Response:

The Company believes the use of psychological assessment can be justified on the basis of addressing fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns.

Question 8:

To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without preemployment psychological assessment? What specific risk would remain if both psychological assessment and behavioral reliability program were not part of & screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

• CP&L Response:

Psychological assessment provides a base indication that the individual is within the normal psychological limits and to some degree a prediction of continuance of normal behavior. The behavioral reliability program contributes on a continuing basis to affirm normal behavior. It is our position that all three elements (background, observation, and psychological assessment) contribute to the effectiveness of the program and that the deletion of one element significantly reduces program effectiveness.

Question 9:

What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability progr~s?

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 5 of 8 CP&L Response Psychological Assessment - Those individuals who indicated to be emotionally unstable, untrustworthy, unreliable, and otherwise unsuitable for employment in the nuclear industry.

Background Investigations - Those individuals who have falsified records, have undesirable work and criminal records and are abusing alcohol and drugs.

Behavioral Reliability Program - Those individuals who are abusing alcohol and drugs; those who are showing deteriorating work performance, those who are showing defensive behavior and resisting authority, and those who are showing adverse behavior to stress.

Question 10:

What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures,

• - including psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

CP&L Response:

None to our knowledge.

Question 11:

How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

CP&L Response:

There is generally a pos1t1ve feeling (approval) of the Company's program.

Employees indicate it contributes to a general feeling of well-being, safety

• and security at operating sites. While CP&L has not fully explained the provisions of the proposed rule(s) to employees at large, the existing program is virtually identical to the proposed regulation. Based on the preceding, the Company believes that with adoption of the proposed rule, subject to certain revisions, employee approval will continue.

CP&L COMMENT ON PROPOSED REVISION TO 50.34 PARAGRAPH (d) AND ADDITION OF PARAGRAPH (h)

The Company concurs that the rev1s1on to paragraph (d) is appropriate. The Company concurs with the addition of paragraph (h) except that the Company recommends the deletion of the words "grievance review procedures" for reasons which will be addressed later.

CP&L COMMENT ON PROPOSED REVISION TO 50.54 PARAGRAPH (p)

The Company concurs that guard training and qualification and access authorization plans should be included in the provisions of this paragraph.

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 6 of 8 CP&L COMMENT ON PROPOSED REVISION TO 73.55(d) AND ADDITION OF PARAGRAPH (i)

The Company concurs with the proposed revision of 73.55(d). The proposed addition of paragraph (i), which the Company assumes could only be applied to single unit plants, must be read along with the proposed 73.56(e)(3) to determine the full impact of these proposals. In sum, these proposals appear to be impractical. Further information concerning the addition of this proposed paragraph will be provided in the Company's comments on the proposed 73.56 and Regulatory Guide.

CP&L COMMENT ON PROPOSED ADDITION OF 73.56 Paragraph (a)(4) provides for a generic plan to be used by all licensee contractors, manufacturers etc., but does not provide for a generic plan for utility companies with multiple sites. In many cases the personnel screening program is not administered at nuclear power plants sites. This is particularly true in those cases of companies with multiple sites. In view of the preceding it is recorrmended that paragraph (a)(4) be revised as follows:

(4) Licensees may provide a generic Access Authorization Plan to be used by each of the utility's sites (in the case of multiple sites) and by all licensee contractors, manufacturers, or suppliers for screening and observing their employees. The.licensee shall be responsible for

• etc.

Paragraph (b)(l) delineates the components of the access authorization program and provides the objectives of each of these components. The portion of the paragraph describing the continual behavioral observation program contain the sentence, "This behavioral observation shall include a supervisor training program and, if needed, a new psychological assessment." The intent of the last portion of the sentence, "and, if needed, a new psychological assessment," is both unclear and in our opinion unnecessary. Paragraph (e)(l) provides guidance as to what actions are expected in those cases when unusual behavior 1s observed. In view of the preceding, it is recommended that the

• sentence in question be revised as follows:

This behavioral observation program shall include a supervisor training program.

Proposed paragraph 73.56(c) delineates the elements of the background investigation but fails to specify the retrospective period involved. The Company believes that the retrospective period should be specified by t~e regulation to ensure consistency among licensees, contractors and others involved in the process. Further, to specify the retrospective period will provide a clear indication of the intent of the Commission and will lend regulatory weight to the requirement which does not exist if the requirement is contained in a Regulatory Guide. The last sentence of paragraph (c) states in part, "The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these conditions * *

• etc." The Company believes this requirement to be unduly harsh and perhaps impossible and would suggest that if necessary at all that it be restated as follows: The licensee shall be required to inform individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions that the individual shall promptly report to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance * *

• etc.

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 7 of 8 In sunmary it is recon:mended that paragraph (c) be revised to read as follows, text changes as underlined: (c) Background investigation. The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for, background investigations that provide assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reliable, trustworthy, and would act in a manner that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. As a minimum, this background investigation shall cover a retrospective period of 5 years and must verify an individuals true identity, employment history including military service if appropriate, educational history, financial responsibility, criminal history, and character and reputation (a minimum of 2 listed and 2 develo ed references to be em lo ed 1n determining character and reputation. The licensee shall be required to inform individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions that the individual shall promptly report to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individuals continued access authorization. Paragraph (d)(2) appears to mandate a clinical interview for those individuals whose personality tests results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits. This requirement does not seem to recognize that an individual whose results were inconclusive or abnormal might be eliminated from further consideration for employment or for unescorted access for reasons other than purely psychological testing. To require an interview in such cases is unwarranted.

In view of the preceding, it is recommended that the first sentence of paragraph (d)(2) be revised as follows:

Clinical interviews for individuals whose personality test results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits and who remain under consideration for employment at an operating nuclear power plant in an unescorted access status.

- Paragraph (d)(2), last sentence, refers to appropriate senior licensee management. The use of the word "senior" is unnecessary and unduly restrictive, and should be deleted. Inasmuch as the word management is

• qualified by "appropriate," the specifics of the level of reporting should be left to the good judgment of the licensees. The word "senior" should be deleted from paragraph (e)(l) for the reasons indicated above and the word "appropriate" substituted therefore. The provisions of the proposed regulation which are contained in paragraph (f)(l) suggesting a photograph(s) of each non-licensee employee granted unescorted access be retained for 365 days after the individual has left the site and that the Company provide the gaining licensee a "written verification of the individual's unescorted access authorization along with a statement which indicates its current validity is impractical." Clearly, the Company cannot attest to current validity if the individual has been gone from the site for the time specified. Further, the proposed revision to paragraph (d)(7)(i)(A) of 73.55 requires that vital island access be updated and reapproved at least every 31 days; therefore, not later than 31 days after the individual left the site validity for unescorted access would cease. Additionally neither the gaining or losing licensee would be required to examine what the individual had been doing in terms of employment, criminal records, etc., during the period of interruption. There is no provision in the proposed addition to the regulatio~ to permit a long term*employee to be exempt from the provisions of the background investigation and psychological evaluation required by the proposed addition. The Company (824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 1 Page 8 of 8 believes there should be such a provision. It is therefore recommended that when an employee of a licensee or nonlicensee has been employed for a minimum of three consecutive years and has had annual written evaluations performed clearly indicating that the individual's performance is satisfactory, stable, reliable, and trustworthy an exemption from the provisions of the requirement for background investigation and psychological testing should be granted. The Company recommends that paragraph (g) "Review Procedures" be deleted from the proposed revision to the regulations.

The Company and other licensees, as well as many contractors are non-union.

Consequently, the proposed regulation language appropriate to union settings is not appropriate to us. Further, we have a structured grievance procedure in place which adequately serves the purposes of concern to the regulation.

The Company's procedure has the acceptance of employees and management based upon several decades of existence and use. It is designed to ensure impartial and objective hearings and judgments. We believe that for both union and non-union companies adequate controls are in place to satisfy the concerns of all parties concerned

• The Company recommends that 73.56(h)(2) be amended to read," * *

• or to those who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties." Without such amendment, management review and routine filing by clerical personnel may be excluded. The Company has no comment on the proposed amendment to Appendix B of Part 73 *

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1 CP&L COMMENTS CONCERNING MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The Company welcomes the effort to define vital equipment/vital islands but believes that the proposed addition of paragraph (nn) definitions and the explanation of the vital island concept contained in the amendments to 73.55 do not provide sufficient guidance to licensees. Many licensees have been subjected to a study of vital equipment by an NRC contractor. Even though this study was*conducted approximately 3 years ago at our operating plants, the Company has not been officially informed of the outcome of the study nor was it provided the rationale or assumptions employed in the study. The Company is unable to develop a meaningful comment on the vital island concept due to the lack of definition contained in the proposed amendment to the regulation. The Company supports the amendment to paragraph (d)(9) of 73.55 *

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 3 Page 1 of 1 CP&L COMMENTS CONCERNING SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS AT POWER REACTOR FACILITIES The Company supports the proposed revision to paragraph (d)(l) of 73.55 and believes that the revision is in keeping with the Company's understanding of the intent of the regulation as originally proposed *

(824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 4 Page 1 of 3 CP&L COMMENTS CONCERNING DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE, STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT GUIDE FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Paragraph 2.2 Investigative Criteria INTENT - Carolina Power & Light Company recommends the deletion of the first sentence of the second paragraph. All information on an application form need not be verified in all cases.

TRUE IDENTITY - It is unrealistic to verify all aliases, birth date and place. The Company suggests wording as follows: "consistency of listed and developed information shall be reviewed to determine that the individual 1s 1n fact who they purport to be."

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY - This paragraph states, "Pertinent information would include any record of disciplinary action taken against the individual, unusual safety or accident records, psychological and medical records, the reason for the individuals termination, and his or her reemployment potential." The Company suggests that "when available" be added to this sentence. Further, it is reconnnended that this paragraph be modified as follows:

The information mentioned above need only be collected for the previous 5 years including if appropriate, military service, periods of unemployment exceeding two months shall be noted, explained, and where practical verified.

The paragraph contains the sentence, "However, all claimed employment should be verified." The intent of this requirement is unclear and if intended to apply to employment beyond the 5-year retrospective period, the requirement is unrealistic and unduly burdensome. To verify the employment beyond the 5-year period can only be achieved by contacting all employers for whom the

• individual has ever worked since there is no other reasonable method of verification. Depending on the age of the individual and his or her work record such verification could involve perhaps several dozen previous employers. In view of the preceding it is recommended that the last three sentences of this paragraph be deleted.

EDUCATIONAL HISTORY - This paragraph states, "The type of information sought should include disciplinary, psychological, or medical problems and the circumstances under which the individual left the institution (e.g.,

graduated, was expelled, dropped out)." To suggest that educational institutions would consistently provide this information appears, from our experience, to be clearly unrealistic. The first sentence of the paragraph indicates, in our judgment, the purpose of this requirement i.e., "Attendance at all secondary and higher level institutions during the previous 5-year period should be verified." To our knowledge verification is normally accomplished by obtaining from the educational institution a transcript of

,grades or a certification by the institution that the individual in question did attend the institution during the period claimed and was awarded any degrees claimed. In view of the preceding it is recommended that this paragraph be modified by deleting the sentence beginning with the words, "The (824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 4 Page 2 of 3 type of information sought * * * " The Company notes that the paragraph does not suggest that there may be cases when the licensee would require additional educational history such as when the individual is being hired based on his or her educational background. While the Company does not consider such a requirement to be essential to the Regulatory Guide, this procedure certainly constitutes a sound practice.

CREDIT HISTORY - As stated in the first sentence of this paragraph the purpose of this requirement is to determine financial responsibility, the words CREDIT HISTORY therefore are a misnomer and should be FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

While a credit check is a useful tool in determining financial responsibility, the absence of credit reference is not necessarily an indication of lack of financial responsibility.

CRIMINAL HISTORY - The Company does not oppose the inclusion of the 6 months interim unescorted access authorization since the guidance states, "May grant an individual an Interim Unescorted Access Aut_horization * *

• 11 MILITARY SERVICE - The Company believes that military service should be treated as any other employment within the 5-year retrospective period.

Reasonable exception must be allowed if insufficient time has elapsed since military separation for all records to be in place. Such exception might include reviews of a creditable DD214.

CHARACTER AND REPUTATION - This paragraph does not specify the minimum number of listed references to be obtained nor does it specify the retrospective period involved. It is recommended that the second paragraph under CHARACTER AND REPUTATION be revised as follows:

A minimum of two listed (those provided by the individual) references should be obtained. Since the applicant is expected to list references who will provide favorable information, the primary value of such references is to assist the investigator in identifying developed character references. At least two persons who know the applicant but who were not listed as character

• references should be identified and interviewed. While each reference need not cover a 5-year period, the references in composite should cover a minimum of 5 years. Information elicited through these interviews would be used to obtain an integrated behavioral profile of the individual and should not normally be used to deny unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands without further verification.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT - The Company agrees with the inclusion of a psychological assessment program as an element of an access authorization requirement. The Company does not however, agree that two such instruments should be required as is suggested in the draft regulatory guide. In Section 3 the words appropriate senior licensee management or senior management appear several times. The Company believes that the word senior should be deleted as unnecessary and unduly restrictive, and that the words appropriate management are adequate.

CONTINUAL BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM - The Company believes a requirement of continual supervisory observation is a reasonable element to provide assurance that once an individual has be~n deemed to be stable, reliable, and trustworthy these characteristics continue. Section 4.1 General: While the (824SNP/ccc)

Attachment 4

' . Page 3 of 3 Company agrees that the scope of an EAP, including confidentiality, should be clearly defined, it does not agree that the scope should include theft, vandalism, and breaking of work rules. In part 4.1 of the regulatory guide, the Commission recommends that following a temporary suspension licensee management should decide to either reinstate or revoke an employee's unescorted access authorization within 20 work days. The Company believes that this short period of time is unduly burdensome and impractical. In addition, the Company believes that reasonable judgment should be exercised by management based upon the specific circumstances of each incident.

In Section 4.2, Detection of Behavioral Change the term senior licensee management is used repeatedly. For the reasons previously cited i.e.,

unnecessary and unduly restrictive it is recollElended that "appropriate licensee management" be employed. Our earlier comments regarding paragraph (f) Non-licensee Employees, 73.56 Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants, points out that the Company believes the procedure cited is impractical.

In view of the preceding, Section 5.1 Acceptance of Unescorted Access Authorization Granted by Another Licensee, should be modified accordingly.

It is recommended that Section 6 Review Procedures be deleted in its entirety for the reasons previously cited.

Section 7.2 Procedures and Records for Protection of Information should be completely deleted. It is unduly restrictive to limit the use of background investigation data to decisions of unescorted access authorization. Nor should these regulations limit the availability of this data to employees with a proper need to know as judged by Company management. Employment decisions are an example of a proper need to know. Further, audits, while frequently based on sample files, should not be limited as indicated in this section.

Finally, the reference to a locked file cabinet is too precise when the intent is to keep data in a properly controlled manner *

(824SNP/ccc)

, ... j NORTHEAST UTILITIES General .o~~f.8-_t

• Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut o;c

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THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT ANO POWER COMPANY WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS EL~ClRlC COMPANY U5, ,1,; P.O. BOX 270 HO\.YOKE WATER POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST UTK.ITIES SERVICE COMPANY HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY (203) 665-5000 OFF1cc:

DOCK£ Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 B11465 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary of the Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Comments on Proposed Changes to Security Regulations and Draft Regulatory Guide On August I, 1984, the NRC published three Notices of Proposed Rulemaking concerning security requirements applicable to nuclear power plants. The proposed rules involved an Access Authorization Program (49FR30726), Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (49FR30738), and Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (49 FR 30734). The comment period for this proposed Insider Safeguards Rule Package expires on March 7, 1985 (49FR48200). Subsequently, the NRC also published for comment a proposed Regulatory Guide entitled "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" (49 FR 36582).

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, as licensees of the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Unit Nos. I and 2, and license applicant for Millstone Unit No. 3 appreciate the opportunity to comment on these interrelated rules and Regulatory Guide.

The proposed rules and Regulatory Guide have been considered by a number of industry groups which are separately submitting detailed comments. We have participated in the preparation of comments to be submitted by the Physical Security Coordinating Group (comments to be submitted by KMC, Inc.), the Edison Electric Institute Security Committee (EEi), and the Atomic Industrial Forum Subcommittee on Domestic Safeguards (AIF). We generally endorse the comments being filed by these groups. In the interest of efficiency, we are not repeating their detailed comments. Instead, the following comments concern those selected issues which are considered particularly important. In addition, the attachment provides specific comments which may not be reflected in the comments of the groups noted above.

D tmark D t

Access Authorization Program (49 FR 30726)

Proposed 10 CFR 73.56 (b) would require each power reactor licensee to implement an access authorization program which would include a continual behavioral observation program. The Statements of Consideration accompanying the proposed rule noted that a similar technique would be employed in a fitness for duty program which was the subject of a separate rulemaking. The Commission subsequently reconsidered its position on the fitness for duty rule and voted on October 17,1984 to publish a policy statement rather than finalize the rule. We believe this action was appropriate. The considerations which made it undesirable to codify a requirement for a continual behavioral observation program in connection with fitness for duty are equally applicable to an access authorization program. The continual behavioral observation program should be deleted from proposed 10 CFR 73.56 and its companion Regulatory Guide.

Proposed 10 CFR 73.56(g) would require that each licensee provide a procedure for the review of a denial or revocation of access authorization that has an adverse effect on the involved individual's employment. The rule would further require that this review include an evidentiary hearing. This provision is not appropriate for a rule promulgated by NRC. Existing State and Federal laws, as well as the collective bargaining agreement covering employees at many nuclear plants, provide sufficient avenues of appeal for individuals who believe they have been wrongfully denied employment. Section 73.56(g) should be deleted in its entirety.

Proposed 10 CFR 73.56 would require that an access authorization program include a requirement for background investigations. These investigations would be required to verify an individual's employment and educational history, among other information. The companion Regulatory Guide, in section 2.2, specifies

• that these investigations normally be accomplished by personal interviews with previous employers and with school officials. This would represent a major increase in the burden and cost associated with conducting background investigations over current practices which generally utilize telephone calls and/or written requests. Employers and school officials have been very cooperative with investigative agencies conducting background investigations, and we are aware of no problems sufficient to justify the substantial impact which would result from specifying personal interviews as the normal investigative technique. Those portions dealing with personal interviews should be removed from the Regulatory Guide.

Proposed 10 CFR 73.56(d) would require that a psychological assessment program be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted access to protected and vital areas. Only individuals who have been granted access authorization prior to the effective date of the rule would be exempted from this requirement. We have had an access authorization program, approved by NRC, in effect for several years. Under our program, personnel who have had three years of continuous and trustworthy employment may be granted access authorization without being subjected to psychological examination or background investigation. No significant problems have resulted from use of this

program at our facilities. We are not aware of any problems at other facilities utilizing similar programs which would justify the additional burden and cost associated with psychological assessment and background investigation. We recommend that the proposed rule be modified to permit an exclusion from these provisions for individuals with at least three years continuous and trustworthy service.

Safeguards provisions, including NRC approved security plans, have been in effect at all power reactors for several years. Operating practices have been adjusted to accommodate security requirements. Changes in this area can be disruptive in the same way as changes to plant design. Since all personnel at a reactor site are affected by safeguards requirements, the effect of seemingly minor disruptions can, in fact, be significant. Changes in this area should therefore be subject to the same backfitting controls as other new requirements.

This would be the case if backfit controls were based on the effect or impact at a facility, as discussed in our recent letter regarding the proposed backfit rule.CO Regarding the balance of the proposed safeguards requirements, we have verified that operations at our facilities will not be significantly impacted by t he proposed changes.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

• W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President By: C. F. Sears Vice President (1) W. G. Counsil letter to S. Chilk, dated January 23, 1985, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Backfitting.

Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-3.36 50-423 Attachment Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Additional Comments Regarding Proposed Security Regulations and Draft Regulatory Guide March, 1985

Docket Nos. 50-2 13 50-245 50-336 50- 423 Additional Comments Regarding Proposed Security Regulations and Draft Regulatory Guide

1. Section 73.56(a)(4) would permit an access authorization plan to include a generic plan for use by contractors, manufacturers and suppliers. The licensee would remain responsible for granting, denying, or revoking access authorization. To assure that the benefits of a generic plan are realized, this section should be revised to clearly indicate that licensee review of the contractor's documentation need not precede action on access authorization. Periodic audits of contractor documentation, by the licensee, of contractor documentation should be sufficient to verify conformance with the generic plan.

2. Section 73.55(a) would provide authority to suspend safeguards measures to facilitate response to emergency conditions. This authority should be extended to permit suspensions in simulated emergency conditions, or drills. This would add valuable realism to training exercises.

3. Section 73.56(h) would specify requirements to protect the privacy of personal information collected for access authorization purposes. This information is no different than other personal information controlled by licensees. Codification of privacy requirements in this manner is neither necessary nor appropriate

• NRC-85-43

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WISCONSIN PUBLIC SE,RVICE COEleO-F!ATION P.O. Box,, ,1200, Green B'ay, ~WI 54305-45 t, I J*

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, I H March 11, 1985 Secretary of the Commission Attention Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Conrnents to Proposed Access Authorization Program Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) is currently one of twenty-three member utilities of the KMC, Inc. Physical Security Coordinating Group. This group has submitted comments pertaining to the proposed rule and associated draft regulatory guide on the Access Authorization Program. The proposed rule would amend NRC regulations with regards to individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants by imposing prescriptive requirements in the areas of background investigations, psychologi-cal assessments, and continual behavior observation.

Although WPSC is represented by the KMC group and is in general agreement with the group's comments, we have found it necessary to prepare additional comments to address those concerns which we view as most significant, or which deviate from the concensus of the group. Thus, we are also offering the following com-ments for your consideration.

The supplementary information provided by the proposed rule concludes that the adoption of the Access Authorization Program will, in fact, "result in increased assurance of the trustworthiness of licensee employees and contractor personnel".

But, what is not explicitly stated in the provided information is:

1) that this proposed program represents a culmination of years of efforts by the NRG to attempt to resolve the postulated risk posed by an insider, and

2) that most of the governmental and private industry studies addressing the insider threat have either concluded that sufficient data to

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Secretary of the Commission March 11, 1985 Page 2 formulate reasonable accurate predictions of the insider threat does not exist or that the probability of such threats resulting in serious consequences to public health and safety (although theoreti-cally possible) was acceptably low. Not surprisingly, many of these studies pointed to the inherent resistance of nuclear power plants to sabotage due to their safety based design and construction.

Thus, while recognizing that the NRC desires greater assurance of protection from the postulated insider than is currently available, WPSC questions the necessity of an Access Authorization Program to protect against a risk which has not been adequately defined and suggests that no rule be promulgated in this regard.

Although we maintain that the proposed rule is unnecessary, there are several requirements of the rule which we feel are inappropriate and therefore must be addressed. The first of such requirements revolves around psychological assessments. WPSC is not in a position to assess the validity, reliability or the effectiveness of psychological tests. Nonetheless, we are aware of the great disagreements among experts in this field which indicate that the value of such test r emains questionable, at best. In addition, while many utilities already include psychological testing as part of the pre-employment screening process, WPSC is also aware that charges have been made against this technique on the basis that it violates civil liberties and that the test results are sub-ject to possible abuses. Thus, because of the questionable value-impact of psychological testing, the potential for misuse of results, the associated institutional and judicial problems, and the potential demoralizing impact that such tests may have on personnel, WPSC believes that this aspect of the rule is inappropriate.

The second requirement of which we oppose is the inclusion of continual behavior observation in the proposed rule. We believe that behavior observation can be useful in identifying problem employees and should be an integral part of the everyday routine of a good supervisor in any industry. Yet, this requirement essentially parallels the "fitness for duty" program which the industry currently has in place. The NRC recently elected not to embody behavior obser-vation as a rule, but to issue a policy statement encouraging licensees to address the fitness for duty issue in its entirety. WPSC believes that any actions which are contrary to this policy may undermine the voluntary efforts of the industry towards self-improvement.

The final issue of which we strongly oppose is the application of the rule to both the protected area and vital area. The underlying intent of the access authorization rule is to protect the health and safety of the public. Inas-much, one can argue that the proposed rule goes beyond this intent since a Vital Area, as defined by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation, is any area which contains any equipment, system, device, or material, the failure, destruc-tion, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. WPSC believes that the rule (if any) should be limited to vital areas only. This limitation would satisfy the underlying intent of the access authorization rule and will also reduce the cost of implementation for the licensee.

Secretary of the Commission March 11, 1985 Page 3 In closing, we reiterate that any rulemaking in this area is inappropriate at this time, and urge the NRC to reevaluate the risk posed by the postulated insider prior to continuing rulemaking which could greatly impact the nuclear work force.

Very truly yours,

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D. C. Hintz Manager - Nuclear Power MSL/jks cc - Mr. S. A. Varga, US NRC Mr. Robert Nelson, US NRC

245 SUMMER STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS J \.

ADDRESS ALL CORRES PO N D ENCE _TO P.O. B O X 232S, BOSTON. MASS. 02107 W . U . TELEX : 94 *0001 BOSTON 94 *0977 DES I GN NEW YORK CONSTRUCTION CHERRY HILL. N .J . REPORTS DENVER EXAMINATIONS CH I CAGO CONSULTING HOUSTON ENGINEERING PORTLAND , OREGON WASHINGTON, D . C .

Secretary of Commission March 6, 1985 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 uora 1U1181Rp* ~~

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10CFR PARTS 50 AND 73, "ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM,"

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PLANTS, "AND "SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS - -7~

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(49FR30726-30739)

We are pleased to submit our comments on the proposed rules, known collectively as the "Insider Safeguards Rule". We believe that *existing regulations, combined with industry practices, have minimized the need for further regulation in this area. We endorse the use of ANS Standard 3.3-1982 and offer the following comments on the proposed changes to the Code of Federal Regulations.

Access Authorization Program (49FR30726-34)

We endorse the Commission I s proposal to conduct a comprehensive background

• investigation and psychological assessment; however, we believe the requirements associated with a continual behavioral observation program would prove extremely costly with no resulting benefit to the Access Authorization Program. Accordingly, we recommend all words used in reference to the continual behavioral observation program should be deleted from the rule.

Background Investigation We endorse the use of a background investigation as an important screening tool but we do not believe it is always possible to assure that an individual is reliable, trustworthy and/or will act so as to protect health and minimize danger to life and property, therefore, we recommend the first sentence read as follows:

The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for background investigation with the objective of providing assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear reactors are reliable, trustworthy ... ".

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soc 2 March 6, 1985 Similarly, it is important to recognize the fact that background investigations may be limited because criminal records are not always accessible, particularly for crimes committed out-of-state or local jurisdictions. Accordingly, we recommend that the phrase, "to the extent reasonably possible" be inserted after the words "must verify" in the second sentence of paragraph 73.56(c).

We recommend that the following sentence be deleted from paragraph 73.56(c) of the proposed rule change because it would conflict with voluntary Employee Assistance Programs.

"The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance [conviction, hospitalization, etc] that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

Finally, we do not believe a licensee should be subject to an enforcement action in making an access authorization determination under the criteria stated in paragraph 73.56(b)(3). These criteria provide a uniform, baseline reference, but they are subjective and as evidenced by the inclusion of item 73.56(b)(3)(vii), they are open-ended.

Psychological Assessment We endorse the approach recommended by the Atomic Industrial Forum. We believe that a psychological assessment is a reasonable tool to use in the screening process and believe licensees should be allowed to develop their programs within the framework of ANS-3.3-1982. We recommend that the rule read as follows:

"The licensee shall establish and maintain a psychological assessment program to be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands."

Subparagraphs 73.56(d)(l) and 73.56(d)(2) should be deleted.

Continual Behavior Observation The continual behavioral observation program is the most subjective portion of the proposed rule. We believe this aspect of the rule would impose a significant paperwork burden on the licensee without commensurate improvement in the Access Authorization Program. Therefore, we recommend that paragraph 73.56(e) be deleted from the rule.

Review Procedures We endorse the introduction of fair and equable review procedures in the proposed rule; however, we do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to reference grievance review procedures associated with collective bargaining agreements in the proposed rule. Accordingly, we recommend that the last sentence in paragraph 73.56(g) be deleted.

soc 3 March 6, 1985 Miscellaneous Amendments Concemin Ph sical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants 49.FR30735-3 The proposed rule would require licensees to submit amendments to existing security plans detailing how vital island designation and protection plans would be met. We do not believe it is appropriate to require licensees to adopt the vital island concept. We believe each licensee should have the option to revise its security plan, based on the particular circumstances associated with the plant design. Similarly, we do not believe it is necessary to define a minimum set of equipment which must be treated as independent vital islands in all cases. This would represent a major shift from existing practice, where the staff normally performs a case-by-case review. In addition, the term "important to safety", used in Section 73.55(c)(l) in conjunction with the set of vital equipment, is undefined and subject to open-ended interpretation by the NRC staff, accordingly we recommend that this term be deleted.

Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (49FR30738-39)

We endorse the recommendations advanced by the AIF in its letter dated March 5, 1985.

Chi ef Engineer Nuclear Technology and Licensing Division RH:jmm

Post Office Bax 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 March 8, l 9S5

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VIRGINIA POWER Secretary of the Commission Serial No . : 85-161 Attn : Docketing and Service Branch Sec/WSM:nkp U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. 50-280 Washington, D. C. 20555 50-281 50-338 50-339

Dear Sir:

License Nos . DRP-32 DPR- 37 NPF-4 NPF-7 VIRGINIA POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED RULE AND DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE AND VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT ON ACCESS AUTHORIZATION Representatives from a number of utilities have carefully examined the proposed rulemaking package and comments have been developed by several industry groups. On February 27, 1985 at a NUMARC Executive Group Meeting, a majority of the utilities agreed that the proposed access authorization rule is

• unnecessary and overly prescriptive .

The potential "insider" threat is not sufficient to justify the measures conta i ned in the proposed rule for access authorization . The security record that has been accumulated by the Nuclear Industry is testimony to the adequacy of current industry practices .

For these reasons, we believe that the industry has developed reasonable and adequate standards for access authorization . These standards have provided appropriate protection from the insider threat. Therefore, the proposed access authorization rule is not needed .

However, if a rule is to be adopted, we recommend that the rule be consistent with the attached industry developed access authorization program.

The attached program specifically deletes any continual observation program. We support this position because the essential requirements for observation are al ready included in the fitness for duty rule committed

!Ct!AR' R'EGUlAT OF 0

HE ro llv roMMIS KETfNG & SERVICE '"':~Tl()

omn OF TH N

• c Date Rece: vc '

Secretary of the Commission Page 2 VIRGINIA POWER to by NUMARC and implemented throughout the industry. Both rules appear to have the same objective, to ensure that an employee can reliably perform his or her responsibilities.

W. L. Stewart Attachments cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Region II Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Rea ctor Regula tion Mr. D. J. Burke NRC Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. M. W. Branch NRC Resident Inspector

• North Anna Power Station

PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM 1.0 PURPOSE To support the safe operation of licensed nuclear power plants, utilities will implement an access authorization program in accordance with the following guidelines. These guidelines have been designed with the intent to provide reasonable assurance that personnel granted unescorted access authorization to the protected and vital areas of utility nuclear power plants are trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel. Individual utilities may have additional requirements.

2.0 SCOPE These guidelines define the acceptable levels for conducting and evaluating the elements of the screening program; provide evaluation criteria for the determination of access authorization; provide provisions for accepting unescorted access authorization from other utilities; allow for a waiver of screening requirements for personnel who have three years continuous employment; include a grandfathering of personnel who were previously screened; address continual behavior observation program requirements; and discuss records maintenance and evaluation and audits of the access authorization program to assure compliance with the intent of the utility's unescorted access authorization program *

• 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY The final granting and controlling of unescorted access authorization is the responsibility of the utility. Utilities are responsible for auditing non-utilities, who conduct their own screening and/or implement continual behavior observation programs, to assess compliance with these guidelines.

4.0 APPLICABILITY These guidelines apply to all utilities and utilities shall require those contractors and vendors who provide services at the utility's nuclear power plants to also follow them. These guidelines will become effective on DATE One level of unescorted access authorization will be granted to personnel who have been processed in accordance with these guidelines.

Such unescorted access authorization will allow access to both protected and vital areas, as needed, for all personnel.

5.0 SCREENING PROGRAM 5.1 Initiation of a Screening Program No element of the screening program shall be initiated without the knowledge and written consent of the person who is subject to such screening. The applicant for unescorted access authorization shall be informed of the types of records that may be produced and retained, where such records are normally maintained, the duration such records are usually retained, the applicant's rights concerning access to the information, and to whom and under what circumstances the information will be released.

Initial screening requirements are applicable to those individuals who have never been screened or granted unescorted access authorization except as defined in Section 7.0 or 11.0.

Th e initial screening progra m has two components: A background investigation (Section 5.2) and a psychological assessment (Section 5.3).

An applicant may withdraw consent to a psychological assessment or background investigation at any time. When withdrawal of consent is made, all processing of work in connection with either the psychological assessment or background investigation shall cease as soon as practical. Withdrawal of consent shall be deemed withdrawal of the application for unescorted access authorization.

Information collected under these guidelines shall be released

• only on a need to know basis

• 5.2 Background Investigation Elements The background investigation shall cover the last three years prior to the date of application for access authorization. Each utility shall make every reasonable attempt to address the applicant's employment history, educational history, criminal history, military service, and the applicant's character and reputation in the following manner.

5.2.1 Employment History - Through contacts with previous employers obtain the following information:

a. Verification of claimed periods of employment and interruptions of employment in excess of 30 days;

b. Disciplinary history;

c. Reasons for termination and eligibility for rehire; and

d. Any other information that would adversely reflect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as it relates to being permitted unescorted access.

5.2.2 Education History - Verify claimed enrollment at an educational institution for the previous three years. In addition, verify the highest claimed post high school attendance or degree regardless of time.

5.2.3 Criminal History - As permitted by federal, state or other app l icable law, a criminal history record check through appropriate law enforcement agencies or court records shall be performed.

5.2.4 Militar Servi ce - Verification of military period of service claimed or developed), by receipt of an honorable discharge on a form 00214 or through acquisition and submittal of an applicant's authorization for re lea se of military history info rmation to the National Personnel Records Center. If it becomes known that an individual's discharge is other than honorable, further investigation shall be made.

5.2.5 Character and Reputa tion - The applicant's reputation for emoti ona l stability , re li ability and trustworthiness shall be examined through contact with two references supplied by the applicant and at least two additional references (not related to the applicant) developed during the investigation. Emphasis shall be placed on:

a* Identified psychological problems;

• b.

c.

d.

Criminal history; Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance; Abuse of alcohol;

e. Susceptibility to coercion; and

f. Any other conduct relating to an applicant's trustworthiness and reliability to discharge job duties within the environment of a nuclear power plant.

5.2.6 Verification of True Identity. - The verification of the applicant's identity through a means such as applicant's name, photograph, physical characteristics, social security number, date of birth, and physical characteristics with employment, educational, military and other records and/or employer and character references who have a personal acquaintance with the applicant.

5.3 Psychological Evaluation Reliability and stability shall be indicated by the result of a reliable written personality test or by any other professionally accepted clinical assessment procedure. The results of such test or procedure, including an interview if required, will be evaluated by, or evaluated in accordance with the procedure or guidelines approved by a qualified, and if applicable, a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist.

6.0 EVALUATI ON CRITERIA FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION The decision to clear an individual for authorization for unescorted access shall consider information obtained during the background investigation and psychological assessment. This information shall be reviewed using the guidelines specified in this section:

6. 1 Willful omission or falsification of information submitted in support of employment or request for clearance for unescorted access to protected or vital areas.

6.2 Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol without adequate evidence of rehabilitation.

6.3 Criminal history that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6.4 History of mental illness or emotional instability that may cause a significant defect in the individual's judgment or reliability and may cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel .

6.5 Any evidence of coercion, influence or pressure that may be applied by outside sources to compel an individual to commit any act of sabotage or other act that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6.6 Evidence that the individual has committed or attempted to co11111it or aided, or abetted another who committed or attempted to commit, any act of sabotage or other act that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6.7 A psychological evaluation which indicates that the individual is a risk in terms of trustworthiness or reliability.

6.8 Any other information that would adversely reflect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as relates to being permitted unescorted access.

7.0 WAIVER FOR CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT The utility may waive the background investigation and psychological assessment for any individual who has had, for the previous three years, continuous and trustworthy employment with the utility, contractor or vendor, provided that the utility, contractor or vendor meets the requirements of these guidelines.

8.0 TRANSFER AND REINSTATEMENT OF UNESCORTED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION Transfer or reinstatement of unescorted access authorization requires verification of the individual's true identity by the utility.

8.1 Transfer An individual's unescorted access authorization granted by one utility may be transferred to another utility if the individual's unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days. The gaining utility must verify that the individual has been screened in accordance with Section 5.0 and evaluated in accordance with 6.0 and has a current, valid unescorted access authorization or that a valid unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions within the previous 365 days. This verification documentation may be accomplished by a written certification from the utility who last granted unescorted access authorization, through review of computer records, or other means. The gaining utility must cross-check information such as name, date of birth, social security number, sex and other applicable physical characteristics for identification *

• 8.2 Reinstatement The utility may reinstate the unescorted access authorization granted an individual if the individual returns to the same utility and unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the previous unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions.

8.3 Background Update Requirements Where the individual's unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for more than 365 calendar days, the utility will update the background investigation to cover the individual's activities from the date of the previous background investigation but not to exceed three years.

9.0 SCREENING DURING COLD SHUTDOWN 9.1 Devitalization of Vital Areas During refueling or maintenance outages in which all or a part of a nuclear power plant is in a cold shutdown and/or devitalized status, the utility may grant unescorted access authorization to the protected and devitalized areas for personnel who have not been screened in accordance with Sections 5.0 or 7.0 providing that:

9.1.1 The unescorted and unscreened person is restricted to the protected or devitalized areas.

9.1.2 Other requirements of the approved security plan remain in force for the other vital areas.

- 9.1.3 Prior to start-up, a thorough visual inspection of the devitalized area is made by knowledgeable plant personnel to identify signs of tampering or sabotage.

9.1.4 Approp riate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure that all operating and safety systems are functioning normally.

9.2 Temporary Clearances In situations where there is insufficient time to process a full clearance in accordance with Section 5.0 such as maintenance and refueling conditions, provisions are available to grant a temporary clearance. A temporary clearance is to be used in situations which require expedited processing.

Unescorted access authorization based on a temporary clearance

• will not exceed a period of 180 continuous days. A temporary clearance cannot be transferred from one utility to another in accordance with Section 8.1. This 180 day temporary clearance may be based upon satisfaction of 9.2.1 and one or more of the following conditions listed under 9.2.2 thru 9.2.6.

9.2.1 Passing a psychological evaluation within the past year.

9.2.2 Submission of a signed and notarized document by the present employer attesting that the employee has not committed acts that would otherwise preclude granting of unescorted access.

9.2.3 Verification of the employee's current or last period of employment and reason for termination. This verification must be made within 30 days of the date temporary clearance is granted.

9.2.4 Administration of and successful completion of a drug screen during processing for access authorization.

9.2.5 Recommendation of two developed character references who have had frequent and direct association with the contractor employee within the past 90 days.

9.2.6 Favorable criminal history record information.

10.0 GRANDFATHERING The utility may grant unescorted access authorization to individuals who are cleared for unescorted access as of DATE 11.0 CONTRACTOR AND VENDOR REQUIREMENTS The utility may accept the results of the entire screening program or any part thereof conducted by a contractor or vendor, provided that the contractor or vendor meets the requirements of these guidelines and that it makes its records available for auditing by the utility in accordance with Section 12.0 and 13.0.

12.0 EVALUATION AND AUDITS The utility or its designated representative shall conduct triennial audits of contractor and vendor access authorization programs to ensure compliance with these guidelines. A copy of this audit will be made available to the NRC. Other utilities may accept the originating utility's audit and need not re-audit the same contractor or vendor.

• The NRC will maintain a current list of contractors and vendors that have been audited and retain the copies of the audits for a period of three years.

13 .0 RECORDS Utilities and contractors and vendors of utilities who conducted screening programs in accordance with these guidelines shall maintain records that verify:

a. A background investigation and psychological assessment was conducted for each person who is screened under Section 5.0 of these guidelines.

b. Three years of continued and trustworthy employment for each person who is screened under Section 6.0 of these guidelines.

c. That the persons were cleared for unescorted access authorization on DATE

d. Satisfaction with the conditions of Section 9.2 which results in the granting of a temporary clearance.

Records for each person who is granted unescorted access shall be retained with the utility, contractor or vendor for a three year period following termination of access authorization.

Each utility or utility's contractor or vendor who collects personal information for the purpose of processing access authorizations shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for the protection of the personal information. This information should not be disclosed to persons other than the subject or his representative, auditors whose purpose for review is to inspect program compliance, and other utilities if an individual's access authorization is transferred

• Iowa Electric Light and Power Company March 8, 1985 NG-85-1126

~OJ ' 13 All :04 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No: 50-331 Op. License No: DPR-49 Comments on Proposed Rule Change to 10 CFR 73, Access Authorization Rule File: A-119

Dear Mr. Ch i1 k:

This letter provides comments regarding the proposed revision to 10 CFR Part 73, generally referred to as the Access Authorization Rule.

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company endorses the position developed by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) that rulemaking is not necessary to address this issue.

If it is ultimately determined that rulemaking is required, Iowa

• Electric supports the alternative rulemaking proposed by EEI. Additionally, Iowa Electric proposes that polygraph examinations be accepted as valid security clearance screening in lieu of the background investigation and psychological assessment.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this issue.

Very truly 'yours,

I?, w. t!hfu~

Richard W. McGaughy Manager, Nuclear Division RWM/BWR/t a*

cc: B. Reid L. Liu S. Tuthill M. Thadani NRC Resident Office ,/

Acknowieag.., bJ Glllf, ., * !!Nt~ a, General Office

• P.O. Bo,x 351

• Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406

• 319/398-4411

lJ S N'UU f:/1 ~ UI ATORV OMMISSitlW DOCK~T NG & srnv1r ~-rroN C F HES I

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LOUISIANA; p OWE R & LIGHT 142 DELARDNDE ~tRE~)r.

P. D. BOX 6()()8

• N~W CfRLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345 MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM p3:32 March 07, 1985 ROTH S. LEDO/CK Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations "C

W3P85-0564 3-A1.01.04 A4.05 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Proposed Nuclear Access Authorization Rule:

F.R/Vol. 49, No. 149/Wednesday, August 1, 1984

Dear Sir:

Louisiana Power & Light has reviewed the Access Authorization Rule aud proposed amendments to 10CFR73, and as a Member of NUMARC, we support the NUMARC position. However, pursuant to the request for comment, we wisn to note certain exceptions and comments

• Enclosed are Louisiana Power & Light's comments on the subject rule.

Very truly yours, RSL/RMN/BGM/cmb kl.~

Enclosure cc (w/enclosure): H.S. Blumenthal

U.°t. UCLEAR REGUl..ATnov C"OMMISSIOII DOCKETING & SF" V OFFICE OF l OF TW r r--r10N Y

D Poatmark Da

• W3P85-0564 Secretary of the Commission bee (w/enclosure): w.c. Nelson, R.S. Leddick, R.P. Barkhurst, F.J.

Drummond, L.F. McCrocklin, C.A. Ponder, W.J.

Friloux, F.J. Englebracht, J. Sleger, E.G.

Beckendorf, E.W. Haskins (EEI), D.P. Cooksey, Administrative Support, Licensing Library

Louisiana Power & Light Comments on Proposed Access Authorization Rule and Miscellaneous Amendments Louisiana Power & Light has reviewed the Access Authorization Rule and

.Miscellaneous Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 and has noted certain ex-ceptions, our comments are formatted along the guidelines of the Federal Register Vol. 49; No. 149, Wed., August 1, 1984 as follows:

Searches of Indiyiduals 10 CFR Part 73.55(d)(1) page 30739 We recommend the rewording of a portion of this section as follows:

"When firearms and/or explosives detection equipment at a

,portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the license may exempt persons granted unescorted access from pat-down search for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If either

.. firearms or explosives detection equipment is not operational after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> a random 10S pat-down search or persons ~ranted unescorted access shall be instituted until

• such time as either firearms or explosives detection

• requirement is operational. On-duty armed security force

• members should receive the same exemption from search as on-duty law enforcement officers for the same reason as set forth in the logic for not searching law enforcement officers."

The 100S pat-down search requirement in the event of

• equipment failure will result in long delays and irate employees. The proposed screening requirement for unescorted access should establish a high degree of reliability for those exempted from search during temporary periods of equipment failure. Personnel not screened for unescorted access would be subject to 100j pat-down search.

1

Implementation-Period 73.56, page 30732 No comment on proposed implementation date.

Background-Investigation 73.56(c) page 30733 We propose that the essential elements of the background investigation be as follows:

- Take reasonable steps to verify true identity

- Account for time and establish a past history of trustworthiness and reliability by verifying the following for a retrospective time period 01* a minimum of 3 years:

Employment History

- Education (verify all past high school degrees)

- Criminal History

- Military History (To be considered when listed or wnen surfaced by other investigative steps)

- Character and Reputation - to include two references not supplied by applicant Credit check LP&L proposed rewording rule on Grandfathering. See writeup in Grandfathering section.

The last sentence of paragraph (c) requiring self reporticg by the employee of incidents which may have a bearing on his/her access authorization (and possibly his/her employment as well) should be deleted. It is our opinion that such a requirement is unrealistic and is difficult to audit at be st.

2

Backgroynd Investigation Evaluation Criteria, 73-56(b) General performance objective and requirements, last sentence page 30733.

,* * (b)(3) As some state law may be in conflict with the regulation i.e. it is an act of employment discrimination to refuse to employ, to bar or terminate from employment any individual because of his/her conviction record unless the offense substantially relates to the circumstances or tne particular job. The NRC should clarify the legal authority of its regulations as they may relate to state statutes *

• PsYohologtcal Assessment 73.56(d)

We have reviewed the psychological assessment in the amendment and make the following comments:

The Reg Guide Task SG 301-4 is unduly prescriptive.

Licensees should be required to develop psychological testing programs within the framework of the general objectives of the rule without detailed direction as to how this should be done.

(2) clinical interviews (ii) - The regulations state that tests and

• interviews shall be designed to evaluate *** behavioral patterns which could develop into a "high" (very subjective) potential for committing detrimental acts.

It is assumed that a licensee which might determine to take a somewhat more conservative and restrictive approach would thereby be in violation of the rule. This prescriptive, subjective standard should be eliminated.

Same section - the word "senior", relating to the reporting relationship of the clinician to management should be deleted as being unduly prescriptive. The licensee should be free to establish and implement this program at the level

. . it sees fit.

3'

Continual Behavioral Observation 73-56(e) page 30734 We recommend that this section be deleted.

Contractor-Screening Reauirementa 73-56(a)(4) page 30733 The "generic plan" needs to be further clarified in terms of whether the scope needs to be further clarified - "must the contractor program be implemented to the same extent as for licensee employees"?

• NRG Employee Access 73-56(f)(2) page 30734 We agree with the right of NRC employee access based on certification that they have met the intent of those requirement. We again note the seeming double standard applied to NRC and non NRG personnel in the area of psychological testing.

Appeals Process/Review frocedure 73-56(g) page 30734 We recommend that this section be deleted in its entirety.

Protection-or~rnformation (h) Protection of Information pag~ 30734

• Revisions are recommended as follows:

Revise 73.45(h)(2) as follows: "The licensee *** shall not disclose the personal information collected *** to persons other than the subject individual, or his representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process of granting or denying access to protected areas and vital islands or any legal actions stemming-therefrom," Legal actions stemming from future security clearance denials are a certainty. The proposed revision recognizes that licensee legal staff may require access to screening records in order to represent the licensee in such cases.

Permit the exchange of information from one licensee to another to reduce, somewhat, the potential for liability ex-posure.

Grandfathering 73-56(b)(1) page 30733 We recommend rewording as follows:

n *** This behavioral observation program shall include a supervisor training program* and, if needed, a new psychological assessment. Unescorted access to the Protected and/or Vital Areas may be granted to employees

• based on the reliability established by three continuous years of trustworthy employment. Employees having three or more years of satisfactory service may be given a full or abbreviated investigation or be exempt from Background Investigation. No employees requiring unescorted access will be exempted from the psychological screening portion of

.-. - the Personnel Screening Program. n Employee Self-Report 73-56(c) page 30733 We recommend that this be deleted as discussed under Background Investigation *

• Reci proc+/--tv We support the granting of reciprocity for the employee moving from one licensee to another. We oppose the requirement for transmittal of a photograph from one licensee to another.

Cold-ShutdowntRefµel+/-ne---IemoorarY Access 73-56(f)(3) page 30734 We agree with the proposal to permit temporary unescorted access in these circumstances providing this is only an op-tion as stated in the rule.

5

Safeguards eorttringencY*Plans 50.34(d) page 30731 and 50.54(p) page 30732 We have no comment on the 50.34 change as it appears to change nindustrial sabotagen to "radiological sabotage" only. We believe the 50.54(p) change should be deleted as it appears to be redundant.

NRC-Audtt-Regutrements 73.56(g)(3) page 30734 We recommend that the word "ensure" be deleted and be

• replaced with assure that-concractoc-records -are pertodica}ly-audited. We note also that considerable dif-ference of opinion exists as to the extent of required audits. Some question has al~o been raised over the legal authority of the rule to protect licensees or contractors from civil liability in the disclosure of screening records.

Record*Retention-Regu+/-remenc 73-56(g)(5) page 30734 We have no comment on the record retention requirements *

. Vital Isrand-Desiinaticn-and-Vital-Island*Access & Control 73.55 page 30736 We recommend that this section delete all references to Vital Islands and resubmittal of plans.

suspension-of-Safeguards-+/-n-Eroergenoies 73.55(a) page 30737 We agree with this proposed amendment.

Protection-of-Sec~rity-Egutpment 73.55(e)(l) page 30737 We cannot comment pending issuance of Reg Guide Task 301-4 which may provide additional information on the scope of the proposed change.

6

Alarm*Response 73.55(4) page 30737 We have no comment concerning this proposed amendment.

Access-Record-µog 73-55(d)(7)(A), page 30737 The proposed rule requires the establishment of "access lists" for each vital island. The term "listn may imply that a written log for each vital island is required.

At present, the names of the personnel who are authorized access to a vital area are entered into the access control system computer and physical controls to the vital areas are maintained via the ID/card reader issued to each authorized person.

We recommend that the wording be changed to reflect that either a procedure (i.e. sign-in log) or computer controlled system are required to meet the intent of the rule.

D(A) Establish current authorization procedure3-or system3 for each vital island. The procedures-or sys~ems must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least every 31 days. The licensee snall include in-the-procedure-or sys~em only

• * *n

"(B) Positively control, in accordance with the procedure or-3ystem establish***"

7

• I

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C4 q !=fl Jo 72 ~) Northern States Power.

Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis , Minnesota 55401 Telephone (612) 330-5500 March 6, 1985 GFFICE DOCKET

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Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and S_e rvice Branch Comments on Proposed Changes to 10 CFR Parts SO and 73 Miscellaneous Amendments Con~erning Physical Protection Searches of individuals at Power Reactor. Facilities Access Authorization Program Northern States *Power Company appreciates the opportunity to review and comments on proposed changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 involving physical protection, searches, and access authorization in the Federal Register on August i, 1984. The comment period for these proposed changes was extended to March 7, 1985 through notice in the Federal Register on December 11, 1984.

10 CFR Part 73, Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants

1. The 180-day period specified in the proposed 73.55 to implement amended safeguards requirements is inadequate.

Hardware lead time, especially card readers and similar devices, is now six months or longer.

2. Paragraph (c) (1) states, "The licensee shall protect , as independent vital islands, onsite alternating and oirect current emergency power sources **** " Does this mean that vital islands cannot include more than one of the listed systems or structures? The term "independent" should be deleted.

3. Paragraph (d)(9) states, "Whenever an individual's access authorization is revoked due to his or her lack of thrustworthi~

ness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that person had access to must be changed. *The term "inadequate work performance" is very vague and should be deleted.

Does this paragraph mean that locks must be changed if a person used a vital area key and _returned it several months prior to having access authorization revoked?

This requires clarification.

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Northern States Power Company Secretary of the Commission March 6, 1985 Page 3

4. In conducting background investigations, temporary access should be permitted while completing some of the lengthly checks (e.g. employment history, criminal history, or military service).

For example, we have had pipefitters and welders that have worked at 15 or 20 other job sites in a one year period. Perhaps 50 to 100 individual verifications could be required if five years of employement history is checked.

5. Section (d)(l) states, Written personality tests which have " Does this indicate that more than one

• testis required? Clarification should be provided.

6. Does the continual observation program required by Section (d) apply to contractor employees as well as employees of the licensee. If so, clarification and revision of this section is needed.

Please contact us if you have any questions related to our comments.

~~~- . ::1 David Musolf Manager - Nuclear Suppo~ Services c: G Charnoff

Northern States Power Company Secretary of the Commission March 6, 1985 Page 2

4. The proposed 73.70 (d) requires, "A .log indicating name, badge ntnnber, time of entry, reason for entry, and time of exit of all individuals granted access to a vital island except those individuals entering or exiting the reactor control room." This requirement currently applies only to unmanned vital areas.

This change will require extensive additional hardware to implement. These modifications could not be completed within 180 days (see item 1 above).

The requirement for additional logging can adversely affect safety by denial of operator access if mistakes are made in entering access codes. The benefits of this logging in continuously manned vital areas do not appear to balance this adverse affect on safety.

As noted in IE Information Notice 83-36, vital area access control systems, beyond the basic requirements, will degrade safety by unnecessarily restricting operators.

10 CFR Part 73, Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities The proposed change requires equipment searches of all persons entering a protected area except federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on offical duty. It would appear that other exemptions are appropriate. Fire fighters, ambulance

• drivers, and paramedics responding to a plant fire or accident could be unnecessarily delayed by security searches.

10 CFR Parts 50 and 73, Access Authorization Program

1. Section 73.56(a)(2) requires submittal of an Access Authorization Plan within 120 days of the date the final rule is published.

More time should be allo.ted licensees for this work . A period of 180 days is appropriate.

2. Section (b)(3)(vi) requires, " *** adequate evidence of rehabilitation . " Some clarification is needed on what would be considered 'adequate evidence.

3. Section (c) requires verification of " * *

• an individual's true identity." Clarification is needed as to which methods of establishing identify are acceptable. A picture drivers license should be acceptable.

P. 0 . Box 724928 Atlanta, Ga . 302>39 P. 0 . Box 3:.189 Charlotte, N .C . 28242 NUCLEAR UTILITY MANAGEMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCE . COMMITTEE March 7, 1985 I.,

Mr. William J. Dircks Execut i ve Director for Opera~)O~s o_

~ NUM

~ o IWLE tRPR -73.

• as ~tt *, i P12 :09

~~;hi~~~~~~r 0~eg~b;~~ry Corrmnss,on [44 ~12- ?x:; 73 ¥)

Dear Mr. Dircks:

On August 1, 1984, the proposed "Insider Safeguards" rules were published for comment. The publ i c colTITlent period was extended based upon requests from the industry and from NUMARC as discussed in our November 20 letter to you.

During this extended review period, we assembled representatives from a number of utilities who carefully examined the proposed rulemaking package and the corrments that had been developed by several industry groups.

• - On February 27, at the NUMARC Executive Group Meetingt a preponderance of the ut i lities agreed that some existing and proposed regulations for access author i zation are unnecessary and overly prescriptive.

We conclude that the potential "insider" threat does not warrant the measures contained in the proposed regulations for access authorization.

NUMARC is concerned that continued expansion of security regulations could adversely impact the ab i l i ty of the i ndustry to manage and motivate its employees. We believe that adequate standards to provide appropriate protection from the ins i der threat are already in use.

The proposed rule has the very real danger of diverting industry resources away from the matters roore directly related to operational safety.

NUMARC als~ believes that the need for these proposed regulations is reduced by the estab l ishment of ut ili ty fitness for duty programs. A NUMARC work i ng group is develop i ng guidelines based on current industry standards, to help ass i st utilities in implementation of the i r access author i zation programs.

We request that the NRC withdraw its proposed regulations on access author i zation and re-eva l uate the need for ex i sting and addit i onal regu l ations i n thi s area.

In our March 20, 1985 meet i ng with the NRC Commiss i oners we plan to discuss the need for regulations i n this area. We look forward to a constructive i nterchange wit h the Commiss i on on th is matter.

Yours truly, ri.~9.-

Cha i rman Steering Committee cc: Secretary of the Commission v (Attn: Docketing and Service Branch)

U.S. NUCLEAR RE~ULAf6~Y C<'MMISSI.OJI DOCKETING & SERVI CE SECT ION OfflrE OF THF SE,- ET ARY OF THE CC" M' ION

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NOTE TO RECEIPIENTS PR-50,73 (49 FR 30726)

Co1T111ent No. 131 from IRM Energy, Inc. (Bach) is a duplicate of"'J MY.,l2J Pl 2 :QO Comment No. 107. This number will be used again.

Docketing and Service Branch Office of the Secretary of the Commission March 12, 1985

IRM Energy, Inc.

5 March 1985 Security Screening 421 Sixth Street Annapolis, Maryland 21403 Telephone (301) 268-3700 All :59 ftF"t-"i(.;-* . . .., .. l. .t.

Secretary of the Commission KCT" G ..,EfiVICt

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission BRANCH Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

,-- r-

Reference:

Access Authorization Program 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73

- Gentlemen:

This letter is in response to NRC 's invitation for comments and suggestions as outlined in the Federal Register of 1 August 1985 on the above-referenced subject, and specifically as pertains to psychological assessment.

There is considerable research evidence that has accumulated over the many years since the development of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test (MMPI) attesting to the validity and reliability of the instrument as a screening device. Similar research has led to the development of other scales scales particularly useful in situations for specific screening circumstances.

For example the MacAndrews scale, which is related to a measurement of the potential for substance abuse. It is felt that the use of the MMPI as a clearly validated and reliable instrument well serves the NRC specifically both in determining an individual's fitness for duty in a nuclear power plant, but also to the end of concerns about radiological sabotage. While

• issues can be raised about the individual's civil liberties and their possible infringement upon these liberties by psychological assessment, it is felt by the undersigned that the social consequences can outweigh the acknowledged infringement on an individual's civil liberty. The potential cost of a nuclear catastrophy is so high that its psychological concerns should be paramount due to the concern about potential harm to society.

This does not mean that the exclusion of an individual from a security (i.e., unescorted access) position would automatically exclude this indi-vidual from other positions.

It is terribly important, however, that the psychological assessment procedures be used solely to determine reliability in a nuclear setting and not be utilized by institutions as a way of dealing with issues that are, and should be, purely administrative concerns and decisions.

(For example, bringing in a Labor Union problem, etc.)

i. ~AR REtui.ATORY ~fflOJI l)OCKETING & 5-EIWICE SECT I QFFICE OF THE SECRET RY.

F THE COMM IS ION Oocum nf St st ICf cttnArlc Date _3_/4 / fS-_ _

pi R c~1 ved

- - I-dd' I Copies Rep xi \

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Secretary of the Commission 5 March 1985 Page Two In any reliability screening program there will be Type I and Type II errors. Type II errors are of the magnitude that are unknown. The percentage of Type I errors in the reliability assessment program is unknown, however, it is a researchable question and an important question. It is recommended that appropriate research be directed to this question.

While the MMPI is a valid and reliable self-r~port inventory that measures an individual's potential for aberrant 9ehavior in functioning in deviant matters, it is not a behavioral observation and therefore it is most useful wi th the backg1.o.:and i11vestigat.ior. and cl.in:i.ccil inte:::view.

The focus of evaluation js in detecting .individuals with potential for acting out behavior, passive aggressive characteristics, substance abuse, psychopathology in which reality is distorted, and other emotional di fficulties.

We would s trongly recommend due to the issues of public safety that serious consideration be given to the use of valid and reliable means of determining an individual's suitability.

If there is any further information you may find useful please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely yours,

~.~

• Thomas R. Bach, Ph.D *

~,t Consultant TRB/EEI/n IRM Energy, Inc.

Mailing Address Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street ooem lUll!IRPR PQ()Q!O RULE -SO, 7..;.,/

2 Post Off1ce Box 2641 Birmingham , Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6090 CAii Ff2 3o1Z6 R. P. McDonald Senior Vice President Flintridge Building

.\

Alabama Power 1*. A11 :47 NS-85-0594 OFFICE , ~ lRt .J. t' OOCKE.T ,G & SERVIC'.

S~ANCH March 5, 1985 Secretary of the Co1T111ission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Alabama Power Company is opposed to the proposed Access Authorization Program as published in the Federal Register, Volume 49 No. 149 on Wednesday, August 1, 1984. Alabama Power Company considers the guidance now in effect to be sufficient to address the postulated security threat and does not feel any rulemaking is jus * *ed.

~ R. P. McDonald RPM/JGS:sam

• cc: Mr. W.

Mr. H.

Mr. J.

Mr. K.

Mr. D.

File 0.

O.

G.

W.

B.

Whitt Thrash Sims McCracken Hinman

NUCLE~R RFG Ul OC T G 0 F OF n ~

OF THE COM T(:'IDY r . I ~

<"OMMf$S ET Docu:nent Stati,t ics rk Date Received Co ie -

YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY Telephone (617) 8 72-8100 TWX 710-380-7619 FYC 85-05 r-Ct,A - 85=-26 16 71 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachus(tltitOJ 701 March 6, 1985 Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject rulemakings. Yankee Atomic owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. Its Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services for other nuclear power plants in the Northeast including Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook.

Yankee Atomic is a participant in the Physical Security Coordinating Group (PSCG), who will comment at our request and in our behalf. We urge the Commission to give the fullest consideration to the PSCG's comments since they represent a unique and insightful contribution to the record in this rulemaking.

We fail to see a need, however, for increased regulation in the access authorization area. The so-called "insider" threat has, to our knowledge,

• never materialized, and the record in this rulemaking does not evidence any substantive proof of its existence. We strongly believe that this situation is a consequence of effective utility compliance with the already extensive NRC physical security requirements, as well as a result of the Industry's excellent security practices. Thus, we encourage the Commission to reconsider the need for rulemaking, especially as it appears to be premised more upon the perception of risk than upon any ascertained risk.

Very truly yours, Robert E. Helfrich, Esq.

REH:mj Mgr. Generic Licensing Activities

~~ IUIIB£RPR

- _7.3 {ii)

{_4q FR.. 30735.

' I.,

Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney40~~~~(3~~~~~ 68 w :46 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 UlDl1 ":HPR-M;~c_ ,JJ;~

ATTN: Docketing & Service Branch C1/2. 9~)

Subject:

(1) Comments on Proposed Rule on Access Authorization Program (2) Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (3) Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (4) Draft Regulatory Guide Regarding Vital Islands, Protection of Physical Security Equipment and Key and Lock Controls The Omaha Public Power District, owner and operator of Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1, is a member of the Physical Security Coordinating Group sponsored by KMC Inc. We wish to support the comments filed by the Group on March 7, 1985, regarding the four (4) subject issues. The District respectfully requests your consideration of these comments.

• RLA/DJM/dao R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby &MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Mr. E.G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager Mr. L.A. Yandell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

-'cknowfedged by card.

• 45 5124 Employment w ith Equal Opportunity Ma le Female

I *

u. s. NUCLEAR Rrou T PY C DOO<ETING & s l- C ~ Tl OH OF THE SECRETt RY:

OF THE COM I N Document Sto i,tic P01fmark Date 311 trs-Copie,s Received Add' I Copies Repr

PR-~, 13 (jj

• SMUD 4q F£ ~12.~

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT [) 6201 S Street, ~Q., ~.ox-15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830, (916) 452-3211 AN ELECTR l~~frw"LE M SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA March 6, 1985 SECRETARY TO THE COMMISSION US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATTN DOCKETING AND SERVICE BRANCH WASHINGTON DC 20555

SUBJECT:

1. District comments on the "Proposed Rule on Access Authorization Program."

2. District comments on "Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants."

3. District comments on "Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities . "

On August 1, 1984, the Commission published in the Federal Register three proposed rules on physical protection of nuclear power plants. These proposed rules are interrelated, and to some degree relate to other initiatives either

• completed or under way within the NRC and industry. For example, the "Fitness for Duty" policy statement was approved by the Commission on October 17, 1984, and will be published soon. Certain portions of the "Proposed Access Authorization Program" requirements related to continued observation are redundant to that policy statement. Additionally, the NRC's review of assumptions used by their contractors in vital area analysis could markedly influence the designation of vital areas subject to control under the proposed rule on "Miscellaneous Amendments."

The District is in agreement with the use of equipment instead of hands-on, pat-down searches of personnel gaining access to protected areas. This rule should be implemented irrespective of what happens to the other proposed rules.

The District is commenting in detail on the proposed security regulations and their related Regulatory Guides. These comments are provided as enclosures to this letter, identified as Enclosures A, B, C, D, E, and F. Additionally, we would like to make a few general comments concerning the proposed Access Authorization Program.

U.S. NUCLEAR RE.GULATORY CO"'MMISSLOB DOCKETING & SER-VICE SE<il OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Pottniark Date Copi* Received I Add' I Copies Reproduced I ---~---,--'-

First of all, the District wants to stress the point that it is committed to excellence in our security program at the Rancho Seco Nuc lear Generating Station. This is evidenced by NRC 's giving the security program at Rancho Seco a Category 1 rating for the last two years. Additionally, the District believes its NRC- approved security program is more than sufficient as it is now implemented. Our access authorization and screening program, in conjunction with the other elements of our security program (i.e., vital area access controls, patrols, inspections, supervisory oversight, etc.), have successfully prevented radiological sabotage to the plant for many years.

While it is true that the District (and other nuclear power plants) has experienced some minor and iso lated incidents where an employee or contractor has committed acts of malicious mischief, the District believes these incidents were caused by disgrunt led persons who, after they were screened and given access authorization, became upset for various reasons and then acted out their frustrations. In the District's experience, those persons were identified by the existing security program and our ongoing supervisory observation and inspection procedu r es. It is the Dist ri ct's opinion that even if the proposed Access Authorization Prog ram had been in effect, that it would not have predicted their future actions any better than its present program, nor identify their actions any soone r than its current program.

The District is not aware of any NRC study that indicates there has been any significant change to the threat levels to nuclear power plants. With the absence of any such evidence, it is difficult to understand why the Commission wants to issue a more stringent, highly prescriptive, and very-expensive- to-implement new rule on access screening and authorization. The proposed access screening rule does not provide any flexibility in the implementation of screening programs from utility to utility. This new rule, if implemented, would cost the District hundreds of thousands of dollars per year without conclusive improvement in the secur i ty program. The latitude allowed in interpretation of the cold - shutdown security-inspection procedures could cost the District three plant weeks and the r esulting millions of dollars in energy replacement costs for the detailed inspections every t i me the plant is shut down under the devitalization procedures.

Additional rules should not be imposed upon the utilit i es unless there are clearly identifiable benefits. We see little benefit associated with the proposed rules on access authorization and the miscellaneous amendments.

There must be acceptable limits of risk in operating nuclear plants--or, said another way, how secure is secure enough? With the recent addition of the "Fitness for Duty" program, the District believes its security program i s more than sufficient to meet the threat criteria as established by the Commission.

The new, proposed Access Authorization Plan is not needed and should not be enacted by the Commission.

We fully support and concur with NUMARC ' s position that the potential "insider" threat is not sufficient to justify the measures contained in the proposed regulations for access authorization, and that the NRC withdraw its proposed regulations on access authorization and reevaluate the need for

additional regulations in this area. If, however, the NRC believes additional regulations are necessary, we are offering our comments on the NRC proposals and responding to the NRC questions submitted on the access authorization rule in the enclosures.

C /./::::::~

General Manager

Enclosures:

A - District comments on proposed Access Authorization program B - Answers to specific questions--Access Authorization Rule C - District comments on proposed rule concerning Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities D - District comments on proposed Miscellaneous Amendments E - District comments on draft Regulatory Guide (Task SG30l-4) 11 Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants 11 F - District comments on draft Regulatory Guide (Task SG302-4) 11 Vital Islands, Protection of Physical Security Equipment, and Key and Lock Controls 11

Sacramento Municipal Utility District John J. Mattimoe ENCLOSURE A COMMENTS ON ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM I. INTRODUCTION The NRC, when it promulgated 10 C.F.R. Section 73.55 in February, 1977, established by rule the requirement that power reactor licensees protect against the postulated threat posed by an insider. Studies of the vulnerability and likely consequences of sabotage to various targets in our society have shown that many other industries and human endeavors pose greater risks than do nuclear power plants (Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Reactors to Acts of Sabotage--SAND 75-0504). While the insider threat remains only a postulated risk, the NRC s regulatory 1

framework continues to require that it be considered.

The issue underlying the proposed rule and the existing Section 73.55 is whether the required physical security measures provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected. Absolute assurance is neither required nor possible. The question then is how secure should nuclear plants be--what is the acceptable limits of risk?

To evaluate the proposals, and to put them in perspective, it is also useful to consider the success of present programs and alternative techniques that have been proposed to minimize the threat of insider sabotage. First of all, current policies and procedures have been effective in preventing radiological sabotage at nuclear power plants.

There have been some isolated events where utility or contractor employees have caused some malicious mischief and these acts were apparently motivated by persons who became disgruntled about something after the initial screening and background investigations had been completed. It is likely that a strong Fitness for Duty or Continued Observation Program would be the primary programs that would identify the individuals involved--not a more stringent access authorization program.

Other alternatives considered by the NRC in the past have included personnel pat-down searches, two-man rule requirements for access to vital areas, and more stringent access control provisions, i.e.,

antipassback features on computer access control cards, individual identification codes in addition to card access, time of day controls, required entry of work order numbers into card readers to track reason for entry into vital areas, etc. The Connnission must recognize that no one'technique is foolproof. Extensive pat-down searches would improve the detection of sabotage equipment being brought on-site; however, the material or equipment needed to carry out many scenarios is already available in the plant. The two-man rule might reduce the probability of some acts of sabotage; but, in many cases it would not reduce the A-1

risk at all and would increase occupational exposure and personnel response times for taking corrective actlons. In recent months the Commisslon has recognized most of these measures would also impede access which is required to maintain safe plant operation.

In the overall evaluation of the proposed access authorization rule, a balanced judgment needs to be made. Security must be adequate. But it must be achieved in a-way that will not adversely affect plant safety and will not be so burdensome that it will discourage good security attitudes and practices by the people affected and ultimately prove to be counter productive.

Wholly apart from NRC regulatory requirements, it is in the District s 1

own interests to permit only trustworthy and reliable individuals to*

have unescorted access to plant areas in which safety-related equipment could be sabotaged. The District agrees that trustworthiness and reliability can be established based on periods of satisfactory employment and/or by a reasonable check of past history. It becomes a question then of degree, how much checking is enough?

In view of the large numbers of transient workers who may be required to have access to the plant during extended outages, the NRC's proposed rule recognizes that when a plant is shutdown, the potential consequences of any act of sabotage are less. Certain areas may, therefore, be temporarily reclassified as nonvital. While the District agrees with this new concept, it is vital that the required prestartup inspection of devitalized areas be better defined. The current rule and 1ts accompanying Regulatory Guide leaves wide latitude to NRC Regional personnel to interpret how much inspection is required to detect sabotage or sabotage attempts. For example, if the District were required to check every wire connection to determine if the correct wire was affixed to the correct terminal, etc., the inspection could take weeks to perform. Since this inspection would have to be performed after the outage was over and all uncleared individuals had left site, the costs for th1s feature of the new proposed rule would result in several millions of dollars per shutdown in additional outside purchases of energy.

The proposed rule as drafted permits one reactor licensee to take advantage of another licensee s authorization program to reduce the 1

duplication of screening efforts of workers who move from site to site.

Again, the District agrees that this reciprocity provision is a good element of the new proposed rule. However, a new rule is not necessary or required to allow for reciprocity. Utilities within a region, who found ft advantageous or economically feasible, can and do meet together and have developed mutually agreeable methods to share information, develop a common data base, etc. For example, a group of south eastern utilities have developed what is called the NEDS <Nuclear Employee Data System) System. There is no need for the NRC to use a new rule as a "cookie cutter to force all utilities to have identical security plans 11 and programs. The "cookie cutter" approach does not allow for flexibility of programs in order to meet regional needs and wide variances in State laws concerning many elements of the proposed rule.

A-2

The District believes that there has been sufficient experience among the utilities since 1977, with programs similar to those now proposed in the rule, to give confidence that all existing security access authorization programs are effective against the insider threat. If it is true that there are still individual sites with truly substandard security programs, then the NRC should deal with those utilities individually to bring their programs up to standard. It is time to bring to rest the alternative physical security proposals which have surfaced from time to time. This new access authorization rule is simply not needed.

II. DEVITALIZATION As indicated in the previous section, the District agrees with the basic idea that during cold shutdowns, devitalization of most, if not all vital areas is appropriate. The District is pleased that the NRC properly recognizes that when a plant is shutdown, the potential consequences of any act of sabotage are less. Other than the previously stated concern over the potential wide latitude given NRC personnel to interpret what a good inspection program should consist of, and the potentially enormous costs, the District favors this stated concept.

The District does not consider this portion of the new rule, with the exceptions as stated above, a real increase in overall risks considering the other safeguards requirements already required to be in place.

Another comment concerning devitalization concerns the treatment of licensee employees during cold shutdown and refueling operations. There is no logic for prohibiting licensee employees who do not have access authorizat1on from the same temporary access authorization that contractor, manufacturer or supplier employees are afforded. Yet, the title of Section 73.56(f), "nonlicensee employees," suggests that the temporary authorization provided by Section 73.56(f)(3) does not apply to licensee employees <even though the wording of Section 73.56(f)(3) does not seem to be so restricted). While this distinction may not have been intended, the Commission should make clear that licensee employees are treated as are other employees. This can be done by appropriately changing the title of Section 73.56(f) or by giving Section 73.56(f)(3) it's own subsection.

I II. BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION Proposed Section 73.56(c) sets forth the general requirements for background investigation component of the access authorization program.

First, the provision states that the licensee is responsible for background investigations "that provide assurance that Individuals are 11 reliable, trustworthy and will act so as to protect health and minimize danger to life and property. The "provide assurance" standard is inconsistent with the "reasonable assurance standard that underlies all 1

of the Commisston s responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act. See, 1

Power Reactor Development Corporation vs. Industrial Union, 369 U.S. 396 (1961). While it may be appropriate for a background investigation program to have as it's objective the providing of assurance that individuals are trustworthy and reliable, licensees can not be asked to assure such findings. The language of proposed Section 73.56(c) should be appropriately IOOdifted.

A-3

However, persons working in the nuclear industry have grown accustomed to general background checks into their past work history and criminal history. It is our experience that many persons object to psychological checking or testing and almost all highly resent credit checks.

With regard to the continued behavioral observation program, the District does not believe that the proposed extensive guidelines for shift supervisors can-be fairly or adequately applied. These guidelines do not contribute anything beyond what a competent supervisor would observe in his or her daily contact with employees. The aura created by a 11 continuous behavioral observation" formal program as proposed can only be detrimental to staff morale, and such a program is no more likely to identify behaviors detrimental to plant or public safety than an active plant safety program coupled with informed and competent supervision.

The need for a physical security program, and the usefulness of particular elements of that program can only be matters of individual judgment. The District believes that the lack of any evidence of any incidents, or bona fide intelligence that any incidents involving radiological sabotage are being planned, that it is not reasonable to increase the scope or detail of our current security plan. The District, and the nuclear power plant industry in general, is entitled to a degree of assurance that, absent unforeseen flaws or substantial security benefit, that we will be relatively free of added requirements. There must be acceptable limits of risk. The District believes it is currently at an acceptable level with its current security program.

4. Question: What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment* by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

Response: Tests, such as the MMPI, by themselves, are not complete enough to make an overall clinical assessment. The tests are only indicators of how an individual feels about a particular set of questions, on any given day. Then there is the problem of the individual understanding what the question is asking, and attempts by the individual to 11 mask 11 his true feelings. In all cases we are aware of, a total clinical assessment could only be done by using a combination of tests, interview by a psychologist or psychiatrist, and a personal history investigation. Thus, test data alone, should not be the sole source of denying an individual unescorted access. As we indicated in our answer to an earlier question, it is our opinion that psychological testing has not been used for the purpose of predicting risk for committing radiological sabotage and the NRC staff has been unable to validate any data base to support it s use for such a purpose.

1 B-3

Secondly, the statement that licensees shall require individuals to report to the licensee anything that may have a bearing on continued access authorization is unenforceable. While the licensee can inform and instruct individuals subject to background investigation of the need to report significant new information, the licensee cannot reasonably compel such reports. Therefore, it would be unreasonable for the licensee to be subject to NRC enforcement action were an individual not

- to report such information to the licensee. Indeed, it may be illegal

• to require an individual to violate his Constitutional Right against self-incrimination concerning a matter not yet adjudicated in a court of law.

The Commission's goal in establishing this requirement must be balanced against policies such as the confidentiality of medical self-help programs. An integral part of many established programs is preserving the confidentiality of self-reported problems, i.e., an employee seeks assistance for an alcohol problem. Reporting in such instances could well defeat the goals of an employee assistance program. Additionally, the District needs to have the latitude and decisional flexibility to balance the merits of each case in making any decisions on revoking any privileges for unescorted access. This requirement, if left in the proposed rule, should be modified to incorporate the previously stated concerns.

Proposed Section 73.56(c) sets forth the requirement that licensees will also perform a credit history check as part of the background investigation. The District opposes this requirement as it would be of little, if any value to the background investigation. Unless the NRC were to establish some sort of criteria (and you do not), we would not use poor credit_ ratings to deny access. The information would create more paperwork problems (and legal problems) than it could be possibly worth. In this day and age, many young persons live from payday to payday, just to survive high inflation and ever increasing costs. A pdor credit rating would not necessarily mean that the person was not trustworthy and reliable. This data would contribute very little to the background investigation but it would contribute to higher costs to conduct the investigation, contribute to longer investigative time spent and would adversely effect the morale of the individual being investigated. It has been the District's experience that just the threat of making credit checks has caused more employee consternation than any other single element of the background investigation, except perhaps psychological assessment. This one element of the background investigation could create a very large morale problem and is not worth the problems it would create.

IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT A number of comments are in order on proposed Section 73.56(d). First, the provision is written in a way that can be interpreted (and was in the accompanying Regulatory Guide) to require the District to give more than one type of written personality test. We do not believe that the Commission should require an individual to be subjected to more than one written test. There is nothing to support the need for multiple tests, particularly when such tests are used as a screening tool and have debatable validity. The language should be modified to require one test.

A-4

Second, the provision as written could be interpreted to require each written test result to be evaluated by a psychologist or psychiatrist.

The test (as in the District's case) may be of a type that can be mechanically graded or manually graded by clerical staff and need not be evaluated by a qualified professional. The scores obtained could be compared to the established 11 norms 11 and a person other than a psychologist or psychiatrist could determine if the candidate 11 passed 11 or if the score would indicate the need for a follow-up interview.

While the District would agree it is important that the test and scoring norms be established by a qualified professional, it is entirely appropriate for others to conduct the test and score it within the established guidelines.

Third, proposed Section 73.56(d)(l) would require that the evaluation scales, "shall have been proven to be valid. 11 The purpose of the written test is an Initial "screen to measure the individuals traits.

11 The clause, 11 shall have been proven to be valid may be an impossible 11 test. The Di str1 ct be 1i eves the requirement to 11 prove 11 any test to be valid should be deleted. The District believes that such a test should be reliable and approved by the American Psychological Association, whose job it is to determine that tests meet their requirements.

Finally, the District must comment on the requirement in Section 73.56(d)(2) that the tests and interviews evaluate whether the individual had strong potential for committing acts detrimental to the 11 public health and safety or property 11 , or 11 a h1.9.h potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health, safety, or property. 11 Our experience has been that psychologists are unable to quantify the degree of risk an individual presents to the site. Aside from the fact that there is no reason why different terminology ( strong 11 vs. "h1gh 11 )

11 should be used, or even h1nt of what the differences in the words are suppose to mean, the District believes that the modifiers 11 high 11 and 11 strong should be deleted. If the combination of the test and an 11 interview, if required, led a psychologist or psychiatrist to conclude that an individual is an unacceptable risk, that finding should be enough to deny unescorted access. To require a test, or the psychologist or psychiatrist, find a strong or high potential may 11 11 11 11 set an unreasonably difficult standard which is not cpmmensurate with the risk being created. These modifiers may be very difficult to define and defend 1n an official or court hearing.

V. CONTINUED BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM Proposed Section 73.56 would require the District to establish a continued behavioral observation program designed to detect changes in an individual 1 s on-the-job performance, judgment level or behavior.

This component of the access authorization program is essentially parallel to the fitness for duty program which the Commission had earlier proposed. 49FR33980 (1982). Any person who would have been 11 unfit for duty because of (a) mental or physical impairment that could affect his or her performance in any way contrary to safety,' would also 1

be a person whose on-the-job performance, judgment level, or behavior would have changed so as to trigger action under the continued observation program.

A-5

At it's October 14, 1984 meeting, the Commission reconsiDered it's action on the fitness for duty rule and voted to issue it as a policy statement. Since the Commission has decided that the fitness for duty concept should not be embodied in a rule at this time, the same should hold true for the parallel provisions of the continued behavioral observation program. Proposed Section 73.56(e) should, therefore, be deleted, as well as the reference to such a program in proposed Section 73.56(b)Cl) and Section 73.56(f)(3).

VI TRANSFERABILITY Proposed Section 73.56(f)(l) establishes a mechanism for transferring to one licensee access authorization granted by another licensee. As stated in paragraph 9 of Section I, "Introduction", the District believes that this transferability is a worth while component, however not at the expense of the NRC using a 11 cookie cutter 11 approach and requiring all utilities to have identical access authorization programs. This section should be deleted. As a minimum it should be modified to provide guidance and allow flexibility.

One aspect of transferability is that the licensee wishing to use another licensee's access authorization, must be assured that the individual in question is, in fact, the same person. The proposed rule requires the original granting licensee to send the gaining licensee the individual's photograph and written verification of the individual's access authorization. This is unduly prescriptive and would prohibit licensees from using other forms of positive identification, such as a transfer card with photo, finger prints, physical features description, etc. A more general requirement for positive ident1f1cation would be more appropriate.

An 1ssue requiring clarification concerns the language in Section 73.56(f)(l) that the original granting licensee must verify the current 11 va11dity 11 of the individual 1 s access authorization. This could be read to mean that at the time of verification, the individual must have right of unescorted access to the granting licensee's facility. If th1s interpretation is correct, the language of the proposed amendment to Section 73.55(d) would effectively nullify many of the benefits of transferability.

Under proposed Section 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A), 49FR30737, a licensee must update authorization access lists at least every 31 days and remove from the list those who do not require access. This would mean that those individuals with valid access authorization, but without the need for access, would not appear on the authorization list. The Commission should clarify that currently valid access authorization for the purposes of Section 73.56(f)(l) does not require that the individual 1 s name appear on the authorization access list established under Section 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A).

VII. REVIEW PROCEDURES The proposed Section 73.56(g) mandates that a licensee s access 1

authorization program include procedures for an individual to obtain review of a denial or revocation.

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The District believes that this entire subsection should be deleted from the rule. The District's (licensee's) procedures for reviewing the denial or revocation of unescorted access, whether the procedure is unique or that of a bargaining agreement, should not be part of a plan requiring submittals to, and approval by, the NRC. The NRC's interest should be limited to ensuring proper attention to the protection of the public health and safety and need not include employee appeal rights.

Other avenues of redressing claimed violations of due process are available to an employee or contractor who believes his rights are violated. The District believes such avenues will no doubt be explored whether or not proposed Section 73.56(g) appears in NRC regulations.

Indeed, individuals have already availed themselves of judicial and nonjudicial remedies in cases in which access to nuclear facilities was denied under access authorization programs. Thus, the proposed section unnecessarily intrudes on licensee management prerogatives .

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District John J. Mattimoe ENCLOSURE B ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE The Commission invited specific attention to certain questions on the proposed access authorization program requirements, 49 Federal Register at 30730-31.

The District is pleased to provide comments on those questions.

1. Question: To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in commercial power reactor ind~stry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavior reliability programs already used by nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

Response: Under ex1sting utility security plans approved by NRC staff, most if not all utilities we are aware of, have employee screening programs that meet most if not all the elements contained in the proposed access authorization rule. The District's employee screening program does not include credit checks, a subject we discussed earlier in paragraph three of Section III, Background Investigations. The District's screening program does not include a five year background check, especially on contractor (crafts personnel) hired from local union halls. Our experience has shown most crafts personnel hold dozens of jobs in one year and many of these people do not keep previous employment records for that reason. Additionally, when we check with a pervious employer/son painters, electricians, etc., the employers have had almost no records, unless the craft person had been with them over six months, which is rare. These types of personnel work construction jobs, moving constantly from job site to job site, frequently working a month or less at each site .

The District uses psychological testing - the Gordon Personality Test.

Although this test is recognized by the American Psychological Association, it may not meet the stringent criteria set up by the proposed Regulatory Guide issued to go with the proposed access authorization rule.

A behavioral reliability program (continued observation) is not part of the District's employee screening program, but part of each supervisor's ongoing responsibilities. A supervisor's basic responsibility is to know the people who work for them, evaluate their work and report problems up the established chain of command. Persons who have demonstrated that they may not be reliable, have been reported and their access revoked. NUMARC, with it's Fitness-For-Duty program policy, has accelerated the District's involvement in this area, i.e., the District has established a formal Alcohol and Drug abuse program.

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2. Question: What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Response: As required by the NRC, the District uses it's psychological assessment procedure to identify 1ndividua1s who may be suffering from a serious mental illness. After an employee has been given access and he or she begins to act differently or display signs of aberrant behavior, the District may use psychological testing 1n an attempt to determine the cause for their behavior.

The District believes that psychological testing is a 11 snapshot 11 of how an individual 1 s mind is working--but only at the time the test is given. The District agrees with an expert at the National Institute of Mental Health who recently wrote, 11 It must be recognized that the MMPI, or any other personality measure that might be used, has questionable predictive value for behavior of concern to the NRC. 11 11 In fact, personality testing would,be unlikely to add significantly to information obtained in a thorough background check. 11 (September 7, 1984, NIMH memorandum by Lyle Bivens, PhD.) Additionally, the NRC staff stated to the Commission, when it was discussing the proposed access authorization rule on October 4, 1983: 11 We were unable to validate any data base that this test was used for the purpose that we would try to adapt it to. 11 In the D1str1ct's opinion, and the opinion of Gail B.

Coad, Chief, Regulatory Policy Branch, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, the collection and retention of unvalidated data appears to lack practical unity. Thus, the District does not believe that psychological testing should be used for predicting an individual's potential for committing radiological sabotage, substance abuse, or other criminal behavior.

3. Question: What are the particular concerns about 1nfringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

Response: Anytime that any investigation is made into a person's background, some infringement of personal privacy occurs. The question is whether the infringements are reasonable in light of the interests to be protected, and alternatives available, if any.

The risk of sabotage is one which has been deterministically postulated by the NRC. Since no cases of sabotage causing radiological consequences have been documented, it is impossible to demonstrate that any elements of the proposed rule--or indeed any elements of the physical security prograrn--would decrease the risk of sabotage or be worth the infringement into one's personal privacy.

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5. Question: What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and fals~ negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychologi'cal assessment procedures? Are more effective procedures ava1lable and practical?

Response: The District believes there is inadequate eata available to provide an objective answer to this question. Although a clinical psychological assessment might identify hostile attitudes or an active psychosis that would pose a safety threat, it is also likely not to.

The District is not aware of any data on which to base a statement regarding the probability of Type I or Type II errors.

6. Question: Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?*

Response: Psychological assessment can not be justified solely on the basis of reducing risks of radiological sabotage for reasons given in earlier answers. It is the District's opinion that the relative risk reduction produced by psychological screening, background information checks, or behavioral observation is impossible to assess, given the current state of knowledge in the psychological and behavioral assessment field. The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.

7. Question: Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Response: Again, the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. The background check procedure would be superior to the psychological assessment or behavioral observation procedures. The District does not believe psychological assessment is justified for the stated purpose by the NRC.

8. Question: To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without preemployment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

Response: As we stated previously, the District believes that psychological assessment techniques evaluate at a particular point in time, that 1s, a 11 snapshot 11 of the mental state of an individual at that moment. The test will not predict future behavior, and it frequently will not give any explanation for an individuals behavior within the last few days. Proponents of psychological testing apparently forget the numbers of cases each year, where very aggressive persons have B-4

killed other people and the pretrial psychologists can not agree on the actual mental status of the suspect. Even more alarming are the.cases where individuals who have been incarcerated in mental institutions for violent and hostile attitudes and actions; who after being tested, treated by psychologists and psychiatrists, and tested again; are declared fit to reenter society only to kill again--in some cases, within hours of their release. This would indicate that psychological testing is of questionable reliability in it s behavioral assessment 1

capability. The District has experienced a situation where an individual employee, who had been previously cleared by our screening pt-ogram, became very hostile toward the site security program. The individual, among other acts and threats, demonstrated to another screened person, how he could potentially bomb a vital area of the plant. This hostile employee was removed from the site and his access authorization revoked, because of fellow employee observation and supervisory actions. A series of psychological tests, and interviews by at least two psychologists and one psychiatrist failed to reach a conclusion relative to the suspect as a risk to the safety of the public and to the plant site.

Thus, the District feels that psychological assessment would serve very little purpose to a behavioral reliability program. It is the District 1 s opinion that the same potential risks would exist whether or not psychological assessment or behavioral reliability programs were not part of the screening program. It has been our experience competent supervision will provide more risk reduction than the other programs proposed.

9. Question: What kinds of individuals have been 11 screened out 11 of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment? by the use of background investigations? by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Response: The District is aware that some psychological testing proponents are claiming that psychological assessment will screen out individuals for such reasons as: aggressive or violent behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, lack of temper controls, hostile and destructive actions, disrespect for social norms, i.e., violation of rules, inability to handle stressful situations, impulsiveness and a disregard for one 1 s actions, and emotional problems. As stated earlier, the District s experience with psychological assessment shows that these 1

tests also will not find or detect these traits. The National Institute of Mental Health has stated that, 11 Although a clinical psychological assessment may identify hostile attitudes or an active psychosis that would pose a safety threat, it is also likely not to. 11 On the other hand, background investigations have been useful to the District s screening program and has resulted in our denying unescorted 1

access to one or two percent of the persons who have applied for access. The District does believe that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.

10. Question: What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedur~s, including psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

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Response:' The District is unaware of any management abuses concerning these programs. In the District's programs, there is always more than one person involved in a decision about access, decertification, etc.,

which will generally prevent a single supervisor from unfairly singling out an employee.

11. Question: How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do {hey feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

Response: When the District first implemented it's screening rules at Rancho Seco, employee resentment ran high. Most have come to accept the basic concept of security requirements, however, two elements of the proposed access authorization rule; credit checks and formal continued behavior observation program will strongly impact the morale of the employees. Employees do not like psychological assessment, but have accepted our testing program. The proposed rule would require two psychological tests and this would be considered too evasive and an unwarranted intrusion into their private lives .

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District John J. Mattimoe ENCLOSURE C COMMENTS ON SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS AT POWER REACTOR FACILITIES The District ls in agreement w1th the use of equipment instead of hands-on pat-down searches of personnel gaining access to protected areas. Th1s rule should be implemented irrespective of what happens to the other proposed rules. The delay time associated with pat-down searches is sufficient for most responsible management organizations to install equipment .

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District John J. Mattimoe ENCLOSURE D MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS I. VITAL ISLANDS The proposed revision to the introductory paragraph of Section 73.55 approves the vital island concept and appears to require each licensee to revise it's security plan to incorporate the vial island concept.

The Commission's explanation indicates that it's experience has shown that the current vital area concept (controlling access to each*

i ndi vi dual vi ta l area), may be unnecessarily stri ct 11 11

49FR36735. The Commission points out that licensees, under the proposed rule, would be 11 given considerable latitude to take advantage of existing barriers and access control points. 11 The District agrees that it is appropriate to give licensees the option to revise it's security plan to incorporate the vital island concept.

However, the District does not agree that it is appropriate to require licensees to adopt the concept. No rationale has been suggested to require those licensees who are satisfied with their current security plans using the current vital area philosophy to recast those plans.

Licensees who have experience with security plans built around vital areas may not wish to recombine them into vital islands. Each licensee should be entitled to decide, based upon it's particular situation, whether or not to adopt vital islands. Mandated revision of existing approved security plans serves no useful purpose and could be unnecessarily expensive to licensees without significant improvement in

• the overall level of security .

II. VITAL ISLAND DEFINITION Proposed Section 73.55(c)(l) would define a m1n1mum set of equipment which must be treated in all cases as vital islands. This represents a major shift from existing practice which the NRC independently reviewed for systems and equipment designed as vital. Since the NRC must approve all security plans, all plants were subject to a case-by-case review.

The Commission has not explained why this review process should be changed by a regulatory definition of a minimum set of vital areas/islands.

Furthermore, the proposed language would have a requirement to protect AC and DC sources to permit functioning of "important to safety" equipment. The term important to safety" has been in dispute as to 11 it's definition and should be resolved in other forums and not raised in the context of safeguarding vital equipment.

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III. VITAL ISLAND ACCESS CONTROLS The proposed language of Section 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A) would require the establishment of access lists for each vital island. The District can not believe the Commission's intent was to literally require the establishment of "lists" and we would recommend that a change should be made to clarify the intent of this requirement to develop procedures and systems for access controls to vital areas which may or may not literally include "lists." Many licensees have developed access controls which use computer controlled systems including access cards issued to employees. By use of the access card in card readers at vital area doors, a computer checks the validity of the "need for access" and an "access list or log as such is not generated. This procedure has been accepted by the NRC and the proposed rule change would indicate it's continued acceptability.

IV. RECORD REQUIREMENTS The proposed rule of Section 73.7O(d) requires the maintenance of "logs" of all entries, exits, and reasons for access to a vital island.

Consistent with our previous comments, this record-keeping requirement may be made by a computer logging subroutine of the access control system rather than literally posting a "log" at the entry portal. In addition, we see no value of the need for logging the reason for entry or logging out of each vital island. A monthly validation is required to permit only those who have the need to *enter an area, and a requirement for a person to enter his reason for each entry borders on harassment. This requirement would also be a detriment to plant operators and others who may need entry to vital areas during times of plant emergency, as they may forget the correct codes or numbers required. Similarly, no valid security reason has been established to require one to log out upon exiting the vital island .

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District John J. Mattimoe ENCLOSURE E COMMENTS ON THE REGULATORY GUIDE REGARDING STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT GUIDE FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The introduction to this regulatory guide states that the purpose of the document is to describe the standard format and content suggested for preparing an access authorization plan. The guide further states, 11 conformance with this guide is not required by the NRC. 11 Were this statement subsequently shown to be true, and the guide provided only guidance on one method acceptable to the NRC and other alternatives would truly be considered, our comments would be unnecessary. Our experience with NRC s use of 1

regulatory guides, however, has demonstrated that the detailed prescriptive 11 examples of how one might meet a regulation are in fact accorded the status 11 of interpretations of how to meet the regulation by both the reviewers and 11 11 the inspectors. The District is therefore providing comments on the regulatory guide, and recommend that less prescriptive approaches be given, and where possible, additional examples be made clear in the subsections that more than one technique may be used to meet the stated requirement.

In commenting on the,specific requirements of the proposed Regulatory Guide, the District is assuming our comments provided in earlier enclosures are acceptable and the proposed rule, if issued at all (and it should not be) will be modified as we have recommended .

1. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE AND REQUIREMENTS The proposed Section 73.56(b) of IOCFR Part 73 states:

(b) The licensee shall establish ... an access authorization program which has as it s objective preventing unescorted access ... to those 1

individuals whose history, psychological profile or changes in behavioral patterns indicate a potential for committing acts that are inimical to the public health and safety or present a danger to life or property.

The District believes that as a public agency, it will need to show more than a potential that an individual may commit acts, or present a danger to life or property. In a criminal court, evidence must be presented.

In civil proceedings, even though the rules of evidence are much more liberal, one must still have evidence to support your action or position. Mere potential or present a danger is not objective enough to prove. What does the term or present a danger to life and property 11 11 mean legally? These terms are too vague to be enforceable. In order to E-1

enforce NRC regulations, the District will need criteria that amounts to evidence that a person is an unacceptable risk to commit acts that are inimical to the public health and safety.

2. BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

2. l General The time period for investigation should be shortened from the five year period to three years. The ANSI/ANS 3.3 - 1982 standard considered the investigation period and selected three years as appropriate. Since a three or five year period is a judgment call and there is no strong basis for selecting either, the District recommends adopting the time period already accepted by the standards committee.

In addition, the criminal and military service history checks require extensive time periods to complete, if it is possible to do them at all. Here in California, criminal history checks can take up to 8 weeks to secure. We are told by the military service records center that a simple and typical military record can take up to 13 weeks to obtain. If changes to the federal law are enacted which permit the FB!to release their criminal history records to utilities, we are told it will take a minimum of nine weeks and could be as long as 13 weeks.

For these reasons, the guidance for background investigations should be such that reasonable record checks could be made considering the legal availability of the.records being sought.

For example, there is no reason why the NRC and the District should not accept the DD214 record of an individual as proof of military service. Also, there should be a provision permitting temporary or interim clearances pending receipt of government held or controlled records .

• 2.2 Investigative Criteria True Identity - Establishing the applicant's true identity is a valid goal of the background investigation. Identification by use of fingerprints (which is the stated preferred method) could prove to be nonproductive since a person's fingerprints may not be on file, and/or the records of the FBI or local police may not be available to the industry. There are other investigative techniques that can also be useful in establishing true identity (without showing photographs to friends, alleged relatives and neighbors). One could use recent passports with photos, government issued identification cards with photos, state driver's licensees with photographs, etc. It is unnecessary and an unwarranted high expense to require the applicant to provide a photograph of himself and then have the utility show the photo to friends, co-workers, etc., many of whom may be in some far away state or country.

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Employment History - The record checks should be conducted for a three year period rather than the five year period as stated previously. The guidelines state that records of d1sciplinary action, medical records, reason for termination, etc. should be obtained. The District has experience that would indicate these records are not generally available from employers--who are afraid of potential lawsuits.

Education History - The record checks should be for three years not five years as previously stated.

Credit History - The District is opposed to making credit checks.

See our comments on this subject in our response to the Access Authorization Rule.

The guideline suggests that if unfavorable financial information is obtained through the credit bureau, then the licensee should attempt to verify information through investigation of individual accounts. This would be an expensive and time consuming exercise in futility as most stores, banks, etc., would not give us this information. Without some sort of criteria set by NRC, it would be difficult to define 11 unfavorable financial information. 11 As a practical matter, unless the NRC were to establish some sort of criteria, we would not use poor credit ratings to deny access.

Criminal History - See our comments above under 2. 1 General. The time required to obtain government held or controlled records is very extensive. It is vital that some sort of temporary or interim clearance be granted pending receipt of these types of documents.

This section goes on the say, 11 Since criminal history records typically contain little detailed information about an offense, the licensee should make an effort to determine the circumstances surrounding the offense. The licensee should not base the denial of authorization for access to protected areas and vital islands solely on a person 1 s conviction record. 11 Normally access is not denied solely on the basis of one s conviction record. Official 1

criminal history records, however, are sufficient evidence to uphold a decision to withhold access authorization in certain situations, such as arson. In such rare situations, further investigations should not be required.

Military Service - See District comments above in Section 2. l on this important subject.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT The guidance of this section should not specify the administration of two separate test instruments. It should remain the responsibility of the District (licensees) to select the test of their choosing. While some utilities may use the MMPI alone with success, other utilities may find other test vehicles to their liking. The selection of a proper test should be left to the District without the requirement of submitting the 11 Basis for Use of Psychometric Measurement Instrument

forms shown in the regulatory guide.

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Clinical Interviews - The guidance in this area should not be prescriptive as to the length, structure, and content of interviews to be given. By requiring qualified professionals to establish and administer the program, and to conduct any interviews, the NRC should be assured that a quality program will be established without the need to dictate the nature of interviews and become involved in how the program is managed.

4. CONTINUAL BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM As indicated in our comments on the proposed rule, the District does not believe this portion of the regulation is any longer needed. The Commission decided to issue a policy statement dealing with Fitness for Duty which duplicates the requirements of this subsection. There is no need to have two separate requirements speaking to the same issue.

5. NONLICENSEE EMPLOYEES The District is in full agreement with the concept of permitting the transfer of authority for unescorted access of individuals between different utilities. Once a background investigation is completed and all information has been evaluated and one utility has granted the authority for unescorted access, a second utility should have the ability to continue that authority without the need to duplicate the entire investigation and review process (if it so chooses). However, as stated earlier in our comments on the proposed rule, we do not believe that all utilities in the nation should be forced by the NRC into identical access authorization plans in order to allow the transferability of clearances. Those utilities who choose to participate in the transferability of clearances can, with NRC permission (by approval of their plans) do so. There are utilities who would apparently profit little by transferability because of the minor amount of interchange of contractor personnel between them. In the District's case, most of the craft personnel hired during an outage are from within a 100 mile radius. Few if any of these people work in another nuclear power plants because of the great distances between plants. Eastern utilities apparently not only trade contractor personnel back and forth, but many actually schedule their refueling outages so as not to interfere with each other and to minimize energy load implications to their geographical area.

Likewise, if the District wanted to give unescorted access to a contractor employee(s) who travel all over the United States and who had access authorization at lets say an eastern plant, the District should be allowed to compare our screening procedures with the plant back east. If it was found that our procedures only differed slightly, the District could either accept that utilities screening procedure or supplement part of their procedure in order to meet our NRC approved plan. While this may cause the District to perform some additional screening, it would salvage the large segment of screening already completed.

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Hith regard to NRC employees, the District would expect that when the NRC certtfies them as requiring unescorted access that an equivalent program required of licensees will also be in effect for them.

Certainly, the same cross section of engineers and technicians is available for employing both NRC inspectors and licensee employees and what is required in assuring reliable performance from*one group should be equally applicable to the second group. The District believes that the NRC should establish programs at least equivalent to what it expects licensees to perform prior to granting an individual unescorted access to the plants.

5.3 Unescorted Access During Major Outages The District generally agrees with the concept of allowing uncleared or unscreened, temporary workers on site during cold shut down. One particular section needs to be more clear on NRC's intent concerning, 11 procedures are employed to ensure that areas and safety/safeguards equipment that were accessible to unscreened persons are examined and performance tested before they are used in plant operations. 11 "These measures should include a visual examination of areas and equipment by knowledgable persons for the purpose of locating apparent sabotage devices or signs of mechanical or electrical tampering and functional testing of safety-related or vital equipment. 11 What was NRC' s intent concerning inspections 'to locate signs of mechanical or electrical 1

tampering 11

• An over zealous NRC inspector, or plan reviewer, could interpret this to mean verification that thousands of wires in electrical panels were in fact attached to the correct terminals, etc., etc. This type of inspection could require several weeks and cost millions of dollars in lost generation, employee time, etc.,

without a significant improvement in the level of security.

6. REVIEW PROCEDURES The District recommends that this portion of the rule be deleted. While it is the responsibility of the NRC to protect the health and safety of the public, any redressing of abuses of "due process" should not be regulated and enforced by the NRC.

An employee or contractor who has disagreements with the Districts*

procedures in this regard have other avenues to have those concerns heard. It ts unnecessary to have the Districts* appeal procedures submitted, reviewed, and approved by the NRC, thereby injecting the NRC into this labor-management area. The District therefore, recommends that this section of the regulatory guide also be deleted.

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District John J. Mattimoe ENCLOSURE F COMMENTS ON THE REGULATORY GUIDE REGARDING VITAL ISLANDS, PROTECTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT, AND KEY AND LOCK CONTROLS The District provided comments in Enclosure Don the rule changes of Section 73.55 which form the basis for the guidances of this regulatory guide. Our major concern with the rule, thus the companion regulatory guide, is the apparent requirement for all licensees to adopt the vital island concept and to define certain minimum sets of equipment which must be grouped within defined vital islands. The District is in agreement with this concept, provided that the present definition of vital equipment is not changed and the requirement to go to vital islands is an optional program to our present plant configuration.

The District and all other licensees were required, under currently effective rules, to define vital areas necessary to protect vital equipment from sabotage, and to describe their security provisions to provide that protection. Absent any showing need for requiring all licensees to change their protection provisions, we do not believe it necessary or appropriate that the NRC require a wholesale change. The District, after spending considerable effort to establish our vital areas and security protection methods, is satisfied with our present security plan and do not wish to combine any further vital areas within vital islands .

From another perspective, the District, along with the Physical Security Coordinating Group of KMC, Inc., has followed with considerable interest the NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) program to reevaluate the adequacy of licensee designation of vital areas. Some considerable controversy has been generated, we understand, by disagreements of NRC reviewers on the designation of some vital areas arising from these reviews. The NRC has appointed a "task force" to review the assumption used in the computer analysis of vital areas (which apparently is made during the RER) and this guidance will be carried into the future RER program.

We have not been aware of any published results of the task force review findings; however, from the limited interface we and the KMC Inc., members have had with NRC reviewers, we believe more strict and onerous redesign of vital area/vital islands will result rather than a more liberal interpretation as advertised in the proposed rule. Although the proposed rule states the current rule "may be unnecessarily strict" and under the proposed rule "licensees would be given considerable latitude to take advantage of existing F-1

barriers and access control points"; we understand that the more recent reviews of security programs for new licensees by the NRC have not permitted advantage to be taken of the vital island concept.

In the District's case, we were recently asked by an NRC reviewer to set up a date so another vital area analysis could be performed by one of NRC's contractors. When we pointed out that our vital area analysis had been completed some time ago and asked why another vital area analysis was necessary, we were told that there were significant new criteria. The NRC reviewer either could not or would not inform the District of what the new criteria was or where the District could find a study or document that outlined the reasons for the new criteria. Apparently our new vital area analysis study has been delayed as we have not heard any more from the NRC representative in many weeks.

• The District, and fellow members of the KMC, Inc. Physical Security Coordinating Group, question the motives for offering a proposed rule to liberalize certain security requirements when just the opposite results are apparently currently being obtained from NRC reviews. The District and certain other licensees are concerned that requiring a resubmittal of security plans to take 11 advantage" of proposed changes will result in a major ratchet of security requirements before approval will occur.

The remainder of the District's comments on this Regulatory Guide assumes that the COITITiission accepts our earlier comments on the proposed rule.

Accordingly, the following comments are offered on the various sections of the Regulatory Guide.

l. INDEPENDENT VITAL ISLANDS The listing of equipment needed to be protected within vital islands is not necessary. Certain items are already required to be enclosed within vital areas, however, the specification of diesel generators, all batteries connected to lE loads, and on-site water supplies required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown to be within vital islands is not justified. From a purely practical standpoint we do not understand how certain on-site water sources, for example, can be protected with barriers having all the physical attributes required of vital area barriers. (How does one protect a cooling pond?) Past reviews for adequacy of security measures examined the District's (and other licensee) designated vital areas, and methods for protection. The District believes that approach was adequate and a change has not been justified.

5. CONTROL OF ACCESS TO VITAL ISLANDS UNDER ROUTINE CONDITIONS The District (and many other licensees) have systems and procedures to maintain the access authorization within a computer controlled system.

The NRC has approved such systems in the past and we believe it should continue to be acceptable. A master computer listing should be recognized as acceptable.

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The requirement to keep a "log" has also been commented on previously.

The District believes a computer controlled master system of access logging should be recognized as acceptable. In addition, there is not a valid security reason to require an employer to maintain a record for each entry containing the reason and the time of exit from the vital island. The District must certify the reason each employee needs to enter each vital area and must revalidate it every month. It adds nothing to security to require an employee to parrot that reason for each and every entry. In a similar vein, logging-out serves no useful security purpose and as indicated in section 7.2 of the Regulatory Guide on antipassback, the NRC does not desire it to be used as a condition for entry to the next vital area. In fact, Region V has required removal of an antipassback system and the District has removed this feature from its system.

The NRC guidance on Exterior Doors would appear to require an active intrusion alarm system on all doors leading into the building from the Protected Area even though the door does not directly open to a vital area. These so-called 11 sunshine doors" should not be locked and controlled as it would or could delay operators and others free access to the power block building or between buildings during an emergency.

In fact, the NRC Region V office only recently required the District to remove card access control from our "sunshine doors 11 for the very safety reasons indicated. Section 5.4 should be deleted in its entirety.

7. l Access to Keys During emergency or abnormal conditions at a power reactor, the District agrees that rapid access may be required by plant personnel into vital areas. The District uses an electronic, fail safe, bypass system to allow vital area doors to open in the event the security computers should fail. This section requires that keys be issued to plant personnel. This section should be modified to allow alternatives in emergency door controls.

• The District had no further comments on this Regulatory Guide.

F-3

GPU Nuc ear orpora ,on Nuclear 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054-11 49 (201 ) 263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

OfflC::- Of Sc.CKt.1At,

,oeEJ IUll8lR PR /.:?\

a, oocKtr 1t.li & SEiWIC:f aU&K QAOI01?IJIIII - 13 UV

'"'. ; March 6, 1985 (4'/ /:R_ 3a7.3 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

The staff of GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) herewith submits comments on the subject proposed amendments. Comments were requested in August 1, 1984 Federal Register notices (49 FR 30726/30735/30738).

We have organized our comments as follows: Enclosure 1 discusses the Access Authorization Program; Enclosure 2 covers the Designation and Protection of Vital Locations; while Enclosure 3 covers Searches of Individuals at Power Plants. We have also included, as Enclosure 4, GPUN's

• responses to the eleven questions posed for public comment on the Access Authorization Rules.

Sincerely, D. G. Murray Director Human Resources RPJ:dls:1500f Enclosures (4)

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corporation

EAR RE.GULATORY ~OMMISSIOR DOCKETING & SER-VICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY.

OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics P0ttmarlc Date 4/1/FS" Copiu Received d' I Copies Repr

ENCLOSURE l GPUN ColTITients on the Access Authorization Program As a general comment, it should be noted that many licensees, including GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN), have voluntarily adopted elements of the Access Authorization Program which they deem to be appropriate and practical for their particular facility. Imposing the entire program, as an NRC regulation, is unreasonable and discourages voluntary efforts by licensees to implement effective, site-specific programs. Imposing this regulation will also result in excessive screening with an attendant increased potential for trivial procedural violations and significant resource commitment to reconcile grievances. A licensee attempting to implement a program which most effectively meets the intent of this regulation runs a high risk of not being able to show strict compliance because of the specific detail embodied in the regulation.

We also have concerns with the legality of some sections of the rule as written. There are questions of privacy act and due process violations that may occur if the Program were instituted and carried out as proposed.

The cost of implementing a program that meets all of the requirements of this proposed regulation are understated considering the costs associated with the program administration, training, psychological screening support, etc. As an example, when the Nuclear Records Management Association reviewed the proposed program they identified a potential for forty-three new records that would need to be kept, at an estimated cost of $750,000 per year/per utility.

In su1T1Tiary, we do not believe that a rulemaking is needed in this area. Rather, an industry standard should be established. It is our belief that the industry has devised such a standard--ANS/ANSI 3.3-1982--and that with modifications, this is the appropriate manner in which this issue should be handled *

• While we do not believe a rulemaking is necessary, specific elements of the rule do deserve further discussion. Should the NRC deem it worthwhile to reconstitute the information contained in the proposed rule on Access Authorization into some other fonn of regulatory guidance (perhaps a NUREG) we would like to present the following comments for your review and consideration:

Temporary Workers 0

Licensee retains responsibility for granting, denying or revoking unescorted access Agree 0

Manufacturers, contractors, suppliers authorized to screen/observe employees based upon plan approval by the Licensee Agree

0 Licensee responsible for auditing all accepted screening/observations programs We feel that this should be modified to pen11it the sharing of audits among utilities that are members of an association formed for this purpose (i.e. NEDS).

0 Acceptance by second Licensee of unescorted access status for individuals whose access authorization has not been interrupted for more than 365 days.

Agree, but do not believe obtaining a photo from prior Licensee is feasible. We believe the licensee should only be required to reasonably assure the individual's true identity.

• 0 0

Temporary workers subject to behavioral observation program Agree Provision for suspension of access authorization requirements during cold shut down or refueling Agree 0

Grandfathering - employees on board prior to date of rule so as not to require background investigation of psychological testing, but subject to behavioral observation Agree Background Investigations 0

Program industry administered Agree 0

Reconmendation of two year retrospective background investigation for protected area authorization; five years for vital area authorization; or 5 years retrospective background investigation for protected or vital area access authorization.

We recommend three year retrospective (minimum) review for access to protected area or vital area.

0 Background investigation to cover true identity, previous employment, education, credit and criminal history, and character reputation Partially agree. Do not feel that credit check is essential.

0 Information evaluation criteria.

Should not be part of rule but incorporated in Regulatory Guide.

Continual Observation Program 0

On detection by supervisor of threatening behavioral patterns, referral to individual responsible for administration of licensee's access authorization program Do not agree. Referral should be to management with notification to Security, including information as to whether or not the employee has been suspended *

• 0 Authorizes supervisors to suspend inmediately if individual's actions, he believes, represents imminent potential danger to public health and safety.

Same corrment as above.

Review Procedure 0

For employees not covered by a collective bargaining agreement or where collective bargaining agreement is inadequate, Licensee establish a review procedure Agree, except that no NRC approval or review should be required.

This would be an intrusion into management prerogatives

• ENCLOSURE 2 GPUN Conments on the Designation and Protection of Vital Locations The proposed rule is designed to provide a more safety conscious safeguards system and ensure that security measures do not impede plant safety. The rule would require protection only to the extent necessary to interrupt sabotage. Revision to 10 CFR 73.55(a) would permit suspension of safeguard measures during emergencies to accorrmodate emergency response.

We agree with the philosophy of the proposed rule; however, the rule would designate on site diesel generators and batteries, reactor containment, control rooms, control alarm stations and on-site water supplies required for safe shut down, as vital equipment. This is too prescriptive and does not allow for unique plant design. In addition, this portion of the rule does not recognize the redundancies and diversity of components in the plant. Where nuclear safety is ensured by a redundant system or components physically separated, they should not be considered vital equipment although the function they provide is vital.

A requirement to design access systems which allow rapid ingress and egress during emergency conditions, without relief from other regulations requiring stringent control of access, creates direct conflicts that will result in obvious opportunities for violations unless additional NRC guidance is provided.

Further, the proposed rule would require that specified on site physical security equipment, including secondary power supplies for intrusion alarms and non-portable corrmunications equipment, be designated as vital equipment. This equipment is back up equipment only and should not be designated as vital equipment

• ENCLOSURE 3 GPUN ColMlents on Searches of Individuals at Power Plants The proposed rule would require equipment searches of all individuals seeking access to protected areas except on-duty peace officers and pat down searches (1) when detection equipment fails or (2) cause to suspect exists.

We would support this rule if revised to permit random searches at times when equipment fails in lieu of 100% pat down searches. Random searches could be established on a percentage basis, e.g., 10% when the metal detector or explosive detector is inoperable, 20% when both the metal detector and explosive detector are inoperable.

Additionally, we believe the NRC should be corrmended for proposing the elimination of pat down searches for all visitors, as long as detection equipment is functioning

• ENCLOSURE 4 onses to the Eleven uestions Posed

NRC 10 C F . T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHOR-r'oN RULES

1. To what extent are the proposals GPUNC does not now have an Access Authorization Plan; however, contained in the proposed access authori- an Access Authorization Policy draft is under review. Many zation rules already in place in the elements of the proposed rule are already in effect:

commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment 1. Since November 1983, all GPUNC new hires are required to and behavioral reliability programs undergo a five year background inve~tigation.

already- used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs? 2. All GPUNC employees have had psychological screening.

3. Training of selected supervisory and management personnel in the behavioral reliability program was conducted in prior years. A more formal Continual Behavioral Observation program is und~r development.

4. Contractor employees undergo a three year employment record review by the Security Department for both Protected and Vital areas.

5. All new contracts negotiated after July 1984 include provisions for both psychological testing and five year background investigations.

PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI.ION RULES

1. To what extent are the proposals The following proposed elements are not in effect:

(Con't) contained in the proposed access authori-zation rules already in place in the 1. At present GPUNC does not differentiate between normal connnercial power reactor industry? To operation and outage access authorization requirements.

what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs 2. No formal appeal program as proposed now exists. However, already used by the nuclear industry as we have achieved a high degree of success utilizing an part of employee screening programs? interview process which brings together the individual concerned, supervisory and labor relations personnel, shop stewards and the Security Department. Results of these interviews are conveyed directly to the site Vice President/Director for final approval.

3. The 365 day continuance rule for temporary employees is not in effect. A break of only two weeks now requires a full reevaluation of the employment record.

NOTE: Special screening lists, consistent with the NEDS concept, are maintained and shared by the Security Sections of all GPUNC nuclear plant sites. These lists are strictly confidential. They are in no way "black ball" lists, but merely indicate that a closer look at any given individual on the list is required.

PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORl-ION RULES

2. What purposes are being served by the use Within GPUNC, it 1.s the intent of psychological screening to of psychological assessment procedures in serve both stated purposes, i.e., fitness for duty concerns and the nuclear industry? Is psychological prevention of radiological sabotage. We established the assessment used to address fitness for program initially in response to 73.55 requirements. It is duty concerns, radiological sabotage con- also geared towards fulfillment of the proposed fitness for cerns, or both? duty rule and anticipates the proposed access authorization rule.

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI.ON RULES

3. What are the particular concerns about GPUNC is very concerned about protecting the individual from infringements on civil liberties associ- the release of highly confidential information. Our files are ated with each of the components of the protected and controlled in the same manner as Safeguards proposed access authorization rule? The Information, and are stamped Confidential. (See Note under 1.

Commission is also interested in specific above.) With respect to each part of the proposed rule, our comments regarding the contribution of comments are as follows:

the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage a. It is the intent and practice of GPUNC not to infringe and whether they have been adequately upon an individual I s rights of free speech, association demonstrated to outweigh the infringe- and privacy.

ments on individual privacy associated with the initiatives. b. The GPUNC program for temporary workers is already similar to the proposed rule. While we take into consideration the contractor I s findings on screening and observation of their own employees, we feel that more control is neces-sary. Hence, we have established a security supervisor interview (or review) with each prospective temporary employee covering employment records for the previous three years. This interview is detailed with respect to military service, prior convictions for any offense other than minor traffic violations, and any pending legal action against the individual. While all of this informa-tion is interpreted in a liberal manner, willful failure to provide it or making false statements on the interview form is normally considered sufficient reason for denial of unescorted access. In every case of delay or denial, the individual is offered another full interview with labor and management personnel attending in which to state his/her case. In some such cases employment is allowed on site, but outside the Protected/Vital areas. It is the Security Department position that the acquisition of this sensitive information is mandatory in order to assess adequately and objectively any individual's reliability for unescorted access.

NRC 10 C . T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS.AUTHOR-ION RULES

3. What are the particular concerns about c. GPUNC does not envision any problems with waiving access (Con't) infringements on civil liberties associ- authorization program requirements for temporary workers ated with each of the components of the during cold shutdown or refueling, if the proposed follow proposed access authorization rule? The up conditions are met.

Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of d. GPUNC agrees with the "grandfather" clause effecting the specific provisions of - the proposed individuals who have received unescorted access authoriza-rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage tion prior to adaption of the proposed rule. Our draft and whether they have been adequately Access Authorization Policy already reflects this position.

demonstrated to outweigh the infringe-ments on individual privacy associated e. As mentioned above, GPUNC feels a three year employment with the initiatives. review of temporary employees is acceptable for access into Protected/Vital areas. This may later be removed when we feel an adequate background investigation program is in use by all contractors, vendors, etc.

f. GPUNC concurs with the proposed requirement that all employees report any information arising later that may have a bearing on their screened status (e.g., a subse-quent arrest and/or conviction).

g. GPUNC concurs with and has already instituted psycholog-ical screening for GPU and temporary personnel. An expanded and more intensive Behavioral Reliability Program involving supervisors is in the process of being imple-mented.

PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI.ION RULES

4. What evidence does or does not support No comments the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate over-all clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to con:onercial nuclear power reactors?

5.

What specific characteristics are identi-fied by a clinical psychological assess-No comments NRC 10 CFR PART 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULES ment that related directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI.ION RULES

6. Can the use of psychological assessment General Comment:

in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the combined the risk of radiological sabotage? Is preventive access control measures proposed and already in there any evidence which would help use. While we have had no sabotage at our plants, that fact quantify the extent, if any, of risk alone is not conclusive. Would we have had sabotage attempts reduction supplied by psychological if none of these measures were in use? That is difficult to assessment, background investigations, answer. However, common sense and prudence indicate that and behavioral reliability programs? something must be done in an attempt to detect and deal with potential trouble makers in nuclear power plants. Perhaps, not surprisingly, there have been no overly adverse employee reactions to these measures. Especially around Three Mile Island, public pressure for safety of operation has virtually dictated the use of such personnel review and observation policies.

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHOR.ON RULES

7. Can the use of psychological assessment General Comment:

in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both Same as for 16 fitness for duty and radiological sabo-tage concerns?

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI-ION RULES

8. To what extent is the use of psycholog- GPUNC believes that the total package comprised of psychologi-ical assessment related to a behavioral cal assessment, background investigation, and continual reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability is necessary. People tend to change behavioral reliability program be effec- over a period of time; some changes may adversely impact on tive without pre-employment psychological their reliability. Continued observation must be a part of the assessment? What specific risks would program. However, we do not believe that a formal, documented, remain if both psychological assessment periodic report on individuals is necessary.

and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI.ION RULES

9. What kinda of individuals have been No comments "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORI.ION RULES

10. What examples, if any, exist of manage- GPUNC is not aware of any management abuses of these measures.

ment abuses of screening procedures, On the contrary, we have established an interview and review including psychological assessment, back- system to prevent such abuses.

ground investigation and behavioral reliability programs?

NRC 10 CFR.T 73 - PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHOR**ION RULES

11. Row do employees and employee organiza- General Comment:

tions feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel Same as for #6 about the proposed access authorization rules?

PACIFIC

+ 77 BEALE STREET

• SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFOR N IA 94106 * (415) 781-4211

• TWX 910-372-6587 JAMES D. SHIFFER VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION March 7, 1985

\

PGandE Letter No.:

Secretary of the *commission U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Proposed Rules: Access Authorization Program Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities Federal Register, Volume 49, No. 149 Pages 30726 - 30739, August l, 1984 Gentlemen:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGandE) has reviewed the subject Proposed Rules and endorses the comments developed by KMC's Physical Security Coordinating Group. The Physical Security Coordinating Group is composed of 23 electrical utilities who provide their unified opinion on nuclear plant security issues to the NRC through KMC. The group's comments will be submitted to your office by KMC, Inc. on or about March 7, 1985 *

• Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely, cc: J. B. Martin

11,f; ~Af IFGOCAIOlf l"O'MMISKII OOOITTING & S~P 'r<c seer 0

OFFICE Of Tf'C " ' "TA RY OF lHE COW.it F,;,tr.,N

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C4'l ~ 3012~)

--PR -~~ *,

73 ([jj) .a:m lUMBIRPR -'73 PADlllllUli souTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC POST OFFICE 764 8c GAs coMPANv (49/:/l ~73~)

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 292 1 8 0 . W . DIXON , JR .

IIICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS March 7, 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear ~tat.ion Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Proposed Rule/Regulatory Guide Response  ::a-:'PR~M,*~ fJJ;~

Dear Mr. Chilk:

(_ ~~. 9u~. c'-u' On August 1, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published for comment three (3) proposed rules, commonly referred to as the "Insider Rulemaking Package, 11 in the Federal Register. Attached in enclosures 1 through 4 are South Carolina Electric and Gas Company's comments on these proposed rules and on the related draft Regulatory Guide entitled, "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants. 11 Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these items.

Very truly yours,

• AMM/OWD/gj O. W. Dixon, J r .

Attachments:

cc: v. c. Summer T. c. Nichols, Jr./0. w. Dixon, Jr.

E. H. Crews, Jr E. c. Roberts

w. A. Williams, Jr.

D. A. Nauman Group Managers

o. s. Bradham

c. L. Ligon (NSRC)

NPCF File

Enclosure 1 SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY Comments on Proposed Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities March 1985

GENERAL COMMENT

S PROPOSAL:

Revise the proposed 73.55(d)(1) as follows: "* ** The licensee shall subject all persons except on-duty armed security force members and bona fide federal, state and local law enforcement personnel on official duty * * *

• Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portal are out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a random physical pat-down search of 10% of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches. 11 JUSTIFICATION:

The potential threat to personnel and equipment safety is not lessened by searching an on-duty armed security force member. He/she has authorization and indeed is required _by regulation to carry a firearm into the protected and vital areas. A search for deadly weapons/explosives is therefore superfluous and alienates the officer, causes questions about the need for the entire search process by security and plant personnel alike, and often delays the actual performance of security duties and responsibilities.

The NRC proposed ruling indicates temporary power or equipment failures will result in pat-down searches of 10OS of those persons entering the protected area. This requirement fails to take into account the increased level of

• protection against the "insider" offered through the proposed Access Authorization Rule. During busy periods such as shift changes, this requirement will result in excessively long delays in gaining access to the plant. The proposed "1OS search" requirement will have a strong deterrent effect and help to minimize _delays.

Enclosure 2 SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY Comments on Proposed Access Authorization Program March 1985

GENERAL COMMENT

S

1. SCE&G recognizes the need for consistency and comparability among licensee and contractor screening programs. The adoption of a common standard could bring about the ability to transfer security clearances, share audit findings/results, and eliminate the need for major contractors to meet the screening requirements of numerous licensee access authorization programs.

SCE&G's position is that rulemakings should only be adopted if the benefits derived significantly exceed the cost of implementation. Those utilities who have implemented access authorization programs based on ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982, "Security for Nuclear Power Plants", have excellent security records. Based on this experience, SCE&G recommends that the NRG officially endorse the implementation of ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982 in lieu of pursuing the proposed Access Authorization Rule. The guidelines for a nuclear power plant access authorization program submitteQ by EEI in response to this proposed rulemaking is another industry-baaed document which could be endorsed. The EEI guidelines are more comprehensive, including requirements for positive identification, interim clearances, protection of information, audit sharing and records retention.

2. The Continual Observation Program and the Fitness for Duty Rule have overlapping requirements. Elements from the two programs should be combined into a single rule.

3. Consistency among licensee programs and future willingness to accept

• security clearances granted by others can be enhanced by stating specific time requirements for background investigation components, audit frequencies, unusual behavior training, etc.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS PROPOSAL:

Revise the proposed 73.56(b)(1) as follows: "* ** Individuals who have received an unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective date of these amendments or licensee employees who have provided continuous trustworthy and reliable service for a period of 5 years or longer are exempt from having to meet the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section for a background investigation and paragraph (d) of this section for psychological as seaament.

JUSTIFICATION:

From time to time, a licensee may desire to transfer or promote employees from a non-nuclear to a nuclear position. An employee considered for such a move would not have been selected without first having proven traits of trustworthiness, reliability and loyalty to the licensee. One of the moat positive indications of future behavior is an employee's past behavior. For a period of 5 years, sufficient assurance can be made that an employee will continue to function in this same manner. To subject this employee to an background investigation and psychological assessment would be both demoralizing to the employee and costly to the licensee without substantially improving the effectiveness of the licensee's access authorization program.

PROPOSAL:

Review 73.56(b)(3)(iv) as follows: "(iv) Has been convicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses 1/4fttH.-ea~*4:ttg-1.'H!l."'bi~tte:i-*ef*1/4ti:t:i:fittl-~eHdeno!~-that raise serious concerns relative to the individual's trustworthiness or reliability."

JUSTIFICATION:

A single criminal act, such as participation in a recent armed robbery, does not indicate habitual criminal tendencies; but does demonstrate that the individual may act irresponsibly under a given set of circumstances.

PROPOSAL:

Revise proposed 73.56(c) as follows: "* ** The licensee shall notify those

• F*e(:}1/4H,F-e-~-e:a.-t-individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions of their responsibility to report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or "

JUSTIFICATION:

• A licensee could programatically inform personnel having unescorted access that any occurrence having a bearing on his status be reported to appropriate management. The licensee should not be held responsible from an enforcement standpoint if it is later found that the individual attempted to coverup or conceal such information.

PROPOSAL:

Revise proposed 73.56(d)(2) as follows: "* ** the psychiatrist or psychologist shall provide, in writing to appropriate -seni'Ot" licensee management, a recommendation ** *"

JUSTIFICATION:

Licensees must be able to delegate the implementation of the Access Authorization Program to line organizations. "Senior Management" normally implies Vice President level and above.

PROPOSAL:

Revise 73.56(e)(1) as follows: "In the case where the individual's behavioral actions represent an imminent danger to the public health and safety, the individuals's supervisor shall 1-mmed-i-a-t-e-ly- s~s~en& ensure that the individual is promptly escorted to appropriate licensee management to make a decision relative to the immediate suspension of the individual's unescorted access on a temporary basis * * * "

JUSTIFICATION:

An individual's immediate supervisor may not have the authority to suspend access authorizations.

PROPOSAL:

Revise proposed 73.56(g) as follows: "* ** The procedure must provide notice and an opportunity for a fair evidentiary hearing and be consonant with fundamental principles of due process. --'Phe--gl'"ievanoe reoiew--prouedure- contained

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...the /4!0Ilt rao1;.

JUSTIFICATION:

The licensee is solely accountable for the safety and security of the facility and the public. As such, the licensee can not afford to abdicate the responsibility of granting or denying access authorization to some third party protected from that liability. The proposed wording should be, and is, more appropriately included in other regulatory guidance giving an option to those licensees who may accept this type of arbitiary adjudication.

PROPOSAL:

• Revise proposed 73.56(h)(2) as follows: "The licensee, contractor or supplier shall not disclose the personal information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, or his representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process of granting or denying access to protected areas and vital islands,£!:_

the licensee's legal representatives, or to other licensees in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section, including negative information such as in the case of a clearance denial.

JUSTIFICATION:

Legal actions stemming from future security clearance denials are a certainty.

The proposed revision recognizes that licensee legal staff may require access to screening records in order to represent the licensee in such cases.

The licensee must have some legal basis to ensure that both positive and negative information may be transferred between licensees in compliance with paragraph (f) of this section.

PROPOSAL:

Revise proposed 73.56(h)(5) as follows: "The licensee shall retain the access authorization file of an individual for thre-e- two years after termination of the unescorted access authorization * * * "

JUSTIFICATION:

In accordance with proposed 73.56(f)(1), access authorization acceptance is only valid from the same file if employment is uninterrupted for not more than 365 days. To require one additional year of retention for inspection purp9ses is prudent; consistent with accepted security suitability, training and qualification records retention; and will reduce considerably the storage space requirements

• Questions for Specific Public Comment (Access Authorization Program) 1* To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavior reliability programs already used by nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

For licensee employees, SCE&G has implemented the elements of the proposed access authorization rules since October 1979, with minor exceptions/

deviations. Essentially all elements have been in place since January, 1982 for the contractor providing security services to SCE&G

• The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test results and subsequent interviews with a psychologist, if test results are inconclusive, comprise a single element of SCE&G's Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). This element is evaluated along with many others to determine an employee's trustworthiness and reliability before clearance for unescorted access is granted or denied.

A behavioral reliability program (continued observation) is an ongoing element of SCE&G's PRP. Coupled with supervisory training, it is viewed as an essential element which ensures an employee's reliability is sustained and any deviant behavior receives early detection and immediate treatment *

2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Psychological assessment has enabled SCE&G to avoid placement of persons who were found to possess one or more of the following traits:

disoriented, unreliable, dangerous, irresponsible, substance addicted, unpredictable or deliberately deceptive.

The assessment therefore addresses trustworthiness, reliability and emotional fitness-for-duty. A "propensity" for radiological sabotage is not evaluated in our testing; however, an unreliable person who leaves valves and switches in inappropriate positions can cause as much radiological damage as one who intentionally sets out to accomplish the same thing

• What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

SCE&G regards their PRP as an integral part of the overall security program for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. The judious implementation of this program several years ago, along with employee acceptance, has produced very few, if any, civil liberty questions. It is regarded by the plant population as simply another personnel qualification requisite associated with working at a nuclear generating facility.

Participation by any individual in SCE&G's PRP is voluntary. No psychological evaluation or research into an individual's background relating to a security clearance is initiated without his prior knowledge and written consent. A subject may withdraw consent relating to a psychological evaluation, research into his background, alcohol and drug abuse checks, or continued observation anytime after the original consent is given by providing written notice to the Manager, Nuclear Security. The privacy of the subject is safeguarded by all concerned departments by the implementation of measures to restrict access to information gathered for security clearances. Access to information is confined to only those persons who have a "need to know".

There is a delicate balance between the need for strong security and the rights of an individual for privacy. The risk associated with the postulated threat of an insider far outweighs the risks associated with gathering personal information. The usefulness of the proposed access authorization program far exceeds that of other alternatives such as increased compartmentalization, the two-man rule, or a government clearance program.

4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

SCE&G uses the MMPI as a screening tool, and through a counseling psychologist, the services of the National Computer Services (NCS)

Interpretive Scoring Sytems for scoring and printout. All MMPI's are administered by trained proctors or by the psychologist. Scoring and interpretation of each test is provided by NCS and subjected to the psychologist's personal analysis.

There are two extremely important needs in MMPI psychological testing:

First, to provide the organization with as much assurance as possible that the persons cleared are psychologically fit for responsible work, and secondly, to be fair to the persons tested. SCE&G meets these needs by combining testing with selected interviews. Interviews assure that the individual's test scoring is not biased by external factors such as temporary emotional distraught due to marital separation, death of a loved one, etc.; the inability to read; a very conservative fundamental religious background; failure to comprehend the impact of double negatives; or a conscious attempt to make the best possible impression.

As of July 1984, 2836 MMPI tests had been administered to SCE&G and contractor employees associated with the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

Of this number, 915 tests revealed evidence of elevated scales. Subsequent item analysis and interviews performed by a counseling psychologist resulted in 134 rejections (5%) *

5. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedures? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Individuals have been refused psychological clearance by SCE&G under several diagnostic categories. They are listed from the most frequent to the least:

Personality Disorder/Psychopathic Deviate Defensive/Deceptive Antisocial/Explosive Personality Manic Depressive Psychosis Depressive Reaction/Schizoid Personality Sociapathic Personality Schizo-manic Psychosis Drug/Alcohol Dependency Depressive Neurosis Schizophrenia, Simple Type Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type Severely Disturbed/Multi-Classification Paranoid Personality SCE&G feels that false negatives associated with MMPI testing can only be controlled through an interview with a counseling psychologist. In a selective interview process virtually all false positive errors can be eliminated.

• No significant statistical data is available to date which would give an estimate of false positives errors associated with MMPI testing. SCE&G addresses this potential through a continued observation program designed to ensure an employee's trustworthiness and reliability through ongoing monitoring of his daily work habits.

SCE&G is not aware of more effective procedures being available or practical for this purpose.

6. can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

Initially, psychological assessments were performed because of security concerns associated with the "insider" threat and potential radiological sabotage. SCE&G currently views the activity as only a single management "tool" in the overall personnel reliability program. Where the use of psychological assessment may reduce the risk of radiological sabotage, it also may reduce the Company's vulnerabiltty to other risks, including theft, vandalism, and occupational accidents *

• One aspect of SCE&G's suocessful human resource management system is that the psychological assessments, background investigations, and continued observations have significantly contributed to the relatively low attrition rate, reasonably high morale and job satisfaction, and minimized incidents of unintentional accidents.

Because of insufficient/inconclusive statistical data, psychological assessment cannot be justified solely on the reduced risk of radiological sabotage. As noted in our response to Question 2, an individual who is untrustworthy and/or unreliable can cause radiological damage just as severe as the person who intentionally sabotages the equipment *

7. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Psychological assessment alone cannot address both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns. Combined with a comprehensive screening program including background investigations, physical examinations, and continued observation, it can indirectly address each of these concerns.

Applying the McAndrews Alcoholism Scale to the results of the MMPI can identify an individual's tendency toward substance abuse, directly in support of fitness for duty. In the case of radiological sabotage, the psychological assessment can identify individuals with traits of aggressiveness, resentment to authority, and psychopathy before granting them unescorted access authorization.

After granting unescorted access authorization, the continued observation element becomes the most vital part of the access authorization program.

This element addresses both the fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns on an on-going basis *

8. To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e.,

if only background investigations were adopted?

Psychological assessment is used to assist SCE&G in assuring that only employees with acceptable psychological traits are allowed unecorted access to protected and vital areas. Through adequate supervisory training and a continued observation program, individuals are continuously monitored to further assure that they are able to cope normally with job-related and personal stresses which might alter their psychological profile *

• The proposed behavioral reliability program could be effective regardless of whether a pre-employment psychological assessment was made or not. The reliance on a stronger observation program in this setting would become extremely important. It would require the trained supervisor, who is not a pyschiatrist or psychologist, to establish psychological "norms" for each of his/her subordinates from which continued observation could be based.

The risk of allowing unescorted access to vital areas to people with unacceptable reliability and trustworthiness traits would significantly increase without psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program. The loss of these components would essentially leave nothing but background investigation on which to base unescorted access authorization.

Background investigations, like psychological assessments, comprise only one element of a comprehensive personnel reliability program *

9. What kinda of individuals have been "aoreened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment? by the use of background investigation? by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Psychological assessments have been used to screen out individuals found to possess one or more of the following traits: disoriented, unreliable, dangerous, irresponsible, substance addicted, unpredictable or deliberately deceptive (see question #5).

Background investigations have been used to screen out individuals who have falsified records, abused drugs and/or alcohol, severe financial problems, past employment problems and criminal convictions which cause concern relating to trustworthiness and reliability.

Behavioral reliability has been used to screen out individuals who, for some reason, have been unable to cope with job-related or personal stress.

To date, this program has screened out an individual who developed a substance abuse problem, an individual who was experiencing marital problems and one who developed tension and emotional anxiety *

10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, inciuding psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

Because SCE&G very specifically designed a program to protect the privacy of its employees, no management abuse of this information should occur.

Access to personnel reliability information, including psychological tests and background investigations, is limited to only those involved in the approval/appeal process. This information is not associated in any way with employee performance appraisals, promotions, or progressions *

11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

SCE&G employess have grown to accept the personnel reliability program as a part of the necessary qualification criteria for employment in the nuclear industry. Most appear to accept and acknowledge the benefits to the security and safety of the plant and public .afforded by this program.

The average employee is not ~ware of the proposed access authorization rules. Little, if any, impact is expected on the employee since SCE&G's program is very similar to 10CFR 73.56 as proposed.and has been in place for five years

• Enclosure 3 SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMP ANY Comments on Proposed Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants March 1985 PROPOSAL:

The introductory comments to 10CFR 73.55 should be modified to permit licensees to have the option of continuing their currently-approved methods of protecting vital areas (i.e., compartmentalization) or taking advantage of the economies possible with the vital island concept.

JUSTIFICATION:

• The physical protection to vital equipment through compartmentalization generally exceeds protection provided to the same equipment through the vital island concept. SCE&G would like to evaluate the advantages of providing freer access to the operators as a result of this relaxation of security requirements, but should be allowed to pursue such possibilities based on specific needs, budget situations, etc.

Enclosure 4 SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY Comments on Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants (SG 301-4)

March 1985

GENERAL COMMENT

S

• Wherever "senior management person" or similar wording appears in the draft regulatory guide this wording should be changed to read "appropriate licensee management".

The term "senior management" normally refers to vice presidents and above.

Implementation functions are normally delegated to line organizations.

Chapter 1 - GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE AND REQUIREMENTS In addition to "grandfathering" employees who have received unescorted access authorization prior to the effective dates of the proposed rule changes, a

• provision should be made to accommodate licensees or contractor employees who have provided continuous trustworthy and reliable service for 5 years or longer.

From time to time, a licensee may desire to transfer or promote employees from a non-nuclear to a nuclear position. An employee considered for such a move would not have been selected without first having proven traits of trustworthiness, reliability and loyalty to the licensee. One of the most positive indications of future behavior is an employee's past behavior. For a period of 5 years, sufficient assurance can be made that an employee will continue to function in this same manner. To subject this employee to a background investigation and psychological assessment would be both demoralizing to the employee and costly to the licensee without substantially improving the effectiveness of the licensee's Access Authorization Program.

Chapter 2 - BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS 1* True Identity: The use of fingerprint checks are currently impractical because of legal restrictions to FBI and/or local police files and of lengthy delays which would result even if access was available. From a practical standpoint, fingerprint checks do not necessarily verify an individual's identity, rather only identifies whether or not he/she has a criminal record. This information research is more appropriate under criteria for a "criminal history" check. The preferred method of validating/verifying an individual's identity would be through the use of photographs taken at the time of applying for a clearance. An acceptable procedure would be to have this photograph identified by one developed source (i.e., someone not referenced by the applicant). The cost associated with requiring two sources versus one is not justified since it would not significantly improve the reliability of the process. It should also be recognized that the use of photographs in either personal interviews or by mail may be acceptable methods of verifying an

• individual's true identity *

2. Employment History and Educational History: Change the last sentence to read: "This investigation would ordinarily be accomplished through personal interviews, telephonically, or by mail with ***** " SCE&G's five years of experience with performing background investigations has proven that the reliability of data gathered by either of these three methods is relatively equal. In some cases telephonic or mail interviews are better received by the interviewee and in all cases this process is less expensive.

Miltary Service: Military Service should only be verified if it falls within the 5 year period under investigation. The DO214 form is quite acceptable in satisfying this requirement. To require past military service records to be obtained from the National Personnel Records Center is not cost effective or realistic when an honorable discharge can be ascertained from the OD214. Only if a discharge other than honorable is

• indicated or an applicant is unable to produce his/her DD214 should a request be processed through the Center.

Chapter 3 - PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT The use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is quite common within the nuclear industry. As noted in NUREG/CR-2O76, page 134, "Personnel selection decisions for most occupations may not require the kind of information the MMPI provides. However, with critical occupations in which great responsibility, personality, stability, honesty, etc. are highly desired characteristics (airline crew, police, etc.) the benefits of closed personality evaluation may offset the costs involved. The MMPI appears to offer useful information of potential personality problems that could interfere with performance in some occupations." SCE&G uses the MMPI for exactly this purpose--not as an ultimate criteria but as a single element in determining an individual's trustworthiness and reliability within an overall comprehensive reliability program.

Chapter 3 - PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT (Con 1 t)

The NUREG also discusses the 16PF Questionnaire and states "A study by Karson and O'Dell found no relationship between peer and supervisor ratings in any of the personality variables measured by the 16PF."

It would appear from these statements that the MMPI far exceeds the 16PF for the purpose of employee screening. It is SCE&G's position, based on five years of using the MMPI, that it is the perferred testing instrument to be required for helping to determine personnel reliability.

Chapters 4, 5 1 6 and 7 No comment

• P. 0 . BOX 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408

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• 'FtORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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(_~. 9 u..'uL.v Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) would li ke to take this opportunity to submit written comments and suggestions on the proposed rule regarding the "Access Authorization Program" (FR 30726, August I, 1984) and the proposed rule regarding "Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants" (FR 30735, August I, 1984). Also comments are provided concerning two draft Regulatory Guides which were formulated as implmentation guidance for the proposed rules, namely, SG 301-4, "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants", September, 1984 and SG 302-4, "Vital Islands, Protection of Physical Security Equipment and Key and Lock Controls", January, I 985.

We trust that the attached comments and discussion will prove useful toward the formulation of a final rule. Thank you for your attention in this matter

• Very truly yours, J. W. Williams, Jr.

Group Nuclear License Nuclear Energy Attachment JWW /KLC/WFK/cab MAR 111985 rmwlodpd by card. a.'flrl-'flifi llrif1'I~

PEOPLE . * . SERVING PEOPLE

U.S. NUCLEAR. ROOIJl.A.Tt'\~Y COMM! KIi DO KET .G SE?~ _'ICE si:c.. vM OFF' OF THE SEC ET. RV.

OF THE COMMISC. IQN Document Stat 1st ,cs P01fm11rk Date Copiu Received

' I Copie, Reprod

Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) supports the adoption of a personnel reliability ~rogram including background investigation.

FPL does not support the inclusion of psychological evaluation and continual behavioral observatio_n program as set forth in proposed rule Part 73.56,10 as published in the Federal Register

• on August 1, 1984 particularly as interpreted in draft Regulatory Guide SG 301-4, "Standard Format and Content Guide For Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants," September, 1984.

• FPL would generally support the NUMARC generated *Guidelines For Industry Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program" as alternative to draft Regulatory Guide SG 301-4.

an FPL also recommends that the inclusion of Miscellaneous Amendme~ts, "Yital Islands," as defined in 73.2(nn) and the related draft Regulatory Guide SG-302-4, entitled "Vital Islands," Protect1on of Physfcal Security Equip~ent and Key and Lock Controls 11 be deferred, only as the foregoirig relate to Vital Islands.

11 11 We support elements of the proposed amendment and regulatory guide as they relate to

• Physical Protection Plan and Contingency Emergency Access to Vital Islands, and Keys and Locks.

Plan Suspending Security Interface, Measures FPL Comments Concerning Commissioner Roberts' and Commissioner Gilinsky's Separate Views.

FPL agrees with the general thrust of the views of Commissioners Roberts and Gilinsky. Our specific comments concerning psychological evaluation -and continual behavioral 'observation will be set forth elsewhere in this document as wa comment on specific aspects of the proposed rule. We b2lieve that this utility, and others as well, has demonstrated the ability to 1

manage people and that the unduly prescriptive detail in which the proposed rule and regulatory guide address psychological testing and continual behavioral observation is an unnecessary and unwarranted intrusion into management's prerogatives and personal privacy.

FPL Comments Concerning Questions For Specific Public Comment

1) To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rule already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessments and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

FPL Comment Background investigations, psychological assessments and behavioral reliability programs are noA being used to varying degrees by most utilities. Any well managed business must use some type of program to assess and monitor the behavioral reliability of its applicants and employees.

FPL is no exception having had programs in place for many years. In addition, FPL is in tne process of upgrading this program as it applies to nuclear plant personnel. FPL also uses psychological assessr.1ent for employees (operators and security personnel) in certain key nuclear power plant positions, however, does not require psychological testing for 100% of personnel granted unescorted access to nuclear power plants.

2) What purposes are being served by the use of psychological 2

assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

FPL Comment Psychological assessment procedures represent another method of gathering samples of behavior. The more samples that are made available by means of psychological assessment and supervisory interviews and background investigations and peer interactions and observed behavior, etc., the more data are available to address all issues related to employment.

Psychological tests only have the possible capability of identifying unreliable behavior of angry, vengeful, or disturbed individuals. "Professional Saboteursn would be very difficult to identify by psychological testing.

Thorough background investigations and observed behavior would be of far gr2ater importance in detecting such problems .

• 3) What civil the are the particular concerns about liberties associated with each of the proposed access authorization rule?

infringements components The Commission is on of also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they nave adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associat~d with the initiatives.

FPL Comment There is no question that the proposed access authorization rule raises concerns about infringement on civil liberties 3

of incumbents and new job applicants with the nuclear industry. However, the potential risk to public safety and to critical equipment either by willful design or as a result of '

disturbed thinking is so great that the discomfiture of the individual (resulting from an infringement on individual privacy) is out weighed by that risk.

4) What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall 'clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessments by licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not* an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

FPL Comment Comparing the reliability of nuclear operators with factors such as "dangerousness" of incarcerated individuals and mental hospital inmates (or even with "abusive potential" of police officers) represents comparing apples with pears, peaches, plums, etc. But not with *apples.M There are instances of individuals who behaved irresponsibly and, in some cases, dangerously in nuclear power installations but not in numbers sufficient to produce statistically meaningful results. Such results are not easily obtainable because in order to accomplish this, you would have to take a large number of individuals screened out by means of the MMPI, for example, and then *follow them" for the next. three 4

to five years in order to see if predictions made for them came true. In order to be properly scientific, you would have to employ a significant number of these people in spite of their *suspect" profile in order to see if they were indeed irresponsible and unreliable. No company with a nuclear installation would be willing to take that kind of risk with its tremendous potential for future litigation.

Therefore, the problem relates to the practical utility of the proposed psychological assessment. It is to be used to predict whether the licensee's employees or contractor personnel have 11 a potential for committing acts_ that are inimical to the public health and safety or present a danger to 1ife or property" {49 FR 30733). To be useful, the psychological assessment has to have a validated history of success at predicting the characteristics sought to be identified. The proposed rule neither specifies the psychological assessment tests to be used, nor defines the psychological characteristics to be identified, nor explains how any identified characteristics are to be weighed in determining employee trustworthiness.

As Chairman Palladino asked, when the Commission was discussing the proposed rule on October 4, 1983:

"But has psychological testing been used for the purposes that we are trying to use it right now, and does it have any history of success?" (Tran-script, p. 55) 5

NRC staff responded, Awe were unable to validate any data based that this test was used for the purpose that we would 2

try to adapt it to." An expert at the National Institute of Mental Health wrote us recently that, "It must be recognized that the MMPI (the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), or any other personality measure that might be used, has questionable predictive value for behavior of concern to the NRC. 11 (Enclosed September 7, 1984 NIMH memorandum by Lyle Bivens, p. 1) The collection a~d

-- retention utility.

3 of invalidated data appears to lack practical Quote at page 55. As Chairman Palladino stated later in tne Commission meeting:

• 3 "I just am quite significantly concerned about the psychological testing in that I am not confident what it can do and what it can't do." (Transcript,

p. 81)

The NRC Background Information on this proposed rule (SECY 72, February 9, 1984, Enclosure B, p. 2) repeated this concern, "potential inconsistencies in test interpretation, and inability to always predict future behavior from the test results." We understand, moreover, that the American Psychological Association requires through its Ethical Principles of Psfichologists (American Psychologist, June, 1981, pp. 633=!5"38) tat member psychologists exercise caution in using personality assessment devices beyond their designated purposes (clinical/diagnostic applications). Although the Association does not specifically ban the use of the devices for screening purposes, it does e~phasize that the results of personality measurement tests may be deficient in both validity and reliability when the tests are applied in this manner.

5

5) What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives or false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

FPL Comment Characteristics possibly identified by clinical psychological assessment (that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiologic sabotage) include:

Antisocial tendencies, poor impulse control, inadequate frustration tolerance, free-floating anxiety or hostility, evidence of addictive personality characteristics, paranoid thinking, feelings of grandiosity and depression proneness.

None of these characteristics in themselves ~ecessarily preclude an individual from working at a nuclear facility

• without representing a significant risk to plant or the public~

co-workers, Trained psychologists will need look at the particular configuration of sy~ptoms to see the to if they are well controlled or if there is a likelihood of an acting out episode. The clinical assessment must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of r~ality boundaries in order to determine if the person is able to differentiate between reality and fantasy and if he/she can control his peculiar ideation rather than his inappropriate thoughts and feelings being in control of him (or her). Such information 7

might be gained by an interpretation of a test such as the MHPI by a trained psychologist. However, Or. Ly1e W.

Bivens, an expert at the National Institute of Mental Health, makes a profound point in his September 7, 1984, memo to the Deputy Director, DERP (enclosed). He states, "Although a clinical psychological assessment might identify hostile attitudes or an active psychosis that would pose a safety threat, it is also likely not to. There is no data on *which to base a statement regarding the probability of Type I or Type II errors."

6) Can the use of psychological assessment -in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? ls there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

FPL Comment The incidence of radiological sabotage is essentially nan-existent. Psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs may help to identify individuals who are :nore likely to be involved in unintentional events or accidents, who are likely to have difficulty in adjusting to a heavily regulated work environment and who have a history of being involved in events less catastrophic than sabotage, but which include theft, vandalism, deliberate accidents and so on. Some psychologists note that we do not have statistically significant objective evidence to show that 8

psychological tests will significantly reduce the possibility of inappropriate behavior but suggest such tests may reduce the likelihood of employing or retaining an unreliable employee. However, there simply is no*way to objectively answer this question.

7} Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

• FPL Comment The question of radiological sabotage concerns has answered previously. As far as fitness for duty been is concerned. there are other factors involved. Far example, the psychological assessment might reveal the presence or absence of anxiety which is likely to reduce work effectiveness as well as other characteristics such as excessive dependency, comp:Jlsive inefficiency and a tendency to feelings of helplessness in the face of emergencies .

• These people are not a risk in terms of sabotage but they can fail at critical times.

identify a potentially troublesome Psychological assessment might personality pattern.

Previous work history and supervisory observation and/or background investigation could also achieve these same results.

8) To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related .to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without preemp 1oyment psycho logi ca 1 assessment? What specific* risks 9

would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of the screening program, 1.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

FPL C~mnent To the extent that the convnent to question number "4. 11 above documents the invalidated status and questionable predictive value of personality ~asures, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI}, there appears to

• be little relationship between psychological assess~ent and a behavioral observation program at all. Consequently, the effectiveness of a behavioral reliability program would rest with the quality and thoroughness of supervisory training and supporting programs such as Employee Assistance Programs and follow-up documentation systems.

To think that behavioral observation programs only exist if formalized by a company policy or government regulation is to ignore*the inherent structure of American business. The Supervisor/Employee relationship by definition imposes a certain relationship based on performance observation tied directly to compensation for work performed. A supervisor s 1 job is to observe his/her employee s 1 behavior. The supervisor's skills may be enhanced by certain behavioral reliability education, however. Therefore, background investigations are rarely, if ever, the only component of a screening program.

9) What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by th~ use of psychological assessment, by 10

the use of background investigation, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

FPL Comment No specific statistical data is available. A very wide range of problems have been detected primarily through background investigations and supervisory observations.

10) What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment,

• background programs?

FPL Comment investigation and behavioral reliability We are unaware of any abuses concerning these components.

11) How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

FPL Comment Em~loyees have generally accepted past and present screening

• programs.

screening Some employees have indicated some resentment as they believe they are being wsingled outw for more stringent than if they were employed in non-nuclear employment. Upper level union'management has given support to the proposed rule in comments to the Commission, however, we have noted that these sentiments may not be shared. by certain locals.

FPL Comment on Proposed Revision .to 50.34 paragraph ill and Addition of paragraph ,ill We agree with proposed revision to paragraph (d).

11

We concur with the addition of paragraph (h), however, we recommend the deletion of the words *grievance review procedures*

for reasons which we will address later.

FPL Comment 2.!!. Proposed Revision to 50.54-paragraph 1.el We agree that guard training and qualification and access authorization plans should be included in the provisions of this paragraph.

• FPL Co:nment 2.!!. Proposed- Revision to 73.55 ill and Addition ill of paragraph We agree with the proposed revision of 73.55 (d). The proposed addition of paragraph (i), which could only be applied to single unit plants, must be read along with the proposed 73.56 (f) (3) to determine the full impact of these proposals. The creation of some type of interim ~ccess authorization is essential to enable the licensee to cope with major outages and emergencies, particularly in multi-unit facilities. In addition, we see no need to require a visual inspection of all affected protected

• areas following cold shutdown or refueling operations d (2),

work performed in the protected area, whether conducted during an outage or not, is routinely supervised and *inspected as Any performed. An additional documented inspection in protected areas is unnecessary. We assume that no special start-up procedures for inspection of vital areas ar~ required and that a thorough visual inspection of all affected areas is adequate.

FPL Comment 2.!!. Proposed Addition of 73.56 Proposed paragraph (b) "grandfathers" personnel having received unescorted access authori~ation prior to the effective date of 12

the proposed amendments. It is recommended that licensee and contractor employees with 36 months of continuous service without display of aberrant behavior also be exempt from paragraphs (c) and (d) (if retained).

Proposed paragraph 73.56 (c) delineates the elements of the background investigation but fails to specify the retrospective period involved. We believe that the retrospective period should be specified by the regulation to ensure consistency among licensees, contractors and others involved in the process.

• Further, to specify the retrospective period will provide a clear indication of - the intent of the Commission and will regulatory weight to the requirement which does not.exist if the lend requirement is contained in a Regulatory Guide. Credit checks may surface information reflecting adversely on an individual's credit history, howeverj it would be most difficult to deny access based on such data. For this reason, and as credit history is not mentioned in the rule's considerations for denial of access, we recommend that credit history be deleted as a

• minimum requirement.

in part, "The The last sentence of paragraph (c) licensee shall require that individual~ granted unescorted access under these provisions report states promptly .** etc.**

We believe this requir~ment to be unduly harsh, in possible conflict with Employee Assistance Program confidentiality and impractical. We suggest that, if not deleted, it be restated as follows: The licensee shall be required to inform individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions that the individual shall promptly report to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance .*. etc. In summary, it is recommended 13

that paragraph (c) be revised to read as follows, text changes as underlined: (c) Background investigation. The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for, background investigations that provide assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reliable, trustworthy, and would act in a manner that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. As a minimum, this . background investigation shall cover a retrospective period of 5 years and must determine an individual's true identity, employment history including military service, if appropriate, educational history, criminal history, and character and reputation (~ minimum of 2 listed. and .£ developed references to be employed .!_Q determining character and reputation). The licensee shall be required to inform individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions that the individual shall promptly report to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction,

• hospitalization, etc.) that may individuals continued access authorization.

have a bearing on such FPL recommends that section (d) Psychological Assessment be deleted. We believe psychological assessment is a useful screening tool to help determine if a person with unescorted access is emotionally stable and reliable and we recommend that utilities use it as they see fit. Because of the wide disparity of opinions on its application and validity, psychological assessment for all personnel, without exception, should not be made mandatory, particulafly in light of the prescriptive 14

implementation terms and conditions as set forth in the Regulatory Guide (pages 15 - 21 and Appendix A and B.)

Psychological testing is used to some extent by nearly all or all utilities at the present time. Different tests or combinations of tests are used, different scales are used by different utilities using the same tests,* differences of opinion on criteria exist between psychologists and between psychologists and psychiatrists as well as professional differences of opinion

• • as to the qualifications of one clinician versus the other.

Regulatory Guide prescribes specific criteria for evaluation be conducted by the clinician, with which some clinicians may The to differ, the specific level of management to which clinicians must communicate findings, the minimum length of an interview, and specifies very precise qualifications and standards for psychologists and psychiatrists which may be considered unduly prescriptive .

• It is recommended encouraged that psychological testing be by this rule, endorsed but not mandated as a minimum standard to be applied without exception due to substantial differences of and opinion as to its application which currently exist.

FPL is committed to and supports the concept of a continual behavioral observation program, however, recommends that this section (e) be deleted from the proposed rule. It is our understanding that utilities, through NUMAHRC, have committed to an industry standard program to address fitness-for-duty.

Continual behavioral observation ts an integral part of this

commitment. The Commission has apparently elected to reissue the fitness*for-duty rule as a policy statement based on this initiative, accepting the industry proposed standard including continual behavioral observation. _The-inclusion of continual behavioral observation in this proposed rule is, therefore, redundant and unnecessary. Should continual behavioral observation be included in the rule, the prescriptive detail, as set forth in the related regulatory guide, should be eliminated thereby per~itting the licensee to exercise its management prerogative as to how best to manage its facilities and employees.

We recommend that paragraph (g) Review Procedures be deleted from the proposed revision to the regulations.

Ample recourse for the redress of grievances already exists in civil law. The NRC is attempting to create new law through its imposition of due process.>> This is unnecessary and beyond the scope of NRC regulatory authority. "Due process" provision seems to be in direct conflict with the balance of the proposed content. The NRC appears to be trying to create rights which do not exist. The Mdue process" requirement co~tinues to be based on, what we be1ieve to be an erroneous presumption, the presumption that every employee has a uproperty right" to a job.

The recommended use of the grievance review procedure would result in decisions contrary to the purpose of the regulation and would be virtually unworkable.

16

Arbitration procedures are designed to resolve contractual disputes. Arbitrators are used to enforce the contract and are usually prec~uded from going beyond the contract. Should the grievance procedure be used, it must be interpreted that the NRC is requiring that the Review Procedure must be negotiated into all contracts.

A licensee, using an outside contractor is generally not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. A co-employee relationship could exist if this were done.

Arbitrators have no expertise in this area. Any hearing panel should know what it is doing. Using arbitrators will result in wide variances in interpretation and confusion.

An arbitrator's decision cannot be reversed due to misinterpretation of law or facts. The primary means of obtaining a reversal of an arbitrator's decision is if the decision can be shown to be in noncompliance with the contract or

• outside Any the scope of the contract. The use of an hearing panel would have to be familiar with due arbitrator would seem to be in conflict with the Hdue process" requirement.

process."

Such is not the case with arbitration and/or arbitrators.

Section (h) (3) requires periodic audit of.contractor records to ensure compliance. Additional clarifying information is requested as follows:

The rule states that auditing of all lice~see accepted contractors' programs is necessary, but it does not mention 17

any time intervals between audits. Are specific time intervals to be defined?

Will the people who will be performing these audits be required to meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.237 Also, will there be any other special requirements these auditors must meet?

What level or depth of audit will be required? Will the normal sampling of records be accepted or will 100%

• • verification be required?

Will these audit reports and relat2d information be considered QA records, and therefore require storage to ANSI N45.2.9?

FPL Comments Concerning Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of nuclear Power Plants.

We reco~m2nd that the inclusion of "vital islands" into an amended rule be deferred for the following reasons:

The proposed rule requires the resubmittal of security plans defining how the licensee would address vital islands. While the vital island approach may be beneficial to some licensees, it may not be beneficial to others. Failure to take the vital islands approach may neither detract from or add to safety or safeguards concerns in every case. We believe that it is more beneficial at this time to proceed on a case by case basis until uncertainties in this area are resolved.

18

We understand that an NRC task force is currently studying the entire vital area question. The recommendations of this group may well not be in conformity with the Vital Islands approach.

To proceed before regulatory direction has been clarified may result in needless and very costly modifications. To require every licensee to reopen the vital area question would, therefore, seem inappropriate.

We do support the proposed revisions to paragraph (d). Wit~

specific referance to proposed (d) (1) amendment, we

• recommend that on-duty armed guards be included enforcement personnel on official duty as being exempt search with by firearms and explosive detection equipment.

la~,

from As these guards are authorized to carry weapons into the protected area, the value of the search is not clear. In addition, this section, in the event of firearms or explosive detection equipment failure, would require physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise be subject to equipment searches. The foregoing would result in substantial delays. It is recommended that personnel granted unescorted access be granted access without search for a period not to exceed three days. It is noted that the FAA does not require equipment searches of flight crews and airport personnel at any time.

19

FPL Comment Concerning Draft Regulatory Guide SG-301-4, MStandard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants*

Paragraph 2.2 Investigative Criteria True Identity The Reg Guide, page 5, states that we must *ensureu (guarantee)

"that the applicant is who he or she purports to be" through a fingerprint check with law enforcement or a photograph to be

• positively identified by at least two individuals.

"guarantee" true identity through the use of a fingerprint check or- photo is impossible. Civil fingerprint cards are not normally To checked in the review of applicant prints. No fingerprint identification may be possible, therefore, if the applicant has no prior criminal record. The matching of an applicant's prints with those of a criminal may also not "guarantee" "true identity" as the identity of the name of the criminal card may be incorrect or false. The same logic may be applied to the use of photographs.

In addition, it is understood that verification, as described above, must take place when an individual attempts to transfer his/her unescorted access from one licensee to another. While electronic transmission of photos is possible, the cost is substantial as would be the negative impact on reciprocity.

It is suggested, therefore, that the word "ensure" be deleted from the Reg Guide text and replaced by "take reasonable steps" to verify name, aliases, Social Security number, etc., through 20

the evaluation of documents, (to include photographs) and the cumulative results of the background investigation. The limitations of verification to fingerprints and photographs should be eliminated.

Employment History This paragraph states, "Pertinent information would include any record of disciplinary action taken against the individual, unusual safety or accident records, psychological and medical

• records, her most the reason for the individual's termination, and his or reemployment potential."

previous Due to liability employers simply will not provide considerations, such detailed informatiqn. A more realistic requirement would be to verify dates of claimed employment, whether the previous employer would rehire the individual and, if available, the reason for termination. A fundamental axiom of conduct of background investigations is to account for all time included in the retrospective period. There is no requirement to acco~plish this in this paragraph or elsewhere in the draft Regulatory Guide. It is therefore recommended that this paragraph be modified as follows: (The information mentioned above need only be collected for the previous 5 years including, if appropriate, military service, periods of unemployment shall be noted, explained, and, where practical, verified. In many cases, periods of unemployment may be verified during the course of the investigation by making the matter a question addressed to listed or developed references.) The paragraph contains the sentence, "However, all claimed employment should be verified. The intent 21

of this requirement is unclear and if intended to apply to employment beyond the 5 year retrospective period, the requirement is unrealistic and unduly burdensome. To verify the employment beyond the 5 year period can only be achieved by contacting all employers for whom the individual has ever worked since there is no other reasonable method of verification.

Depending on the age of the individual and his or her work record, such verification could involve perhaps several dozen previous employers. In view of the preceding, it is recommended that the last three sentences of this paragraph be deleted.

Education History This paragraph states, "The type of information sought should include disciplinary, psychological, or medical problems and the circu~stances under which the individual left the institution (e.g., graduated, was expelled, dropped out) ... To suggest that education institutions would. consistently provide this information appears to be clearly unrealistic. The first sentence of the paragraph indicates, in our judgment, the purpose of this requirement, i.e., 11 Attendance at all secondary and higher level institutions during the previous 5 year period should be verified." To our know1edge, verification is normally accomplished by o~taining a transcript of grades or some other documentation from the institution giving reasonable assurance that the individual in question did attend the institution during the period claimed and was awarded any degree clai~ed. In view of the preceding, it is recommended that this paragrap~ be 22

modified by deleting the sentence beginning with the words,_ ~The type of information sought *** ".

Credit History Our opinion of credit history as a minimum requirement was previously stated. We have no objection to credit checks as an optional or nonrequired tool. Additionally, as stated in the first sentence of this paragraph, the purpose 9f this requirement is to determine financial responsibility, the words CREDIT HISTORY, therefore, are a misnomer and should be FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. While a credit check is a useful tool in determining financial responsibility, the absence of credit reference is not necessarily an indication of lack of financial responsibility.

Criminal History We agree with the content of this section. The provision for "Interim Unescorted Access Autnorization for 6 ~onths .... ,"

however, should be included in the text of the rule *

• Military History The same provision for "Interim Unescorted Access Authorizationu snould be included here and in the text of the rule as set forth

'above for criminal history. The presentation of an original DO-214 should suffice for interim access unti1 a response from the National Personnel Records Center has been received.

Character and Reputation This paragraph does not specify the minimu~ nu~ber of listed references to be obtained nor does it specify the retrospective 23

period involved. It is recommended tnat the second paragraph under Character and Reputation be revised as follows:

A minimum of two listed (those provided by the individual) references should be obtained. Since the applicant is expected to list references who will provide favorable information, the primary value of such references is to assist the investigator in identifying developed character references. At least two persons who know the applicant but who were not listed as character references should be identified and interviewed. While each reference need not cover a 5 year period, the references in composite should cover a minimum period of 5 years. Information elicited through these interviews should be used to obtain an integrated behavioral profile of the individual and should not normally be used to deny unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands without further verification.

Paragraph 2.3 Infor:nation Evaluation Criteria We have no comment concerning this paragraph

• Paragraph l Psychological Assessment Our position concerning psychological testing has been previously stated. Should psychological testing be included in the rule and this guide, the following comments would be applicable.

We do not agree that two tests should be required as is suggested. Section 3.2 Personality Test Intent states in part, "Each of these tests should contribute to the ability to predict emotional instability in a unique way with minimal redundancy,"

and suggest that the MMPI is geared toward abnormal behavioral 24

patterns and that the 16PF is geared toward the Mnorma1* adult population. We believe that the requirement contained in the draft regulatory guide that two test be employed is a costly and unnecessary redundancy and that only one test should be required.

In Section 3, the words, "appropriate senior licensee management" or *senior management" appear several times. As previously indicated, we believe that the word senior should be deleted as unnecessary and unduly restrictive, and that the words "appropriate management" are adequate. Appendix 8 establishes "training and qualifying criteria of professionals to ad~inister ***.. " If the intent of "administer" relates to. the physical monitoring of personnel taking a written test, we do not consider the recommendation that this administrator be a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist to be reasonable or essential.

Paragraph~ Continual Behavioral Observation Program Our comments have been previously stated sup~orting the concept of such a program but recommending exclusion from this rule based on the Commission's apparent acceptance of an industry standard covering this program. In the event the program does becomes a part of the rule, the following comments are made:

Section 4.1 General of the draft regulatory guide suggests but does not require the establishment of an employee assistance program (EAP). Further, it is suggested that the scope of the EAP be clearly defined and should include incidents involving theft, vandalism, or the breaking of work rules. While we agree that the scope should include, per se, theft, vandalism and breaking of work rules, an EAP should not condone the committing 25

of a crime in defining its scope, but should address itself ta troubled employee. Further, the guidance document discusses mandatory referral and later used the words should provide complete confidentiality. In the cases involving mandatory referral, the referring supervisor could and should expect appropriate feed back from the EAP. While confidentiality is an essential feature of a well structured EAP, the words "appropriate confidentiality" should be used versus "complete confidentiality. 11 In section 4.2 Detection of Behavioral Change, the term senior licensee management" is used repeatedly.

11 For the reasons previously cited, i.e.,* "unnecessary" and "unduly restrictive, 11 it is recommended that "appropriate licensee management" be employed.

In addition to the previous comments regarding "vital islands,"

the following - should be considered before finalizing the comments proposed Reg. Guide SG 302-4:

• In Section C.2, vital

~ntry.

the Reg Guide reco~mends that openings in island barriers be specially protected to delay forced It should be noted that many openings to vital areas are the already equipped with fire stops or other fire barriers. This Section should address how security and fire barriers can coexist in the openings within vital island barriers, and how --existing fire barriers can be upgraded to qualify as barriers* to limit access.

In paragraph 2 of Section C.2, the requirement that the minimum level of penetration resistance for an opening be equal to that 26

for the vital island barrier itself is too restrictive since some vital island barriers may be constructed of 18" reinforced concrete which would clearly exceed the security requirement envisioned by this Reg Guide. Some standard for the minimum level of penetration resistance would seem to be more appropriate.

We believe that the Access Lists as proposed in Section C.5.2 ~ay be workable with the modification that individuals whose duties e, require frequent or routine access not be required to state the "Reason for Entry" as proposed in Section C.5.2 under logging requirements. Establishing the n2ed or reason for entry should be the threshold for a "General" access listing on the Access list. Individuals with the need for occasional or limited access might be entered on the Access List under "Special" access with the added require~e~t that the reason for entry be logged .

27

• • • • • • • • • DOCKETED us,mc Power CORPORATION March ,, 198-'

3F038-'-04 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20,,5 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. -'0-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Comments On Proposed Rules For Access Authorization Program As Published In The Federal Register, Volume 49, No. 149, pp. 30726-30739

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) is pleased to provide comments on the subject proposed Access Authorization Program. We are very interested to register our opposition to all but one portion of the Rule. Our fundamental position is that these rules are unnecessary and, with one exception, constitute an unfortunate

• direction for the Federal Government at this time in the implementation of its nuclear power option.

FPC believes these rules are unnecessary because:

1) The investment by nuclear electric power utilities demands that employees be screened and equipment be protected.

2) If the utility investment is protected, the public will be also.-

3) Using current FPC screening methods, no evidence exists at FPC of "insider" or sabotage attempts.

4) NRC estimates of the costs of implementation of the new rules by utilities appear to be unrealistically low.

-') We understand that the efforts by government (AEC and NRC) and industry (EPRI and IDCOR) to re-examine the "accident source term" give trends that are considerably below those used for purposes of reactor siting.

AcknowJedied by cant.* MAR .11 GENERAL OFFICE 3201 Thirty-fourth Street South

• P.O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

• 813-866-5151

ocu ent S cs Pc:atmark Da te Cor>i* Received

!Add' I Copies eprod J

March 5, 1985 3F0385-04 Page 2 FPC comments are provided in three Appendices:

1) FPC Comments On Supplementary Information To The Proposed Access Authorization Program

2) FPC Comments On Questions Posed By NRC For Specific Public Comment

3) FPC Comments On Proposed Rule Revisions In summary, FPC considers (with one exception) that added public benefit has not and cannot be demonstrated from promulgation of these rules. Adoption of these regulations would constitute an unnecessary addition of regulation and expenditure to the public and the nuclear utility industry.

Sincerely, M

G. R. Westafer Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management EHD/feb Enclosures

APPENDIX 1 FPC COMMENTS ON PORTIONS OF SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO THE PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM Historical (Background) Portion This proposed rule appears to be based on recommendations from a Hearing Board which commented four years ago on a rule initially proposed in 1977. There is no indication that current practices of utilities have been recently surveyed. Perhaps this step should be taken prior to final NRC determination of whether additional requirements are needed to control personnel access. FPC believes that no new rule is needed.

Proposed Amendments There is little likelihood that adoption of the proposed amendments, which would affect all nuclear power plant licensees, will result in increased assurance of the trustworthiness of licensee employees and contractor personnel.

We agree that background investigations, psychological assessment, and continual behavioral observation programs are needed and should be industry-run. We also believe that these programs should be performed under industry, rather than government rules or guidelines.

Temporary Workers The option to allow unscreened non-licensee personnel temporary unescorted access during cold shutdown or refueling operations serves to defeat the purpose of the entire access screening process. The fundamental premise of granting access to unscreened, non-licensee personnel is incongruous with protection against insider threat since it ignores the risks associated with admitting individuals with a criminal history or pre-existing psychological problems.

Background Investigation We agree that this program should be administered by the industry which should establish the minimum areas of background investigation. If completely administered by the industry, no new Regulatory Guide, which represents a large investment of NRC staff time, would be required.

No basis is provided for the Commission's proposed requirement for a five-year retrospective investigation.

One of the proposed requirements is that licensees will als:> be responsible for ensuring that individuals granted access to protected areas and vital islands will report any information arising later that may affect their screened status, such as a subsequent conviction. We consider that such a requirement cannot be enforced.

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Conforming Amendments With respect to the amended language in 10 CFR 50.54, we favor the proposed changes, on a non-fee basis, to guard training and qualification plans that do not decrease the effectiveness of these plans. FPC believes that these changes should be put into effect, apart from promulgation of the Access Authorization Program Rules which we oppose.

Psychological Assessment And Continual Behavioral Observation Program These requirements have already been implemented by FPC. If not included at other utilities, implementation should be consistent with industry developed standards, such as those contained in ANSI/ ANS 3.3-1982.

Review Procedure No further requirements need be imposed by NRC in the area of employee grievance prov1s1ons. Requirements of this nature, already imposed by other government agencies in the non-nuclear arena, are already applicable.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification FPC disagrees that the proposed regulations will affect only large concerns which service the industry. Small subcontractors who provide specialized services to the industry (such as consulting firms and local service organizations) which operate with small staffs would be required to hire additional personnel or to hire the services of investigatory agencies to fulfill the requirements of the proposed rules.

Regulatory Analysis FPC believes that the net cost per applicant and licensee is substantially understated by the NRC estimates.

Commission Statement On The Proposed Rule "The Commission is not pursuaded at this time that the psychological assessment and behavioral observation elements are appropriate requirements for this agency to adopt."

FPC shares the Commission's concern and agrees with Commissioner Roberts' separate view which did not approve the psychological assessment and behavioral observation elements of the proposed rule.

FPC also agrees with Commissioner Gilinsky's worry that this rule will too easily lend itself to abuse and will contribute to the demoralization of nuclear plant staffs at a time when there is a great need to retain experienced personnel.

1-2

(

APPENDIX 2 FPC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE REVISIONS FPC hereby provides the following comments on the proposed rule for Access Authorization Programs in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 published in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register (FR Vol. 49, No. 149, 30726-30739).

50*.54(p)(l):

"The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures **

II and

.50 *.54(pX2):

• "The licensee may make changes to the plans in paragraph (p)(l} of this section if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan."

Comment:

FPC agrees with the proposal to permit changes to the "Security Guard Training and Qualification Plan" and the "Safeguards Contingency Plan" that do not decrease the effectiveness without prior Commission approval. This proposal will afford both the licensee and the NRC cost savings over the current review and approval by 10CFR.50.90.

73*.5.5(d)(i)(2)

"(i) During cold shutdown or refueling operations, as specified in the facility's technical specifications as required in 10 CFR 50.36, the licensee has the option under 73.56(e)(3) of this Part to grant temporary unescorted access authorizations to unscreened individuals provided that:

(1) Applicable requirements of this section are followed:

(2) Prior to startup, a thorough visual inspection of all affected protected areas and vital islands is conducted by licensee personnel who normally work in these areas to identify any signs of tampering or sabotage; and (3) Appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure that all operating and safety systems are functioning normally."

Comment:

FPC believes that personnel afforded access to protected areas and vital islands should be screened or escorted prior to entry. The efforts associated with screening and escorting appear to be better justified than those proposed in the rule which would attempt to detect (after the fact) signs of tampering or sabotage by unscreened personnel.

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73 *.56(aX4)

"Licensees may include in their Access Authorization Plan a generic plan to be used by all licensee contractors, manufacturers, or suppliers for screening and observing their employees. The licensee shall be responsible for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted access. Authorization to these individuals (contractors, etc.) based on results of the contractors', manaufacturers', or suppliers' findings or observations."

Comment:

FPC considers that a "generic plan" should be developed by the industry which would serve to standardize the current screening requirements which licensees are invoking upon sub-tier companies.

Current procedures provide for contractors to conduct background investigations, and, in the case of FPC, psychological assessments, and to review and certify acceptability of results to the licensee. FPC conducts audits of contractor programs to assure that the investigation assessments and reviews are in accordance with our requirements. We find continued use of this procedure is acceptable and desirable.

FPC is concerned that the second sentence of proposed 73.56(aX4) could be interpreted as requiring us to look at the actual investigation data or psychological assessment results on each contractor employee prior to granting access authorization. That would be an unnecessary, time consuming, and expensive effort. This would unnecessarily open investigation data and further compromise individual privacy. Without the provision for licensees to accept contractor certifications (attesting to the satisfactory background investigation and psychological evaluation of contractor employees requesting unescorted access to licensee facilities), responsibility for a contractually-imposed service becomes effectively transferred to the Hcensee who must base authorization decision on contractor-compiled data. The licensee retains ultimate responsibility through the current certification review and sample audit process, yet the contractor is compelled to enforce primary screening of their own personnel. FPC contends that retaining the contractor certification process is imperative for effectiveness.

Recognizing the need for standardization and explanation of screening requirements, FPC has participated with several other licensees in the development of such a generic plan, Nuclear Contractor Access Specification (NCAS-1, Rev. Original 05/84) to be offered for use by utilities to impose on contractor organizations. NCAS-1 is a self-explanatory set of requirements, instructions, criteria, guidelines, and sample forms for meeting and exceeding the minimum features of ANS-3.3-1982; since NCAS-1 is compiled from existing licensee requirements, it represents a currently manageable and effective instrument. As discussed in comments to proposed 73.56(h)(3), licensees imposing NCAS-1 upon sub-tier organizations are capable of exchanging the results of audits on contractor implementation of NCAS-1, utilizing a standardized auditing format.

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• J 1 73.56(bXI)

"Individuals who have received an unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective date of these amendments are exempt from having to meet the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section for a background investigation and paragraph (d) of this section for psychological assessment."

Comment:

This allowance in the rule neglects to address certain circumstances which will arise as problems in implementation. They are as follows:

1) A person may have been granted unescorted protected area access but never vital area access. Without evidence of unreliable behavior, that person should be exempted from paragraphs (c) and (d) also.

• 2) 3)

It is highly likely that a long time licensee employee may be transferred fron non-nuclear to nuclear related departments within the utility. Those employees should be exempt from paragraphs (c) and (d) also.

Contrac~or employees with a minimum period of continuous trustworthy service (perhaps 3 years) should also be exempt from paragraphs (c) and (d).

These recommendations are in accordance with current industry practice and with the requirements of ANSI/ ANS-3.3, "Security for Nuclear Power Plants". No new Federal regulation is necessary.

10CFR73.56(b)(4)

"No person may cite this section as authority for the denial, revocation, or suspension of an access authorization based upon information derived from a background investigation when the basis for the denial, revocation, or suspension is other than application of a criterion listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section"

• Comment:

FPC strongly recommends deletion of this statement which places a limitation on the licensee's ability to protect public safety as well as company property. The protection of personnel rights ostensibly provided by this encompassing clause is assured under the proposed 73.56(g) review process. There is no obvious compelling justification for legislating a superfluous requirement which is counter-productive to the authorized charter of the sponsoring regulatory agency. Existing regulations and Commission influences guarantee objective treatment of licensee personnel matters; this requirement would subject the background investigation process of licensees, contractors, manufacturers, and suppliers to the prospect of legally defending decisions made (under NRC-approved plans) for the protection of public safety. This danger becomes even greater as it may divert attention from reviewing personnel reliability by over-caution to avoid counter-reviews.

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73.56(c)

"The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

Comment:

This requirement will be impossible to effectively implement. Licensees may add such a statement to their access authorization plans, and may have employees sign an agreement at the time of authorization, but the effect is likely to be minimal.

This item requires the employee to make a judgement of his/her own actions and a determination of its effect on his/her continued authorization and perhaps employment. Regardless of the determination by the employee of an incident as either Insignificant or significant, the likely result will be the same - don't report it. The establishment of punitive measures to assure reporting would not only be ineffective but also counter-productive. No such new rule is needed.

10 CPR 73.56(fXl)

"Non-licensee Employees. (1) The licensee may accept an unescorted access authorization granted an employee of a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment supplier by another licensee, or a previous employee of another licensee, if the individual's employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the original granting licensee sends to the gaining licensee a photograph of the individual and a written verification of the individual's unescorted access authorization along with a statement which indicates its current validity. For individuals whose employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days, the individual's activities must be investigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and a new psychological assessment made according to the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section."

Comment:

Although the proposed reciprocity provision appears very desirable to avoid time-consuming and costly repetition of an access screening process (i.e., background investigation and psychological assessment), FPC believes it is idealistic because actual implementation requirements may be found to eclipse the potential benefits of this clause. For example, it is unrealistic for utilities to maintain multiple copies of photographs on file for each non-licensee individual who has been granted unescorted access. Further, it is legitimately inappropriate for licensees to attest to a contractor's screening of contractor employees. Through periodic audit of contractor programs, FPC will verify a contractor's screening process, but would not certify individual cases. Responsibility for the screening and verifying of non-licensee personnel reliability must remain with the employer. The licensee (customer) will apply behavioral observation to non-licensee personnel while on licensee premises, whereas the actual employer is uniquely capable of alerting all licensee customers of relevant changes, such as termination for cause.

2-4

FPC suggests the consideration of techniques currently-proven to be manageable and effective, such as employer certifications of satisfactory screening (reference ANSI/ ANS-3.3-1982, paragraph 5.4.5.1, and comments to proposed 10CFR73.56(a)( 40)). The requirements of the obtaining licensee are more accurately fulfilled by an employer's statement of screening validity than by another licensee's endorsement of the employer's screening results. Legitimately, it is the employer who receives contractual compensation for the screening of the employees, thus the employer should appropriately bear the accountability for attestations and recent photographs. In event of any suspicion (or for periodic confirmation tests), the obtaining licensee may elect to contact other licensee customers to validate claims of previous unescorted access privileges.

It should be noted that a working group chartered by the Edison Electric Institute has designed a Nuclear Employee Data System (NEDS) for on-line confirmation between licensees of transient worker information. Included in the data elements for a pilot program currently underway are records of an individual's having been screened for unescorted access. This system will provide national network capability for notifying licensees of acceptable (i.e. audited) screening programs and for alerting facilities to instances of access revocations. Industry and regulatory support of these initiatives are encouraged for the development of mutually-beneficial instruments.

The present system used by FPC is sufficient. No new Federal rule is required.

10CFR73.56(f)(3)

"During cold shutdown or refueling operations, as specified in the facility's technical specifications, as required in 10CFR50.36, the licensee has the option to grant a temporary unescorted access authorization to an unscreened individual if:

(i) The requirements of 73.55 of this chapter are followed: and (ii) The affected individual is subject to the continual behavioral observation

• Comment:

requirements of paragraph (e) of this section"

• The option to allow unscreened non-licensee personnel temporary unescorted access during cold shutdown or refueling operations serves to defeat the purpose of the entire access screening process. Even though actual risk may be minimized during shutdown conditions, there is no justification for abandoning well-implemented prevention techniques in favor of unproven detection methods.

Further, there ls no advantage to even partial application of this option (i.e.,

permitting unscreened access for a minor percentage of personnel) since the detection effort must cover all accessible areas.

Given the large numbers of contractor organizations which currently screen employees for nuclear plant access, it is inconceivable that such companies would eliminate employee screening and reduce their marketable services to cold shutdown and refueling outage needs.

2-5

'I The fundamental premise of granting access to unscreened, non-licensee personnel is incongruous with protection against insider threat since it ignores the risks associated with admitting individuals with a criminal history or pre-existing psychological problems. Behavioral observation techniques are effective in detecting changes in behavior; detection of changes without prior personal knowledge or baseline psychological profile is not a realistic basis for protecting against inimical acts which potentially threaten public safety. The value of this option is further diminished by its application on large numbers of temporary, characteristically-transient workers which are employed during refueling outages.

To offset the administrative delays of processing access screening on non-licensee personnel (due to urgent conditions or large numbers of personnel), FPC suggests that an interim access basis be authorized.

In the unlikely event that FPC might utilize the cold shutdown option, it would be with the interpretation that the pre-startup inspections be performed by plant security staff and operators (without additional personnel qualifications for performing such inspection activities).

• There are few known instances where current regulatory relief mechanisms offer proportionately less protection for occasions of increased exposure to risk.

73 *.56(g)

"The licensee's plan *** must include a procedure for the review of a denial or revocation * *

• of an access authorization of an employee of the licensee, contractor, or supplier ***".

Comment:

This requirement must ultimately be interpreted as making the licensee responsible for hearing grievances over access denial for contractor employees. Since neither the NRC nor the licensee has authority to address employee-employer relations for contractors, the only remaining avenue left under the rule is for the licensee to hear such cases. This is clearly inappropriate. If the access denial is based on contractor findings and recommendations, other legal forums exist to hear legitimate employee-employer discrimination charges. If the decision is based on licensee findings or observations, no recourse by contractor employee is appropriate. As a licensee, the utility is responsible for health and safety of the public, and if it is determined that an individual is a threat, the licensee's decision to revoke or deny access for a contractor should be final. FPC knows of no cases where appeal actions have been identified as necessary even though existing screening programs continue to result in a percentage of access denials and revocations.

10CFR73 *.56(hX3)

"The licensee shall have access to and periodically audit contractor records to ensure that all requirements to 73.56 are being met in accordance with the licensee's approved physical protection plan."

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('

Comment:

FPC recognizes the need for licensees to periodically assess contractor compliance with contractually-imposed requirements relative to 10CFR73.56. Approximately two-thirds of the contractor-organizations currently authorized for access to Crystal River Unit 3, also provide similar services to other nuclear facilities.

Under the requirements of this rule, each organization providing services at nuclear facilities can anticipate sustaining an audit of their personnel screening program by each nuclear customer. For many companies, this requirement may represent pointless redundancy which diverts limited resources. Without moderating considerations, the impact of this feature can be predictably traced to the further reduction of technically-qualified companies willing to compromise their predominately non-nuclear markets for the sake of a few nuclear clients. The net result of unreasonable restrictions is the ultimate reliance of the industry upon fewer qualified sources.

To avoid this undesirable consequence, FPC plans to accept the results of audits performed on contractor programs by other licensees, provided the audit is found to have been performed in a manner equivalent to the FPC's audit procedure (or in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.144). A currently accepted parallel practice can be found in licensee exchange of 10CFR50 Appendix B audit reports via the Coordinating Agency for Supplier Evaluation (CASE) under an NRC accepted Topical Report. FPC desires the capability to employ the CASE Nuclear Section as a mechanism for sharing the results of licensee audits on contractor access screening programs performed in accordance with standardized industry-developed checklists which assess compliance with a generic plan (as discussed in comments on 10CFR73.56(a)(4)).

The goal of assuring contractor adherence to specified requirements can be achieved without further Federal regulations

• 2-7

APPENDIX 3 FPC COMMENTS ON QUESTIONS POSED BY NRC FOR SPECIFIC PUBLIC COMMENT The Commission was particularly interested in receiving public response to their following specific questions concerning the proposed requirements for amending Rules in 10 CFR 50 and 73 on providing access authorization to protected areas and vital islands in nuclear power plants. The questions below were posed by NRC in requesting comments on the Proposed Rule. The comments below were prepared by FPC's clinical psychologist consultant and are endorsed by FPC with only minor alterations, principally editorial in nature:

Question 1:

"To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?"

Comment 1:

Psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs are in place at FPC and are part of the employee screening program.

Question 2:

"What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?"

Comment 2:

Psychological assessment procedures represent a gathering of samples of behavior.

The more samples that are made available by means of psychological assessment, the more data available to address issues such as emotional fitness for duty. As far as radiological sabotage is concerned, there are really two concerns. In the case of the first, such sabotage would be carried out by angry, vengeful or disturbed individuals. Psychological assessment should be very useful in identifying these persons. On the other hand, sabotage carried out by "professional saboteurs" trained to infiltrate the work place, would be very difficult to spot because these individuals would probably not show "suspect" profiles similar to those of disturbed men and women. Here, thorough background checks would be of greater importance. The professionally trained saboteur may show sociopathic features but these in most cases would not be deviant enough to mark him as a "suspect" individual.

/

3-1

' I Question 3:

"What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives."

Comment 3:

There is no question that the proposed access authorization rule could be utilized to raise concerns about Infringement on individual privacy of incumbents and new job applicants with the nuclear industry. However, the right and responsibility of Florida Power Corporation to provide for the continuing health and safety of its employees and, consequently, the public is obviously greater than a potential employment discomfiture of any single individual.

Question 4:

"What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?"

Comment 4:

There ls no evidence in support of the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools used to initiate overall clinical assessments. The MMPI .

has been found useful as a screening device to identify "suspect" individuals. At the same time, most experts agree that cutting scores alone should not be employed to deny access to anyone. The concensus of experts is that the proper interpretation of an MMPI or similar test can only be carried out by a properly trained psychologist. Under such circumstances, the MMPI has proven to be an excellent screening tool used to initiate overall clinical assessments.

Actual experience over a period of approximately six years resulted in identifying roughly 10% of the evaluatees as "potentially suspect". These persons were evaluated further by means of interview and/or additional testing methods. This meant that 90% of applicants and current employees tested did not require further evaluation. In case of specific very high stress job assignments, emotional stability requirements could be made even more rigorous so that a larger proportion of the nuclear applicants would fall in the "suspect" range. (This was in fact the case with armed security officer personnel. Since the potential for damage was greater in their case, more rigorous demands were made regarding emotional stability.

Approximately 16% of the security personnel tested were placed in the "need further evaluation" category through the use of the MMPI.) Type I and Type II errors are discussed later.

3-2

I I Some psychiatrists have a modicum of experience in the use of psychological tests such as the MMPI. However, psychiatrists do not have rigorous training in the theory and in the interpretation of personality tests: such preparation is standard in programs for clinical psychologists. Many psychiatrists use computer-generated MMPI interpretations even though a few have a certain degree of experience in the interpretation of the test. Still, the psychiatrist should not make diagnostic judgment on the basis of the MMPI any more than a psychologist should be allowed to decide what medications should be used for an emotionally disturbed individual even though he might have a fairly good understanding of commonly used tranquilizers and anti-depressant medication.

Question 5:

"What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage?

What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure?

Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Question 6:

Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs."

Comment 5/6:

A working definition of sabotage is: The willful damaging of materials, or disruption of work by dissatisfied, disturbed, angry workers, or hostile agents.

Characteristics identified by clinical psychological assessment (that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage) include: antisocial tendencies, poor impulse control, inadequate frustration tolerance, free-floating anxiety or hostility, evidence of addictive personality characteristics, paranoid thinking, feelings of grandiosity and depression proneness. None of these characteristics in themselves necessarily preclude an individual from working at a nuclear facility without representing a significant risk to co-workers, the plant or the public. Trained psychologists will need to look at the particular configuration of symptoms to see if they are well controlled or if there is a likelihood of an acting out episode. The clinical assessment must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of reality boundaries in order to determine if the person is able to differentiate between reality and fantasy and can control a peculiar ideation rather than letting inappropriate thoughts and feelings be in control. Such in formation can be gained by an interpretation of a test such as the MMPI by a trained psychologist. Either the MMPI or the 16 PF Test will also provide additional information with regard to the possibility that an individual is attempting to make himself appear better than he really is ("Faking Good") in order to hide problems and personality defects so as to be found acceptable and gain admittance to the nuclear facility.

3-3

As far as Type I and Type II errors are concerned, various researchers have reported "false positives" to be in the range of 60 '96. In other words, people whose test results and behavior observations indicated that they were likely to act out in a dangerous way in fact did not do so. This still left about 3596 who, true to prediction, caused damage to life and property. Type I errors are a problem because individuals who have valuable skills may be rejected because of a so-called "suspect" personality profile. However, these "false positives" will be reduced significantly if a clinical interview is added to their clinical assessment. Still, the FPC responsibility to provide for the safety of employees (and consequently the public) and its right to minimize the potential for damage, injury and loss of life at a nuclear facility is so great that these "false positives" represent "the price to pay" to protect the workers (as well as the public). The actual numbers of these "false positives" which would be excluded from the work force are quite minimal.

For example, out of every one hundred workers evaluated, 10% on the basis of the MMPI may fall into the "suspect" category. Experience has shown that when these ten applicants are told that they did not fully meet the criteria necessary to be "cleared" on the basis of the test, two (approximately) will drop out of further contention for the job. Of the eight evaluated, five will be cleared on the basis of the diagnostic interview, leaving three in the category representing too great a risk to the nuclear facility to be considered for employment. If 4096 of these individuals represent a false positive, there may be one to two individuals (out of 100) at most kept out of the plant who could perform in a reasonably responsible manner.

"False negatives" are a greater problem even though they, according to various research estimates, represent only 15 to 2596 of the tested population. For example, sociopathic personalities who may represent a considerable risk, are likely to "slip through" both the testing as well as interview evaluation, particularly if they are well trained foreign agents. Even if they are not, sociopathic personalities often know how to tell people what they want to hear, even though they are "tripped up" quite frequently by "faking" indices which show them to be trying much too hard to present themselves in a favorable light. It is less likely that truly disturbed individuals will fall into the "false negative" category, particularly if they are seen for testing as well as diagnostic interview

• The number of false negatives can be reduced by significantly "tightening the adjustment standards" required for nuclear personnel. For example, arms bearing security officers who guard critical areas and who could potentially inflict more serious damage could be held to even higher standards than regular employees.

This would result in a greater percentage of rejection and, therefore, a smaller number of "false negatives". Some of the individuals previously "cleared" with the proviso that their supervisors be particularly alert to unusual behavior, would now be in the "not passecfl' category.

Massive psychological assessment, including day long evaluations, for example, would not significantly reduce the risk of employee behavioral unreliability. The analogy can be made to requiring industry to install the kind of polution control equipment which will further reduce emission of noxious substances. In some cases, an additional expenditure of 40096 may reduce these emissions by two to three percent. Similarly, a greatly enhanced evaluation program which would be very costly, would in turn increase the confidence limits regarding employee behavioral reliability only very slightly.

3-4

The key is to obtain services of well trained psychologists with specific experience not only in testing but in dealing with the identification of potentially disturbed, hostile or abusive individuals. In the hands of such an individual, even a single major personality test such as the MMPI, 16 PF or E.M.O. Questionnaire would be very effective in identifying "problem" employees. An interview by the same type of professional would further enhance the behavioral reliability program.

Question 7:

"Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?"

Comment 7:

The question of radiological sabotage concerns has been answered in Response 5/6.

As far as fitness for duty is concerned, there are other factors involved. For

• example, the psychological assessment should reveal the presence or absence of anxiety which is likely to reduce work effectiveness as well as other characteristics such as excessive dependency, compulsive inefficiency and a tendency to feelings of helplessness in the face of emergencies. These people are not a risk in terms of sabotage but they can fail at critical times. Psychological assessment can identify a potentially toublesome personality pattern. In cases such as this, an individual need not necessarily be prevented from access to the nuclear facility but a recommendation would be made so that the individual would not function in critical areas.

Question 8:

"To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without preemployment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e, if only background investigations were adopted?"

Comment 8:

There is a definite close relationship between the use of psychological assessment and the behavioral reliability program. The behavioral reliability program without pre-employment psychological assessment would then have the total responsibility for detecting employees with problems since they would not have been pre-screened by means of tests and/or diagnostic interviews. The two aspects of the program go together because the initial responsibility for reviewing an individual is given to the psychologist who makes a recommendation as to the person's suitability for access. After this is done, if hiring occurs, it is up to the supervisor and the behavioral reliability program to look for changes as well as signs of aberrant behavior. Both of these elements are necessary for an effective program designed to screen out and/or remove individuals who pose a risk; without the psychological assessment results on file, baselines for measuring behavioral "changes" will be difficult to establish with objectivity.

3-5

Background investigations are a necessary "screening filter" because they eliminate individuals who have given evidence of poor judgment and inappropriate behavior in the past. Since the best predictor of future behavior is past performance, a background investigation is very vital. However, there are many individuals who have not been "caught" even after they have behaved inappropriately or anti-socially so that a number of potential toublesome job applicants may "slip through" the background investigation screen. Furthermore, instances of misbehavior do not come to light during the background investigation.

Question 9:

"What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Comment 9:

Experience extending over six years at FPC has resulted in "screening out" a number of potentially "problem" individuals by means of psychological assessment (mostly the MMPI) as well as through implementation of the behavioral reliability program (through supervisory training designed to detect changes and evidence of aberrant behavior). Employees were also seen who were involved in so-called "critical" incidents such as attempting to smuggle weapons into the plant, assaulting fellow employees or exhibiting other problem behavior. In certain cases, the individual decided to leave employment following the interview while at other times the inappropriate behavior was the result of environmental pressures which were temporary and which showed a small likelihood of recurrence. The diagnostic interview also provided an opportunity for the psychologist to counsel with the employee and teach better ways of dealing with difficult and stressful situations.

Question 10:

"What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?"

Comment 10:

FPC management has been most cooperative with the psychologist utilized in the company psychological assessment programs. This may be, at least in part, because management has taken a very professional attitude and protected the privacy and confidentiality of psychological assessment data.

Question 11:

"How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?"

3-6

• I Comment 11:

No surveys have been conducted to obtain data in these areas. However, we believe that in any group of employees there are divergent views with regard to company-wide programs. Typically, technically oriented indivi_duals who are more comfortable in dealing with facts and figures (data) see aspects of the program as inexact, inaccurate and as not helping them to make "definite go no-go" decisions regarding a particular subordinate. They are accustomed to definite cutoff scores and precise standards, which cannot be produced in the area of emotional functioning and/or prediction of future human behavior. On the whole, the acceptance of the psychological pre-screening program as well as the supervisory training instruction has been good, with critical incidents being appropriately reported and dealt with according to guidelines recommended by the psychologist and approved by management. The individual employees who were seen following a critical incident seemed to understand and accept that they were being held to higher standards than would be expected in the usual industrial milieu and that a higher degree of behavioral reliability was needed.

• Concluding Statement Florida Power Corporation already has the psychological assessment and the behavioral training program in place with no real changes needed or anticipated.

Since the programs deal with human beings, unreliability of performance can only be reduced but never eliminated. The three aspects of the proposed program which include background investigations, psychological screening and behavioral observation training are in effect at FPC. No additional federal regulations are needed

• 3-7

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CHARLOTTE, N,O. 28242 USNRi; (704) 373-4011 March 7, 1985 (jfflC_;.JJF S[Cflt. TAf. :

OICKt.1 ING & SfRVllf UANCH Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

1. 10CFR Parts 50 and 73 - Access Authorization Program (Proposed Rule) *

2. 10CFR Part 73 - Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (Proposed Rule).

3. 10CFR Part 73 - Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (Proposed Rule).

Dear Sir:

The NRC requested in a Federal Register Notice dated August 1, 1984 (Vol. 49, No. 149, FR30726 - 30739), comments on the subject proposed rule 10CFR Parts 50 and 73. In response, Duke Power Company offers the following for consideration.

General Comments as to the Proposed Rule 10CFR, Parts 50 and 73

• It is necessary to put the proposed rules, known collectively as the "Insider Safeguards Rule", in the perspective of all the other NRC requirements that are currently in effect to meet the postulated insider threat. These requi~ements (10CFR, Parts 50 and 73) have been in the NRC rules and guidance for a number of years (February 1977) and are incorporated in the approved security programs of operating reactors. They include measures such as:

• Detection equipment.

• Surveillance equipment.

• Illumination.

• Security patrols.

• Vital and Protected Area barriers.

• Positive identification.

• Personnel and vehicle search.

• Protected and Vital Area Access control features.

• Protected and Vital Area Access authorization .

It is therefore clear that the proposed insider safeguards rule expands on all of the existing comprehensive programs to meet the postulated threat.

Acknowledged by card. ~~~- .: .: . ~ .fi.--

2 At this point in time based on the results of the NRC already promulgated 10CFR, Parts 50 and 73 Regulations (1977 to 1985), NRC Safeguards/Safety Studies, Nuclear Power Industry initiatives and the Nuclear Power Industry historical safeguards track record, the philosophy of the NRC regulatory framework, for the protection of public health and safety, should be the reduction of the requirements rather than the expansion of the requirements.

The industry, through industry initiatives, has recognized the need for a responsible inclusive safeguards program which would provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected, and the integrity of the nuclear power plant/reactor will not be compromised by sabotage. Based on early industry initiatives the American Nuclear Society developed ANSI N 18.17 - 1973, which addressed the need and requirements for Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants. In time based on high standards of excellence and industry self-regulation the American Nuclear Society developed and published ANSI/ANS 3.3 - 1982, which addresses a responsible inclusive safeguards program including procedures needed to minimize the potential for an insider threat. Recognizing that absolute assurance is neither required nor possible and reasonable assurance has been achieved by industry initiatives and self-regulation, Duke Power Company strongly feels (emphasis added) that the ANS 3.3 - 1982 standard adequately reflects a responsible inclusive safeguards program and Duke opposes (emphasis added) any further promulgated 10CFR, Parts 50 and 70 Regulations except an NRC endorsement of ANS 3.3 - 1982. As indicated Duke would strongly endorse NRC initiatives on the reduction of current requirements and promulgated regulations.

Duke knowing that the NRC has had a number of alternatives for several years such as, the two man rule, total pat-down search, governmental clearances, and compartmentalization, and feeling that some form of promulgated regulation will eventually evolve from the Proposed Rules, Duke offers the following specific comments. If the Proposed Rule is still necessary and is modified by the NRC with our specific comments then it will be as preferable to Duke as any of the previous NRC alternatives.

• Specific CoIIHDents:

10CFR Parts 50 and 73 - Access Authorization Program (FR30726 to 30735)

FR* Page: Comments:

30727 Item 5 incorrectly references the obsolete ANSI 18.17 - 1973 standard. The current industry standard is ANS/ANSI 3.3 - 1982.

The current standard in use with in the industry meets the requirements of Item 7 in the Supplementary Information Paragraph.

30728 The Commission's belief that there would be no significant difference in resource impact to the licensee between the two programs (2 year to 5 year) is totally unrealistic. Because both protected area and vital area access is required at sites does not mean that industry is using the 5 year screening program.

Psychological Assessment, Continual Behavioral Observation and

3 FR* Page: Comments:

30728 Review Programs as addressed by ANS/ANSI 3.3 - 1982 have been (Cont.) on-going within the industry and satisfy the requirements of the proposed rule.

30732 "A rule has not proven to be workable and effective." Present programs have proven workable and effective.

30733 Define "potential" in terms of committing acts against the public health and safety.

30733 ANS 3.3 - 1982 does not address true identity, credit history and military service. True identity should be a criteria of the employment process and should be verified by the Employment Department (Human Resources) at the time of employment. If the proposed rule is promulgated into law it will effect all the access programs within the industry and impact all licensees to some degree.

30733 "Individuals granted unescorted access shall report any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.)

that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

Unrealistic, individual has everything to lose and nothing to gain.

30733 Para. 73.56(b)(l) "General Performance Objectives and Requirements" The proposed rule states:

"The unescorted access authorization program shall consist of a background investigation program, a psychological

• assessment program, and a continual behavioral observation program . . . The continual behavioral observation program shall be designed to detect certain individual behavioral changes, etc . . . "

Since most licensees consider continued observation as part of an ongoing element of management's duties, and employees are subjected to annual performance evaluations, we feel that the access authorization program should only include the background investigation and the psychological assessment components. If the continual behavioral observation were embodied by a rule, such a program would force licensees to track and file numerous records on thousands of employees for the sole purpose of auditing. This requirement would prove extremely costly with no resulting benefit*

to the program.

For the reasons stated above, we feel the second sentence should read:

4 FR* Page: Comments:

30733 "The unescorted access authorization program shall consist of (Cont.) a background investigation program and a psychological assessment program."

Subsequently, all words used in reference to the continual behavioral observation program should be deleted from the rule.

The last sentence states:

"Individuals who have received an unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective date of these amendments are exempt from having to meet the requirements of.

We recommend that the phrase, "and other licensee and non-licensee employees who have provided continuous trustworthy and reliable service for a period of three years or longer" be inserted after the words "these amendments". If an individual has provided continuous trustworthy employment for three years, sufficient assurance can be made that the individual will continue to function in the same manner.

30733 Para. 73.56(b)(3)(iv)

The proposed rule states:

"Has been convicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses indicating habitual criminal tendencies;"

Since participation in a criminal act does not indicate habitual criminal tendencies but does demonstrate that the individual may act irresponsibly under a given set of circumstances we recommend

• the following:

Delete the phrase "indicating habitual criminal tendencies" and replace it with "that raise serious concerns relative to the individual's trustworthiness or reliability."

30733 Para. 73.56(c), Background Investigation We endorse the use of background investigations as an important screening tool. However, this section asks the licensee to conduct background investigations "that provide assurance" the individuals are reliable, trustworthy, and will act so as to protect health and minimize danger to life and property. It is not always possible to assure such findings, but the licensees can attempt to accomplish this as their prime objective. Therefore, we recommend the first sentence to read as follows:

"The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for background investigation with the objective of providing

5 FR* Page: Comments:

30733 assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to (Cont.) protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reliable, trustworthy . . . "

Additionally, the usefulness of the background information may be limited because criminal records are not always accessible, particularly for crimes committed out of the state or local jurisdictions. The second sentence states:

" . . . this background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment history, education history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation."

We recommend that the phrase, "to the extent reasonably possible" be inserted after the words "must verify" .

The third sentence states:

"The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence . . . ", etc.

We recommend that this sentence be deleted because it could conflict with voluntary Employee Assistance Programs which address problems that can impact a person's performance and ability while on the job.

30733 Para. 73.56(d), Psychological Assessment We agree that psychological assessment is a viable option to use in the screening process. However, we are opposed to the

• prescriptive nature of the rule. Since a wide disparity of opinions exist among licensees regarding the validity of different psychological assessment programs, we recommend the licensees be allowed the freedom to develop their own programs within the framework of ANS-3.3-1982. Therefore, we believe the rule should read as follows:

"The licensee shall establish and maintain a psychological assessment program to be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands."

30733 and Subparagraphs 73.56(d)(l) and 73.56(d)(2) should be deleted from 30734 the rule.

30734 Para 73.56(e) Continual Behavior Observation The continual behavioral observation program is the most subjective portion of the proposed rule. Continual behavior observation of employees is contained in ANS-3.3-1982, and we

6 FR* Page: Comments:

30734 recommend that utilities apply it with discretion. Also, behavior (Cont.) observation is of course a part of each utility management's continuing responsibility. Therefore, we do not believe a regulation on continual behavior observation is necessary. We believe this aspect of the rule would impose much additional paper work without providing the means to adequately identify a potential saboteur. The nuclear industry is concerned about the reliability, suitability and fitness for duty of their employees and steps are being taken by the licensees to enhance their programs without the need for this element of the proposed regulation.

NUMARC has developed proposed guidelines for the industry which incorporate a fitness for duty program and continued observation program which applies to licensee contractor and vendor personnel. Additionally, at its October 14, 1984 meeting the Commission reconsidered it's action on the fitness for duty rule and voted to issue it as a policy statement. Since the Commission has decided that the fitness for duty concept should not be embodied in a rule, the same should hold true for the continual behavioral observation program. Therefore, we believe that paragraph 73.56(e) should be deleted from the rule.

30734 Para. 73.56(f), Non-Licensee Employees Subparagraph (1) states:

" and if the original granting licensee sends to the gaining licensee a photograph of the individual . . . ", etc.

We recommend that this photograph requirement be replaced by a statement that the subject individual's true identity be

• verified by appropriate means. Identification can be established by other means and should not be limited to a photograph.

Also, the photograph requirement could potentially undermine the viability of the centralized Nuclear Employee Data System (NEDS).

This new industry initiative is a pilot recordkeeping program for nuclear workers that is being established by a group of utilities in the mid-Atlantic states.

Subparagraph (3)(ii) states:

"The affected individual is subject to the continual ti behavioral observation requirements of paragraph (e)

We recommend that this subparagraph be deleted for reasons indicated above.

7 FR* Page: Comments:

30734 How often must these audits be conducted?

It should include a provision to have these audits done by a contractor company.

30734 The access files should only have to be kept for one (1) year.

Keeping the files for three (3) years places a burden on the licensee. Especially, since the individual must be reinvestigated if their access is broken for 365 days or more.

30734 The proposed 73.56(g) mandates that a licensee's access authorization program include procedures for an individual to obtain review of a denial or revocation, "due process".

We believe that this entire subsection should be deleted from the rule. The licensee's procedures for reviewing the denial or revocation of unescorted access, whether the procedure is unique or that of a bargaining agreement, should not be part of a plan requiring submittals to, and approval by, the NRC. The NRC's interest should be limited to ensuring proper attention to the protection of the public health and safety and need not include employee appeal rights. Other avenues of redressing claimed violations of due process are available to an employee who believes his rights are violated. And such avenues will no doubt be explored whether or not proposed §73.56(g) appea.rs in NRC regulations. Indeed, individuals have already availed themselves of judicial remedies in cases in which access to nuclear facilities was denied under access authorization programs. Thus, the proposed section is surplusage and unnecessarily intrudes on licensee management prerogatives.

30734 "Areas as appropriate which may be reclassified as non-vital".

This process will work for single unit plants only .

10CFR Part 73 - Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (FR30735 to 30738) 30735 Para. 73.55, Requirements for Physical Protection . etc.

The proposed rule would require that licensees submit proposed amendments to security plans detailing how vital island designation and protection requirements would be met. We agree that it is appropriate to give licensees the option to revise their security plans to incorporate the vital island concept. It is not appropriate to require licensees to adopt the concept.

Each licensee should be entitled to decide, based upon its particular factual situation, whether or not to adopt vital*

islands. A licensee wishing to make revisions to incorporate the vital island concept should be allowed to submit under S0.54(p) if applicable.

8 FR* Page: Comments:

30735 Para. 73.55(c)(l), Physical Barriers The fifth sentence defines a minimum set of equipment which must be treated in all cases as vital islands. This represents a major shift from existing practice where the NRC independently reviewed the system and equipment designated as vital. Since the NRC must approve all security plans, all plants were subject to a case-by-case review. The Commission has not explained why this review-process should be changed by a regulatory definition of a minimum set of vital areas/islands. Therefore, vital equipment lists should be determined on a site specific basis.

30735 This should read access control system failure not "computer".

Would emergency include fire? If so, we know from our preliminary Appendix R review of CAD doors that may lock and can't be opened unless power is removed from the door.

30735 Why impose stricter measures on security power distribution system than what is required for safety systems need to shutdown the plant (i.e., vital island clarification (pg. 30735) excludes electrical distribution system).

Our security power system secondary power components (SSF D/G, inverter, panelboards) are in "secured areas" (SSF-Oc; SSF, U2 Elect. Perre. Rm.-Mc; SSF, Ul & U2 Elect. Perre. Rom.-Cat).

However, power distribution terminal boxes are not in vital areas in all cases.

30737 Pulling an employee's CAD badge at or prior to termination could cause problems. It is recommended that the NRC reword this section in order to allow the licensee some flexibility in this process .

• 30737 Duke Power Company is currently protecting areas of plants associated with SSF similar to the "vital island" concept.

However, the requirement of 73.55 & 7.i.D is definitely not relaxing security requirements. With the SSF philosophy, this requirement, to have active intrusion alarms on all exterior doors would be all turbine building, auxiliary building and service building doors. This would be a significant cost impact. This requirement should not be necessary if the licensee can show that he interrupts sabotage prior to any entry into a vital area.

30737 If an employee is successfully screened and cleared for unescorted access, why is the 30 day updated by licensee manager/supervisor necessary? Why not develop a procedure whereby Security is told when changes are necessary otherwise maintain status quo?

9 FR* Page: Comments:

30737 Section c,1 This section attempts to redefine that equipment and those areas requiring protection by introducing the concept of vital islands and stating requirements for vital island protection. A more straightforward approach would be to simply redefine "vital equipment 11 and "vital area".

Define "significant radiological release" and "reactor core damage" - I suggest that they be defined as a Part 100 release and cladding failure, respectively.

In Duke Power Company's vital area philosophy, which takes credit for the Standby Shutdown Facility, the onsite emergency AC and DC power sources (Diesel Generators and Batteries) are not vital.

Therefore, we see no need to mandate protection of these areas. A better approach would be to let the vital area analysis determine which areas are vital rather than arbitrarily mandate certain ones as being vital.

With reference to the AC & DC Power sources, it makes absolutely no sense to protect the power sources and not protect the power distribution systems, especially the circuit breakers.

30737 Recommend that Section (a) be revised to address reporting requirements for the suspension of safeguards measures to facilitate response to emergency conditions.

30737 Recommend that Section (a) be revised to allow for the suspension of access control measures (i.e., badging and search requirements) during scheduled Crisis Management exercises. This would provide for a more realistic assessment of emergency conditions .

• 30737 30737 Recommend that Section (d)(9) be revised to include the option to rotate keys, locks and combinations at least every 12 months.

Note that Section (d) as proposed will impact station operations since we will be required to manually log into vital islands during degraded access control (computer) conditions. Currently we are only committed to manual logging in normally unoccupied vital areas during degraded access control (computer) conditions.

30737 Section d, 7, i, D The proposed requirement to control exterior doors leading to vital islands is excessive and does not significantly increase protection of the vital islands, especially since there is no requirement for exterior walls to meet any standards. For Duke, this requirement would mean controlling all exterior Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building doors and probably all exterior Service Building doors.

10 FR* Page: ColIUllents:

30737 Section e, 1 This section states that all walls, doors, floor, and windows in the CAS shall be bullet-resisting. What about ceilings?

30737 73.55 C (1)

The wording and rationale for the last sentence of this paragraph are not clear. Suggested rewording as follows:

The lic*ensee shall protect, as independent vital islands, those structures, systems and components, including onsite alternating and direct current emergency power sources (excluding electrical distribution systems), primary reactor containment, the reactor control room, central alarm station, and onsite water supplies (excluding piping), required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standby.

30737 73.55 e (1)

The wording of the last sentence of this paragraph is such that two interpretations are possible. Assume that intent is to protect the power supplies for both annunciator equipment and common equipment versus protecting the common equipment and power supplies for the annunciator equipment.

Requirement should be to locate subject equipment within security access controlled areas, not vital areas, since this equipment is not "vital" per the definition of 73.21.

30737 Subparagraph (d)(7)(i)

• The rule states that the licensee shall lock and protect by an active intrusion alarm system unoccupied and all exterior doors leading to vital islands which are not otherwise controlled. We recoJIUllend that the word "active" be changed to "activated". An active intrusion alarm system indicates a microwave or ultrasonic device where as an activated alarm system includes the above mentioned devices plus other passive systems such as doors protected by balance magnetic switches.

30737 Subparagraph (d)(9)

The rule states that whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination or related equipment may have been compromised, it must be changed. We recommend the words "related equipment" be changed to "related access control devices". We believe this terminology is more appropriate since it would be consistent with the next sentence which states:

11 FR* Page: Comments:

30737 The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other (Cont.) access control devices to protected areas and vital islands only to persons who possess access authorization. 11 Additionally, this change would include computers which are used as authorization control devices.

30737 Subparagraph (e)(l) "Detection aids" The last s*entence of the rule states that secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment must be located within vital islands. We recommend the word "vital" be changed to "protected". The protected areas would give sufficient security to secondary power supply systems. Moving the secondary power supply systems into vital island would be extremely costly with no resulting benefit to the program.

10CFR Part 73 - Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (FR30738 to 30739) 30738 This rule is acceptable to us with the following exceptions. We recommend that paragraph 73.SS(d)(l), sentence commencing on line 13 be revised as follows:

"The licensee shall subject all persons except armed security force members on duty, bonafide federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty and persons responding to an emergency to these equipment searches upon entry into a protected area."

Additionally, the sentence commencing on line 24 be revised as

• follows:

"However, when firearms or explosive detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a 5% pat-down search of all individuals following a four hour period after the breakdown of such equipment and until the equipment is repaired.

Our proposed four hour time frame would give sufficient time to repair the equipment before it became know to "insider threats" that the detection equipment was inoperative. The 5% search would have a strong deterrent effect and minimize employee discontent.

30739 If for any reason power is lost to the PAP, or janitorial or others bring solvents, etc., into the proximity of the explosive detectors, the ability to machine search personnel going into the protected area will be lost. This will require a 100% pat-down search of all personnel going in to the protected area. This could cause undue delays in personnel accomplishing their jobs which could affect plant safety. Some latitude is necessary if/when search equipment is inoperative.

12 FR* Page: Comments:

30739 Recommend that Section (d)(l) be revised to allow the use of (Cont.) random pat-down searches when metal and/or explosives detection equipment is out of service or not operating satisfactorily. A 5%

random selection of all individuals entering the protected area is considered to be an adequate deterrent against the unauthorized introduction of firearms, explosives or incendiary devices into the protected area under degraded search equipment conditions .

13 Answers to Specific Questions - Access Authorization Rule The Commission invited specific attention to certain questions on the proposed access authorization program requirements 49 FED. REG at 30730-31.

1. Question: To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavior reliability programs already used by nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

Response: Under existing utility security plans approved by NRC Staff, most utilities conduct some form of employee screening program. The programs and practices vary widely, although most include in-depth background investigations and some type of psychological testing. Many utilities also have developed continued observation programs. The screening programs are used as one basis for granting unescorted access to the nuclear power plants.

Differences among the approved programs stem from individual utility preferences, the case-by-case NRC review process in which the individual security plans were reviewed, and in some cases local limitations on obtaining certain information (for example, the availability of criminal history information).

Psychological testing, when included in a utility's program, uses a wide variety of tests.

Many utilities use the MMPI, while others use the Gordon Profile, the California Personality Inventory, Thurstone, and 16 PF. Different scales are also used by utilities to evaluate the test results.

A behavioral reliability program (continued observation) is

• not part of employee screening, but rather part of a follow-on system. Some continued observation programs had their start in employee-awareness programs that many companies have established as part of an employee assistance program.

Alcohol and drug abuse programs are perhaps the most common examples. The Commission with its consideration of the Fitness-for Duty rule accelerated the tempo of company involvement.

2. Question: What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Response: Psychological assessments are used by some utilities as one part of their physical security program with the objective of providing assurance that individuals given unescorted access to portions of the nuclear facility are trustworthy. Some utilities also use psychological assessments as an aid in determining the extent to which an individual may be at risk with regard to a substance abuse problem.

14 Psychological assessment both predicts and detects. That is, tests show which individuals are more likely to steal, cause unwitting accidents, have difficulty with a highly regulated environment, or be distracted by emotional, personal or substance abuse problems. Clinical interviews help to establish how the individual has behaved in the past (detection) and to what extent the individual is "at risk" for such behavior in the future (prediction).

Psychological assessment can be adapted to address many different criteria. Fitness for duty criteria addresses the substance abuse problem which can also be detected and predicted by psychological assessment. Some utilities use a special MMPI scale (McAndrews) to detect the probability of a substance abuse problem.

Psychological assessment addresses radiological sabotage concerns since the process is aimed at screening out individuals who have the characteristics or behavior patterns of a saboteur. Since there is no "real" data base for radiological sabotage (no cases of sabotage causing radiological consequences have been documented), no proof can be shown of a demonstrated validated scale for radiological sabotage.

3. Question: What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

• Response: Any time that any investigation is made into a person's background or a person is required to undergo psychological testing, some infringement of personal privacy occurs. The question is whether the infringements are reasonable in light of the interests to be protected, and the alternatives available.

The risk of sabotage is one which has been deterministically postulated by the NRC. Since no cases of sabotage causing radiological consequences have been documented, it is impossible to demonstrate that any elements of the proposed rule -- or indeed any elements of the physical security

• program -- would decrease the risk of sabotage.

The requirement for physical security at power plants was established by NRC rule in 1977. The need and bases for many of the requirements have been debated since that time, but the fact remains that licensees are required by regulation to protect against the threat of insiders who may be saboteurs.

From time to time, the Commission staff has proposed various

15 alternatives to protect against the insider such as:

government clearances, extensive personnel searches, tighter access control of vital areas, and two man rule for entry into vital areas. Each of these has strengths and weaknesses. One identified weakness of a screening program is the infringement on privacy.

In any industry with tight controls and strong security systems, a certain degree of infringement occurs. However, this infringement is voluntary, on the individual's part. The applicant may choose to participate in the screening or choose to seek employment elsewhere. Applicants also sign releases allowing others to gather extensive information about them.

Utilities who gather security information keep this data separate from personnel files. Supervisors, co-workers, or the personnel department do not have access to information gathered for screening. This reduces substantially the risk that this information will be used improperly.

There is always a balance between the need for strong security and the rights of an individual for privacy. We believe that the risk represented by the potential damage one individual or a group of individuals could cause far outweighs the risks associated with gathering personal information.

The need for a physical security program, and the usefulness of particular elements of that program can only be matters of judgement. We have, however, compared the usefulness of the access authorization program recommended in the proposed rule with other possibilities described earlier (such as increased compartmentalization, the two-man rule, or a government clearance program). So long as the Commission continues to postulate the existence of a inside threat, we believe that the access authorization program is greatly preferred over any of the alternatives.

4. Question: What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

Response: The answer to this question lies in how psychological tests are constructed empirically, and how they are scored. Test instruments like the MMPI, CPI, and 16PF are scored against "normal" samples. The statistics of means and standard deviations help to establish what scores fall within or outside a "normal" range. Test profile interpretation guides can be established for determining which individual should proceed to a psychological assessment.

16 The experience of two utilities using the written psychological tests followed by clinical assessments for those with abnormal test scores shows that about 20% to 30% of those who took the written test were then given clinical assessments. About 4% of the total were eventually screened out. Subsequently, about 0.1% of those who "passed" the psychological assessment were denied access based on referrals from the continued observation program.

Tests admittedly are not perfect. They raise hypotheses about an individual's behavior, but they do not prove that behavior beyond a doubt. Test data should not be the sole source of denying an individual unescorted access. Therefore, out of fairness to the individual, a clinical interview should be conducted to find out whether the individual manifests those identified behaviors or traits in his or her life. Without interviews, utilities would be screening out many inadvertently who would be screened in (false positives) .

(Some utilities interview all applicants regardless of test scores.) In the final analysis, as indicated, experience has shown approximately 4% of applicants have been screened out due to the psychological screening component.

5. Question: What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedures? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Response: ANS 3.3 guidelines state that characteristics such as emotional instability and lack of trustworthiness should be identified in a psychological assessment.

Research sponsored by EEI (See NUREG/CR-2076, "Behavioral Reliability Program for-:.the Nuclear Industry",) established five criteria or characteristics which should be identified.

These are:

1. Argumentative Hostility Toward Authority

2. Irresponsibility/Impulsivity

3. Defensive Incompetence

4. Reaction to Stress

5. Emotional Adaptability (Psychopathology)

(See NUREG/CR-2076 for full definitions of the criteria and what behaviors have led an individual to be denied access.)

Two of these criteria (#1 and #5) relate directly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage. Criteria #2, #3, and #4 related more to the prevention of unintentional accidents and errors.

17 Consensus among those utilities using psychological assessment and background investigations is that Type II error is slightly higher than Type I and Type I error is less than 1 in 1,000. Type II error is higher because of the decisions which have been made about what types of errors can be tolerated.

To keep Type I error (someone has been incorrectly screened in) extremely low means that some degree of Type II error (someone incorrectly screened out) will occur.

We are not aware of any more effective procedures which are available.

6. Question: Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

Response: Psychological assessment should not be justified solely on the basis of reducing risks of radiological sabotage.

Psychological assessment also helps to identify individuals who are more likely to be involved in unintentional events (accidents), who are likely to have difficulty adjusting to a heavily regulated work environment, and who have a history of being involved in events which are less catastrophic than sabotage, but which include theft, vandalism and unintended "accidents".

Population statistics do exist which document the degree of psychopathology (emotional instability) in the general work force and the proportion of the work force with a previous record of anti-social behavior (lack of trustworthiness).

With limited screening programs and no or limited security systems in the work place, research shows that the frequency and percentage of reported instances or "insider" problems is higher than in work places with such safeguards.

There are several research efforts sponsored by the NRC which provide information on the extent of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs. The "Insider Study" (Ref. 1) provides documentation on sabotage and theft events and their rate of occurrence in environments with low, medium and high safeguards, security and screening. The report states that inadequate screening, insufficient behavior observation, and poor management/employee relations contributed to the success of 72% of all sabotage incidents surveyed.

18

References:

1) A. A. Mullen, J. J. Davison, and J.B. Jones, Jr.

"Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders (Insiders Study)" USNRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, May 1980.

2) B. M. Jen.kins and J. L. Krofcheck, "The Potential Nuclear Non-State Adversary" prepared for the NRC by Rand Corp. Santa Monica, California. 1977.

3) Reineke, John M. "The Insider Threat to Secure Facilities: Data Analysis". Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (prepared under contract to USNRC, NUREG/CR-1234), 1980.

7. Question: Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Response: Psychological assessment can be used both in the context of fitness for duty and access authorization. In the fitness for duty context, for example, the tendency for alcohol abuse can be detected by applying the MacAndrews Alcoholism Scale to the results of the MMPI. Trustworthiness and reliability, the underlying characteristics of interest for access authorization determinations, can be evaluated based upon the identification through psychological assessment of such traits as aggressiveness, resentment of authority, and psychopathy.

Thus, some utilities presently use psychological assessment for both purposes.

8. Question: To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

Response: Psychological assessment techniques evaluate an individual at a particular point in time. The behavioral reliability program is intended to look for changes in an individual over time, by sensitizing the supervisor to recognize changes in an individual's behavior or to recognize clear signs of aberrant behavior. The supervisor is not expected, and indeed is cautioned not to make psychological or medical judgements.

Background investigations without psychological assessments and an observation program would screen out fewer individuals and raise the rate of Type I error. Individuals who are screened out under the five criteria of behavioral reliability (see question #5) do not always have records of extreme behavior problems. Background investigations capture the extremes on some of the five criteria but cannot measure them all well.

19

9. Question: What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment? by the use of background investigations? by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Response: Psychological testing using the five criteria has screened out individuals for such reasons as:

- Aggressive or violent behavior

- Drug or alcohol abuse

- Lack of temper controls

- Hostile and destructive actions

- Disrespect for social norms - violation of rules

- Inability to handle stressful situations

- Impulsivity and a disregard for one's actions

- Emotional problems Background investigations have screened out:

- Falsification of records

- Drug and alcohol abuse

- Temper problems

- Severe financial problems

- Past employment problems Behavioral reliability have screened out:

- Excessive fear of radiation

- Memory problems - operate wrong systems or valves

- Inability to follow instructions

- Severe personality change related to impaired ability to function on the job

- Emotional breakdowns

- Development of substance abuse problems

10. Question: What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

Response: We are unaware of management abuses concerning these programs. Most utilities use a system of chec.ks and balances as well as appeal processes which prevent such abuses. There is always more than one individual involved in a decision about access, decertification, etc. which will generally prevent a single supervisor from unfairly singling out an employee.

11. Question: How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

Response: Most have come to accept it, and existing employees view it as a benefit not only to the company but to their own personal security as well. Some data suggest that the quality of work

20 force has improved and fewer behavioral problems exist on sites with strong screening programs. Nonetheless, a few employees resent the programs and consider them an unwarranted intrusion into their private lives.

Unions have some concerns about the programs but have generally come to accept them. Individual employees at times resent the degree of pre-employment screening for a variety of reasons. The greatest problem seems to be with those contractor employees who visit several sites and participate in several different screening programs.

We appreciate this opportunity to provide you with our comments. We endorse the comments submitted in response to the proposed rules by EEI and KMC. We trust that our comments will be considered and that the Commission will move J promptly to resolve this package of proposed rules .

If there are any questions or problems concerning this subject, please advise.

Very truly yours,

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Hal B. Tucker SWD:fimll

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• Allentown,,it._-fi~18101

• 215 / 770-5151 0 D USNRC Norman W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear 215/n0-7501 MAR 7 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES AND DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE: ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM ER 100450 FILE 841-11 Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-2358 and 50-388

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Attached are Pennsylvania Power & Light Company's comments on the NRC proposed rules for an Access Authorization Program (49FR30726) and the supporting Draft Regulatory Guide (Task SG 301-4). PP&L supports the development of industry standards for Access Authorization Programs. To this end, we endorse the Edison Electric Institute Alternative Rulemaking submittal. In the event NRC chooses to proceed with the proposed rule, PP&L provides the following comments.

Although PP&L concurs with much of the proposed rule, some revisions appear necessary. In particular, with regard to review procedures, PP&L does not believe there is any need for a hearing. References to hearings and to collective bargaining grievance procedures are inappropriate because these take the decision for access authorization out of the hands of the licensee.

To give this authority to an outside party such as an arbitrator prevents the licensee from fulfilling its responsibilities for the sa~ety of the plant and the public. Since the licensee has this responsibility, it must retain final authority over who is to be authorized unescorted access. A fair and effective internal appeal process can protect employees without the need for a hearing which could jeopardize the protection of information requirements of the proposed rule and present other practical problems. Additional justification is provided in Attachment 1, item 9, and Attachments 6 and 7.

PP&L also believes that some revisions are necessary in order to provide for an effective program for non-licensee employees. In addition to the "cold shutdown" and transfer options in the proposed rule, temporary clearances l should be allowed based on reduced clearance criteria in order to provide for rapid access authorization when necessary. Any requirement which results in longer lead times prior to granting access authorization has substantial negative impacts on the employees of licensees and contractors and ultimately on the public due to increased costs of operation and outage delays. Some

Page 2 SSES PLA-2358 MAR 7 1985 ER 100450 File 841-11 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk balance must be reached which will provide sufficient protection to the public without imposing undue or unnecessary hardship on the personnel who are subject to access authorization requirements.

With regard to the draft Regulatory Guide, PP&L strongly urges that it be deleted in its entirety. In many cases where the proposed rule is acceptable, the Regulatory Guide is overly prescriptive and provides conflicting guidance or an interpretation which is clearly not supportive of the rule. Specific comments on the guide are provided in Attachment 2.

In general, PP&L supports standards for an access authorization program.

PP&L's program has been largely self-imposed. One clear benefit of an

• industry program will be to standardize licensee and contractor programs. If, as a result, reciprocal exchange of clearances between licensees can be achieved, this will have a very positive impact. It is PP&L's hope that the attached comments will prove to be of use.

Very truly yours, N. W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear RMH/mks Attachments cc: W. Kushner NRC Region 1 W. Bailey NRC Region 1 M. J. Campagnone NRC Bethesda R.H. Jacobs NRC Resident

t LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1: Comments on Proposed Rule Attachment 2: Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide Attachment 3: Comments on Supplementary Information Attachment 4: Responses to Questions for Specific Public Comment Attachment 5: Description of PP&L's Temporary Clearance Options Attachment 6: Detailed Comments on Hearing Requirement Attachment 7: Detailed Comments on Collective Bargaining Process

Attachment 1 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES

1. Proposed 50.34(h)

The proposed rule states:

" *.* The Access Authorization Plan shall describe in detail the program used for. * * . grievance review procedures *** 11 As will be discussed in more detail later, PP&L strongly opposes the use of collective bargaining grievance procedures for the review of access denial or revocation. Identifying the review procedure as a "grievance" review procedure is clearly inappropriate in 50.34(h). PP&L agrees that the Access Authorization Plan should describe the licensee's review procedures, but the use of "grievance" type procedures is only one of

• 2.

several options which are available to the licensee. The word "grievance" should be deleted from the final rule.

Proposed 73.56(b)(l)

a. The proposed rule refers to "written personality tests." PP&L believes that a single test is adequate. Justification for this position is provided in Attachment 2, Item 3a. Therefore, the rule should be modified to refer to "one or more written personality tests." This will allow maximum flexibility for licensees who wish to use a second test.

b. PP&L recommends the following change to the proposed rule to prevent misinterpretation or misuse of the "grandfather clause".

"Individuals who have received an unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective date of these amendments may be exempted by licensees from having to meet the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section for a background investigation and paragraph (d) of this section for psychological assessment, except as provided in paragraph (f)(l)." '

As originally written, this section could be interpreted as prohibiting updating of clearance information by licensees. An employee of a licensee or contractor could cite this rule as exempting him and then refuse to submit to updating. Clearly, the licensee should not be prohibited from updating background information or administering personality tests, especially if warranted as a result of continual behavioral observations. In addition, blanket exemption from these requirements conflicts with 73.56(f)(l) which requires updating where more than 365 days has elapsed since previous employment by a licensee.

3. Proposed 73.56(c)

a. PP&L believes that a five-year retrospective time frame for background investigations should be incorporated into the rule. For additional information, see Attachment 3, Item 1.

Attachment 1 2

b. The proposed rule states:

"As a minimum, this background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation."

PP&L believes that the retrospective time frame discussed in "a" above and in Attachment 3, item 1, must be applicable to all of the items specified in the rule as stated above. This should be clarified in the final rule. In addition, PP&L feels that the requirement to verify all of the information is unreasonable.

Specific problems are enumerated in PP&L's comments on the draft Regulatory Guide provided in Attachment 2, items lb to lf. PP&L

• recommends that the rule be modified to require verification to the extent reasonably possible consistent with the nature of the information being sought. To absolutely require verification could preclude individuals from employment for reasons totally beyond their control and which may have no bearing on their suitability for unescorted access authorization. In addition, PP&L endorses the draft Regulatory Guide position that interim access authorization should be permitted pending receipt of criminal history since lengthy delays can otherwise result. PP&L suggests that this be extended to military history for the same reason. However, the rule, as presently worded, does not appear to allow for granting of interim access authorization and should be modified accordingly. PP&L suggests the following revision:

"To the extent reasonably possible, this background investigation should verify an individual's true identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation.

The investigation should cover a retrospective period of five years or since the age of 18, whichever is shorter. Interim unescorted access may be authorized for up to 180 days pending receipt of criminal history and military service information where other available information provides reasonable assurance that unescorted access will ultimately be authorized."

c. The proposed rule states:

"The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

However, in the "Background Investigation" section of the Supplemental Information provided with the proposed rule, NRG states:

"Under the proposed requirements, licensees will also be responsible for ensuring that individuals granted access to

Attachment 1 3

protected areas and vital islands report any information arising later that may have a bearing on their screened status (e.g., a subsequent conviction)." (49FR30728)

Clearly, the licensee can not ensure that individuals report new information. Licensees can require individuals to report and can take appropriate action where it is discovered that an individual has failed to report, but it is impossible for a licensee to ensure that a report is made. In addition, this requires the individual to make a judgement as to whether the new information has any bearing on bis continued access authorization. It is unreasonable to expect an individual to report himself ~hen the consequences to the individual may involve loss of access.

• 4.

For these reasons, this portion of the rule will, for all practical purposes, be unenforceable and should therefore be deleted, Proposed 73.56(d)(l) and (2)

As previously indicated, all references to multiple personality tests should be modified to permit the use of a single test. Justification for this position is provided in Attachment 2, Item 3a. Specifically, "written personality tests" should be changed to "One or more written personality tests". Later references to "tests" should be changed to "test or tests".

5. Proposed 73.56(e)(l)

With regard to the continual behavioral observation program, the proposed rule states:

"In the case where the individual's behavioral action$ represent an imminent danger *to the public health &nd safety, the individual's supervisor shall immediately suspend the individual's unescorted access authorization on a temporary basis and then refer the individual to senior licensee management."

PP&L believes the decision to suspend access authorization must be made at a higher level than the first-line supervisor. This protects the first-line supervisor from the potential legal ramifications of determining when immediate suspension is appropriate. In addition, it protects the employee from capricious and arbitrary actions by the supervisor. The licensee should be left the f~eedom to determine how it will respond where there is "imminent danger". The propos~d rule, as written, leaves no alternative. PP&L believes that a prompt decision can be reached by licensee management and that, in the interim, the individual can be continuously supervised or even restrained (if necessary) prior to suspending his unescorted access authorization and without endangering the public health and safety. Therefore, this portion of the rule should be deleted and the remainder revised as follows:

Attachment 1 4

" *** and, after detecting a single serious incident or a pattern of abnormal behavior, refer the individual to appropriate licensee management *.* "

These revisions are necessary to provide licensees flexibility in determining what level of management will make the decision to suspend or revoke access authorization and to allow this action for a single serious incident. As written, the proposed rule requires that a pattern of abnormal behavior occur unless there is imminent danger.

6. Proposed 73.56(f)(l)

With respect to non-licensee employees, PP&L recommends the following changes to the proposed rule as discussed below:

• "The licensee may accept an unescorted access authorization granted an individual by another licensee if the individual's unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days. The gaining licensee.must verify that the individual has a currently valid unescorted access authorization or that a valid unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions within the previous 365 days.

In addition, the licensee may reinstate the unescorted access authorization granted an individual if the individual's unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the previous unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions. Transfer or reinstatement of unescorted access authorization requires verification of the individual's true identity by the gaining licensee. For individual's whose unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days, the individual's activities must be investigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and a new psychological assessment made according to the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section. In any event, the investigations according to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section need not exceed the period since the last termination of unescorted access authorization under favorable conditions.

The numerous changes identified by the underlined sections above are necessary to eliminate inadequacies in the original version:

a. As originally proposed by NRC, the rule referred to previous employees and unnecessarily excluded current employees of one licensee who might require unescorted access at another licensee's facility for purposes such as training. Also, unescorted access for former NRC employees would not be transferrable. The changes proposed by PP&L eliminate these and other possible inequities.

Unescorted access authorized by any licensee for any individual should be transferrable within 365 days.

Attachment 1 5

b. The proposed rule refers to interruption of an individual's "employment in licensed nuclear power reactors". This has been changed to refer to interruption of unescorted access authorization.

The former term is subject to various interpretations and could create problems for individuals who require periodic unescorted access but who are not technically employed in licensed facilities.

Termination of unescorted access authorization is. clearly more significant than attempting to determine the nature or location of an individual's employment. In addition, as presently worded the proposed rule would penalize individuals at near-term operating license plants who have not been employed in a licensed plant and who then must be subjected to complete reinvestigation upon employment by another licensee,

• c* Requiring the original granting licensee to provide the information necessary for the transfer of unescorted access authorization is not logical. Pursuant to proposed 73.56(h)(5), a licensee need only retain an individual's access authorization file for three years following termination of unescorted access authorization. By requiring the gaining licensee to verify this information, there are several clear benefits. (1) An individual could establish an unbroken chain of access authorization over a period of many years involving numerous licensees without unnecessary reinvestigations.

(2) The gaining licensee would be assured that an individual had not been terminated under unfavorable conditions with a subsequent licensee. This information would probably not be available to the original licensee. (3) The gaining licensee would benefit from the most up-to-date information regarding the individual.

d. The rule as proposed by NRC required verification of the "current validity" of the access authorization. This definition has been expanded to include termination within 365 days under favorable conditions.

e. An entire sentence has been added to expand this section to include reinstatement of access authorization by a licensee. This omission unnecessarily penalized contract workers and other personnel who may be subject to short-term layoff or leave of absence without employment by another licensee in the interim.

f. The requirement for the original licensee to provide a photograph to the gaining licensee has been replaced with a requirement for the gaining licensee to verify true identity. This is consistent with the requirements for background investigations and allows for alternatives to the use of photographs in establishing true identity.

See Attachment 2, item lb for additional comments on methods of establishing true identity.

g. A final sentence has been added to clarify that investigations are never required to go back beyond the last favorable termination information which is available. It is not necessary to conduct a full 5-year background investigation for an individual who has had

Attachment 1 6

only a one or two year break in access authorization. Requiring a full investigation would increase costs and have very negative impacts on the individuals due to unnecessary delays in granting access.

The transfer and reinstatement provisions of the rule are among the most important provisions. The changes which PP&L has proposed are necessary to make these provisions as useful and consistent as possible while minimizing the potential for inadvertently overlooking potentially unfavorable information.

7. Proposed 73.56(f)(2)

This paragraph requires licensees to grant unescorted access authorization

• to NRC employees "who have been certified by the NRC to have met the intent of the requirements of this section." This raises several questions in reference to the proposed rule.

a. Will NRC's program actually meet the intent of the rule? NRC does not currently certify except to the extent that a clearance has been granted. PP&L can see no reason why employees of NRC should be considered more or less reliable than anyone else. Will NRC employees be subject to background investigations and psychological evaluations? Will NRC have a continual behavioral observation program? If so, who observes the resident inspectors who have free access to the plant, detailed knowledge of the plant, and considerable authority?

b. Regardless of NRC's certification, how is the licensee expected to verify true identity of an NRC employee? Currently, NRC requires that licensees accept an NRC picture badge as evidence of true identity. This clearly would not be acceptable for non-NRC employees. Yet NRC refuses to provide other identifying data such as date of birth, social security number, or even sex. It appears unreasonable to mandate verification of true identity and then exempt NRC employees.

PP&L recognizes that access by inspectors is a necessary requirement for NRC to carry out its regulatory obligations and responsibilities. These questions are merely intended to express reasonable concerns relative to the protection of public health and safety.

8. Proposed 73.56(f)(3)

'.fllis section of the proposed rule permits authorizing temporary unescorted access to unscreened individuals during cold shutdown or refueling if certain other conditions are met. Except in the event of a two-unit shutdown, the advantages of this provision are not available to PP&L or to other multi-unit stations where common systems prevent "de-vitalizing" the plant. Most licensees must utilize contractor personnel for major outages and our experience shows that the vast majority of these temporary personnel require access to common areas. Prescreening contractor

Attachment 1 7

personnel for outages is not a workable solution for a licensee due to the transient nature of these workers. PP&L currently uses an NRC approved temporary clearance program which allows prompt processing of personnel and therefore does not significantly interfere with outage schedules.

This clearance is limited to 180 days duration and is awarded based on one of three options regarding the kind of information readily available to indicate a reasonable level of confidence as to the individual's suitability for access authorization.

PP&L strongly recommends that the propoeed rule be modified to permit the use of temporary clearances for unescorted access authorization using criteria similar to that which has been approved by NRC for use by PP&L.

A description of the three options available to PP&L are provided as Attachment 5. Failure to allow for temporary clearances will severely

• impact outage durations, especially unscheduled outages, with resultant increased costs to the public. Just as importantly, there would be substantial adverse effects on the large group of transient workers who would be precluded from employment due to the lengthy clearance process.

A full background investigation would take a minimum of 60 to 90 days to process. Outage costs could become exorbitant due to delays associated with processing contractor personnel for access authorization. In some cases, it may take longer to process access authorization than the duration of the work. The option of a temporary clearance should also be considered from a cost viewpoint. PP&L's costs for a temporary clearance are approximately $35, as compared to approximately $300 for a clearance based on a full background investigation and psychological evaluation.

During an outage situation approximately 1,200 contractor personnel are brought on to most sites. Based on PP&L's figures, savings related to temporary clearances can exceed $600,000 per year for a two~unit station due to background investigations alone. The temporary clearance also minimizes costs associated with nonproductive contractor time, unnecessary escorting costs, and lost revenue resulting from extended down time.

PP&L has had excellent results with its temporary clearance program.

During outages, up to 100 individuals have been processed for temporary clearances within a three-day period. PP&L's temporary clearance has contributed to a significant increase in efficiency and responsiveness in processing contractor personnel promptly to support maintenance and outage functions. To date, out of approximately 2,900 temporary clearances processed, only 8 temporary clearances have been suspended due to adverse information developed in the processing for a full clearance and/or through the continual behavioral observation program. The inclusion of temporary clearances in PP&L's program has provided substantial benefits to PP&L and contractor personnel with minor additional incremental risk as evidenced by the small number of suspensions. In fact, PP&L believes that the temporary clearance poses less risk than the "grandfather clause" and "cold shutdown" option contained in the rule. The advantages of the temporary clearance over these other alternatives are the short duration of access authorization and a partial background check. The "grandfather clause" in particular poses more risk than a temporary clearance since it permits access authorization indefinitely to individuals who may have never been investigated or psychologically screened.

Attachment 1 8

9. Proposed 73.56(g)

PP&L agrees that review procedures are a necessary element of an Access Authorization Program. However, PP&L opposes the requirement to include an evidentiary hearing. A formal review process with an evidentiary hearing and all the elements of due process presents several problems and is unnecessary.

First, such a requirement would appear to necessitate a third party before whom hearings would be held. This third party would presumably have the authority to determine whether access authorization should be granted in particular cases. PP&L believes this is inappropriate since it could result in a licensee being forced to grant access to a person who the licensee believes may be a serious threat to plant security. One of the basic conceptual precepts of the Commission's regulations is that ultimate responsibility for plant safety rests on the licensee. Only the Commission has the authority to modify a licensee's implementation of this obligation. To adopt a hearing process which allows third parties to decide issues pertinent to plant safety undermines licensees' responsibilities, especially where the decision could increase the risk of radiological sabatoge.

Second, other avenues are already available to redress injuries suffered if an employee's rights are infringed upon. These include the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the National Labor Relations Board, their counterparts at the state and local level and the federal and state courts.

Third, a formal hearing will necessarily present practical problems. For example, a full evidentiary hearing with all the elements of due process may well cause the decision-making process to extend beyond completion of the work.

PP&L believes that on balance, the benefits from the hearing requirement are outweighed by the attendant risks and problems. While such hearings should be allowed, the rule should permit more flexibility to the licensees. There are other methods which achieve the same goals yet avoid many of the difficulties inherent in the proposed rule. A more detailed explanation of PP&L's arguments on this issue is provided as Attachment 6.

Regardless of the Commission's final decision on the hearing requirement, the rule should be modified to avoid any inference that individuals have the right under NRC regulations to use a grievance review procedure to appeal access authorization decisions. The proposed rule states that

"[T]he grievance review procedure * *

• may be used * *

• whether or not the denial or revocation of access authorization is a grievable action under the contract." It is not clear whether use of the grievance is at the option of the licensee or is a right being given to an individual employee. If the Commission determines that references to grievance procedures are appropriate, it should be made clear that use of such procedures is at the option of the licensee. This is particularly important because most grievance procedures are totally unsuited for

Attachment 1 9

deciding security clearance issues, particularly where confidential information is involved. A detailed explanation of PP&L's position is set forth in Attachment 7.

Based upon the above, PP&L urges the Commission to delete all but the first sentence of Section 73.56(g) in the final rule.

10. Proposed 73.56(h)

Paragraph (2) of 73.56(h) prohibits disclosure by licensees, contractors, or suppliers of personal information except to the individual, his representative, or to those who need the information to grant or deny access authorization. Paragraph (3) provides that licensees may audit contractor records and paragraph (4) provides that NRC inspectors may

• audit licensee records. However, there is no provision for a licensee to audit its own records or for NRC to audit contractor records. The final rule should be modified such that paragraph 73.56(h)(2) permits disclosure to NRC or licensee personnel for the purpose of auditing the implementation of the requirements of the rule

• Attachment 2 Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide PP&L strongly opposes the prescriptive nature of the draft Regulatory Guide and urges that it be deleted. Some of the more significant problems raised by the guide are explained in the following comments. However, many others are not discussed because of overlapping concerns or because comments have already been provided on the proposed rule in Attachment 1. If NRC proceeds toward issuing this guide, PP&L hopes that these comments will prove useful.

1. Section 2. 2, "Investigation Criteria"

a. Intent (1) The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"It is recommended that all information submitted on the employment application be verified *** "

The information requested on an employment application is not normally germane to security concerns. Employment applications cannot ask questions which do not relate directly to a job or may appear to have a discriminatory effect, such as conviction history. Additionally, employment applications are not available or required for certain positions such as craft personnel from union halls. In lieu of an employment application, personnel being processed for access authorization should complete an access authorization questionnaire which would require personal history information. In addition verification of afl information on an employment application would probably require investigation back beyond the suggested five-year retrospective period.

(2) The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"The licensee should ensure that the persons responsible for conducting such investigations are qualified and trained and that the program established is adequate to determine whether the investigative criteria of trustworthiness and reliability are met".

Most licensees will be unable to ensure that investigators are qualified and trained especially in terms of the licensee's program and information evaluation criteria. Many licensees contract out all or a portion of the investigative work to large security companies. Additionally, many licensees allow contractors to contract directly with such security firms for background investigations. These security companies employ many part-time investigators on an "as-needed basis" and rarely will one investigator be assigned more than a few cases for a particular licensee. In either case, whether assigned by the licensee or a contractor, the licensee has no control over the assignment of a particular agent and/or the qualifications and training of an agent.

Attachment 2 2

b. True Identity The draft Regulatory Guide states that verification of true identity must be made through a fingerprint check or a photograph which must be positively identified by at least two individuals. In most cases, a fingerprint check will only disclose that "no record" exists on the individual. This does not verify true identity. Verification by photograph is a more favorable alternative, but is not a total panacea either. Due to changing facial features and the questionable recency of the photograph, verification of identity may be thwarted.

Additionally, the photograph requirement will result in additional delays and costs which would not be encountered with alternative methods. It should also be noted that Department of Defense clearance procedures do not contain these prescriptive requirements

• for verification of true identity. In addition, NRC requires licensees to grant unescorted access to NRC employees without verification of true identity. PP&L believes that identity can also be verified by cross-checking records on data such as social security number, date/place of birth and parental names. These alternatives should be allowed. We recommend the Regulatory Guide be amended to permit these alternatives.

c. Employment History (1) The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"Pertinent information would include any record of disciplinary action taken against the individual, unusual safety or accident records, psychological and medical records, reason for the individual's termination, and his or her reemployment potential. 11 The "pertinent" information which the guide states should be acquired in the course of employment inquiries will not normally be available. PP&L's experience in interviewing personnel managers indicates many employers will only release information on position held, dates of employment, reason for termination and eligibility for rehire. Several reasons exist for the reluctance of previous employers to provide additional information. These include records being kept in various repositories; potential liability due to the sensitive nature of these records; EEOC considerations; and company policy due to the administrative burden to locate such records.

(2) The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"However, all claimed employment should be verified."

The verification of all claimed employment is unreasonable.

First, to verify information which may be more than 20 years old can appear as harassment of the individual being investigated.

Many individuals, and especially highly transient workers, can

Attachment 2 3

barely recall five years of employment history. Second, the relevancy and applicability of data older than five years is questionable. The criteria for substance abuse allows access authorization for personnel who have been rehabilitated; the same criteria should apply for employment verifications.

Information should not be held against an individual indefinitely. A five year record will provide sufficient data to form a basis for an access authorization decision. Third, for the licensee, the verification of all employments would result in extending the time to process the case and would thereby increase costs substantially and negatively affect the individual being investigated. Verification should only be required to the extent reasonably possible. See Attachment 1, item 3b. Fourth, inability to verify even one period of

• employment due, for example, to the demise of the employing-company, could preclude the granting of a clearance until five years had elapsed since that period. This is obviously a heavy penalty for the individual to pay for circumstances beyond his control which may not even have a bearing on his suitability for unescorted access authorization.

(3) The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"This investigation would ordinarily be accomplished through personal interviews with previous employers and a check of employment records."

The requirement of personal interviews is unwarranted. In PP&L's screening program, inquiries can be made by either correspondence, telephone or personal contact. PP&L has found that the quality and reliability of the information acquired

• using all these methods is comparable. Personal contact of all employments will substantially increase costs. Based on PP&L's cost figures, an estimated 200% to 300% increase could result if all checks must be made personally. Additionally, considerable delays and backlogging of cases will result if personal contact is required. The following figures exemplify this concern.

PP&L has calculated an average telephone check takes 20.6 minutes and costs $5.44; a correspondence check takes 8.6 minutes and costs $1.99; and a personal check takes 57.8 minutes and costs $14.99.

For all of the above, there is significant potential for increased costs and delays which have very negative consequences for the licensee and the individual with practically no corresponding increase in protection of public health and safety. The overly prescriptive nature of the guide is totally inappropriate.

d. Educational History The draft Regulatory Guide states:

Attachment 2 4

"The type of information sought should include disciplinary, psychological, or medical problems and the circumstances under which the individual left the institutions (e.g., graduated, was expelled, dropped out) *** This investigation would ordinarily be conducted through personal interviews with school officials and an investigation of the individual's records."

PP&L's experience in conducting education checks has indicated that most schools will only release dates of attendance, area of study, and circumstances under which the student left the school.

Additionally, some of the larger universities will provide the above information by mail request only. Unless a reference check is also being accomplished at the school, personal interviews of registrar's records provide nothing more than can be accomplished with a correspondence check. The value of a personal interview in a situation where the individual graduated three to five years ago from a large university is questionable. The probability of locating a student or teacher in the above situation who would know the individual is highly unlikely. Personal interviews would only result in process delays and significant cost increases with generally no corresponding benefit.

e. Criminal History The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"The Licensee should not base the denial of authorization, **

solely on a person's conviction record."

"Obtaining criminal history may take several months. As a consequence, the licensee may grant an individual an Interim Unescorted Access Authorization for 6 months or until this information is received, whichever period is shorter, provided the other background investigative criteria are satisfactorily met. Upon receipt of the criminal history information, the licensee should either grant or deny authorization **. "

The guidance on criminal history is internally inconsistent and ambiguous. Paragraph 73.56(b)(3)(iv) of the proposed rule permits denial of access authorization on the basis of a single felony conviction. Since the guide states that denial should not be based solely on a person's conviction record, receipt of criminal history information after granting interim access leaves the licensee with little justification for subsequently revoking the access authorization.

Another issue is that the proposed rule and guide ignore the value of reviewing arrest records where conviction's did not result or where a case is still pending. Arrest records are not consistently available from law enforcement agencies. However, a licensee should not be precluded from denying access where a pattern of arrests without conviction have occurred, It is not in the best interest of public

Attachment 2 5

health and safety to permit access by a suspected arsonist with multiple arrests simply because no convictions resulted.

PP&L endorses the concept of interim access authorization pending receipt of criminal history and military history where there is sufficient information available from other sources such as employment history to indicate to a reasonable degree that the missing information is not likely to result in denial of access.

However, the proposed rule has no provisions for issuance of interim unescorted access authorization. PP&L has recommended that the rule be modified to permit this. See Attachment 1, item 3b.

f. Military Service Clarification is needed on the period of military service to be verified. The draft Regulatory Guide clearly states that five year histories are required for employment and education verification.

PP&L recommends that verification of military service be consistent with employment verification since military service should be viewed as employment. Military records can be very voluminous and contain little which is relevant to the clearance process. The effort and cost for NPRC to obtain records which are more than five years old seems wasteful in consideration of the questionable relevancy of these records. PP&L believes that a copy of the form DD214 should be considered sufficient for verification of military service.

In a case where an individual has recently retired or separated from the armed services, their record is not available at the NPRC for several months to a year. Therefore, interim access authorization should apply to military history. The Regulatory Guide should include this point of clarification and the proposed -r:ule should be

• 2.

modified to include interim access authorization for both military service and/or criminal history.

Section 2.3, "Information Evaluation Criteria"

a. Emotional or Mental Illnesses The draft Regulatory Guide implies that a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist must review the records obtained pertaining to an emotional or mental problem and provide a recommendation on access authorization. PP&L does not believe that this is necessary. During the six years PP&L has been conducting background investigations, numerous records from hospitals, clinics, psychologists and psychiatrists have been reviewed. The records are generally clearly stated and expressed in lay terms. The licensee's manager responsible for determining access authorization is fully capable of reviewing and evaluating this type of information. Additionally, the availability of a psychologist/psychiatrist for review of these records may be a potential problem for many licensees. Obviously, the prudent security manager will avail himself of appropriate professional counsel where necessary for matters requiring professional interpretations.

Attachment 2 6

b. Use of Controlled Substances The draft Regulatory Guide states that detection of two or more instances of usage in the preceding five years is sufficient to conclude that the individual is a habitual user. This criteria will have a discriminatory effect on young individuals. Many recent high school and college students have experimented with drugs, primarily marijuana, during the past five years. PP&L feels that the application of the above criteria is too restrictive. Each case must be judged on its own merits in relation to reason for usage, extent of usage, future intentions and evidence of rehabilitation since usage.

3. Section 3, "Psychological Assessment"

• a. Personality Tests The draft Regulatory Guide identifies the MMPI and the 16PF as the two test instruments recommended. The rationale for the psychological evaluation is to detect a psychological profile which indicates a potential for committing acts which are inimical to the public health and safety or present a danger to life or property.

PP&L supports the use of a psychological evaluation. The company's current program requires all personnel to undergo a psychological evaluation. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is used, and if the results need further clarification, a clinical evaluation is arranged. However, PP&L does not believe there is a necessity for administering two tests for the following reasons:

o The MMPI is the most widely used and respected test.

• 0 The MMPI has been used most predominantly among nuclear licensees, and data/norms can be developed for the population.

Two of PP&L's consulting psychologists conducted a study of PP&L's population to assess which scales and cut-off scores on the MMPI were most predictive in identifying individuals who were considered potential security risks. They also developed a criteria referenced MMPI scale which would differentiate between individuals who were granted a clearance and individuals who were denied a clearance. This study identified several scales

• predictability and respective cut-off scores which increased greatly. Additionally, an experimental scale, The Nuclear Security Scale was developed for PP&L as a criterion reference scale based on PP&L's population. The findings of this study strengthened PP&L's position in using psychological testing due to development of a criterion related scale and norms based on PP&L's population, PP&L has validated its findings in two additional studies.

o The criteria to be measured is the potential for committing acts which are inimical to public health and safety. The application of the 16PF to this criteria is questionable. The objective of

Attachment 2 7

the 16PF is to measure variations in normal personality and not to identify abnormal traits. There is little empirical evidence which relates the features measured on the 16PF, such as reserve vs. outgoing, less intelligent vs. more intelligent, or sober vs. happy-go-lucky, with the behavioral unreliability criteria listed on pages 16 and 17 of the draft Regulatory Guide.

o Differences between problematic 16PF profiles are too small to facilitate the development of objective 16PF criteria which would indicate individual evaluation.

0 It would be difficult to provide any evidence that difficulties in "interpersonal interaction" relate to the behavioral unreliability criteria as listed on pages 16 and 17 of the draft Regulatory Guide. In the professional opinion of a consultant psychologist to PP&L, judgements of an individual's "interpersonal interaction" could result in adverse decisions being made about individuals which are not related to the behavioral unreliability criteria.

o A second personality test would entail one or two additional hours of testing time for each individual. The benefits gained from this additional testing do not justify the additional time.

The use of the MMPI has been shown to be highly effective in the identification of individuals who meet behavioral unreliability criteria as listed on pages 16 and 17 of the draft Regulatory Guide. Use of the Clinical Analysis Questionnaire (CAQ), the clinical version of the 16PF, by PP&L did not show any additional accuracy in detection of individuals who meet behavioral unreliability criteria. It is therefore felt that the addition of a second test would not be justified.

0 In an unpublished study by one of PP&L's consultant psychologists, the MMPI and CAQ were correlated. The results indicated the clinical scales on the CAQ only correlated with the lie scale of the MMPI. This result can be interpreted to imply that the CAQ can be easily manipulated by applicants.

o For approximately two years (1978 to 1980), PP&L used both the MMPI and the CAQ. During this period, PP&L's four consulting psychologists did not refer any individuals for a clinical evaluation based on the CAQ. Based on their recommendation, the CAQ was eliminated from the testing battery.

For the above reasons, PP&L strongly urges that the requirement for a second test be deleted from the Regulatory Guide and the rule. See Attachment 1, items 2 and 4.

b. Clinical Interviews The draft Regulatory Guide requires the clinician in the clinical interview to address life history information and other factors. The

Attachment 2 8

interview and the written test results are both evaluated as the basis for the professional recommendation. However, the draft Regulatory Guide stipulates that the clinician cannot release other data to the senior management person beyond a professional recommendation which includes a basis for the recommendation.

This prohibition is not appropriate. The written psychological report provided as a result of the clinical interview should include information acquired by the psychologist concerning employments, education, drug or alcohol usage and/or treatment for substance abuse or emotional problems, arrest history and any other information considered relevant to both the psychological and background data criteria. It has been PP&L's experience that some individuals are more willing to provide information to a psychologist on substance

• abuse, mental health treatment, and arrests than they would list on an access authorization application. Additionally, the converse has occurred when the individual does not provide certain information to the psychologist which was previously identified in the background check and/or listed on the application, but which may have affected the psychologist's recommendation if he had been privy to this information. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the psychologist report such information to the licensee in order to provide a necessary and valuable cross check between the psychological evaluation and the background check.

4. Section 4, "Continual Behavioral Observation Program" The draft Regulatory Guide is unduly structured and does not provide sufficient latitude for licensees and contractors to use existing programs or to develop equally effective alternate programs. Additionally, PP&L feels that the draft Regulatory Guide goes beyond the scope of a continual behavioral observation program when it addresses the parameters of employee assistance programs and disposition of employee actions, such as theft and breaking of work rules. The following comments pertain to the guidance contained in the draft Regulatory Guide on the implementation of a continual behavioral observation program.

a. The draft Regulatory Guide states that the employee assistance program personnel should not be required to make judgments concerning suitability of access authorization. PP&L agrees with this position; however, information regarding treatment through an employee assistance program should be accessible. A company's employee assistance program should be viewed like any other mental health clinic or psychologist/clinician and therefore, the records should be reviewed. This information is critical to an access authorization decision. With the individual's consent, the employee assistance program should provide information relative to the information evaluation criteria for emotional or mental illnesses. If this information is not available, the licensee will be unable to make an informed decision.

b. The draft Regulatory Guide states:

Attachment 2 9

"The employee assistance program should operate outside the other human resource departments and should provide complete confidentiality to employees who wish to use the service."

This conflicts with the proposed rule which states:

"The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance *** that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

c. The draft Regulatory Guide states that 20 days is sufficient for a licensee to reach a final decision to reinstate or revoke a suspended access authorization. PP&L believes that this would force premature decisions in many cases. The company agrees it is unfair to allow a lengthy suspension to occur intentionally. However, resolution of the suspension may require the retrieval of records from police departments, hospitals, or clinics, the results of pending court cases and/or psychological testing. There will be occasions where the 20-day period will not provide sufficient time for completion of these actions. PP&L recommends that the Regulatory Guide be changed to indicate that access authorization which has been suspended be adjudicated in an expeditious manner consistent with the circumstances on which the suspension was predicated.

d. The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"It is the intent of this requirement that the supervisor's responsibility include observing employee behavior on a day-to-day basis."

Day-to-day observations are not always possible, especially for certain positions such as vendor personnel who service equipment.

These individuals do not report directly to one individual and primarily work independently. It is suggested that the requirement for "day-to-day" observation is not always practical and should be deleted.

e. The draft Regulatory Guide states that continual behavioral observation training should be several days in length. It is not appropriate to prescribe the length of the training.

The objectives of a continual behavioral observation program may be effectively accomplished through alternative approaches which are not as restrictive. PP&L believes that its continual behavioral observation program is an effective program as evidenced by the 20 referrals since June, 1982, when the program was implemented. PP&L's continual behavioral observation program includes an initial training session of four hours for supervisors. This has proved to be adequate. The training focuses on identifying behavioral changes in job performance and on the reporting process if such changes are detected. Three hours of retraining are conducted every two years to

Attachment 2 10 reinforce the objectives of the program and to address past experiences with the continual behavioral observation program.

PP&L's training program, although not several days in length, generally meets the objectives outlined in the draft Regulatory Guide, with the exception of specific recognition of chemical dependency and identification of signs of stress in themselves and others. Our supervisors are only taught to recognize changes and not to diagnose the cause or signs of change. It is PP&L's opinion that retraining is more appropriate and beneficial than requiring several days of initial training. PP&L's approach is more effective since it reinforces the initial training and allows supervisors at a subsequent date to discuss their experiences and receive additional guidance. A total of 720 supervisors have been trained in the continual behavioral observation program to date *

• f. The draft Regulatory Guide states that a decision to suspend an individual's access authorization should be made only after consultation with a qualified psychologist, psychiatrist, or medical doctor. This obviously conflicts with earlier guidance in the guide and in the rule which requires immediate suspension in "the case where the individual's behavioral actions represent an imminent danger to the public health and safety *** " Additionally, a psychological evaluation should only be conducted if it is considered germane to the referral. A psychological evaluation may not be appropriate in the situation where an individual has been referred due to an arrest or conviction.

g. The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"The supervisors should also periodically prepare a behavioral observation report for each subordinate."

• PP&L's program does not require periodic reporting. It is strictly exceptional reporting. PP&L strongly objects to any requirement for periodic reports for the continual behavioral observation program for several reasons. First, this requirement may encourage supervisors to delay reporting problems until the periodic report is due. This type of procrastination by supervisors could permit a grave situation to become more serious. Additionally, the draft Regulatory Guide does not indicate what information should be contained in these reports. It seems plausible that annual performance reports could be used as the vehicle to meet this requirement. PP&L does not feel that annual performance reports should be used for this purpose nor are these reports of concern to security. Annual continual behavioral observation program reports might also increase the reporting of non-security problems such as discipline or poor performance problems. The continual behavioral observation program could be viewed by supervisors as a mechanism to pass off non-security related problem employees to someone else to handle.

To require periodic reports on all employees would result in a tremendous paperwork burden with no resulting improvement or benefit

Attachment 2 11 to the program. Approximately 4,000 to 5,000 employee and contractor personnel have unescorted access authorization in the course of one year at PP&L's facility. To review, track and file periodic reports on this number of individuals will have the following negative effects: It will interfere with other program responsibilities; it will potentially result in administrative errors such as misfiling and missing real referrals; it will increase non-productive time for supervisors to complete reports; and it will become an administrative burden to track and monitor these reports. PP&L strongly objects to this requirement. PP&L has an effective program which accomplishes the continual behavioral observation program objectives without needless, ineffective evaluation reports.

5. Section 5.1, "Acceptance of Unescorted Access Authorization Granted by Another Licensee"

a. PP&L has proposed changes to the proposed rule which would affect this section significantly. See Attachment 1, item 6. It should be the responsibility of the gaining licensee to verify current or former access authorization and the individual's true identity.

PP&L's believes that the Nuclear Employee Data System can be an effective means to accomplish this. Six utilities in Region I have formed a group for the purpose of transferring data relating to medical, training, health physics and security records for transient nuclear workers. The primary objective of this group, called Nuclear Employee Data Systems (NEDS), is to eliminate unnecessary reprocessing of personnel. This has both cost and time savings benefits. In order to allow acceptance and transfer of access authorization, standards on the parameters of the background investigation, psychological evaluation and continual behavioral observation program were agreed upon by the six licensees. These standards closely parallel ANS 3.3 standards. The NEDS group did not become unduly prescriptive in defining these standards in order to allow some individual licensee managerial flexibility.

PP&L, as a member of the NEDS, takes strong objection to the processing of non-employees addressed in both the rule and regulatory guide. First, the prescriptive nature of the regulatory guide prohibits any managerial decisions on the scope of the program. The NEDS group was able to achieve security standards which meet the intent of the rule and allow flexibility in application. Secondly, the rule as currently written interferes with the prime objective of NEDS, prompt and easy transfer of access authorization. In the NEDS_

program, one licensee would grant access authorization and document this status in the computer system. If the individual left this licensee, his access authorization history would be reviewed by the second licensee. The second licensee would accept the previous authorization if the individual had access authorization within the previous 365 days. The second licensee would be responsible to:

1) verify the individual's identity through cross-checking records on personal data, and 2) to input the current data on access authorization. Subsequent licensees would similarly review the

Attachment 2 12 computer for access history. If the individual's access history did not reflect any breaks in access authorization longer than 365 calendar days and final access authorization was not withdrawn for cause, the individual's access authorization would simply be transferred from licensee to licensee without any further reprocessing. Additionally, the "original granting licensee" would not be involved in the transferring of access authorization unless the individual returned to the "original granting licensee's" site.

The existence of the NEDS concept points out the desire among licensees to transfer access authorization and their ability to agree on standards for this purpose. The NEDS project will include an auditing program to monitor compliance to the standards and procedures agreed by the group

• b. The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"Additionally, it is incumbent upon the employing licensee, but not required, to determine to the licensee's satisfaction the' activities and employment of the individual desiring unescorted access for the interval of time (less than 365 days) when the individual did not hold unescorted access authorization.

If it is the commission's intent to allow access authorizations to be "transferrable" (if access has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 calendar days), the above statement is inconsistent with the intent of the proposed rule for transferring clearances. Verification of employment for less than 365 days will not allow prompt processing of contractor personnel and will only contribute to unnecessary costs and delays. PP&L suggests a 365 day cut-off point as reasonable and prudent. See Attachment 1, item 6.

6. Section 7, "Protection of Information" The draft Regulatory Guide states:

"Random summary information may be provided to individuals performing facility quality assurance audits."

• PP&L believes that its auditors should have full access to these files in order to adequately assess the implementation of the programs required by NRC. The potential for abuse is easily controlled by a variety of mechanisms which should be left to the individual licensee to establish.

See Attachment 1, item 10.

7. Appendix B, "Training and Qualification Standards for State-Licensed Psychologist or Psychiatrist" Appendix B of the draft Regulatory Guide addresses the training and qualification standards for State-licensed psychologists or psychiatrists who administer and interpret psychological assessments, PP&L feels that the standards provided are a good guide for licensees who are looking to contract such services or employing such a professional. However,

Attachment 2 13 individuals who do not meet all the standards should not be disqualified or dismissed. For example, in the State of Pennsylvania, an individual with a masters degree may be licensed. Under the standards in Appendix B, 1 even if a person had been involved in the licensee's screening program for several years, he would not meet the standards. Licensees should consider Appendix B but must have the flexibility to employ whomever they feel is qualified in accordance with applicable state licensing requirements

• Attachment 3 Comments on Supplementary Information

1. Under the "Background Investigation" section of the Supplementary Information provided with the proposed rule, the Commission solicited comments on the retrospective time frame to be used for background investigations (49FR30728).

PP&L concurs with a single program involving one level of access authorization for both protected and vital areas. PP&L's experience indicates that the majority of personnel need access to both vital and protected areas. In 1983, PP&L eliminated a separate protected area clearance from its program due to the relatively small number of personnel processed for this clearance (130 of 2300) and the frequency with which these personnel needed to have their clearances upgraded from protected to vital.

• 'PP&L recommends that the 5-year retrospective time frame proposed by the Commission be included in the final rule under 73,56(c). The retrospective requirement should apply to all aspects of the background investigation including military service. Information should be obtained only for the previous 5 years or since the individual attained the age of 18, whichever is shorter. Although the licensee is free to investigate beyond these minimum requirements, there should be no requirement to do so.

2. Under the "Commission Statement on Proposed Rule" section of the Supplementary Information provided with the proposed rule, the Commission requested comments concerning the appropriateness of psychological assessments and behavioral observations (49FR30729).

In general, PP&L supports the proposed rules including a three-part program of background investigations, psychological evaluations and continual behavioral observation. PP&L has considerable experience in processing both employees and contractor personnel having processed approximately 11,000 clearances since 1978. PP&L has included the three components in its program for both employees and contractors and has found that each component complements the others by providing an additional source of information and/or perspective for consideration. Since 1978, the PP&L program has identified 81 individuals as potential risks due to information gathered during background investigations (0.7%), 118 due to psychological evaluations (1.1%) and 27 for a combination of background investigations and psychological evaluations (0.2%). In addition, 20 individuals have been referred under the continual behavioral observation program (0.2%). This experience strengthens PP&L's belief that each component is a viable aspect which contributes to the overall effectiveness of the program.

3. In response to NRC's request for descriptions of typical continual behavioral observation programs, the following provides a brief description of th~ program currently used by PP&L.

If a supervisor identifies an individual who is exhibiting behavior which is inappropriate to the job environment and which may pose a potential

2 Attachment 3 threat to the security and/or safety of the plant or the individual, the supervisor reports his observation to a Cost Area Head (Management Level Position). The Cost Area Head determines if the allegation/observation is significant and appropriate for referral to the Director-Corporate Security. The Cost Area Head may elect to limit duties or remove the individual from his position. If the behavior presents an immediate threat, the Cost Area Head can remove the individual from this duties without prior notification to other parties. If a referral is made, a written report is sent to the Director-Corporate Security which describes the observed behavioral changes. Additionally, the Plant Superintendent is advised of the referral by the Cost Area Head, The Cost Area Head is also responsible to notify the affected individual of the referral under the continual behavioral observation program.

The Director-Corporate Security determines: (1) if the referral is related to access authorization criteria and, if so, (2) is the referral serious enough to warrant suspension; and (3) action necessary to resolve the allegation. If the clearance is suspended by the Director-Corporate Security, his decision must be concurred with or reversed by the Executive Vice President-Operations within three working days after the initial suspension decision. See Attachment 1, item 9 for a discussion of PP&L's review procedures. For employees, the suspension decision is followed up by additional psychological testing and/or investigative action, A psychological evaluation is conducted only if it is considered germane to the referral; it may not be appropriate in the situation where an individual has been referred due to an arrest or conviction.

An Employee Assistance Program is available to any employee of PP&L. This program is confidential and entirely independent of the continual behavioral observation program.

4. PP&L shares the Commission's concern over the implementation of the psychological assessment and continual behavioral observation elements of the rule. PP&L believes such programs can be useful in protecting the public health and safety. However, to be effective and not abusive, it is particularly important that these two elements be closely circumscribed.

The language of the current rule does not do this. Specifically, the language in the rule as well as the supplementary information varies between phrases referring to a potential for committing acts that are "inimical to the public health and safety" or "prevention of danger to life or property" andsuch terms as "defects in judgment or reliability,"

and "trustworthy." To resolve this problem, the rule and supplementary information should use only one criteria; that is, "the potential for committing acts that are inimical to the public health and safety or prevention of danger to life or property."

Attachment 4 PP&:VS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR SPBCIPIC PUBLIC COMMENT

1. To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological 8.l:13es:;ment and behavior reliability programs already used by nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

In late 1983, Pennsylvania Power &: Light Company (PP&:L) conducted a limited random survey of seventeen nuclear licensees. These licensees represented approximately 55% of the operating reactors in the United States. The purpose of this survey was to determine whether or not the elements of psychological evaluation, background investigation and continual behavior observation programs were in each licensee's commitments. The surveys revealed twelve of the seventeen licensees (71 %) conducted psychological evaluations of personnel requiring unescorted access. Additionally, twelve of seventeen conducted some sort of background investigation. Fifteen of seventeen licensees (88%)

had in some form a continual behavior ot>servation program. Although the survey identified that the three components are contained in most licensees' screening programs, it also revealed that variations exist in regard to the scope of each of the components.

Background investigations ranged from a retrospective period of three to seven years.

Psychological asses;ment instruments varied considerably from licensee to licensee; however, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) was most frequently 4t used. Likewise, continual behavior observation programs varied considerably from licensee to licensee.

Despite the lack of consistency among programs observed in the above survey, standards have been agreed to by six utilities in Region L These utilities have formed a group called Nuclear Employee Data System (NEDS). The purpose of the NEDS group is to share security, health physics, training and medical data on transient workers. , The security group of NEDS has agreed to screening standards which includes background investigation, psychological evaluation and continual behavior observation program. Uniformity in standards by the NEDS group has been achieved by agreeing to standards which closely parallel ANS 3.3.

Attachment 4

2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns? radiological sabotage concerns? or 'both?

Psychological asrn!l:lment procedures are being used by some licensees for fitness for duty aoo radiological sabotage concems. PP&L has used psychological screening for several purposes. In the PP&L Personnel Security Program, all personnel who are being processed for unescorted access authorization must undergo a psychological evaluation. The objective of this evaluation is to identify an individual who is prone to engage in destructive acts, including radiological sabotage, suscepti~le to insidious manipulation, prone to mreliability and/or dr~ or alcohol abuse.* The 0bjectives of our program cover both radiological sabotage and fitness for duty concerns. In the case of a referral under the PP&L continual behavior observation program, most individuals have been requested to undergo additional psychological testing to assess their current status for continued eligibility for acceS::1 authorization. *Another application of psychological testing used by PP&L is testing of security officers and plant control operators to evaluate their suitability for their respective positions.

In the determination of access authorization, the PP&L psychological evaluation program has identified persons who are experiencing psychological problems, such as severe depression, paranoid, psychopathic and psychotic symptomatology. Psychological assess-ment has also identified individuals who are prone to drug and alcohol abuse and exhibit hostile and aggressive behavior. Psychological evaluations have identified a total of 118 individuals who represent potential security risks in the PP&L screening program.

3. What are the particular concerns about infringement on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been _adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy 8.9::lociated with the initiatives.

Attachment'4

' \

The NRC's concerns about infringements on civil liberties is a particularly difficult and complex one. Any time an individual's personal history is investigated or an individual i.8 subjected to psychologi~ testing, some infringement on personal privacy may occur. In any case it is apparent that a security program would involve some explicit concerns for civil liberties related to privacy, equal opportunity and fairness in placement. In addition there is the overriding concern which was originally voiced by Szasz (1963) that intervention based on prediction of future behavior violates the most fundamental rights guaranteed in a democratic society; punishm~nt for past acts, not detention for future acts. The point is that prospective employees should not be punished, i.e. denied a job opportunity, for behaviors which have not yet occurred *

• The background investigation and the psychological evaluation represent quantitatively different aspects of individual rights than does the continual observation program.

People's behavior in public places is always open to public scrutiny and the objective observation of a person's behavior is probably not an invasion of their privacy as long as it does not involve subterfuge, entrapment or deception. Psychological assessment programs involve responses to sensitive test items and may require answers to private or personal matters. These include, but are not limited to, education, employment, family, financial

• am other personal matters. The background investigation involves inquiry into public records, employment records and reference checks which may include more personal matters. The potential fOl" abuse may exist in the latter two programs. The concerns of infringement on civil liberties must be weighed against the effectiveness of the screening program in decreasing the risk of radiological sabotage. Additionally, steps can be taken which minimize the infringement of civil liberties such as the confidential treatment of information, obtaining the consent of the individual to undergo the psychological evaluation and the background investigation and conducting psychological evaluations in accordance with the Code of Ethics for the American Psychological Association. The above actions all act to protect the individual's civil liberties.

Attachment 4 *

' I In th~ PP&L program, each individual who needs unescorted access is initially asked to provide written consent for both the background investigation and the psychological evaluation. No action will occur until the individual has provided such consent.

Additionally, the individual has the opportunity to rescind his consent at any point in the proceS:J. During the six years several individuals have declined to or rescinded their consent to participate in the program.

The infringement of civil liberties is further minimized by the protection accorded to the information contained in the file. All PP&L security files are protected from unauthorized acceS:J and are kept in. locked containers. Access to tbe files is restricted to

• those individuals involved with processing the clearance and/or adjudicating the clearances. NRC and PP&L auditors also have acces; to files for the purpose of determining compliance to program procedures. Additionally, the results of the back-grouoo investigation and the psychologic~ evaluation are available only to the subject and/or his representative~

Acccrding to the Code of Ethics by the American Psychological Association, all information regarding psychological evaluations is communicated and stored with due regard for confidentiality. Should these ethical safeguards be transgressed, the worker has legal recourse. With the above safeguards in place to protect against infringement on civil liberties, an acceS:J authorization program whose purpose it is to identify individuals who may represent a security risk clearly outweigh the concerns for individual privacy and infringement on civil liberties. Thus far, the PP&L Personnel Security Program has identified 226 individuals for various reasons who have been considered as potential security risks.

' \

Attachment 4, .

4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical afSes,ments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

There is a plethora of empirical studies and published research to support the use of objective diagnostic tests, such as the MMPI, as screening tools when specifically used to initiate overall clinical a93ea;ments. In fact, the majority of published research supports the actuarial use of test data as the preferred method in contrast to clinical judgments.

Actuarial awroaches use automated or mechanistic decision rules that involve mathemat-ical manipulation of the data, while clinical approaches tend to rely more upon the

• intuitive or subjective combination of the factors deemed relevant. In virtually all the studies that have compared clinicians and actuarial tables in predicting the same events, the tables have proven the more accurate (Nell, 1954; Sawyer, 1966). So many studies have reached this conclusion that "actuarial prediction is better than clinical prediction" has become a truism in psychology. Actuarial studies in prediction of violent behavior have resulted in several significant correlates (Monahan, 1981). These correlates include past criminal activity, age, sex, race, socioeconomic status, drug or alcohol abuse cir other factors.

During the clinical interview, the psychologist has the opportunity to observe and question-into these areas which can be considered in the overall prediction of unreliability. PP&L's experience with using psychological evaluations, in particular, clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist, has ide11tified that 496 of all individuals processed are denied unescorted acce::s authorization. The PP&:L psychological evaluation process has identified 118 individuals as potential security risks. Correlation of these individuals to the list of total individuals denied clearance reveals the psychological evaluation identified persons as being potential risks and provided information which would not have been available through the background investigation; that is, the psychological evaluation program identified potential security risks which would not have been identified through the background investigative procedures.

Attachment 4'. ~

5. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that re1ate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II areas) can be expected from using the NRG-proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

The type of characteristics which have been identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage include identification of individuals who have displayed argumentative hostility towards authority, irresponsibility /impulsivity, defensive incompetence, substance abuse, emotional adaptability /psychopathology. Objective diagnostic tests, when supplemented by clinical a!:13essments, can produce reasonably accurate decisions regarding delusional thinking, psychopathic behavior and interpersonal difficulties. In addition, they quantify previous criminal, employment, personal or background problems. The availability of means and motives for radiological sabotage can*a1so be assessed. It should be noted tht:tt while the actuarial predictive data are generally regarded as superior to the clinical awroach, there are certain *conditions when cliriical prediction has shown to be preferable. Additionally, clinical predictions are more palatable because, of necessity, they involve a one-to-one relationship and avoid some of the uneasiness related to certain criteria which are a part of the statistical prediction process. In addition, it has been demonstrated that key specific factors may be overlooked in the actuarial approach. In

• the prediction of rare events, of which nuclear sabotage is includ~, single facts are often sufficient to change the probability ef violence from one direction to another. When written personality tests are used in conjunction with a clinical interview which develops infcrmation about specific material such as backgrol.100 data, the prediction of this unusual event improves.

The determine.tioo of PP&L's cut-off scores on the MMPI have been determined to be in favor of a Type II error (to incorrectly fail someone) and subject them to the clinical interview, as opposed to missing a potential security risk'. Sixteen percent of all individuals will require an interview, however, only 4% of the overall are determined to

Attachment 4

• present a risk based on the clinical evaluation. A study conducted on the PP&L population and respective cut-off scores for the MMPI identified that 8496 of all individuals evaluated with the MMPI were ccrrectly identified. Six percent represent a false ~ositive type error and 996 represent a false-false type error. Additiona.lly, individuals who have been referred under the Continual Behavior Observation Program may be considered as false positives, as they were initially labeled as a pass. and subsequently identified as a potential risk. Thus far, twenty individuals have been referred under the Continual Behavior Observation Program out of approximately 49 00 employees evaluated. This indicates that the psychological and backgrowx'i investigation have correctly identified approximately 9996 of all employees evaluated.

• 6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological aESessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

There are published studies which indicate that psychological assessment in the commer-cial nuclear industry can be justified solely on the basis of reducing radiological sabotage.

Research by Jones and S c ~ (1981) has demonstrated that psychological tests can be used to screen out job applicants who both endorse and have a high probability of committing employee crimes or misconduct in nuclear facilities. The results of this study documented that high endorsers of nuclear crime were more apt to engage in crime themselves and less likely to paEB specific tests related to honesty and violence when compared to low endorsers of nuclear crime. Sabotage and acts of violence are two major forms of nuclear crime that conceivably can be committed by employees. A study sponsored by the NRC (Mullin, Davidson and Jones, 1980) address two types of insider crime that are the primary concern of nuclear safeguards: sabotage and theft. This study developed a tentative profile of insider criminals based on incidents of these crimes.

Acc<rding to the study, "unyielding advocacy characterized the opinions of many security experts on the issues of pre-employment screening." However, security personnel

Attachment 4 interviewed in the NRC study felt that federal and state restrictions on background investigations were undermining their efforts to hire employees with high integrity. A related study by Jones (1980) demonstrated that it is possible for personnel managers and security administrators to use psychological tests to identify and screen out job applicants who are most likely to engage in disr~tive and costly violence on the job. The same author, in 1981, obtained significant results showing that high endorsers of nuclear crime held more fav<rable attitudes toward theft and illicit drug usage than low endorsers. In addition, the tendency towards psychopathology increased with greater endorsement of nuclear crime. Research has shown that people with high potential for nuclear crime are more likely to engage in (1) rumination over theft acts; (2) projection of theft in others;

• (3) tolerance of theft in others; (4) inter-thief loyalty; and (5) greater rationalization of theft acts compared to individuals with a lower potential for nuclear crime. In addition, persons with a high potential for nuclear crime are more likely to exhibit impulsivity, poor social judgment, anti-social behavior and significant conflict with authority f"igures than persons with a low potential for nuclear crime. Significant differences exist for various scales on the MMPI, such as PT, SC and MA between high and low endorsers of nuclear crime. These studies demonstrate that high endorsers of nuclear crime have significantly different personalities and criminal histories than low endorsers. This finding is especially true for males. Psychological aSS8$ments, in our opinion, can be justified solely on the basis of reducing radiological sabotage for the reasons cited above.

However, additional benefits are derived from using psychological testing. These benefits include fitness for duty concems, especially in regard to drug and alcohol abuse. Public confidence is a derived benefit gained from the screening process including psychological testing. Knowledge by the public that workers are screened to assure their safety and well-being contributes to public confidence in the nuclear industry. Psychological assessment can also be justified from a safety perspective. Employees feel confident that fellow workers have been screened. 'Ibis awareness may increase the employee morale in the work environment. Additionally, the screened individual is aware of the licensee's concern for safety which may act to reinforce his safety attitude and conscientiousness.

Attachment 4* *

7. can the use of psychological asses,ment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Psychological ai:sea;ment can be used in the context of fitness for duty and access authorization. In the fitness for duty context, psychological testing can detect one's proclivity for drug or alcohol abuse by the MacAndrews' Alcohol Scale on the MMPI.

Other :f'itnei:s for duty considerations have included interpersonal difficulties, unrelia-bility, unpredictability and pronenei:s to insidious manipulation. There is an overlapping in criteria for fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns as discussed in the response to Question #6. Psychological assessment, in PP&Vs opinion, is justified based on radiological sabotage concerns alone *

• 8. To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological a!iB~ment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of

• a screening program, i.e. if only backgrouoo investigations were adopted?

The psychological evaluation proces:; provides: (1) an assessment of an individual's current mental functioning, and*(2) a prediction of future behavior based upon a S,:atistical data base. In the total context of the screening program, the background investigation covers an i.ndividual's past behavior. The psychological testing, based on current functioning, provides a prediction of future behavior, and the continual observation continually monitors "on-the-job" suitability in terms of reliability and trustworthiness. If either the background or the psychological evaluation would be removed from the screening process, it would result in removing a valuable source of information in the determination of acces:i authorization. The continual behavior observation program is a reactive program.

It identifies someone after a problem has been identified. Using psychological evalu-ations, as well as the background investigation, is a proactive approach. It pre-identifies a potential problem. To eliminate psychological testing from the screening process would result in more false positives (Type 1 errors). Additionally, the effectivene$ of the

Attachment 4 ,

continual observation program rests solely on supervisors. If the psychological evaluation proce!!B were eliminated from the screening process, the responsibility of identifying those individuals who would have been screened out by the psychological evaluation program must now be detected by supervisors solely. This places a greater responsibility and burden on supervisors who are not trained profe!!Bionally in the field of behavioral science.

Additionally, there is a greater risk of not identifying the potential risk by the supervisor.

The behavicral reliability program would be seriously compromised without a pre-employment psychological a1:Bessment. Without pre-employment psychological testing, the full burden of identifying reliability before employment would rest on the background investigation. If the background investigation process were totally without fault, this

• "single safety net" approach would be sufficient. However, in reality, the background investigation process is not going to screen out all individuals who represent a risk to the safety and health of the public. It seems imprudent to attempt to protect the public with one safety net, when a two-tier pre-employment screening procedure is available.

The deficiencies of background checks without reference to a psychological or behavioral data are well documented in literature. Background checks suffer from many pitfalls as pre-employment screening strategies. OWens (1976) noted that unless a standardized questionnaire is used to obtain such biographical data, the background checks will prove laborious with often unreliable and usually lacking relevance to a given criterion. They are also expensive and time-consuming. In general, arrest records cannot be used in background checks on dishonesty and violence since they have an adverse impact on certain protected groups. Conviction records can be used if shown to be job-related. Due to recent privacy legislation, it is becoming difficult to obtain conviction records in many parts of the country. Furthermore, not all convictions are a matter of public record.

Finally, most crime is never detected. Consequently, job applicants might be potential employee criminals, but a background check without corroborating psychological data

Attachment 4.

• _.

would provide no clues to distinguish high risk applicants from low risk applicants. AB noted by Jones and Scruggs (1981), Background checks alone are not the most valid and reliable way to screen out potential employee criminals within nuclear facilities."

If the behavioral reliability and psychological a!:Bessment programs were eliminated and unescorted clearance decision-making would rest solely on the background investigation, there would be no checks and balances in the security program. Once a clearance has been granted, there would be no organized formal procedure for reevaluating the awropriatene!fi of continuing one1s cl~ce if the continual behavior observation program would be eliminated. Such a process ignores the fact that people do change with

• age and their environmental influences. Psychological assessment can effectively identify who those people are who would be most prone to these changes.

The following are PP&L figures for denial of clearance and the basis for this deniaL Eighty--nine individuals have been identified as potential security risks due to information gathered during the backgrouoo investigation. One hundred eighteen were identified as risks due to the psychological evaluation. Twenty-seven were identified for both psychological and backgrouoo investigation results. Twenty individuals have been referred under the Continual Behavior Observation Program. These figures clearly indicate the eff ectivene!fi of the three-tiered program. If the psychological evaluation and the continual behavior observation program were removed from the screening program, the potential exists for failllre to: (1) pre-identify and (2) to react to someone who has changed and may potentially be a security risk at a later date.

• 9. What kinds of individuals have been screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment? by the use of background investigations? by the use of behavior reliability programs?

Attachment 4 .

The use of psychological asse113ment by PP&.L has screened out persons who exhibited or showed proclivity to:

e hostile and aggressive behavior;

• drug er alcohol abuse;

• psychosis;

• psychopathic or criminal behavior;

• clinical depression.

PP&.L's backgrouoo investigation has primarily screened out individuals who have:

• been convicted of a felony er been convicted of lesser crimes indicating habitual criminal tendencies or habitual disregard for law and authority or have a history of significant misconduct;

• been or is a user of controlled substances without evidence of rehabilitation;

• .been er is a habitual user of alcohol and to exceg, without adequate evidence of rehabilitation;

• deliberatly omitted or falsified significant information.

Attachment 4 PP&L's behavioral reliability program has screened out individuals who have:

• showed a sharp decline in job performance;

• been inattentive and unable to follow instructions;

• showed emotional outbursts such as chronic crying;

• displayed aggres;ive behavior;

• been arrested and/or convicted for such offenses such as assault, disorderly conduct, indecent exposure, public drunkenness, driving while intoxicated, etc.;

• displayed exces;ive and debilitating fears relating to nuclear power;

• showed argumentative hostility towards authority;

• a.bused drug and/or alcohol.

10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

We are not aware of any management abuses of the screening process. The potential exists, however, for supervisors to maliciously refer an employee under a continual, behavior observation program. However, the safeguards discussed related to the infringement of civil liberties and the review procedures protect the individual from management a.buses.

' 11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

PP&L's screening program has been well received by both employees and contractor personnel.. Prior to the implementation of the PP&L screening program, the employee union was fully briefed on the program and endorsed it. All contractors are informed of the screening process during contract negotiations and the pare.meters of the screening program are contained in the terms of the contract. Educating both employee and contractor personnel on the program has contributed to acceptance and understanding of the program.

• Complaints are occasionally voiced regarding the time it takes to process a clearance by both employees and contractors. These complaints focus on the length of time to process a clearance (in some cases, 60 days) as opposed to being screened. Common complaints from contractor employees stem from being reprocessed from licensee to licensee and the differences among licensees' programs. Employees who were screened under a less stringent program and are subsequently reprocessed under a more intensive program occasionally voice some displeasure. Additionally, clinical evaluations .and subject interviews may ca.use anxiety for some individuals. However, to date no complaints have

• been ma.de against any aspect of PP&L's screening program. The proposed access authorization rule would have a positive effect on contractor employees with regard to transferring clearances. However, the proposed rule would have a negative effect in terms of extending the time to process the clearance.

Attachment 5 DESCRIPTION OF PP&L'S TEMPORARY CLEARANCE OPTIONS As discussed previously, the proposed rule would permit unscreened individuals unescorted access during cold shutdown; however, this option would not be available for multi-unit plants which have common systems. Therefore, PP&L strongly recommends the inclusion of a temporary clearance as an alternative to the cold shutdown option for multi-unit plants. The following is a description of the three options available for processing of a PP&L temporary clearance.

PP&L's cun-ent program allows for a temporary clearance for contractor personnel who need immediate access. This temporary clearance is only valid for 180 days. *our program has three options available for the awarding of a temporary clearance.

Option I is only available for vendor personnel whom we define as manufacturer representatives, technical representatives, equipment specialists, PP&L temporary hires foc administrative/light labor and management or supervisory personnel of companies holding contracts with PP&L. Excluded from this' group of vendor personnel are the crafts.,

• Option I requires submission of employment verification from the vend<X' to PP&L attesting to the fact that the vendor employee has been continuously employed with that vendor for a minimum period of three years. This documentation.

must also specifically state that the trustworthiness of the individual has been 'determined by a review of the individual's employment record.

Option II and m are available for all non-licensee employees.

Option II requires: 1) the succee:1ful completion of a psycho-logical evaluation; 2) submission of a signed and notarized letter of certification attesting that he/she has not committed certain acts that would otherwise preclude the granting of unescorted accef:B; 3) verification of the employee's current or last period of employment and reason for termination; and 4) the emp1oyee must provide a picture or other such appropriate identification to establish true identity at the time of completing the letter of certification.

Option m essentially allows transfer of unescorted access authorization or clearance within the previous 365 days in accordance with a program meeting ANSI NlS.17 standards and if no activities occun-ed while ,access was granted at that site which resulted in unescorted access/clearance being withdrawn or suspended for cause.

The non-licensee employee needs only to satisfy the requirements for any one of the above options but all requirements for that particular option must be satisfied.

ATTACHMENT 6 Detailed Comments on Hearing Requirement A. Introduction PP&L supports the concept that checks and balances must be included in an access authorization program to protect indivi-dual employees from arbitrary, capricious or other inappropriate actions by supervisors. This is particularly important since the proposed rule requires employers to acquire information which is not otherwise appropriate or relevant to the employment process; for example, credit history and certain criminal records. How-ever, PP&L believes it is unnecessary and impractical to mandate the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on all denials and revocations of clearances. We agree an applicant deserves noti~e to the extent this means a clear, concise explanation of the basis for the denial, suspension or revocation. It is also fair and reasonable to allow the employee to respond to the notice before a final decision is made. However, this can be accom-plished without a full evidentiary hearing.

B. Shifting Responsibility for Plant Safety PP&L believes it is important that ultimate respon-sibility for the safety of the plant remain with the licensee.

The proposed rule is intended to enhance protection of the public health and safety. The conceptual framework of the NRC's entire regulatory scheme is to place that responsibility on the licensee.,

By requiring a hearing before a third party, the proposed rule is taking this responsibility away from the licensee. As ex-plained below, there are alternatives available which adequately protect individual employees yet maintain ultimate responsi-

• bility for plant safety with the licensee where it belongs.

c. Practical Problems A formal review process with a full evidentiary hearing and all the elements of due process creates numerous practical problems. Foremost among these is the time involved. A com-plicated appeal process will almost invariably lead to long delays.

During these delays, the status of the employee and his ability to work is in limbo. Oftentimes it is impractical and expensive to have employees without clearances. They must either be escorted or given other jobs which they may be less qualified to perform. This problem increases as delays increase. It is important that the decision process be a prompt one.

ATTACHMENT 6 Timing is even more critical with respect to contractor employees. The shorter the project and the longer it takes to reach a decision on the status of a security clearance; the more likely the work will be done or significantly completed before the appeal is resolved. In such cases, the contractor cannot be certain whether or when the individual will be available. More-over, the right to appeal becomes useless if the employee's clearance is still being decided after the job is completed or he is laid off or transferred due to his unavailability. A contractor cannot face a long review process where the avail-ability of its employees is uncertain.

In addition, requiring an evidentiary hearing consonant with fundamental principles of due process raises a whole series of collateral issues. Is there a right to discovery? Is there subpoena power? If so, by whom? Who is an appropriate arbitra-tor? What if the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator? Is an arbitrator's decision appealable? To whom?

D. Protection of Rights Already Available If an employee is subjected to improper action, the employee has other avenues to pursue these rights. There is no justification for creating new ones. Any member of a union has the opportunity to bargain for whatever contractual protections he feels are applicable under the circumstances. Individual consultants and contractors are in a similar position. The NRC should not impose requirements which would restrict these parties' freedom to agree with the licensee on a mutually satisfactory process to review security clearance decisions. In addition, all individuals are protected by federal and in many cases state laws against certain acts by their employers. If any of these contractual or legal rights are infringed upon, the employee is free to pursue the appropriate remedy. To the extent individuals are not protected by contracts or are employees at will and none of their legal rights are violated, the hearing process may not afford them significant additional protection. An employer can discharge the individual regardless of whether a clearance is ultimately granted. Thus, changing Section 73.56(g) by retain-ing only the first sentence should protect employees without imposing requirements which present practical problems and will not in most cases add any significant protection.

E. Alternatives The primary ~ationale for requiring a hearing is to protect employees from unreasonable actions by their super-visors. It is generally agreed that submission of an issue to an independent third party will result in a fair d~cision. How-ATTACHMENT 6 ever, this third party need not be independent of the company.

If the appeal process is totally insulated from the employee's normal management, supervisory process,1/ the risk of polluting the security clearance process with nonsecurity related consider-ations is minimized. Thus, the employee is protected, yet the practical problems of a lengthy review process are avoided.

If the employee's superiors are unaware of the details and are not involved in the process, they cannot use this infor-mation inappropriately. For example, in PP&L's program, all security clearance applications and decisions are handled by the Corporate Security Department. Supervisors are not involved except pursuant to their responsibilities under the continual behavioral observation program. Even then, if aberrant behavior is noted by a supervisor, Corporate Security is notified and handles the case.2/ PP&L supports a review procedure which allows the employee the opportunity to appeal the denial deci-sion. However, the procedures or process of an appeal should be left to the licensee's discretion subject to NRC review and approval. In PP&L's procedures, if adverse information is developed which is significant enough to be considered relevant to the denial criteria, the employee is first interviewed to acquire "his side of the story." The case is forwarded to the Legal Department for review to assess sufficiency of the case.

The case is then reviewed by the Executive Vice President-Operations for his determination to grant or deny the clearance.

PP&L's appeal procedures require notice to the employee of the denial decision, a description of the basis for the decision and an outline of the appeal process available. If the clearance is denied by the Executive Vice President-Operations, an employee may appeal the decision to the Executive Vice President-Corporate Services, within ten days. In the event the clearance denial decision is affirmed by the Executive Vice President-Corporate Services, the employee is informed by certified letter and is 1/ As explained below, this would not be the case if a union grievance procedure is used.

2/ Where behavior is noted which could be both a supervisory problem and the basis for revoking a clearance, the issues are handled separately. For example, if during an emotional outburst an employee were to make general threats against the Company, Corporate Security would investigate the matter to determine whether the employee's security clearance should be revoked. Through a separate process, supervisory personnel would determine whether disciplinary action was appropriate. Conceivably, Corporate Security could conclude that the security clearance should not be revoked, but management decide to discharge the individual as a result of the incident.

ATTACHMENT 6 given an opportunity to appeal to the President and Chief Executive Officer within ten calendar days following receipt of the letter. An appeal to the President and Chief Executive Officer must be presented in writing. Decisions of the President and Chief Executive Officer are considered fina1.3/

This appeal process does several things. First, by isolating the security clearance process from the employee's supervisors, it protects employees against misuse of personal information. Second, it provides a prompt, efficient but inde-pendent and, therefore, fair process for reviewing denials or revocations of security clearances. Third, it retains the ulti-mate responsibility for safety of the plant where it belongs; with the licensee. If an externa+ third party such as an arbi-trator decides an individual should have a clearance over the objection of the utility, the licensee is going to be respons-ible for something it has no control over. Moreover, an inde-

• pendent third party review process internal to the Company but isolated from the normal management chain has clear precedent in other areas. Both the quality assurance and nuclear safety assessment groups provide an independent review function by reporting to senior management while still retaining overall responsibility with the licensee.

F. Conclusion While PP&L does not believe in curtailing employees' rights purely for the sake of an expeditious process, it is clear a balance must be struck. PP&L maintains that the type of appeal process provided for in its current plan balances fairly the interests of both employees and the licensee. Complicated time-consuming appeals will not significantly increase an employee's protection. In most cases, they would only create frustration as well as additional cost and inconvenience for both employees and the licensee.

3/ The following figures exemplify how well PP&L's appeal process has worked. To date, 29 employees have initially been denied a security clearance, 9 appealed the decision, and 2 of the 9 were subsequently granted a clearance based on their appeals. The appeal process for contractor person-nel is somewhat different from the employee program but it has provided similar results. A total of 102 contractor personnel have been initially denied a security clearance, 30 appealed the decision, and 21 of the 30 were subsequently granted a clearance based on their appeals.

ATTACHIIENT 7 Detailed Comments on Collective Bargaining Process A. Introduction For the reasons set forth in Attachment 6, a "full evidentiary hearing" which is "consonant with fundamental principles of due process" is unnecessary and impractical in many circumstances. Regardless of whether the Commission ultimately adopts this view, we strongly urge that any reference to the collective bargaining process be deleted from both the supplementary information portion of the rule and particularly Section 73.56(g) and the Regulatory Guide.

The intended goal of protecting employees against arbitrary actions by employers can be achieved with the first sentence of paragraph g. Otherwise this regulation will give

(

unionized employees contractual rights which were never agreed upon by the parties. Perhaps more significantly, it indirectly leads to the very evil the Commission is trying to avoid. Due to the practical mechanics of the grievance process, it can foster use of the security clearance process for other purposes.

While many collective bargaining agreements have provisions for notice and hearings before a neutral arbitrator, using this process for appealing security clearance decisions will create many more problems than it solves. It may appear on the surface to be a convenient vehicle to adopt. Closer examination reveals serious flaws.

B. Conflict with NLRA The proposed rule is inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and national labor policy. If the denial or revocation of a security clearance is not grievable under a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may have negotiated that issue specifically. Imposing an NRC review requirement is inconsistent with the NLRA.

C. Practical Problems Arising From Nature of Grievance Process The proposed rule fails to recognize that many, if not most, collective bargaining agreements provide for several steps in the grievance process. These often include meetings among the employee, a shop steward or other union representative, the employee's supervisor, as well as other managers. Meetings of this nature to discuss a security clearance are totally inappro-priate for several reasons. First, it is an unnecessary and

ATTACHMENT 7 unwarranted intrusion into the personal affairs of the employee.

There is a great deal of very personal information which is relevant to the issuance of a security clearance. This informa-tion, however, is often not only irrelevant to any other aspect of the individual's employment but is, in fact, improper to be inquired into by the employer. The grievance process will very likely lead to disclosure of this personal information to many individuals who have neither a need nor a right to acquire it.

It greatly increases the risk this information, not otherwise available to an employer, will either advertently or inadver-tently affect the employee's employment outside of the security clearance context. This is inconsistent with the Commission's conclusion that "information of a sensitive nature and personal records, resulting from the application of this rule, should be handled with discretion and disseminated to persons, other than the individual involved, or his representive, only if they have a legitimate 'need to know' in administering the access author-

• ization program." It also discourages employees from pursuing review of the initial decision.

If the revocation or denial of a security clearance is subject to the grievance procedure, presumably it is also subject to collective bargaining and a basis for picketing, strikes and other labor activity. Politicizing the security clearance program in this manner would be totally inappropriate.

Application of the denial criteria to an individual employee should not be subject to the scrutiny of third parties who are not directly involved in the process.

Using the grievance procedure under a collective bargaining agreement to the review of a denial or revocation permits withdrawal of an employee's appeal at one of the earlier stages prior to a hearing if the union chooses not to pursue the case. This appears inconsistent with the proposed requirement of a full evidentiary hearing. If the NRC extends this to allow contractor employees to seek review of a revocation or denial through their collectively bargained grievance procedure, the licensee would not be a party to that collective bargaining agreement.1/ Enforcement against a non-party licensee would be questionable. Further, the contractor would not have the power to compel the licensee to issue a security clearance.

1/ If the licensee is made a party to the collective bargaining agreement, this could create a "co-employer" relationship.

I* ...,..1 ATTACIDlENT 7 Labor arbitrators are generally unfamiliar with security issues. Consequently, a greater potential exists for inconsistencies in application of denial criteria. In addition, arbitration will foster different standards for union and non-union employees. Grievances are also very expensive and time consuming. Grievance costs for PP&L vary between $3,000 and

$11,000 per grievance. Grievances can take years to resolve and the system is already taxed with pending grievances. For contractor personnel involved in short-term projects, the grievance process may be completed months to years after the work is finished. With little downside risk to the individual employee, and at least the possibility for back pay, frivolous grievances would be encouraged; thereby increasing arbitration costs for both labor and management as well as causing addi-tional delays.

If a licensee and union agree that review of a revo-

• cation or denial should be subject to the grievance procedure of their collective bargaining agreement, it should be permitted.

However, no licensee should be required to use a grievance pro-cedure for such review. The NRC should not interfere with the collective bargaining process by looking to the grievance pro-cedure as an adequate review procedure.

D. ,Conclusion For these reasons, PP&L maintains the rule should not contain any reference to the collective bargaining process.

While we see no need to bar the use of this process as a means to fulfill the requirements of the first sentence of §73.56, assuming the union and the employer agree; we believe the current language could be construed as mandating it. Utilities, unions, and contractors should be left considerably more freedom to decide what process is best to satisfy this requirement

• 0 Wisconsin Electr,c Powrn coMPAN Y 231 W. MICHIGAN , P.O. BOX 2046 , MILWAUKEE, WI 5320 1 March 5, 1985 Secretary to the Commission U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

• COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES PART 73 PERSONNEL ACCESS AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION This letter and its attachments are submitted by Wisconsin Electric Power Company, the owner and operator of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in response to proposed rules as published in the Federal Register, Volume 49, No. 149 dated Wednesday, August 1, 1984, regarding personnel access authorization requirements.

Wisconsin Electric, as a member of the KMC Inc. Physical Security Coordinating Group, has participated in a comprehensive review of the proposed NRC rules on access authorization and related miscellaneous amendments concerning physical protection of nuclear power plants and the related regulatory guides.

Wisconsin Electric generally endorses the KMC Group's comments which have been submitted to NRC. Nevertheless, we are submitting herewith separate additional comments that pertain to the proposed rules (Attachment A). Among other things, these separate Wisconsin Electric comments respond to the Commission's questions listed on pages 30730 and 30731 of the Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 149.

These comments also identify specific sections of the proposed rules which Wisconsin Electric does not agree with and offer potential alternative wording for these sections.

Aside from our Attachment A comments, Wisconsin Electric, as a general matter, feels strongly that the proposed regulatory guide on access authorization is too prescriptive in defining procedures for compliance with the proposed rule. The proposed regulatory guide also appears to be in potential conflict with certain Wisconsin laws and the NRC's previously approved Point Beach Nuclear Plant security plan. It too severely impinges on management prerogatives and current successful company polic y ~~

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U.& NUClEAR lfiGULA101Y llOGKETING & SEWla OFFICr: OF THE ru-nriral!l.v OF THE CO Document Statistics Fmlmark Date E f<;/fJs-Copie.s Received I

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Secretary to the Commission-NRG March 5, 1985 The recent development of proposed guidelines for an industry-wide nuclear power plant access authorization program by the NUMA.RC Working Group on Access Authorization, we believe, provides a more viable method for implementing the proposed NRC rule. A copy of the Working Group's proposed guidelines is attached (Attachment B). We urge the adoption of these NUMA.RC guidelines by the NRC.

As a related matter, on February 24, 1977, the NRC published 10 CFR 73.55 "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." This proposed rule includes requirements for countering the "insider threat," for access control measures for protected and vital areas and for control measures for recording entries and exits at vital areas. Wisconsin Electric or KMC Inc. previously identified several problems with the proposed rule and submitted petitions for rule making. The subjects of these petitions are listed on Attachment C.

Wisconsin Electric believes that the concerns expressed in these petitions continue to exist; we point out that they have not as yet been acted upon. Depending upon the outcome of the current rule making effort, no*action other than dismissal may be required. If, however, the subjects of the petitions continue to be applicable, we request favorable NRC response.

Very truly yours, T. J. Cassidy/tmf Senior Vice President Attachments

ATTACHMENT A COMMENTS ON PART 73

§73.56 PERSONNEL ACCESS AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT$ FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS COMMENTS ON SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION Protected and Vital Area Access Program Wisconsin Electric supports the Corrmission 1 s recorrmendation that one access authorization program should be applicable to both the protected and vital areas providing that the licensee may devitalize specific areas during cold shutdown as defined on page 30727.

Commission Statement on Proposed Rule - Psychological Assessment and Behavioral Observation Elements The Commission expressed reservation regarding the inclusion of psychological assessment and behavioral observation as elements in the proposed access authorization rule. Wisconsin Electric Power Company has a psychological assessment program and a behavioral observation program for its Point Beach Nuclear Plant employees. We consider these programs to be e, effective in identifying and deterring aberrant behavior. It is our opinion that the inclusion of psychological assessment and behavioral observation in the proposed access authorization rule would increase the quality of personnel in the nuclear industry in terms of trustworthiness and reliability. The rule and its supporting guide, however, should not become overly prescriptive.

There are a variety of techniques and methods that are sound and professionally acceptable that could be used for these purposes. The rule and the supporting guide should give facilities ample latitude to employ these techniques with which the psychologist or psychiatrist is most familiar and best trained to use.

Psychological Assessment The section on psychological assessment is adequately stated in the rule. The interpretation of three elements within this section de~erves corrment.

1.) Personality tests to be used and proof of validity.

2.) The qualifications of those who interpret the personality tests or conduct psychological evaluation.

3.) The criteria or definitions of behavioral reliability.

1.) Most nuclear facilities use the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Some nuclear stations use one or any combi-nation of the following tests: t+1PI, California Psychological Inventory, 16 Personality Factors, and the Thurstone Tempennent Scale. The NRC NUREG/CP-2075 recorrmends the MMPI, 16PFt CPI and situational tests be used.

There are many different techniques that would be acceptable. The supporting guide to the proposed access authorization rule should allow nuclear facilities to 'choose among a variety of professionally acceptable techniques

• and tests.

The rule also states, 11 Tests *** shall have been proven to be valid *** 11 Proof of validity of a psychological test for predicting aperrant behavior in a nuclear facility is practically impossible. To conduct a criterion-related validation study would require at least some incidence of employee behavior that is detrimental to public health and safety. For many facilities there have been no such cases. The rule should ~elete the 11 proof of validity" requirement.

2.) The access authorization rule and the supporting guide should not detail the qualifications of a psychologist or psychiatrist who is to be

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involved in psychological assessment. It would be best for the Commission to define "qualified" as that which is consistent with professional standards as specified by the American Psychological Association.

3.) If a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist is to interpret tests or conduct a clinical interview, they must make their predictions for a specific, detailed set of criteria or behaviors. In order to provide a clear

• picture of the types of behaviors that are to be predicted, some behavioral examples are needed. The criteria found in NUREG/CR-2076 addresses this issue.

The criteria of behavioral reliability is the most critical element in the-section on psychological assessment. These definitions should be retained in the guide to the access authorization rule to help standardize the assessment process and to provide consistency among those who are interpreting tests and conducting clinical interviews *

• Continual Behavioral Observation Program The section on continual behavioral observation program in the proposed access authorization rule is adequately written. The Supervisor's Guide to Observing Behavioral Changes in Appendix C should be deleted. The inclusion of Appendix C in the proposed rule gives a misleading impression as to the nature of a behavioral reliability program; it implies or suggests that supervisors are to evaluate insignificant and incidental behaviors to pass judgment on one's behavioral reliability. This is not the case. In fact, the training 'program outlined in NUREG/CR-2076 instructs supervisors to avoid falling into the role of an amateur psycholgist. They are taught to observe behavior and to pass on important information to qualified professionals.

Colllllission Questions for Specific Public Corrment The Commission noted in the proposed access authorization rule a particular interest in receiving public response to the following ~leven questions.

1.) To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rule already in place in the co~ercial power reacto_r industry? To what extent are psychological assessments and behavioral reliability programs already used by the QUclear industry as part of employee

• screening programs?

Answer:

employment screening.

Most utility security plans include some sort of pre-Programs and practices vary widely. Some utilities conduct a clinical interview for every individual; some utilities administer the J,V,tPI as a screening tool and conduct the clinical interview only in those cases where abnormal personality traits are detected. Other utilities use a very cursory psychological assessment or no assessment at all. The use of background investigation is quite conman.

Although many utilities claim to have a behavioral reliability program in place, many of these programs are not formalized to the extent of that which is outlined in NUREG/CR-2076.

2.) What purposes are being _served by the use of psychologica*l assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psycholgical assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Answer: Psychological assessment can be adopted to fit different

.criteria. It can be used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or the more broader criteria specified in NUREG/CR-2076.

Psychological assessment is particularly helpful in detecting individuals who may corrmit serious acts which would endanger public health and safety (e.g.,

' ~

sabotage). Psychological assessment can also provide infonnation ~n substance abuse. There is a special MMPI scale (McAndrews) to detect the probability of substance abuse. Applicants who are apt to colTITlit radiological sabotage are very few in number. Although it is the most severe and significant act that must be detected, it is also the most rare. An act of almost equal significance, yet highly more probably, is the unintentional act that an

• • employee may co1TJTJit which places the p1ant in danger. Psychological evaluation can help predict or identify individuals with personalities that are overly compulsive, highly paranoid, impulsive, risk takers, etc.

1 The mos_t corrmon personality temperament that is rej,ected from nuclea~ plants through psychological assessment is the aggressive individual who has disregard for rules, atrthority and an orderly approach to tasks. Such an individual is a misfit in the highly structured nuclear setting and psychological assessment provides a valuable service in detecting such an it:idividual.

3.) What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberit1es associated with each of the components of the proposed access I

authorization rule?* The Corrmission is a1so interested* in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have adequately demon-strated to outweight the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

Answer: All screening and investigation procedures infringe on an individual 1 s privacy to a certain degree. Items of concern regarding civil liberties include confidentiality of information and appropriate handling of such information. This should not be of particular concern as the nuclear industry is quite experiened in handling sensitive information. The proposed access authorization rule in the section titled Protection of Information" 11 adequately covers this point.

4.) ;What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall

• , clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessments by'.licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

Answer:* Although the MMPI is widely used as a screening tool for assessing emotional stability for nuclear power plants, there is limited research aadressing its validity in this setting. ~owever, one study conducted by F. B. Martenis and D. G. Thompson, from the Marathon Corporation

- Associates for Nuclear Psycho.logical Services, does show* favorable and significant results for the MMPI and the clinical interview as psychological assessment techniques for screening nuclear personnel.

5.) What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical

• psychological assessment that *_relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? W~at percentage of false positives or false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected fron using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Answer: Research sponsored by the Edison Electric Ins.itute and noted in NUREG/CR-2076 include five criteria of behavioral reliability.

These are:

1. Argumentative Hostility Towards Authority

2. Irresponsibility/Impulsivity

3. Defensive Incompetence

4. Substance Abuse

5. Emotional Adaptability (Psychopathology)

(Note~ See NUREG/CR-2076 for full definitions of the criteria.)

Two of the above mentioned criteria, #1 and #5, relate directly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage. Criteria #2, #3, and #4 relate more to the prevention of unintentional acts and errors.

Reports fron nuclear facilities using psychological assessment indicate that for every 1,000 individuals screened in, one person will lose their unescorted access for some unreliable act. It should be noted that this rate of Type I error (false positfve) may actually be less since it is possible that some of the employees started to have problems subsequent to being bired (e.g., marital, substance abuse, etc.).

Type II error (false negative) is more difficult to measure as this reflects the numer of individuals who have been screened out who would have caused no problems on the job. Generally, it must be assumed that Type II error is greater than Type I error because in order to keep Type I error ti extremely low, some degree of Type II error will occur.

The combined use of background investigation, psychological assessment and continual observation is the most effective means of screening and maintaining behavioral relability. These techniques are well established and can be conducted by qualified professionals. We are unaware of other available techniques or problems.

6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the coll1!lercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence'which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

Answer: The incidence of radiological sabotage is essentially non-existent; however, the consequences of such are devastating.

Psychological assessment, background investigation and behavioral ~liability programs should not hinge their justification solely on the basis of radiological sabotage. Psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs also help to identify individuals who are more likely to be involved in unintentional events or accidents, who are likely to have difficulty in adjusting to a heavy regulated work environment and who have a history of

• being involved in events less catastrophic than sabotage, but which include theft, vandalism, deliberate accidents and so on.

7.) Can the use of psychological assessment 'in the co11111erical nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and r,adiological sabotage concerns?

Answer: Psychological assessment can address both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage. The McAndrews scale of the MMPI measures chemical dependency; however, medical: tests of the blood and urine are much more accurate for this purpose *

• 8.) To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behaviorial reliability program be effected without preemployment psychological assess-ment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of the screening program, i.e.,

if only background investigations were adopted?

Answer: Psychological assessment is the initial detector regarding the applicant 1 s current psychological condition, and it also makes some predictions as to whether the individual may be apt to co1TDTiit unreliable acts in the future. Psychological assessment depends upon sound professional techniques that are interpreted by professiona1s. A behavioral reliability program, on the other hand, falls on the shoulders of supervision and plant management. In a behavioral reliability program, supervisors are fnstructed not to evaluate or diagnose behavior. They are to observe job perfonnance and pay particular attention to deviations from the employee s typical behavior.

1 Since supervisors are trained to detect changes in behavior, it is essential that employees coming into t~e plant be initially screened in order to provide assurance to supervisors that new hires are competent and emotionally stable.

• In addition, psychological assessment is also a component within a behavioral re1iability program to be used in those cases when a supervisor observes unusual and atypical behavior and requires professional assistance to evaluate the individual.

Background investigations without the use of psychological assessment would raise the rate of Type I error. This would *be most pronounced in the low paying jobs where the incidence of personality problems are more prevalent. To omit the behavioral reliabilfty program would be a disservice to the employees themselves. A main element of a behavioral

• ., reliability program is an employee assistance problem which provides prfessional help to troubled employees so that they may return to their normal levels of performance. In essence. behavioral reliability programs are early detection programs. Without such a program, a troubled employee can go undetected; his problems may compound and result in an act which could result in termination of employment.

9.) What kinds of individuals have been "screened out 11 of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment~ by the use of background investigation, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

- 9 *-

Answer: Psychological assessment can identify individuals who have the following types of behavior:

-aggressive or violent behavior

-drug or alcohol abuse

-lack of temper control

-hositle or destructive acts

-violating rules and orderly procedures

-inability to handle stress

• -impulsiveness

-emotional problems.

Background investigations screen out individuals who have been involved in the following:

-falsification of records

-drug and alcohol abuse

-temper problems

-criminal convictions

-severe financial problems

• -past employment problems.

Behaviorial reliability programs can identify individuals who:

-have substance abuse problems

-serious lack of attention problems, memory problems

-excessive fear of radiation

-emotional breakdowns

-inability or unwillingness to follow instructions

-severe personality change related to impaired ability to function on the job.

10. What examples, if any, exist of man~gement abuse of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigation and behavioral reliability programs?

Answer: We are unaware of any abuses concerning these components.

Most utilities use a system of checks and balances as well as an appeal process to prevent abuses.

11.) How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access

• authorization rules?

Answer: Our experience has been that unions generally have -some concerns about psychological testing. However, the behavioral reliability program was well received at Wisconsin Electrjc since union representatives were able to clearly see the advantages to their membership.

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED 173.56 General Performance Objective and Requirements (Para (b), page 30773).

Under this subsection of the proposed regulation, licensees are required to establish and maintain an access authorization program which has as its objective preventing unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands to those individuals "whose history *** (among other things) indicates(s) a potential for collll1itting acts that are inimical to the public health and safety or present a danger to left or property. 11 In furtherance of this general requirement, licensees are required to have and maintain an 11 unescorted access authorization program" which shall include a 11 background investigation. 11 Subsection (b)(l) further provides that: 11 The (licensees) background investigation program shall be designed to identify past actions that would be predictive of an individual's future reliability within a protected area of a DUClear power plant."

Subsection (3) of the proposed regulation provides that 11 in making a determination under this section for the denial, revocation or suspension of access authorization based upon data derirved from a background in~estigation.

the licensees shall consider whether the individual: *** (iv) has been convicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses indicating habitual criminal tendencies .** "

The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, as amended, Sections 111.31-111.395, Wis. Stat., prohibits discrimination on the basis of 11 conviction record. 11 The WFEA defines "conviction record 11 to include 11 information indicating than an individual has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense, has been adjudicated delinquent, has been less than honorably discharged, or has been placed on probation, fined, imprisoned or paroled pursuant to any law enforcement or military authority." Section 111.32(3}, Wjs. Stats. Section 111.322, Wis. Stat., generally states that it is an act of employment discrimination in violation of the WFEA to refuse to hire, employ, to bar or terminate from employment any individual because of his or her conviction record. Section lll.335{c), Wis. Stat., provides that

• "notwithstanding §111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of con-viction record to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or tenninate from employment **. , any individual who:

1. Has been convicted of any felony. misdemeanor other other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job .. . n There is a potential conflict between the language of the proposed regulation and the requirements of the WFEA as noted above, as the proposed regulation requires the denial, revocation or suspension of access authorization in the case of any individual who "has been convicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses indicating habitual criminal tendencies,"

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and the "substantial relationship test 11 embodied in the WFEA at Se~tion 111.335(c), Wis. Stats.

Reconmendation Specifically provide in the regulations that any state law(s) and/or regulation{s) concerning discrimination of the basis of conviction record(s) are preempted *

• Background Investigation (Para (c) , page 30773)

In the supplementary information, the NRC states that "under the proposed requirements, licensees will also be responsible for ensuring that indivi.duals granted access to protected areas and vital islands report any information arising later that may have a bearing on their screened status (e.g., a subsequent*conviction}: 0 If an individual reports, as required, a conviction, hospitalization or other incident that may cause a significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the individual and may have an

• adverse impact on the safe operations of the plant and public health and safety, the licensee may have no other choice than to terminate the individual., Obviously, it is not in the best interest of the individual to report a conviction or other incident that could result in his/her termination from employment.

It appears that the licensee access authorization program, that is comprised of the background investigation, psychological assessment and continued behavioral observation elements, provides reasonable assurance that the intent of this rule is met. The additional requirement of ensuring that the individual granted unescorted access report any information later that may

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have a bearing on their screened status is very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce and should not be included in the rule.

RecolTl!lend Delete last sentence, para (c) page 30773, "The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

Detection of Drug Addiction and Alcohol Abuse (new para)

Many in9ividuals who abuse alcohol or drugs are never arrested nor convicted. Employers or character references either are unable to detect alcohol or drug abuse or are unwilling to reveal that the individual is an abuser of alcohol or drugs. Therefore, the background investigation by itself does not ide~tify all past or present actions that would be predictive of an e:

- ~,

individual's future reliability within a protected area or vital island of a nuclear power plant.

The psychological assessment program can measure for chemical dependency; however, the measurement may indicate that the individual could be prone to dependency on alcohol or drugs under certain conditions but not that the individual 1s presently abusing alcohol or drugs.

The continued behavioral observation program is based on the observance of changes in job performance, work and personal habits, and other changes in the 'individual's "normal" behavioral patterns. However, to-detect any change, the observor must know what are the individual's "nonnal 11 behavioral patterns. If a new employee joins the plant workforce w_ith an existing drug or alcohol abuse problem, it may take some time to determine that the individual's daily behavior is abnonnal. The observation program may also detect a change in an individual's 11 nonnal 11 behaviorial patterns, but verification will be needed to determine if the change is due to alcohol or drug abuse.

Medical examinations and testing for alcohol and drug abuse is an 1* essential procedure to employ with the background investigation, psychological assessment and continual behaviorial observation programs for providing reasonable assurance that the licensee meets the general performance objective and requirements of this proposed rule.

Recmrmend Add new Paragraph (f} Detection of drug and alcohol abuse and change subsequent paragraph letter designations accordingly.

Individuals shall have no established medical history or medical diagnosis of alcohol or drug abuse, or where such a condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of assurance that the individual will be capable of perfonning his/her assigned duties in manner that assures the public health and safety and prevents a da~ger to life or property. The l,icensee shall provide for medical examinations and tests, in accordance with acceptable medical practices and standards, to detect evidence of drug or alcohol abuse prior to the granting of unescorted access to pro-tected areas and vital islands and for verifying suspected alcohol or drug abuse by individuals that has been detected through the psychological assessment or the continual behavioral observation programs.

Review Procedures {para (g) page 30774)

Subsection (g) requires that the licensee 1 s access authorization

'l plan must include a procedure for the review of a denial or revocat.ion of an

• access authorization of an employee of the licensee, contractor, or supplier that has'an adverse effect on the individual's employment. The regulation further requires that the procedure must provide "notice and an opportunity for a fair evidentiary hearing and be consonant with fundamental principles of due process."

The regulations fail to specify what is to be included in a fair 11 evidentiary hearing 11 and precisely what kind of fair evidentiary hearing would be 11 consonant with fundamental principles of due process. 11 The proposal for review procedures for contractor and supplier personnel may place the licensee in a position of making a management decision for non-employees and, therefore, also place the licensee in a co-employer status. The co-employer status is an unacceptable position for this company.

Reco1T1J1endation Since there are existing avenues for appeals pertaining to alleged

.: unfair labor practices, this requirement should be deleted.

COMMENTS ON PART 73 MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

§73.55 Requirements for physical proteGtion of licensed activities :;n nuclear power reactors against radiologial sabotage.

The proposed change to the rule requires that 11

• • • each licensee shall submit proposed amendments to his security plan which define how the amendment vital island designation and protection requirements of paragraphs (a), (c)(l), (c)(2), (d){2), (d)(7), {d)(9), (e)(l) and (3) and (h}(4) will be

• met. Each submittal shall include a proposed implementation schedule for ColTillission approval. 11 Wisconsin Electric currently has an NRC approved security plan, security equipment and implementing procedures for the protection of vital equipment. This overall protection program has been tested by the licensee and inspected by the NRC. The program has proven to be successful for the protection of vital equipment. We do not believe that it is necessary to change an approved and validated security program.

Recoornendation Change paragraph to read: "By (120 days from the effective date of this amendment or 120 days after receipt of a Conmission provided site specific vital area review, whichever is later) each licensee proposing to combine vital areas within vital islands shall submit. II 573.55 (c) Physical barriers (1}, page 30737 At present, the vital areas are identified in the site security plan.

These vital areas were established through studies by NRC and WE of the PBNP site specific locations of vital equipment. The NRC reviewer for the site security plan approved the final selection of vital areas.

The proposed rule specifies areas that shall be designated as vital areas without any consideration for the variety of plant configurations and the vulnerabilities or lack of vulnerabilities associated with the specific site. The present method of individually reviewing the specific location of vital equipment in relation to the overall protection afforded by the construction of the plant, as well as the defense in depth concept for the protection of the vital equipment, is the most practical method for designating and providing security procedures for vital areas.

Recommend Delete last sentence, "The licensee shall protect, as independent vital islands, onsite alternating and direct current emergency power sources (excluding electric distribution system} required to permit functioning of structures, systems and components important to safety, primary reactor containment, the reactor control room, central alarm station and onsite water

• supplies (excluding piping} required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standby

• 11 173.55 (d)(7)(i)(A), page 30737 The proposed rule requires the establishment of 11 access lists 11 for each vital island. The term 11 list 11 may imply that a written log for each vital island is required.

At present, the names of the personnel who are authorized access to a vital areas are entered into the access control system computer and physical controls to the vital areas are maintained via the ID/card reader issued to each auhtorized person.

Recommen.d Change wording to reflect that either a procedure {i.e. sign-in log) or computer controlled system are required to meet the intent of tKe rule.

11

{A) Es tab 1i sh current authorization tte-e-s-s-.::i1-st-s procedures or systems for each vital island. The -aeee5-s-*.::i-1-st-s procedures or systems must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least every 31 days. The licensee shall include -E>fl-~-Re--&££ess-~4-s-t in the procedure or system on 1y *** 11 11 (8) Positively control, in accordance with the u££-ess-~45~-procedure or system esti'iblish *** 11

§73.70 Records, page 30737 Paragraph (d) of the proposed rule requires that a log be maintained to indicate time of entry, reason for entry and time of exit of all individuals. Paragraph (i)(D){ii) requires the licensee to NDesign the access

• . authorization system to accomodate the potential need for rapid ingress or egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions. 11 Wisconsin Electric et al filed a petition for rule change on December 2, 1981 requesting that the log out requirement at nuclear power plants be eliminated because the 11 requirement not only is unnecessary from a safety standpoint, but may be detrimental to safe plant shutdown and effective plant response to other emergencies." This petition has been assigned NRC Docket Number PRM-73-7. It appears that if the proposed rule is changed to eliminate the log-out requirment, the 'intent of paragraph (i)(D}(ii} will also be met.

The proposed paragraph (d) to §13.70 applies to all vital islands except those individuals entering or exiting the reactor control room. The

~

proposed rule appears to be a requirement that the licensee will not* include access controls for the control room. At PBNP, access to the control room has always been closely monitored and only thos~ oersons viith a Peed to be in the control room are granted access.

Recommend Change !73.70 Records {d) to read: A procedure or system indicating

• name, badge number, time of entry and authorization for entry to all indivi-duals granted access to a vital island. The licensee may waive this require ment for those individuals entering the reactor control room.

~73.5~-(d) Access Requirements (l)~page 30739 On August 19, 1977 a petition was filed with the NRC by Wisconsin Electric, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company and Wisconsin Public Service Company to eliminate the requirement for "pat-down" searches of individuals entering a protected areas. The petition was published in the Federal

• Register on September 15, 1977.

The proposed rule on Access Requirements states that all persons (employees, contractors and visitors) except for bonafide federal, state and local law enforcement personnel are subject to a search by firearms, explosive and incendiary detectors prior to entry to the protected area. The proposed rule further states that. "However, firearms or explosives detection equipment at .a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches." Under these conditions, regular plant employees, cleared in accordance with approved clearance procedures

' or the proposed rule for unescorted access, would be subject to the 11 pat-down 11 search prior to entry.

Reconvnend Change paragraph S73.55(d) Access Requirements to read: 11 The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and

• incendiary devices shall be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection ~quipment capable of detecting those devices. The.-

licensee shall subject all persons except bonafide federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a protecte~ area. For visitors without authorized unescorted access or when the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce contraband, firearms, explosives~ or incendiary devices into protected areas, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of that individual. However, when firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portal is out of service or- not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a five-percent random physical pat-down search for four hours following the equipment outage and 100% pat-down search thereafter of all persons, other than regular plant employees granted unescorted access, plant security officers, and bonafide federal state and'local law enforcement personnel on official duty, who would have been subject to equipment searches. The individual responsible *** 11 A I I Al..HMl:.N I tl GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM 1.0 PURPOSE To support the safe operation of licensed nuclear power plants. utili-ties will implement an access authorization program in accordance with the following guidelines. These guidelines have been designed with the intent to provide reasonable assurance that personnel granted unescorted access authorization to the protected and vital areas of utility nuclear power plants are trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat to* public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel. Individual utilities may have additional requirements.

• • 2.0, SCOPE These guidelines define the acceptable levels for conducting and evaluating the elements of-the screening program; provide evaluation criteria for the determination of access authorization; provide pro-

. visions for accepting unescorted access autho.rization from other utilities; allow for a waiver of screening requirements for personnel who have three years continuous employment; include a grandfathering of personnel who were previously screened; address continual behavior observation program requirements; and discuss records maintenance and evaluation and audits of the access authorization program to assure compliance with the intent of the utility's unescorted access authorization program. ,

• 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY The final granting and controlling of unescorted access authorization is the responsibility of the utility. The utilities are responsible to audit the non-utilities, who conduct their own screening and/or implement continual behavior observation programs, to assess com-pliance with these guidelines. Each utility is responsible for having an independent evaluation conducted of its program in ac~or-dance with these guidelines.

4.0 APPLICABILITY These guidelines applies to all utilities and to the contractors and vendors who provide services at the utility's nuclear power plants.

These guidelines will be implemented on {date)

One level of unescorted access authorization will be granted to personnel who have been processed in accordance with these guide-lines. Unescorted access authorization will allow access to both protected and vital areas, as needed, for all personnel.

5.0 SCREENING PROGRAM Initiation of a Screening Program No element of the screening program shall be initiated with-out the knowledge and written consent of the person who is subject to such screening. The applicant for unescorted access authorization shall be infonned of the types of records that may be produced and retained, where such records are nor-mally maintained, the duration such records are usually re-tained, the applicant's .rights concerning access to the infor-mation, and to whom and under what circumstances the information

• will be released

• Initial screening requirements are applicable to those indi-viduals who have never been screened or granted unescorted access authorization except as defined in Section 7.0 or 11.0. The initial screening program has two components: A background investigation (Section 5.2) and a psychological assessment (Section 5.3).

An applicant may withdraw consent to a psychological assess-ment or background investigation at any time. When withdrawal of consent is made, all processing of work in connection with either the psychological assessment or background investi-gation shall cease as soon as practical. Withdrawal of con-sent shall be deemed withdrawal of the application for unescorted access authorization.

Infonnation collected under these guidelines shall be released only on a need to know basis.

5.2 Background Investigation Elements The background investigation covers the last three years prior to the date of application for access authorization. Each utility shall make every reasonable attempt to address the applicant's employment history, educational history, criminal history~ military service~ and the applicant's character and reputation in the following manner.

5.2.1 Employment History - Through contacts with previous employers obtain the following infonnation:

a. Verification of claimed periods of employment and interruptions of employment in excess of 30 days;

b. Disciplinary history;

c. Reasons for termination and eligibility for rehire; and

d. Any other information that would adversely~re-flect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as it relates to being pennitted unescorted access.

5.2.2 Education History - Verify claimed enrollment at an edu-cational institution for the previous three years. In addition, verify the highest claimed post high school attendance or degree regardless of time.

5.2.3 Criminal History - As pennitted by federal, state or other applicable law, a criminal history record check through appropriate law enforcement agencies or court records shall be performed.

• • 5.2.4 Military Service - Verification of military period of service (claimed or developed), by receipt of an honor-able discharge on a fonn 0D214 or through acquisition, and submittal of an applicant's authorization for re-lease of military history infonnation to the National Personnel Records Center. If it becomes known that an individual's discharge is other than honorable, further investigation shall be made.

5.2.5 Character and Reputation - The applicant's reputation for emotional stability, reliability and trustworthi-ness shall be examined through contact with two refer-ences supplied by the applicant and at least two additional references (not related to the applicant)

.\ developed during the investigation. Emphasis shall be placed on:

a.

b.

Identified psychological problems; Criminal history;

c. I1 l e.ga 1 use or possession of a contra 11 ed substance;

d. Abuse of alcohol;

e. Susceptibility to coercion; and

f. Any other conduct relating to an applicant's trustworthiness and reliability to discharge job duties within the environment of a nuclear power plant.

5.2.6 Verification of True Identity. - The verification of the applicant's identity through a means such as applicant's name, photograph, physical characteristics, social security number, date of birth, and physical characteristics with employment, educational, military and other records and/or employer and character re-ferences who have a personal acquaintance with the applicant.

5.3 Psychological Evaluation Reliability and stability shall be indicated by the result of a reliable written personality test or by any other pro-fessionally accepted clinical assessment procedure. The results of such test or procedure, including an interview if required, will be evaluated by, or evaluated in accordance with the procedure or guidelines approved by a qualified, and if applicable. a licensed psychologist or psychiat~ist.

6.0 EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION The decision to clear an individual for authorization for unescorted access shall consider information obtained during the background investigation and psychological assessment. This infonnation shall be reviewed using the guidelines' specified in this section:

6.1 Willful omission or falsification of information submitted in support of employment or request for clearance for un-escorted access to protected or vital areas; 6.2 Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol without adequate evidence of rehabilitation.

6.3 A criminal history that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6.4 History of mental illness or emotional instability that may ca,use a significant defect in the individual,'s judgment or

• reliability and may cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6.5 Any evidence of coercion, influence or pressure that may be applied by outside sources to compel an individual to com-mit any act of sabotage or other act that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its pe~sonnel.

6.6 Evidence that the individual has corrmitted or attempted to commit or aided. or abetted another who corrmitted or attempted to corrmit, any act of sabotage or other act that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6.7 A psychological evaluation which indicates that the individual is a risk in tenns of trustworthiness or reliability.

6.8 Any other information that would adversely reflect upon the

• reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as relates to being permitted unescorted access.

7.0 WAIVER FOR CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT The utility member may waive the background investigation and psycho-logical assessment for any individual who had, for the previous three years, continuous and trustworthy employment.

~.O TRANSFER AN~ REINSTATEMENT OF UNESCORTED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION Transfer or reinstatement of unescorted access authorization requires verification of the individual's true identity by the utility.

8.1 Transfer An individual's unescorted access authorization granted by one utility may be transferred to another utility if the individual's unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days.

The gaining utility must verify that the individual has been screened in accordance with Section 5.0 and evaluated in accordance with 6.0 and had .a current, valid unescorted access authorization or that a valid unescorted access authorization was tenninated under favorable conditions within the prevfou*s 365 days. This verification or docu-mentation may be accomplished by a written certification from the utility who last granted unescorted access authorization, through review of computer records, or other means. The gaining utility must cross-check informa-tion such as name, date of birth, social security number, sex and other applicable physical characteristics for identification.

8.2 Reinstatement The utility may reinstate the unescorted access .authorization granted an individual if the individual returns to the same utility and unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the previous unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions.

8.3 Background Update Requirements Where the individual's unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for more than 365 calendar days, the utility member will update the background investigation to cover the individual's activities from the date of the previous back-ground investigation but not to exceed three years.

9.0 CONTINUAL BEHAVIOR OBSERVATION PROGRAM The utility and the utility member's contractors and vendors shall develop a continual behavior observation program that includes a fitness for duty program. The combination continual behavior observation and fitness for duty program applies to the members' contractors' and vendors' personnel who are granted unescdrted access to the protected and vital areas. The overall program shall include:

9.1 A fitness for duty program that provides reasonable assur-ance for the detection of alcohol and drug abuse and other behavior that may cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

9.2 A continual observation program which provides that management/

supervisory personnel are responsible for observing personnel for behavioral traits and patterns which may cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant

• 9.3 and its personnel

• A program which reasonably assures management/supervisory personnel have the skills to detect and report changes in behavior, to include suspected alcohol and drug abuse, and refer such persons to the utility's management for approp-riate evaluation and action. Such skills may be acquired through managerial/supervisory experience or a training program.

10.0 SCREENING DURING COLD SHUTDOWN 10.1 Devitalization of Vital Areas During refueling or maintenance outages in which all or a part of a nucle~r power plant is in a cold shutdown and/or devitalized status, the utility may grant unescorted access authorization to the protected and devitalized areas for personnel who have not been screened in accordance with Sections 5.0 or 7.0 providing that:

10.1.1 The unescorted and unscreened person is res-tricted to the protected or devitalized areas.

10.1.2 Other requirements of the approved security plan remain in force for the other vital areas.

10.1.3 Prior to start-up, a thorough visual inspection of the devitalized area is made by knowledgeable plant personnel to identify signs of tampering or sabotage.

10.1.4 Appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure that all operating and safety systems are functioning normally.

10.2 Temporary Clearances In situations where there is insufficient time to ptocess a full clearance in accordance with Section 5.0 such qS mainten-ance and refueling conditions, provisions are available to grant a temporary clearance. A temporary clearance is to be used in situations which require expedite processing.

Unescorted access authorization based on a temporary clearance will not exceed a period of 180 continuous days. A temporary clearance cannot be transferred from one utility to another in accordance with Section 8.1. This 180 day temporary clearance may be based upon satisfaction of 10.2.1 and one or more of the follow-conditions listed under 10.2.2 thru 10.2.6 *

• 10.2.1 Passing a psychological evaluation within the past year.

10.2.2 Submission of a signed and notarized docu-ment by the present employer attesting that the employee has not committed acts that would otherwise preclude granting of un-

~scorted access.

10.2.3 Verification of the employee's current or last period of employment and reason for termination. This verification must be made within 30 days of the date temporary clearance is granted.

10.2.4 Administration of and successful completion of a drug screen during processing for access authorization 10.2.5 Recommendation of two developed character references who have had frequent and direct association with the contractor employee within the past 90 days.

10.2.6 Favorable criminal history record information.

11.0 GRANDFATHERING The utility may grant unescorted access authorization to indivi-duals who are cleared for unescorted access on (date) 12.b CONTRACTOR AND VENDOR REQUIREMENTS The utility may accept the results of the entire screening program or any part thereof conducted by a contractor or vendor, provided that the contractor or vendor meets the requirements of these guidelines and that they make their records available for auditing in accordance with Sections 13.0 and 14.0.  !

13.0 EVALUATIONS AND AUDITS 13.1 Utility Programs

. I .. ~

An independent evaluation of the access authorization program and its compliance with these guidelines shall be made. A copy of the evaluation shall be available for inspection by the NRC. All reports of evaluations shall be retained for a period of three years.

13.2 Contractor and Vendor Programs The utility or their designated representative shall conduct tri-ennial audits of contractor and vendor access authorization programs to ensure compliance with these guidelines. A copy of this audit will be provided to INPO. Other utilities may accept the originating utility's audit and need not re-audit the same contractor or vendor. INPO shall maintain a current list of contractors and vendors that have been audited and retain the copies of the audits for a period of three years. All audits shall be available for inspec-tion by NRC.

14.0 RECORDS Utilities and contractors and vendors of utilities who conducted screening programs in accordance with these guidelines shall maintain records that verify:

a. A background investigation and psychological assessment was conducted for each person who is screened under Sections 5.0 of these guidelines.

b. Three years of continued and trustworthy employment for each person who 1s screened under Section 7.0 of these guidelines.

c. That the persons were cleared for unescorted access authori zation on (date)

d. Satisfaction with the conditions of Section 10.2 which results in the granting of a temporary clearance.

Records for each person who is granted unescorted access shall be retained with the utility, contractor or vendor for a three year period following termination of access authorization.

Each utility or utility's contractor or vendor who collects personal information for the purpose of processing access authorizations shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for the protection of the personal infonnation. This infonnafion should not be disclosed to persons other than the subject or his :representa-tive, auditors whose purpose for review would be to inspect program compliance, and other utilities if an individual's access authori-zation is transferred,

,.. . MI I Ml..nl'lt.1~ l L, PETITIONS FILED FOR RULE MAKING

1. PETITION DOCKET NUMBER: PRM-73-2 PETITIONER: Wisconsin Electric Power Company, et al. ~

FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION: September 15, 1977 (42 FR4643l)

SUBJECT:

Elimination of Pat-Down Physical Searches of 11 11 Individuals at Nuclear Power Plants

2. PETITION DOCKET NUMBER: PRM-73-3 PETITIONER: KMC, Inc., et al.

FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION: July 10, 1978 (43 FR29635)

SUBJECT:

Physical Security Requirements at Nuclear Power Pl ants

• 3. PETITION DOCKET NUMBER: PRM-73-7 PETITIONER: Wisconsin Electric Power Company, et al.

FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION: February 16, 1982 (47 FR6658)

SUBJECT:

Elimination of Required Log-Out of Personnel From Vital Areas of Nuclear Power Plants

Southern California Edison Company r n P O BOX 800 22 44 WALNUT GROVE A VENUE M . 0. MEDFORD M AN AGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING ROSEMEAD , CALIFORNI A 91770

• as MAR 11 A9 :1 2 TELEPHONE (818) 302-1749 March 6, 1985 Secretary to the Comm1ss1on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conm1ssion Wash1ngton, D. c. 20555 Attention: Docket1ng and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on Three Proposed Rules and Two Regulatory Guides:

1) Access Authorization Program,

2) Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor facil1ties,

3) Miscellaneous Amendments Concern1ng Physical Protect1on of Nuclear Power Plants and

4) Standard format and Content Gu ide for Access Authorizat1on Plans for Nuclear Power Plants (SG 301-4)

5) Standard format and Content Gu1de for V1tal Islands, Protection of Physical Secur1ty Equipment, and Key and Lock Controls (SG 302-4)

The Commission has published for public comment in the Federal Register the subject proposed rules (Fede ral Register Vol. 49 No. 149) and regulatory guides (federal Register Vol. 49 No. 182 and Vol. 50 No. 15) regarding physical protection of nuclear power plants.

The following general comments are presented for the NRC's consideration. The subject proposed rules and regulatory guides are interrelated, and to some degree relate to other initiatives of the NRC and industry, particularly, the fitness for duty program, wh ~ h. ~a ~ been under review by the Conmission and industry for the past year . It, should be notedp.~ ~,

that portions of the proposed access authorization prog ram requirements --~,

related to continued observation are redundant to the fitness for duty program. Additionally, the NRC's current rev1ew of assumptions which support vital area analyses could markedly influence the designation of v1tal areas subject to control under the proposed rule on miscellaneous amendments.

finally, the viability of the 1ndustry initiat1ve on the Nuclear Employee Data System would be adversely influenced by the access authorizat1on program rule as well as interpretations developed by the NRC in its regulatory guide . The above points should be considered in order to minimize regulatory duplicat1on, the need for future rule changes, and adverse impact on industry 1nitiatives.

AdmcJwledaad by..,,,::.-:.~**!.!.~

t NUCt!AR REGUl.Al~Y COMMf5Stolt DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SF,:-n ~*

• o_y OF THE COMi\W<;ICJN arl* D.

Doc

• .,, *, ** ** ics J

• Docket1ng and Serv1ce Branch March p, 1985 Southern Cal1forn1a Ed1son (SCE} part1c1pated w1th KMC, Inc. and 22 other ut111t1es to prov1de conments on the subject proposed rules and regulatory guides. Mr. Don Knuth, President, KMC has subm1tted those conments separately. SCE generally concurs with the conments submitted by Mr. Knuth.

However, we deviate* significantly on certain selected points, and for this reason have elected to subm1t additional conments detailed 1n the enclosures to this letter. SCE s specific colTiTlents on two of the ma1n points of 1

deviation from KMC 1 s submittal are sunmarized below.

SCE does not concur with acceptance of the proposed requ1rement for psychological assessment (10 CFR 73.56(d. The Corm11ss1on has not 1dent1fied any psycholog1cal assessment 1nstrument w1th a val1dated h1story of success as a pred1ctor of persons who have a potential for conmitting act1ons that are 1n1mical to the public health 'and safety or present a danger to life and property. Th1s 1s ev1dent from the Conmission 1 s statement and the eleven

 *Questions for Spec1fic Publ1c Conmentu publ1shed 1n Federal Reg1ster, Vol 49,

• No. 149, pg. 30727. In add1t1on, the proposed rule does not state wh1ch psychological character1st1cs are to be 1dent1fied by assessment tests. The draft regulatory gu1de attempts to c1rcumvent these defic1enc1es by recommending that two psycholog1cal assessment tests be used and further reserv1ng for the NRC the r1ght to approve the 11censee*s selection of the assessment instruments.

Southern Cal1forn1a Ed1son s exper1ence in the use of psycholog1cal 1 assessment, over a per1od 1n excess of four years, has shown that the tests are costly, and serve no s1gn1ficant purpose. The NRC has est1mated the 11censee*s first year costs for the proposed psycholog1cal assessment program to be about $100,000. The documented d1rect cost to SCE and assoc1ated contractors for such assessments dur1ng 1983 was approximately $580,000, wh1ch far exceeds the NRC estimate. Estimated d1rect costs for 1984 are __ approx1mately the same as those for 1983. These costs do not 1nclude 1nd1rect costs assoc1ated with delays of useful employment wh1le the psycholog1cal testing and 1nterv1ew are completed. At SONGS, the 1ndirect costs range from

• an average of about $100/employee for low sk1ll profess1ons to more than

 $400/employee for h1gh sk1ll profess1ons. During 1984 SONGS conducted psychological assessments of more than 5000 contractor employees. The indirect cost of employment delays inc1dent to these screen1ngs was approximately 1.5 million dollars.

SCE also takes strong issue with the requirement 1n the rule for cont1nued observation wh1ch would dupl1cate the NRC 1 s current 1ntention to def1ne a general pol1cy statement on f1tness for duty. The imposit1on of a new rule 1n the area of f1tness for duty has the potent1al to transform SCE 1 s well established program, which accepts manager1al respons1b1-11ty for assess1ng f1tness for duty of nuclear plant employees and workers, into an excess1ve paperwork and record keeping burden, where t1me devoted to mak1ng and rev1ew1ng personnel record entries to ensure compliance would detract from sound administration of the program. The requ1rements for record keep1ng and record audit could also tax the viab1lity of our Employee Assistance Program, w~ich demands anonymity and protection of privacy as a key to employee acceptance.

Docket1ng and Serv1ce Branch March 6, 1985 Our co11111ents 1n the enclosures to th1s letter suggest changes to strengthen the overall secur1ty program and to el1m1nate unneeded regulatory dupl1cat1on. Enclosures A, B, C, O and E provide our conments on subject items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respect1vely. We would be pleased to discuss these conments w1th the NRC staff, or to answer any quest1ons which may ar1se. If you have any questions or requ1re add1t1onal 1nformat1on, please call me. Very trul~u:~/..__../ 1/lL t, Yff ~ p

• Enclosures

ENCLOSURE A INTRODUCTION The NRC, when it publi~hed the requirl!llents of Part 73.55 for th~ physical protection of nuclear power plants in February of 1977, establi>>hed by federal rule a general requiremant to protect against the threat of an insider. NRC subsQquently has failed to apecify requireMants or standards for any prograM of screening nuclear plant eMployaes, other than security personnel, to ~xclude from unescorted access to protected and vital areas of nuclear pc,wer plants those persons whose history, psychological profile or behavioral pattern indicate potential for COfllMitting acts which threaten tha public health and safety. In the absence of a published regulatory requirement, SCE has taken voluntary actions to screen employees prior to granting unescorted access. Those actions have exceeded the pre-employment screenings common in the hiring practice of industry in general. SCE has also required random personnel

• pat-d,:iwn searches, two-man rule requirements for interim badge access to vital areas, and stringent access control provisions which have accepted sOMe or all of the recommended standards of the industry standard, ANSI

18. 17. The prop~ed rule and regulatory guide, though roughly modeled on the standards of ANSI 18.17, significantly expands these recommended standards.

From SCE's perspective, it is a licensee management responsibility to permit only truBted employees to have unescorted access to areas where safety 1

relatmd equipment could be sabotaged and affect the safety of the plant, its mmployees, and the ganttral public. Tru5tworthiness can be best established by review of il'IIMadiately previous pariods of satisfactory employment or by a reasonable retrospective check of the employee's history. Once trustworthiness is established the employae's performanca should be continuously reviewed by his immediate supervisor to insure hia continuing trustworthiness and fitness for duty. The NRC's proposed rula recognizes that the potential consequance* of any

• act of sabotage .re lass whan the plant is >>hut down and perMits certain vital areas to be reclas5ified as non-vital to accommodate transient workers. Similarly, the currently drafted rule permits the reactor licensee to take advantage of a previous licensee's screening efforts to reduce tha duplication of screening skilled construction work~r<D who move from one nuclear power reactor site to another. It is essential that these features be retained in tha access authorization rule to permit such a program to be manageable for the large numbers of employees who may be required during periods of outages, The sections of the rule on which we have comments are described below2 REQUIRE~ENIS DURING SHUTDOWN 73.55 Requirements for physical protaction of licensed activities in nuclear power reactor. against radiological sabotage.

(d) Access Requirements. In addition to tha requirements of 73.56 of this Part1 2

(1) During cold shutdown or refueling operations, as specified in tha facility's technical spacifications as required in 10 CFR 50.36, the licem9.e& has the option tt~ds~ =ra.56teH3r of ~h~9 Pe~~ to grant temporary unescorted acces~ authorization5 to unscreened indiv~du.ls provided that, (1) Applic.bla requirements of this 5ect1on are followed; (2) Prior to start-up, a thorough visual inspection of all affected protected areas aY,d vital islands i's conducted by 1 icensee p&rsonnal who normally work 1n these areas to identify any signs of tamparing or sabotage; and (3) Appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure that all operating and safety systems are fuY1Ction1ng normally. (ii) For_multi-unit_nucl~ar sites_which_have 5har~Qrotecteg

 ~r§i!s_an2/or_vital_areas_ang_one_unit_remains in_QQerations_ibe_un.escorted ynscreened_1ndividuals shoulg_b!LQrovided di 2 i1ncti~_badg~s and_~ecuri~

• me 8 syres enhanced_to_Qrovide_additional_assurance that tho~e_indivigyals_are nQi_a2mitteg_to_unauthorized_vital_areas."

In previous discussioms with NRC representatives, SCE has recommended two levels of personnel screening as a condition for unescorted access: one for vital areas, and a lesser program for protected areas. Our recommendat ioris were made because the ovJrall risk of radiological sabotage being initi.ted by persons within a protected area is less than if an individual were within a.vital area *

• The proposed rule assumes that a single screening program for both the protected area and vital areas would be simpler to administer and that most persons who er,ter a protected area also enter the vital areas. Neither assumption is necessarily true. For multiple unit faciliti~ such as San Onofre Generat1Y,g Station, which groups three reactors within a single protected area, the advantage of granting temporary unescorted access solely to a shutdoWl"I facility would YJOt be viable as the rule is proposed unless all Ur,i ts at the site were shutdown.

3

Tha sugg sted ravision prmits unescorted access in th protected area provided parsons granted unescorted acc ss ar distinctively badged and nl

 ~curity raaasures exist to assure that thasa individualg can not gain                 acc 5>>

to vital islands of operating unitz. We recommend that thi$ section also permit unscreened licensee amployas access to the shutdown plant si~ilar to that granted to non-lica~ee employ-.s. Hence, we racomm nd that the referenca to Section 73.~<*> (3) be deleted (we believe 73.S6(e) (3) $hould hava been 73.56(f)(3) since thttr is no sub-

                       - -;: ! I section    <*> (3) as now referenced) *

• ~~~§BQY~Q_ll!Y~§Il§8IIQ~

      "73.56 (c) Backgroul'ld Inve5tigation The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangaments, for background investigations that provide assuranca that individual5 u&king unescorted access to protliCted araas and vital islands at nucl  ar power reactors ara raliable, trustworthy, and would act in a mann r that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. A& a miniMWII, this background investigation must verify an individual's tru identity, employment history, military *s rvice, and character and r~putation. The licensee shall n21irt 1!:tf!i@ ~ t t ~ ithtt individuals granted un.scorted access under these provisions 2f :thnc cg~ibiill~ to report promptly to the licensee any aubsquent occurrenc  or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.> that-ooay hava a bearing on such individuAl's continu~ acces5 authorization."

The proposed changaa of this subsection clarify that the licensees' responsibility is to notify individuals of their reporting responsibility. A l1cert<Sea should inform any individual having un99cortad access that any occurrence having a bearing on trustworthiness, which might affect his retention of that 2tatus, should be reported to his gupervisor. The licens~, however, should not be held rvspon11ible from a enforcement standpoint if it ware later found that the employiN attempted to cover-up or conceal 5Uch inforMation. 4

This i~su& of self-reporting is not without problems. Tha Commis&ion's goal in &stablishing this requirement must bm balanced against the confidentiality of medicAl self-help programe. BCE has a well estAblished program in existenca which stres9es a conmitment to preserve confidentiality of self-reported problems. Reporting, in ~any instanc~, could defeat the goals of self-help programs. The licensee nesda to have the latitude and decieional flexibility to balanc9 the merit. of each case in making any decisions on whether the authority for unescortmd access will be continued or revokl!d. Southern California Edison recommends that subsection 73.56(d), Psychological Assessment, be deleted in its entirity, since it imposes on the licemsea a significant recurrent cost for a program which has no proven practical utility. Additional argum&nts for deletion of this subsection, based on SCE's experience in u~ing a program of psychological assessment similar to that recommended by ANSI 18.17, are included in our answers to the eleven "Questions for Specific Public Comment", which are part of this enclosure *

• If our recommendation for deletion of 73.56(d) is riot accepted that the following minimal chang~s to the requireMent be made:

WR recommend 11 73.56(d) Psychological Assessment. The license shall establish and maintain a psychological assessment program to be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted acces& to protected areas and vital island~. The requirements of this paragraph supplant the requirements of Appendix B paragraph I.B.2.b. of this part for nuclear power reactor security personnel. This program, as a minimum, shall consist of: 5

(1) A written pert1onality ite9H !~§~~!!~nt_il~§!l which have Q@§ been designed to furnish .an ObJectiva evaluation of some of the maJor person.ality traits which influence individual and interpersonal behavior. Results of ths personality test9 shall be evaluated using th~ ~riterie of by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The tests chosen shall have predetermined evaluation scales which are 9tatistically proven to have a high degre& of reliability, 9he:1/4+ have been ~roven ~ be 'f'Sttd,and shall meet the criteria of paragraph (d) (2) below. e:nd !H'taH* eortf1'1/4Y wi-ith t-1-te ~+o~ 9e1/4eeH*on ~eechu*es gtrldeh*n~ 99 de9ert~ tn .U.l::httfon11 Stt'i*ch!1/4-tnes on Efl'tl'1/4-oyee Se1/4-eet-ton Pl""Oeedttrtt9

      *H*9T8t-,.u. 43 FR i38e95 -fAttgtt9'C' eS; t9=t8r 29 SFR Pal""t- 1/460r.-

(2) Clinical interviews for individuals whose personality tests or results are inconclusive or indicate abnorMal personality traits. These interviews shall be administered and conducted by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The tests and interview shall be designed to evaluate (i) an individual's current behavioral reliability, looking for traits which would indicate that the individual possesses a 9-ltr-ong potential for COmMitting acts detrimental to the public health and safety or property, and (ii) behavior.al patterns which, if combined Hith tha expected work environment, could develop into a high potential for committing acts d~trimental to the public health, safety, or property. Based on the results of the tests and, if needed, clinical interview, the psychiatrist or psychologist shall provide, in writing to appropriate senior licensee management, a recommendation as to the individual's behavioral suitability for unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants." The edits shown would clarify that the grading of the written test ne~ only use a program or grading key developed by a qualified psychologist or

• psychiatrist, and delete the undefined qualifiers on the degrees of potential for conducting acts of sabotage. The written tests currently used by SCE can be mechanically graded or mar1ually graded by clerical staff. It is important that the test and scoring "norms" be established by qualified profes~ionals, but it is entirely appropriate for other9 to conduct the test and score it within the guidelines established.

The purpose of the writter1 testing i!! to be a first 'screen' on measuring the individuals traits and the clause 'shall have been proven to be valid' presents an unreasonable requirement. The requirement to use tests having a 6

high degree of reliability 1s sufficient and ig an opinion of the experts. Wa believe the requirement to prove any t~*t to be valid could be an impossible task and should be deleted. The NRC ha~ 5pl!Cifically avoided the task of "certifying" any single tast, as the Cornmis!iion has pointed out in its comments on the proposed rul&s. II 73.56(e) Continual Behavioral Observation Program. ( 1) Th* licensee shall establish and maintain a continual behavioral observation program for individuals which is designed to hava

    , supervisors detect changes 1n an individual's on-the-Job performance, Judgment level, or behavior and, after detecting a pattern of abnormal

• behavior, refer the individual to senior licensee management to make an initial decision on whether to maintain or teMporar1ly suspend the individual's unescorted access authorization to prot~cted areas and vital iglands. In the case where the individual's behavioral actions represent an imminent danger to the public health and %fety, the individual's supervisor shall immediately suspend the individual's unescorted access authorization on a temporary basis and then refer the 1nd1vidual to senior licensee management."

The maJor issue with any continued observation program is whether this particular section should be included in this rule sir,ce the Fitness for Duty pol icy statement currer,t ly under Commission review duplicates the essential requirement for continued observation. The Fitnes3 for Duty rule

• when approved for implementation statedz

      " *** shall provide reasonable assurance that any person 1n a vital area, while performing any duty in that area, is not:

(i) unfit for duty due to the influer,ce of alcohol; (ii) unfit for duty due to the influence of any drug or drugs that could influence his or her faculties in any way contrary to safetyJ or

    <iii)    1..rnfi t for duty because of any other mental or physical impairment that could affect his or her performance in any way contrary to safety.

7

The Commi>>sion on Octobar 17, 198/t, suQpended th* publication of a fitnese for duty rule pending a datarmination to issue it as a policy statasnant. Thus the ineluaion of a requir&fllant for continued observation in this proposed rule subsection is potantially duplicative of a CoM111ission Fitness for Duty policy statement. Both al"tl aimad at ensuring,,-that the employee can reli.bly perform his or n*r function

• We balieva that subsection (a) should be d*leted in it. entirety, and th*

Statement of Consideration~ acknowledge that this portion of the proposed rule duplicate other potential Cormnission initiativ*** To do othen1ise would

• create two regulatory requiraments aimed at th* ume obJeclive.

11 1)

                   -73. 56   (f)       Non-lic*r11an Employees The licensee ~ay *ccept an una-.corted access authorization granted an eMployee of a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment supplier by another licensee, if the individual's iYib.m:ili!i!m for YMSt;grt@!it
        !££~§ !!@JI not ~nrmin!1!9 fm: s~*!I eMploymnt in lkansed nuclear power reactors has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days1 and if tha or~1/4 gr-enitmg Hetm9mt MmCh!I ite ii-he gaining licen~ea a ph~g,-.apt, of Q2§itiv~l~ i9!DiifiU the individual.

And a \'ff"tti:-en ..-*1"'-i-f1/4eaiti:-on of 'the ~tth.tai-1--9 tt'l"le!!te0l"'4'-ttd acce99 auither-i-taho'l"I a1/4-ong wHm a ,1'-ai-amttM ..t,ese l!Mp+oyffleni- m etttAren'lt

         ~attdttyr       For individuals whose employmant in licensed nuclear power reactors has been interruptad for a continuous period of mora than 365 days, the individual's activities must be investigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and a l"!tfW f::!9YCho1/4og't'ea1/4 t!Ul<sllt99l'l'Mt1'rlt mede ecc:or-d1:ng ~ itt,e t"'11qt.:t1/4r-eMenits of f!Hn*11;,-af::!h
         ~or   of imis 9eeit't"OftT (2) Consistent with th* requirements of paragraph 50.70(b) (3) of this chapter, the licensee shall grant umKCorted access authorizAtion to protected ar*as and vital islands without further investigation by tha licen9H with regard to th* requirRmmnt~ of this section to all amployas of th  Col'ftl'l'lission who have bean certified by the NRC to have met the intent of tha requirements of this section.

n (3) During cold 5hutdown or refueling oparations, as zpecified in the facility'* technical specifications, ** required in 10 CFR ~0.36, the licensee ha* tha option to grant a tamporary unescortltd access _ authorization to an unscreaned individual i--il !.o..~C!arIS11~i!!:L~~1gt~A 8

f".i:+ fne ~etttfr-l!fflel"l'lt!I ~ ito.-SS of ithtt et"tap'ltar- ar-e fo1/41/4o"etd, and fH+ The af'--Feeit~ ~l"ldtrl-dttri- ht 9ttb;ttteit 'Ito itt,e eol"lttm:te1/4 bttl-ta'ri-ora1/4 ot,_,.,,,aitton l"fttU~et'IN!!n~~ of pai-egi-ai:m fet of itt,f!!I BltC'lt+cmT.11. Our comments on this aubsection are directed toward g~neralizing the requirements to functionally state what is required rather than specifying only ona detailed method of meeting the requiremmnts. Also, we recommend deletion of reference to section 73.55<*> on continued observation which we believe will be covered by Commission action on Fitness for Duty. With regard to transference of authority for unescor~ed acc1ns, it i~

• necessary that the- individual previously had been granted unmscorted access, and if terminated that is was not done for cau&e. It is not esaential that this access be currently valid. Other portions of the regulations require licensees to revalidate a need for an amployea to retain unes~orted access every 31 days, and if not needed that the person be removmd from the access list. In a situation such as this, the individual might not ba current in his access authority, but it was not withdrawn because of any problem.

Rathar, it was suspended beca*Jse the employee had no "work related need"

• during that period of time which required access to vital areas.

same vein, it is also important to positively identify that the individual is who he represents himself to be, but there are ways of accomplishing this In the other than by exchang* of photographs.

     "73.56 (g) Review Procedures" We believe that this entire subaaction !ihould be deleted from the rulR.                      The licensee's proc!idures for reviewing the denial or revocation of unescorted 9

access, whethar the procedure is uniqua or that of a bargaining agreement, should not ba pjlrt of a plan requiring sul:xnittals to, and approval by, the NRC. The NRC's interest should ba limited to ensuring proper attention to the prot~tion of tha public health and safety and not be expand9d to includa employae appeal rights under its enforcement Jurisdiction. Other avenU&l:i of redressing abuses of "due process" are available to an employae who believes his rights are violated. We have severa doubts that tha NRC has legal authority to require a review of the type dascribed and whether the NRC is adequately staffed to monitor and review Hdua processw considerations even if such a legal authority were detert11ined to exist

• ANSWERS_TO SPE~IFIC_QUE§TION§_- ACCESS_ffiil!:!QRIZATIDN_RUbs The Commission has invited specific attention to certain questions on the proposed requirel'lltl!nts. Southern California Edison's cornment!I are thEi!sa.

1. To what extent are the propc.Eals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavior reliability programs already used by nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

• The SCE-SONGS Physical Security Plan voluntarily commits to the following screening requirements:

11 0 Compliance with the employee screening elements set forth in Section 4.3 of the 1973 Edition of ANSI 18.17; Qr o Documentation of at least three continuous years of trustworthy ernplc,yment of the individual via a revietw of the individual's employment record. f0

o The background investigation includes criminal record, previous employment, and reference checks covering the most recent thre& yaars. 11 SCE has U$ed the MMPI and a clinical interview to perform psychological assessments. A program of continuing behavioral observation by supervisors is in operation, and eupervisors are trained in behavioral observation, with special emphasis on recognition of drug and alcohol abuse. We are currently evaluating dropping use of the MMPI due to its high cost and lack of

• • demonstrated benefit.

2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns? radiological sabotage concerns? or both?

Psychological assessment is used by SCE as one part of the physical security prograr11 to provide assurance that individuals given unescorted access to portions of the nuclear facility are trustworthy, and as an aid in determining the extent to which an

• ir1di vidual May be a risk with regard to an alcohol or substance abuse problem.

3. What are the particular concern5 about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the componer-1ts of the proposed access authorization rule? The Comrnismion is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provi~ions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

SCE employees and contractor employees are all informed that the tight disciplinary controls and strong security systern5 prescribed 11

for nuclear reactors require a degree of infringement of thair privacy rights. Howev9r, acceptance of these measures is voluntary. The applicant rnay choose to participate in the screening or choose to 9~~k employment elsewhere. Applicants also sign releases-allowing investigators to gather extensive information about the~, and agree to submit to chemical testing as an element of pre-employment screening and the annual review of each individual's authorization for unescorted access. BCE positively controls the security information and keeps this data separate from personnel files and locked in storage containers

• Supervisors, co-workers, or the pe~onnel department do not have access to information gathered for screening which reduce~

substantially the risk of information being used against an employee on the Job. There is always a dyr,amic balance between the need fc,r strong security and the rights of an individual to privacy. The risk of potential damage which one individual or a group of individuals

• could cause, outweighs the intrusions of privacy associated with gathering persor,al information.

It is too early to tell to what extent thes~ requirements, of relatively recent origin, may create problems with employee and union acceptance.

4. What evidence does or does not support the use of obJective diagnostic tests- such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments?

What evidence does c,r does not support the use of clinical assessmer,t by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power re~ctors? 12

SCE has no svidance that the use of psychological screening, .tan annual cost in excess of $500,000, ha~ practical value and makes any significant contribution to excluding malicious or aberrant persons from unascorted access to vital areas. The cost figure discussed above reflects only direct cost of screening and interivew. The indirect cost, occasioned by delay of the work 9tarting date, ranges fro~ $100 to $400 per pet'$on, depending upon the wage rate of the individual. During 1984 SONGS has conducted psychological ass~s-ments of more than 5,000 cor-1tractor a-mployees. The indirect cost of employment delays incident to these $Creenings was approximately 1.5

• rnillion dollars.

5. What specific cnaracteristics arQ identified by a clinical pmychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage?- What percentage of false positives and fals~ negatives <Type I and Type 11 l!rrors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment

    .procedures? Are more effective procedures available and practical?
     *we have no specific data to ~espond to this question. We seriously doubt that such data exists in any form, since no accepted list of criteria or activ1t1es which should be identified has been compiled.

6. Can the use of psychological assessment 1n the commercial r-1uclear industry be Justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

No comment.

7. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial Y1uclear industry be Justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and rad1olog1cal sabotage concerns?

13

To tha degrae that psychological asesament identifies par5ons who are psychologically disturb~ or usm drugs or alcohol to excess, both concerns are addrliS>>ed. Background investigations and supervisor observation, however, addresa th~ concerns more credibly and aff1ciantly. BCE also conducts* chemical t~~t, which screens for alcohol and drug use, as an element of pre-aNployment screening and as a part of the reevaluation of an employee's authorization for unescorted accns. 1

8. To what extent i§ the use of psychologic~l assessment rel.tad to a behavioral reliability program? Would the propc,sed behavioral reliability program be effective without prs-employment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a scr&ening program, i.e., if only background investigation were adopted?

Psychological assessment techniques may theoretically-- eva-luat an individual at a particular point in time. Th* btthavioral reliability program is intended to look for changes in an individual ovar tiMe, by sensitizing the supervisor to recognize chang@S in an individual's behavior or to recognize clear signs of aberrant behavior. The supervisor is not expected, indeed is cautioned Y-,ot to makli' psychological or medical Judgm&nts. SCE' s experience with the ANSI 18.17 screening program convinces us that background investigation, coupled with a strong behavioral observation program provid s th* fairest and most workable sy>>tem of protection against a malicious or aberrant insider, and that* program of behavioral reliability assessMent can be effective without psychological assessment. 14

We are currently evaluating whether SCE should discontinue use of psychological assessment as a part of pre-employmemt screenir,g.

9. What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of pgychological assessment? by the use of background investigations? by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Psychological assessments have screer,ed out a relatively small number of individuals for such reasons as: Aggressive or violent behavior Drug or alcohol abuse Lack of temper controls Hostile or destructive actions Disrespect for social norms - violation of rules Inability to handle stressful situations Impulsivity and a disregard for one's actions Background inve~tigat1ons have screened out individuals for: Falsification of records Drug and alcohol abuse Temper problems Severe financial problems Past employment problems Tendency to criminal behavior Behavioral reliab1l1ty programs have screened out individuals for: Drug and alcohol abuse Severe persor,allty char,gea which could impair fitness for duty Emotional breakdowns 15

10. What axaMples, if any, axist of ~anage111ent abuses of screening procedure~, including psychological assassment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

SCE has* systmm of chacks and balancms, ~swell as appeal procasBeB, to prmvent abuses. Thara is always more than one individual involved in decisions about access or decertification which protect tha employee.

11. How do employee>> and eMployee organizations feal about past and present us& of screening prograMs? How do thay feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

So~e mmployee>> undoubtedly resent the prograAJs and consider them an

• • intrusion into their private lives. This question is still open, and wa* cannot infer that the unior,s and employees have accepted restrictions upon individual access as a legitimate and acceptable element of eroployer-workar relations.

16

C!WsNTS_ON_SEBRCH~S_OF I@IVIDY8LS AT_POWER RE8CIQR FACILITIES SCE is in agreement with the use of equip111ent instead of hands-on pat down searches of personnel gaining access to protected areas. We have no comments. ('

ENCLOSURE_C OF_l'NJCbEAR POWER_B,ANTS Our comment~ on the subsections ares 11

73. 55 Requirements for physical protection of licenslitd activities in nuclear power reactors again9t radiological sabotage *

• By (120 days from the effective date of this amendment or 120 days after receipt of a Commission provided site specific vital area review, whichever is later) each licensee QrQRosing_to combine vital areas within Yit@l_i~lan2s shall submit proposed amendments to his security plan which define how the amended vital i~land designation and protection requirements of paragraphs (a), (c) ( 1), (c) (2),

(d) (2>, (d)(7), Cd) (9), Ce) (1) and (3), and (h) (4), will be met. Each submittal shall include a proposed implementation schedule for Co~1mission approval. Th& amanded safeguards requirements of these paragraphs must be implemented by the licen5Re within 180 days after Commission approval of the proposed security plan in accordance with the approved schedule." The early security implementation reviews by the NRC required licensees to

• individually control access to designated vital areas. The way mar,y
• plants were constructed required control of a relatively large nufllber of vital areas; however, liceY"rSees now have experience with their security systems and may not wish to recombine them 1Y1to vital islands. For those desiring to maintain access control over each vital area, we see no reason to resubmit the security plan for a re-review. We therefore recommend that the requirement to submit amended plans apply only to those utilities choosing to take advantage of the vital island concept.

1

H 73.55 (c) Physical Barriers. (1) The licens!N 9hall locate vital equipll'lent within a vital area, which in turn 9hall be locatad within a protected area. One or more vital ar&1ae may constituta a vital island. Vital island. shall be configured to ensura that an individual must gain accemm to a vital island to accoa:iplish sabotage resulting in a significant radiological release or reactor core damage or both. Access to vital islands must require passage through a l~aat two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet th* performance rtiquirl!tfl'lents of paragraph (a) of this section. More than one vital island may be located within a singla protected area. :fhe 1/4te~ae 9hatt pro1'~ a9 tnd~r,dem,, '9'tta1/4 ts1/4and* On9tte a-Htet-nat-i-r,g e,,d et1/4~ ettl"1"emt ema~e,iey powe,- 90ttt"ee!! -fe1tei-ttet1/4i,g e~+/-eat ct-i-s'lt,-.thttttoi, 9:,"9tM9t

          ,-eqtt-i-1'6ed to pttt"~ fttnehor,-i-ng of si:-t"ttetttt"e9; sy91'9tll9 al"ld eompor,et"t'!t9 tmpot"i:-aM 1:-o saf*~Yr ~ MNte1tot- eonta ir,r'ffl!1              ,1,, 'Ith* ,-eae~ eoi-m-o1/4 t"oOfi'I; eer,i:-,-a1/4 a-i-a-,-111 9HttOYIT end OT'l9t1te wa:itttt" 9 ~ t e -tewe-htdi-~

p+i,;:r,g+ t"l!qtt-i-t"ecf fot" aehtevi-1"19 i,1/4en~ ~ , 9htt~dotffl o,- ho'lt ttm,dby.-

                  -t~ =Fne i,t,ys1/4ea1/4 eat"rltff"1S sit i:-he peM1'11ttel" O'F ithtt p,-o1'acited a,-ea m~t- be 9epal"ai:-e fi-om ar,y oithel" bal"t"tei- dt!9~~ed a9 a i,hye,:eat bai-l"tt!H6 TOI" a '9'i-i:-at i-91/4ar'ld wtthtn '!the i,,-ot-~ ai-ea-;-~

The functional requirement to protect vital islands with adequate barriers is in itself a sufficient requirement, and an mxplicit requirement to protect certain list!id systems is unneces5ary. For example, a requirt!Ment to protect AC and DC s.ource~ to permit functioning of "important to safety" equipment is redundant. The term 11 ir.1portant to safety" is in dispute as to its definition and should be defined in other forums and not raised in the cOT1text of safeguarding vital equipment. As amother example, - an explicit requirement to protect as an independent vital island "on-site water supplies (excluding piping) required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standby", places plant uniqu~ features which may be subJect to differing interpretations under a direct rule requirement and subJect to enforcement actior1s. In the past, licensees developed programs for protecting vital equipment and the security plan dsfined how that protection wa9 provided. The NRC and its contractor!J hava µ.rformed independent evaluations to dii!termin& if the 9et of vital areae and their protect ior1 measuras were adequate. We believe th is revittw process should be 2

retained. If the NRC i$ in d1sagreer11ent at a given pl~nt, the disagreeMant should be resolved in that arena rather than Making an arbitrary sel~ction of a "1111nimum set" of equipment, which may not be applicable to 11very plant si tm. The requirement to have the physical barrier at the protected area separate froM vital island barriers is generally Met - certainly for all vital islands that are located within the reactor building complex. It may not bm neces5ary for vital islands located at the site periMeter. As an example, ta the water intake structure 15 UbUally at the si boundary, and the protected area ard vital island boundary may be one and the same. This has been examined in past reviews and found acceptable. Another instance may be the vital islands containing designated security equipMent located at the gate house which have a coMmon barrier. Again, the approach has bemn Justified. We suggest this rule be modified to agree with past review practice.

          "73.55(d) (7) (1) <A>  Establish current authorization eee~ t~!lt-Qrocedures or systems for each vital island. The eeee!l!I t~!lt-2rocedures or systems must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant 1 icensee mar,ager or supervisor at least every 31 days. The licer,see shall include in the erocedure Qr system only individuals whose speci fie duties require access to vital islands during r,on-emergency conditions. 11 The recommended change 1s to clarify the intent of this requireMent to develop procedures and systems for access controls to vital areas which may or may not literally include "lists".       Many licensees have developed access controls which use computer controlled systeMs including access cards issu~

to employees. By use of the* access card in card readers'at vital area 3

doors, a computer checks the validity of the "need for accesa" and a "access liatu or log a~ such is not ganerated. This procedure ha>> been accepted by the NRC and the propos&d rula change would indicate its continued acceptabi 1 i ty.

           "73. 70(d) Records.      A tog E!!:Q£~!:!l:~~!ieM indicating name, badge number, time of entry, and ~tffl@ of ewtt of all individuals granted access to a vital island axcept th09& individual~ entering the reactor control roomu.

The coMM*nt is directed at the need to keep records of entry into vital islands. Again, consistent ~ith our previous remarks, this record-keeping requirement may be sati3f1ed by a coMputer logging subroutina of the access control system rather than a hard copy "log" at the entry point. In addition, we see no value or need for logging the reason for entry, or logging out. A monthly validation is required to permit only those who have the naed to enter an area, and a requirement for a person to enter his or her reason for each entry is not useful. Similarly, there is no valid security reason to log out upon exiting the vital island. 4

                          ~Q!!l!§~!§_Q!'Lm;;§~QBLfil:!lQ~

_Bg§A@l~§

       §I8~Q8@_EQR!:1BI-8~Q-~~IOO_§YID~_EQfLeg~§§_ffiIT~QB1~8IlQ~_E'.600§ EQBJ:!YtL~fLeQ~~!:LE'bANI§ The introduction to this ragulatory guids 5tates that the purpose of the document is to describe the standard format and content suggested for preparing an access authorization plan. The guide further states

• "conformance with this guide is not required by the NRC." Theoretically, NRC regulatory guid~ provida only guidal"1ce on one method accsptable to the NRC and any other demonstratable alternative is also acceptable. SCE's experience with NRC's use of regulatory guides, however, haa demonstrated that the detailed prescriptive "examples of how one might ~eet a r~gulationu are in fact quickly accorded the status of interpretation5 of "how to" meet the regulation both by the reviewers and the inspectors. We therefore are providing comments which clearly identify alternativs means which may be used to meet the stated requirement.

In comT11enting on the specific requirememts of the proposed rule, we have assumed our comments provided in earlier enclosures are acceptable and that the proposed rule will be so Modified.

1. __ General Performance.ObJective~rt9 R~rement~

No Comment 1

73.56(c) Ths licensee shall conduct, or maka arrangements, for background invastigations that provide assurance that individuals seeking unescorted acc&ss to protected arRa5 and vital islands at nuclear powar reactors are rmliable, trustworthy, and would act in a 1¥1anner that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. As a ~inimum, this background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment history, military service and character and reputation. Th* licensee shall OQ!i!~ iho~ individuals granted unescorted access under these provil!ior1s of theiJ: r:elieonsibi lit~ to raport promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurr*nce or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.> that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization." The time period for invastigatioM should be shortenad frOIII the 5 year pa~iod to 3 years. The ANSI/ANS 3.3-1982 standard recommended a three year retrospective period for investigation. SCE has comr11itted to this period of time in current programs, and contractual arrangements made in anticipation of the new rule use this time period. We suggest adopting the three year time period recommern:led by the ANSI Standards Committee. Even a three year period can bm a !!ignificant problem with respect to transient contractor employees. - In addition, the criminal and military service history checks require extensive time periods. In many cases it would not be possible to do them to the degree of completeness discussed in the proposed guide. Even 1f law changes are mada permitting the FBI to release such records to utilities, experience has shown these confirmatory record checks may extend into several months. Verifications of military records also take considerable periods of time. The military record check should be required only if it falls within the three year retrospective period. Such verification should be satisfied by review of DD-214 and/or military discharge documents. For

these reasons, the guidance for background investigation should specify that rea50nable record check~ should be made, considering the legal availability of tha records baing sought. Also, there should be a provision permitting temporary grant of unescorted access, based on preliminary background inve5tigations, pending the receipt of closely controlled records. 2.g_Investigative Criteria Ir~Q!ntl!Y - Establishing the applicant's true identity is a valid goal of the background investigation. Identification by use of fingerprints (the stated preferred method) could prove to be non-productive since a person's

• fingerprints may not be on file, and/or the records of the FBI or local police may not be available to the utility. By the same token, other investigative techniques can also be successful in e~tablishing true identity without the use of photographs. We would recor(lmend that the 5tatemerit "In the event the applicant's identity cannot be verified through either his or her photograph or fingerprints, authorization for unescorted access to protected and vital islands should not be granted" sho1.1ld be deleted and be replaced with "In the event the applicant's identity cannot be verified,
• authorization for unescorted access to protected and vital islands should not be granted. "

 ~mQlQ~inLli!tf!CT -   The record checks should be conducted for a three year period rather than the. five year period as stated.

E!!Y£~tional_Histor~.- The record checks should be for three years rather than five years. Educational record checks should be conducted only if within the three year retrospective period and then only to verify 3

attendance. We are not concsrned with an individual's education, but are concerned with hi~ location and conduct during the period of investigation. grediLti!§~ory - Delete. Serves no purpose not already covered by other checks. Criminal History - The time period required to conduct a criminal history check could be exterusive. If authorization is obtained for the FBI to perform record checks on utility applicants, estimates range from weeks to mont,ha to receive requested information. Experience of government agencies in processing routine requests for record checks has demonstrated that a wait period of three months i5 not unusual. It is doubtful than any maJor increase in workload for the FBI would result in shorter review times. We therefore concur with the view that an ir,terirn badging decision using the best available criminal history be authorized, pending completion of the full background investigation, either by the current system of licensee r~quest, or from the FBI, if proposed legislation is passed. Militarv_Servi£§ - This aspect of the background review, similar to criminal

• history record checks, is not under the schedule cc,r,trol of 1 icensees. The government office processing requests may require appreciable periods of time for processing, depending on the backlog of requests pending. We urge the same approach be taken in processing this information as with crimir,al history records; that is, an interim background investigation be used as authority for badging until cor11plete records can be obtained.

4

3. P*yc!:ll;!logisal..B~!!!ll!!J!nt SCE reCOMMends deletion of this requirement. If the requireD1er1t is retained the following cOft'Rl'lants apply:

  ~J.-~-2Ml i tY-!M:li The guidance of this section 9hould not spscify the admini5tration of             t~Q separate test instruments.            It should be the responsibility of the utility, in consultation with its experts, to select the btiSt test or tests.

SCE has used the MMPI. The selection of a proper test should be left to the utility without the raquirefllent of submitting the "Basis for l.1$e of

• • Psychometric Measurement Instrument" forms.

  ~,F   Clinisal I~r,yi~~!

The guidance in this area should not be prescriptive as to the length, structure and content of interview to be given. By requiring qualified prof1naionals to establi9h and administer the program, and to conduct any interviews, the NRC should be assured that a quality program will be established without the need to dictate the nature of interviews and NRC

• involvement 1n how the program is managed *

4. CQntinyal Behavi~1-Q~ervati2n Pr-2ru:am As indicatad in our comments on the rule, we do not believe this portion of the regulation is needed. The Commission currently plans to issue a policy statement dealing with Fitness for Duty which would duplicate the.

requirements of this subsection~ There is no need to have two separate regulatory requirements addressing the same issue. 5

This chapter providfn guidanca for meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.56(f) which are as follows: II 73.56 (f) Non-Licerrsee Employees (1) The licensee may accept an ur1e~corted access authorization granted an employee of a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment supplier by another licensee, or a previous employea of another licensee, if the individual's authorizatiQn fQC unescorted ~c~ess wa~ nQt termina:ted for cause; employment in licensed mtclear power reactors has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days; and if the gaining licensee a~iii~l~ iggntifi§ the individual. For individuals whose employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days, the individual's activities must be inv~tigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this gection. snd s new ~hotogfest a99e99ffll!!Y'lt made seeo~t~g to the

         ~e~ttt~emel"l'l:-9 of pa~so~aph ~d+ of tht9 9eetton.

(2) Consistent with the requirements of paragraph 50.70(b) (3) of this chapter, the licensee shall grant unescorted access authori zat ior1 to protected areas and vital islands without further investigation by the licensee with regard to the requirements of this sect ion to all employees of the Commissior1 who have been certified by the NRC to have met the intent of the requirements of th is sect ion. (3) During cold shutdown or refueling operations, as specified in the facility's technical specifications, as required in 10 CFR 50.36, the licensee has the option to grant a temporary unescorted access authorization to an unscreened individual in accordanc~ filth Z!h;;i§ i!ll!.. II We strongly support the concept of permitting the transfer of the authority for unescorted access of individuals among licensees. Once a background investigation is completed, all information has been evaluated and one utility has granted the authority for unescorted access, a second utility should have the ability to continue that authority without the need to duplicate the entire investigative and review process. The primary quality control requirement for the transfer of authority for unescorted access is assurance that the 1ndiv1dual is the same one who was investigated. The exchange of E,

photographs i>> but one means of conducting this vsrification. Other suitable mea~ should also ba permitted. With regard to NRC amployeee, we would expect that the NRC will certify them for unescorted acce~& only after usa of controls equival&nt to those required of licensees. We do not suggest that licensees conduct the screening for NRC employees, but rather that the NRC establish a progra~ at least equival&nt to that requ_ired of licensees prior to granting an individual unescorted access.

• 6. ___ _fl!!lYiew_PrQcedures We *recommend that this portion of the rule be deleted. Redress of abuses of "dua process" should not be regulated and enforced by the NRC. Any employee who disagrees with licensee procedures or actions has other c~ntractual and legal avenues to air those concerns. It is unnecessary to have licensee appeal procedures !!Ubmi ttad, reviewed, arid approved by the NRC
• 7

ENCLOSURE E Connents_on Bo9ula:toty Gulde Regarding Yitai Islands, ProtectJqn of PbysJcol security Eguloment,_and Key ang Lgck Controls Our major concern with the rule changes of 73.,5 and the associated guidance Is the apparent requirement for all licensees to adopt the vital Island concept and to define certain mfnlmUII sets of equipment which must be grouped within defined vital Islands. SCE-SONGS, under the currently effective rules, has recently defined the vital areas necessary to protect vital equipment from sabotage, and to describe their security provisions to provide that protection. This reconfiguration was reviewed and approved by the NRC In 1984, and has'" Just recently been Implemented., we* do not bel feve ft appropriate that the NRC require a wholesale change. Other licensees, after spending considerable effort and expense to establish and construct their vital areas and security protection systems, may not wish to combine currently defined vital areas Into vital Islands. Although the proposed rule states the current rule "may be unnecessarily strict" and under the proposed rule "licensees would be given considerable latitude to take advantage of existing barriers and access control points"; the more recent reviews of security programs for new licensees by the NRC have not permitted advant~ge to be taken of the vital Island concept. We question the motives for offering a proposed rule to lfberalfze certain security requirements when Just the opposite resu.lts are currently being* obtained from NRC reviews. In this regard the discussion of exterior doors on pages 7 and 8 Is partlcularly confusing, and represents a very

significant new requirement which Is equlvalent to requiring that each vltal area be protected by two concentric locked and alarmed barriers. The fol lowlng comnents relate speclflcal ly to the appropriate section of the regulatory guide.

1. INDEPENDENT VITAL ISLANJS The llstlng of equipment needed to be protected within Independent vital Islands Is Inconsistent with NRC*s safety-safeguards phllosophy of protecting only that equipment which must be protected. The selectton of specific equipment to be protected ts site specific, and the specification that dlesel generators, ill batteries connected to 1E loads, and on-site w8ter suppltes required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown to be within vltal Islands Is not Justified. From a purely practtcal standpoint we do not understand how certain on-site water sources, for example, can b~ protected with barriers having all the phystcal attributes required of vital area barriers. (How does one protect an Intake structure?) Past NRC reviews for adequacy of security measures examined each licensees designated vital areas, and methods for

- protection. We believe that approach was adequate and a change has not been Justified.

2. Cf EN I NGS 1H YITAL I SLAt,O BARR I ERS No comnent.

3. TEMPORARY DES I GNAT I ON AS YIJAL -

The guidance that a back-up systera outomatlcsl ly becomes vltal equipment whenever maintenance, repair or replacement Is performed on the primary vltal equipment Is not Justified. Nuclear power plants Inherently have 2

redundancy bullt Into required safety systems. Usually there are l'IU!lny tiers of equipment which can be used to perform the system function of a piece of equipment removed from service. There may be times when, for unique reasons, a backup system must be designated for protection If selected vltal equipment Is Inoperable. This should be reviewed and required on a case-by-case basis as needed and not made a general rule requirement for all systems at all plants.

 - 4. I.I.ME DEPENDENT YITAL ISLANDS No conment *

• 5. CONTROL ~ ACCESS IQ VITAL I SLANOS UNDER ROUT I NE CQNP ITl ONS There Is not'a valid security reason to require an employer to maintain a record for each entry containing the reason and the time of exit froa the vltal Island. SCE-SONGS require that supervisors evaluate and certify the reason each employee needs to enter each vltal area and supervisors must revalldate each persons need every month. It adds nothing to security to require an employee to recite that reason for each entry and to make a written log entry. In a slmllar vein, logglng-out serves no useful security purpose, partlcularly since NRC has modified earller guidance on antlpassback and does not desire It to be used as a condition for entry to the next vltal area.

The NRC guidance on Exterior Doors (Sunshine doors) would appear to present an entlrely new requirement for locklng mechanisms and active Intrusion alarm systems on all doors leadlng Into the bulldlng from the protected area even though the door does not directly open to a vital area. There Is no Justification for this practice. To lmplemerrt It would requlr.e major modification and control of normally open bulldlngs 3

(such as the turbine building) ff there were a vital area within that butldtng and would greatly Increase access control provisions with no Increase In security. It would also detract from the safety-safeguard Interface by adding a new level of restriction to movement of maintenance, operations end medfcal responders to plant emergencies or Industrial accidents.

6. PHYS ICAL PROTECT ION ELM. AYl CONJ INGENCY 1:1.M INTERFACE No comnent.

• • 7.

8. EMERGENCY ACCESS IQ VITAL !$LOOS No camient. SUSPENDING SECURITY MEASURES No COUlnent.

9. PROTECT ION .Qf SEaJR III EQUIPMENT No connent.

1o. KEIS. .Mil LOQ<S No comment. 4

                                                                      ..... IUIPNR IWJPID 11H PR -StJ, 7\J1. VJ.:..."1)  r.,,..,,

C4q Fl!.. ao 72(&, NORTHEAST UTILITIES mm General Offices

• Selden Street, Ber lin, Connecticut THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
• TE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECT RIC COMPAN Y H0L 'l'OKE WATER POWER COMPANY 3/ .:; P.O. BOX 270 NOATtEAST UTllllllS SERVICE. COMPANY HARTFORD , CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 NORTHEAST NUClEAR ENERGY COMPANY (203) 665-5000

                                                                     *as              P? : 2 Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 B11465 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary of the Commission

• Attn: Docketing and Service Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Comments on Proposed Changes to Security Regulations and Draft Regulatory Guide On August 1, 1984, the NRC published three Notices of Proposed Rulemaking concerning security requirements applicable to nuclear power plants. The proposed rules involved an Access Authorization Program (49FR30726), Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (49FR30738), and Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (49 FR 30734). The comment period for this proposed Insider Safeguards Rule Package expires on March 7, 1985 (49FR48200). Subsequently, the NRC also published for comment a proposed Regulatory Guide entitled "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" (49 FR 36582). Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company and Northeast Nuclea?-* Energy Company, as licensees of the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Unit Nos. l and 2, and license applicant for Millstone Unit No. 3 appreciate the opportunity to comment on these interrelated rules and Regulatory Guide. The proposed rules and Regulatory Guide have been considered by a number of industry groups which are separately submitting detailed comments. We have participated in the preparation of comments to be submitted by the Physical Security Coordinating Group (comments to be submitted by KMC, Inc.), the Edison Electric Institute Security Committee (EEi), and the Atomic Industrial Forum Subcommittee on Domestic Safeguards (AIF). We generally endorse the comments being filed by these groups. In the interest of efficiency, we are not repeating their detailed comments. Instead, the following comments concern those selected issues which are considered particularly important. In addition, the attachment provides specific comments which may not be reflected in the comments of the groups noted above. MAR 8 1985 AoknQlwl4tdied b)' card . *********** * * *

• S. NUClEAR REGUI AT.,," l"l"\i Mf ICJII DOCKETING t, orncr -

OF ttmtrk pi d I

Access Authorization Program (49 FR 30726) Proposed 10 CFR 73.56 (b) would require each power reactor licensee to implement an access authorization program which would include a continual behavioral observation program. The Statements of Consideration accompanying the proposed rule noted that a similar technique would be employed in a fitness for duty program which was the subject of a separate rulemaking. The Commission subsequently reconsidered its position on the fitness for duty rule and voted on October 17,1984 to publish a policy statement rather than finalize the rule. We believe this action was appropriate. The considerations which made it undesirable to codify a requirement for a continual behavioral observation program in connection with fitness for duty are equally applicable to an access authorization program. The continual behavioral observation program should be deleted from proposed 10 CFR 73.56 and its companion Regulatory Guide

• Proposed 10 CFR 73.56(g) would require that each licensee provide a procedure for the review of a denial or revocation of access authorization that has an adverse effect on the involved individual's employment. The rule would further require that this review include an evidentiary hearing. This provision is not appropriate for a rule promulgated by NRC. Existing State and Federal laws, as well as the collective bargaining agreement covering employees at many nuclear plants, provide sufficient avenues of appeal for individuals who believe they have been wrongfully denied employment. Section 73.56(g) should be deleted in its entirety.

Proposed 10 CFR 73.56 would require that an access authorization program include a requirement for background investigatlons. These investigations would be required to verify an individual's employment and educational history, among other information. The companion Regulatory Guide, in section 2.2, specifies that these investigations normally be accomplished by personal interviews with previous employers and with school officials. This would represent a major increase in the burden and cost associated with conducting background investigations over current practices which generally utilize telephone calls and/or written requests. Employers and school officials have been very cooperative with investigative agencies conducting background investigations, and we are aware of no problems sufficient to justify the substantial impact which would result from specifying personal interviews as the normal investigative technique. Those portions dealing with personal interviews should be removed from the Regulatory Guide. Proposed 10 CFR 73.56(d) would require that a psychological assessment program be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted access to protected and vital areas. Only individuals who have been granted access authorization prior to the effective date of the rule would be exempted from this requirement. We have had an access authorization program, approved by NRC, in effect for several years. Under our program, personnel who have had three years of continuous and trustworthy employment may be granted access authorization without being subjected to psychological examination or background investigation. No significant problems have resulted from use of this

program at our facilities. We are not aware of any problems at other facilities utilizing similar programs which would justify the additional burden and cost associated with psychological assessment and background investigation. We recommend that the proposed rule be modified to permit an exclusion from these provisions for individuals with at least three years continuous and trustworthy service. Safeguards provisions, including NRC a pproved security plans, have been in effect at all power reactors for several years. Operating practices have been adjusted to accommodate security requirements. Changes in this area can be disruptive in the same way as changes to plant design. Since all personnel at a reactor site are affected by safeguards requirements, the effect of seemingly minor disruptions can, in fact, be significant. Changes in this area should therefore be subject to the same backfitting controls as other new requirements.

• This would be the case if backfit controls were based on the effect or impact at a facility, as discussed in our recent letter regarding the proposed backfit rule.CO Regarding the balance of the proposed safeguards requirements, we have verified that operations at our facilities will not be significantly impacted by the proposed changes.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President By: C. F. Sears Vice President (1) W. G. Counsil letter to S. Chilk, dated January 23, 1985, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Backfitting.

\ Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245

                                                 .50-336
                                                 .50-423 Attachment Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Additional Comments Regarding Proposed Security Regulations and Draft Regulatory Guide March, 1985

Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 Additional Comments Regarding Proposed Security Regulations and Draft Regulatory Guide

1. Section 73.56(a)(4) would permit an access authorization plan to include a generic plan for use by contractors, manufacturers and suppliers. The licensee would remain responsible for granting, denying, or revoking access authorization. To assure that the benefits of a generic plan are realized, this section should be revised to clearly indicate that licensee review of

• 2.

the contractor's documentation need not precede action on access authorization. Periodic audits of contractor documentation, by the licensee, of contractor documentation should be sufficient to verify conformance with the generic plan. Section 73.55(a) would provide authority to suspend safeguards measures to facilitate response to emergency conditions. This authority should be extended to permit suspensions in simulated emergency conditions, or drills. This would add valuable realism to training exercises.

3. Section 73.56(h) would specify requirements to protect the privacy of personal information collected for access authorization purposes. This information is no different than other personal information controlled by licensees. Codification of privacy requirements in this manner is neither necessary nor appropriate.

CHARLES CENTER* P.O. BOX 1475

• BALTIMORE, MARY~ND 212?3 Al :Q 1 2 ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL, JR.

VICE PRESIDENT SUPPLY Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

• The NRC published for connnent in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register, proposed rules, 10CFR Parts 50 and 73, "Access Authorization Program" (49FR30726-30735). In the September 18, 1984 Federal Register (49FR36582),

the NRC announced that the draft regulatory guide SG301-4 "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" was available for public comment. The utilities participating in the Nuclear Employee Data System (NEDS) Pilot Program have reviewed the proposed rule and draft regulatory guide and offer these comments on issues relevant to the NEDS or other similar centralized nuclear employee information systems. In addition, the NEDS participants will also be submitting individual comments on those portions of the proposed rule and draft guide that address issues other than those relevant to the development and operation of a centralized data base containing nuclear employee information. We thoroughly support the efforts of the NRC to establish a uniform industry standard that provides for reciprocity for personnel screening programs. However, we feel that such standards could be established without additional regulation . In fact, we are currently developing such standards for the NEDS utilities which could serve as the basis for an industry wide standard endorsed by appropriate industry groups. Should NRC decide to proceed with the develop-ment of a regulation and guidance based upon the proposed rule, we are concerned that certain of its more prescriptive aspects will serve, in practice, to hinder screening program reciprocity. In particular, the proposed 10CFR73.56 (f) (1) requires that an access authorization granted by another licensee can be accepted only "if the original granting licensee sends to the gaining licensee a photograph of the individual and a written verification of the individual's unescorted access authorization along with a statement which indicates its current validity". This requirement for a photograph and a written statement significantly diminishes the utility of a central automat ed data system and introduces unnecessary delay due to the requirement to transmit documents through the mail. The intent of this regulatory requirement could be met without these impediments if the following reconnnended r evision, indicated by the underlined

                                                                                       ~

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' . Secretary of the Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch - 2 March 6, 1985 text, was made to 10CFR73.56: (f) (1) "The licensee may accept an unescorted access authorization granted an employee of a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment supplier by another licensee, or a current or a previous employee of another licensee, if the individual ' s employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the gaining licensee receives reliable information enabling him to positively verif y the identity of the individual and establish the validity of the individual unescorted access authorization with the granting licens ee . For individuals whose employment in licensed nuclear power reactors ha s been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days , the individual's activities must be investigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and a new psychological assessment made according to the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section." In conjunction with this change we recommend modifying Chapter 5 of the draft regulatory guide to permit such reliable information to be obtained from an automated data base for which appropriate data security and integrity standards have been established. Such information when properly verified would, in conjunction with fingerprint and past history information, provide adequate assurance of identity . The second area of concern relates to the proposed 73.56 (a) (4) that permits licensees to include in their access authorization plan, a generic plan to be used by all licensee contractors, manufacturers, or suppliers for screening and observing their employees . The statement of consideration (46FR30727) also states that: "In addition , the licensee would be responsible for auditing all licensee-accepted contractor, manufacturer, or supplier administered programs to determine compatibility with the requirements of this rule . " I t is our belief that , unless standardization of such generic plans within industry groups, such as the NEDS participants and those utilities within the Southeastern Electric Exchange, is encouraged, the administration of this aspect of the proposed rule will impose an unnecessary regulatory burden, not to mention inconsistency of effort. In particular, a single contractor or vendor may have to administer dozens of slightly different access authorization programs depending upon the particular site at which his personnel are employed . Further-more, he would be subject to dozens of essentially duplicative audits by licensee personnel to verify compliance. Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed 10CFR73.56 (a) ~4) be modified in the following manner as indicated by the underlined text: (a) (4) "Licensees either singly or as members of an industry group, may include in their Access Authorization Plan a generic plan to be used by all licensee contractors, manufacturers, or suppliers for screening and observing their employees . The licensee shall be responsible for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted access authorization to these individuals based upon the results of the contractors ' , manufacturers', or suppliers' findings or observa-tions. When licensees submit such generic plans as members of an industry group,

• • Secretary of the Commission Attn: Docke ting and Service Branch - 3 March 6, 1985 they may discharge the ir responsibilitie s to audi t t he contr actor s' , manu-facturers', or suppliers' programs to determine compatibility wi th this part through audits by members or representat i ves of that industry group."

It is our belief that these recommended changes to the proposed rule will provide a significant increase in the cost-effectiveness of the proposed rule without noticeable effect on the level of protection of the public health and safety

• Bechtel Power Corporation Engineers-Constructors

                                " T Fifty Beale Street San Francisco, California Mail Address : P.O. Box 3965, San Francisco, CA 94119
                               , -8 Ai1 :02 March 1, 1985 Gff ,CE o;:- SE C.1 t 11\ ~

OOC~E.TtNG & SE~V Cf BRANCH Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Insider Safeguards Rule

• Gentlemen:

The NRC published in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register, proposed rules, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73, "Access Authorization Program," "Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants," and "Searches of In-dividuals at Power Reactor Facilities", (49 FR 30726-30729) and solicited com-ments on same. Bechtel Power Corporation has reviewed the proposed rules and offers the following comments for your consideration: o Access Authorization Program

1. 10CFR73.56 proposes guidance long overdue for the nuclear industry regarding standardization in the process of screening applicants for nuclear power plant unescorted access authorization. Through such standardization, the probability is greatly enhanced for positive personnel access authorization by a receiving utility in employment relocations without duplication of a prior utility employer's proces-sing costs.

2. We recommend that in initial employee screening, an exception to the background investigation and psychological assessment requirements be provided by virtue of an individual having a period of years of con-tinuous trustworthy employment with the current employer. Without such exception the initial screening will result in significant cost increases to utilities.

3. The requirement for a background investigation verifying an applica-tion's true identity, employment, credit, educational, military ser-vice and criminal histories, character and reputation for a five-*

year retrospective time frame has a potential cost impact. This is true, at least from a nuclear contractor's standpoint regarding its construction workers. Although many "temporary" craft workers are S026

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Secretary of the Co1111ission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 1, 1985 Page two indigenous to the general area of a nuclear power plant site construction/maintenance location, another large segment is "travelers" who have worked for various periods for different em-ployers at a variety of widely separated locations. This is also true of same contractor's field and field office nonmanual employees. To date, nuclear utilities have generally adopted a three-year scope for background investigation. An additional two-years period for inquiry could require a cost increase of 40%, at minimum, for the investigation in many cases. Considering the restrictions en-countered in the development of personal information via investiga-tory methods, the value, if not the integrity of information, does not appear to warrant covering two more years. With much of the in-quiry effort conducted by telephone or correspondence, the probable results in most cases are of limited worth. The likelihood of obtaining full, true facts of, for example, prior employments in today's litigious climate is most doubtful. Accurate and timely detail of criminal conduct is almost impossible to acquire.

4. The imposition of psychological assessment is considered pertinent for realizing a more complete profile of access applicants. However, the use of a single paper test (such as the MMPI) does not provide comprehensive evaluation in and of itself. Such assessment results describe the test subject at the time of testing. The addition of further testing would essentiall y cover aspects of assessment absent in the MMPI. These tests, coupled with a face-to-face interview (by a psychologist at least somewhat familiar with the typical nuclear plant and construction employee attitudes and environments), would be more likely to provide a reasonably well-rounded assessment regarding the individual's present, past and future attitudes and tendencies.

We recognize that the above assessment effort is a costly under-taking. However, it would cost less than a properly conducted back-ground investigation, and the results would seem to be more directly applicable to the intent of the screening process.

5. A continual behavi oral observation program (CBOP) requirement, to be effective, is perhaps the most difficult to accomplish of all the proposed access authorization standards. The use of employee as-sistance programs currently in use by most companies would seem suf-ficient for this purpose.

6. An appeals process available to contractor nonmanual employees, in the *event of access denial, suspension or revocation, is absent. We recommend that a direction or guidance be provided.

Secretary of the Comaiaaion u.s. Nuclear*laauJ.atory Colllliaaion March 1, 1985. Page three

7. The Colllllissiou has placed an obligation (upon individuals granted unescorted access authorization) to come forward and reveal the existence of criminal charges against them during the period they actively possess access authorization. How many individuals will come forward to "show and tell" their derelictiona1 We suggest that this requirement be deleted .

8. We support the temporary authority for unescorted access of un-screened individuals during such operations (with the requirements of 10CFR.73.55 in effect).

Miscell aneous Amendments Conce rning Protection of Nuclear Power Plants 0

1. The identification of the vital island concept as an overall area of protection should, in many cases, reduce the numbers of personnel required to enforce security. The periodic review of physical security plans should aid in ensuring that security does not ad-versely impact on plant and personnel safety.

o Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities

1. The lessening of pat-down search requirements and concentration on search equipment use is an appropriate modification.

2. The authority to suspend Safeguard measures during emergencies al-ready exists but without specifying via 10CFRS0.54 (x) and (y), if approved by a licensed operator. Specific regulatory language would be appropriate within the physical security regulation.

• 3* Onsite secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications within a "protected area (in lieu of vital) would seem appro pr iate to the basic safeguards intent.

We are available for any questions you may have regarding our comments to the proposed rule.

                                                                     ~
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Peter Karpa Manager of Engineering Bechtel Power Management PK:ntl

NUMOHAWK T NIAGARA NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, ,N.Y. 13202/ TELEPHONE (3 15) 474- 1511

                                                                           -r The Honorable Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20005 Attn: Docketing and Service Branc h

Dear Sir:

On August l, 1984 , the Commission published for comment proposed rules on Access Authorization Programs for Nuclear Power Plants. 49 FR 30735. In conjunction with the proposed rule, the Commission also published for comment a Draft Regulatory Guide entitled Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants. As a utility involved in the operation and construction of nuclear power plants , we are pleased to offer comments with regard to the proposed regulation and the implementing guidelines of the draft Regulatory Guide. Our comments are directed at both the Rule and the Regulatory Guide since, in our view, the Regulatory Guide reflects the Staff interpretation of the Rule and, from our experience, will likely be the minimum standard to which programs will be required to conform. In our view, the proposed access authorization program is overly restrictive and for the most part, unnecessary. We are particularly concerned with the quality of the Draft Regulatory Guide. The Regulatory Guide is something less than a thoughtfully conceived document. It contains a number of inaccµracies and is apparently based on numerous incorrect assumptions. The Regulatory Guide imposes requirements on the scope of the background investigation that are, for all practical purposes, impossible to attain. It also proposes a continual observation program that is in our view inconsistent with the concepts of personal privacy and dignity. Of equal significance in our decision to oppose the proposed rule, is its relative inflexibility and its inadaptability to the circumstances encountered at different nuclear plants. While the proposed regulation (with a somewhat more reasoned version of the

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Regulatory Guide) may have little adverse impact on an established, operating plant at a single-plant site, the proposed regulation will have a substantial adverse impact on dual plant sites (where the entire site is likely never to be in cold shutdown), plants not yet in operation (where "grandfathering" will not be available), plants where most maintenance is perfonned by licensee employees (the "cold shutdown" exception applies only to contractor employees), and plants faced with unscheduled outages. We believe that the proposed rule does not consider the unique circumstances existing at each plant site and does not adequately balance the specific needs of each plant against the advantages gained from a C00111ission-mandated access authorization program. While a decrease in the "insider" vulnerability is an admirable

• goal, it must be balanced against the inherent decrease in efficiency and effectiveness of plant maintenance activities created by the consequent restrictions on accessibility, and the potential decrease in employee morale (and consequently, in our view, a c9rresponding decrease in employee efficiency) created by onerous employee observation requirements. That balancing is best left to the individual licensees who are most aware of the requirements of their plant sites.

Niagara Mohawk is implementing in conjunction with start up of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, an access authorization program that adequately balances the requirements for security of the plant site against other plant requirements, including efficient and effective maintenanc~. We believe that the decrease in effective and responsive maintenance capability at Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 that would result from the proposed access authorization program would more than outweigh the potential increase in safety obtained by more stringent access requirements. Accordingly, we urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed rule on Access Authorization Programs for Nuclear Power Plants. Detailed comments on the proposed rule and Regulatory Guide are contained in Attachment A. Responses to questions for specific public comment are contained in Attachments Band C. Very truly yours, J. J. Sunser Manager, Corporate Security JJS/GDW/gma

Enclosures:

Attachment A - Specific Conunents on Access Authorization Program Attactnnent B - Responses to Questions for Specific Public Conment Attachment C - Comments of System Councjl U-11 of the IBEW.

Attactment A Specific Cooments on Access Authorization Program Background Investigations The Access Authorization Program as outlined in the proposed rule and the Oraft Regulatory Guide contains unrealistic expectations as to the ability of utilities to obtain detailed background infonnation. Both the proposed rule and the Regulatory Guide require the verification of the employees *true

• identity 11
• To verify a literal ntrue identity 11 re qui res the establ i shnent of a chain of identity back to birth. But to verify that the applicant is the same person whose name appears on a birth certificate can be a monumental task and is not particularly useful. Background investigations should instead insure that the applicant has maintained a consistent identity during the period over which the background investigation is being conducted. The phrase ntrue identity 11 should be replaced simply with 11 identity~"

The Regulatory Guide states that the preferred method of verifying identity is a fingerprint check with the local police or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such a requirement is simply not practical. The local police and the FBI do not nonnally honor requests for fingerprint checks from private parties. Further, even if access to State and Federal Fingerprint Records were available, these records are far from complete. It is more than likely that an applicant's fingerprints would not be on file. Finally, even if the

fingerprints were available, all that would be established is simply whether the applicant's claimed identity at the time of the fingerprinting is the same as his current identity. More flexible criterion for identity verification should be allowed. Utilities face a similar problem in attempting to ascertain the criminal history of an applicant. The Regulatory Guide apparently ass1.P11es that there

• is a central clearing house that will provide infonnation with regard to criminal convictions.

available. No such central source of criminal information is In order to obtain a complete criminal history of an applicant, ft is necessary to make inquiries in every state in which the applicant could have cormiitted a criminal act. Further, a number of states, including New York State, do not make criminal records available to private parties. Accordingly, if the C00111ission desires utilities to conduct a thorough investigation of the applicant's criminal history, ft must establish a mechanism that will allow utilities to gather such infonnation. Further, the detailed information on employment history and educational history required by the Regulatory Guide is not nonnally made available by employers and educational institutions. Because of concerns for liability for providing incorrect derogatory infonnation and concern for personal privacy, they are generally reluctant to release information regarding disciplinary I records, and psychological a~d medical problems. While we agree that this type of information is useful in evaluating the acceptability of an applicant for unescorted access, it is unrealistic for the ConJ11ission to expect utilities to obtain more than general infonnation on dates of employment, positions held and reasons for tennination. Finally, our experience indicates that inquiries to the National

• Personnel Records Center with regard to an applicant's military history require an inordinate amount of time for response.

months are not uncommon. Delays in excess of 6 As a result, inquiry into an individual's military record should generally be limited to a review of his DD 214. Further inquiry should be limited to those circ11J1stances where the initial review indicates that additional infonnation is needed. In sum, the background infonnation required by the Draft Regulatory Guide is simply beyond the ability of many utilities, including Niagara Mohawk, to

• obtain. If the Commission desires investigations of the breadth and depth suggested by the Regulatory Guide, utilities should be authorized by law to collect such information. Without legal authority to obtain such information, the scope of background investigations will be substantially limited *

 . Moreover, the depth and breadth of the suggested investigations will place an especially severe hardship on those utilities currently constructing nuclear pl ants. While operating pl ants will be able to 11 grandfather 11 the majority of their employees, and thus limit the scope of background investigations to a relatively small number of newly-hired employees, newly-licensed plants will be required to conduct detailed background investigations of essentially their entire nuclear staff.

Niagara Mohawk agrees that 11 grandfathering 0 of employees previously granted authorization is appropriate, but believes that an exemption from

• • background investigations should also be granted to all employees with three or more years of continuous service with the utility. It can hardly be argued that 3 years of day-to-day observation of an individual is a far better indication of personal stability than a five year background investigation.

Such a provision would do much to reduce the burden of investigation faced by a newly-licensed utility faced with literally hundreds of employees to investigate and would not reduce the effectiveness of the access authorization program *

• Psychological Evaluation In Niagara Mohawk's view, psychological evaluation is an appropriate part of an access authorization program. Indeed, Niagara Mohawk's voluntary program includes psychological evaluation~ The proposed rule inappropriately requires, however, that the tests 11 be evaluated by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist." The procedure should allow the test to be administered and mechanically graded by clerical personnel using criteria developed by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist.

Continual Observation Program Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation strongly opposes the proposed requirement

• for a continual observation program. It was the Conmission's decision some time ago to issue the previously proposed Fitness for Duty rule as a policy statement rather than implement a fonnal rule. The proposed continual observation program is for the most part a restatement of the Fitness for Duty program and is therefore a needless duplication.

Furthennore, the scope of the proposed continual observation program required by the Rule and the Regulatory Guide, is disquieting. The ubig brother is watching" type of environment that would be required by the regulation is not the kind of environment in which an efficient and effective operating team is developed and maintained. In our view, the kind of environment in which a statement about not sleeping well (see question 5 of Appendix C to the Regulatory Guide) made in casual conversation with a fellow employee must be dutifully noted in a personnel file, is the antithesis of a proper working environment. At most, the rule should require the training of supervisory personnel to increase their awareness of and sensitivity to indicators of potential problems. It should not mandate a fonnal program of obse*rvati on. Other Ccmnents Proposed §73.56(c) states that "the licensee shall re<JJire that

• individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report pronptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individuals' continued access authorization" (emphasis added). Such a requirement is as a practical matter unenforceable, is inconsistent with the guarantee of confidentiality present in most employee assistance programs, and will tend to induce self-denial of the problem by the employee. While it is appropriate to encourage self-reporting of problems, a mandated requirement of self-reporting is actually counterproductive *
• The proposed regulation allows access to unscreened non-licensee employees during cold shutdowns and refueling operations~ 10 CFR S73.SS(c). Access should also be allowed for unscreened licensee employees during shutdowns (i.e., employees nonnally assigned to the licensee's non-nuclear facilities).

This would allow the licensee the option of perfonning major maintenance and construction activities with either contractor labor or licensee maintenance employees without requiring that the licensee maintain a large pool of screened maintenance employees. Provision should also be made in access authorization programs to allow the granting of interim clearances on a limited basis~ An interim clearance which could be based, for example, upon the favorable completion of psychological evaluation, verification of recent employment, identity verification, and checks with character references, would allow utilities to properly respond to exigent circ1J11stances, such as unscheduled outages, that frequently arise in the operation of a power generation facility

• Attactrnent B Responses to Questions for Specific Public Conment

l. To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the canmercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral re1iabi1 ity programs al ready used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

We are aware that a number of utilities, including Niagara Mohawk, have implemented voluntary programs intended to screen individuals who may be unsuited for access to nuclear plants. Since we have not surveyed the entire nuclear industry with regard to this matter, we are unable to speculate as to the industry-wide status of such programs.

2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Psychological assessment is used as a preliminary screening device to identify individuals who are likely to exhibit inappropriate, unreliable or aberrant job behavior in nuclear power plant settings. Hence it can be used to address potential fitness for duty or radiological sabotage concerns.

3. What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil 11 berties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Cooanission is also interested in specific canments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweight the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

• The imposition of an access authorization rule will clearly impact employees' First Amendment and privacy rights. These rights are not absolute or unqualified rights, however, but rather are subject to reasonable restrictions necessary to safeguard the public interest. Accordingly, reasonable regulations enacted to promote or advance the public health and safety will not be considered by the courts to be an abridgement of First Amendment rights. In addition, the right to individual privacy (which is,
• contrary to the Statement in the Draft Regulatory Guide, not a specific right protected by the First Amendment) may be explicitly or implicitly waived.

our opinion, an employee's voluntary application for access to protected and In vital areas of the nuclear facility implicitly constitutes a waiver of an assertion of privacy with regard to matters nonnally considered in background investigations and psychological testing. Further, a prudent utility will request express waivers froo, applicants for access. Accordingly, reasonably designed access authorization programs providing increased physical security to the plant will likely withstand legal challenge. Notwithstanding, the likely legality of the access authorization rule, we would point out that a voluntary program, such as the program being implemented by Niagara Mohawk, does not involve state action which is required to trigger First Amendment concerns. Even though it is likely that the proposed Access Authorization Rule would pass Constitutional muster, we believe tha~ the continual observation program a*s outlined in the Regulatory Guide 1s a particularly offensive (albeit legal) invasion of privacy: Further comnents with regard to this concern are provided in Attachment A.

4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidenc~ does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to corrmercial nuclear power reactors?

There fs extensive literature including over 5,000 books, manuals and papers on the use of the MMPI for clinical assessment in a variety of psychological, educational and industrial settings. In general, the MMPI has been shown to be useful as an initial screening device to identify the most severely psychologically impaired individuals: There is evidenc~ to support clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in combination

• with the MMPI as an effective means to identify individuals who might be a hazard if given unesc9rted access to nuclear power reactors.

5. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What perc~ntage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Individuals with emotional instability who have such characteristics as argumentative hostility and antisocial conduct, irresponsibility and impulsivity, psychopathology, compulsive incompetence, and substance abuse {alcohol and drugs) have been identified by some of the MMPI scales. False positives (Type I errors where individuals are diagnosed as dangerous but who really aren t) and false negatives (Type II errors were individuals are 1 diagnosed as hannless when in reality they are dangerous) occur in typical or

• average populations a relatively small proportion of the time. However, those individuals with extremely severe psychological malfunctioning are identified relatively frequently. We know of no data that gives error rates for the nuclear power industry. There have been other psychological tests, e.g. 16 PF, which have been used and some studies undertaken by the Edison Electric Institute. The general consensus according to the last review of the MMPI and its literature in Buros 1 Mental Measurements Yearbook concludes:

          "To sumarize, the MMPI remains matchless as the the objective instrument for the assessment of pyschopathology.u (Professor King)

6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs.

The uses of psychological assessment in the nuclear industry is justified on the basis of its ability, with competent usage, to screen out large numbers of individuals with severe dangerous psychological impairment. We do not believe that there are validity data on psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs which would permit quantification of risk reduction.

7. Can the use of psychological assessment in the c011111ercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Experience and the literature on psychological assessment, including the use of the MMPI have been shown to have value (although not sufficiently adequate by themselves) in screening out the most severely psychologically impaired individuals in both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage situations.

8. To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment?

What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e.,

• if only background investigations were adopted?

The psychological assessment program is the most easily implemented and least disniptive of the three programs constituting the proposed rule. It has also been demonstrated to be effective in the screening of unreliable tndividuals. The elimination of psychological assessment would therefore increase the possibility of admitting inappropriate individuals to the plant.

9. What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment? By the use of background investigations? By the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Psychological assessment has screened out individuals with the following behavioral problems: Aggressive or violent behavior Lack of temper controls Hostile or destructive acts Inability to handle stress Disrespect for social nonns Impul sivity Emotional problems Background investigations have screened out individuals who have: Falsified or 001itted infonnation Criminal convictions Poor employment history Drug abuse The behavioral reliability program has resulted in tennination of employment for: Unstable actions Poor job perfonnance Alcohol abuse

10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures including psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

We are unaware of any abuses by management personnel in administering the screening progr511. Review and/or grievance procedures preclude abuses.

11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

In order to provide an objective response, Niagara Mohawk offered the Chainnan of System Council U-11 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which represents the unionized employees of Niagara Mohawk, the opportunity to respond directly to this question. The Council's response is included as Attacllnent C* Attachment C 1Jutrrnationul filrntl1rrqonh of tlrrtriral 3Wlnrkrrs I B E. W SYSTEM COUNCIL U-11 LOCAL UNION 79 SYRACUSE LOCAL UNION 133>1. BUFFALO LOCAL UNION 137, ALOAN'Y LOCAL UNION 1352 Bun.-.Lo LOCAL UN!ON 310, UTICA LOCAL UNION 1369 GLENS FALLS LOCAL UNION 478 OSWEGO LOCAL UNION 1385 ALBANY LOCAL UNlON 554 WATERTOWN LOCAL UNION 1371. GLOVER8VILI.E LOCAL UNION 836, POTSDAM LOCAL UNION 1484 SYR..,CU6E February 25, 1985 The following is a statement by System Council U-11, International Brotherhood Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.) who represent the employees of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (N.M.P.C.) The subject matter being the "Standard Format and Content Guide For

• • cess Authorization Plans For Nuclear Power Plants" being proposed by the

.clear Regulatory Commission (N,R.C.) In an effort to respond calmly and intelligibly to the latest myriad of rules and regulations proposed by the NRC and defined as an Access Authorization program; we will attempt to discuss our concerns in the three specific componets hi-lighted by the commissions proposed rule. Although there may be some validity in all three areas of concern and most notably in the background investigation area, the ability of the agency to add reams of paper containing rules and regulations to an already sound, active and reputable system only serves to make one wonder is nuclear power worth it all, for those who have to work at these facilities. In the Background Investigation area we have different opinions where credit and character are concerned. One's credit is of a personal nature d doesn't belong in the hands of others as a check against ones stability.

• e merit behind this idea is unfounded and would appear more to border on the line of harassment then to protect the safety of the public. Agencies deal with credit risks. People have a right to certain privacies and this should include from their employer and the N.R.C.

The character issue is too ambiguous. The wrong person in the right position can make anyones character look skeptic. Several people judging ones character may also be a poor measure. A man was once nailed to the cross because of character. I wonder who was on the committee. Over the years nuclear power has been d ended by utilities and its employees as a safe and economical means of supplying power for the publics everday needs. Public concerns addressed to our people have nearly 100% been in the areas of mechanical and technical engineering safe guards.

I have never been questionen by the public about what safe guarrls no uti] 1ties prescribe for hiring rh~ir personnel at a nuclear station. We and the public it would 1nrl1cate are quite satisfied that the system presently administered in ~iring and maintaining its employees at nuclear facilities is adequate and sufficient to provide protection for public health and safety. Psychological assessments also is hanjled sufficiently with corporate tests an4 interviews. A private interview with a phychiatrist or psychologist may allow him to understand a human being on a comparison value against ot~ers but it shouldn't become a measuring stick for employment at a nuclear plant. If enough people take enough tests, sooner or later they are bound to stumble, even a psychiatrist. Last but not least and the most degrarling would be the Continual Behavior Observation Program. There isn't anyone who could pass it. Mople would be paranoid just working in a facility where every move, de-9sion, act or breath they took was being monitored. The falacy here is that with a couple of hours of study a supervisor now will become a competent judge of behaviorial patterns that could cost an individual his livelihood. It also opens the door for personality con-flicts to be handled by judgement calls. Supervisors may well be qualified to do the jobs they were hired for but to judge the many facets of the complicated tool known as man I have to strongly challange. FroM one day to the next, hahits and personality could change due to many outside cir-cu~stances that work associates would not be aware of. To pass off changes in certain behaviorial patterns as "patterns which may lead to acts detrirnental to Puhlic Health and Safety" is ludicrous. tline ~ile Nuclear Plant, Unit #1 has been in operation for around 15 years. If this Access Authorization Plan is so important then why wasn't anyone concerned in these areas lS years ago? How did we ever manage with- . t all the "red tape". We personally believe public safety in this program is taking the rap for agency job security at the publics expense. Any valid ideas found in the program have been buried in a sea of rules and regulations that carry no just merit. This proposal borders Unconstitutional in its restrictive format and supplies the employer with a means of discharging an employee at will. Even though the agency tries weakly to address the problem of fair-ness wit~ review boards, constitutional rights and adequate bargaining agreement measures their concerns are only of a legal nature and not of human concern.

This program is best described in the agency's own text found under appendix "C - "The Supervisors Guide to Observing Behavioral Change" # 11 "Bizz*are and Unusual Ideas". We strongly oppose this plan in its present format and hope you will share our concerns. Respectfully submitted, SYSTEM COUNCIL U-11

                                   ~             & . ~~

Richard D. Banks Chairman

Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

• 1.

Attached are Commonwealth Edison Company's comments on the following documents: 10CFR Parts 50 and 73 Access Authorization Program Proposed Rule

2. Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection

3. Draft Regulatory Guide "Standard Format and Content Guide For Access Authorization Plans For Nuclear Power Plants" These comments should not be construed to mean that CECo approves or endorses the rulemaking as a means of addressing concerns related to potential insider threats. It is still our position that the best approach to the problem is the development of an access authorization program guide based on ANS 3.3 by the industry and implementation by the individual utilities of a program meeting the intent of the guide.

We sincerely appreciate having been given the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule making and draft documents. Very truly yours,

                                                         ~e~

Nuclear Licensing Administrator bs encls. MAR 8 1985 9849N Acknowledged by card.*

l. S. . CLEAP. ~t:GULATORY COMM__,_

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY COnments for: NUclear Regulatory Coan:uission 10 CFR Parts 50 and 13 Access Authorization Program Proposed Rule 13.56 Personnel Access Authorization Requirements For NUclear Power Plants (a) General (1) through ( 4) Cauments - COUIDonwealth Edison Company recommends that when a licensee is multi-unit and multi-site, it is understood that one Access Authorization program will be submitted. -- (c) Background Investigation Comments - As a minimum, this background investigation must document an individual's true identity and criminal history. The individual's character and reputation will be determined through two listed and two developed references. The activities for the past three years to be examined would include residence, employment, education and military service. All post-secondary school degrees must be verified.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Clarification of the grandfather clause 1s necessary. There should be a provision that addresses the period following the effective date of rule for licensee employees and/or contractor employees who were not authorized unescorted access; License recommends that no background investigations be required if an employee has 36 months of continuous service and has not exhibited signs of aberrant behavior during this service time. This background investigation exemption would be extended only to those companies with continuous observation programs in effect. True Identity commonwealth Edison does not believe that positive identification should be limited to fingerprint records or photographs. In light of other identification programs being developed, it is recommended that licensees be able to develop their own programs, mutually acceptable within the industry, for positive identification. Employment History Considering the employment history of transient workers, a representative verification of all claimed employment would be sufficient rather than checking all claimed employment. The licensee also recommends that employment for a three year, rather than a five year period, be verified.

COIMMONWEALTH EDISOlil C011PANY Additionally, because of the expense involved with personal interviews, Commonwealth Edison recommends that "personal interviews with previous employers" be clarified to include the use of telephone or mail *

• Educational History The licensee believes that "personal interviews" do not need to be conducted. Official records or transcripts of post-secondary degrees should be verified as well as technical equivalency degrees, if needed, for direct job qualifications.

Credit History commonwealth Bdison firmly believes that an individual's credit history is not a viable criterion for job qualification. Any negative aspects of a credit history check could be subject to misinterpretation as a qualifier. It is believed that if an individual has credit problems that are directly related to character deficiencies, these problems will surface as a part of the overall background investigation.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COKPANY Military Service The licensee recOlllllends verification be restricted to a three year background period unless the military experience provides the qualifications for the. position. If adverse information regarding military service emerged during a background investigation, a more l complete investigation would be undertaken. Short of the above two exceptions, the DD-214 should satisfy military service verification. The last sentence of paragraph (c) requiring self reporting by the employee of incidents which may have a bearing on his/her access authorization (and possibly his/her employment as well) should be deleted. It is our opinion that such a requirement 1s unrealistic and

• impossible to audit. This position also appears to be in direct conflict with the NRC's position (and that of most licensees) with regard to employee assistance programs. There is also concern that this provision could be in direct conflict with some state statutes. The Draft Reg Guide, (page 24) for example, states that an employee assistance program should "provide complete confidentiality to employees*.

COMHONWBALTH EDISON COMPANY (d) Psychological Assessment comments - Licensee recommends the use of a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist. A psychologist's education, training and experience better qualifies him to evaluate personality traits. 'fhis is a psychological assessment, not a psychiatric assessment

• Also, licensee questions how the tests' predetermined evaluation scales

      *shall have been proven to be valid". Previous studies have shown the tests to be predictiv.,e to the general population. To date, there have only been a few studies, which are limited in scope, made on nuclear facilities employees. There is ample room for debate as to what constitutes validity; therefore commonwealth Edison recoomends that every utility develop and/or continue using its own psychological testing procedure.

d(2) "abnormal personality traits" Comments - There will be no consistent application throughout the United States unless abnormal is defined more specifically. Additionally, licensee requests that the licensee be allowed to designate the "appropriate senior management'" who shall receive the written recommendation as to the individual's behavioral suitability. As an example, Commonwealth Edison utilizes the company's Medical Department. This department receives and retains psychological reports, since medical personnel are trained in confidentiality and matters of this nature.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (e) continual Behavioral Observation Program Comments - canmonwealth Edison recommends deletion of this section as it is generally recognized as part of management's continuing responsibility. For instance, at Commonwealth Edison, programs to train managers in observing employees' behavior include Awareness Day, and supervisory Training. The licensee's managers are trained to be sensitive to abnormal behavior and our Employee Assistance Program has been designed to address problems that can adversely impact a person's performance and ability while on the job. (f) Non-Licensee Employees

• Comments - Licensee rec011111ends that identification should not be limited to photograph and written verification. The licensees should be able to develop their own programs, mutually acceptable within the industry, for positive identification of non-licensee employees.

(g) Review Procedures COmments - commonwealth Edison believes that additional review procedures are not necessary as there are existing state and federal regulations that provide adequate opportunities for an individual to address the grievance procedures. Licensee does not believe there is widespread abuse that necessitates this additional review procedure.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON (h) Protection of Information Revisions are recormnended as follows: Revise 13.45(h)(2) to read as follows: "The licensee **. shall not disclose the personal information collected *** to persons other than the subject individual, or his representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information 1n performing assigned duties in the process of granting or denying access to protected areas and vital island." Legal disputes stemming from future security clearance denials are predictable. The proposed revision should recognize that certain documents may be required for disclosure to both licensees' and plaintiffs' attorneys. ~dditionally, nuclear employee data type systems are being developed to efficiently and uniformly screen employees. This provision should provide a means for the exchange of information between licensees to accomodate these data systems. canments - In order to ensure that documents are not lost or destroyed and to meet privacy requirements, any review of files or documents made by the NRC should be undertaken on the licensee's property.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON (5) Licensee requests more complete definition of the access authorization file. Additional eomments To The Proposed Draft Regulatory Guide and

• Value/Impact Statement A review of this Guide suggest that various potential costs have not been fully addressed. For example, due to the collective bargaining agreements, licensees may have to pay wages while awaiting results of a background check for a potential worker who is not performing any duties
• COMMONWEALTH EDISON COKPJ\NY MISCELLANEOUS M'IENDMENTS CONCERNING PH'!SICAL PRO'J!ECTION OF HUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Clarification of Vital Area Designation Policy

        *certain items, however, would be deemed vital in all cases".

COmments Camnonwealth Edison company reccxnmends that Vital Areas should be designated on a plant specific basis and would be the result of agreements between licensees and reviewers. A blanket interpret'ation, as indicated by the proposed rule change, could establish an unnecessary constraint on operations *

• commonwealth Edison strongly petitions that all exemptions granted by past reviewers be honored.

The proposed rule requires the establishment of *access lists* for each vital island. 'rhe term *1ist" may imply that a written log for each vital island 1s required. commonwealth Edison does not believe that a written log is either necessary or should be the only method employed. Presently, the names of the personnel who are authorized access to a vital area are entered into the access control system computer and physical controls to the vital arMS are maintained via the ID/card issued to each authorized person. We recaamend that wording be changed to read as follows: (a) Establish current authorization procedures or systems for each vital island. The procedures or systems must be updated and

• (b) reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least wery 31 days. 'fhe licensee shall include in the procedure or system only ***
• Positively control, in accordance with the procedure or system establish
• gev and LOck Controls (2) *whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for reasons of lack of trustworthiness, reliability or inadequate performanceM.

Comments Licensee requests that *1nadequate perfo.cmance* be deleted or 1110d.1f1ed to indicate how that inadequate performance poses a threat to security.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COHPANY

                                   - Page 'l."Wo -

(c) Physical Barriers (c) MRevoke, in the case of an individual's involuntary termination for cause, the individual's access authorization and retrieve his/her identification badge and other entry devices, as applicable, prior to or simultaneously with notifying this individual of his/her termination." comments COmmonwealth Edison believes that simultaneous notification is impractical because of the fact that contractors are located throughout the country and it would be very difficult to receive simultaneous notification. This should be modified to: notification within a reasonable time

• 73.10 Records (d) COmments commonwealth Edison takes exception to the rationale of maintaining an entry log. currently, licensee 1s not required to keep a log for entry for those requiring access into normally occupied vital areas. This new ruling would cause unnecessary delays and added costs and would not measurably enhance the efficiency of security.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY canments on Draft Regulatory Guide and Value/Impact Statement

1. General Performance Objective and Requirements (b) "This section describes the general objectives and major components of the licensee's access authorization program. It is intended to provide for the "grandfathering" of certain employees who have received unescorted access authorizations prior to the effective date of the rule.*

( COIIIUents - Clarification of the grandfather clause is necessary. There should be a provision that addresses the period following the effective date of rule for licensee employees and/or contractor employees who were not authorized unescorted access. Licensee recommends that no background investigations be required if an employee has 36 months of continuous service and has not exhibited signs of aberrant behavior during this service time. This background investigation exemption would be extended only to those companies with continuous observation programs in effect.

2. Background Investigation (c) *As a minimum, this background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation. a

cxntoNWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Comments - As a minimum, this background investigation must document an individual's true identity and criminal history. The individual's character and reputation will be determined through two listed and two developed references. The activities for the past three years to be examined would include residence, employment, education and military service. All post-secondary school degrees must be verified.

• True Identity*

commonwealth Edison does not believe that positive identification should be limited to fingerprint records or photographs. In light of other identification programs being developed, it is recommended that licensees be able to develop their own programs, mutually acceptable within the industry, for positive identification. Employment History Considering the employment history of transient workers, a representative verification of all claimed employment would be sufficient instead of checking all claimed employment. The licensee also recommends that employment for a three year, rather than a five year period, be verified. Additionally, because of the expense involved with personal interviews, Commonwealth Edison recommends that "personal interviews with previous employers" be clarified to include the use of telephone or mail.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Educational History The licensee believes that *personal interviews" do not need to be conducted. Official records or transcripts of post-secondary degrees should be verified as well as technical equivalency degrees, if needed,

• for direct job qualifications.

credit History commonwealth Edison firmly believes that an individual's credit history is not a viable criterion for job qualification. Any negative aspects of a credit history check could be subject to misinterpretation as a qualifier. It is believed that 1f an individual has credit problems that are directly related to character deficiencies, these problems will surface as a part of the overall background investigation. Military Service The licensee recommends verification be restricted to a three year background period unless the military experience provides the qualifications for the position. If adverse information regarding military service emerged during a background investigation, a more complete investigation would be undertaken. Short of the above two conditions, the DD-214 should satisfy military service check.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY The last sentence of paragraph (c) requiring self reporting by the employee of incidents which may have a bearing on his/her access authorization (and possibly his/her employment as well) should be deleted. It is our opinion that such a requirement 1s unrealistic and impossible to audit. This position also appears to be in direct conflict

• with the NRC 1

s position (and that of most licensees) with regard to employee assistance programs. There is also concern that this provision could be in direct conflict with some state statutes. The Draft Reg Guide, (page 24) for example, states that an employee assistance program should "provide complete confidentiality to employees*.

3. Psychological Assessment d(l) "Results of the personality tests shall be evaluated by a qualified and if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist."

we concur with the inclusion of psychological assessment in the amendment with the following comments: The Reg Guide is unduly prescriptive. Licensees should be required to develop psychological testing programs within the framework of the general objectives of the rule without detailed direction as to how this should be done.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (2) clinical interviews (ii) - The regulations state that tests and interviews shall be designed to evaluate *** behavioral patterns which could develop into a pattern which could develop into a *high" (very subjective) potential for committing detrimental acts. It 1s assumed that a licensee who might determine to take a somewhat more conservative and restrictive approach would thereby be in violation of the rule. This prescriptive, subjective standard should be eliminated. Licensee recommends the use of a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist. A psychologist's education, training and experience better qualifies him to evaluate personality traits. This is a psychological assessment, not a psychiatric assessment *

• Also, licensee questions how the tests' predetermined evaluation scales "shall have been proven to be valid".

tests to be predictive. Previous studies have shown the To date, there have only been a few studies, which are limited in scope, made on nuclear facilities employees. There is ample room for debate as to what constitutes validity: therefore, commonwealth Bdison recommends that every utility develop and/or continue using its own psychological testing procedure.

COHMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY d(2) *abnormal personality traits". carments - There will be no consistent application throughout the united States unless abnormal is defined more specifically.

• Additionally, licensee requests that the licensee be allowed to designate the "appropriate senior managementM who shall receive the written recommendation as to the individual's behavioral suitability. As an example, commonwealth Edison utilizes the company's Medical Department.

     '!'his department receives and retains psychological reports, since medical personnel are trained in confidentiality and matters of this nature.

4. continual Behavioral Observation Program

• • (e)(i) "'!'he licensee shall establish and maintain a continual behavioral observation program for individuals which is designed to have superiors detect changes in an individual's on-the-job performance, judgment level or behavior, and after detecting a pattern of abnormal behavior, refer the individual to senior licensee management to make an initial decision on whether to maintain or temporarily suspend the individual's unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands.~

COMMONWEALTH EDISOt~ COMPANY Cormnents - Commonwealth Edison recommends deletion of this section as it is generally recognized as part of management's continuing responsibility. For instance, at Commonwealth Edison, programs to train managers in.observing employees* behavior include Awareness Day, and Supervisory Training. The licensee's managers are trained to be sensitive to abnormal behavior and our Employee Assistance Program has been designed to address problems that can adversely impact a person's /21 performance and ability while on the job.

6. Review Procedures comments - eommonwealth Edison believes that additional review procedures

• are not necessary as there are existing state and federal regulations that provide adequate opportunities for an individual to address the grievance procedures Licensee does not believe there is widespread abuse that necessitates this additional review procedure.

1. Protection of Information Revisions are recommended as follows:

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Revise 13.45(h) (2) to read as follows: "The licensee *** shall not disclose the personal information collected *** to persons other than the subject individual, or his representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the

• process of granting or denying access to protected areas and vital island". Legal disputes stenming fran future security clearance denials are predictable. The proposed revision should recognize that certain documents may be required for disclosure to both licensees' and plaintiffs' attorneys. Additionally, nuclear employee data type systems are being developed to efficiently and uniformly screen employees. This provision should provide a means for the exchange of information between licensees to accomodate these data systems *
• (h)4 *The licensee shall make available files or documents relied upon by the licensee, including records of audits done on the contractor's screening program, for examination by an NRC inspector to allow the NRC to determine the licensee's compliance in implementing its approved plan.*

comments - In order to insure that documents are not lost or destroyed, and to meet privacy requirements, any review of files or documents made by the NRC should be undertaken on the licensee's property.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Appendix B Training and qualification standards for state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist *

• 1) Licensee recommends that only a clinical psychologist should administer and interpret psychological assessment. COUnseling or individual psychologists may not have experience in psychological testing regarding clinical matters because experience may be limited to normal population.

Licensee would also recommend thdt only state-licensed psychologists be used .

• Additional COmments - A review of the Draft Regulatory Guide and Value/Impact Statement suggests that various potential costs have not been fully addressed. For example, due to the collective bargaining agreements, licensee may have to pay wages while awaiting results of a background check for a potential worker who is not performing any duties.

   #2047H

G L EN N L. KO ES T ER VIC E PRESI D EN T

• NUC L EAR PJ :23 March 5, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing & Service Branch KMLNRC 85-075 Subj: Comment on Three Proposed Rules

Dear Sir:

• On August 1, 1984 three proposed rules were published in the Federal register for comment:

1) Access Authorization 30726),

Program (49 Federal Regulation

2) Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plant (49 Federal Regulation 30735),

3) Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (49 Federal Regulation 30738).

Kansas Gas and Electric Company's comments on the three proposed rules are contained in the attachment. Yours very truly,

                                                                  ~~
                                                           ~ Glenn L. Koester
                                                       / - - Vice President - Nuclear GLK:dab Attachment xc:            PO'Connor (2)

HBundy JCummins 201 N. Market -Wichita, Kansas - Mail Address: P.O. Box 208 / Wichita, Kansas 67201 - Telephone: Area Code (316) 261-6451

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE ECTION OFFICE OF THE SE(IW Y OF THE COM I ' *N Po,tmark Oats

Attachrrent to KMINRC 85-075

                      ~        Clil PIDPOSED NRC *rNSIIER RULES*
 "Access Authorization Program" (49 Fed . Reg. 30726)

1) The proposed rule requires a psychological assessment utilizing a written personality test. Currently, ANSI 18.17-1973, "Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants," requires an examination by a licensed psychiatrist, physician or other person professionally trained to identify aberrant behavior. Use of a written test should be left to the discretion of the professionally trained individual .

2) ANSI Nl8 . 17 currently requires a continued behavior observation program. The proposed rule goes beyond this point and specifies the administration of this program. The utility should be allowed flexibility in order to fit the administration of their program to its own individual organizational policies for detection and referral .

3) Elimination of the requirerrent that temporary workers rreet access authorization requirements during cold shutdown or refuel ing operations, with the stipulation that thorough visual examination of the affected protected areas be made prior to starting up the plant, is part of the proposed rule . KG&E supports this change .

 "Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants " {49 Fed . Reg . 30735)

In general, KG&E supports the arrendments, with the exception of "on-site

• water supplies {excluding piping) required for safe shutdown" as a vital area {as this could be extended to mean the Ultimate Heat Sink) and an increase in the classification of physical security system support equipment to a vital area designation.

 "Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities" (49 Fed . Reg . 30738)

Requirerrent of 100% pat down searches of individuals allowed unescorted access whenever the metal detectors or explosive detectors are out of service could be very detrimental to norale. These individuals are carefully screened, providing a degree of assurance that they will not ccmnit sabotage to the plant . KG&E strongly opposes this proposed change.

I SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 1800 M STREET , N . W . WASHINGTON, D . C. 20036 TELECOPIER 12021 822-1099 & 822- 1199

                                                                                    'l ~x 89-2693 ISHAWLAW WSH I March 7, 1985                            CABL E " SHAW LAW "

TELEPHONE JAY E. SILBERG, F'.C . 12021 822-1063 Secretary to the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C . 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rules on Access Authorization Program, Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities, and Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants. On August 1, 1984, the Commission published in the Federal Register three proposed rules on physical protection of nuclear power plants. These proposed rules are interrelated, and to some degree relate to other initiatives either completed or underway within the NRC and industry. For example, the Fitness for Duty policy statement was approved by the Commission on October 17, 1984 and will presumably be published soon. Certain portions of the proposed access authorization program requirements related to continued observation are redundant to that policy statement. Additionally, the NRC's review of assumptions used by their contractors in vital area analyses could markedly influence the designation of vital areas subject to control under the proposed rule on miscellaneous amendments. Also the viability of the industry initiative on the Nuclear Employee Data System would be influenced by the access authorization program rule as well as by NRC interpretations developed in its regulatory guides. KMC, Inc. and the 23 utilities listed in Enclosure A who are members of the Physical Security Coordinating Group are pleased to provide comments on the three proposed rules and related regulatory guides. Insofar as possible, our comments recognize the on-going NRC and industry initiatives and suggest changes to strengthen the overall security program elements either completed or being developed and to eliminate unneeded regulatory duplication. Enclosures Band C provide comments on the proposed Access Authorization Program. Enclosure D provides comments on the proposed rule concerning Searches of

U, S. NUCLEAR REGUI T Y r DOCKETING & c I OFFICE OF T, E OF THE C M Ooc1 ,O.t111arft D t Copi* Rec i f Add' I Cor , 7 .. Spec.wit Oi /l I l> S1~ ~ " - " '

  ~I..A.f I ~Al,,ll ~

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNERSHIP Of" PROFE-IONAL CORP0RATION5 Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities, and Enclosure E provides comments on the proposed miscellaneous amendments. Enclosures F and G provide comments on the two regulatory guides associated with these proposed rules. In many cases, the utilities listed in Enclosure A have already submitted or are submitting individual comments on their own behalf. Some of these comments may differ signifipantly from the comments provided with this letter. The comments transmitted with this letter represent a consensus of the utilities listed in Enclosure A (and, we believe of nuclear utilities in general) and as such do not necessarily reflect the individual position of each utility on each issue. In a number of areas, the Physical Security Coordinating Group was unable to reach a consensus on an issue and elected to defer any comment on that issue to the individual utility members. One such issue was the requirement that the Access Authorization Program include a credit history check. Some members believe that a poor credit rating check is unrelated to a motive to conduct sabotage~ others believe it is only one piece to be considered in the overall assessment of an individual's trustworthiness and reliability. Another issue where there was no clear consensus is related to the need to establish a continued observation program. Some believe that including a continued observation program in the rule will degrade a worthwhile endeavor into a paperwork-enforcement nightmare where more time will be devoted to making and reviewing personnel record entries than will be spent in a sound administration of the program. In addition, most recognize a continued observation requirement would be duplicative of the existing Fitness for Duty program. We would be pleased to discuss these comments with the NRC staff or to answer any questions which may arise. Sincerel( g~ Enclosures SILBERG J JES:lam

ENCLOSURE A PHYSICAL SECURITY COORDINATING GROUP Arizona Public Service Co. Carolina Power & Light Co. Colillllonwealth Edison Co. Consolidated Edison Company of New York Consumers Power Co. Detroit Edison Co. Duke Power Co.

• Duquesne Light Co .

Florida Power & Light Co. Nebraska Public Power District Northeast Utilities Service Co. Northern States Power Co. Omaha Public Power District Portland General Electric Co. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire Public Service Electric & Gas Co. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. Sacramento Municipal Utility District Southern California Edison Co. Toledo Edison Co. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. Yankee Atomic Electric Co .

ENCLOSURE B COMMENTS ON ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM I. INTRODUCTION The NRC, when it promulgated 10 C.F.R. §73.55 in February, 1977, established by rule the requirement that power reactor licensees protect against the postulated threat posed by an insider. The need to protect against such a threat has been widely questioned. Studies of the vulnerability and likely consequences of sabotage to various targets in our society have shown that many other industries and human endeavors pose greater risks than do nuclear power plants. While the insider threat remains only a postulated risk, the NRC's regulatory framework continues to require that it be considered *

• The issue underlying the proposed rule and the existing

 §73.55 is whether the required physical security measures provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected. Absolute assurance is neither required nor possible.

To evaluate the proposals, and to put them in perspective, it is also useful to consider alternative techniques that have been proposed to minimize the threat of insider sabotage. Such alternatives have included personnel patdown searches, two-man rule requirements for access to vital areas, and more stringent access control provisions. One must recognize that no one technique is foolproof: extensive patdown searches would improve the detection of sabotage equipment being brought onsite; however, the material or equipment needed to carry out many scenarios is already available in the plant. The two-man rule might reduce the probability of some acts of sabotage; but, in many cases it would not reduce the risk at all and would increase occupational exposures and personnel response times for taking corrective actions. More stringent access control measures could improve plant security by reducing access into vital areas; however, such measures would also impede access which is required to maintain safe plant operation. In the overall evaluation of the proposed access authorization rule, a balanced judgment needs to be made. Security must be adequate. But it must be achieved in a way that will not adversely affect plant safety and will not be so burdensome that it will discourage good security attitudes and practices by the people affected and ultimately prove to be counterproductive. Wholly apart from NRC regulatory requirements, it is in the licensee's own financial interests to permit only trustworthy and reliable individuals to have unescorted access to plant areas in which safety related equipment could be sabotaged. Trustworthiness and reliability can be established based on periods of satisfactory employment or by a reasonable check of B-1

past history. In view of the large numbers of transient workers who may be required to have access to the plant during extended outages, the NRC 1 s proposed rule properly recognizes that when the plant is shut down, the potential consequences of any act of sabotage are less. Certain areas may, therefore, be temporarily reclassified as non-vital. Similarly, the proposed rule as drafted fermits one reactor licensee to take advantage of another licensees authorization program to reduce the duplication of screening efforts of workers who move from site to site. It is essential that these features be retained in the access authorization rule if such a program is to be workable. Since 1977, KMC and those members of the Physical Security Coordinating Group listed in Enclosure A have maintained a continuing dialogue with the NRC staff on the establishment of an access authorization program. We believe that significant strides have been made in dealing with the institutional concerns as well as the practical constraints which this program poses. We further

• believe that sufficient experience exists with utilities having programs similar to those now proposed in the rule to give confidence that such an access authorization program is indeed workable and effective. It is, therefore, time to move forward with approval of the rule to permit the transferability aspects which it would authorize, and lay to rest the alternative physical security proposals which have surfaced from time to time.

II. DEVITALIZATION Proposed §73.55(i) and 73.56(f)(3)*/ contemplate allowing unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands during cold shutdowns and refueling outages. While the proposal as written is workable and worthwhile for sites with only a single unit, it may not be so for multiple unit sites. As the proposed rule is now drafted, the substantial benefits of allowing unescorted access during major outages would only be available at multiple unit

• sites if all the units were simultaneously shut down.

This problem arises because multiple unit sites often have shared protected areas. Thus, the shared protected areas could not now be "devitalized" so long as one of the site's reactors would be operating. Under these conditions, while the licensee could grant unescorted access to the vital islands of the non-operating unit, it would not be able to do so because of the connnon protected area. There would be no practical way for an unescorted individual to reach the vital islands of the non-operating unit. The reference in proposed §73.55(i) to "§73.56(e)(3) 11 is presumably a typographical error and should refer to

       §73.56(f)(3). There is no §73.56(e)(3).

B-2

The Colillllission should make the acknowledged benefits of devitalization available to multiple unit sites. These steps would also recognize that access to protected areas entails a much lesser risk of sabotage than does access to vital islands. (It must be recognized that much of the equipment in protected areas which could be subject to sabotage could be disabled without even entering the protected areas.) By imposing reasonable additional measures, workers without access authorization could be admitted to colillllon protected areas and to devitalized vital islands. Our revision proposes unescorted access within the colillllon protected areas as well as the vital islands of the non-operating unit, provided persons granted unescorted access are distinctively badged and security measures are enhanced to provide added assurance that these individuals would not have access to vital islands of operating units. We do not consider this a real increase in overall risk considering the other safeguards requirments already required to be in place.

• This comment could be implemented by adding the following language to proposed §73.55(d)(i):

For multi-unit nuclear sites which have shared rotected areas and one or more units 1 remain no eration the unescorted unscreene in v ua s s a e provided distinctive badges and security measures shall be enhanced to provide assurance that those individuals are not ad.mltted to unauthorized areas. Another colillllent concerning devitalization concerns the treatment of licensee employees during cold shutdown and refueling operations. There is no logic for prohibiting licensee employees who do not have access authorization from the same temporary access authorization that contractor, manufacturer or supplier employees are afforded. Yet, the title of §73.56(£),

 "Non-licensee employees," suggests that the temporary authorization provided by §73.56(f)(3) does not apply to licensee employees (even though the wording of §73.56(f)(3) does not seem to be so restricted). While this distinction may not have been intended, the Commission should make clear that licensee employees are treated as are other employees. This can be done by appropriately changing the title of §73.56(£) or by giving
 §73.56(f)(3) its own subsection.

III. BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION Proposed §73.56(c) sets forth the general requirements for the background investigation component of the access authorization program. Two aspects of the Commission's proposal warrant modification. First, the provision states that the licensee is responsible for background investigations "that provide assurance" B-3'

that individuals are reliable, trustworthy and-will act so as to r.rotect health and minimize danger to life and property. The

  'provide assurance" standard is inconsistent with the "reasonable assurance" standard that underlies all of the Commission's responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act. See Power Reactor Develo ment Cor . vs. Industrial Union, 369 U.S. 396 (l96l).

e t may e appropriate or a ac ground investigation program to have as its objective the providing of assurance that individuals are trustworthy and reliable, licensees cannot be asked to assure such findings. The language of proposed §73.56(c) should be appropriately modified. The second comment concerns the statement that licensees shall require individuals to report to the licensee anything that may have a bearing on continued access authorization. While the licensee can inform and instruct individuals subject to background investigation of the need to report significant new information, the license cannot reasonably compel such reports. Therefore, it would be unreasonable for the licensee to be subject to NRC enforcement action were an individual not to report such information to the licensee. This issue of self-reporting is a difficult one. The Commission's goal in establishing this requirement must be balanced against policies such as the confidentiality of medical self-help programs. An integral part of many established programs is preserving the confidentiality of self-reported problems. For example, if an employee seeks assistance under an employee medical assistance program for an alcoho1 problem, the problem is not reported to the supervisor so long as assistance and treatment is progressing. Reporting in such instances could well defeat the goals of these programs. In addition, the licensee needs to have the latitude and decisional flexibility to balance the merits of each case in making any decisions on revoking any privileges for unescorted access. To accomplish the modifications suggested above, proposed

 §73.56(c) should be modified as follows:

The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements, for background investigations ekae with the objective of p~eviae providing assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reliable, trustworthy, and would act in a manner that would protect health and minimize danger to life and property. As a minimum, this background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation. The licensee shall notify those B-4

Fe~~iFe-chae individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions of their responsibility to report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization. IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT A number of comments are in order on proposed §73.56(d). First, the provision is written in a way that could be interpreted to require a licensee's psychological assessment program to include more than one type of written personality test. Thus, the section speaks of a program which, "as a minimum," consists of "written personality tests." We do not believe that the Commission should require an individual to be subjected to more than one written test. There is nothing to support the need for multiple tests particularly when the test is used as a screening tool. The language should be modified to require, as a minimum, one test. Second, the provision as written could be interpreted to require each written test result to be evaluated by a psychologist or psychiatrist. The written test may be of a type that can be mechanically graded or manually graded by clerical staff and need not be evaluated by a qualified professional. The scores obtained could be compared to the established "norms" and a person other than a psychologist or psychiatrist could determine if the candidate "passed" or if the score would indicate the need for interviews. It is important that the test and scoring norms be established by qualified professionals. But it is entirely appropriate for others to conduct the test and score it within the established guidelines. Third, proposed §73.56(d)(l) would require that the evaluation scales "shall have been proven to be valid." The purpose of the written testing is an initial 'screen'to measure the individual's traits. The clause "shall have been proven to be valid" may be an impossible test. The requirement that tests being used have a high degree of reliability should be sufficient. We believe the requirement to "prove" any test to be valid should be deleted. Finally, we would comment on the requirement in §73.56(d)(2) that the tests and interviews evaluate whether the individual had "a strong potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health and safety or property" or "a high potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health, safety, or property." Aside from the fact that there is no reason why different terminology ("strong" vs. "high") should be used and not a hint of what the differences in the words are supposed to mean, we believe that the modifiers "high" and "strong" should be deleted. If a B-5

psychologist or psychiatrist concludes that an individual has the potential for corrnnitting detrimental acts, that finding should be enough to deny unescorted access. To require that the psychologist or psychiatrist find a "strong" or "high" potential may set an unreasonably difficult standard which is not corrnnensurate with the postulated risk being created. To make the modifications discussed above, proposed §73.56(d) should be changed as follows: The license shall establish and maintain a psychological assessment program to be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands. The requirements of this paragraph supplant the requirements of Appendix B paragraph I.B.2.b. of this part for nuclear power reactor security personnel. This program, as a minimum, shall consist of: (1) A written personality tests which kave has been designed to furnish an objective evaluation of some of the major personality traits which influence individual and interpersonal behavior. Results of the personality tests shall be evaluated using the criteria approved by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The tests chosen shall have predetermined evaluation scales which are statistically proven to have a high degree of reliability, saa+/-+/--aave-eeeR-~FeveR-Ee-ee va+/-ia 7 shall meet the criteria of paragraph (d)(2) below, and shall comply with the employee selection procedure guidelines as described in "Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978)," 43 FR 38295 (August 25, 1978), 29 CFR Part 1607. (2) Clinical interviews for individuals whose personality test results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traints. These interviews shall be administered and conducted by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The test,.&, and interview shall be designed to evaluate (i) an individual's current behavioral reliability, looking for traits which would indicate that the individual possesses a eEreR~ potential for corrnnitting acts detrimental to the public health and safety or property, and (ii) behavioral patterns B-6

which, if combined with the expected work environment, could develop into a high potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health, safety, or property. Based on the test results ei-Ehe-~eaEs and, if needed, clinical interview, the psychiatrist or psychologist shall provide, in writing to appropriate senior licensee management, a recommendation as to the individual's behavioral suitability for unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. V. CONTINUED BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM Proposed §73.56(e) would require each licensee to establish a continued behavioral observation program designed to detect changes in an individual's on-the-job performance, judgment level

• or behavior. This component of access authorization programs is essentially parallel to the fitness for duty program which the Commission had earlier proposed. 49 FR 33980 (1982). This latter proposal would have required that each licensee establish a program which

             ... shall provide reasonable assurance that any person in a vital area, while performing any duty in that area, is not:

(i) unfit for duty due to the influence of alcohol; (ii) unfit for duty due to the influence of any drug or drugs that could influence his or her faculties in any way contrary to safety; or (iii) unfit for duty because of any other mental or physical impairment that could affect his or her performance in any way contrary to safety .... Any person who would have been "unfit for duty because of [a] mental or physical impairment that could affect his or her performance in any way contrary to safety" would also be a person whose on-the-job performance, judgment level, or behavior would have changed so as to trigger action under the continued behavioral observation program. At its October 14, 1984 meeting, the Commission reconsidered its action on the fitness for duty rule and voted to issue it as a policy statement. Since the Commission has decided that the fitness for duty concept should not be embodied in a rule, the same should hold true for the parallel provisions of the continued B-7

behavioral observation program. Proposed §73.56(e) should, therefore, be deleted, as well as the reference to such a program in proposed §§73.56(b)(l) and 73.56(f)(3). VI. TRANSFERABILITY Proposed §73.56(f)(l) establishes a mechanism for transferring to one licensee access authorizations granted by another licensee. This authority is an important component of a workable access authorization program. Some aspects of this provision should be modified or clarified. One aspect of transferability is that the licensee wishing to use another licensee's access authorization must be assured that the individual in question is, in fact, the same person. The proposed rule requires the original granting licensee to send the gaining licensee the individual's photograph and written verification of the individual's access authorization. This is unduly proscriptive and would prohibit licensees from using other forms of positive identification. A more general requirement for positive identification would be more appropriate. An issue requiring clarification concerns the language in

 §73.56(f)(l) that the original granting licensee must verify the "current validity" of the individual's access authorization. This could be read to mean that at the time of verification the individual must have the right of unescorted access to the granting licensee's facility. If this interpretation is correct, the language of a proposed amendment to §73.SS(d) would effectively nullify many of the benefits of transferability.

Under proposed §73.55(d)(7)(i)(A), 49 FR 30737, a licensee must update authorization access lists at least every 31 days and remove from the list those who do not require access. This would mean that those individuals with valid access authorization but without the need for access would not appear on the authorization access list. The Commission should clarify that a currently valid access authorization for the purposes of §73.56(f)(l) does not require that the individual's name appear on the authorization access list established under §73.55(d)(7)(i}(A). To implement the changes suggested above, the wording of

 §73.56(f}(l) should be modified as follows:

(1) The licensee may accept an unescorted access authorization granted an employee of a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment supplier by another licensee, or a previous employee of another licensee, if the individual's employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 daysi aRe if the original granting licensee sends to the gaining licensee a

            ~heeeg~aph-ei-ehe-iReivieaa+/--aRa-a written B-8

verification of the individual's unescorted access authorization along with a statement which indicates its current validity, and if the ~aining licensee ositively 1 identif es the individua. For individuals whose employment in licensed nuclear power reactors has been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days, the individual's activities must be investigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and a new psychological assessment made according to the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section. VII. REVIEW PROCEDURES The proposed §73.56(g) mandates that a licensee's access

• authorization program include procedures for an individual to obtain review of a denial or revocation.

We believe that this entire subsection should be deleted from the rule. The licensee's procedures for reviewing the denial or revocation of unescorted access, whether the procedure is unique or that of a bargaining agreement, should not be part of a ~lan requiring submittals to, and approval by, the NRC. The NRC s interest should be limited to ensuring proper attention to the protection of the public health and safety and need not include employee appeal rights. Other avenues of redressing claimed violations of due process are available to an employee who believes his rights are violated. And such avenues will no doubt be explored whether or not proposed §73.56(g) appears in NRC regulations. Indeed, individuals have already availed themselves of judicial remedies in cases in which access to nuclear facilities was denied under access authorization programs.*/ Thus, the proposed section is surplusage and unnecessarily-intrudes on licensee management prerogatives. S e e , ~ Catalltic, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Boilers~ Local 93 and Edwin J. Hayes, Civ. Action #J-81-2817 (D. Md. B-9

ENCLOSURE C ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE The Commission invited specific attention to certain questions on the proposed access authorization program requirements. 49 Fed. Reg. at 30730-31. We have previously discussed these issues with NRC Staff members and we are pleased to provide additional connnents at this time.

1. To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the connnercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavior reliability programs already used by nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

• Under existing utility security plans approved by NRG Staff, most utilities conduct some form of employee screening program. The programs and practices vary widely, although most include in-depth background investigations and some type of psychological testing. Many utilities also have developed continued observation programs. The screening programs are used as one basis for granting unescorted access to the nuclear power plants.

Differences among the approved programs stem from individual utility preferences, the case-by-case NRC review process in which the individual security plans were reviewed, and in some cases local limitations on obtaining certain information (for example, the availability of criminal history information). Psychological testing, when included in a utility's program, uses a wide variety of tests. Many utilities use the MMPI, while others use the Gordon Profile, the California Personality Inventory, Thurstone, and 16 PF. Different scales are also used by utilities to evaluate the test results. A behavioral reliability program (continued observation) is not part of employee screening, but rather part of a follow-on system. Some continued observation programs had their start in employee-awareness programs that many companies have established as part of an employee assistance program. Alcohol and drug abuse programs are perhaps the most connnon examples. The Commission with its consideration of the Fitness-for-Duty rule accelerated the tempo of company involvement.

2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

C-1

Psychological assessments are used by some utilities as one part of their physical security program with the objective of providing assurance that individuals given unescorted access to portions of the nuclear facility are trustworthy. Some utilities also use psychological assessments as an aid in determining the extent to which an individual may be at risk with regard to a substance abuse problem. Psychological assessment both predicts and detects. That is, tests show which individuals are more likely to steal, cause unwitting accidents, have difficulty with a highly regulated environment, or be distracted by emotional, personal or substance abuse problems. Clinical interviews help to establish how the individual has behaved in the past (detection) and to what extent the individual is "at risk" for such behavior in the future (prediction).

• Psychological assessment can be adapted to address many different criteria. Fitness for duty criteria address the substance abuse problem which can also be detected and predicted by psychological assessment. Some utilities use a special MMPI scale (McAndrews) to detect the probability of a substance abuse problem.

Psychological assessment addresses radiological sabotage concerns since the process is aimed at screening out individuals who have the characteristics or behavior patterns of a saboteur. Since there is no "real" data base for radiological sabotage (no cases of sabotage causing radiological consequences have been documented), no proof can be shown of a demonstrated validated scale for radiological sabotage.

3. What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Cormnission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

Any time that any investigation is made into a person's background or a person is required to undergo psychological testing, some infringement of personal privacy occurs. The question is whether the infringements are reasonable in light of the interests to be protected, and the alternatives available. The risk of sabotage is one which has been deterministically postulated by the NRC. Since no cases of sabotage causing radiological consequences have been documented, it is impossible to demonstrate that any C-2

elements of the proposed rule or indeed any elements of the physical security program would decrease the risk of sabotage. The requirement for physical security at power plants was established by NRC rule in 1977. The need and bases for many of the requirements have been debated since that time, but the fact remains that licensees are required by regulation to protect against the threat of insiders who may be saboteurs. From time to time, the Commission staff has proposed various alternatives to protect against the insider such as: government clearances, extensive personnel searches, tighter access control of vital areas, and two man rule for entry into vital areas. Each of these has strengths and weaknesses. One identified weakness of a screening program is the infringement on privacy. In any industry with strong security controls, a

• certain degree of infringement occurs. However, this infringement is voluntary, on the individual's part. The applicant may choose to participate in the screening or choose to seek employment elsewhere. Applicants also sign releases allowing others to gather extensive information about them.

Many utilities who gather security information keep this data separate from personnel files. Supervisors, co-workers, or the personnel department do not have access to information gathered for screening. This reduces substantially the risk that this information will be used improperly. There is always a balance between the need for strong security and the rights of an individual for privacy. We believe that the risk represented by the postulated damage one individual or a group of individuals could cause far outweighs the risks associated with gathering personal information. The need for a physical security program, and the usefulness of particular elements of that program can only be matters of judgment. We have, however, compared the usefulness of the access authorization program recommended in the proposed rule with other possibilities described earlier (such as increased compartmentalization, the two-man rule, or a government clearance program). So long as the Commission continues to postulate the existence of an inside threat, we believe that the access authorization program is greatly preferred over any of the alternatives.

4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use C-3

of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors? The answer to this questions lies in how psychological tests are constructed empirically, and how they are scored. Test instruments like the MMPI, CPI, and 16PF are scored against "normal" samples. The statistics of means and standard deviations help to establish what scores fall within or outside a "normal" range. Test profile interpretation guides can be established for determining which individual should proceed to a psychological assessment. The experience of two member utilities using the written psychological tests followed by clinical assessments for those with abnormal test scores shows that about 20% to

• 30% of those who took the written test were then given clinical assessments. About 4% of the total were eventually screened out. Subsequently, about 0.1% of those who "passed" the psychological assessment were denied access based on referrals from the continued observation program.

Tests admittedly are not ferfect. They raise hypotheses about an individuals behavior, but they do not prove that behavior beyond a doubt. Test data should not be the sole source of denying an individual unescorted access. Therefore, out of fairness to the individual, a clinical interview should be conducted to find out whether the individual manifests those identified behaviors or traits in his or her life. Without interviews, utilities would be screening out many inadvertently who would be screened in (false positives). (Some utilities interview all applicants regardless of test scores.) In the final analysis, as indicated, experience has shown approximately 4% of applicants have been screened out due to the psychological screening component.

5. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedures? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

ANSI 18.17 guidelines state that characteristics such as emotional instability and lack of trustworthiness should be identified in a psychological assessment. Research sponsored by EEI (see NUREG/CR-2076, "Behavioral Reliability Program for the Nuclear Industry,") C-4

established five criteria or characteristics which should be identified. These are:

1. Argumentative Hostility Toward Authority

2. Irresponsibility/Impulsivity

3. Defensive Incompetence

4. Reaction to Stress

5. Emotional Adaptability (Psychopathology)

(See NUREG/CR-2076 for full definitions of the criteria and what behavior have led an individual to be denied access.) Two of these criteria (#1 and #5) relate directly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage. Criteria #2,

      #3, and #4 relate more to the prevention of unintentional accidents and errors.

Consensus among those utilities using psychological

• assessment and background investigations is that Type II error is slightly higher than Type I and that Type I error is less than 1 in 1,000. Type II error is higher because of the decisions which have been made about what types of errors can be tolerated. To keep Type I error (someone has been incorrectly screened in) extremely low means that some degree of Type II error (someone incorrectly screened out) will occur.

We are not aware of any more effective procedures which are available.

6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and

• behavioral reliability programs?

Psychological assessment should not be justified solely on the basis of reducing risks of radiological sabotage. Psychological assessment also helps to identify individuals who are more likely to be involved in unintentional events (accidents), who are likely to have difficulty adjusting to a heavily regulated work environment, and who have a history of being involved in events which are less catastrophic than sabotage, but which include theft, vandalism and unintended "accidents." Population statistics do exist which document the degree of psychopathology (emotional instability) in the general work force and the proportion of the work force with a previous record of anti-social behavior (lack of trustworthiness). With limited screening programs and no or limited security systems in the work place, research shows C-5

that the frequency and percentage of reported instances of "insider" problems is higher than in work places with such safeguards. There are several research efforts sponsored by the NRC which provide information on the extent of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs. The "Insider Study" (Ref. 1) provides documentation on sabotage and theft events and their rate of occurrence in environments with low, medium and high safeguards, security and screening. The report states that inadequate screening, insufficient behavior observation, and poor management/employee relations contributed to the success of 72% of all sabotage incidents surveyed.

References:

1) S. A. Mullen, J.J. Davison, and J.B.

Jones, Jr. "Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities

• from Insiders (Insiders Study)" USNRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, May 1980.

2) B.M. Jenkins and J.L. Krofcheck, "The Potential Nuclear Non-State Adversary" prepared for the NRC by Rand Corp.,

Santa Monica, California. 1977.

3) Reineke, John M. "The Insider Threat to Secure Facilities: Data Analysis." Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (prepared under contract to USNRC, NUREG/CR-1234), 1980.

7. Can the use of psychological assessment in the connnercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Psychological assessment can be used both in the context of fitness for duty and access authorization. In the fitness for duty context, for example, the tendency for alcohol abuse can be detected by applying the MacAndrews Alcoholism Scale to the results of the MMPI. Trustworthiness and reliability, the underlying characteristics of interest for access authorization determinations, can be evaluated based upon the identification through psychological assessment of such traits as aggressiveness, resentment of authority, and psychopathy. Thus, some utilities presently use psychological assessment for both purposes.

8. To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e.,

if only background investigations were adopted? C-6

Psychological assessment techniques evaluate an individual at a particular point in time. The behavioral reliability program is intended to look for changes in an individual over time, by sensitizing the supervisor to recognize changes in an individual's behavior or to recognize clear signs of aberrant behavior. The supervisor is not expected, and indeed is cautioned not to make psychological or medical judgments. Background investigations without psychological assessments and an observation program would screen out fewer individuals and raise the rate of Type I error. Individuals who are screened out under the five criteria of behavioral reliability (see question #5) do not always have records of extreme behavior problems. Background investigations capture the extremes on some of the five criteria but cannot measure them all well.

• 9. What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment? by the use of background investigations? by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Psychological testing using the five criteria has screened out individuals for such reasons as: Aggressive or violent behavior Drug or alcohol abuse Lack of temper controls Hostile and destructive actions Disrespect for social norms - violation of rules Inability to handle stressful situations Impulsivity and a disregard for one's actions Emotional problems

• Background investigations have screened out:

Falsification of records Drug and alcohol abuse Temper problems Severe financial problems Past employment problems Behavioral reliability programs have screened out: Excessive fear of radiation Memory problems - operate wrong systems or valves Inability to follow instructions Severe personality change related to impaired ability to function on the job Emotional breakdowns Development of substance abuse problems C-7

10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations and behavioral reliability programs?

We are unaware of management abuses concerning these programs. Most utilities use a system of checks and balances as well as appeal processes which prevent such abuses. There is always more than one individual involved in a decision about access, decertification, etc. which will generally prevent a single supervisor from unfairly singling out an employee.

11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

Most have come to accept it, and existing employees

• view it as a benefit not only to the company but to their own personal security as well. Some data suggest that the quality of work force has improved and fewer behavioral problems exist on sites with strong screening programs.

Nonetheless, a few employees resent the programs and consider them an unwarranted intrusion into their private lives. Unions have some concerns about the programs but have generally come to accept them. Individual employees at times resent the degree of pre-employment screening for a variety of reasons. The greatest problem seems to be with those contractor employees who visit several sites and participate in several different screening programs . C-8

ENCLOSURE D COMMENTS ON SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS AT POWER REACTOR FACILITIES The Physical Security Coordinating Group is in agreement with the use of equipment instead of hands-on pat down searches of personnel gaining access to protected areas. We have no substantive comments to offer. Two minor editorial corrections should be made in proposed §73.SS(d)(l). In the sixth sentence, the first word should be changed from "However" to "Whenever." In the ninth sentence, the word "package" should be changed to "paragraph." D-1

ENCLOSURE E MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS I. Vital Islands The proposed revision to the introductory paragraph of §73.55 approves the vital island concept and appears to require each licensee to revise its security plan to incorporate the vital island concept. The Connnission's explanation indicates that its experience has shown that the current vital area concept (controlling access to each individual vital area) "may be unnecessarily strict." 49 FR at 36735. The Connnission points out that licensees, under the proposed rule, "would be given considerable latitude to take advantage of existing barriers and access control points."

• We agree that it is appropriate to give licensees the option to revise its security plan to incorporate the vital island concept. It is not appropriate to require licensees to adopt the concept. No rationale has been suggested to require those licensees who are satisfied with security plans using the vital area philosophy to recast those plans. Licensees who have experience with security plans built around vital areas may not wish to recombine them into vital islands. Each licensee should be entitled to decide, based upon its particular factual situation, whether or not to adopt vital islands. This would be consistent with the language of proposed §73.SS(b) that "[o]ne or more vital areas fay constitute a vital island." Mandated revision of exist ng approved security plans serves no useful purpose and would be unnecessarily expensive to licensees.

The language of §73.55 should, therefore, be modified as follows: By (120 days from the effective date of this amendment or 120 days after receipt of a Connnission provided site specific vital area review, whichever is later) each licensee proposing to combine vital areas within vital islands shall submit proposed amendments to his security plan which define how the amended vital island designation and protection requirements of paragraphs (a), (c) (1), (c) (2), (d) (2), (d) (7), (d} (9), (e}(l) and (3), and (h)(4), will be met. Each submittal shall include a proposed implementation schedule for Connnission approval. The amended safeguards requirements of these paragraphs must be E-1

implemented by the licensee within 180 days after Commission approval of the proposed security plan in accordance with the approved schedule. II. Vital Island Definition Proposed §73.SS(c)(l) would define a minimum set of equipment which must be treated in all cases as vital islands. This represents a major shift from existing practice which the NRG independently reviewed the system and equipment designated as vital. Since the NRC must approve all security plans, all plants were subject to a case-by-case review. The Commission has not explained why this review process should be changed by a regulatory definition of a minimum set of vital areas/islands. Furthermore, the proposed language would have a requirement to protect AC and DC sources to permit functioning of "important

• to safety" equipment. The term "important to safety" has been in dispute as to its definition and should be resolved in other forums and not raised in the context of safeguarding vital equipment. Another requirement would be to protect as an independent vital island "on-site water supplies (excluding piping) required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standby."

This, in effect, could require plant unique features to be subject to differing regulatory interpretations under rule requirements which are subject to enforcement actions. To implement this comment, proposed §73.SS(c)(l) should be revised as follows: (1) The licensee shall locate vital equipment within a vital area, which in turn shall be located within a protected area. One or more vital areas may constitute a vital island. Vital islands shall be configured to ensure that an individual must gain access to a vital island to accomplish sabotage resulting in a significant radiological release or reactor core damage or both. Access to vital islands must require passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. More than one vital island may be located within a single protected area. l'h.e-lieeRsee-saall-pFeeeeE,-aa-iRaepeReeRe v!Eal-ialaRas,-eRBiEe-aleeFH.aEiRg-aRa-aiPeee eaF¥eRE-emeFgeRey-peweF-eea¥ees-~exelaeiRg eleee~ieal-aieeFieaeieR-syeeema -FeqHiFea-ee peFHtie-faReeieRiR~-ef-ae~eeaFea,-ayseems-aRa eefflf'eReRss-impeFeaRe-ee-eafeey,-pFimaey E-2

            ~eaeee~-eeReaiBmeRE;-eae-Peaeeer-eeRe~e+/-

Peem,-eeRere+/--a+/-aEl:1.-BEaeieR;-aRa-eRsiee-waee~ S~~p+/-ies-feRe+/-~aiRg-pipiRg -~e~~iPea-fep aeaieviag-plaRe-aee-sa~eaeWR-eP-aee-aeaRaBy~ III. Vital Island Access Controls The proposed language of §73.55(d)(7)(i)(A) would require the establishment of access lists for each vital island. We do not believe the Connnission's intent was to literally require the establishment of "lists." Our recommended change is to clarify the intent of this requirement to allow for access control procedures and systems which may or may not literally include "lists." Many licensees have developed access controls which use computer controlled systems including access cards issued to employees. By use of the access card in card readers at vital area doors, a computer checks the validity of the "need for access" and an "access list" or log as such is not generated. This procedure has been accepted by the NRC and the proposed rule change should indicate its continued acceptability. We, therefore, recommend §73.55(d)(7)(i)(A) read as follows: Establish current authorization aeeeas liaee procedures or s stems for each vital 1 island. The aeeeaa-l BE procedures or systems must be updated and reapproved by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least every 31 days. The licensee shall include eR-eae-aeeeas-+/-ise in the procedure or system only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital islands during non-emergency conditions. IV. Record Requirements The proposed §73.70(d) requires the maintenance of "logs" of all entries, exits, and reasons for access to a vital island. Consistent with our previous comments, this record-keeping requirement may be made by a computer logging subroutine of the access control system rather than literally posting a "log" at the entry point. In addition, we see no need for logging the reason for entry or for logging out of each vital island. A monthly validation is required to permit only-those who have the need to enter an area, and a requirement for each person to enter the reason for each entry borders on harassment. Similarly, no valid security reason has been established to require one to log out upon exiting the vital island. E-3

We, therefore, recommend §73.70(d) be changed to read as follows: A +/-eg procedure or sistem indicating name, badge number, and time of entry, FeaseR ie~-eReFy,-aRe-eiHl.e-'er-exie, of all individuals granted access to a vital island except those individuals entering e~-exieiRg the reactor control room . E-4

ENCLOSURE F COMMENTS ON REGULATORY GUIDE REGARDING STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT GUIDE FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The introduction to this regulatory guide states that the purpose of the document is to describe the standard form.at and content suggested for preparing an access authorization plan. The guide further states "conformance with this guide is not required by the NRC." Were this statement subsequently shown to

• be true, and the guide provided only guidance on one method acceptable to the NRC and other alternatives would be considered, our comments would be unnecessary. Our experience with NRC's use of regulatory guides, however, has demonstrated that the detailed prescriptive "examples of how one might meet a regulation" are in fact accorded the status of interpretations of "how to 11 meet the regulation both by reviewers and inspectors. We therefore are providing comments on the regulatory guide, and recommend that less prescriptive approaches be given, and where possible, additional examples make clear in the subsections that more than one technique may be used to meet the stated requirement.

In commenting on the specific requirements of the proposed regulatory guide, we have assumed our comments provlded in earlier enclosures are acceptable and the proposed rule will be modified as we have recommended .

1. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE AND REQUIREMENTS No Comment

2. BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION 2.1 General The time period for investigations should be shortened from the 5 year period to 3 years. The ANSI/ANS 3.3-1982 standard considered the investigation period and selected 3 years as appropriate. Many licensees have accepted the ANSI/ANS standard in their current programs and contractual arrangements are already in place which use this time period. Since the choice between a 3 or 5 year period is a matter of judgment, we urge that the NRC adopt the time period judged adequate by the standards committees.

F-1

In addition, the criminal and military service history checks require extensive time periods to complete if it is possible to complete them at all. If changes to the law are enacted which permit the FBI to release such records to utilities, experience has shown that the time to complete these record checks may extend into weeks or months. Verification of military records also take comparable periods of time. For these reasons, the guidance for background investigations should recognize a reasonableness test for record checks which considers the ability to gain access to the records being sought. Also, there should be a provision permitting temporary or interim background investigations pending the receipt of government controlled records. 2.2 Investigative Criteria True Identit! - Establishing the applicant's true identity is a valid goal o the background investigation. Identification

• by use of fingerprints (the stated preferred method) could prove to be non-productive since a person's fingerprints may not be on file, and/or the records of the FBI or local police may not be available to the utility. By the same token, other investigative techniques can also be successful in establishing true identity (without the use of photographs). We would reconnnend the deletion of the statement "In the event the applicant's identity cannot be verified through either his or her photograph or fingerprints, authorization for unescorted access to protected and vital islands should not be granted." This statement should be replaced with "In the event the applicant's identity cannot be verified, authorization for unescorted access to protected and vital islands should not be granted."

Em*loyment Histora - The record checks should be conducted for a t ree year perio rather than the five year period as stated . Educational History - The record checks should be for three years rather than five years. Criminal History - The time period required to conduct a criminal history check could be extensive. If authorization is obtained for the FBI to perform record checks on utility applicants, estimates range from weeks to months to receive requested information. Experience of government agencies in processing routine requests for record checks has demonstrated that a delay of three months is not unreasonable. It is doubtful that any major increase in workload for the FBI would result in shorter review times. We therefore concur with the view that interim background investigations be completed using available information and delaying the completion of the full background investigations until criminal history is received. F-2

MilitaH Service - This aspect of the background review, as with crimina history record checks, is not under the schedular control of licensees. The government office processing requests may require appreciable periods of time for processing depending on the backlog of requests pending. We urge the same approach be taken in processing this information as with criminal history records; that is, an interim background investigation be performed and the full background investigations be held open until the records can be obtained.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 3.1 Personality Tests The guidance of this section should not specify the administration of two separate test instruments. It should be the responsibility of the utility in consultation with its experts to select the best test or tests to be used. Many

• utilities today use the MMPI alone with success. Other utilities may find other test vehicles to their liking. The selection of proper test or combination of tests should be left to the utility without the requirement of submitting the "Basis for Use of Psychometric Measurement Instrument" forms.

3.2 Clinical Interviews The guidance in this area should not be prescriptive as to the length, structure and content of interviews to be given. By requiring qualified professionals to establish and administer the program and to conduct any interviews, the NRC should be assured that a quality program will be established without the need to dictate the nature of interviews and become involved in how the program is managed.

4. CONTINUAL BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM

• As indicated in our connnents on the proposed rule, we do not believe this portion of the regulation is needed. The Connnission decided to issue a policy statement dealing with Fitness for Duty which duplicates the requirements of this subsection. There is no need to have two separate requirements speaking to the same issue.

5. NON-LICENSEE EMPLOYEES We are in full agreement with the concept of permitting the transfer of an individual's authorization for unescorted access between different utilities. Once a background investigation is completed, all the information has been evaluated and one utility has granted the authority for unescorted access, a second utility (if it so chooses) should have the ability to continue that authority without the need to duplicate the entire investigative and review process. In that instance, it is necessary to F-3

positively identify that the individual is the same one who was investigated -- and the exchange of photographs is but one means of conducting this verification. We would recommend that other suitable means also be permitted (in addition to positive identification through photographs) in the regulatory guide. With regard to NRC employees, we would expect that when the NRC certifies them as requiring unescorted access that an equivalent program of background investigation and psychological assessment will also be in effect for them. There is no basis for distinguishing between the pool of individuals comprising NRC inspectors and licensee employees and what is required in assuring reliable performance from one group should be equally applicable to the other group. We are not suggesting that licensees conduct the screening for NRC employees, but rather that the NRC establish programs at least equivalent to those required for licensees.

• 6. REVIEW PROCEDURES We have recommended that this portion of the rule be deleted. It is the responsibility of the NRC to protect the health and safety of the public and any redressing of abuses of "due process" should not be regulated and enforced by the NRC.

An employee who has disagreements with the licensee's procedures in this regard has other avenues to have those concerns heard. It is unnecessary to have the licensees' appeal procedures submitted, reviewed, and approved by the NRC, thereby injecting the NRC into a labor-management area. We, therefore, recommend that this section of the regulatory guide also be deleted . F-4

ENCLOSURE G COMMENTS ON REGULATORY GUIDE REGARDING VITAL ISLANDS, PROTECTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT, AND KEY AND LOCK CONTROLS The Physical Security Coordinating Group provided comments in Enclosure Eon the rule changes of 73.55 which form the basis for this regulatory guide. Our major concern with the rule and the associated guidance is the apparent requirement for all licensees to adopt the vital island concept and to define certain minimum sets of equipment which must be grouped within defined vital

• islands. Licensees were required, under the currently effective rules, to define vital areas necessary to protect vital equipment from sabotage, and to describe their security provisions to provide that protection. Absent any showing of a need for requiring all licensees to change their protection provisions, we do not believe it appropriate that the NRC require a wholesale change. Many licensees, after spending considerable effort to establish their vital areas and security protection methods, are satisfied with their present security plans and may not wish to combine vital areas within vital islands.

From another perspective, the Physical Security Coordinating Group members have followed with considerable interest the NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) program to re-evaluate the adequacy of licensees' designation of vital areas. Some considerable controversy has been generated by *disagreements of the NRC reviewers on the designation of some vital areas arising from these reviews. The NRG has appointed a "task force" to

/"' review the assumptions used in the computer analysis of vital areas (which apparently is made during the RER) and this guidance will be carried into the future RER program. We have not been aware of any published results of the task force review findings; however, from the limited interface members have had with NRC reviewers, we believe more restricted and onerous redesign of vital area/vital islands will result rather than a more liberal interpretation as advertised in the proposed rule. Although the proposed rule states the current rule "may be unnecessarily strict" and under the proposed rule "licensees would be given considerable latitude to take advantage of existing barriers and access control points," the more recent reviews of security programs for new licensees by the NRG have not permitted advantage to be taken of the vital island concept. We question the motives for offering a proposed rule to liberalize certain security requirements when just the opposite results are currently being obtained from NRC reviews. Licensees are concerned that requiring a resubmittal of security plans to take "advantage" of proposed G-1

changes will result in a major ratchet of security requirements before approval will occur. Our comments on the Regulatory Guide assume that the Commission accepts our comments on the proposed rule. Accordingly, the following comments are offered on the various sections of the Regulatory Guide.

1. INDEPENDENT VITAL ISLANDS The listing of equipment needed to be protected within vital islands is not necessary. Certain items are already required to be enclosed within vital areas, however, the specification of diesel generators, all batteries connected to lE loads, and on-site water supplI'es required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown to be within vital islands is not justified. From a purely practical standpoint we do not understand how certain on-site water sources, for example, can be protected with barriers

• having all the physical attributes required of vital area barriers. (How does one protect a cooling pond?) Past reviews for adequacy of security measures examined the licensees' designated vital areas, and methods for protection. We believe that approach was adequate and a change has not been justified.

2. OPENINGS IN VITAL ISLAND BARRIERS No comment.

3. TEMPORARY DESIGNATION AS VITAL The guidance that a backup system automatically becomes vital equipment whenever maintenance, repair or replacement is performed on the primary vital equipment is not justified. Nuclear power plants inherently have redundancy built into required safety systems. Usually there are many tiers of equipment which can be used to perform the system function of a piece of equipment removed from service. There may be selected plants where for unique reasons a backup system should be designated for protection if selected vital equipment is inoperable. This should be reviewed and required on a case-by-case basis as needed - not made a general rule requirement for all systems at all plants.

4. TIME DEPENDENT VITAL ISLANDS No comment.

5. CONTROL OF ACCESS TO VITAL ISLANDS UNDER ROUTINE CONDITIONS We do not believe the Commission intended to require each licensee to literally develop access "lists" for each vital island. Most licensees have systems and procedures to maintain the access authorization within a computer controlled system. The G-2

NRC has approved such systems in the past and we believe it should continue to be acceptable. The requirement to keep a "log" has also been commented on r.reviously. We do not believe it necessary to literally develop a

  'log."   A computer controlled system of access is acceptable. In addition, there is not a valid security reason to require an employer to maintain a record for each entry containing the reason and the time of exit from the vital island. The licensee must certify the reason each employee needs to enter each vital area and must revalidate it every month. It adds nothing to security to require an employee to parrot that reason for each entry. In a similar vein, logging-out serves no useful security purpose and as indicated in section 7.2 on antipassback the NRC does not desire it to be used as a condition for entry to the next vital area.

The NRC guidance on exterior doors would appear to require an active intrusion alarm system on all doors leading into the

• building from the protected area even though the door does not directly open to a vital area. If this is correct, we do not see any valid justification for this practice. This could require major modification and control of normally open buildings (turbine building) if there were a vital area within that building and would greatly increase access control provisions with no increase in security.

6. PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN AND CONTINGENCY PLAN INTERFACE No comment.

7. EMERGENCY ACCESS TO VITAL ISLANDS No comment.

8. SUSPENDING SECURITY MEASURES No comment

9. PROTECTION OF SECURITY EQUIPMENT No comment.

10 . KEYS AND LOCKS The general thrust of this section is to recommend a change of locks or keys annually or whenever there is a suspicion of compromise. In the spirit of this theme, we would recommend that the last sentence of the first paragraph be changed to make this intent clear: "Changes should also be made whenever a person who had unescorted access to protected or vital islands is terminated for cause." There is no need for changes upon termination of those persons who had access to the protected area or vital areas and were escorted and did not have access to the keys, locks or combinations. G-3

UUfMJ 1Mt8ER

                                                   ~--*    PR -sa7..3 V.L,'::/     /117i)o
                                             't,~l      .3tJ?:l,C:,          JOHN J . KEARNEY, Senior Vice President EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE The association of electric companies

• I.,

111119th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 828-7400 ~v ) l I I P *.13 March 7, 1985 Mr . Samuel J . Chilk Secretary U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1121 1717 H Street, N. W. Washington , D. C . 20555 Re: Access Authorization Program, 49 Fed. 30726 (August 1, 1984)

Dear Secretary Chilk:

The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) submits the following comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking estab-lishing an access authorization program for individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants . 49 Fed . Reg . 30726 (August 1 , 1984) . EEI is the association of investor-owned electric utility companies in the United States. Its members serve 73 percent of the nation's electricity consumers . EEI ' s members operate 71 nuclear power plants with full operating licenses, four with low power licenses and 27 under construction which are currently undergoing or will be subject to operating license review at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) . Fundamentally , EEI does not believe that there is a need for an NRC rule establishing an access authorization program. We believe that the nuclear industry has already implemented effective measures to provide reasonable assurance against insider threats . Our experience to date provides no basis for the imposition of additional regulatory requirements such as those set forth in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and contained in the Regulatory Guide. Moreover , the proposed rule and the Regulatory Guide are unnecessarily prescriptive and burdensome , and would have a cost impact far in excess of any benefits resulting from their adoption . Therefore, EEI feels strongly that this proposal is an unsatisfactory means of accomplishing an effective and workable access authorization program.

U.S. NUCLEAR RE.GULATORY COMMISSIOS DOCKETING & SERVI r: c;~rrroN OFFIC~ OF TH F '" - ,Y OF THE CO ~ )N Postmark Date Copie.s Reco Add'I Co :

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk March 7, 1985 Page 2 The review procedure required by § 73. 56 (g) of the proposed regulation is a particularly troublesome aspect of the Commission's proposal. First and foremost, there is no nexus between the Commission's statutory authority to implement regulations to provide for the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public, and the requirement in the proposed regulation that a licensee offer a review procedure when authorization is denied or revoked.1/ Nothing in the intended grant of such procedural rights to - employees of licensees (or contractors) under this proposal would advance the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. Nor would such a review procedure serve in any way to provide increased assurance of the trustworthiness of utility employees and contractor personnel--the Commission's stated purpose in proposing this rule. Beyond these issues, there are serious practical problems in the establishment of such a review procedure. For instance, the

• procedure would leave ultimate authority to review access authorization decisions to a third-party arbitrator. Arbitrators, however, are bound to render decisions based upon collective bargaining agreements which are not related to NRC or utility security concerns. Hence, the decision of an arbitrator, who is likely to have little or no expertise in security-related matters, could require the licensee to reinstate an individual who genuinely constitutes a security risk. Furthermore, the NRC has failed to address an important labor law ramification of its proposal, i.e.,

the possibility that licensees could be deemed co-employers of a contractor's work force (with all the consequent labor relations complications such a determination would entail) as a result of their providing a review mechanism to contractor employees who dispute a decision relating to grant or denial of authorization. In sum, the review procedure is beyond the scope of the Commission's authority, is not otherwise compelled by law, may impede a licensee's ability to minimize security risks at its plant site and in all liklihood will result in detrimental consequences that were neither considered nor intended. For the reasons set out above, EEI recommends that the proposed rule (and attendant Regulatory Guide) not be issued in final form. In the event that the Commission decides to issue a final rule on access authorization, EEI has attached to this l/ Appended herewith as Attachment 2 is a memorandum which demonstrates that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the NRC promulgate a review procedure as part of an NRC-mandated access authorization program operated by licensees.

Mr. Samue l J. Chilk March 7, 1985 Page 3 c ommen t (Attachme nt 1) guidelines for a nucle ar p l ant access authorization program which were developed by, and are g enera lly acc eptable to , the industry. We offer them as an alterna t ive to the current NRC proposal. Sincerely , JJK: jbl Attachments

Attachment 1 PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM 1.0 PURPOSE To support the safe operation of licensed nuclear power plants, utilities will implement an access authorization program in accordance with the following guidelines. These guidelines have been designed with the intent to provide reasonable assurance that personnel granted unescorted access authorization to the protected and vital areas of utility nuclear power plants are trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel. Individual utilities may have additional requirements.

• 2.0 SCOPE These guidelines define the acceptable levels for conducting and evaluating the elements of the screening program; provide evaluation criteria for the determination of access authorization; provide provisions for accepting unescorted access authorization from other utilities; allow for a waiver of screening requirements for personnel who have three years continuous employment; include a grandfathering of personnel who were previously screened; and discuss records maintenance and audits of contractor and vendor access authorization programs to assure compliance with the intent of the utility's unescorted access authorization program.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITY The final granting and controlling of unescorted access authorization is the responsibility of the utility. Utilities are responsible for auditing non-utilities, who conduct their own screening programs, to assess compliance with these guidelines. 4.0 APPLICABILITY These guidelines apply to all utilities and utilities shall require those contractors and vendors who provide services at the utility's nuclear power plants to also follow them. These guidelines will become effective on (date) One level of unescorted access authorization will be granted to personnel who have been processed in accor_dance with these guidelines. Such unescorted access authorization will allow access to both protected and vital areas, as needed, for all personnel.

5.0 SCREENING PROGRAM 5.1 Initiation of a Screening Program No element of the screening program shall be initiated without the knowledge and written consent of the person who is subject to such screening. The applicant for unescorted access authorization shall be informed of the types of records that may be produced and retained, where such records are normally maintained, the duration such records are usually retained, the applicant I s rights concerning access to the information, and to whom and under what circumstances the information will be released. Initial screening requirements are applicable to those individuals who have never been screened or granted unescorted access authorization except as defined in Section 7.0 or 11.0. The initial screening program has two components: A background investigation (Section 5.2) and a psychological assessment (Section 5.3). An applicant may withdraw consent to a psychological assessment or background investigation at any time. When withdrawal of consent is made, all processing of work in connection with either the psychological assessment or background investigation shall cease as soon as practical. Withdrawal of consent shall be deemed with-drawal of the application for unescorted access authorization. Information collected under these guidelines shall be released only on a need to know basis. 5.2 Background Investigation Elements The background investigation shall cover the last three years prior to the date of. application for access authorization. Each utility shall make every reasonable attempt to address the applicant's employment history, educational history, criminal history, military service, and the applicant I s character and reputation in the following manner.

5. 2 .1 Employment History - Through contacts with previous employers obtain the following information:

a. Verification of claimed periods of employment and interruptions of employment in excess of 30 days;

b. Disciplinary history;

c. Reasons for termination and eligi-bility for rehire; and

d. Any other information that would adversely reflect upon the relia-bility and trustworthiness of the individual as it relates to being permitted unescorted access.

5.2.2 Education History - Verify claimed enrollment at an educational institution for the previous three years. In addition, verify the highest claimed post high school attendance or degree regardless of time.

5. 2. 3 Criminal History - As permitted by federal, state or other applicable law,

• 5.2.4 a criminal history record check through appropriate law enforcement agencies or court records shall be performed.

Military Service - Verification of military period of service (claimed or developed), by receipt of an honorable discharge on a form DD214 or through acquisition and submittal of an appli-cant's authorization for release of military history information to the National Personnel Records Center. If it becomes known that an individual's discharge is other than honorable, further investigation shall be made.

5. 2. 5 Character and Reputation - The appli-cant's reputation for emotional stability, reliability and trustworthi-ness shall be examined through contact with two references supplied by the applicant and at least two additional references (not related to the appli-cant) developed during the investi-gation. Emphasis shall be placed on:

a. Identified psychological problems;

b. Criminal history;

c. Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance;

d. Abuse of alcohol;

e. Susceptibility to coercion; and

                        -  3 -

f. Any other conduct relating to an applicant's trustworthiness and reliability to discharge job duties within the environment of a nuclear power plant.

5. 2. 6 Verification of True Identity - The verification of the applicant's identity through a means such as applicant's name, photograph, physical characteris-tics, social security number, date of birth, and comparison of physical characteristics with employment, educational, military and other records

                  ~nd/or employer and character references who have a personal acquaintance with the applicant.

• 5.3 Psychological Evaluation Reliability and stability shall be indicated by the result of a reliable written personality test or by any other professionally accepted clinical assessment proce-dure. The results of such test or procedure, including an interview if required, will be evaluated by, or evaluated in accordance with the procedure or guidelines approved by a qualified, and if applicable, a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist.

6.0 EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION The decision to clear an individual for authorization for unescorted access shall consider information obtained during the background investigation and psycholog1cal assessment. This information shall be reviewed using the guidelines specified in this section: 6.1 Willful omission or falsification of information submit-ted in support of employment or request for clearance for unescorted access to protected or vital areas. 6.2 Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol without adequate evidence of rehabilita-tion. 6.3 A criminal history that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel. 6.4 History of mental illness or emotional instability that may cause a significant defect in the individual I s judgment or reliability and may cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel. 6.5 Any evidence of coercion, influence or pressure that may be applied by outside sources to compel an individual to commit any act of sabotage or other act that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel. 6.6 Evidence that the individual has committed or attempted to commit or aided, or abetted another who committed or attempted to commit, any act of sabotage or other act that could cause a threat to public health and the safety and security of the plant and its personnel.

6. 7 A psychological evaluation which indicates that the individual is a risk in terms of trustworthiness or reliability.

6.8 Any other information that would adversely reflect upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as relates to being permitted unescorted access . 7.0 WAIVER FOR CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT The utility may waive the background investigation and psycho-logical assessment for any individual who has had, for the previous three years, continuous and trustworthy employment with the utility, contractor or vendor, provided that the utility, contractor or vendor meets the requirements of these guidelines. 8.0 TRANSFER AND REINSTATEMENT OF UNESCORTED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION Transfer or reinstatement of unescorted access authorization requires verification of the individual's true identity by the

• utility.

8.1 Transfer An individual's unescorted access authorization granted by one utility may be transferred to another utility if the individual's unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days. The gaining utility must verify that the indivi-dual has been screened in accordance with Section 5.0 and evaluated in accordance with 6.0 and has a current, valid unescorted access authorization or that a valid unescort-ed access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions within the previous 365 days. This verifica-tion or documentation may be accomplished by a written certification from the utility who last granted unescorted access authorization, through review of computer records, or other means. The gaining utility must cross-check information such as name, date of birth, social security number, sex and other applicable physical characteristics for identification. 8.2 Reinstatement The utility may reinstate the unescorted access authori-zation granted an individual if the individual returns to the same utility and unescorted access authorization has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and if the previous unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions. 8.3 Background Update Requirements Where the individual's unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for more than 365 calendar days, the utility will update the background investigation to cover

• 9.0 the individual's activities from the date of the previous background investigation but not to exceed three years.

SCREENING DURING COLD SHUTDOWN 9.1 Devitalization of Vital Areas During refueling or maintenance outages in which all or a part of a nuclear power plant is in a cold shutdown and/or devitalized status, the utility may grant unes-corted access authorization to the protected and devitalized areas for personnel who have not been screened in accordance with Sections 5.0 or 7.0 providing that: 9.1.1 The unescorted and unscreened person is restricted to the protected or devi-talized areas. 9 .1. 2 Other requirements of the approved security plan remain in force for the other vital areas. 9 .1. 3 Prior to start-up, a thorough visual inspection of the devitalized area is made by knowledgeable plant personnel to identify signs of tampering or sabotage. 9.1.4 Appropriate safety start-up procedures are followed to assure that all operat-ing and safety systems are functioning normally. 9.2 Temporary Clearances In situations where there is insufficient time to process a full clearance in accordance with Section 5.0, such as maintenance and refueling conditions, provisions are available to grant a temporary clearance. A temporary clearance is to be used in situations which require expedited processing. Unescorted access authorization based on a temporary clearance will not exceed a period of 180 continuous days. A temporary clearance cannot be transferred from one utility to another in accordance with Section 8.1. This 180 day temporary clearance may be based upon satisfaction of 9.2.1 and one or more of the conditions listed under 9.2.2 through 9.2.6. 9.2.1 Passing a psychological evaluation

• 9. 2. 2 within the past year .

Submission of a signed and notarized document by the present employer attest-ing that the employee has not committed acts that would otherwise preclude granting of unescorted access. 9.2.3 Verification of the employee's current or last period of employment and reason for termination. This verification must be made within 30 days of the date temporary clearance is granted. 9.2.4 Administration of and successful completion of a drug screen during processing for access authorization. 9.2.5 Recommendation of two developed charac-ter references who have had frequent and direct association with the contractor employee within the past 90 days. 9.2.6 Favorable criminal history record information. 10.0 GRANDFATHERING The utility may grant unescorted access authorization to individuals who are cleared for unescorted access as of (date) 11.0 CONTRACTOR AND VENDOR REQUIREMENTS The utility may accept the results of the entire screening program or any part thereof conducted by a contractor or vendor, provided that the contractor or vendor meets the requirements of these guidelines and that it makes its records available for auditing by the utility in accordance with Sections 12.0 and 13.0. 12.0 AUDITS The utility or its designated representative shall conduct triennial audits of contractor and vendor access au~horization programs to ensure compliance with these guidelines. A copy of this audit shall be available for inspection by the NRC. Other utilities may accept the originating utility's audit and need not re-audit the same contractor or vendor .

• 13.0 RECORDS Utilities and contractors and vendors of utilities who conducted screening programs in accordance with these guide-lines shall maintain records that verify:

a. A background investigation and psychological assessment was conducted for each person who is screened under Sections 5.0 of these guidelines.

b. Three years of continued and trustworthy employment for each person who is screened under Section 7.0 of these guidelines.

c. That the persons were cleared for unescorted access authorization on (date)

d. Satisfaction with the conditions of Section 9.2 which results in the granting of a temporary clearance.

Records for each person who is granted unescorted access shall be retained with the utility, contractor or vendor for a three year period following termination of access authorization. Each utility or utility's contractor or vendor who collects personal information for the purpose of processing access authorizations shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for the protection of the personal information. This information should not be disclosed to persons other than the subject or his representative, auditors whose purpose for review is to inspect program compliance, and other utilities if an individual's access authorization is transferred. I Attachment 2 REVIEW PROCEDURES This attachment addresses proposed Section 7 3. 56 (g) ( "Review Procedures") of the proposed Access Authorization Program concerning restricted access to certain areas of nuclear power plants. This Section would introduce a review procedure for employees denied access authorization. This proposed review procedure appears to be based upon the erroneous premise that there are due process considerations that the NRC must assure will be observed. This attachment deals primarily with that issue, but also raises additional considerations. I. The Review Procedure Requirement Rests Upon an Erroneous Premise The underlying premise of the review procedure which would be

• introduced by the NRC proposal rests upon a specious foundation since (1) constitutional due process obligations ordinarily do not attach to actions taken by private employers, and (2) even assum-ing, for the purposes of argument, that due process obligations could attach to the private employer, they would attached only to constitutionally protected property rights of the affected employ-ee. Since there is no constitutionally protected right of employ-ees to nuclear plant access, constitutional due process consid-erations simply do not come into play. In short, the reason for the existence of any review procedure in the NRC proposal is inapplicable to individuals whose positions require access to restricted areas. A discussion of the applicable principles follows.

The Commission must pass two hurdles before it can establish the existence of a company's due process obligation to its employees. First, it must show *that due process obligations are applicable to the private employer. Second, it must also establish that the employee enjoys a property interest in access to a particular job site to which due process protections attach. This is so because under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, the government cannot deprive a person of life, liberty or "property" without "due process of law." 1/ Each of these two predicates to due process protection are addressed below. The standards for determining applicability of "state action" sufficient to trigger due process protections are the same irrespective of whether the source of the due process pro-tection claimed is the Federal Government under the Fifth Amendment or the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Warren v. Gov't. Nat. Mtg. Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 1232 (8th Cir. 1980).

A. Are Constitutional Due Process Protections Applicable to Private Employers? Due process obligations attach only to actions taken by the government. It is well settled that actions taken by a citizen (e.g., a private employer) "however discriminatory or wrongful, 11 are innnune from the constitutional requirements of due process of law. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Moose Lodge No. 107

v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171, 179 (1972). This fundamental principle remains unchanged even if the private employer is extensively regulated by the government. Notwithstanding the governmental regulation of their activities generally, the actions of regulated utilities remain the actions of the private corporate citizen and not the actions of the government. Jackson v.

Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). Only where the action of the private employer is shown in reality to_ be the action of the government can the bridge separating insulated private action from covered "state action" be crossed, and due process protections invoked. Whether this bridge is crossed, so that the action of the private employer can be equated with the action of government, requires "detailed inquiry" (Metro-politan Edison, supra, 419 U.S. at 351) into the facts of each case. As the Supreme Court stated in Metropolitan Edison, supra, 419 U.S. at 349-350: While the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is "private," on the one hand, or "state action," on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer. The facts of Metropolitan Edison are illustrative. That case involved the contention of a user of electricity that she was entitled to a hearing required by due process of law before a governmentally regulated utility could cut off her electric service for non-payment of charges; Rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court held that the utility owed no, due* process obligation to the customer because there was no "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State itself." 419 U.S. at 351. The Court's further statements shed some light on helping deter-mine when the private action is to be treated as state action. The Court emphasized that the state regulatory commission "has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by order-ing it . . . . "; "Respondent's [the company's] exercise of the choice allowed by the state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so

 'state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."     (Id.)

                                    -  3 -

The proposed NRC regulation does not establish a "sufficiently close nexus with government, within the meaning of Metropolitan Edison, to treat the private employer as an instrumentality of the state. There are, to be sure, some factors which may give the flavor of "state action 11

the regulation is imposed upon util-ities by the government; the NRC must in some cases approve the program pursuant to which adverse action shall be taken; and the NRC can seek civil and criminal penalties against employers who fail to

• comply with the regulation. However, such factors are overwhelmingly outweighed by facts militating against a finding of state action. Thus, the regulation goes no further than simply complimenting the employer's common law right to transfer or discharge its employees on grounds it chooses; all discretion on whether to take adverse action remains with the employer; the NRC can take no action itself to bar an employee; the government does not act to select any employee for access deprivation or to determine than any employee should be barred from the site; and the government does not participate in any access deprivation
• decision. At bottom, there is no state action involved because the government does not compel action against any employee; it only compels the employer to establish a framework for making its own assessments about its employees.

In Metropolitan Edison, the Court observed that a touchstone of state action incident to a private employer's implementation of a government regulation was the act of government in putting "its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it . . . . " (Id. at 357) .) Here, however, although the NRC has put its weightbehind the program by ordering that the program be established, it has not itself exercised the prerogative of the employer in determining who should be barred from access. Lower court decisions subsequent to Metropolitan Edison, while not dealing directly with the issue at hand, suggest that no state action exists under the proposed regulation. For instance, in Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir . 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980), the court construed Metropolitan Edison narrowly. In Fitzgerald, a jockey violated state race commission rules and the private track barred him from further access. It did so, however, not on the basis of the violation of regulation, but simply on the basis of its power to revoke stall privileges to any jockey for any reason. The court found state action because the decision to revoke stall privileges was made by the track in conjunction with state racing officials assigned to the track. The court stated, 607 F.2d at 600 (emphasis in original): We hold today that it is only when the state officials with delegated authority to enforce state laws or regulations participate with management in the decisional process to expel for a violation of a State Commission Rule is the requisite nexus under Jackson [v. Metro-politan Edison] established. The essence of state action is supplied by the presiding

judge and is supplied by the presiding judge and racing secretary's meeting with management to analyze Fitzgerald's conduct and officially participating in reaching the decision to expel. The court noted that its decision might have been different if the track had reached its decision without the involvement of the state officials. Id. at n. 15. In substantial contrast to the facts of Fitzgerald, supra, is Lemberos v. Laurel Racecourse, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 1376 (D. Md. 1980). In Lemberos a private track revoked the stall privileges of a jockey. The State Commission, acting pursuant to a regu-lation that forbade jockey access to tracks in which the track had not granted stall space, refused to allow entry of the jockey to the track. The court found no state action present. Noting that Ja-ckson v. Metropolitan Edison, supra, required a showing of

• intimate state involvement" in the challenged private action 11 sufficient to render such "state action, 11 the court emphasized that the private action challenged stemmed from a decision made by a private entity, unlike Fitzgerald where the state officials participated in making the debarment decision. The court stated (489 F.Supp. at 1376-1377):

Under this Rule, the decision is left to the discretion of each track which is decisive. By enforcing the Rule, the Commission was not intimately involved in making the initial decision itself.*** The critical determina-tion that plaintiff should not be granted stall space was made solely by the private defendants and was not based on any action taken by the Commission.*** [R]epresentatives of the State'of Maryland did not participate in the challenged activity to such an extent that the private action became state action. Refusing to find state action in Waters v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 618 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1980)--a case involving a hospital's revocation of a doctor's staff privileges under a statute permit-ting such revocation--the court narrowly read Metropolitan Edison so as to find state action only where the government orders or compels a private party to act in a certain way, that party I s action will not constitute "state action".i/ The court also Accord, Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hospital, 509 F.Supp. 815 823 (S.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd. 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1985):

        "What involvement the State may have through its licensing procedures is not applicable unless these regulations somehow compelled the hospitals or physicians to act against plaintiffs."

                                    -  5 -

relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978), in which the Court refused to find state action on the basis of a statute which merely authorized a previously legal private action: "Our cases state

   'that a State is responsible for the . . . act of a private party when the State, by its laws, has compelled that act." Similarly here, although the government is involved in the NRC regulation, it has not commanded a specific result under it.

In sum, the first predicate of any due process claim by the NRC--the presence of state action because the private employer is acting under government regulation--is lacking because the employ-ment decisions remain those of the private employer not compelled to act one way or the other by the NRC. B. Even if Due Process Protections Were Applicable to Private Employers, They Would Not Apply Here

• Because There Exists No Property Right Entitled to Due Process Protection With respect to the second predicate of any due process contention--the demonstration of an employee's property interest in site access which is subject to due process protections--the NRC's proposed review procedure appears even more vulnerable.

The leading case in this area is Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-Cl0 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). There the Supreme Court dealt with the situation of a worker in a privately run cafeteria on a military base who was denied access to the base for security reasons by the base commander and hence lost her job in the cafeteria. The barred employee claimed that she was entitled to a statement of charges against her and to a hearing on the basis of the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that the denial of access to the military installation did not involve due process

• ~- considerations. The Court declared (Id. at 894):

                   . she had no constitutional right to be there in the first place, she was not deprived of liberty or property by the Superintendent's action.

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the conclusion that employees did not have property interests in their jobs and accordingly were not entitled to due process protection.l/ The nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract was held not subject l/ Different results have been reached in cases where the government licensed persons to practice a profession and, by revoking the license, would be barring the employee from a right to his profession.

to due process protections in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where the Court noted that the decision not to employ did not confer a public charge of imroorali ty, dishonesty, or impose a stigma or disability on his freedom to find employment elsewhere. The employee "remains as free as before to seek another [job]," Roth at 575, citing McElroy at 895. Applying the same Roth rationale in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a police officer enjoyed' no due process right to a hearing incident to his discharge, stating:

 "This same conclusion applies to the discharge of a public employ-ee whose position is terminable at will of the employer when there is no public disclosure* of the reasons for his discharge."

Accord, Franci v. AVCO Corp., 460 F.Supp. 389, 398 (D. Conn. 1978). In short, there is no property right to employment at a nuclear power plant and hence no constitutional right subject to due process protection. This conclusion is underscored here by virtue

• of the fact that nothing in the proposal necessarily involves a loss of employment. Indeed, the barred employee may well be transferred to another facility of the employer and, in any event, remains free to practice his trade with any other employer.

As the Supreme Court stated in Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577-578:

 "To have a property interest in a benefit [subject to due process protections] a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.     [T]he respondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment."

In order to confer property interest in employment (and hence due process protection) there must be an expectation in continued employment arising from governmental statutes qr rules, or private contract. Winston v. U.S. Postal Service, 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978). There is no statutory or other government regulation upon which an employee of a utility may claim an expectation of employ-ment at a nuclear power plant. Hence, there is no constitution-ally protected property interest which is jeopardized by NRC actions. Accordingly, no due process protections attach to a utility's decision to deny access to an employee. Finally, a unionized employee might argue that he has an expecta-tion of employment and hence a property right because his union contract provides that his employment can be terminated only for just cause. Union contracts, however, also contain grievance and arbitration procedures in the event of termination, and those provisions in themselves have been held sufficient to satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process. Winston v. U.S. Postal Service, supra, 585 F.2d at 209-210.

                                  -  7 -

In sum, therefore:

1. There is no governmental action inherent in the 'NRC proposal sufficient to render the private employer subject to due process obligations to their employees, because the proposal does not compel or dictate any decision to be reached by the utility.

2. Even if such "state action" were shown to exist, no due process protection would apply because there is no constitution-ally protected property right to work at a particular job site and hence no property right deserving due process protection.

Finally, to the extent unionized employees could show both "state action" and a contractually based property right deserving of protection, the collective bargaining agreement grievance and arbitration provisions would, in and of themselves, satisfy this obligation.

• II. The Absence of Any Comparable Due Process Review Procedure in Any Governmental Regulations The Federal government, through its agencies and departments, requires private employers to have their employees meet certain standards as a condition to the employee's performance of his work. Numerous regulatory arrangements have been surveyed where the government has imposed conditions of employment upon private employers. Not a single one of these regulatory schemes contains an agency mandated due process review procedure. In this regard, therefore, the NRC proposal is seriously out of step with other federal agencies. A sampling of our survey follows:

A. Under 49 U.S.C. S 106, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. Appx. SS 1354, 1355, ,1421, 1422 and the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 1655, privately employed aircraft repairmen must be recommended by the employer for government certification pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 65.101. There is no provision for due process review procedure rights for an employee who is denied such a recommendation and hence, in effect, effectively is barred from access to employment as a repairman. B. Under 49 U.S.C. S 106, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S .c. Appx. SS 1354-58, 1421-30, 1432 and the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 1655, law enforcement officials working at federally regulated airports must be certified under 14 C.F.R. 107.17. There are no due process review procedure rights provided for law enforcement officials who are denied certification and hence, in effect, are denied access to employment at airports.

C. Under 49 u.s.c. §§ 502, 3103, 3104 and the Department of Transportation Act, 49 u.s.c. Appx. § 1655, the government extensively regulates private employers' qualifications of motor vehicle and other commercial drivers in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 391. There is no provision for any due process review procedure rights of any employee who is found by the employer not to possess the requisite qualifications.- D. Under the Air Force Subchapter of the Armed Forces Act, 10 U.S.C. 8012, qualifications are imposed on private contractors for their flight crew members in accordance with 32 C.F.R. 860. 4 (c) . No provision is created thereunder for due process review procedure rights of any employee found unqualified, and hence debarred from access to that position, by the private employer. The same result obtains under the same statute for ground personnel of such contractors under 32 C.F.R. 860.15. E. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e et

 ~ - , the EEOC has promulgated sexual harassment regulations which specify the responsibility of employers toward their supervisory personnel for complying with the regulations set forth at 29 C.F.R. 1604.11.         No provision is made for due process review procedure rights of any supervisor relieved of his employment for having violated these regulations.

F. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S .C. SS 651 et seq. and under 40 U. S .C. § 333, employers are responsible for their employees complying with literally thousands of safety and health regulations promulgated at 29 C.F.R. Parts 1910 and 1926. Yet, no due process review procedure rights are provided in favor of any employee relieved of his employment by the employer for failing to comply with these government regulations .

• A.

III. Independent Basis for Redress by Aggrieved Employees Under Federal and State Law The vast majority of personnel affected by the subject proposal are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Typi-cally, these agreements contain grievance and arbitration provisions which protect the employee from any unjust adverse employment action. Under federal law, the employer is subject to judicial injunction to honor these provisions. 4 / Moreover, the employee is entitled to judicial review of the-arbitration deci-sion. He further has a judicial cause of action against both the United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 LRRM 2414 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 46 LRRM 2416 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 5 9 3 , 4 6 LRRM 2 4 2 3 ( 19 6 0 ) .

union for breach of fair representation for not adequately pursu-ing his claim to arbitration and against the employer for breach of contract for unjust discipline or discharge. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). B. An employee not represented by a union (as well as one who is) also may assert a judicial cause of action against the employer for deprivation of his "property rights" (to his job) without due process of law (notice of charges against him, con-frontation of accusers, right to a hearing) guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, if he or she could prove "state action.n1/ C. Any employee who felt he or she was pretextually denied site access due to race, sex, national origin, age or maternity status could seek relief through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

• D. Any employee pretextually denied access in retaliation for his or her union organizational activities could seek relief through the National Labor Relations Board.

E. An increasing number of states have judicially narrowed the nemployment at will 11 doctrine and permit employees to sue their employers for alleged unjust discharge, particularly where the discharge offends a public policy interest of the state. See, e.g., Annotation: "Employee 1 s Arbitrary Discharge as Breach of Employee Contract Terminable at Will," 62 ALR 3d 271. This trend is expected to continue. If it does so, increasing numbers of unrepresented employees will*likely be able to invoke this addi-tional remedy in state court. 3./ Of course, the employee would have to prove both of the elements discussed in Part I of this memorandum, specifi-cally: (1) governmental action against him through the vehicle of the regulated employer, and (2) the existence of a protected property right to his job.

IV. Miscellaneous Criticisms of the Proposal

1. The proposal does not contain any standard of review upon which a neutral arbitrator is to base his decision upon review of denial or revocation of access. Consequently, with respect to those cases which would come before the arbitrator, the arbitrator would have unbridled discretion--without standards or criteria of any kind--to permit access.

2. Where Congress has intended to create a governmental review of private action against an employee aggrieved by govern-ment regulations, it has expressly created such a cause of action.

See, for instance, § ll(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 u.s.c. 660(c). Under that statute, Congress has expressly provided that the government may initiate a cause of action on behalf of any employee who claims that he was discriminated against in the exercise of his rights under that Act. Similarly,

• Congress has expressly declared in§ 8(a) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a) (4), that it shall be an unfair labor practice for any employer to discriminate against any employee for having given testimony to the NLRB. The fact that Congress has not created such a cause of action under the Nuclear Regulatory Act, nor even intimated that the Commission should have such power, strongly militates against the Commission 1 s assumption that it has such power .

OOC:KETEr: USMC" CHARLES CENTER

• P. 0. BOX 1475
• BALTIMORE, MARY~ D ~1?03

                                                                               ,..l,      P1 :40 NORMAN   J. BOWMAKER VICE PRESIDENT                                                   0FFIC,;.__ - SE.CRt 11\r GENERAL SERVICES                         March 5, 1985            0OCKt.,

• 6 & S£RVJC:'

ANC!-. Secretary to the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sirs:

The Baltimore Gas &. Electric Company respectfully submits comments regarding the three rules published in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register. These rules proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 50 and 73 and specifically addressed the following areas:

1. Access Authorization 10 CFR 73.56 (Attachment A and B).

2. Miscellaneous Amendments conceming physical protection of nuclear power plants (Attachment C).

3. Search of individuals at power reactor facilities (Attachment D).

This letter transmits and summarizes our Corporate position regarding these proposed rules. Our detailed comments and suggested word changes are included as Enclosures A through D. ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE When initially proposed in 1977, there was a perceived need for regulation in the area of access authorization. In the last eight years, however, the nuclear industry has made significant improvements in the procedures and guidelines goveming access to nuclear facilities. These procedures assure, to the maximum degree possible, only trustworthy individuals are granted access. Steps taken by the Industry in an effort to improve access controls can be seen by the development of screening programs and the Nuclear Employee Data Systems (NEDS). In view of the foregoing, BG&E recommends that the proposed rule, as written, not be issued. We believe the rule is unnecessary and attempts to regulate areas which are management responsibility. An example of this can readily be seen in the review procedure delineated in the rule. We oppose this procedure and any similar actions which attempt to regulate those areas which are clearly management prerogatives. Acknowtedged by card **., IAR ? 1985 0

U.S. NUCtUll ~EGUf ATORY COMM ISSI DOCKETING & SERVICE C:ECTION OFFIU OF TtF SE J; TA, Y O F THE CO ,\Ml'iSION Postmark Oa t - Copies Rect. / _ Add'I Copi J

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However, if the Commission decides that regulatory action is necessary, we recommend that it requires licensees to develop individual Access Authorization Programs using NUMARC guidelines for Access Authorization Programs as a basis. These guidelines were used to develop our specific comments regarding the proposed rule. MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS Our review of the Miscellaneous Amendments indicates that compUance with the vital island concept discussed in the amemment may require backfits, i.e. the construction of new faciUties. The requirement that the secondary power sources for the security system be located in a vital area may also require modifications to the existing system. We believe that the costs of this construction and modifications are not Justified l1y the associated reduction in risk. SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS Generally, we are in agreement with and support the provisions for modifying the 1X1t-down S80rch of personnel prior to access into the Protected Area.

SUMMARY

We have included as attachments to this letter detailed comments conceming these rules and the proposed regulatory guides, as well as the answers to the specific questions asked by the Commission as part of the Federal Register Notice. We would be pleased to discuss these comments with the NRC staff or answer any questions which may arise. Bowmker

Attachment A Page 1 of 11 Comments Conceming The Access Authorization Rule and The Associated Dro.ft Regulatory Guide Federal Register, Page 30726 10 CFR 73.56 Task SF 301-4 These comments reflect a program that BG&E either presently has or expects to implement without a rule, using Industry guidelines. The areas which exceed the minimum standards reflect our own Management policy, given the flexibility allowed l1y the guidelines which may or may not be the best program for other companies. Text of proposed regulations and Regulatory Guides is set forth in ordinary type. BG&E commentary is in bold type. Where a change is suggested in the proposed regulattoos, it will be und.erUned. BG&E 0ppose3 thfB proposed regulation and beleves that U attempts to regulate areas of Management ""3J)(Jl1Bfbillty. We bel:leve that if a rule is fsaued, it should only require Ucensea to develop an access authorization program WJfng Industry approved gufdm.ce. Below are our apecf.ftc comments regan1:tng the proposed rule as presently written. ITEM I. Proposed Regulatory Statement 73.56 (c) Background Investigations Reg. Guide Chapter 2 A. 73.56(c)

                "The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for, background investigations that provide assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reliable, trustworthy, and would act in a manner that would protect health and minimize danger to li.fe and property. As a minimum, this backgroWld investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment hf.story, education hf.story, credit hf.story, criminal history, milttary service and character and reputation. The licensee sha.ll require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospftaUzation, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization. 11

< I Attachment A Page 2 of 11 B. Reg. Guide paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2, page 3 "Areas of inquiry relevant to such a determination are employment, credit, educational, criminal, and military service histories. A retrospective period of.§_ years or since the age of 18, whichever is shorter, is considered generally sufficient to achieve this objective." C. Reg. Guide para.graph 2.3, Page 12 nuse of Controlled Substances Habitual abuse of controlled substances may seriously im-pair an individual's judgment and reliability. In addition, an individual may be driven to perform criminal acts in order to sustain the habitual use of such substances and may be susceptible to coercion. If 'background

• investigatim indicates that the person has been detected using a controlled substance on two or more instances in the preceding 5 years without either a prescription or under a doctor's direction, access authorization to protected areas and vital islands may be denied. The presumption is that the individual, knowing that the use of such substances is not legal, will attempt to conceal such use. While a single detection might not ordinarily be adequate for denial of access privileges (an exception might be a heroin user detected while selling the drug), two detections are considered sufficient to conclude that the person is a habitual user."

D. BG&E Comments:

• 1. We end01'88 the use of lJackgrouJW1 fnvestigatfons sc-reentng tooL

                                                               <13 an fmportant Criminal reconb are not alW0)'3 accasfble, partfcularfy for crimes committed out of the state or local jurisdiction& Access to the FBI records 13 deslruble in order to provide licensees with criminal hfatory fnfonnation about workers who will 1Je granted rmescorted access fn a plant. We support CWT'8llt legislative tnitfative3 (U.S.

Senats Bfll S 214) that would make this infonnatlon available to Hcenaees.

                     ]d--

Backgroum fnvestigatlons can only reflect the best effort:s of the licensee. Reall8tlcally 30me records wfZZ remain imavaflable.

2. a. True While fmgerprints are a valuable tool for crlmtna ry checks, we disagree with the U88 of fingerprints as a prefe-n-ed means for veriflcatlon of True Identity as stated fn the Reg. Gulde. We 'believe this is too restrictive. Many licensees do not have access to local '{fngerprint J'8C01'ds and no

I I Attachment A Page 3 of 11 present legislation allows an FBI check. Addftfonally, an fndMdual's fdentfty can only be verified through fingerprints if there Is a set of prints on -record as a r-esult of the fndivfdual's previous action& We believe verification of true fdentlty shoo1d be erpcnled to allow the licensee to "taJce reasonable steps to verify name, alias, social security rumber, etc., through the ewluatfon of documents (to include photographs) and cumulative resulf3 Of the bflckgroum fnveBtfgation. II

b. Educational History - this check should not solicit infonnation conceming psychological, discfpllnary and medical problems, becou8e that fnfonnatlon ts not available through educational reconf& '.lllfs hfstory should verify ~tfonal Information only and shw.ld be conducted lJy a nreords review.

c. Credit History- thb should be completely eliminated from the rule. We do not believe ft will be cost e"ectfve and question the va1ldtty of "judging individuals' -reliability based on their

   ..... credit ratings.

d. Military History - military history checks shoold be limited to those listed or developed on the employees application or through backgroun1 check& Also, a<tf a new sentence a~er " **

• mffltary history.* - "Interim acce&9 not to exceed sa months may be gmnted pending 1'8Celpt of criminal history and military service vertflcatlon. 11 Thl8 is suggested because these ttems cannot be Immediately obtained and would become a bottlenecking process.

e. Charact.er and Reputation - the requirement that the licensee contact the references Zfiied lJy an applicant and that they develop and bttervfew at least two additional refenmces is not cost-effective or Wcely to increase -reliability. We feel this requirement shouJd be deleted from the n.tle entirely*

• f. ~~- The word "require" shoold be deleted and substttuted in its pla.ce becau8e self reporting cannot be effectively enforced.

g. ~ - T h r o u g h conmcts wfth previous e a t o obtain the following information:

1. Veri.fi.cation of claimed periods of employment am.

bttem,ptfons of employment in excess of 30 days.

2. Di3ciplfnary history.

1 I Attachment A Page 4 of 11

3. Rea.801UI for temdnatlon and ellglbUity for rehire.

4. Any other Information that woul:f adversely reflect upon the reliabClity and truBtworthlness of the indf.vfdual as ft relates to being f)ermitted imescoried access.

h. Criminal History- .A3 pennttted "by federal, st.ate or other applicable law, a criminal history record check through appropriate law enforcement agencies or coort records shall be performed.

3. Investigations should caver a -period of 3 years instead of the 5 years proposed. This reduction fn investigating time enables the licensee to make a final detemdnatlon of clearance or denial more rapidly. Thl8 fn tum reduces the risk of allowing ll1desfrable woncers fn the Protected and Vital areas on a cond.ttfonal basL<J. In addition, ft 1l1fll reduce the e.rperul88 involved with condu.ctlng these checks.

4. The word "Habitual" Bhou'1d be deleted from this paragraph as any abuse of a can.trolled substance or alcohol may seriously Impair (Bl fndfvfdual's pdgment and reliability. We also believe the 1POl'ds "or al.cohol" 3hould be added to this paragraph.

Change "on two or -* preceding 5 -years" to "detected using a controlled aub61:ance anytime fn their lifetime without etther a prescription or doctor's direction, access authorization to PA/VI may be denied." The reason being, we reserve the right to deny access to someone wring hard drugs or previously used drugs that may have {la8hbacks. Additfonally, sfnce such use is Ulegal, ft could mtse the tssue of the user's mllabl11ty*

I l Attachment A Page 5 of 11 ITEM II. Proposed Regukltory Statements 73.56 (d) Psychological Assessment l_l,eg. Guide, Chapter 3 A. 73.56(d)

                    "The Ucensee shall estabUsh and maintain a psychological assessment program to be administered to all individuals prior to granting them Wtescorted access to protected areas and vital isklnds. The 1'0quirements of this 'f)Qragraph supplant the requirements of Appendix B paragraph I.B.2.b. of thts part for nuclear power 1'0actor security personnel. This program, as a minimwn, shall consist of:

1. Written personality tests which have been designed to furnish an objective evaluation of some of the major personality traits which

• influence individual and interpersonal behavior. Results of the personality tests shall be evaluated !!1._ a qualified and, if appUcable, state-licensed psychologtst or psychiatrist. The tests chosen shall have predetermined evaluation scales which are statistically proven to have a high degree of reUabiUty, shall have been proven to be valid, shall meet the criteria o[ JXJragraph (dX2) of this section, and shall comply with the emloyee selection procedure guidelines as described in "Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978)," 43 FR 38295 (August 25, 1978), 29 CFR Part 1607.

2. Clinical interviews for individuals whose personality tests results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits. These interviews shall be administered and conducted by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The tests and interview shall be designed to evaluate (i) an individual's current behavioral 1'0Uabflity, looking for traits which would indicate trot the individual -possesses a strong potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health, safety, or property and (ii) behavioral patterns which if combined with the expected work environment, could develop into a high potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health and safety or property. Based on the 1'0su.lts of the tests and, if needed, clinical interview, the psychiatrist or psychologist shall provide, in writing to appropriate senior licensee management, a recommendation as

I t Attachment A Page 6 of 11 to the individual's behavioral suitability for unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants." B. BG&E Comments:

1. The second sentence of (d)(l) should be changed to delete the word "by" and in3ert in tts place "using criteria established by *** "* This will allow the test to be mechanically graded by a clerical staff.

ThB scores obtained could be compared to the established "nonns" and the st.aft could determine ff the candidate "passed" or the score Indicates the need for an interview. The clerical personnel would always be fn a posttfon to consult with a r,sychlatrist or psychologist ff the criteria established indicated that such a cmsultation was necessary.

2. The words "written personality tests1' shruld be cmnged to "one or more written personality tests which" 'because one test can be used

• 3.

to su/ff.cfentl:y test fndivfduals* The words "shall have been proven to be valid" must be deleted because thfs requirement cannot be met. The MMPI test which many ltcenaeu utllize Btrictly for a screening purpose has not been and fn all Wcellhood cannot be validated as a selection device to choose employees In acconlance ll7fth the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure&, as would be required by Subparagmph (d)(l). Since such tests are not being used as selection devices, they 3hould not be required to be validated as though they were being utll1zed for that purpose.

4. Add the following to ~2XO after the word "safety,": "property, or reputation of the licensee. n We feel that the cllnical Interview should have as one of its designated purposes the fdentif(catiDn of fndfvfduals wfth a propensity for commfttfng acts detrimental to the repumtfon of the licensee. For example, this coukf mean acts which come to public knowledge and do not 1'fJ8Ult in crlmfnal convictions, but ldtich nonetheless cast doubt upon the character, rellabillty, and trustworthiness of the fndfvidual employee or contractor employee in the licensee-'s power plant.

An illustration might be an Individual an-ested for possession of WWJwfuI substances. As part* of a "plea lJargaln" he or she might acknowle(Ve that, while technically guilty of the offense, ft is a flrst of{8J1JIB, and he or she might ask for and receive probation before venffct. Suppose further that the case attracts media coverage because the fndfvfdual ls an employee fnslde a mclear power plant. The fndfvfdua1 technically has no criminal conviction, but there 18 a sub3tantlal lfkellhood that harm will be done to the public1s conflden,ce fn the licensee if the fndfvfdual ls allowed to retum to work inside a nu.clear power -plant. In our ;,<<Jgment a clfnfcal Interviewer should be able to take such a set of ctrcumst.ances Into consideration fn evaluating the Individual's rell.abfllty and trustworthtness. The interviewer should not be precluded from considering such events 8fmply becaUse there ms been, technically, no criminal conviction, especfally lllhen the individual has acknow~ed his or her culpabillty.

I 1 Attachment A Page 7 of 11

5. Change the words on 73.56 (d)(2) from I\Jenior licensee management" to "cognizant 'lfcenaee manager or supervisor."

Senior llcenaee management may fndfcate someone at a Vice Prealdentia.I level. To forwa.m all the information. to senior management woold fJIICWJlber the access process procedure&

Attachment A

                                     -{

Page 8 of 11 ITEM ill. Proposed Regulatory Statements Continual Behavioral Observation Reg. Guide, Chapter 4 A. Paragraph 4.1, page 25 "Although it is recommended that the access authorization program be designed so that employees will not suffer monetarily because of the temporary suspension of unescorted access, the NRC believes that a lengthy suspension period is both unfair and unnecessary. Therefore, the Commission recommends that a decision be made within 20 workdays to e,ither reinstate or revoke the employee's unescorted access authortzatiCRl. This amount of time is sufficient for the licensee to review the appropriate information and to make a final decision.."

• B. Paragraph 4.2, 'P(lge 27

1. "This training (CBO) shoo.ld be several days in length and should involve supervisors from a variety of departments and different levels in the plant hierarchy*** "

2. "Supervisors should consult senior licensee management conceming any gradual behavioral deterioration observed in subordinates.

However, the supervisor must refer a subordinate to senior licensee management when signifi.cant changes in behavior are detected. The supervisor must make judgments about both the severity and the prevalence of such behavioral changes. For example, if the employee has made a very serious mistake and fails to report it or deliberately damages facility equipment, immediate referral to senior licensee management should result or the supervisor should immediately suspend the individual's unescorted access authorization and then refer him or her to senior licensee management. However, if the incidents are of a relatively minor nature (e.g., the employee suddenly starts complaining about sleeping difficulties), the supervisor should document this but should not refer the individual to senior Ucensee management. ... "

Attachment A

 ,.                                                               Page 9 of 11 C. BG&E Connnents:

A. The 20 workdays lfmft shoo.ld be deleted and changed to "as soon as pructfcal hut not to exceed 90 workday& n B. 1. The tra.tning time shoo.ld be determined l1y the licensee.

2. Change the words from "senior licensee management* to "cogrdzant llcensee manager or supen,lsor." Senl.or licensee management may fndfcate vfce presfdential levels. We believe the lfcensee can better determfne who within tts orgunizatfon can beBt handlB the8s sftuatlon&

Attachment A Page 10 of 11 ITEM IV. Proposed Regulatory Statements 73.58 (f)(1) - Non-licensee Employees Reg. Guide - Chapter 5 A. 73.56(f)(1)

                "The Ucensee may accept an unescorted access authorization granted an employee or a manufacturer, contractor, or equipment supplier 't,y another licensee, or a previous employee of another licensee,   if the Individual's employment tn licensed nuclear power reactors has not been intemipted for a continuous period of more than 365 days and     if the original granting licensee sends to the gaining licensee a photograph of the individual and a written verification of the individual's unescorted access authorization along with a statement which indicates its current validity. For individuals whose employment tn Ucensed nuclear power reactors has been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days, the individual's activities must be investigated according to the applicable requirements of paragraph (c) of this section and a new psychological assessment made according to the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section."

B. BG&E Comments:

1. Change 73.56 (f)(l) and Reg. Guide, pamgraph (/)(1) page 31 to aft.er the word "photograph" add nor other means of fdsntf/i.catimt accepmble to licensee." This 1tlOU1d allow for other auttabl.e means of veri.fl.catfon to be accepted.

• z* Change Reg. Gulde, paragraph 5.1, sentence two, page 32 to "The certtflcatlon should contain the date on which access authorization was removed or tennfnated. n

Attachment A Page 11 of 11 ITEM v. Proposed Regulatory Statements 73.56 (g) Review Procedures A. 73.56(g)

               "The licensee's plan submitted pursuant to 73.56 (a) must include a procedure for the review of a denial or revocation under this section of an access authorization of an employee of the licensee, contractor or suppUer that has an adverse effect on the individual's employment."

B. BG&E Comments:

1. We oppose 13.56 (g) grievance procedures In its entirety. These review procedures are far more formal procedures than most non-wdon utlllty licensees have or need. These procedures are clearly patterned on Wtion grievance procedures, many of which postulate a totally antagonfstfc relationship between supen,fsfon cnf employee. While such a relationship will occasionally ezlst In the non-tmfon contert, more o~en than not there will be a 1Jroad area of agreement a to the validtty of a policy, and some question as to consfstency of application. The non-tmion grfevance procewre operates most effectively men there is a shared assumption lJy all cmcemed of good fatth of the J)a1't of those who wrote the policies and those who are attempting to implement them. The proposed review procedures indulge no such assumption of good faith on the J)a1't of etther party.

For this reason, our feeling ts that the licensee shoo.ld develop its OlPl'l review procedure fn accordance with eriBting state and fedeml law*

Attachment B Page 1 of 7 Responses to Specific NRC Questions on 73.56 Federal Register Page 30730 The CommiBBion is '[Klrticularly interested in receiving public response to the following questions concerning the proposed requirements:

1. a. To what extent are the proposals cont.ained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry?

la. BG&E pre88Rtly JH111orms paychDlogfcal ruare.ssment, backgrow1l:f fnvestfgatfon (ldtfch includes criminal, employment, education and mflttary service history), and a contfnual beha:vfoml obserwrtfon (CBOJ tnlfnfng program for supervisors. However, BG&E prefers the fle%1Ml1ty of choolflng the extent of ttB p-rogram rather than having tt mandated by -regulation.

b. To what extent are psychological asessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

lb. BG&E presently haJJ both a psychological assessment and a behavioral obaerwtfon progm:m. The J>BYCho1.ogical assessment pmgram is admfniBtel"8d by a state-Ucenaed -psychologfBt and has two components: psychological testing (Including the MAfPI) and fntervfelPS by Btate-llcensed psychologf.sts when deemed appropriate. The behavioral obaematfon program corudsts of a fOUl"-hour CBO supervisor training program adminfstel"8d by the Supen,IBor, Securtty Screening, with partfcfpation by a member of the Psychological ASS888111ent Staff, and the Coonffnator, Employee Medi.cal ABsistance Senile&

2. a. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological asseBBment procedures in the nuclear btd.ustry?

Za. PtJyChologfcal as,e.ssment fs uaefu.I fn detecting the following threats to rellabfltty and Btabf11ty:

1. .Argumentative; hostllity toward authortty

2. Irresponsibfllty/lmpuJBMty

3. Defensl.ve incompetence

4. Std>Btanceabuse

5. Emotional tnadaptabfffty (PfJYChopatholDgy)

6. Hostile and destructtve actions

7. Dfsrespect for social nonns; violation of n.tle.s

8. Inablllty to handle stressful or emergency Bltuatlons

9. Threat to property, public health, and publl.c safety

10. carele.ssness, poor judgment, inattention

11. Low effective fntellegence

Attachment B Page 2 of 7

12. Organic brain dysfrmctlon: memory problems, concentration problems, fnabfllty to follow dtrectfons

13. Susceptlbflity to blackmaU

14. Sulmantial risk to the Company's repumtfon in the community Psychologlcal assessment fs useful fn detecting a history of relevmt crfmfnal actfvfty days or weeks before a backgroum fnvestfgatlon would detect the same Information. Also, psychological assessment may result tn the lndtvldual's voluntary disclosure of infonnatfon about erfmfnal actfvtty whlch may not 'be revealed by a backgroond Investigation, such as juvenile recorc& lllhfch are closed by the court.

b. Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concems, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Zb. There Is no direct psychologfcal measure for mdfo'logfcal saboteurs, because of the infrequency of this behavior. However, psychologfcal aaseament has a high probabUlty of detecting fndtvfduals most llkely to

• be involved In fndwJtrlal damage, either Intentional or accfdentuL Psychologlcal assessment determines f'ltneas for duty at the moment of the assessment, and can make limfted predictions abwt the loss of fitness fn the future.

3. a. What are the particular concems abrut infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule?

3a. Certain fndtvfduals may perceive any one of these components as an infringement of their ctvll libertle& BG&E believes that any one of these components has the potential for provfdtng pertinent information which can be used to detect a potential saboteur. Therefore, we believe the benefits of thfB program, which mafntufn3 strict con/'fdentlality, far outwefgh the perceived Infringements because of the potential for damage to the plant and/or hann to the public. Data collected by BG&E fndfcate that the psychological assessment program has not discriminated by sex or by mce. We have granted WlBSCorted access to 98.296 of the males, 98.696 of the females, 98.496 of the Caucasians, 97.396 of the Blacks, and 10096 of the other mcfal group& These J'(gures are all Jtigh and indicate the lack of dfscrfmfnatfon tn thfB program.

b. The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk to sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

3b. BG&E has no data conceming 'What e"ects our program has had fn preventing sabotage, because we have never had an incident of sabotage.

Attachment B Page 3 of 7

4. a. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments?

4a. The .AIMPI has been used for decades in clinical <188e38l11ents and psychological research, and the data establish tts construct validtty. That Is, the MMPI has been shown to fnd1cate abnormal personality tendencte& The test Is very useful in fdentlf'ytng individuals who should receive further -psychologfcal assessment, which Is emctly what we do via follow-up clfnical fntervie103 when indlcated. For exampl.e, the 4-9 scale confl.guration fs commonly U88d to detect fndtvfduals with antfsoctal tendencies. We have found that persons with elevationB on these scales are far more likely (more than 8 times more Ulely) to be denied acc888 after a -psychological interview. This evidence validates the use of the MMPI in detecting fndtvfduals who need follow-up intervielPS. The MMPI is very U38ful in picking out disturbed fndfvfduals from a population that contains both nonnal and dlBturbed fndtvfdual& Further testimony to this fact Is contained in NUREG/CR-2016."

b. What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration. in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

4b. A program that would me psychological te3ttng without review and/or Interview by a Ucensed psychologist Is not a satbffactory altematfve. The following data were collected at BG&E from Jrm.e, 1916, to February, 1985: of 7409 workerB evaluated fn this program, 1145 were Interviewed by cltnlcal Psychologists regardle38 of thBlr MMPI scores bBcaullB of their job category (e.g., security guard), and 6264 were screened by the MMPI in order to determine the need for interviews. Of the 1145 worker8 recetvlng mandatory interviews, 31 were denfed access. Of the 6264 screened by the MMPI, 1563 were referred for

• interviews, and only 101 of these were ultimately denied access. These data support ow- contention that access should never "be denfed on the baBl3 of the MMPI alone. If we had re'jected penmm.el without the benefit of an interview, 1482 fndfvfduals or 23.396 would have been false negattve& There are some Innocuous reasons why Individuals might get deviant MMPI acores, such as language comprehension problems, poor ewcational background, etc. The interpretation of these test scores requlre3 professional judgment and an hour-long clinical interview. n

5. a. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relates directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sa'botage?

I I' I Attachment B Page 4 of 7 5a. We have included a copy of BG&E's Cleamnce Recommendation Report fonn (Attachment B(1)) wftfch fs used to report specfflc chamcterfstfcs which we feel are fmportant to ascertain cluing the psychological aasemnent. Some of these relate indirectly to the llkellhood of radiological sabotage, such as: (a) criminal acttvtty, (b) subst.ance abuse, (c) au,ceptlbf11ty to blackmail, (d) irresponslbfllty, (e) impulstvtty, (f) emotional problems, etc.

b. What percentage of fa'lse positives and fa'lse negatives (Type I and Type ll errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure?

b. Since there have been no fncidents of sabotage at oor facfllty, we do not have any known Type I eJTOr& Furthermore, we have no way to determine Type H en-ors J>ecouse rejected candidates were not foll.owed to see if they conunltted acts of radiological sabotage elsewhere.

However, if thb question pe,iafns to psychologfcal stability fn generul and not jJ.St to rudlolDgical sabotage, then we can estimate error tn the foll.owing manner. (1) Of 1271 woncers granted unescorted access to the Calvert CUffs Nuclear Power Plant between Jr.me, 1916, and February, 1985, 33 later were denfed access (23 because of unusual behaviors and 10 because of 'backgroum fltve6tfgation data which came fn after the psychologfcal evaluatlonJ. This gtves a very low Type I error mte of 0.4%. However, this 13 technf.cally not a Type I en-or rute, because some of these indfvfduaZs may have developed their p1'0blems after their assessment, and the goal of Psychologfcal asseasment ts an evaluation of the worke,.s CWT8nt psychologfcal statu& (2) As for Type H error, again, we do not foll.ow re'jected applicants so we do not know how many proved to 'be rell.able employees somewhere else. However, we can utfmate the Type H error rate of the queatfonable pructfce of re'jectlng appl1cants on the basis of MMPI profiles alone. Data reported WYier Item 4b above sh0117 that, of the 6264 workers for whom the MMPI was uaed cu, a screen, 1583 were referred for Interviews wtth clinfcal Psychologfst3, but only 101 were ultbnately rejected. 1462 -persons or Z3.396 might have been wrongfully rejected on the baBfs of deviant MMPI profile& A program that rejects persomel on the basis of deviant MMPI proffles wf:thout gtvtng them the beneff,t of cllnfcal interview may Inflate ftB Type H error rute as high as 23.3%.

c. Are more effective procedures available and practical?

5c. We believe that the combfned WJ8 of backgroum fnvestfgatfon, psychologfcal asse&mlent and contlnual observations programs are effective and pructfcal procedures.

6. a. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs.

6a. The 23 00888 fdentff{ed by our behavforul rellabflity program were mentioned wvler Sb above. Compared with the 132 person., denied 'by psychologfcal <13888S11lent, these data suggest that the great maJorfty of ccues wre fdentffled 'by psychological assessment.

I \ I ! Attachment B Page 5 of 7

7. a. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basi.s of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

7a. BG&E bellevn that psychologlcal aseamient can addre.98 both fU;ne8s far duty and, indirectly, radfologfcal sabotage. Factors we detect which may Indirectly fndi.cate a rlBk of radialogfcal sabot.age were discussed under item Sa.

8. a. To what extent i.s the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral re liabflf ty program?

Ba. P3ychDlogfca1 assessment fs the fnftfal detector mgatd.lng the applicant's cWTEtnt psychologlcal comttfon, and ft also makes ll.mlted pnJdfctlorur of whether the tndtvfdual may be wrellable fn the futr.cre. The fact that all wo,fcers have been psychol.ogfcally screensd for a minfmwn level of fncHvfdual rell.abill.ty allows the supervisor to admfntster the behavioral rell.abill.ty program more eUectively. Without paychologl.cal asseBSment, the supervisor in the plant would have to serve the function CWTently being aerved by the psychologist: screening out dfst.urbed personnel who lhould not be in the plant fn the ffnt, place. Also, the data collected during the initial psychologf.cal assessment provides the J>SYChologfBt with good baseline dam which may be needed later to evaluate suspected abemmt behavior.

b. Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without preemployment psychological assessment?

Sb. Without psychologf.cal assesmnent, the program may be more difficult to admtniBter. There would be behavioral and dfscfplfnary problems from per'BOlUISl who would not have been grantsd Wl88Corted access based on the psychological evaluation. m addttfon, there would be no baae"line psychologtcal dam to evaluate any fu,tu:re abemmt behavior. BG&.E beffeves that by including psychologlcal asse.ssment in this program we get a much more stable, mature and conscfentfous workforee..

l I* 1 l Attachment B Page 6 of 7

           ,c. What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

Be. As 6tated earl1er, we believe that an three of these programs are Interdependent. Deleting one or more of these will lower the probabfllty of detecting problem personneL The psychological asse&ffllent procedures used at BG&E have been successful in obtaining important data about fndfvidual 'backgroums vitfch have not been detected in the background fnvestigatlon procedures ( e.g. juvenile offemJ1Bs and omissions). Furthennore, if only background fnvestigations were adopted, data would 'be collected but 1l10U1d not be put in the perspective that is possfble with careful psychologfcal inquiry. For example, a background fnvestfgatlon on a certain Individual might reveal a series of minor traffi.c violations, but a -psychologfcal. assessment might determine ff these were JHUt of a general pattem of irreaponslbillty, substance abuse, or emotional disturbance.

• 9. a. What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigation, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

9a. Psychologlcal asse&ffllent at BG&E has identified fndfvfdua1s who have the following type of problem temenciea: o aggressive or violent behaVfor o substance abuse problems o lack of temper control o hostile or destructive acts o violation of rules and orderly procedures 0 fnability tD handle stress o impulsiveness o emotional problems o falsification of records; lying o organic bmin dysfunction o e.rcesstve fear of radiation o low e"ectlve fntBllegence 0 frre3pon8fbility o carelessness, poor 'judgment o threat to property, health, or safety o substantial risk to company's reputation

I \I I I Attachment B Page 7 of 7 Backgrouncl fnvestfgatlon3 fdenttfy fndfvfduals who have been Involved fn the following: o falsification of records o drug and alcohol abuse o temper problems o criminal convictions o past employment problems Behavioral rellabllity progru.ms can fdffl'ltify fndfvfduals who HA VE: o .subBtance abuse problems o serious lack of attention problems, memory problems o excessive fear of radiation o emotional breakdowns

• o o

fnablllty or wnrilltngness to follow fnstructfons severe personality change related to bnpaired abfflty to function on the job

10. a. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological aSBeSBment, backgrotmd investigation and behavioral reliability programs?

1Oa. We have had no examples of management abuse of scmenfng procedures because we maintain strict confidentiality of this information. Smee we U88 state-Ucensed psychologists, strict doctor/client confidentiality fa maintained, and management does not have access to any mw data. - 11. a. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access m.1.thorization rules? 11a. BG&E's program fs effective, unbiased and well accepted by employees, appllcants and contractors, both w1fon and norHDlfon.

ATrACHMENT B(l) Page 1 of 3 BG&E CLEARANCE RECOMMENDATION REPORT FORM Interviewee: Date Interviewed: (Last) (First) (Middle) Applicant SWF _ __ Employee of INTERVIEW OBSERVATIONS (Circle all relevant adjectives): Appearance: Alcohol odor; body type (end./mes./ect.); breath/body odor; casual; clean; dirty; disheveled; drunk; grooming (good/fair/poor); neat; obesity (mild/moderate/severe); Cooperation: Argumentative; cautious; defensive; enthusiastic; "innocent"; manipulative; polite; reluctant; resistive; secretive; short answers; timid; volunteer info.

 * (none/little/lot):

Mood: Bitter; bored; calm; cheerful; complaining; depressed; discouraged; even; excited; frightened; hopeless; hostile; irritated; labile; matter-of-fact; nervous; range of affect (full/avg/restricted); smiling; steady; sullen; tearful; tremulous: Responsiveness: Alert; animated; assertive; attention-seeking; attentive; blunt; direct; ------------- distracted; energetic; extrovert; impatient; introvert; methodical; passive; quick; quiet; restless; slow; talkative: Thinking: Clear; coherent; confused; disoriented; fragmented; logical; paranoid: Estimate of IQ: 79 or below ( ); 80-89 ( ); 90-109 ( ); 110-119 ( ); 120 or above ( ). rbal Problems: (comprehension, reading, speech, spelling): INTERVIEWER'S JUDGMENT OF PROBABLE FUTURE RISK: 1 2 3 Behavior Category Low Average High Acting out Behavior Adverse Response to Stress Anxiety Chemical/Drui:i; Dependence Depression Hostility Impulsivity Le~l Problems Risk (Thrill) Seeking Sabotap;e .Thinkinp; Problems

 . Untrustworthiness INTERVIEWER'S CLEARANCE RECOMMENDATION:

Clear Doubtful Reject: Review with Psycholo.r:i:ist* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 OK-No Diffi- Some Diffi- Some Diffi- Review One or more Serious (Many) cul ties or culties but culties but with Significant Problem(s) - Severe Within Normal Adequately on way to BG&E Problem(s) Inadequate Problem(s) Problems of Compensated Ameliorating; Psycho- Not Dealt Interest/ (Now or in Living has help/ logist* with Resources Future) Support Adequately to Correct Svstem I *Reviewed with: Date: I FINAL DECISION: CLEAR ( ) REJECT ( ) SIGNATURE: DATE: ( 1)

                         , A
                                - _ _._:_._,, .... _.__..~-~ .. ~ ....... _ ' __ ....__ * ; . , - *- , -..L.. - ,_
                                                                                                                                         ,:t        ' ,_,

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                                                                                                                                                               * '**-           ' .......... t...1 ...

ATTACHMENT B(l) 2 of 3 INTERVIEWEE: DATE.INTERVIEWED: (Last) (First) (M. I.) INITIALS (IF

  !TEM  NOT PRESENT)                      CHECK TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH BG&E 1                 History of criminal activities: felony/arrest/conviction ( ) or pattern of lesser crimes/arrests/convictions ( )    .

History of serious chemical dependence (alcohol or drugs) ( ) ; heavy usage even if no dependence ( ); used during working hours or immediately 2 preceding ( ); lost time due to drug usage ( ); more than one experience with hard drugs other than marijuana or alcohol ( ); drug dealing ( ) ; medical intervention ever needed for effects of drlli!s/alcohol ( ) . 3 History of major emotional disturbance even if not involving hospitalization or outoatient treatment ( ) . History of work adjustment problems such as multiple firings ( ), 4 absenteeism ( ), grievances ( ), conflicts with supervisors and/or co-workers ( ), nomadic life-style ( ) etc.( ) . History of maladjustment in military service such as undesirable discharge 5 ( ), general discharge ( ), prolonged AWOL periods ( ), insubordination ( ), etc. ( ) . DISCUSS if in oa.st 1 to 2 vears or if flagrant earlier). 6 Current oarole or probationary status with criminal .iustice system ( ) . 7 Current tenuous personality adjustment { ) . 8 History of frequent and recent accidents whether minor or major, regardless of location (work, home, etc.) ( ) . (DISCUSS if more than iust bad luck). History of significant driving problems, DWI ( ), license suspended or 9 revoked ( ), numerous speeding tickets ( ), excessive speed for road conditions ( ). even if not resulting in le~al problems. 10 History of suicidal attempt(s) ( ) . Serious financial problems: history of personal bankruptcy or current possibility of bankruptcy ( ), financial mismanagement or poor 11 jud~ent ( ) . History of violence (spouse beating, child abuse, fights, gang wars ( ) or history of anti-social behavior even if not including violence ( ) , arrest 12 for being disorderly whether drunk or sober ( ) . (DISCUSS if person is ', considered to have potential for violence/subversive behavior ( ) History of or currently exhibited doubtful judgment: in personal medical self-management ( ) (non-compliance with medical regimen in diabetes, blood 13 pressure management, etc.); non-compliance with safety regulations in nuclear or non-nuclear environments ( ); feeding disturbances such as obesity or anorexia ( ) . 14 History of persistent horseplay on the job ( ) . History of excessive risk-taking ( ) or currently exhibited addictive 15 gambling ( ); "plunging" in stocks, etc. ( ); riches to rags to riches to rags cycle ( ) . 16 Susceptibility to blackmail: past exposure to compromising situations: homosexuality ( ), illicit liasons ( ), embezzlement ( ), etc. ( ) . SIGNATURE: DATE: (2)

ATTACHMENT B(l) Page 3 of 3 INTERVIEWEE: DATE I N ~ D : (Last) (Firs,_i-----(-M-.I-.-) FACTOR PREDICTED WORKER GROUP UNACCEPTABLE 15-20% 70-75% WORKERS SATISFACTORY ADJUSTED 5-10% CHECK PREDICTED BEHAVIORS OF CONCERN WORKERS WORKERS 1

• ARGUMENTATIVE R_efuses to work as a team member ( ); resents and/or challenges HOSTILITY TOWARD supervisory authority ( ); takes action to "get back" at people ( ) ;

AUTHORITY argues and/or fights with others ( ); frequently secretive and un-( Anti-BOO ial Conduct' willin~ to share information ( ): may damw:e other's orooertv ( ).

2. IRRESPONSIBILITY Acts without thinking or considering the consequences ( ) ; exhibits AND IMPULSIVITY frustration with rules and regulations ( ); refuses to comply with (Unreliable Conduct) procedures and requirements ( ); engages in horseplay ( ); plays pranks on others ( ); responds inappropriately to emergency situa-tions throu~h forgetfulness or inattentiveness ( ).

3. DEFENSIVE Rarely interacts with others ( ) ; fails to inform others ( ); seeks INCOMPETENCE to cover up possible mistakes ( ); appears to fear taking action (Withdrawal Conduct) without direct orders or directions ( ) ; takes little or no responsi-bilitv as a team member ( ) .

4. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY Frequently nervous, moody, withdrawn, and depressed ( ) ; may panic or (Incapacitating become incapacitated in emergency situations ( ); shows deteriorating Emotional job performance ( ); irritable ( ); aggressive and emotional without Instability) apparent reason ( ); exhibits frustration and may become emotionally distraught over rules, regulations and procedures ( ); shows erratic behavior from accumulated stress ( ); is alternately irritable, melancholv, arui:ressive and depressed ( ) .

5. COMPULSIVE Refuses to delegate duties or allow others to help ( ) ; refuses to INCOMPETENCE rely on others ang must "check" everything excessively ( ) ; with-(Obsessive Control holds information ( ); resents structure and rules ( ) j "cracks" and Compulsive from inability to "do everything" ( ) j "flies off the handle" ( ) ;

Conduct)

6. SUBSTANCE ABUSE artn1es and fi~hts with others ( ) .

Appears at work drunk or high on other drugs ( ); history of (Chemically Induced excessive use ( ) . Erratic Conduct)

1. ADVERSE REACTION Fails to respond to emergencies ( ); loses temper ( ); shows poor TO STRESS judgment ( ); shows physical symptoms of stress ( ); erratic be-havior from accumulated stress ( ); allows tension to accumulate ( ).

8. EMOTIONAL & Rigid thinking or behavior ( ); inadequate personality ( ); uncom-PERSONAL INA- municative ( ); extremely introverted or schizoid ( ) ; defiantly BILITY TO ADAPT oroud or narcissistic ( ): susoicious ( ): other ( ).

SIGNATURE: DATE: ( 3)

\

• I I Attachment C Page 1 of 9 MiscellaneOU8 Amemments Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants AND ASSOCIATED DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE Fedeml Register, Page 80735 10 CFR 73.2; 73.55(a), (c)(1), (d)(7), (d)(9),

(eX1), (e)(3), (h)(4) and (h)(4Xiii)(A); 73. 70 SG-302-4 ITEM I. Proposed Regulatory Stntement A. 73.55 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed ActMties in Nucl~r Power Reactors ago.inst Radiologtcal Sabotage.

                       "By (120 days from the effective date of this amendment or 120 days after receipt of a Commission provided site specific vitnl area review, whichever is later each Ucensee shall submit proposed amendments to his security plan which define how the amendment vital island designation and protection requirements of paro.graphs (g), (cXl), (cX2),

(d)(2), (d)(7), (d)(9), (eXl) and (h)(4) will be met. Each submittnl shall include a proposed implementntion schedule for Commission apProvaZ. The amended safegua.rds requirements of these paragraphs must be implemented by the licensee within 180 days after Commission approwl of the proposed security plan in accordance with the approval schedule." B. BG:&E comments:

1. The proposed revfsfon to the introductory pamgraph of section 13.55 approves the vttal f.lland concept and appears to require each lfcen8ee to revise their secu:rlty plan to Include the vttal island cmcq,t and submit the revision to 'NRC for approval. The propoml also lfst8 the vttal areas that must be included In vital islands.

Most utili.tfes have an apJ)J'OVed security plan that Identifies the protected and vital areas and provides for appropriate protective meaat1'8B for these a1"8(18. Consfderuble amotmts of money have been spent to provide these ph;yslcal and procedural meaaue& If a u:tfflty (utilities) can benefit from a dmtge to their security plan by Including the vttal island concept, then the vftal f.lland coocept shouJd be an option avaUable to that utflity, but not mandatory for all utflitfe& The pmpo98d NRC ct<<mge should only req,ulre that thoss lfcensen proposing to combine vital areas wfthfn vital islands submit a revfalon to their security plan for NRC approval. Any NRC B1:te Btudy should not just simply fdentlfty 8vltal" pieces of equipment or systems neceasary to prevent/mfnfmfze offBtte release. lt BhouJd also work with the utfflty concemed to determine whether establishing vttal islands would vfolate sepan1tfon criteria or other desfan features nec8880ry to enaure mfety sy,tem, operation. Again, ff the perceived benefit

Attachment C Page 2 of 9 to security from any modt(f.cation is not warranted by the cost Involved, such aa building an enclosure for refueUng water tanks or condensate storage tanks, then the modif{cation should not 'be performed.

2. Delete "shall submtt..approved schedule." Rewonf to "proposing to fnBtttute vttal islands shall submit for Commf.ssion approval an implementation schedule to protect tho3e areas d'esignated as vital islands; fnc'luded In this schedule wfll be the Interim Security mea8W'88, if necessary, that wm. be taken to protect these areas.

Proposed revlsfon8 to the secmity plan reflecting the final condftton of the 'Vftal island protection measures shall be submitted to the Commfssfon 90 days after all implementation is complete. bl any case, if the lic81188e plans to implement vital islands all proposed modifications must be completed by the end of the second refueling outage following (the effectlve date of the rule) rrie8s specific relief is grunted by the Commbmon."

i

• 1 \.

Attachment C

        ' '  l Page 3 of 9 ITEM ll Pro-posed Regulatory Statement 73.55 (c)(l) Physical Barriers and Independent Vital Islands Reg. Guide Section Cl PG. 4 "The licensee shaU locate vital equipment within a vital area, which in tum shall be located within a protected area. One or more vital areas may constitute a vital island. Vital isla.nds shall be configured to ensure that an individual must gain access to a vital island to accomplish sabotage resulting in a significant radiological release or reactor core damage or both. Access to vital islands must require passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. More than one vital island may be located within a single protected area The Ucensee shall protect, as independent vital islands, onsite alternating and direct current emergency power sources (excluding electrical distrfbu.tion systems) required to permit functioning of structures, systems and components important to safety, primary reactor containment, the reactor control room, central alarm station, and onsite water supplies (excluding piping) required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standl,y."

BG&E Comments: BG&E proposn the deletion of the entire laBt sentence of 13.55 (cX1) and any spect.fl,c equipment references in the proposed regulatory guide becau.se ft requires the licensee to treat each area mentioned aboVe as separate independent vital islands, including the protection of on site watersupplies requ1red for hot shutdown in the form of a protected enclosure. This iB an unnecessary expense, because the desired

• protection from the (tnsl.der) rudfologfcal saboteur iB provided through the many other baJrien such as entnmce x-ray and explosimeter monttorfng, lxickgrotud fnve8tfgation. and psychological screenings, ll.mited access to the protected area, etc. The tank 11,1Qff Bltolild be considered a more than adequate lxnrier.

Addftfonally, by singling out certain "vital points" the NRC iB providing a potential saboteur with a menu of selected ta:rgets. It should also be pointed out that thiB same menu appears tn the clariflca:tl.on of the Vltal IBland Deaignation Polley in the Federal Register notice. The n.ile should sfmpl.y allow the sfze and bowldary of the vital island to be tatlored and located to flt the equipment specified by the ll.censee and approved by the NRC.

z. Finally, the references to the terminology "fmportant to safety" wf.th regard to some of the ll.8ted systems iB In con(ll.ct with fhe IndwJtry'B interpretation of that phraseology. The detafled statement contained in the proposed regulation, therefore, may require modifications to quall.fy certain non-vital areas becauBe they contain equipment not presently dealgnated as "fmportant to safety."

1 I I I Attachment C

       '*   l Page 4 of 9 ITEM m. Proposed Regulatory Statement A. Time-Dependent Vital Islands (Spent Fuel Pools)

Reg. Guide Section C4 Pg. 5 Spent fuel pools are cummtly provided vital protection in accordance with Section 73.55. However, it is recognized that the radiation levels of spent fuel decay rapidly a~er removal from the reactor core and eventually do not require vital protection because the potential for a part 100 release is remote. Accordingly, Wider an altem.ative safeguards approach, spent fuel pools could be included in vital islands during that period when the spent fuel pools pose a threat to public health and safety. After this initial period, licensees would have the option of relaxing the spent fuel pool safeguards. B. BG&E Comments: We don't conafder the capabflity to rem vttal protection of the spent -fuel pool a great advantage. The secwtty barrier to this area ls al.so the l>anier to many aJ"Ba6 lt1fthln the aurlllary 1Jul1dtng that hold safety-related equipment. Changing the access requirements of vital areas temporarily Is not a clear 1HmBfft, 61nce ft might result In con(uBIDn and tnapproptfats application of 11t1curlty and adminlstmtlve resource&

Attachment C Page 5 of 9

 ' '  I ITEM IV. Proposed Regulatory Statement A. 73.55 (d)(7)(i) Access Requirements ttThe licensee shall:

Establish an access authorization system to Umit unescorted access to vital islands during nonemergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties. To achieve this the Ucensee must: (D) Lock and protect by an active intrusion alarm system unoccupied vital islands and all exterior doors leading to vital islands which are not otherwise controlled." B. BG&E Comments:

1. The wonf "unoccupied" should be defined to mean an area not normally occupied at least once every 8 1wur&

2. The word "active" sha.tld also be deleted. Altha,gh the words "active fnt:rusfon alarm system" are already in the 1'8gUlatton, using Nu:reg 0820 m guidance, an active Intrusion detection system means a mfrcrowave or ultrasonic device.. Deleting the won:f active wm allow the doors to be protected by devices lllce balanced magnetic switche&

Attachment C

 ' '  l Page 6 of 9 ITEM V. Proposed Regulatory Statement A. 73.55 (d)(9) Key Locks and Combinations "All keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment used to control access to protected areas and vital islands must be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. All such keys, locks, and combinations must be changed at least every 12 months. Whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised, it must be changed. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations, and other access control devices to protected areas and vital islands only to persons who possess access authorization in accordance with 73.56 of this -pa.rt. Whenever an individual's access authorization is revoked due to his or her lack of tro.stworthtness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that person had access must be changed."

B. BG&E Comments:

1. After the words "must be changedn add the words "or rotated."

This wm cause a reduction In the expenses associated with this evolution.

2. The words "related equlpmentn should be changed to "related access control devices. n The e.t:fstlng regulation p1'8S8TI.tly Wl8S the same term, and we have not had a problem. However, the computer is a piece of access control equipment to llllhich mmeone has access, whereas something like a lock fs considered a devfce.

I \ 1 Attachment C Page 7 of 9 ITEM VI. Proposed Regulatory Statement A. 73.55 (e)(l) Proteciton of Security Related Equipment Reg. Guide Paragraph 9.0 PG. 12 "All ala1'1118 requirement pursuant to this part must annuntcate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continurusly manned station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. The onsite central alarm station shall be located within a building such that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. This station shall not contain any operational

• activities that would interfere with the execution of the alarm rel!l)onse function. The walls, doors, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors of the central alarm station shall be bullet resisting. On site secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable commwlications equipment as required in paragraph (0 of this section must be located within vital islands. 11 B. BG&E Comments:

The entire last sentence should be deleted. The Security system is rwt safety related and now may be powered from sources vitlch are not req_ulred to be fn 'Vital areas. A Uc81188e should not be required to

• back/'lt or addttionally protect secon:lary security power supply systems. This kind of protection for secwtty equipment seems to imply that ft f8 safety-related equipment. The primary systems are already protected In au.ch a manner that they would be extremely difficult to sabotage. Addftfonally compensatory measures are implemented whenever primary power Is lo8t provfdfng amfttfonal security during this period. Therefore, to require a Ucensee to backfit, i.e. construct vital ban-ters around their secomary suppltes that may not be presently fn vital areas, would be both ezpensfve and wnecessary.

l ,,

• I
• Attachment C I
• I Page 8 of 9 ITEM vn. Proposed Regulatory Statements A. 73. 70 (d) Logging Requirements Reg. Guide Paragraph 5.2 PG. 6 "A log indicating name, badge number, time of entry, reason for entry, am time of exit of all individuals granted access to a vital island except those individuals entering or exiting the reactor control room."

B. .BG&.E Comments: The requirement to document a reason for entry is r.mnecessary and time consumtng. Supen,tsors control their .subonlfnates worfc tfme, are accountable for their performance and their ll'flereabouts, and determine their need for access to vital anKJ& Keeping track of the rea.sons employees haVe for entering wrfous spaces during the work day Bh.ou1d not be a function of the security organization. Canf readers carmot record this fnfonnation, so the cmd reader system would have to be supplemented by a manned 88cu:rfty admfnfstnlttw o,vanfzatfon or rldk:ulous proportion& Delete this item for logging requirements.

Attachment C l I l ' Page 9 of 9 ITEM VIII Proposed Regulatory Statement A. Physical Protection Plan and Contingency Plan Interface Reg. Guide Paragraph 6.0 PG. 7 Proposed paragraph 73.55(d)(7Xii) would require that the licensee design the access authorization system to accomodate the potential need for rapid ingress or egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions. In order to facilitate ingress/egress during such conditions, the licensee should conduct perioclic reviews of security and contingency plans and ensure prompt access to vital equipment. B* BG&E Comments: Plants with already installed physcfal protection equipment should not be required to r f H l ~their system. Operating plants should have the pNrogattve of lmp , tf necessary, the effectiveness of the security Ol'gQl11zatlon response to achieve rapid emergency ingress or egress to/from vital areas.

Attachment D Page 1 of 1 Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities Federal Register, Page 30738 73.55 (dXl) ITEM I. Proposed Regulatory Statements 73.55 (d)(l) Search of Individuals A. 73.55(dX1)

                "The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals wtless otherwise provided herein mu.st be made and authorization mu.st be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives and incendiary devices shall be accomplishe<J through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The ltcensee shall subject all persons except bona fide federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a protected area *** "
                "However, firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactory, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches."

B. BG&E Comments:

1. Add the following to sentence 4 of 13.55 (d)(l) after" *** law en(orcement" "'{Ire 'fighting, designated emellJency and licensee security force personnel responding tom emellJency."

J. The proposed rule requires a physical pat-down search of all penons entering a protected area when ffreanns or erpl.osfve detection equipment fB not fn service or f.s not opemting aatbfactorily. Because temporary power or equipment fallures would require pat-down searches of 10096 of pe1'801IS entering protected areas, resultfng in long delays during busy periods (such as shift changeN, productivtty losses, and disgnmtled employees, BG&E proposes the following changes to sentence 5 conceming the pat-down requirement: mdivfdualB granted Ul188Corted acceBS by the Lfcenaee ahall be exempted from the pat-dmon requirement for a maximum 4-hrur period immediately following equipment malfunction failure or outage. m addition, ff either ffreanns or explosive detection equipment is not opemtlonal after this 4-h.rur

                     ,period, the Licensee ahall conduct nmdom mfnbnum 596 pat-down search by licenaeu of fndfvfduaJs with unBBCorted access authorization, until the firearms or explosive detection equipment 16 restored to operation. personnel not screened for wteSCorted access wouJd Bfill be subject to 10096 pat-down search.

~.- IIUIIBiRPR -~ 73 @J)

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Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. 7101 Wisconsin Avenue Washington, D.C. 20014 Telephone : (301) 654- 9260  :.J. EC TWX 7108249602 ATOMIC FOR DC S .C A11 :20 March S, 1985 c, IC' Q~CKE Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 '<i) Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

The NRC published in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register, proposed rules, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73, "Access Authorization Program", "Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning Physical Pro-tection of Nuclear Power Plants", and "Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities", (49 FR 30726-30729) and solicited comments on same. The Atomic Industrial Forum's Committee on Power Plant Design, Construction and Operation has reviewed the proposed rules and offers the following comments for your consideration. General It is necessary to put the proposed rules, known collectively as the "Insider Safeguards Rule", in the perspective of all the NRC's other requirements that are currently in effect to meet the postulated insider threat. These requirements have been in the NRC rules and guidance for a number of years and are incor-porated in the approved security programs of operating reactors. They include measures such as: Detection equipment Surveillance equipment Illumination Security patrols Vital area barriers Positive identification Personnel and vehicle search Access control features Access authorization It is therefore clear that the proposed insider safeguards rule expands on the existing comprehensive program to meet the postulated threat. IIAR ? 1985 Acknowfedged by c:ard ***-**-...n"l'l.....-.....,......,......,i

AR RF.GULA TORY COMMISSIOJJ TING & SERVICE SECTION ICE OF THE SECRETARY F THE COMMISSION

Secretary of the Commission March 5, 198-5 The industry has recognized the insider threat and the American Nuclear Society develo~ed the industry standard, ANS 3.3-1982, to address it. We believe that the standard represents an approach that is consistent with the industry's initiatives and represents the high standards of industry self-regulation. Industry self-regulation in this area has already led to the adoption of those procedures by each utility which they feel are needed to minimize the potential for an insider threat. The current regulations also incorporate the minimum necessary access authorization requirements. We believe these regula-tions, combin'ed with industry practices, have minimized the need for any further regulation in this area. However, we recognize that the Commission has had a number of alternatives for several years such as, the two man rule, pat-down search, governmental clearances, and compartmentalization. We believe a personnel screening rule modified by our comments is pre-ferable to any of the previous NRC alternatives. The following comm.en ts are applicable. ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM Enclosure (1) contains our comments on the associated draft Regulatory Guide. Following are our comments on the proposed access authorization rule. Para 73.56(b)(l) "General Performance Objective and Requirements" The proposed rule states:

         "The unescorted access author_ization program shall consist of a background investigation program, a psychological assessment program, and a continual behavioral observation program ***. The continual behavioral observation program shall be designed to detect certain individual behavioral changes etc ... "

Since most licensees consider continued observation as part of an ongoing element of management's duties, and employees are subjected to annual performance evaluations, we believe that the access authorization rule should include only the back-ground investigation and the psychological assessment compo-nents. If the continual behavioral observation were embodied by a rule, such a program would force licensees to track and file numerous records on thousands of employees for the sole purpose of auditing. This requirement would prove extremely

Secretary of the Commission March 5, 1985 costly with no resulting benefit to the program. Also, the industry "Fitness for Duty" program reduces the need for this component of the proposed rule. , For the reasons stated above, we suggest that the second sen-tence should read:

        "The unescorted access authorization program shall consist of a background investigation program and a psychological assessment program."

• Subsequently, all words used in reference to the continual be-havioral observation program should be deleted from the rule.

The last sentence states:

        "Individuals who have received an unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands prior to the effective date of these amendments are exempt from having to meet the requirements of *.. "

We recommend that the phrase, "and other licensee and non-licensee employees who have provided continuous trustworthy and reliable service for a period of three years or longer" be inserted after the words "these amendments". If an individual has :provided continuous trustworthy employment for three years, sufficient assurance can be made that the individual will

• continue to function in the same manner .

Para 73.56(b)(3)(iv) The proposed rule states:

        "Has been convicted of any felony or series of lesser offenses indicating habitual criminal tendencies;"

Since participation in a criminal act does not indicate habitual criminal tendencies but does demonstrate that the individual may act irresponsibly under a given set of cir-cumstances we recommend the following: Delete the phrase "indicating habitual criminal tendencies" and replace it with "that raise serious concerns relative to the individual's trustworthiness or reliability."

Secretary of the Commission March 5, 1985 Para 73.56(c), Background Investigation We endorse the .use of background investigations as an impor-tant screening tool. However, this section asks the licensee to conduct background investigations "that provide assurance" the individuals are reliable, trustworthy, and will act so as to protect health and minimize danger to life and property. It is not always possible to assure such findings, but the licensees can attempt to accomplish this as their prime ob-jective. Therefore, we recommend the first sentence to read as follows:

• "The licensee shall conduct, or make arrangements for background investigation with the objective of providing assurance that individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are reliable, trustworthy ... "

Additionally, the usefulness of the background information may be limited because criminal records are not always accessible, particularly for crimes committed out of the state or local jurisdictions. The second sentence states:

        " ... this background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation."

• We recommend that the phrase, "to the extent reasonably possible" be inserted after the words "must verify."

The third sentence states:

        "The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence *** " etc.

We recommend that this sentence, be deleted because it could conflict with voluntary Employee Assistance Programs which address problems that can impact a person's performance and ability while on the job. Para 73.56(d), Psychological Assessment We agree that psychological assessment is a viable option to use in the screening process. However, we are opposed to the

Secretary of the Commission March 5, 1985 prescriptive nature of the rule. Since a wide disparity of opinions exist among licensees regarding the validity of dif-ferent psychological assessment programs, we recommend the licensees be allowed the freedom to develop their own programs within the framework of ANS-3.3-1982. Therefore, we believe the rule should read as follows:

        "The licensee shall establish and maintain a psycho-logical assessment program to be administered to all individuals prior to granting them unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands."

Subparagraphs 73.56(d)(l) and 73.56(d)(2) should be deleted from the rule. Para 73.56(e) Continual Behavior Observation The continual behavioral observation program is the most subjective portion of the proposed rule. Continual behavior observation of employees is contained in ANS-3.3-1982, and we recommend that utilities apply it with discretion. Also, be-havior observation is of course a part of each utility manage-ment's continuing responsibility. Therefore, we do not believe a regulation on continual behavior observation is necessary. We believe this aspect of the rule would impose much additional paper work without providing the means to adequately identify a potential saboteur. The nuclear industry is concerned about the reliability, suitability and fitness for duty of their employees and steps are being taken by the licensees to enhance their programs without the need for this element of the proposed regulation. NUMARC has developed proposed guidelines for the industry which incorporate a fitness for duty program and continued observa-tion* program which applies to licensee contractor and vendor personnel. Additionally, at its October 14, 1984 meeting the Commission reconsidered its action on the fitness for duty rule and voted to issue it as a policy statement. Since the Com-mission has decided that the fitness for duty concept should not be embodied in a rule, the same should hold true for the continual behavioral observation*program. Therefore, we believe that paragraph 73.56(e) should be deleted from the rule. Para 73.56(f), Non-Licensee ~mployees Subparagraph (1) states:

        " ... and if the original granting licensee sends to the gaining licensee a photograph of the individual ... " etc.

Secretary of the Commission March 5, 1985 We recommend that this photograph requirement be replaced by a statement that the subject individual's true identity be veri-fied by appropriate means. Identification can be established by other means and should not be limited to a photograph. Also, the photograph requirement could potentially undermine the viability of the centralized Nuclear Employee Data System (NEDS). This new industry initiative is a pilot recordkeeping program for nuclear workers that is being established by a group of utilities in the mid-Atlantic states.

 ~ubparagraph (3)(ii) states:

• "The affected individual is subject to the continual behavioral observation requirements of paragraph (e) .*. "

We recommend that this subparagraph be deleted for reasons indicated above. Para 73.56(g), Review Procedures We recommend that this paragraph be deleted because e.xisting state and federal laws provide adequate grievance review procedures. MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS CONCERNING' PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Para 73.55, Requirements for Physical Protection *.. etc. The proposed rule would require that licensees submit proposed amendments to security plans detailing how vital island desig-nation and protection requirements would be met. We agree that it is appropriate to give licensees the option to revise their security plans to incorporate the vital island concept. It is not appropriate to require licensees to adopt the concept. Bach licensee should be entitled to decide, based upon its particular factual situation, whether or not to adopt vital islands. A licensee wishing to make revisions to incorporate the vital island concept should be allowed to submit under S0.54(p) if applicable. Para 73.55(c)(l), Physical Barriers The fifth sentence defines a minimum set of equipment which must be treated in all cases as vital islands. This represents a major shift from existing practice where the NRC independently

Secretary of the Commission March S, 1985 reviewed the system and equipment designated as vital. Since the NRC must approve all security plans, all plants were subject to a case-by-case review. The Commission has not explained why this review-process should be changed by a regulatory defini-tion of a minimum set of vital areas/islands. Therefore, vital equipment lists should be determined on a site specific basis. SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS AT POWER REACTOR FACILITIES This rule is acceptable to us with the following exceptions. We recommend that paragraph 73.SS(d)(l), sentence commencing on line 13 be revised as follows:

        "The licensee shall subject all persons except armed security force members on duty, bonafide federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty and persons responding to an emergencl to these equipment searches upon entry into a protec ed area."

Additionally, the sentence commencing on line 24 be revised as follows:

        "However, when firearms or explosive detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfac-torily, the licensee shall conduct a SI pat-down search of all individuals following a four hour period after the breakdown of such equipment and until the equipment is repaired~

Our ~roposed four hour time frame would give sufficient time to repair the equipment before it became known to "insider threats" that the detection equipment was inoperative. The SI search would have a strong deterrent effect and minimize employee discontent. Subparagraph (d)(7)(i) The rule states that the licensee shall lock and protect by an active intrusion alarm system unoccupied and all exterior doors leading to vital islands which are not otherwise controlled. We recommend that the word "active" be changed to "activated". An active intrusion alarm system indicates a microwave or ultrasonic device where as an activated alarm system includes the above mentioned devices plus other passive systems such as doors protected by balance magnetic switches.

Secretary of the Commission March S, 1985 Subparagraph (d)(9) The rule states that whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination or related equipment may have been compromised, it must be changed. We recoJD11end the words "related equipment" be changed to "related access control devices". We believe this terminology is more appropriate since it would be consistent with the next sentence which states: The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other access control devices to protected areas and vital islands only to persons who possess access authoriza-tion *** " Additionally, this change would include computers which are used as authorization control devices. Subparagraph (e)(l) "Detection aids" The last sentence of the rule states that secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment must be located within vital islands. We recommend the word "vital" be changed to "protected". The protected areas would give sufficient security to secondary power supply systems. Moving the secondary power supply sys-tems into vital i'sland would be extremely costly with no resulting benefit to the program. Sincerely, J. W. Williams, Jr. Chairman, Committee on Power Plant Desifn, Construction and Operat on JWW:bep Enclosures

Enclosure 1 AIF Comments on the Draft Regulatory Guide and Value Impact Statement:

                   "Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" The AIF opposes the prescriptive nature of the draft Regulatory Guide and urges that it be deleted. The problems raised by the regulatory guide are explained in the following comments.

Section 2.2 "Investigative Criteria" "TRUE IDENTITY" The draft Regulatory Guide states that a fingerprint check or a recent photograph identified by at least two other individuals are the preferred means for verifying true identity. In most

• cases, a fingerprint check will only disclose that "no record" exists on the individual. Verification of true identity by photograph, although a more favorable alternative, remains uncertain, due to changing facial features and the questionable recency of the photograph. It is recommended that the Regulatory Guide be amended to allow true identity to be verified by cross-checking records on data such as social security number, date/place of birth and parental names. This would supply sufficient data to verify true identity.

 "EMPLOYMENT HISTORY" The draft Regulatory Guide describes the type of information pertinent to an individual's employment history such as psychological, medical records, etc. We recognize this type of information should be asked for, but in many cases will .not be released or will be unavailable.

The draft Regulatory Guide states:

      "However, all claimed employment should be verified."

The verification of all claimed employment is unreasonable. First, many individuals, especially highly transient workers have difficulty recalling just five years of employment history. Second, the relevancy and applicability of information older than five years is questionable. Third, the verification of all employment would, for the licensee, extend the time and cost of the investigation process and negatively affect the individual being investigated. Verification should only be required to the extent reasonably possible.

Enclosure 1 The draft Regulatory Guide states:

      "This investigation would ordinarily be accomplished through personal interviews with previous employers and a check of employment records."

Because of the high costs and delays associated with personal interviews, it is recommended that the guide be clarified to include the use of telephone or mail. The personal interview requirement will have negative consequences for the licensee and the individual with practically no increase in the protection of health and safety. The overly prescriptive nature of the guide in this area is unnecessary. *

 "EDUCATIONAL HISTORY"

• The draft Regulatory Guide states:

      "The type of information sought should include disciplinary, psychological, or medical problems and the cirumstances under which the individual left the instituions (e.g., graduated, was expelled, dropped out) *** This investigation would ordinarily be conducted through personal interviews with school officials and an investigation of the individual's records."'

Past experience of licensees conducting education checks has indicated that most schools will not release information regarding the individual's desciplinary, psychological, or medical problems. However, dates of attendance, area of study and circumstances under which the individual left the school is the type of information most schools are willing to release, and in some cases by mail only. It is our belief that "personal interviews" do not*need to be conducted. Personal interviews would only result in process delays and significant cost increases with no corresponding benefit.

 "MILITARY SERVICE" A completed copy of the DD form 214 should be considered sufficient for verification of military service. In cases where individuals have retired or separated from the armed services, records may not be available for several months to a year.

Therefore, the regulatory guide should be modified,to include interim access authorization until the military history can be verified. Additionally, the retrospective time frame researched should be consistent with the other items in the background investigation.

Enclosure 1 Section 3, "PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT" Several utilities have implemented their own psrchological assessment programs with positive results. It s therefore recommended that the Regulatory Guide allow the licensees to continue to develop their own programs within the framework of the general objectives of the rule without detailed direction as to how this should be done. Therefore, we recommend that section 3.2 be revised to delete requirements for multiple personality tests. Section 3.3, "Clinical Interview" The draft Regulatory Guide stipulates that the clinician cannot release other data to senior management personnel beyond a professional recommendation which includes the basis for the recommendation

• This prohibition is not appropriate. It has been determined that some individuals are more willing to provide information to a psychologist on substance abuse, mental health treatment, and arrests than they would list on an access authorization application. Additionally, the converse has occurred when the individual does not provide certain information to the psychologist which was prevously identified in the background check and/or listed on the application, which may have affected the psychologist's recommendation. Therefore it is recommended that the psychologist r.eport such information in order to provide necessary crosschecking of information. Therefore we recommend that the last two sentences in section 3.3 commencing with "No other data *. " be deleted.

Section 4, "CONTINUAL BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM" This section of the draft Regulatory Guide is unduly structured and does not provide sufficient lattitude for licensees and contractors to use existing programs or to develop equally effective alternate programs. Additionally, continual behavior observation is generallr recognized br many utilities as part of management's continu ng responsibi ity. This section 1s adequately covered in the proposed NRC Fitness for Duty policy statement.The following comments pertain to the guidance contained in the draft Regulatory Guide. Section 4.1., "General" The draft Regulatory Guide states:

       "The employee assistance program should operate outside the *other human resource departments and should provide complete confidentiality to employees who wish to use the service."

Enclosure 1 This conflicts with the proposed rule, paragraph 73.S6(c), which states:

      "The licensee shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circum-stance ..* that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization."

We have recommended that this part of the rule be deleted because it could undermine voluntary employee assistance programs. The last paragraph of this section states that twenty days is sufficient for a licensee to reach a final decision on reinstatement or suspension of access authorization. In cases

• regarding retrieval of records from police departments, hosipitals, clinics, etc., twenty days will not provide enough time to adequately review the records and reach a decision on access authorization. It is recommended that the Regulatory Guide be modified to indicate that questions conerning suspended access authorization be resolved in an expeditious manner.

Section 4.2, "Detection of Behavioral Change" Page 27 of the draft Regulatory Guide stipulates that training for supervisors who will be participating in a behavioral observation program should be several days in length involving supervisors from a variety of departments. We believe the training time should be determined by the licensees since many licensees have already incorporated this component in their supervisory training programs. The draft Regulatory Guide states on page 28:

      "The supervisors should also periodically prepare a behavioral observation report for each subordinate."

We disagree with the requirement for periodic reporting for several r.easons. This requirement may encourage supervisors to delay reporting problems until the periodic report is due. It seems plausible that annual performance reports could be used to meet this requirement. To process periodic reports on all employees who have unescorted access authorization would result in a tremendous paperwork burden with no resulting be~efits to the program.

Enclosure 1 Section 5.1 "Acceptance of Unescorted Access Authorization Granted by Another Licensee" Page 32 of the draft Regulatory Guide describes the criteria contained in the written certification supplied by the licensee who granted access authorization. We believe the certification should also contain the date on which access authorization was removed or terminated. Section 6, "REVIEW PROCEDURES" Since there are existing state and federal regulations that provide adequate opportunities for an individual to address the grievance procedures, we believe that no additional procedures are needed in this area. It is recommended that this portion of the guide be deleted in its entirety .

l\tl ~ IRM Energy, Inc. c~ llli~~ ~

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(M) IICK(T(n.. 5 March 1985 US~ ~curity Screening 421 Sixth Street Annapolla, Maryland 21403 135 lMR ; A10~f7on, c301> 26s-3100 I Secretary of the Commission

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Reference:

Access Authorization Program 1o c*.r'R Farts Su and ;3

• Gentlemen:

This letter is in r e s pons e to NRC's invitation for comments and suggestions as outlined in the Federal Register of 1 August 1985 on the above- referenced subject, and specifically as pertains to psyc~ological assessment

• There is considerable research evidence that has accumulated over the many years since the development of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test (MMPI) attesting to the validity and reliability of the instrument as a screening device. Similar research has . led to the development of other scales scales particularly useful in situations for specific screening circumstances.

For example the MacAndrews scale, which is related to a measurement of the potential for substance abuse . It is felt that the use of the MMPI as a clearly validated and reliable instrument well serves the NRC specifically both in determining an individual's fitness for duty in a nuclear power plant, but also to the end of concerns about radiological sabotage. While

• issues can be raised about the individual's civil liberties and their possible infringement upon these liberties by psychological assessment, i t is felt by the undersigned that the social consequences can outweigh the acknowledged infringement on an individual's civi l libgrty. The potentia l cost -of a nuclear ca*. :astrophy is so high that its psychological concerns should be paramount due to the concern about potential harm to society.

This does not mean that the exclusion of an individual from a security (i .e., unescorted access) position would automatically exclude this indi-vidual from other positions. It is terribly important, however, that the psychological assessment procedures be used solely to determine reliability in a nuclear setting and not be utilized by institutions as a way of dealing with issues that are, and should be, purely administrative concerns and decisions. (For example, bringing in a Labor Union problem, etc.)

tJ. I. Mia.EAR REGULATOR COMM I( DOCKETING & SERVI E c; CT 10 OFFICE OF TH E SE c Y OF THE COMMI Do; umer / ) ,., Pcwfmarlc Oat., ~ Copi-., Re eive 1 Add' I Copies " ,4-

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Secretary of the Commission 5 March 1985 Page Two In any reliability screening program there will be Type I and Type II errors. Type II errors are of the magnitude that are unknown. The percentage of Type I errors in the reliability assessment program is unknown, however, it is a researchable question and an important question. It is recommended that appropriate research be directed to this question. While the MMPI is a valid and reliable self-report inventory that measures an individual's potential for aberrant behavior in functioning in deviant matters, it is not a behavioral observation and therefore it is most useful with the background investigation and clinical interview. The focus of evaluation is in detecting individuals with potential for acting out behavior, passive aggressive characteristics, substance abuse, psychopathology in which reality is distorted, and other emotional difficulties. We would strongly recommend due to the issues of public safety that serious consideration be given to the use of valid and reliable means of determining an individual's suitability. If there is any further information you may find useful please do not hesitate to call. Sincerely yours,

   ~-~               4',t Thomas R. Bach, Ph.D.

Consultant TRB/EEI/n IRM Energy, Inc.

c-4,~t-£~~7,2 PR~ MC BEHAVIORDVNE PSYCHOLOGICAL eo'RPORATION

                                                            .       l~f_~i;,T(O February 27, 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Corrmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                 ....... -~ 'I .... ,,,,.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73, as described in the Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 149, 1 Aug 84.

Dear Secretary Chilk:

Our organization has more extensive experience in performing psychological assessments as part of nuclear industry unescorted access programs than any other similar consulting group. We have screened over 21,000 persons since 1975 for nuclear utilities and nuclear power service companies. Our clients have included Pacific Gas and Electric, Detroit Edison, Consumers Power, Southern California Edison, Pinkerton's Inc. (the security guards at Indian Point), and General Electric Nuclear Division (as a subcontractor to Pinkerton s 1 Inc. )

• Dr. Schultz, President of our organization, received his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from Pennsylvania State University in 1954. Since then, he has been a clinical psychologist with the Veterans Administration for five years, has served seven years as the Executive Officer of the California State Psychological Association, has held the office of Chairman of the Board of Professional Affairs of the American Psychological Association (APA), and has served on the Board of Directors of the APA. From 1970 to 1977, he was the Dean of the San Francisco Campus and Executive Vice President of the California School of Professional Psychology. From 1977 to the present, he has been President of Behaviordyne Psychological Corporation.

Dr. Tondow is Chairman of the Behaviordyne Group. He is a 1 icensed psychologist and a diplomate of the American Board of Professional Psychology and the American Academy of Behavioral Medicine. He received his doctorate in 1953 from the University of Southern California. He has written widely in the area of clinical psycho l ogy with special attention to the use of the computer in psychodiagnostics. 599 COLLEGE AVENUE, SUITE ONE

• PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94306
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f U.S. NUCLEAR ll£GUI A Y DOCKETING & ERVIC" OFFIC OF Tl ~ OF THE Do(' I Ot ...ilt/f'S-R 1 Add't Co i -4

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Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Two Dr. Olson is Vice President for Development of Behaxiordyne Psychological Corporation. He received his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in 1967. After several years of inpatient work, he entered private practice with a special emphasis on screening police applicants and other high responsibility personnel. He has been involved in nuclear industry psychological screening since 1979. Also, he is an Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the Stanford University School of Medicine.

• We believe that this cumulative professional experience is invaluable in determining the level of a screening program appropriate for unescorted access to a nuclear facility. On the basis of this experie~ce, we strongly urge the Coomission to: ~

1. Speedily adopt a clearly and explicitly defined psycho-logical assessment program as a required part of the Access Authorization Program;

2. Specify that the psychological assessment program shall include both objective psychological tests and a structured clinical interview for all persons to be screened for unescorted access; and --

3. Include background investigations and continual behavioral observation requirements in the Access Authorization Program, as reco1T1Tiended in the Report of the Hearing Board, "Authority for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material (RM 50-7), April, 1979.

11 If the Corrrnission is not convinced that this is the proper course of action, then public hearings that al low open presentation of all relevant arguments and evidence are absolutely essential. The issue of an Access Authorization Program has been before the Commission in some form since 1973 with the adoption of ANSI N18.17. Comnents for NRC regulations were sought in 1977, public hearings were held in 1978 to which Drs. Schultz and Tondow of our organization submitted written and oral testimony, and the Hearing Board report was issued in 19'79. Since that time, no satisfactory definitive action has been taken, and all the members of the Commission have changed. The NRC should fulfill its obligations to the American public and to the nuclear industry without further delay.

                     )

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Three Fundamentally, an Access Authorization Program is an issue of public safety - a program to protect the many from the actions of a few. It is, also, an issue of public acceptance of nuclear power. Most people would not understand the technical aspects of nuclear power generation, but they do understand that they do not want mentally ill or unstable individuals in nuclear facilities. Again, we urge the Commission to speedily adopt the program that we and many others have reco1T1T1ended. The Corrunission is clearly dealing with an issue of low probability and high risk. The public is obviously concerned with the high risk aspect . We know that some members of the CoIT111ission would prefer not to have psychological assessment as part of the Access Authorization Program. Even before the first public comment period began, Commissioner Roberts went on record as stating, "I do not approve the psychological assessment and behavioral observation elements of the proposed rule." (Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 149, 1 Aug 84, p. 30729) We know that some individuals, including a very few psychologists, have argued that psychological assessment is ineffective, intrusive, or expensive. For example, Dr. Bivens of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has stated that "Although a clinical psychological assessment might identify hostile attitudes or an active psychosis that would pose a safety threat, it is also likely not to." (Memorandum to Acting Director, NIMH, 7 Sep 84, p. 2) It is clear from this memorandum that Dr. Bivens is inexperienced in the nuclear industry, and unfamiliar with the available data. One might speculate from his assumptions about the low probability of recognizing an active psychosis that he has little or no clinical experience either. We know, also, that the overwhelming weight of informed opinion is on the side of adopting psychological assessment as a condition of unescorted access, and of requiring clinical interviewing for al 1 persons to be screened. The American Psychological Association and the Association for the Advancement of Psychology support this position, and we believe that the great majority of experienced psychologists and psychiatrists in this country support this position. For example, the American Psychological Association (APA) in its comment to the NRC wrote, "The proposed rule states that the

 'psychological assessment program shall consist of written personality tests and, if needed, clinical interviews*..* ' _We must state, for the reasons mentioned above, that the clinical interviews must fol low the psychological testing -- for individuals whose test results indicate

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Four no [emphasis added] risk, for those whose results are inconclusive, and for those whose test results. indicate the possibility of risk. Psychological testing cannot be used in isolation, and it cannot be viewed as an infallible decision-maker in the absence of professional involvement, clinical assessment,. and a personal appraisal. The considerable experience of psychologists who are currently screening employees for nuclear facility work, using methods as outlined in the proposed rules, makes clear to us the necessity of follow-up interviews after testing. Similarly, the use of the MMPI in screening candidates for police departments has shown that clinical interviews must be an integral part of the process. These interviews can help overturn a possibly negative decision, and can help eliminate potential employees who appear fully satisfactory based only on the written test. That is, a small percentage of false negatives as wel 1 as false positives will result from any written test -- and the clinical interview is of considerable assistance in reducing the extent of these two types of errors. 11 (APA comment to the NRC, 7 Dec 84, p~ 4) See Attachment A. Commenting on behalf of the Association for the Advancement of Psychology (AAP), Clarence Martin said, 11 While in a strict scientific sense it is not possible to conclude that the psychological procedures decribed in the proposed rules have been demonstrated to reduce the specific risk of sabotage, there is abundant evidence that these procedures are extremely effective in detecting individuals who are unreliable employees by reason of emotional instability. 11 (Corrment to the NRC, 4 Dec 84, p. 2) Attachment B. He stated, al so, 11 Psycho-logical testing with a follow-up clinical interview, combined with a background investigation and continued behavioral observation, is the most effective and practical procedure available. 11 (ibid, p. 4) I' Dr. Anne Anastasi, a past president of the APA and author of the book Psycholo§ical Testing, considered a classic in the field, has submitte comments to the Commission advocating the inclusion of psychological testing and clinical interviewing in a screening program. (Anastasi, 26 Nov 84.) Attachment C. Dr. Howard Glazer, president of Corporate StressContro l Services, Inc. stated, 11 In sum-mary, we feel strongly about the crucial importance of including both psychological screening and Continuous Behavior Observation Training along with background investigations as part of the package in any forthcoming regulations. 11 (Glazer, 6 Dec 84, p. 2) Attachment D.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Five It should be noted that, of the independent psychological consulting firms, only Behaviordyne has more experience in the nuclear industry than Dr. Glazer's organization. Again, we believe that the overwhelming weight of informed opinion supports our position. Moreover, we believe that much of the opposition to this position stems from lack of information, lack of clinical experience, or lack of experience with a high quality psychological assessment program in the nuclear industry. It would be very informative to know if the NRG Staff had consu 1 ted any professional organization or organizations that have provided psychological services to the nuclear industry before promulgating the proposed regulations. Based on our extensive nuclear experience, it is our conviction that a comprehensive psychological assessment program such as we have described is:

1. NECESSARY for the protection of the public;

2. PRACTICAL and easily implemented;

3. FINANCIALLY FEASIBLE; and

4. SAFE, in terms of protecting the rights and privacy of the persons undergoing the screening.

1. ~ comprehensive psychological screening program is NECESSARY for the protect ion of the pub 1ic.

We believe that a psycho l ogi cal assessment program to identify and deny unescorted access to those individuals who are emotionally unstable or mentally ill is necessary for the protection of the public. This is not a great number of persons in absolute terms - it is an issue of low probability - but the potential risk they pose is indeed great. Studies funded by the NRC itself have documented that persons who are mentally or emotionally unstable constitute a serious threat to the safety of nuclear power facilities, and hence, to the safety of the public. (Frank, F. D., Lindley, B. S., and Cohen, R. A., Standards for Psychological Assessment of Nuclear Facility Personnel, NUREG/CR-2075, July, 1981.)

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Six Dr. Glazer commented that "Individuals which we have rejected were experiencing a broad range of problems including schizophrenia, mania, major depressive episodes, paranoia, psychopathology, impulse control problems, ect. [sic]" (Glazer. p. 1) He pointed out, also, that only one of the last 50 persons who were found unacceptable for unescorted access had "disqualifying factors appear on his background information." (ibid, p. 1) Our findings have been essentially the same as Dr. Glazer's in the sense that the persons whom we have not cleared for unescorted access were suffering from a wide range of severe psychological problems ranging from psychosis to substance abuse. Some typical examples of persons who were denied psychological clearance for unescorted access by out firm are presented below: This 21 year old, married male was employed as a painter at a nuclear facility. During the interview, his thinking seemed tangential, and he seemed to have some difficulty with recent memory. He was agitated and tearfu 1 through most of the interview. The MMPI report indicated that he might abuse drugs. It turned out that this was the case, and this was related to his agitation and tearfulness. He and his wife had been using cocaine for some time, and about one year ago, began selling the drug to finance their usage. In the two months before the interview, he bought a large amount of drugs to sel 1 to his friends, but they had not paid for it, and he was suffering financially. His wife had written several bad checks to pay for the drugs she had consumed secret 1y. He i ndi cat e d that , i n the past several weeks, he and his wife had consumed about three to four grams of cocaine per day, about three or four days per week. He denied having used drugs on the job, but admitted coming to work feeling the aftereffects. The day before the interview, he had to 1eave work because he was agitated and crying over his situation. Also, about two weeks prior to the interview, he thought that he heard someone breaking into his garage, and fired a gun into the air to scare away the intruder. On the basis of his extensive drug usage and his untenable personal situation, he was denied an emotional stability clearance.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Seven This was a -married male, employed for fire watch at a nuclear facility. He was quite guarded and defensive throughout the interview, but he did give a history of poor adjustment since adolescence. Recently, he was arrested for illegal possession of explosives, and during the incident, he threatened his landlord with a sawed-off shotgun, which he keeps around ujust in case." He said that he was going to "blow the guy away, but God told me not to." He, al so, made frequent statements to the effect that various, random men in his environment had homosexual designs on him, and he was clearly distressed about that. He discussed his job with disdain, saying that his duties were meaningless. Because of his propensity for violence, his irresponsible attitude, and his paranoid ideation regarding the homosexuality, he was denied an emotional stability clearance. For additional brief descriptions of representative cases, please see Attachment E. We think it is self-evident that individuals of this sort do constitute a serious potential threat to the safety of a nuclear facility, even though they might not be "saboteurs" in the classic sense. It must be emphasized that the threats to the nuclear facilities are not totally encompassed in the term "radiological sabotage." To those unfamiliar with nuclear power terminology, the word "sabotage" connotes the activity of a foreign agent or terrorist who has been trained to gain access to a facility and then destroy or disable it. However, persons who are informed about nuclear power security know that many hazardous events do occur that are reported as "vandalism" or "security events" but that could be cal led radiological sabotage. These events are most commonly the actions of disgruntled employees who deal with their emotions in a distorted, potentially destructive manner, or those employees who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol. This point is supported by a General Accounting Office (GAO) Report entitled "Additional Improvements Needed in Physical Security at Nuclear Powerplantsu (GAO/RCED-83-141, 13 July 83). Martin, in his AAP corrment to the NRC stated, "Historically, the Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission has addressed the question of employee reliability in terms of trying to prevent radiological sabotage. Sabotage, however, is only one of a large number of behaviors any one of which, if perpetrated by unreliable employees, would be hazardous to public safety and property." (ibid. p. 1)

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Eight Psychological assessment can identify virtually all of those persons who are mentally ill, emotionally unstable, pathologically hostile to authority, or habitually abusive of drugs and alcohol - in short, the types of people most apt to resort to vandalism to express their feelings. Also, people of this sort are most likely to endanger a facility through unintentional actions caused by inability to concentrate, misperceptions of reality, confusion, etc. We have stated that psychological assessment cannot identify 100% of these persons because we recognize that there are imperfections in any evaluation program, and because we recognize that people change over time in response to life experiences. Therefore, it is important to have the other components in the access authorization program, including the background investigations and the continual behavioral observation program. However, to minimize the incidence offal se negatives, that is, the number of potentially dangerous people who 11 pass 11 the psychological screening, it is imperative that all persons go through a clinical interview. Tondow, Schultz, and lTTson (1984) reported a study of 14,912 persons who had been screened for the nuclear industry with a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and a clinical interview. The authors noted that hl__ly_ 38% of those who ultimately were denied psycho log i ca 1 c 1earanceror unescorted access when the evaluations were completed had not manifested disguaT,TyTng

• psychopathology on the MMPI. -- --

Dr. James Butcher, noted authority on the MMPI, in an article written with Dr. Stephen Finn, advocated the combination of objective personality tests and clinical interviewing. 11 We believe that this two-step, assessment-interview procedure has the potential of prov1iding clinical judgments of greater validity that those judgments obtained through the use of either procedure al one. 11 (p. 330) They go on,to explain that the two procedures have different 11 domains of error" which counteract to result in a more val id decision or judgment.* f'0bjective Personality Assessment, 11 in The Clinical Psy'chology Handbook, Pergammon Press, New York, 1983, pp-:-J"29-344) Dr. Anastasi argued for interviewing and questioning individuals after the test results have been obtained, and concluded that, 11 It is only by using tests in this manner that we can provide the maximum protection of the individual against unfair conclusions and overgeneralizations, and the maximum protection of the public against

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Nine the placement of psychologically unsuitable persons in potentially dangerous situations." (ibid, p.2) Dr. William Schofield, Chairman of the APA CoJTJTiittee on Professional Standards, pointed out very clearly in his comment to the NRC (15 Nov

85) that interviewing only those whose test results were "inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits was a clinically unsound 11 practice that could be regarded as a violation of professional ethics.

This has powerful implications. See Attachment F. Some persons are uncomfortable with the element of subjectivity in interviewing. However, this subjectivity is the essence of an interviewer s clinical skill and professional expertise. In all 1 clinical areas, such as psychology and medicine, judgments and diagnoses are based on a combination of tests and personal examinations by the clinician~ We know that physicians, for example, can tell a great deal about a patient on the basis of their observations and the histories they obtain. Direct observations are invaluable. One of the most important features of the interview is that the person being interviewed reveals a good deal about him or herself through manifest behavior. In other terms, the actions of a person reveal almost as much as the content of what is discussed, and there is no substitute for having a trained clinician observe those actions. A person can make careful choices of what to disclose on an objective personality inventory. Many of the people who work in the nuclear industry, because they have moved from company to company, have undergone repeated testing so they are experienced in how to "pass the test. 11 Clinical interviews can be structured and standardized without losing the element of clinical skill~ Our program has evolved continually' over the past ten years. We hold training meetings for our 25 licensed psychologists at regular intervals~ even though all of them have had extensive experience in nuclear power settings. One additional specific aspect our program is that a psychologist must consult with another of our psychologists before denying an individual a psychological certification or clearance for unescorted access. Measures of this type help to ensure uniformity of standards.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Ten Requirements for a thorough psychological screening program would help to promote public acceptance of the nuclear power industry. It is obvious that there is a good deal of concern among the public about the safety of nuclear facilities. People are inevitably reassured to hear that some utility companies already have comprehensive psychological assessment programs to ensure that only mentally stable individuals are allowed unescorted access within their facilities. And, specifically within the mental health professions, only a program that calls for both testing and interviewing wi 11 have fu 11 credibility and support. Experienced clinicians recognize that testing and interviewing are complementary procedures, and that important decisions should not be made solely on the basis of objective psychological tests; therefore, these clinicians would view an uinterview by exception" program with disdain and mistrust. If one considers the present social awareness in general and the history of American nuclear power in particular, it is clear that the adequacy of any standard of safety in relation to human behavior set by the NRC wi 11 ultimately be tested in the courts. A system that accepts decisions based soley on laboratory data, whether it be psychological or medical, does not meet the standards that courts usually require of psychologists and physicians. The rule followed is to evaluate such professional clinical activity in terms of whether it is Usual, Customary, and Reasonable (UCR). The position of the American Psychological Association is that psychological assessment from test data alone, with clinical interviews by exception, is inadequate and unacceptable. Thus, any psychologist that follows such a model *would be unable to meet UCR standards in any litigation. To set a public safety standard that does not meet the minimal standards of the profession involved would appear to be imprudent at best. Such a standard does not adequately protect the public, and will result in financial* and professional legal liability for the psychologists and the utilities that adhere to it. Nuclear security is the responsibility of the NRC. We believe that the public expects and deserves to be protected from having mentally ill or emotionally disturbed persons working in nuclear power facil-ities. The Commission should adopt a high standard of psychological screening* to fulfill its obligation to the public, and to relieve the nuclear industry from struggling with ambiguous guidelines.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Eleven 1

2. ~ comprehensive psychological screening program is PRACTICAL.

Psychological screening is practical. We know from our ten years of experience in the nuclear field that such programs can be implemented and carried out without a great deal of administrative complexity or demand on the staffs of utility companies. The testing and interviewing can be done in a prompt, efficient manner, and the results reported quickly (while protecting the confidentiality of the ind iv i dua 1 at a 11 ti mes). Consulting firms, such as ours, with a large, flexible staff are capable of examining large groups of individuals in a short time, thus minimizing the delays of clearing people during outages and other such surge situations. At one nuclear facility~ we tested and interviewed over 1,100 persons in one month. 1 There is absolutely no reason to be 1 i e v e that a we 1 1 r un program~ car r i ed out by an exp er i en c ed consulting firm, will be cumbersome, difficult to manage, or an undue burden on the utility company.

3. A comprehensive psychological screening program is FINANCIALLY FEASIBLE.

Based on our familiarity with psychological firms consulting to the nuclear industry, we regard the estimated costs for testing and interviewing individuals presented in the NRG Value-Impact Study to be essentially representative. Moreover, we minimize expenses by having psychologists located near the facility who are trained in our system do the routine screening. During surge conditions, additional experienced psychologists from other locations can be utilized as needed to facilitate prompt evaluation of large groups of people. The NRG Va 1 ue-Impact Study indicated that a psycho 1 ogi ca 1 screening program would not add significantly to the cost of nuclear generated electricity. That statement was made on the assumption that one-third of the persons screened would be interviewed. To interview everyone would represent only an infinitesimal increase in the overal 1 costs in the financial context of nuclear power operations. Claims of exorbitant costs to the uti 1 ity companies are made by persons inexperienced in the realities of psychological screening.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Twelve

4. A comprehensive psychological screening program is SAFE.

Measures can be taken to ensure the confidentiality of psychological information so that employees are absolutely protected from possible misuse of this information. One specific measure that we recommend the Corrnnission adopt as regulation is the practice of only providing to the Access Program Director, a written notification of whether or not a person has been given am emot i ona 1 stabi 1 ity clearance. All clinical records are maintained by the consultant as privileged and confidential; the utility is relieved of the responsibility and liability entailed in maintaining the psychological records. This practice effectively guarantees that the privacy of each individual is protected. No utility company personnel have access to the psychological records. The possibility of abusive use of psychological data or information is thus eliminated. Interviewing everyone is, also, an important protection of the rights of the individual. In an interview by exception program, only those persons whose test results are inconclusive or indicative of a problem are interviewed. There is no way to keep secret who is interviewed and who is not. Those who are could be viewed by their peers as having "failed" the psychological inventory, and thus, as probably having a psychological illness of some sort. When everyone is interviewed, no one is singled out or labeled. There is no stigma attached to it. The practice of interviewing everyone ensures that each person has gone through a comparable, thorough, and comprehensive evaluation. The individuals get an opportunity to present and explain themselves personally. They may ask whatever questions they want, and they receive information about the outcome of their personality inventories. All of this results in much greater acceptance of the screening program by those who go through it. Fewer than ten people out of more than 21,000 have refused to participate in our screening program. In 1 an interview everyone" system, the individuals are less resentfu 1 and II guarded, thus making for more valid assessments.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Thirteen In fact, some people view the interview as a mental health checkup," 11 and raise questions about things that have been troubling them. These problems are usually transitory and insufficient to warrant denying the person an emotional stability clearance. Sometimes, referrals for personal counseling are made. In short, psychological screening programs are not only safe - they are often beneficial to the employees. But again, the most important point is that a clinical interview markedly increases the validity of the screening procedure, thus ensuring that each individual will be judged as meaningfully as possible. There can be no greater QUarantee of an individual's rights than the assurance oroe,ng dea 1t w, th fair 1y anaprofess ion al ly. Some might feel that any sort of psychological evaluation is an intrusion into a person's privacy. However, in special circumstance.s and occupations, it is generally accepted that the public safety deserves more protection than the privacy of an individual. In California and many other states, for example, police officers are required to undergo intensive psychological evaluation before being hired. A New Jersey court decided that firefighters may be required to undergo psychological testing for the protection of the public, as wel las themselves. (Palo Alto Times, 26 May 78) See Attachment G. Ultimately, it must be remembered that the persons at the greatest risk from mentally ill or emotionally unstable nuclear power employees are the other workers at the facility. In the process of interviewing thousands of nuclear power plant employees, we have learned that they are usually grateful for a psychological screening program. They regard it as an added protection for themselves.

Secretary Samuel J. Chilk February 27, 1985 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Page Fourteen We appreciate your g1v1ng careful consideration to these comments, which are based on our extensive nuclear industry experience. Sincerely yours,

 ~~

S. Don Schultz, Ph.D . President yne Group

  ~       J'}'). ~I    fl,_ 01 Gfr.y M. Olson, Ph.D.

Vice President for Development

ATTACHMENT A American

                     ~     ,.,-.hrJrv,*caJ IJ\ ::!::'~ I
                     ~iation December 7, 1984 Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Colll.lllission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Ye are writing in response to the NRC's proposed rule relating to Access Authorization Programs (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73) that was published in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register. We present our views on behalf of the 76,000 Fe!lows, Members and Associates of the American Psychological Association. These views represent a synthesis of the scientific as well as professional areas of the discipline of psychology. Ye commend your basic intent in proposing to require an Access Authorization Program at nuclear power planta -- to protect the health and safety of the populace. While we have some significant reservations about the specific regulations as proposed, *we endorse the general direction - to use available scientific and clinical psychological knowledge to help promote better employee selection, and to help ensure that potential employees are evaluated for suitability in a manner that is the least intrusive on their civil and constitutional rights. Numerous federal and state programs curr~ntly acknowledge the fact that psychology is the lead discipline in testing and evaluation. Unfortunately, there are significant misunderstandings about psy~hological testing and the limitations that must be i~~osed when making decisions based these tests. Thus, while we can endorseyour proposed use of psychological testing as one part of the screening for potential employees. we must offer caveats and suggest some alternative practices to those in the proposed rules. In addition, issues of confidentiality of records need to be further addressed, and valid concerns about possible abuse need to be considered. You have stated in your introduction (at page 30728) *The use of a qualified professional (in the psychological assessment part of the Access Author1%at!on Program) will help assure that an individual is not subject to an arbitrary 1200 Seventeenth St.NW Washington. D C 20036 {202) 955-7600

Samuel J. Ghilk December.?, 1984 Page Two* and capricious decision by a supervisor.* We agree, and we must note other positive effects should also be considered. Kost importantly, psychologists are bound by a professional code of ethics, a full-time APA-based Committee on Scientific and Professional Ethics and Conduct, and parallel ethics committees in each state. Many of the concerns that you have expressed, and that will undoubtedly be mentioned as part of other public comments on these proposed rules, can be effectively answered by consideration of the ethical obligations of psychologists, and the national/state enforcement committees specified above. For instance, individual items on one suggested test (the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI) should not be viewed out of the context of the forced-choice forma1/2 of a long, complex and multi-faceted test. The concern is that responses to individual test items could be used to refuse to hire an employee. However, the professional code of ethics precludes such a result by requiring that only evaluated test results are used f~r interpretation -- the individual item responses are kept confidential because, by themselves, they have no meaning and cannot be interpreted. Another concern that may be expressed Is that the use of psychological testing vill lead to discrimination on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences. Some tests, such as IQ tests and aptitude tests, have been actively challenged on grounds that they are racially/culturally biased. It need£ to be understood, however, that personality tests such as the MMPI are not scored on a similar pass/fail or numerical ranking format -- but must be expertly interpreted for balance and leanings on various scales. Such tests are designed to highlight individual differences, not to contrast an individual against some hypothetical norm. The major point that we must make, and emphasize strongly, is that psychological tests should never be used alone, and should never be used without interpretation by a qualified professional, as a basis for decision making. The videspread belief that certain tests can be used alone to make determinations is simply vrong. Psychological tests are important, sometimes invaluable, tools in the evaluation of an individual -- bu~ they must be combined with professional interpretation to have the necessary reliability and validity. Again, the APA code of ethics requires that interpretation accompany testing, and the proposed rules should also reflect this reality. It seems to us that there are significant issues other than "radiological sabotage" to be considered in screening employees. The complex mechanical safety features required by the NRC at any nuclear facility cannot function

Samuel J. Chilk December .7, 1984 Page Three without human assistance. There is a necessity for close mon1tor1ng, accurate and thorough visual checks of supply lines, vigilance in personal safety, open and direct communication between employees, and quick response to possible crises. Screening out of potential employees who could not, or would not, exercise the appropriate level of care in these areas is important. Individuals whose personality causes them to exhibit certain anti-social or careless behaviors could be just as problematic as those who might consider direct sabotage of the facility. You have asked whether some aspects of the Access Authorization Program -- proposed to include a background investigation, psychological testing, clinical interviews, and behavioral observation -- could be deleted, and at what price for each. This questio~ suggests that perhaps any one of these could be considered as necessary and sufficient to 1,clude all possible good choices and*eliminate all possible bad choices. We cannot concur in this suggestion. Based on our conversations with officials from other federal ag~ncies concerned with security issues, we conclude that background investigations, of 2-year or 5-year depth as suggested, are not overwhelmingly valuable considering their cost in time, money and privacy intrusion--but they appear to be sufficiently valuable to be included. Similarly, while psychological testing and clinical interviews are not inexpensive and are somewhat intrusive, they, alone or in combination, cannot guarantee that all possible problems will be eliminated. Behavioral observation may appear dis~ressingly intrusive and subject to abuse, but good supervisors are going to observe their employees in any case -- and the proposed addition of specific training in behavioral observati~n may make this part of the Access Authorization Program a most useful adjunct. Our point, then, is that no single test or interview or investigation or observation program is likely to be effective in eliminating poor employment choices. Used together and guided by continual improvements, ho~ever, such a program should be of considerable value in protecting nuclear plant safety and the welfare of the general public. With these general comments in mind, we would like to offer some specific comments and suggestions on the proposed rules. Sec. 73.56(b)(l) The description of the psychological assessment should include the requirement that these tests be administered and fnterpreted by trained, credentialed professionals, preferably psychologists. The use of individuals who have been specifically trained in test administration and interpretation is mandatory.

Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 Page Four* The proposed rule states that the "psychological assessment program shall consist of written personality tests and, if needed, clinical interviews *** " We must stat~, for the reasons mentioned above, that the clinical interviews

  ~ follow the psychological testing -- for individuals whose test results indicate no risk, for those whose results are inconclusive, aPd for those whose test results indicate the possibility of risk.

Psychological testing cannot be used in isolation, and it cannot be viewed as an infallible decision-maker in the absence of professional involvement, clinical assessment, and a personal appraisal. The considerable experience of psychologists who are currently screening employees for nuclear facility work, using methods as outlined in the proposed rules, makes clear to us the necessity of follow-up interviews after testing. Similarly, the use of the MMPI in screening candidates for police departments has show'Il that clinical interviews must be integral parts of the process. These interviews can help overturn a possibly negative decision, and can help eliminate potential employees who appear fully satisfactory based only on the written test. That is, a small percentage of false negatives as well as false positives will result from any written test -- and the clinical interview is of considerable assistance in reducing the extent of these two types of errors. ( We suggest an additional paragraph in this section addressing those applicants for employment who refuse to cooperate with the psychological test and/or clinical interview -- whether on privacy grounds or any other. We suggest that such individuals be given the opportunity to talk about the Access Authorization Program with a psychologist, so that issues of confidentiality can be discussed, the tests can be explained, the professional ethics and responsibilities can be spelled out (including necessary limits to privacy of records), and the individual can make a second, and more informed, decision

• Initial refusal to undergo psychological assessment should not be considered against any applicant -- and, in fact, may simply be the expression of a healthy skepticism about the process and its implicatons. 4 continued refusal to participate in the psychological assessment would, however, remove the applicant from consideration.

Sec. 73.56(b)(3)(iii) This section states that "in making a determination .** for the denial, revocation or suspension of access authorization based on data derived from a background investigation," it should be considered whether the applicant "has or has had any illness of a nature which, in the opinion of a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist, or psychiatrist, or medical doctor, may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the individual."

Samuel J. Chilk December ~-. 1984 Page Five* We strongly suggest that this section be modified so as not to preclude the employment of individuals who have, in the past, had certain problems, but who currently present no danger. We suggest the additional phrase: *without evidence of full recovery or sufficient rehabilitation.* Sec*. 7 3. 56(d)(2) The specific rules fo~ the clinical interview part of the psychological assessment should be modified sll~htly. First, as stated above, the clinical interview should be~ requirement for all applicants -- not just those "whose personality test results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits." Second, the test and interview sequence should also be examining whether the individual has problems -- other than radiological sabotage potential -- that would make him or her clearly unsuitable for employment in a nuclear facility. It is not just "the potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health and safety or property* that should be screened, but also the potential for unsafe, anti-social, or un--careful behavior. Sec. 73.56(h)(2) This section, dealing with protection of information, should be strengthened somewhat, we believe. It is stated that personnel information. shall not be disclosed except to the individual tested, bis or her representative, .. or to those who have a need to have ace.es& to the information in perfonning assigned duties in the process of granting or d£nying access to protected areas and vital islands.* We fear that this third exception is too broad and too unspecific. Experience with confidential information in other arenas -- most specifically drug abuse treatment clinics and mental health treatment clinics -- has shown that this "need to have access" exception needs to be interpreted in a most narrow fashion. The fears of abuse as stated by Commissioner Gilinsky can be assuaged only by strong words in the regulations limiting access to records. There should be no open, easy access to these records. The report of the psychologist should be available only as appropriate and necessary, and the actual testing materials should never be released except to another qualified, credentialed professional. (This is a part of the ethical code for psychologists, and is based on sound professional, as well as personal privacy, grounds.) The option of releasing information to a *representative" of the individual should be spelled out more specifically -- such as the legal representative with a signed Power of Attorney, or similar appropriate safeguard.

• Samuel J. Chilli::

December 7:, 1984 Page Six* We appreciate this opportunity to respond,to your proposed rule, and we hope our comments have been helpful.

                                                    /ltJ~

Robert Perloff, Ph.D. President-elect

 ~-Jl'dt!k

• Michael S. Pallak, Ph.D.

Executive Officer

' . ATTACHMENT B m I flt\ _RAP ASSOCIATION for the ADVANCEMENT of PSYCHOLOGY December 4, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

We are taking this opportunity to coimDent on the Commission's proposed rules regarding its Access Authorization Program, as they appear in 49 FR 30726-30739, August 1, 1984, as well as the associated Regulatory Guide. The Collllllission maintains that it "is not persuaded at this time that the psychological assessment and behavioral observation elements are appropriate requirements for this agency to adopt." The Association for the Advancement of Psychology, which includes psychologists in all areas of academic, sci-entific, and professional endeavor, believes that verified knowledge and experience of the science and profession of psychology provide a sound basis for developing an effective, efficient, equitable, and humane access authorization program. Each mechanical component of a nuclear power plant is inspected and tested with extreme scrutiny; it is crucial that the people comprising the human componen~ of these systems undergo thorough evaluation as well. We understand that these tests are to be administered to personnel

• who se~k unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. Our COI!llllents address the questions specifically raised by the Commission in 49 FR 30730-30731.

Question: What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns 2 or both? Both inside and outside the co1JJIOercial reactor industry psychological assessment procedures are used to screen employees for emotional instability and behavioral response styles which are in conflict with specific.job requirements. For example. the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company and the Virginia Electric Power Company have used *psychological screening programs for several years with a high level of success (see the enclosed descriptions of their programs). Historically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has addressed the question of employee reliability in terms of trying to prevent radiological sabotage. Sabotage, however, is only one of a large number of behaviors any one of which, if perpetrated by unreliable employees, would be hazardous to public safety and property. 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washjngtpn, D.C. 20036

• Ph9n.e (202) 466-5757

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 Within the general area of employee reliability, psychological assessment procedures are typically thought of as a tool (along with back-ground investigations and drug screening) to be used for minimizing the selection of unreliable employees. In this broad con.text> there is little question that psycholgical assessment plays an important role as a means of screening out individuals who are likely to act in an unreliable fashion because of emotional instability and/or the presence of behavioral response styles which are in conflict with specific job requirements. Question: How do the proposed procedures contribute to decreasing the risk of sabotage? Does the benefit outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives? While in a strict scientific sense it is not possible to conclude that the psychological assessment procedures described in the proposed rules have been demonstrated to reduce the specific risk of sabotage>

• there is abundant evidence that these procedures are extremely effective in detecting individuals who are unreliable employees by reason of emotional instability. It is noteworthy that few, if any, instances 0£ radiological sabotage have occurred in this nation's commercial power reactor industry. It is probable that psychological screening programs already in place have contributed to this safety record be detecting emotionally unstable applicants who might have endangered workers in the reactors or the public at large.

The two tests proposed by the Commission--MMPI and 16PF--have records of demonstrated reliability with respect to measuring emotional instability. Furthermore, the issue of emotional stability is clearly relevant to the commercial power reactor industry. For these reasons, individual rights should be well protected under the proposed rule> which also has safeguards regarding privacy. The personnel qualifieq to carry out such procedures are defineo in Section 73.56(d) of the proposed rule> and_1n Chapter 3 and Appendix B of the associated Regulatory Guide

• These*professionals are bound by very strict guidelines regarding matters of confidentiality. For example, psychologists are bound by a code 0£ ethical principles and by Standards for Providers of Psychological Se~vices which insure the safeguarding in individual privacy and confidentiality.

Furthermore, the proposed psychological assessment is certainly less intrusive into the privacy of the applicant than the standard background investigation which requires multiple interviews concerning the applicant with neighbors, friends, former employers> etc. The components of the psychological assessment program contained in Section 73.56(d) of the proposed rule and in Chapter 3 of the associated Regulatory Guide conform completely to the provisions of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures> with respect to validity and relevance of the assessment procedures. When the assessment procedures being measured (in this case emotional instability)> and what is being measure is relevant ot the job~ then the courts have consistently found psychological assessment procedures acceptable.

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 We strongly emphasize that psychological tests should never be used alone, or without interpretation, as a basis for decision making. The notion that certain tests can be used in isolation for decision making is erroneous. While psychological tests are important, som~times _in-valuable, tools ln the-evaluation of an individual, they must be combined with professional interpretation to have any large-scale validity. The professional codes of ethics require that interpretation accompany testing, and the proposed rules should also reflect this reality. Question: What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

• The two-tiered approach to psychological assessment reflected in the proposed rule (written test followed by a structured clinical interview) is a logical and widely used approach to screening for employee reliability purposes. Tests such as the MMPI and 16PF were specifically designed for screening purposes. There are over a thousand research articles in which the validity of these tests for detecting emotional in-stability has been consistently demonstrated (e.g., Dahlstrom & Welsh, 1960; Graham, 1977). Th~ use of a clinical interview to intensively investigate the specific areas of psychological fusctioning which have been highlighted by the screening test is a widely used practice by psychologists and psychiatrists when assessing individuals with regard to emotional instability.

Question: What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate-directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical? The standard scientific approach to minimizing the inevitable statistical error that can occur when only a single assessment procedure is used (e.g., use of only background investigations, drug screening, or psychological assessments) is the utilization of a number of different investigative tools in combination with each other (e.g., background investigations along with psychological assessment procedures and continual behavioral--observation). Keeping in mind that no employee reliability program is 100% perfect, errors can be minimized by implementing a two-tier system of psychological assessment, namely, written personality tests followed by a clinical interview. Tondow, Schultz, and Olson {1984) reported in their study of almost 15,000 people that had been both tested and interviewed that 38% of those individuals who, following an interview, were judged to be psychologically unsuitable for unescorted access had not manifested serious emotional problems on the MMPI. That is, a 38% false negative rate occurred when only written psychological tests were administered. This

Access Authorization Program 12/4/82 may have resulted for a variety of reasons, including certain applicants' test savvy, not taking the inventory seriously, testing at an inappropriate time (on day off, or after a long shift), language difficulties due to cultural background, etc. Such problems, which might result in false pos*itives or false negatives*, could be caught during tlTe clinical interview. In brief, psychological testing cannot be ~sed in isolation, and it cannot be viewed as an infallible decision-maker in the absence of professional involvement, clinical assessment, and a personal interview. The considerable experience of psychologists who are currently screening employees for nuclear facility work, using methods as outlined in the proposed rules, makes clear the necessity of follow-up interviews after testing. These interviews can help overturn a possibly negative decision, and can help eliminate potential employees who do not exhibit emotional instability on the MMPI alone. The clinical interview is of considerable value in reducing the extent of some false positives and false negatives. Psychological testing with a fol~ow-up clinical interview, combined_ with a background investigation and continued behavioral observation, is the most effective and practical procedure available. Question: Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs? It has already been noted that sabotage is merely one of a large number of behaviors any one of which, if perpetrated by unreliable employees, would be hazardous to public safety and property. Thus; the cost of psychological assessment to the commercial nuclear industry is small relative to the potential damage which might be done by emotionally unstable, unreliable individuals hired in the absence of such an assessment program. Risk reduction could only be quantified if access authorization programs were established at some sites while, at the same time, not established at other sites. A comparison of the results could then be made. It would be irresponsible and dangerous, of course, to conduct an experiment that would knowingly increase the risk of.emotionally unstable, unreliable employee behavior. Question: To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliabi.lity program? Would the proposed--behaviora.1-*relia-bility program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What specific __ risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening programs, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted? The purpose of each program element, and the type of behavior assessed by each, is very different.

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 The purpose of the pre-employment psychological assessment procedures is to detect emotionally unstable individuals within a general pool of applicants who are seeking employment in the commercial- power reactor industry. To do _this requires significant knowledge and expertise regarding the manifestations and demensions of emotional stability and emotional instability. More specifically. this requires the skills of professional psychologists and psychiatrists with qualifications matching those contained in A~pendix B of the Regulatory Guide. In contrast, the continual behavioral observation program is meant to detect changes in the behavior of otherwise emotionally stable individuals. It is our understanding that the goal is to teach supervisory personnel how to detect changes in the behavior of individuals already well known to them-- changes which may be indicative of emotional unreliability--secondary to changes in the person's life circumstances. For this reason, the psychological assessment procedures and the continual behavioral observation component are not equivalent programs in terms of their purpose, scope, and requirements. Rather, they are complementary programs. both of which are essential ingredients of a comprehensive employee reliability program such as that envisioned by the proposed rule. Question: What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry Qy the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs? According to Tondow, Schultz, and Olson (1984) and Raleigh (1981, enclosed), the individuals who have been "screened out" have been individuals who are emotionally unstable. As discussed earlier, the psychologic8] assessment procedures have been developed and val~dated for the specific purpose of detecting emotional instability. When these procedures are used for this purpose, they are as accurate as is scientifically possible. With respect to the proposed continual behavioral observation program, it is our understanding that this program is not intended to "screen out" employees, but is meant to be a constructive one in the best sense of the term. When supervisors observe that employees have undergone a change in their on the job behavior, one of the program's goals is to assist the em-ployee in taking remedial and/or therapeutic action to correct the situation that has caused the employee's behavior to deteriorate. In this sense, the program is.an ideal one in that it not only serves to minimize acts that are hazardous to public safety but it also helps an employee to become a more productive individual as well. Question: What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs? Management abuse can be minimized by insuring that psychological

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 assessment is carried out only by the types of qualified psychologists and psychiatrists defined in Appendix B of the Regulatory Guide. Professional psychologists and psychiatrists comply with their respective code of ethics and standards of practic~. The provisions of these codes and standards preclude these professionals from recommending action on any basis other than the objective results of the data they obtain. Psychologists who do not adhere to ethical standards are subject to censure or e~pulsion from the American Psychological Association, as well as malpractice lawsuits brought by the client whose privacy was violated. If management abuses have been documented by others, it should be stressed that such abuse is by no means inherent in the use of psychological assessment procedures for employee-:reliability purposes. On the contrary, the correct use of such procedures is one of the best safeguards against management abuse in selecting and maintaining reliable employees. Miscellaneous Comments Regarding Regulatory Guide On page 26 of the Guide, at the end of the first full paragraph on that page, reference is made to the following statement: 11 Judgements [sic] or diagnosis on emotional stability are normally medical judgements [sic) and should therefore be reserved to qualified medical personnel.ti In addition to being factually inaccurate, this statement is unsupported by case law within the Federal courts. For this reason, we suggest that the wording used in the first full paragraph on page 28 of the Guide also be used in the above reference sentence on page 26. Thus, the passage would read:

      "Judgments or diagnosis of emotional stability should be made only by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or medical doctor, as appropriate.ti In sum, we strongly support the use of the proposed two-tier system of psychological assessment, including valid and reliable psychological tests as well as a follow-up clinical interview, conducted by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist. This psychological assessment program, complemented by the background check and continued behavioral observation program, will yield the most effective, efficient, equitable, and humane access authorization program available. Furthermore, we strongly recommend that public hearings be held before the CoIDIDission takes final action on the proposed regulations in order to solicit testimony from experts in the field of psychodiagnosis and psychometrics.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment. Sincerely, Clarence J. Martin Executive Director and General Counsel A.AP CJM/leg

REFERENCES Dahlstrom, W. G., and Welsh. G. S. An MMPI Handbook: A guide to use in Clinical practice and research. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960. Graham, J. R., The MMPI: A practical S;Jide. New York: Oxford University

• Press. 1977.

Raleigh, D.L., "The Assessment of Emotional Instability in Nuclear Power Plant Applicants." Unpublished manuscript, 1981. Available from the Association for the Advancement of Psychology, 1200 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 200, Washington, D. C. 20036. Tondow, M.

• Schultz, D. S., and Olson, G. M., "Psychological Screening for Unescorted Access to Nuclear Power Plants. 11 Paper presented at the 65th annual meeting of the Pacific Division, American Association for the Advancement of Science, San Francisco State University, June 10-15, 1984.

         ..-----~----

L-L - l ' L - L - .__ ATTACHMENT C c6ri1rol

• Offices Nationwide
• December 6, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Att: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Secretary of the Commission:

This letter is in response to the request for comments on the proposed assess regulation which appeared in the federal register. Corporate StressControl Services,Inc. has been providing psychological screening for Un-escor~edAssess Authorization and Continuous Behavior Observation Training Programs to both nuclear plant licensees and contractors since 1978. Since that time we have conducted in excess of 15,000 screenings and trained in excess of 2,000 supervisors. StressControl also participated in the research efforts resulting in NU REG's 2075 and 2076. Our Unescorted Assess Authorization screening procedure employee the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality In-ventory, and a proprietary instrument, the Client Information Booklet, which investigates areas of social development, task performance, prudence, stress, substance abuse and honesty, each area investigated from a historical, attitudinal and behavioral per-spective. In addition, a face to face structured interview is conducted by a licenced psychologist. Our rejection rate from the inception of our testing program bas averaged 3.2%. The majority of these cases received second opinion interviews and in some cases thrid opinion interviews. It is worthy of note that in a recent study conducted by Stress Control of the last fifty individuals found un-acceptable for Unescorted Assess Authorization only one of these individuals had disqualifying factors appear on his background information. The fact that only one of these was found between background in-vestigations and psychological screenings suggests strongly that these two screening procedures are both nesessary and independent of one another. Individuals which we have rejected were experiencing a broad range of problems including schizophrenia, mania, major depressive episodes,paranoia, psychopathology, impulse control problems,ect. Upon investigation many of these individuals were found to have on the job behavioral histories consistent with our findings. These quite frequently include: Corporate Stress Control Services, Inc. 320 E. 65th Street New York, New York 10021 (212) 288*2220

• Offices Nationwide
• accidents, frequent job changes, grievances, ect.

which did not show up on background information. On our Continuous Behavior Observation Training Program we have trained over 2,000 supervisors and managers to identify early symptoms of aberrant behavior which if left unchecked would compromise the safety and health of the individual involved or his co-workers. Our statistics show an increase of 13.4% manager and supervisory referrals to our counseling programs in the months following these presentations. Once again this would seem to argue in favor of the efficacy of such training programs to reduce the likelihood of destructive behavior in the work environment. Our training programs are one full day and involve didactic sections, esper-iental componenets and video-tapes. A note on our counseling services. National Utilization Statistics show that over the course of a year ap-proxim~tely four to six percent of employees will use a corporate sponsered utilization rates averaging over 8% and soaring as high as 18% for certain groups of individauls such as control room operators. These high utilization rates clearly indicate that stress levels among muclear plant employees are higher than average, thus, pointing out the need for psychological screening Jn areas such as stress tolerance. In summary, we feel strongly about the crucial importance of including both psychological screening and Continuous Behavior Observation Training along with background investigations as part of the package in any forthcoming regulations. Sincerely,

                            \-r0l0wd 1. ~~M ~~

Howard I. Glazer, Ph.D President, Corporate StressControl Services, Inc. P.s .. we reg~est a~ opportunity to participate in any public hearing which are scheduled on this matter. Corporate StressControl Services, Inc. 320 E. 65th Street New York, New York 10021 (212) 288-2220

ATTACHMENT D November 26, 1984 Mr. Samuel *J. Chilk

                                       . 'I * *

• • secretary of the Commissio*n U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 * : * - -

Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

   . I am writing in reference*to the proposed r~lations to provide screening procedures for persons with unescorted access or control over special nuclear materials {Federal Register Vol. 49, No.149, 8/1/84, pp.30726-30734). I wish to comment specifically on those parts related to my own specialty, which concerns largely the evaluation o:= psychological testing and the interpretation and use of test results. These nre among the major areas covered in~, textbook, Psychological Testing (5th ed.,, 1982, .r-:ac:r,illan).

It is certainly a fact that psychological*tests are being included increasingly in programs for evaluating personnel for occupations in which emotional stability i~ an important re-quirement. and where responsible behavior under condi~ions of stress is essential for the public safety. Common examples include security guards, police, and firefightera. The addition of such tests has generally been found to help substantially in identifying emotionally unstable persons overlooked through other screening procedures. A second point I want to emphasize is that the proper use of personality tests requires the interpretation of scores in combination with other data about each person. Scores on per-sonality tests cannot be interpreted routinely: the same score may have different meanings for different persons, when considered in the light of facts from the individual*s background and other sources. Such interpretations are most effectively formulated in the course of an interview by a professional specialist who is knowledgeable, not only about the nature of the tests and relevant research, but also about up-to-date findings of behavioral science.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 26, 1984 A principal purpose of such professional interviews is to elicit additional pertinent facts through skillful questioning. The questions are typically fo~low-ups to clues gleaned from test responses, background data, and other investigatory procedures. By this.method, the information from the various sources is integrated for the indiyidual person. Moreover, the tentative interpretations and conclusions generated by the data are progressively tested by the further facts elicited through questioning. It is only by_ using tests in this manner that we can-provide the maximum protection of the individual against.unfair conclusions and overgeneralizations, and the maximum_protection.of the public . against the placement of psychologia~lly unsuitable persons in potentia1.ly dangerous situations.

• Sincerely,

                                                       ) .

Anne Anastasi, Ph.D. AA/pm Professor Emeritus

ATTACHMENT E Case Examples of Persons Not Given Emotional Stability Clearances for Unescorted Access to Nuclear Power Stations Case 1. This was an 18 year old, unmarried male, employed as an apprentice carpenter at a nuclear pl ant. He gave a history of serious antisocial activity beginning at about age 13 years. This included stealing from families who were trying to help him, as well as many burglaries in which he stole go 1 d and silver i terns and sold them to a fence. He was sent to live with his biological father at about age 17 years. Since living with his father, he had received six citations for moving traffic violations and lost his license. He was arrested, also, for the underage purchase of al coho 1. He quit his most recent job as a waiter because he anticipated being fired for assaulting a fellow waiter. He believed the assault was justified because the victim was obnoxious, and the other staff at the restaurant encouraged him in the assault. Also, he admitted drinking a six pack of beer at one sitting on eight to ten occasions per month. This person was judged to be emotionally unstable and behaviorally unreliable, with serious problems in self-control and a lack to loyalty to those helping or employing him. Case 2. This was a 27 year old, single male, employed as an inspector at a nuclear facility. During the interview, he seemed highly agitated, and had pressured speech. He had a serious case of neurodermatitis, and he described himself as being very nervous, a condition that he attributed to being unable to handle the pressures of the job. He said that he was very angry with his supervisor for not having rescued him from the pressure. Also, he said that he drank heavily in an effort to reduce the tension, and that on two recent occasions, he drove after drinking and crashed his car into the center divider of the highway. This individual was denied an emotional stability clearance on the grounds of very poor ability to deal with stress, poor judgment, anger toward his superiors, and possible strong self-destructive tendencies. Case 3. This was a 41 year old, married male ironworker. He reported that he had been fired many times, often for being a "smart ass." He gave a long history of alcohol abuse, and had experienced delirium tremens by the age of 21 years. He denied current alcohol abuse, but admitted that he drank 12 cans of beer at one sitting at 1 east once per week. He admitted getting into numerous fights because, ifl his words, "I get violently pissed." He was in a brawl fairly recently, even though he had a neck injury allegedly sustained on the job. He was suing his previous employer and planned to retire on the proceeds. He was evasive about the nature and extent of the injury. Also, he showed no emotional response when discussing the unsolved murder of his oldest son, which had occurred less than one year before the interview. He was denied an emotional stability clearance on the grounds of his history of antisocial behavior and substance abuse, and the poor control of his hostile impulses.

Case 4. This 21 year old, married male was employed as a painter at a nuclear facility. During the interview, his thinking seemed tangential, and he seemed to have some difficulty with recent memory. He was agitated and tearful through most of the interview. The MMPI report indicated that he might abuse drugs. It turned out that this was the case, and was related to his agitation and tearfulness. He and his wife had been using cocaine for some time, and about one year ago, began sel 1 ing the drug to finance their usage. In the two months before the interview, he bought a large amount of drugs to sel 1 to his friends, but they had not paid for it and he was suffering financially. His wife had written several bad checks to pay for cocaine which she had consumed secretly. He indicated that, in the past several weeks, he and his wife had consumed about three to four grams of cocaine per day, about three or four days per week. He denied having used drugs on the job, but admitted coming to work feeling the aftereffects. The day before the interview, he had to leave work because he was agitated and crying over his situation. Also, about two weeks prior to the interview, he thought he heard someone breaking into his garage, and fired a gun into the air to scare away the intruder. On the basis of his extensive drug usage and his untenable personal situation, he was denied an emotional stabilty clearance. Case 5. This was a 37 year old, married male electrician. He gave a medical history of having been comatose for three weeks immediately following an accident in 1964. At the time of the interview, he was receiving medication for a bleeding ulcer, and taking insulin for diabetes. Also, he had been hospitalized for alcoholism, and was attending Alcoholics Anonymous. During the interview, his speech was slurred, and he often blurted out bizarre statements, irrelevant to the content of the moment. He, also, laughed inappropriately. He was unable to control his movements, and he exhibited frequent tics. He said that he found his job very stressful, partly because he could not tolerate inaction, and partly because he hated to be away from his wife. It was judged that this individual was suffering an organic brain syndrome, with moderate to severe impairment. Also, his tolerance for stress was obviously low. For these reasons, he was denied an emotional stabilty clearance. Case 6. This woman was employed as a construction secretary at a nuclear site. The MMPI report had a very high psychotic point count, and suggested a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with somatic delusions. This was immediately borne out in that this individual reported a variety of bizarre and delusional ideas, comprising various diseases she supposedly suffered, conspiracies against her, secret police investigations, peculiar ideas about death and violence, etc. She, also, claimed to have been married at age five years. She was clearly suffering a severe paranoid schizophrenia, with floridly delusional thought focused on death, violence, disease, and conspiracy. Because of the obvious impairment of judgment and reality testing, she was denied an emotional stability clearance.

Case 7. This was a 33 year old, married male, father of three children. He worked as an "as-built" draftsman at a nuclear facility. His job required him to climb on scaffolding, inspect work that had been done, then draw blueprints of what had been constructed. He reported having been fired from several jobs, usually for being late for work. He said that he suffered a seizure disorder that started when he was 11 years old, and for which he takes large doses of anticonvulsant medication. He said that he could usually tel 1 when he is about to have a seizure, and that the seizures consist of his falling to the ground and losing consciousness. He s us ta i ned one on-the-job i n jury during a s e i z ure when he f e 1 1 on a hot pipe. His most recent seizure was about three months prior to the interview. However, he, also, displayed a serious psychological disturbance. He grimaced frequently, and manifested a tic involving involuntary head turning. He had cl ear deficits in recent memory and in abstract thinking. He often laughed inappropriately, and many of his statements were non sequiturs. He sometimes whispered inconsequential things to the interviewer, and he had etched a girl's initials on*his arm with nitric acid. Besides his seizure disorder, he manifested a serious disturbance of judgment and thinking, probably of a pre-psychotic nature. For these reasons, he was denied an emotional stability clearance. Case 8. This was a 20 year old, married male, employed for fire watch at a nuclear facility. He was quite guarded and defensive throughout the interview, but he did give a history of poor adjustment since adolescence. Recently, he was arrested for illegal possession of explosives, and during the incident, he threatened his landlord with a sawed off shotgun, which he keeps around, ujust in case." He said that he was going to "blow the guy away, but God told me not to. He, also, made frequent statements to the 11 ef feet that various, random men in his environment had homosexual designs on him, and he was clearly distressed about that. He discussed his job with disdain, saying that .his duties were meaningless. Because of his propensity for violence, his irresponsible attitude, and his paranoid ideation regarding the homosexuality, he was denied an emotional stability clearance. Case 9. This was a 35 year old, single male, employed as an inspector at a nuclear facility. He was unclear about his future plans, especially as to whether he wanted to finish college, or go into missionary work. He said that he had become very involved with religion as a way of handling prob 1 ems with drugs and a 1 coho 1. However, he cou 1d not name the denomination of his church. He stated that he had a five year period in which he abused drugs heavily, having taken over 100 LSD "trips," snorted heroin, etc. Also, during that time, he was arrested for possession of marijuana, and for hitting a police officer with a beer bottle at a rock concert. He denied current drug usage, but admitted that h,e sti 11 tended to get into fights at bars. He admitted, also, to hearing voices while alone, and his description of these voices made it clear that he was suffering auditory hallucinations. On the basis of his poor impulse control and his impaired reality testing - the impairment being of a psychotic nature and degree - he was denied an emotional stability clearance.

ATTACHMENT Fl/ UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA Department of Psychiatry TWIN CITIES University Hospitals Box 393, Mayo Memorial Building 420 Delaware Street S.E. Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 November 16, 1984 Mr. Samual J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Secretary Chilk:

I write with regard to the proposed regulations of the NRC which pertain to screening of employees for "unescorted access 11 in nuclear power plants (Federal Register, 8/1/84, Vol. 49, No. 149). My concerns relate specifically to 10CFR, Parts 50 and 73, Access Authorization Program. The proposed regulations require some form of objective personality testing (i.e. a psychological or psychiatric screening test) for all applicants for positions entailing unescorted access to maximum security areas of nuclear plants. A psychological, clinical interview is proposed as as requirement~

 .for those applicants whose test results are 11 inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits. 11 This proposed relationship between a psychological test procedure required of all applicants and an professional interview required of only a subset of applicants is seriously defective.

The proposed regulation is in direct contradiction to well established principles and practice regarding the use of psychological tests for purposes of personality screening. It entails the assumption that all such tests have a zero rate of false negatives, that is, no incidence of individuals with signifi-cant personality aberrations who success-fully "pass" the test. The psychometric literature provides ample evidence that this is not a valid assumption. To illustrate with a specific example: among individuals who are hospitalized because of serious psychiatric disorder, there is a small but not insignificant number who produce 11 normal" profiles on the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory); furthermore, among these 11 false negatives, 11 frequent diagnoses, based on social history and clinical interview, are those of paranoid personality and personality disorder (called sociopathic personalities in earlier diagnostic systems). It is individuals of this class who would be the greatest risk to security of a nuclear plant. HEALTH SCIENCES

Mr. Samual J. Chilk November 15, 1984 The occurance of false negatives, as defined above, constitutes the strongest argument against the proposed regulations and points up their failure to provide maximum reduction of risk through adequate screening for personality aberrations. The proposal is in clear opposition to the long established prin-ciple of all clinical, diagnostic practice (in medicine, engineering, and other fields), i.e. no single diagnostic procedure or laboratory test per g gives the diagnoses; rather, all such diagnostic indices must be integrated with other information to provide for expert, professional interpretation. If the regulations as proposed should be adopted, they very well might create difficulties for contractors in arranging for suitable psychological con-sultation. Throughly competent and professionally qualified psychologists likely would be reluctant to participate in activity which could be viewed as a violation of professional ethics and standards. Relevant principles from official documents of the American Psychological Association include: From Ethical Principles of Psychologists, Principle 8. Assessment Techniques

a. In using assessment techniques, psychologists respect the right of clients to have full explanations of the nature and pur-pose of the techniques in language the clients can understand, unless an explicit exception to this right has been agreed upon in advance. When the' explanations are to be provided by others, psychologists establish procedures for ensuring the adequacy of these explanations. *

b. Psychologists respon?ible for the development and standar-*

dization of psychological tests and other assessment techniques utilize established scientific procedures and observe the rele-vant APA standards. *

c. In reporting assessment results, psychologists indicate any reservations that exist regarding-validity or reliability because of the circumstances of the assessment or the inappropriateness of the norms for the person tested. Psychologists strive to ensure that the results of assessments and their interpretations are not misused by others.

From Standards for Providers of Psychological Services Standards 3. Accountability

   . 3.4 Professional psychologists are accountable for all aspects of the services they provide and are responsive to those con-cerned with these services.

1 Mr

• Samu a1 J
• Ch i l k November 15, 1984 INTERPRETATION: Depending upon the settings, accurate and full information is made available to prospective individual or orga-nizational users regarding the qualifications of providers, the nature and extent of services offered, *and, where appropriate, financial and social costs.

In recognizing their responsibilities to users, sanctioners, third-party purchasers, and other providers, wherever appropriate and consistent with the users' legal right and privileged com-munications, professional psychologists make available infor-mation about, and provide opportunity for, clients to participate in decisions concerning such issues as initiation, continuation, modification, termination, and evaluation of psychological services. I bring these issues to the attention of the Commission to urge that they revise the present proposal. The regulations should require both objective, psychological screening tests and personal, professoinal interviewing of all applicants for security-sensitive positions. WilliaHl.. chofield, Ph.D. Chairman, Commmittee on Professional Standards American Psychological Association WS/sm

ATTACHMENT G PALO ALTO.TIMES, Friday, May _26, 1':'8

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  -'.' NEW}\~K. N.J. (AP) ..... A'~aJ:

'J judge ha, upheld Jer!>ey cm*1;1se 1

       *of psychblogical tests to weeo:..01.tf:'.

• unsuitable applicants to t h ~ ~ -

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             µ.s: District Court Judge-jQfnei:;

,.. K* Coolahan noted Thursaay'7tbe ,

• battery of tests - including qu~s--.

' tion~ _about bedwetting, _sexual

habits atl.d religion,- were*an inva

., sion -of privacy, but *said 'the city

   ,_ had cpmj>~lling i~tercs~ to jf..!_s *.

. the exarns.1 - *.* -1 e _:,.,;, ..  :

  -.-;,~'Whil(a psychological' ev~lua- .

. . tlon i'iitrucles on"an.appJicailt!-a*pr:*

     . vacy:1lt Blay f ave hi'm:from the' risf of :osirig'his l1 fe," he' said: !'Tqe'pys.\

chological

• evaluation ; .. is useful
• and effectivf in identifying. applr:.

    ' cants wnbs< emot1onaf makeup*

makes th~m high-ri~k' *candidates: for the job of fire fighting...

• i Coolahan I ejected a civil)l4lt by; the American Civil Liberties Ul)jon~
• on behalf ~ftive.firemen an~ppl**,

cants, wqo said they rese11t~th~' personal" questions outlined-in *the, battery of tests, which include ir>I< I blot interpretations, sentence con-: pletion and personal interviews. ; The applicants also are askt*d, more than l 000 questions ;uta;a:e. required to answer true-fal~e st<!!,e*~

    . m ~nts such s, s, "I am very strongly
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     '"sf<~iJ spirits p9s&ess me at times';:'

arid I t1el~e ~ ~ins are unpar-. d<,nable."* 4

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The ACLU ct\arged t~hiri_r.g:

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pr a*ctice violated the-. app1icants1 *. ri,~ht to privacy under the First< Amendment right to freedom of: belief. Coolahan said the tests were given for the sole purpose of "se-. lecting fire:nen , ho had a high: probability of wnhstanding the: high psychology pressures offigltt-ing fires and living in close quar* tus.Thejud 6 e rult*d, however, that . the city would have to enact regula-: lions to prevent public access to the dMa and set a time limit on how ' long the results should be retaim;d.

• The ACLU said it would appl*al

the ruling.

1\LYrlC CATALYTIC, INC., Centre Square West, 1500MarketStreet, Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 864-8000 13 February 1985

                                                                                            /.!10 :47 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention:       Docketing and Service Branch

Reference:

10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 Access Authorization Program Dated 1 August 1985

Dear Sir:

Recently I attended the Public Utilities workshop on nuclear security, Mr. George Mccorkle, Chief, Power Reactor Safeguards Licensing-NRG, presented an excellent detailed outline on the present status of the NRC "Insider Rulemaking Package". During the presentation he solicited our written comments on the proposal. In reviewing the proposed access authorization I have the following concerns:

1. On page 30733, under Background Investigation, a five year window is needed for military service history. We are a large nuclear maintenance contractor. At many sites employees are referred by the building* trades. On short notice we may need qualified workers to report for assignments that might last only two months. For example, we could have a 62 year old electrician, and/or a 67 year old carpenter who were in the military service long ago. Without the five year window, by the time we received information from the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri our assign-ment would have been completed and the individuals never cleared.

In addition, the recent behavior of the individuals could have no significant relation to their actions while in the service.

2. On page 30733, under True Identity Requirement, fingerprint identi-fication could cause serious delays for an outage when we hire up to 600 employees from the building trades in a relatively short period of time.

Aeknowtedgad by Cl **

Uf. N(ft\.tAR REGUUioiv c6MMi ~t r l)OCKETING & SERVI CE ~C"TION OFFICE OF THE rr . ~v Of THE COM~ I *1-,1 Po,tmarlc Date

Secretary of the Commission 13 February 1985 Washington, D.C. 20555 Page 2

3. On page 30734, under f-3 (non-licensee employee), we suggest you insert the words stating that an owner will grant a temporary access authori-zation to an unscreened individual provided that CFR 73.55, continued observation, previous employer check for last five years, and a crimi-nal records check for five years has been completed. More descriptive language is needed to outline how an outage is defined with less strin-gent requirements for non-licensee employees.

Thank you for providing us an opportunity to share our thoughts. Very truly yours, Martin T. Lastowka Security Manager MTL/rns cc: W. D. McIntire J. A. Culkin

Buford Kesler, Psychologist Georgia License Number 453 Route 4, Box 1345 Diagnostic Testing Baxley, Georgia 31513 i)OlK.fTEO Personal Counseling (912) 367-6180 Januar,sM~th985 Student Evaluations

                                                             '85 FEB -4 P1 :47        (!jjJ_ -c.....-

Secretary of the Coomission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission OFF'1cE OF SEC RETA Fl .m Washington D. C. 20555 Corrmissioner NRC DOCKETING & SERVICt / BRANCH Aq L'T Attention : Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Corranissioner:

At first, the idea of placing responsibility for identifying abnormal or unusual behavior of nuclear generating employees on plant contractor supervisors sounds like a good idea . With further analysis the wisdom of such a shift becomes questionable . For three good reasons contractor supervisors are not in a good position to identify and take action when employees demonstrate abnormal or unusual behaviors . In the first place, many contractor employees are short term workers . They often move from job to job. They usually perform highly specialized jobs for a very short period of time and then move on to another work site . This means that the supervisor has only a very short period of time to observe employee behaviors . Under these circumstances the supervisor would be prone to ignore questionable behavior or to at least contain it for a short period of time rather than getting involved in the conflicts which often result from such a report . In the second place, supervisors work under a very close time line to complete contracted jobs . Removing employees from a work site jeopardizes completion of the job within the allotted time since other similarly skilled workers may not be available to replace suspended employees . This can put the supervisor at risk for completing the job within the contracted time if he starts removing or suspending employees . A third and severe problem with placing responsibility for recognizing abnormal behavior on contractor supervisors is the time, energy, and investment required of the supervisor to learn the skills and indicators needed to identify and manage abnormal and unusual behavior . The supervisor has the primary task of seeing that jobs get done . Responsibility for identifying abnormal behavior is usually assigned to a trained specialist . We usually recognize this as taking years of training, yet the proposed regulations require each supervisor to learn these skills which may be an overly optimistic expectation . Short of extended training the supervisor may very well learn just enough to be confused . This also may take away from the energies and abilities that

U.S. NlJO.fAlt RE'Gffi.AfO~Y C"C,MMr~ DOCKETING & ~fP VfC~ --~rTfQN OFFICE OF T <;f Y OF P 1E er ' ~ lN

Corrmissioner he should be expending on carrying out the technical operations of his contracted responsibilities. In summary, it appears that the observation program as proposed in the August 1984, Federal Register, should receive much further consideration before implementation. It has the potential for jeopardizing present screening and observation programs and replacing them with an unworkable system. Thank you for your attention. Sincerely,

EQUIFAX SERVICES r-

                                                                                 ~      0 Home Office 1600 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Post Office Box 4081 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 (404) 885-8000 1 1:43 January 30, 1985 Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Docketing & Service Branch On behalf of Equifax Services Inc., I am writing to respond to your request for public comment on proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73, which would establish new requirements for an Access Authorization Program, including mandatory background investigations. This comment supersedes the comment previously submitted to you (dated November 27, 1984). Equifax Services presently provides background investigations on employees and prospective employees to over 9,000 clients across North America, including both private industry and government agencies. Our experience in gathering and reporting information goes back over 80 years, and we complete over 300,000 individual reports each year. We have served the nuclear industry since the late 1970's, and our clients include approximately 200 nuclear utilities and contractors -- comprising about 45% of all nuclear licensees. A sample of our report services to the nuclear power industry is attached to this letter. Comment was specifically requested on eleven questions concerning the proposed requirements. Not all of these questions touch on matters with which Equifax Services has had direct experience; however, we would like to comment with specific respect to the proposal to conduct mandatory background investigations of employees and prospective employees who are seeking unescorted access to protected areas and/or vital islands at nuclear power plants.

1. "To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commer-cial power reactor industry?"

In general, use of background investigations is an accepted selection and screening tool. In our experience, it appears that the majority of licensees use some form of background investigation -- although the scope and detail of investigations often varies significantly from one utility to another. Most such programs cover employees of utilities who require Equifax Services Inc., an Equifax Inc. Company

• Home Office Atlanta, Georgia

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unescorted access. Less attention is typically given to contractor personnel, although they logically represent the same threat of insider sabotage. It is clear, therefore, that these proposed amendments would result in a higher degree of security in the commercial power reactor industry than has been achieved through voluntary action.

     "To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?"

Equifax Services is not in the business of conducting either psychological assessment programs or behavioral reliability programs. However, as a normal component of our services to the nuclear industry, we often arrange for such programs to be conducted by appropriate professionals, coordinating these programs with our background investigations to provide a comprehensive nuclear security package. From our knowledge of the nuclear industry, we estimate that 90% of licensees include some form of psychological assessment and/or behavioral reliability tool as part of their physical security plan.

3. "What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? 11 With respect to background investigations which may affect a person's condition of employment, e.g. access authorization, civil liberties concerns have already been resolved by federal law. Consumer reporting agencies ~uch as Equifax Services are required by The Fair Credit Reporting Act to "adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce, for ... information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy and proper utilization of such information .*. 11 Thus, employees and pro-spective employees of licensees are given important legal rights when background investigations are completed by consumer report-ing agencies. These very specific protections in the area of collection, maintenance and distribution of personal information include the following points:

A reporting agency may issue a report on an individual only in connection with a legitimate transaction involving that individual, such as consideration for an employment assignment, promotion or transfer. Strict procedures must be maintained to insure that when public record information is reported which is likely to have an adverse effect on the conditions of employment, it \._ is complete and up-to-date at the time the report is completed. This includes public records relating to arrests, indictments, convictions, suits, tax liens and outstanding judgments. Should an individual actually be denied employment, either wholly or partially because of information supplied by a

consumer r~porting agency, he or she must be notified of that fact by the prospective employer, and supplied with the name and address of the reporting agency. Upon request, an individual has the right to disclosure of information concerning the investigation in the reporting agency's files. Such information may be obtained in person or by telephone. A reporting agency must reinvestigate the completeness or accuracy of any information in the files that is disputed by the individual. Any disputed information which cannot currently be reconfirmed by the reporting agency must be deleted from its files, and - at the individual's request - a corrected report must be sent to those who have received the deleted information for the prior two years. Every individual has the right to make a written statement concerning disputed information which has been reconfirmed, and that statement must be included in all future reports which contain the reconfirmed information. As a result of these provisions and others, when background investigations are obtained from a consumer reporting agency there is more openness, less intrusiveness, more fairness, and the individual has more confidence in the process and the validity of background investigations as a selection and screening tool. The areas of potential concern suggested in the proposed rule, a review procedure and protection of information, have been resolved by federal law.

6. 11 Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by ... background investigations .*. ? 11 Equifax Services has no information which would directly equate the criteria indicating a potential risk or exposure with an actual future act of insider sabotage. However, it may be helpful to illustrate the degree to which these exposures may exist in the general population of prospective employees. In a recent study completed on over 4,000 reports, over 2.5%

developed criminal convictions not admitted on the application. In another study, background investigations developed information different from that provided on the employment application in 46% of the cases. Of these, 26% involved conflicts in employment data, and 14% in education data supplied by the applicant. In a third study, 60% of the investigations developed conflicts in employment, education or criminal history.

9. "What kinds of individuals have been 'screened out' of nuclear industry by the use of ... background investiga-tions  ?"

Based upon the studies cited in response to Question 6, it is

apparent that background investigations are an effective way of identifying individuals who, based upon the criteria established, present greater than average security exposures. It is important to understand that Equifax Services does not know in every instance that an individual upon whom we have reported has or has not been employed or cleared for access. Since a background investigation is only one tool in the screening and selection of employees, other information - perhaps obtained from an interview with the applicant - or even by psychological assessment or behavioral reliability programs - can mitigate apparently adverse background investigation information. In addition to the preceding comments on points where it was specifically requested, Equifax Services would like to suggest the following additional points for consideration. I. An effective access authorization program, to fulfill its intent, should require standardized background investigations on all people who are seeking unescorted access into protected areas and/or vital islands at a nuclear power plant. The 1980 U.S. NRC study, NUREG-0703 - Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders, indicated that typical insider saboteurs were motivated by psychological problems, disgruntlement and revenge, and acted within two years of being hired. These characteristics, plus the fact that plant employees are usually the most knowledgeable about location of vital equipment, how it works and routine plant operations, suggest that present employees could represent the most serious source of potential sabotage. It would seem that a program of mandatory background investigations should cover recent hires within a reasonable time period, i.e., the last three years, rather than having all employees who currently have unescorted access clearance automatically 11 grandfathered in" upon the effective date of a final rule. II. If legislation permitting access to National Crime Information Center records passes, it should be recog-nized that a check of NCIC records alone does not provide assurance of complete criminal history. NCIC is totally dependent on input from state and local agencies, and, therefore, the records may not be com-plete and up-to-date. Although licensee access to NCIC records is helpful, more may be needed. Consideration should be given to: 0 The thousands of contractor employees who require unescorted access and, therefore, fingerprint processing. These numbers could slow the system. 0 In addition to NCIC access, the need exists for auxiliary criminal record checks, i.e., public record conviction information, at a minimum in the counties

of residence, for the specified time period of the background investigation. III. Revision of the American National Standard Industrial Security for Nuclear. Power Plants, ANSI Nl8.17 - 1973, i.e., ANS 3.3 has not resulted in the universal adop-tion of a voluntary standardized program of screening by licensees, nor contractors. ANS 3.3 is a specific program of background investigation, psychological assessment and behavior observation. The original intent in revising ANSI Nl8.17 was to develop a specific program which qould become the standard for screening and could be implemented by the licensees on a voluntary basis. Although the ANS 3.3 standard was published in 1982, there still exist many different types of licensee screening programs across the country, making reciprocal clearance impossible. If the ultimate objective is to ensure the clearance of trustworthy and reliable tndividuals and to do so quickly, it appears, based on past experience, that a mandatory standardized program will be needed. Equifax Services is pleased to submit these comments for consideration. Our experience has indicated that, without a rule_$~ this one, the security issue which is so important to to *on's energy future will not be resolved voluntarily. Systems

EGl'UIFAX ~ER':flCES I NUCLEAR BACKGROUND VERIFICATION CautJon to Culltomer. Under IMms ol our agraement, this report

• aubmrtl9d wrth 1

the undellltand1ng that d 1s lo be held in 8tnot Confidence Excepl when req,.nred by law, no mlormBIJOn ,n th* report may be revealed dlT'0Clly or 1nd"8cily to any peBOO except to ooe whose othcial dutJM re<ptTe him to p8S8 on the transaction in rehllJon to wtuch 1h19 report wae ordered Tlue report contains 11tonmabon Account No. 402-586 File No. or Requester 636 pertment to personnel selectJon and was prepared lor that pu,poae only Date 9/12/83/8/6 Name HOLIDAY, MARTIN S. Address Raleigh, NC, 202 Regency Lane Posrtlon Applied for Engineer

                                                             )                   Office
                                                                                           - - - - Charlotte   -------

Date of Birth 5/26/55 Soc. Sec. No. 124-30-7390 EXPLAIN ALL CIRCLE@ ANSWERS SCOPE COVERED

1. Employers # -------,2.------

2. Schools # _ _~ - -

3. Credit Bureaus #--~--

4. Criminal Records # _ _~ - -

5. Military Service #--~--

6. References # _ _ _ __

• Other - # and type # _ _ _ __

TRUE IDENTITY Correct NAME - O.O.B. - SS # IZl Yes # of sources 2 Verified 0 No IZl Not Requested Birth Certificate Records Confirmed Yes D Verified D Copy Attached 0 No IZl Not Requested Photograph Posltlvely Identified Yes # of sources 0 No IZl Not Requested Fingerprints Taken Yes Where When 0 No

EQUIFAX NUCLEAR BACKGROUND VERIFICATION REPORT SERVICES SOURCE SHEET NAME - ** ,.. ~, Holidav. Martin S. 402-586 LIAI t: Ut' t!IH I H LIAI t: 5-26-55 9-12-83 SOCIAL :::Sl::vUHI I Y l"ILt IF vn n""""i:;;ou;;n 124-30-7390 636 DATE NAME ADDRESS CONTACTED (OF INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWED/ (SHOW EMPLOYER, SCHOOL, COUNTY, ETC.) PHONE# OR INDIVIDUAL SECURING RECORD) 1 9/8/83 John Lucas Raleiah Enaineerina 919-634-9071 2 9/8/83 Brenda Canfield Canon Associates 919-928-7500 a: w 3 -

      § A. 4 I      5 6                                                              f\
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~re          1            9/9/83     Sandra Sims                                  Unlversltv of NC                               704-745-9515 s~

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w 2 3 etc 1 9/8/83 Marv Johnson Credit Bureau Inc. Charlotte NC 704-282-5000 @e a: (I) 2 CJ ;f 3 w A, I 1 9/9/83 Randv Jones. Efxs. CCCCRl Lee Co.. Raleiah. NC B. 0. 919-872-4481 (I) 2 9/9/83 Rick Marshal CCCCR) Anderson Co. NC 704-527-1090 8-w w tl a: w 3

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1 -9/12/83 John Simon (Efxs.) -- - ' - - St. Louis MO. B. 0. 314-966-6288 i 2 1 9/8/83 Mrs. E. MacKenzie 204 Reoencv Ln .* Ralelah. NC 919-928-2198 Kf CJ 2

              ~

9/8/83 Dan Stevens (Landlord) 200 Reaencv Ln. Raleiah NC 919-928-3700 Z, WI a:, 3 9/9/83 Kevin Toohev 315 Avondale Dr., Raleigh, NC 919-872-2513

     ~I                           -                                                           -

w: a:1 4 9/12/83 Jack Wlsby 2935 MIii Rd .. Atlanta, GA * -404-926-8575 5

PAGE ACCOUNT NO FiLE # OR REQUESTER 2 OF 7 402-586 636 NAME Holiday, Martin S. EXPLAIN ALL CIRCLE @ ANSWERS EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

1. Employer's name and address Raleigh Engineering

   - .                                                                          580 Main St.

Raleigh, NC

2. Source Former supervisor

3. Correct NAME- D.O.B. - SS # 00 Yes

4. Exact dates 0 No 9N/82 to 9/2/83 ~~~'(,

5. Position held Mechanical Engineer

6. Any safety or accident record 0 Yes 00 No

7. Any psychological and/or medical 0 Yes record 00 No

• Any record of disciplinary action

9. Why did subject leave 0

00 Yes No Better opportunity

    -10: - Eligible for -rehire-                                         00 --Yes*   -- -       - -      -   -

0 No

  -

• 11. Would you consider this individual

--* "--*-- to be trustworthy and reliable                                00 Yes
    -       ei. nuclear environment in -        o   *--No            --*- ~----          ---   -*-

CONTINUATION OF REMARKS , , ,. t"'

I ACCOUNT NO FILE i OR REO0EsTER 3 OF 7 402-586 636 NAME Holiday, Martin S. EXPLAIN ALL CIRCLE @ ANSWERS EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

1. Employer's name and address Canon Associates 230 Parkway North Raleigh, NC

2. Source Personnel Director

3. Correct NAME - D.O.8. - SS II IZl Yes

                                                                                         \~'J 0     No

4. Exact dates 6/1/80 to 8/15/80

5. Position held Mechanical Draftsman

6. Any safety or accident record 0 Yes IZl No

7. Any psychological and/or medical record 0 Yes IZl No 111 Any record of disciplinary action 0

IZl Yes No

9. Why did subject leave To go into U.S. Army

10. Eliglble for rehire Yes Subject was hired in a career development position; No however, he neglected to inform us of his 2 yr. military obllgatlon at time of hire.

11. Would you consider this indlvldual to be trustworthy and reliable In a nuclear 00 Yes environment 0

CONTINUATION OF REMARKS

AccoONT NO FILE I OR REQ Es'l"ER 4 OF 7 402-586 636 NAME . Holiday, Martin S. EXPLAIN ALL CIRCLE 0 ANSWERS EDUCATIONAL HISlORY:

1. Name of school University of North Carolina

2. Dates of attendance 9/76 to 5/80

3. Any dlsclpllnary, psychological or medical 0 Yes

[gJ No problems t__ -,.~ ~

e. Reason for leaving Graduated - B. S. Mechanical Engineering

1. Name of school

2. Dates of attendance I

3. Any disclpllnary, psychological or medical -o Yes problems No

 -       Reason for leaving CREDIT HISlORY:
                                                                                                                             , ~. -*-   --   --                       -

Name of CredlvodAcd.

• Amount/Opened Current Balance Paying Record

 --                                                                -~----*-                        --~----                            --- - --           --   --   --

V1SA - 4789-381-562 $2000/12/82 $ 985 Satisfactory lrust Bank - 868-1001-7 $5000/3/83 $4225 Satisfactory

       -            --~             -*-- *-------                                J
                                                                                  -*               -* --~-                            --            -

J. C. Penney ..,.. 389-20-58 $500/11/82 $ 155 Satisfactory

                                                              ---~~~-:::,-~-------
    '*                                         -***   -~ - -  -- - __ ,,.__~ -~~--~-"'---*                          "_,
                   - -- -         - -- ~---
                                                        -----              aa .            --            --   -- - - -     --     -

PAGE I AccoNT NO FILE I OR REQUESTER 5 OF 7 402-586 636 NAME Holiday, Martin S. CRIMINAL HISTORY: COONTYISTATEJJ RISDICTION , TIME PERIOD RES lJ's Lee Co., NC 8/15/82 to present Clear Anderson Co., NC 9/1/78 to 8/15/80 Arrest/Conviction ARRESTS - DISMISSAIJAcOUITTALJcoNVICtloN

• When 10/31/78

2. Why Arrested for public intoxication

3. Where Chapel Hill, NC

4. Outcome Subject was attending a fraternity halloween party. After the party, subject and five friends went "bar hopping" In town and were involved in a parking lot incident with several military recruits. All were charged with public Intoxication. On 11/8/78 the subject pleaded guilty and was fined $200 and placed on six months probation.

MILITARY SERVICE:

1. Verify dates of service 8/15/80 to 8/15/82

2. Reasons and circumstances 2 Yr. obligation fulfilled - honorable for separation-Type discharge

3. Identify and record None disciplinary* problems* - - ---

Acco NTNO FILE I OR REO0EsTER 6 OF 7 402-586 636 NAME Holiday, Martin S. EXPLAIN ALL CIRCLE 0 ANSWERS CHARACTER AND REPUTATION:

1. How long known 1 year I 2. How regarded Good - "Fine young man"

3. Live within means/lifestyle consistent [X] Yes with Income - 0 No I,

4. Aware of any psychological and/or 0 Yes medical history [X] No

 **       Is subject a habitual user of a controlled substance (illegal drugs) or a user of alcohol habitually and to excess 0

[X] Yes No ~~~~\\

6. Aware of any arrests/convictions 0 Yes

[X] No

7. Would you consider this individual to be trustworthy and reliable In a nuclear [X] Yes environment 0 No

1. How long known I 1 year

 **  3.

How regarded Live within means/lifestyle consistent with Income [X] 0 "OK - Yes No Good Tenant"

4. Aware of any psychological and/or medical 0 Yes llistory _ [X] No - - - - - ..

5. Is subject a habltual user of a controlled 0 Yes substance 0llegal drugs) or a [X] No

      .. _user of alcohol habitually and to excess ___

6. Aware of any arrests/convictions 0 Yes

[X] No

7. Would you consider this indivldual to be [X] Yes trustworthy and rellable in a nuclear environment 0 NO

AccOONTNO FILE i 0A REaOESTER 7 OF 7 402-586 636 NAME Holiday, Martin S. EXPLAIN ALL CIRCLE 8 ANSWERS CHARACTER AND REPUTATION:

1. How long known 20 years

2. How regarded "Family friend - great guy"

3. Live within means/lifestyle consistent with 00 Yes income 0 No

4. Aware of any psychological and/or 0 Yes medical history 00 No

- Is subject habitual user of a controlled substance (Illegal drugs) or a user of alcohol habitually and to excess

                                                            ~o 00 No Yes
                                                                                                    ~~~

6. Aware of any arrests/convictions Yes Source remembered some "drinking and fighting No lncldent"whlle subject was in college. No other details.

7. Would you consider this Individual to be trustworthy and reliable In a nuclear 00 Yes environment 0 No

1. How long known 7 years

~ How regarded "Fantastic person - one of my best friends" I

3. Live within means/lifestyle consistent with - 00 Yes ---, -

income 0 No V

4. Aware of any psychological and/or medical 0 Yes history 00 No

                                                                                         --   -           --   --        ~- ---     ~  --- - ---

5. Is subject a habitual user of a controlled substance Ollegal drugs) or a user of 0 Yes alcohol habitually and to excess 00- - No -- _,_

6. Aware of any arrests/convictions Yes Source was a fraternity brother at Univ. of NC. Said the arrest of 10-31-78 was an Isolated Incident and Is No not a true reflection of Mr. Hollday's character.

7. Would you consider this individual to be trustworthy and reliable In a nuclear 00 Yes environment 0 -

               -                                      --   - ... ~-   -         --  -- --            -  -    - -      --

OOBRU~pr,..

                                                        ~       BUI! I\ -52),.1~

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY(,4,C/ FR_, JtJ?~} CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 1630 Chestnut Street Tower II (!]!;) January 7, 1985 #85 JAN 11 p 1 :58 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuolear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is pleased to provide comments on the proposed rule to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 concerning the access authorization program as noticed in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register (49 FR 30726-30734). We believe the current system of screening employees for unescorted access is acceptable. The proposal to utilize supervisors to observe employee behavior will not work because of the lack of the type of psychological training necessary for accurate observation. It seems to us that the attempt by NRC to regulate review procedures, for a denial or revocation of unescorted access, of a Federal agency such as TVA goes beyond the scope of NRC's health and safety authority. Worse, we believe it will result in a less effective safety system for our plants. Enclosed are TVA's specific responses to the 11 questions on the proposed rule requested by the Commission on 10 CFR Part 73 and our general comments on the rule. We appreciate the opportunity to comment. Very truly yours, Enclosure --- An Equal Opportunity Employer

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Secretary of the Commission January 7, 1985 oc (Enclosure): Executive Secretary Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, p.c. 20555 Mr. Tom Tipton AIF, Ina. 7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Enclosure TVA'S COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR, PARTS 50 AND 73 ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC COMMISSION QUESTIONS REGARDING PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT Question 1. To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs? Response: The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has had a psychological assessment program to screen nuclear plant operations and security personnel since 1976. TVA expanded this program to include applicants for access authorization in July 1981. TVA's current psychological assessment program meets the requirements of the proposed rule. In 1982, TVA's Psychological Services Section in the Division of Medical Services conducted a survey of 22 electric power utilities regarding their use of psychological assessment procedures. At that time, all surveyed utilities were employing psychological assessments as an aid to determine qualification for unescorted access clearance. Twelve of the surveyed utilities required clinical interview in addition to personality testing for all screened employees. Ten utilities were found to have programs similar to TVA's in that clinical interviews were conducted only when personality test results were inconclusive or abnormal. The predominant personality test being employed by the surveyed utilities is the Minnesota Multiphastic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Psychological assessment programs at 20 of the utilities were found to be making use of the MMPI, while no other psychometric instrument was being employed at more than two utilities. TVA relies upon the MMPI as its primary psychological screening instrument, as do the majority of surveyed utilities.

Question 2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both? Response: Consistent with ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982, 5.4.5.1, the purpose of TVA's psychological assessment program is to provide reasonable assurance that security-cleared personnel do not possess mental illness or emotional instability which could cause significant defect in judgment or reliability. Persons demonstrating psychopathology are recognized as a heterogeneous group. For example, within that group, some persons may experience impaired reality testing, placing them at risk of unintended error. Others may display characteristics in personality or character adjustment likely to result in acts of deliberate rebellion against authority. Psychological assessment, therefore, is useful in addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage. TVA considers psychological assessment as an integral component of a complete medical evaluation of fitness for duty. The full assessment includes items on a health history questionnaire; behavioral observations of the medical examiner, physician, and diagnostic interview by an alcohol and drug dependency counselor when indicated; and the psychological testing and interview referred to in the proposed rule. Psychological assessment is not capable of detecting all persons prone to mental error or acts of sabotage. However, TVA does regard psychological assessment as a prudent means of preventing most persons who are at significant risk of such behavior from obtaining special security clearance. Question 3. What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives. Response: Any psychological assessment or behavioral observation screening program clearly may involve inquiry into, and recording of information or views about, intimate personal details on the subject. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to the justification of these procedures in light of their impact upon those being assessed. TVA considers psychological assessment programs to be appropriate only in evaluating candidates for employment positions which bear critical relation to public health and safety. Extensive precedent has been established for the use of psychological assessment within occupations responsible for

the health and safety of others. For example, personality testing is frequently utilized in the screening of police officers, security guards, air traffic controllers, and military personnel. In such a context, the individual's voluntary choice to pursue employment is balanced against the public safety. For those persons requiring unescorted access clearance, TVA regards psychological assessment to be a reasonable and responsible method of protecting the public. TVA is not aware of any data in the industry or elsewhere for measuring the reduction in sabotage risk afforded by psychological assessment. Such data would be difficult to obtain for at least two reasons. First, the rate of documented sabotage is extremely low. Second, the construct "risk of sabotage" does not offer behavioral referrants and, thus, does not lend itself to empirical measurement. As a result, it is possible that "risk of sabotage" could be significantly reduced without producing a measurable effect upon an extremely low rate of sabotage. Nevertheless, TVA believes that risk of sabotage is reduced by withholding security clearance from persons demonstrating signs of psychological disturbance. TVA also believes that this reasonable assumption is shared by the public it serves and whose safety it seeks to protect. All psychological reports and data are regarded as medically confidential information and are not made available to management or personnel services. Only the recommendation to extend or withhold security clearance on the basis of medical condition is communicated. Question 4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors? Response: The construct validity of the MMPI as an instrument for measuring psychopathology has been well established in several thousand research studies. In fact, the MMPI is so well accepted in this role that it is often used as a criterion measure to judge the effectiveness of mental health treatment and as a criterion for the validity of other diagnostic procedures. The instrument is also well established as a tool to initiate overall clinical assessments. It has been used in that application to screen medical, nursing, ministerial, and graduate psychology students as well as police, fire department, military, and airline personnel.

In its psychological assessment program, TVA utilizes the MMPI as a tool to yield behavioral hypotheses. Test results are interpreted by licensed clinical psychologists who possess training and expertise in psychometric assessment with the MMPI. These psychologists also make use of extensive local normative data that TVA has collected on the use of the MMPI in screening nuclear power plant personnel and that TVA has shared through professional communications with the industry as a whole. Should the decision be made to not recommend security clearance due to psychological factors, it is not done on the basis of arbitrary or capricious use of isolated test scores. Rather such decisions are based upon professional judgment, utilizing test information in light of the clinical interview. Such professional involvement is analogous to review of medical laboratory findings, suggesting a health-threatening condition, by a qualified physician, who weighs into the consideration health history and medical examination data. Question 5~ What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical? Response: Certain recognized disorders of personality may well relate in a direct manner to risk of radiological sabotage. For example, persons of antisocial personality adjustment frequently exhibit conflicts with authority, aggressive behavior, impulsivity, and a willingness to defy rules and regulations. Such characteristics would seem to result in an increased risk for acts of sabotage. Other forms of psychological disorders would be expected to relate less directly to sabotage but more directly to risk of accident. For example, persons displaying significant mental confusion, depression, or anxiety could be an increased risk of mental lapse or error comparable in its effects to that of deliberate sabotage. TVA regards professionally directed psychological assessment to be capable of detecting some of those persons who display such characteristics and who might therefore pose an associated heightened risk of sabotage or accident. The use of psychological assessment to predict infrequent events has long been recognized as inherently entailing a large ratio of "false positive" decisions. In regard to TVA's psychological assessment program, it is not possible to compute a percentage of false positives (Type I errors) because individuals professionally judged to be at risk have

not been granted med~cal clearance allowing them access authorization. Similar metho~ologioal issues confront efforts to determine false negative (Type II error) rates since the base rate for acts of deliberate sabotage (depending upon definitional criteria) approaches zero. Consequently, false negative percentages would parallel the extremely low base rate. TVA believes, however, that the severe consequences of sabotage or accidents are such that clear benefit is derived from psychological assessment programs even when only a small number of true high-risk cases are identified and thus restricted from unescorted access. Question 6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which  ; would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs? Response: TVA uses psychological assessment to determine fitness for duty, and thus, has not attempted to justify its program solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage. Such an analysis would require an acceptable criterion for measuring "risk of radiological sabotage," which does not appear available. Without such a criterion, the determination of the relative contribution of different approaches to risk reduction is also not feasible. TVA views psychological assessment as complementing other methods of sabotage risk reduction. While it may identify a small proportion of potential saboteurs, psychological assessment is seen as uniquely capable of identifying some persons who may present a special risk of sabotage due to abnormal or antisocial personality adjustment. Question 7. Gan the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns? Response: TVA believes justification of psychological assessment for this dual purpose is valid. As previously discussed, TVA's psychological assessment program is intended to provide reasonable assurance that security-cleared personnel do not possess mental illness or emotional instability which could cause a significant defect in judgment or reliability. If present, such characteristics could be expected to increase vulnerability to either unintentional accident or deliberate sabotage capable of affecting public safety. The justification for such assessment ultimately depends upon a judgment as to what constitutes an acceptable coat/benefit ratio. TVA's opinion is that psychological assessment represents a reasonable and cost-effective precaution to help

ensure that security-cleared personnel are reliable, trustworthy, and not at special risk of mental error or misjudgment. Question 8. To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of the screening program; i.e., if only background investigations were adopted? Response: Psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs complement each other. Psychological assessment utilizes accepted clinical procedures to arrive at a professional judgment as to whether significant risks for mental error, misjudgment, or sabotage exist due to emotional instability or mental illness. Behavioral reliability programs are intended to detect at an early stage signs of such characteristics in employment-related behavior. Without prior assessment there would be risk that psychologically vulnerable persons who would have been identified through routine screening might not evidence overt behavioral unreliability until after a critical incident. If, in addition, behavioral reliability were also excluded from security clearance programs, there would be risk that psychologically vulnerable persons, even when displaying signals of behavioral unreliability, might not be detected until after a critical incident. Such risks are unacceptable to TVA because both psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs are considered reasonable safeguards that may be implemented in a cost-effective manner. Question 9. What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs? Response: As a result of psychological assessment, TVA has "screened out" individuals displaying disturbances in reality testing, severe depression, substance abuse, behavioral agitation, pronounced interpersonal withdrawal, and adjustment patterns marked by conflict with others, impulsivity, aggressiveness, and weak behavioral controls. Some individuals were actively psychotic, displaying frankly delusional beliefs or admitting to hallucinatory experiences usually of a well-circumscribed nature not readily evident without specific effort at psychological assessment. Many of these persons accepted referral to mental health treatment resources where they were often prescribed major psychotropic medications. All were

considered to display clear signs of mental illness or emotional instability raising significant questions as to the adequacy of their judgment or reliability.

            '-The types of individuals who have been screened out based on background investigations have mostly been those with criminal convictions and arrest records which were not stated on the applications and/or those who falsified applications (e.g., stating that reason for leaving previous employment was a "better job" when, in fact, the individual was about to be fired or left by mutual agreement).

Question 10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessments, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs? Response: TVA is aware of no management abuses of its professionally directed programs. Individual employee or applicant interest in the application of the programs to them are reviewed through existing grievance, Equal Employment Opportunity, and other relief mechanisms. Question 11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about proposed access authorization rules? Response: TVA's experience has been that the great majority of employees understand and appreciate the rationale for psychological assessment. The agency believes this is attributable to considerable efforts which have been made to communicate to all those assessed the purpose and limited use of psychological assessment. All tested employees are made aware that they may request an individual appointment with a clinical psychologist to obtain personal feedback on the content of assessment data gathered on them. Psychologists also make themselves available to employee groups to discuss issues surrounding psychological assessment and to answer questions. In fact, TVA is aware of numerous employees who view psychological assessment in a quite positive fashion. These employees feel assessment provided them an opportunity to discuss personally stressful issues with a trained professional in a confidential context and increased their awareness of counseling and employee assistance resources available to them. TVA is aware of no formal complaints by employee organizations about psychological assessment. Employee representatives generally understand the reasons for screening procedures and have no objection to them, so long as they are fairly and consistently applied to all employees. In situations where the employees or their representatives feel that the procedures have not been properly applied, TVA

has attempted to resolve those matters either through established appeal procedures or through informal arrangements. Employee attitudes are not seen as likely to change as a result of the proposed rule because TVA's psychological assessment program is already considered to comply with that rule, and modification in the program is not anticipated. COMMENTS ON 10 CFR PART 73

1. Section 73.56(b)(4)--It appears this section does not permit any latitude by an employer to evaluate the time since a felony or a series of less serious offenses took plac*e. This could rule out employees who have marks from an early age on their records.

2. Section 73.56(c)--We believe a check on personal credit history is unnecessary. If an employee's financial background is such a menace that it causes problems, then other background checks will reveal this.

Therefore, we suggest credit history checks be made only when indicated by other factors of the investigation and not be mandatory for all employees.

3. Section 73.56(e)--We question supervisors' qualifications to make behavioral judgments on employees' actions. We believe a tremendous burden would be placed on supervisors to adequately and correctly carry out the responsibilities of behavior observation and not infringe on employees' privacy. At a minimum the proposed regulation should be clarified so that this is only one of several means used to detect behavior irregularities.

4. Section 73.56(g) would require a licensee to submit for NRG approval its internal administrative procedure for review of personnel decisions denying or revoking unescorted access. First, we do not believe that NRG is given that power by NRC's health and safety authority over nuclear power plants. Moreover, in the case where TVA is a licensee, NRC's attempt to regulate TVA's decision to deny or revoke access oversteps NRC's authority and inappropriately intrudes into the management of another Federal agency's employee policies, which policies are specifically delegated to the TVA Board by Federal law.

TVA's actions are fully subject to Federal law so that NRC's review would provide no additional due process protection. Consequently, we believe this section should be deleted in its entirety or modified to reflect the governmental nature of TVA.

ROBERT N. MEYER _ Presidant Professr',mal R,: ctor Operator Society Consultant - Startup Operations PbWpplne Nuclear Power Plant Napot Point, Moroni. Bataan, Phillpplnes Telephones: 99-26-11 to 15 Ext. 537 (Office) 9!',-10-70 t '> 79 Ext . 1262 (Home) U.S. Area Code 011*632 Telex : 231817WHEB PH Cable : WESTJN'l'CO MANILA W Its H , 1\1 t,; ro N I D . C. . I A-+-f:-c_v: eKfcn s;u!__ d,sc.J,<SSMd w /.f-4 o He~ uptt..l,;, I r , by +he e,d-e,c/. <2/ fh;s. ve7u /11.../--1~,i . M~ruJ be,,l;e,u I 1

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORV COMMISSICII DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION omcc OF TH! SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document St1ti,tica Postmerk D1t1 l~/(_tt/f4 C I A ' I Copi pr~ luc cl ~ I Di rl I lion 1i1P ~ C:~----:;()~ di,,-~ . . L J , , , J ~ ~- 1<-?fl-f2YN'uvvr,.___,, - - --

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                                                            '-U   1 P2 :50 December 13, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

• I am writing in support of the present proposals psychologically to screen persons with access to nuclear facilities through a psychological investigation. I am aware that psychological investigations may seem intrusive and in violation of a person ' s right to privacy. However, the necessity for those connected with nuclear facilities to be stable justifies our attempt to maximize the odds that selection is effective.

Protection of individual rights can be built into a system of psychological screening where the psychological evaluations are monitored and quality control maintained by one group and the "pass-fail" decision be forwarded to another group. Obviously, there must be some control on the decisions suggested by psychologists and there must be at the same .time some protection from too much information being allowed into any public domain or into an employer ' s hands. A psychological battery of tests and interviews may pass some people whose qualities for work in dangerous areas are undesirable. Less

• frequently, a psychological evaluation program may suggest rejecting an able and desirable employee. The level of accuracy does not justify mass programs of screening for areas of little public interest; but in cases of community involvement (police officers, people in high risk professions, and people in areas where great public damage can be done), the screening reduces the dangers of avoidable human error.

Thank you for your attention in this matter. I urge support for psychological screening programs to be developed and administered by respected members of the field and to be overseen by review committees. Sincerely , Donald Ehrman, Ph.D. DE:c

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315 *i * ~gen;ie street Chi cfafg~E li ~-Og-~ r.l DeceM~~r ~it~84 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commissiorr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

• Dear Mr . Chilk; I am writing concerning the proposed regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register on August 1, 1984, "Aocess Authorh*ation Program", (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73) .

I reouest that there be public hearings concerning these regulations . Thorough psychological assessment of the nuclear utility employees is imper~tive to insure that plants and their surroundings are not damaged through the actions of unstable employees . With such precautions I support nuclear energy. Yours trul~* ,

• Leigh Sills Acknowledged by O'ard.~ "P-

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RC HEALTH FOUNDATION

                                                                          -S4 DEC 17 P12 :32 ff December 10, 1984 Tom R. Allen, Chief Regulatory Activities Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. A11 en ,

I have reviewed the 10CFR parts 50 and 73 from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which are concerned with the Access Authorization program. Although the expiration date for responding to the proposed amendments will have passed by the time you recieve this, I nevertheless want to make a few comments. The Company for which I work namely Hanford Environmental Health Foundation, has been in existence since 1965. It provides occupational medicine services for the Department of Energy contractors on the Hanford Site. We also have a contract with the Washington Public Power Supply System and also Exxon Nuclear Corporation. I have scanned the files that we have on the individuals whom we have

• evaluated for unescorted access over the past five year period for one of the commercial nuclear facilities in this vicinity. We gave 234 psycho-logical evaluations and of those 234 people who were seen, 11 were not given a psychological clearance. Unfortunately, we do not have any follow-up statistics on the 223 people who were given a psychologicar clearance and went to work in the nuclear facility for whom they were screened.

However, I thought it might be useful to indicate some of the reasons why the people who were not cleared were screened out. I am listing some of the problems that surfaced during the interviews with the psychologist.

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HANFORD ENVI~ONMENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION File #1 This individual had a dishonorable discharge from the service. At the time he was interviewed by us he was having severe marital problems. He was also reported as not getting along well with his co-workers. He had received a DWI. In response to questions relevant to the safety and security on the site the examiner states, 11 The real problem is his inability .to make some coIT111itment or to follow through if he were to see a violation of security in the work environment." The overall impression from the interview was that this was an individual who was impulsive, showed poor judgment, and would not assume appropriate responsibility for the welfare of others if he were to be employed in a nuclear faci*lity. File #2 This was an individual who was using marijuana, who expressed a good deal of bitterness about some things going on in his personal life. He vacillated in the interview between being very passive and then being extremely emotional. The overall impression was that he would be very quick to fly off the handle in an angry confrontational mode in the work environment. He indicated that he was getting drunk several times a year and that he was not satisfied with his life at the time we saw him. File #3 This was a gentleman who had had se~eral problems with his previous employers, who admitted in the interview, 11 It seems like there is always antagonism." He stated further that, "Bosses have never been honest and have never told me what my problems are. 11 In one previous place of employment which involved the driving of a company vehicle, he had four accidents with the vehicle. He had also had two major and one minor automobile accident involving his own personal vehicle. The overall impression from the combined psychological interviews that he had was that this was a person who under stress might exhibit poor judgment and might indeed be very accident prone. File #4 This indivtdual was found to have some delutions which involved

• some destructive acts to nuclear facilities. He stated that he felt someone was after him and that there were a lot of things*

the company needed to do to tighten up security. He became quite grandiose in -the interview. As it later turned out, he had to recieve inpatient care at a mental health setting. File #5 This individual was .not cleared because she was extremely emotional during the interview and had burst into tears during the discussion stating that she did not know why she was acting as she did. She also had a history of drug abuse and was currently on some prescribed medications for nerves. There was some reason to question her ability to make good judgments under stressful conditions. File #6 This ~ndividual had extnnely elevated test scores on two of the scales which are considered important on the MMPI. In the interview he was basically non-cooperative in responding to the questions insisting he was under time pressures to catch a plane. When . the importance of the evaluation was explained to him he was unable to change his manner of relating and ended up giving a paucity of information. It was the general feeling that there was not enough data to feel comfortable with giving him a psychological clearance, moreover the test data that was obtained would not support the clearance.

HANFORD ENVlllONMENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION File #7 This individual was a very depressed person with poor control over her emotions. She admitted to having crying spells because of a recent breakup in her personal life. Her testing indicated that she was under considerable emotional strain. It was felt that because of the stress that she was experiencing that she would be inattentive to the requirements of safety and security and the job setting. File #8 This individual was using marijuana on a daily basis. File #9 This individual was under a lot of stress because he had recently moved to this geographic area. In the interview situation it turned out that he had a severe learning disability which prevented him from understanding what he was reading. His ability to read signs and labels in order to work around caustic and dangerous

• chemicals or radioactive elements in the environment was difficult and in question.

File #10 This person had a history of alcohol abuse, poor impulse control which was reflected in the fact that he had spent some time in jail for kicking a police officer. He also had some DWis on his record. Moreover, he was drinking alcohol at the rate of 24 cans of beer a week. He did not see any reason to modify his drinking behavior even though he had had problems with the law related to it. File #11 This individual was experiencing a considerable amount of dissatis-faction in the work setting. He expressed an unwillingness to report any violations of security should he encounter them in the work situation. File #12 This person was abusing alcohol. His response to interview questions about safety and security was very poor. There was strong reason to doubt his willingness to report any violations. He came across as an irresponsible person who had problems in dealing with people unless he was under the influence of alcohol. File #13 This person was abusing alcohol and drugs and exhibited poor impulse control. From the above excerpts, I think it is somewhat clear that the reasons for our ruling people out on the basis of the psychological have to do with their ability to show good judgment and reliable behavior under conditions of stress. We tend to look at their past history in addition to factoring in their test results. We do not feel that,it would be appropriate to make the decision just on the decision of the test data. When a person's evaluation raises some doubts in our minds about clearing the individual psychologically, there are several psychologists who sit down and review the file and the final decision is then based on the consensus of the group.

HANFOllD ENVI~ONMENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION One might well ask is it necessary to screen everybody for unescorted access if only a small handful of the people evaluated end up as not receiving a psychological clearance. My response to that would be that there is no way of predicting what kinds of problems these individuals who were ruled out would definitely create in the work environment. However, given the way they described their responses to stressful situations and given their previous histories, one might expect them to continue to have problems in an employment situation. The benefit of the psychological interview is that questions can be asked for clinical purposes that cannot be addressed in the personnel interview: Moreoever, the responsibility for making clinical judgments about the person 1 s behavior is left to individuals who by training and experience supposedly are more qualified to do such interpretations. Relevant to the continued observation programs that had been reco1T111ended

• in the past, I would like to say that my staff and I have found that in giving those programs they have assisted the managers and supervisors not only in identifying the early warning signs that can lead to more significant episodes of aberrant behavior at the work site but also in reinforcing their cormnunication skills in dealing with their employees.

Used appropriately, the behavior checklist that we give the managers seems to help them to focus more on objective data gathering about referrals that they make to us for further assessment; I am attaching a copy of the checklist for your perusal. For the people who are either weeded out from employment because of their psychological evaluation or through the process that might be established under a continual observation program the feeling that rights have been violated can well surface. I would like to point out however, that many people who have gone through the psychological screening wfth us have felt that the experience was a helpful one and have even looked forward to coming back for their annual evaluation if they are in those worksites where such an examination is required by their employer. In short, the evaluation does not have to be a violation of the individual 1 s right to privacy and we feel that we have more evidence on the positive and constructive aspects of the evaluation for the person than on the negative repercussions. If I go quickly down the questions on pages 19, 20, and 21 of 7590-01 in response to Question 2, I would say that psychological assessment addresses both the fitness concern for duty and concerns about radiological sabotage. Question 3, I think I have responded to above, I do not feel that the testing, done appropriately with a psychologist sensitive to the issues of personal rights of the person, would be an infringement on those rights. Question 4 and 5 are perhaps answered by the infonnation that I have already given you. Question 6, cannot be answered since no one is wi_lling to put the people who are screened out as risks into the setting to see what in fact would occur if they were present as opposed to their being absent. Question 7, I do not feel I can respond to this question; Questien 8, we view the initial psychological assessment as an opportunity to establish a baseline on the functioning of the individual relevant to matters of trustworthiness and soundness of judgment. A behavioral reliability program which would not be combined with psychological assessment puts a great deal of responsibility on the manager or supervisor to establish the baseline. This would be very difficult to do during the person's

HANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION early stages of employment. In the meantime an individual who is disturbed could have a significant negative impact in the work setting before the supervisor could know with what he or she was dealing. Our experience with people who do the background investigations here is that their infor-mation and ours is somewhat different. We are frequently able to ask a few more questions in some areas than they can in their investigations. We have found it very helpful to work closely with background investigators and to pool the infonnation on some of the individuals who present more complex problems. Question 9, I think has been answered by previous comments above. Question 10, we seem to have a very good success rate in terms of the way in which the different contractors use the infonnation from the psychological evaluations. Probably the main reason for this is that we give back very little information about the assessment, only that which we feel is essential for the contractor in making any decisions about placement in the work environment. Moreover, such infonnation is not

• given back without the signed consent of the person who was evaluated
• Question 11, I think has been addressed above.

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to provide some input about the proposed amended authorization rules. Sincerely, C~Q _r \ I' CeCilia R. Co~hD Manager, Behavioral Sciences and Education jl

J.. HANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION Date Name of Employee Period-~------------ Covered Name of Observer----------

                     ---------                  Telephone Number of Observer - - - - -

Checklist for Behavior Observation Pl ace a checkmark in the appropriate column to indicate \'l'hether or not the employee being observed exhibited any of the behavions listed during the de-signated time period. When you have come to the end of the list, there should be a checkmark in either the 11 yes 11 or the 11 no 11 column before each item. Your responses should be based upon your own observations of the person or upon the observations made by others that have been verified through inquiry by you. I. Task Yes No

l. Has the employee refused to do assigned tasks?

2. Made persistent errors in doing assigned tasks?

3. Complained about doing assigned work correctly to the point of not being able to function?

4. Disrupted the work flow by del~berately creating a crisis?

5. Given incorrect or insufficient information to fellow em-ployees that was needed by them in order to get their work done correctly?

• 6.

7. 8. Expressed inability to make decisions related to his/her job? Made significantly more errors during this time period? Become significantly less productive?

9. Expressed increasing bitterness, resentment or disillu-sionment about his/her job?

II. Rules

l. Has the employee tried to influence others to violate their contracts?

11

Yes No

2. Shown disregard of safety rules?

3. Shown disregard of security rules?

4. Has this employee covered up for someone else who violated secu~ity or safety rules?

5. Entered into or intiated detailed discussions about sabotage or other ways of circumventing safety and security and se-curity regulations without appropriate reason for such discussion?

6. Been reported participating in illegal activities outside the work setting?

• . 1.

III. Personal Manner Has this employee engaged in physical another person? abusiveness toward

2. Engaged in verbal abusiveness toward another person?

3. Acted persistently boisterous or rambunctious even when ad-monished about such behavior?

U

4. Displayed unpredictable outbursts of emotion?

5. Wore attire totally unsuited to the work situation.

6.

• Displayed secretive behavior?
• 7.

8. 9. Been persistently withdrawn? Expressed fears about his/her physical safety? Initiated detailed discussions about death?

10. Initiated detailed discussions about harming someone else?

11. Initiated detailed discussions about the procurement of and pleasurable effects of alcohol or drugs?

12. Insisted he/she has magic powers or another identity?

13. Made comments that seem to disregard reality e.g., insisting that the vending machines are radioactive?

12

---

Yes No

14. Has this employee been increasingly irritable or tearful?

15. Received psychiatric assistance during this time period for an emotional disorder?

16. Accused others of persecuting him/her or of being out to get him or her?

17. Made unfounded accusations about others?

                      \

18. Communicated in an incoherent and disjointed manner?

19. Exhibited poor attention span?

• 20.

21. 22. Been reported to be behaving in a strange manner outside the work setting? Shown signs of increased fatigue? Become less concerned about his/her hygiene? .

23. Seemed to be seeking more emotional support or understanding?

24. Exhibited memory problems?

25. Exhibited slurred speech?

             .26. Exhibited unsteady gait?

27. Come to work with alcohol on his/her breath?

• 28.

29. Been having frequent accidents? Been having frequent colds or illnesses? 13

                                          .

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                                                               -..,;vi          ~(j]J Ill OP03EO RULE___            )              q C~ rli 3() 7at(p CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGISTS PRESS F'l}NC.                                               1 577 College Ave. (P.O. Box 60070), Palo Alto, California 94306                        (415) 857-1444 DEC 17 Pl2 :09 December 14, 1984                                                    fJ ;; ,,. ,_. 1   ~           ** - *
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Mr. S. J. Chilk, Secretary US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

My staunch support for the nuclear power industry over the years has been predicated on the assumption that your Commission was extremely diligent in insuring that proper safety features were built into every reactor and that great care was taken in the selection and training of employees in sensitive positions. I have recently had some indication that the Commission was inclined to relax standa~ds on personnel screening proce-dures and I want to urge that such procedures be maintained at the most stringent possible level. As a psychologist, I strongly urge that psychological testing be required of all employees who might have responsibilities for the safe operation of a reactor and that all such employees have an interview with a psycho-logist who will have the test results available to him .. As a test publish-er, I am continually insisting that our tests not be used in isolation to make employment or other decisions but that they be used to aid the psycho-logist in conducting a more effective interview by alerting him to possible problem areas. It is particularly important in an employment situation that test results.

• be backed up by an interview because the applicant is, of course, moti-vated to put his best foot forward in answering test questions and while some of the better tests can measure this tendency, they cannot always distinguish between an unusually desirable employee and a sophisticated dissembler. A combination of test data and skilled interviewing can usually do so.

I should also like to suggest that the overriding purpose of thorough screening is not the elimination of potential sabateurs but the elimina-tion of employees who might be emotionally unstable, careless, distrac-tible, or irresponsible. The danger of sabotage seems to me very limited but the opportunity for human error is significant, particularly under stressful situations. The assessment of such tendencies cannot be left to any single procedure but requires a complete evaluation of background, test performance, and interview behavior. I would like to add that I feel fully qualified to give expert opinion on assess:irent procedures, having taught courses and done research in that

U. S. NUCLE R REGU:.. 'T) Y "0".~r... ~;IQ DOC ' t.f l * ~,, ' I o~r c , { ur J. Pos'm, k C *, I.

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Mr. s. J. Chilk Page 2 Dec. 14, 1984 area for mo re than two decades at Stanford University. While I am now involved in publishing tests, I should mention that the particular tests we publish are not ordinarily used in selecting power plant personnel. I share the view of a number of colleagues with whom I have talked that it might be appropriate for the Commission to hold public hearings on the proposed new re gulations so that some of our concerns could be ful ly addressed *

• President Black, Ph.D.

JDB/hmp

VOCKET lJ. Bf RpR PROPOSED RULE ~ 7..3 Lf;;) (44 ~ .../tJ?,t,6,: J <:!:5/ HUMAN FACTORS & ORGANIZATIONA~EMS LABORATORY NAVY PERSONNEL RESEARCH A~* PMENT CENTER SAN 01eGo. CAUF0RN1J;l 7 December 1984

                                                   *a4 DEC 14 A10 :48 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission               Off ICE C*F SU,Rt.1Afi OOCKE"f ING & SEiNff.f Attn: Docketing and Service Branch                          BRANCH Washington, DC 20555

Dear Secretary:

The proposed rule change to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Access Authoriza-tion Program as presented in the Federal Register of Wednesday, August 1, 1984 has been reviewed by several personnel research psychologists on the NPRDC staff who work in the area of nuclear weapons security. The following are our review comments and suggestions.

1. The proposed access authorization rules appear to be reasonable for screening persons for trustworthiness and security risks. Efforts to validate all steps in the procedure are required, but are extremely difficult because of the difficulty in defining trustworthiness and security risks and the low base rates of good criterion measures. Until such validation can be accomplished, the proposed guidelines appear appropriate.

2. The Navy does not use psychiatric tests for screening, although it does use a background investigation and a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) for continued observation. Evidence suggests that base rates for decertifying people using the PRP are low, about five percent (Perry, R. W., Bennett, C. A., & Wood, M. T. 0979). The Role of Securit Clearances and PRP's in Protectin A ainst Insider Threats. Seattle: Battelle Memona La oratories. e PRP as operate y t e avy 1s seen as a workable way to provide on-going screening. Studies have not been performed, however, on the number of false positives and negatives using the Navy PRP procedures.

3. The work behaviors and habits checklist in the proposed regulations has face validity in detecting increased stress, particularly if the triggering mechanism is a change in a symptom or symptoms. The potential for abuse is high, however, and the system within which the behavioral observation is performed is crucial to its success. The training program proposed in the regulations should be described in greater detail, along with procedures for deciding when and how to take action, based on the behavioral observations. In no instance should such a system rely on observations by only one person for action to be taken. Also, procedures for an impartial review of suspension actions should be more clearly stated in the guidelines.

4. One problem encountered in organizations where immediate job suspensions result from behavioral problems is that minor problems are covered up, thereby increasing their likelihood of becoming major. Some organizations now offer "off-the-record" counseling programs that allow people to receive help at early stages without jeopardizing their jobs, thus avoiding more serious problems. A provision for such off-the-record counseling is especially important in counteracting the potential problems and abuses in a behavioral observation program. It would provide the supervisor who observes some early warning signs with an alternative to suspension in the frequent situations in which the evidence is unclear.

AcknowlocigedbyCard.~ ~

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5. Recent research using the MMPI for psychiatric screening of clergy candi-dates suggests that it has some validity as a screening device to indicate general mental health, with particular attention paid to any extremes of any personality dimensions, rather than reliance on any particular character trait or scale. (Haight, E. S. D. (1980)

Psychological Criteria for the Selection of Ministerial Candidates. Chicago: North-western University. Unpublished doctoral dissertation; Majovski, L. F. & Maloney, H. N. The Role of Psychological Assessment in Ministerial Selection. Paper presented at the joint meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and the Religious Research Association, Knoxville, TN, Nov. 4-6, 1983.) Use of the more recent scoring schemes rather than reliance on the original 13 MMPI scales is recommended as well. Security screening scoring keys have been developed commercially. Their validity should be investigated and, if valid, their use should be included in the guidelines, rather than the indiscriminate use of personnel tests in general *

• 6. Requiring a five year rather than a two year retrospective time frame for examination of personal histories for all candidates would seem justified, especially if many of those now requiring two year review would be expected to require a higher access needing a five year review in the future. Cost differential, if done initially, should be minor.

7. The Navy's use of a full background investigation has been questioned on the basis of cost and timeliness. The specific items in the background investigation in the proposed rules appear to include the less costly, more easily accessed sources. Some contact, in person or by telephone with previous employers or teachers should supplement record searches. A voluntary pre-employment interview with the applicant requesting disclosure of his or her arrest record or previous drug or alcohol problems probably would be useful in eliciting this information as well.

8. Another inexpensive source of historical information is a state's Department of Motor Vehicles records search. Such a search could uncover evidence of drug and alcohol problems, risk-taking behaviors and disregard for safety rules. It would be useful both for initial screening and periodically throughout a person's career to supplement observation of work behaviors.

cl<< Director 2

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• Barnwell, South Carolina 29812 * (803) 259-1781 OFFIC=- OF ~ECRt t.i.

Secretary of the Commission DOC E'T ING SEflV '.f. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6 NC. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: DOCKETING AND SERVICE BRANCH

Dear Sir,

Listed below are the comments concerning the proposed Standard Format And Content Guide For Access Authorization Plans For Nuclear Power Plants. CHAPTER 1 - General Performance Objective and Requirements Section b - It is felt that the continual observation program supervisory training requirement, is at best, only an indicator as to any potential problems that an employee may or may not have. It is the feeling of the CNS! Security Department that once a potential problem has been identified, it should be handled by a licensed clinical counselor or psychologist/psychiatrist. Supervisors, even with training, would still be layman at best. CHAPTER 2 - Background Investigation 2.1 - In regards to utilizing age 18 as a stated age, it is felt that regardless of the age, the background investigation should proceed back for a full five (5) years. There are instances where juvenile behavior is an indicator of possible problems that could be carried over into 11 Adulthood 11 *

• 2.2 - Paragraph 4 - True Identity - The use of fingerprints as the preferred means of verifying identity is much to restrictive. Because of the elimination of the mnlitary draft, we have a generation of individuals between the age of 18 and 28 who have never been fingerprinted unless they have a criminal record or have held pass security clearances. It is suggested that a combination of utilizing fingerprints, court records (birth certificates), Social Security numbers, photographs and military records be used in combination to establish true identity.

2.2 - Paragraph 5 - Employment History - Again, it is suggested as in the previous paragraph, age 18 should not be used as the arbitrary cut off date. Again, work patterns can be established as a teenager which may well be carried over to adulthood. CHAPTER 2 - General Comments - His the opinion of Chem-Nuclear Systems that with assurances to the respective contract utilities, management could and should be left with the decision as to whether an individual is fit for unescorted access.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSlO DOCKETING & SE RV ICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRET ARY Of THE COMMISSION Doc,;:mmt Stat isl ics Postmark Da:e µ/;~Ir+ Ccpie.s ~ec~!~c ~ * '" / - - - Ad d' I Cop;,,5 Re produce 2- - - - - Special Di~t r;bution !Jis. /+i I /

  . page 2 (Continuation of Chapter 2)

It is felt that this would be cost saving to the utility and would place proper responsibilities on those companies doing business within the nuclear industry who do not always comply with the direction or intent of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations and the ANSI Standards. As a whole, I find the new guide to be well written, easily comprehensible, and a much needed clarification for the unescorted access concepts. ResRectful ly,

• k yn~#---

Security Manager FCF/gw cc: File

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L&t/Pe .$~7/4) TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ~ - gtu.c<-e.,J CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 OO(;K~T.EO 1630 Chestnut Street Tower I! UN C December 5, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

• In accordance with provisions for public review and comment indicated in the Federal Register on January 17, 1979, TVA is pleased to provide the enclosed comments on draft regulatory guide.

Draft Regulatory Guide Task SG 301-4 "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" Since the content and interpretation of regulatory guides have a large impact on TVA' s extensive nuclear commitment, we welcome the opportunity for review and coment. TVA's comments on additional regulatory guides will be forthcoming as part of a continuing program. Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Enclosure cc (Enclosure) : Executive Secretary Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Tom Tipton AIF, Inc. 7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Acknowledged by cord . , J.lf/41$.~

                                                                                                     -,PL An Equal Opportunity Employer

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u. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY c6MM( s~(Oli DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE 5i:CRETARY o;: THE COMMISSIOM Doc:umenl St~lii!lc:t Postmark Date Copi.?.S Recei vcd Add' I Copies Reproduce 2...

Special Distr:bulion ~ ,-D - s-=~-.-, -, - -

Enclosure Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide Task SG 301-4

1. Page 6, 2.2 Investigative Criteria; Credit History; We believe a check on personal credit history is inappropriate. If an employee's financial background is such a menace that it causes problems, then other background checks will reveal this. Therefore, we suggest that credit history checks be made only when indicated by other factors of the investigation and not be mandatory for all employees.

2. Page 10, 2.3 Information Evaluation Criteria; 3. Emotional or Mental Illness: The proposed regulatory guide suggests that each licensee organization submit background investigation data to psychologist psychiatrists for evaluation in the event of past history of psychiatric illness or chemical dependency. It is possible that the

• use of this information could result in individuals facing adverse discrimination for employment on the basis of certain facts in their health history without the opportunity for an assessment of their current psychological functioning under the provisions of the psychological assessment program. We recommend that the guide suggest that background investigation data relevant to mental health history be forwarded to the psychologist who performs the psychological assessment for evaluation only in connection with current mental status and functioning. All records of mental health history are, by nature, incomplete unless the present level of functioning and behavior is assessed.

3. Page 17, 3.2 Personality Tests: We recommend that the proposed regulatory guide suggest that licensees establish and maintain a program through which licensee psychologists examine and certify applicants as being free from psychological factors which could adversely impact reliability and trustworthiness. The proposed

• regulatory guide suggests that the licensee administer a battery of tests rather than one comprehensive examination. It is estimated that the use of the test battery would nearly double present psychological screening costs and would provide no better quality assurance guarantee.

4. Page 19, 3.3 Clinical Interviews: The proposed guide prescribes specific time limit and content factors for the clinical interview of the psychological assessment program. We believe it is unrealistic to presume that a professional psychologist or psychiatrist will be constrained in clinical interview practices by a government regulatory guideline. Each clinician must (and will) use his/her own experience, style, theoretical frame or reference, and personality to create the stimulus conditions of an interview session. There is no feasible way a licensee can control or influence this process. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not reasonable to require a utility company to commit to something in a license application which it cannot control during actual operating conditions.

• Page 45, Appendix C: We believe Appendix C of the guide is unnecessarily detailed and complex. A list of observed behaviors this extensive could reasonably require several days of training for supervisors. This amount of detail could cause supervisors to miss the larger perspective or global behavior-change features intended by the continual observation program.

We recommend that licensee organizations specify the format and general content of supervisor training, but the specific details should be left to the discretion of the training team within the constraints presented by a needs assessment of individual work force training environments

• PSYCHOLOGIST 1 846 WASHINGTON AVENUE 211 WEST 56 STREET. SUITE 1 OD SEAFORD. NEW YORK 1 1 783 NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10019 (51 6) 781 -5346 JOCl'i[fr (21 2) 977-251 5 I.JSNRC Off,..,::_ ' SELR~ I,,

DOCKETING & SERVI['[ Secretary of the Commissi~n BRANCH * *

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory c.; om mission Washington, D .c. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr./Ms. Secretary:

This letter is being written regarding your "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" regulatory guide (September 1984; Division 5; Task SG 301-4; Contact Person: K. Jamgochian). As a psychologist who is involved in psychological screening for high risk occupations, I believe it to be important that I comment on the above document. It is strongly recommended that in addition to administration of psychological tests to all indivi-dual's that you interview all individuals. The first interview can take the form of a general screening interview. This would be followed by an in depth interview of only those individual's for whom further evaluation was determined to be needed by the first interviewer. Thus, those who II Pass II the first interview would not require the longer interview. I believe that II paper screening" of the psychological assessment data is inappropriate and may lead individuafi's to II Pass" who should not be passed. I also suggest that along with present behavioral traits and patterns, that history be given strong consideration in the pvaluations. In the last lines on page 18 it is stated that "Whenever test scores fall outside normal limits, or when the validity indicators suggest invalid results, the employee should be given a clinical interview." In addition to my suggestion above that all be interviewed, it is recommended that the relation of scores to each other (relative highs and lows be given strong consideration by the clinician. It is sometimes within these differences that high risk people can be found.

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Secretary of the Commission Page two Here is a diagram of the interviewing strategy I am suggesting: I. Psychological Assessment II. Screening all individuals psychologically in an interview. 7§0 or FURTHER EVALUATION III. IN -DEPTH PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVlliW

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• I hope this has been helpful to you. If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to con tact me.

Sincerely yours, Catherine L. Planagan, Ph.D. Certified Psychologist

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              ~ 2 ~-=- - --1.tcoffieiert T. Flint, Ph.D.

Licensed Psychologist C1/2. gui.w) 3045 Telesraph Ave. 47 Creekside Dr., Suite 110

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Oakland, <;a. 94609 ,I.. .. L.1SNkli, Walnut Creek, Ca. 94596 (415) 893-3413 (415) 930-9311 26 November 1984 hl1 :37 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Secretary of the Commission:

Michael R. Mantell , Ph. D., President of the Police Psychology Section of Division 18 of the American Psychological Association , has forwarded to me for review a copy of the document , Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants. I have been evaluating peace officers for over a decade, and have consulted with psychologists who have selected security guards for nuclear power plants . I currently am responsible for screening the security force at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory . I wish to compliment the author of the document for having produced a sensible, practical , and well-written set of guidelines. I particularly laud the requirement for two tests , one designed to detect psychopathology and one to assess the non-pathological candidate ' s style of interaction in hi.gh pressure settings . Further congratulations are deserved for the exclusion of computerized interpretations of psychological tests . I would like to suggest a few supplementary guidelines . I believe it is implied , but should be made explicit , that a careful assessment of the candidate's susceptibility to chemical abuse , especially alcohol abuse , is important . Many clinicians favor using a short form of the MMPI, a practice which rules out scoring the Macandrews Alcoholism Scale. I would like to see a requirement that an assessment be made of the individual ' s susceptibility to stress , using an instrument of the Holmes-Rahe variety . My experience indicates that many candidates say that they have experienced few stressful situations , even though their histories are replete with situations which are likely to be stressful enough to interfere with their functioning. One must remember that many people are motivated to deny stress , rather than to anticipate and counteract it . Further , insight into the effects of stress usually erodes quickly when one has been under prolonged stress. Consequently , self-reports about the amount of stress experienced , and one ' s reactions to it , are highly suspect. It certainly is in accordance with the ethical requirements of the American Psychological Association that one who is involved in personnel selection be familiar with the jobs for which one is selecting . Therefore, a special Acknowlcd3ed by card. IJi/..;:iJf.-f::.'f tl

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U.S. NUCLtfi.i< l!EGU; A O~Y CdMMfSS(. , t>OCl<ETING l!, SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF T'*" <EC'c-*P..Y 0.- 1:1e -r.; *, ., l Ccpi -~, r .I u/zr/# I ArJ-l'I :* 2.. Speci_.l D;;iri6 *fi:,n I Ill l).S, /../.;I /

Secretary, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 26 November 1984 Page 2 orientation program provided by the particular facility is an excellent idea . I believe it should be the responsibility of the facility to arrange such an orientation program, but it should be the responsibility of the psychologist to attend such a program at no cost to the facility . Obtaining a grounding in the particulars of the job is the responsibility of the psychologist , and the facility should not have to pay for the consultant ' s education . Thank you for the opportunity to offer these comments. Sincerely ,

• Robert T. Flint , Ph . D.

Licensed Psychologist Copy to: Michael R. Mantell , Ph . D. RTF:ea

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk .:if,.*, -:, .;, ' . Secretary of the Commission *~ ..... ' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

I am writing in support of obligatory psychological evaluation of people who operate, maintain, and repair nuclear power plants

• In addition to b a ckground investigation, such evaluation should consis t of personality tests and interviews by a psychiatrist or psychologist.

The use of psychological testing in conjunction with interviewing

• is a time honored combination for evaluating personality and emotional disorders.

I am a psychiatrist, in private practice since 1965, a Clinical Associate of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, a Clinical Associate Professor at Stanford University School of Medicine, and a Senior Core Faculty member of the Pacific Graduate School of Psychology. Much of my work is psychotherapy, and I do a good deal of teaching other clinicians during and after their formal training. In my work with patients and their relatives and in teaching others to do this, I stress the use of personal interviewing*and the technique of attending to more than surface information as an effective method for understanding people, their attitudes and motives. The use of this sort of interview adds substantially to background investigation and formal psychological testing for making decisions about an appropriate course of action. It can be effective, too, in decisions about who is qualified to hold positions of responsibility in nuclear power plants. Every day the news carries stories of some person whose irrational behavior has resulted in damage to property and injury or death to other people. Frequently entire groups of strangers are harmed when some unbalanced citizen goes on a rampage or acts on a carefully planned but no less irrational escapage. In addition to those who would purposely damage property or harm their fellows, there are many who are unsuited to work at particular jobs because of personality disorders or emotional instability. We live in a time 1)510 ~ , :,, a.J_J;.Uf~

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when such a person, deranged or unstable, can rather easily cause trouble ranging from inconvenience to absolute havoc for thousands of people. We need only take a commercial flight to be reminded of this fact as we pass through a checkpoint before boarding an aircraft. Some may raise the objection that such interviews constitute an invasion of privacy. Although this is true to some degree, such interviews need not be very much more intrusive than the reasonable and acceptable evaluation any employer might use to determine the personality qualifications of a potential employee for an important position. The only significant difference is that the interviewer is skilled in assessing personality traits, attitudes about work and responsibility, and emotional stability of the person being interviewed .

• It seems to me that requiring a psychological evaluation (psycho-logical testing and interviewing) of people who desire to work in critical areas of nuclear power plants would contribute significantly to the comfort and safety of th~ public.

Sincerely _yours,

                         . ~ M-C... I?IIIIO  *

• ack P. Edelstein, M.D.
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. . . L ~ C . Clinical and Consulting Psychology November 28, 1984 SAMUEL LEVINSON, Ph.D.

Diplomate, Clinical Psychology American Board of Professional Psychology P2'.42 NEILS. HIBLER, Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist VIRGINIA L. REVERE, Ph.D. OFFI " I I, Clinical Psychologist O')CI JOHN R. ROGERS, M.D. Psychiatric Consultant Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen: This letter is in response to your request for comments on the draft regulatory guide and value/impact statement, Task SG301-4, "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants." In General, the proposed guide is precise and is well written. There is one issue, however, which is in need of more precise definition. This issue regards the interpretation of psychological testing. References to this issue are noted on Page 15, Section 3, Paragraph (d) (1) "Results of the Personality Test shall be evaluated by a qualified and, if applicable, state licensed psychologist or a psychiatrist," and Page 18, Section 3.2 Personality Tests, Subsection Intent, with specific reference to the third paragraph on Page 18, "Written Personality Tests always be interpreted by a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist." It needs to be clear to the Commission that there are a variety of specialties within psychology, only some of which regard evaluation, and even then, there are professional and ethical requirements which extend beyond generic licensure. Ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association requires that to properly interpret psychological tests, there must be formal graduate training, supervised practice, and knowledge of any particular tests, its limitations, means by which it is reliable and valid. In those states which have Acknowledgod by co,d, .a/J.#£4:f"Jl Psychological Resources, Inc., Suite 209, 5055 Seminary Rd., Alexandria, VA 223 l l (703) 379-921 l

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2 specialty licensure in psychology, it is typ ically the case that only clinical psychologists can award a diagnosis. Further, in these states (such as Virginia) the ability to use personality tests is separately examined as a component of specific competency for licensure. Having said all of this I draw your attention to Appendix B (Page 43 of your draft). Subsection 6 of Appendix B requires "knowledge of, and substantial experience in, the use of psychometric and other measurement procedures used in the psychological evaluation of individuals." If this statement presumes graduate level training and supervision in the use of these instruments then it should so state, inasmuch as this is the standard by which the APA ethics demand competence. Furthermore, it would appear that very few psychiatrists have more than cursory training in the use of psychological tests, and as required by the standards in most states, are also licensed in clinical psychology so that they are legally and ethically able to interpret tests. In sum, this point is this; psychological testing appears to be a vital part of the reliability program this draft addresses, but the door is left open for the misuse (to include misinterpretation as well as unethical applications) of this invaluable resource. As professionals who have worked extensively in _the area of human reliability, both in government and the private community, we applaud the Commission's efforts to standardize its requirements, procedures, and to make its evaluations of personnel accountable to scientific scrutiny. We offer our comments in support of this vital proposal, and hope that they will help in assuring its purpose .

• Neil S. Hibler, Ph.D.

Clinical Psychologist

                ~

ue ev son, Ph.D., ABPP Clinical Psychologist

I IBEW

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                                                                                             ;cv INTERNATIONAL BROTHERH O~(b OF ELECTRICAL                                             WORKERS 1125-Fifteenth St. N. W.                                          Charles H . Pillard  Ralph A . Leigon International        I nternatlonal Washington, D.C. 20005                *a4 NOV 16 All :14'resident                      Secretary OFf iC ooc                        Novenber 14, 1984 S~retary of the Commissioo US Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnissioo Washingtoo, OC 20555 Attentioo:          Docketing and Service Branch

Reference:

Task SG 301-4 Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorizatioo Plans for Nuclear Power Plants

Dear Sir:

The Internatiooal Brotherhood of Electr ica.l Workers has over ooe millioo dues paying meni>ers in the several branches of the electrical industry irx::lu::ling the building trades, utilities, and manufacturing. The 1983 IBEW Survey of its menbers at nuclear power stations shows that over 12,000 are permanent enployees at 50 of the 80 statioos (same multi unit) operating or under constructioo. In ad:litioo, tens of thousands of IBEW menbers from the building trades are enployed at the operating statioos, as needed, to service and maintain these stations. Denial or revocatiai of access authorizatioo is a concern to the IBEW *

• Under the labor laws the Local Unioo is charged with representing menbers of the bargaining unit. Failure to do so is a serious charge which can be brought against the Local Unioo by a menber and quite costly for the Local Unioo to defend. Fortunately, the collective Bargaining Agreement oontains a mechanisn to represent menbers of the bargaining unit. This mechanisn is the grievance and arbitratioo procedures which are a part of the bargaining agreement.

The IBEW has reservatioos ooncerning the potential for enployer abuse in cetivities of backgrotm:l investigatioo and psychological assessment of workers. Such abuse can lead to discharge or reduced job og>artunities for the

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INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS Date: Noveu:ber 14, 1984 Page: 2 To: Secretary of the Coomissioo Ccncern over activities associated with background investigaticn and psycl:x>logical assesSIOOnt of "WOrkers which l<<)U]d deny or revoke access autoorizatim is a'.idressed in Secticn 6 °Review Prooedures*. '!he Review Proc:edures reference the Collective Bargaining Ag'reements or in the case of inadequate a:JreellElts or open sh:>ps (no a;Jreemants) a similar procedure of due process rust be provided by the enployer. The review procedures outliJ:Ed in the draft nReg Guides* Standard Format generally provide an adequate mechanian of awea]. a.rd review if access autoorizatioo is denied or revoked. S~rely, Charles H. Pillard International President CEIP:dh

U.S. IIUCI.EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH S..,taber 1984 Ofvhton 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS DRAFT REGULATORY BUIDE AHO VALUE/IMPACT STATaEfT Tuk SG 301-4 Conta~t: K. Juigochian (301)443-7687 lli! INTRODUCTION. * * * . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . . . . * . * * * . . * . . . . * * * * * * * * * "

1. GENEAAI. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE AHO REQUIREMEKTS ................... .

2. BACl<GRCXINO INVESTIGATION.......................................... 3 2.1 Qeneral ..................................................... . 3 2.2 lnvest1gat111e Criteria ...................................... . 4 2.3 Infomation Evalu.tion Crtteria ............................. . 9

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ......................................... . 15 3.1 General ....*********.....**...**.**.**.....*****..***.******* 111 3.2 Personality Tests *..*..*****.**.***..*.....................*. 17 3.3 Clinical Intel"Yfewt ......................................... . 19

4. CONTINUAL BEHAVIOillJ. OBSERVATION PROGRAM *...*****.****....******** Z3 4.1 Genera 1 *****..*******.****.**.*.******.*..*..***......*.*.*** 23 4.2 O.tQctfon of Bahavforal Change ........... ; .................. . 25

4. 3 Sec:uri ty Personnel *.**..**.*..*...*..*.*.******.......*.*..*. 30

                                                                                                                            &. NONUCENSEE EMPLOYEES ............ .'................................                                                         31 5.1 Accepta!IC9 of Unas~rt*d Access Authorization Granted by Anothar LicensN.............................................                                                           32 5.2 Unescorted Access for Certain NRC Employees..................                                                            33 5.3 Unescorted Access Oul"fng MaJor Outag*s.......................                                                           33 S. RMEW PROCEOORES ................................................ .                                                           35 6,1 General .........*............................................                                                           35

7. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION *...*.***.*.*.*...**.**..***.....*.*...** 37 7 .1 Qenera 1 ........***....*...*...**...*.*.*.. , ..*..*..*. , .*....* 37 7.2 Procedures and Records for Protection of Infol"lllllt1on .*.****** 38 APPBIOIX A, Bls1s for Use of Psychometric Measureaent Instr1.1111ant....... 41 APPENDIX B, Tra1n1ng and Quallflcatlon Standards for State-Licensed Psychologist or Psychiatrist...................................... 43 APPENDIX C, Supervisor's Guide to Observing Blhavioral Changes......... 45 DRAFT VAI.IJE/IMPACT STATEMEHT............................................. 51 Tlllt ,....,.,Ho?y ,airl... ui. n1<<1.i.d ,...,..,.,11paet 111111 tlle INll!llc lo U.. - l y *t.qu of tlle _ , _

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INTRODUCTION Thh regulatory guide describes the 1nfomatfon requ1Nd in the accen authorization plan sub!D1ttlld as part of an application for a license to operate Th4t Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 directs the Nuclear Regulatory a nuclear power plant. In addftfon to providing guidance for the standard Colalssfon to perfor11 principal licensing and regulation involving all facil-fol'llllt and content of access authorization plans, this regulatory guide ities and uterials l1c11111ad under the Ato!llic Energy Act of 1954, as D8nded, explains the intent of tha various provisions of proposed§ 73.56 of 10 CFR associated with the construction and operation of nuclear power Nactors. Part 73. The intent of each requirement Is found in the discussion of each subsection along with an example of ~easuras and procedures that can be used to The principal requfM111ents wfth respect to the develop11ent of an acce,s fulfill the requll't!ll8flt. authorfutlon plan are found In 10 CFR Part SO, "Do**tfc Licensfng of Produc-tion and Utilfzatfon Facilftfa1,* and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Planu This guide is dfvidad into seven chapters. Each chapter addrenes one of and Materials." Paragraph S0.34(h) of 10 CFR Part 50 identifies the fnforna- the key elQ!lll!nts of the access authorization progr11111 required in I 73.56. tlon that IIU&t be provldttd in an access authorization plan 45 part of a license app11cat1on. Paragraph 73.56(c)* of 10 CFR Part 73 requfl"as a background Purpose and Applfcablllty investfgation for all t111ploya-e1 granted unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected areas and vital islands. Paragraph 73.56(d} requires the athin1stra- This regulatory guide ducribes the ttandard fonllllt and content suggested t1on of a pgycilological 1s1a1s1111nt progrBI for all per1on1 before they &Ml by the NRC for use in preparing an access authorization plan for applicants or granted unescorted access to protected areu and vital islands. Paragraph 73.56(e) for llcens111 who operate nuclear power plants. By using this guide as a bash requires a continual observation progrlllll that l!!Onitor, the behavior of *loyees for preparing an access authorization plan, the applicant or licensee will after unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected areas and vital Islands reduce the chance of subllitting an inc0111pleta plan. Preparation of an acCMs has betn granted. In addition, paragraphs 73.56(f), (g), and (h) contain provl-authorization plan in confoMl!llnce with this guide wfll as1i5t the NRC asse11S111nt sio1111 for granting une&corted access authorfzatfon to protected arau and vital of the plan and will standardize the lic1nsing and ravfew procesa. Confol"ll8nce hlandll to temporary M1Ploya-e1, for a review procedure for individuals whose wfth this guide Is not required by the NRC. An applicant or licensee eay use unucorted accau authorization h revoked, end for protecting personal infol'llll.- an alternative plan. Thh standard foMMt and content guide represents a tlon generated as part of the access authorfzatfon program, respectively. fol'!lat acceptable to the NRC and describes the infomatfon needed for the review of the access authorization plan. Additional infol'llliition 1111y be required Arr, infonution collection actfvltlas 1111ntfoned in this draft regulatory for c:0111pletlng the staff reviw of a particular plan and should be inclllded ff guide aM! contained as requiN1111ents In the proposed asend!llents to 10 CFR Part 73 appropriate. It is the applicant'1 or licensee's responsibility to maintain an that would provide the regulatory bash for this guide. The proposed 8118ncil!ents awareness of new and revhed NRC regulatfons that may influence its Hcenn. have be:en sublllftted to the Office of Management and Budget for clearanc, that IIIY be appropriate under the Paperwork Rtductfon Act. Such clearanc*, ff This standard fon14t and content guide has been prepared as an aid to obtained, would also apply to any lnfonN.tion collection activities mentioned unffol'llity and CO!ll)leteness In the preparation and review of the access author-In thh guide. ization section of the license appllcatlon. The infoT'11111tfon in this guide will help the applicant or licensee prepara an access authorization progralll designed to reduce the opportunity for an individual who it b11haviorally unreliable to All referencu to I 73. 56 of 10 CFR Part 73 in thh draft regulatory gufda gain authorized unescortad access to nuclear power plant protected areas and rafer to the proposed vel"S1on that was published for cc.-ent on August 1, 1984 (49 FR 30735). vital islands. Specific: procedures, criteria, and measures delineated fn I 73.56 of 10 CFR Part 73 are Intended to ensure that the appropriate progr41115 y vi

and 11easuna are 111Pltlllllnted. If the applicant or l1c:1mH1 believes that th* Style and CO!llf)Osit1on c11'CUlll5tances are such ~t certain procedures, criteria, or 111&Uures are not needed or that they uy be replaced by others without coopr09fs1ng the intewity A tabla of contents should be included fn aach suh11fttal. of the progr11111, the appl fcant or licensee h encouraged to address specific departures fl'CII then provisions in the application for a lfc1n1e. Information The applicant or licensee should provide II clear, concfsa presentation of or procedures delineated in any of the regulatory guides in Dlvfsion 5, *"ate-- infol"lllltion. Ccnfusing or siguous statements and 99neral stateaenu of fntent rials and Plant Protection, w nlSY be incorporated by reference in the appropriate should be avoided. Deffnftfons and abbreviation5 should be consistent throughout sections of the plan. the sub!lfttal and should confor to generally accepted usaga. The appl fcant or llcensu should subllit the access authorization plan as Duplfcatfon of infoM1atfon ahould be avoided and, ff neces,ary, dfffarent part of the application to the Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear chapters of the plan should reference each other. The applicant or licensee Regulatory Conaissfon, Washington, D.C. 20555. Upon receipt of th* plan, the should ansura that such references are specific and should directly provide the NRC st<'lff will perfom a pre11 inary review to deter111ne whether ft provides a requested inforatfon. reasonably c0111>1eta presentation of the 1nfo1'11111tion needed to for11 a ba11s for the findings required before isauance of 11 license. This standard fo!"llllt and Physical Specifications of Subafttals content guide will be ul!ll!d by the staff u a gufdelfl'lll for identifying the type and dllta11 of 1nforatfon needed. If 11 pl1111 does not provide a reasonably cor All access authorfzatfon plans subtlltted u part of an application should plete presentation of the necessary 1nfoMD4t1on, further review of the plan will confor to the following physical di11enslons of page size, qualfty of paper and ba sus~nded unt11 this needed fnfomation fl provided. inks, and nl.llRbering of pages: Use of Standard Forttat 1. Paper Size Text pages: 8--1/2 x 11 inches. The applicant or licensee should divide the plan into seven sections that Drawings and graphics: 8*1/2 x 11 inches preferred; h-ver, a larger correspond to the chapters of this standard foru.t and content guide. In each size h acceptabla provided th* finished copy when folded does not axceed chapter, provide all the infol'lllltfon requested in the content sections of this 8-1/2 x 11 fnches. guide, and nllllber tha sequentially within the chapter. Under SOIN circum-stances, certain sections ay not be applicable to a specific plan. If so, 2. Paper Stock and Ink this should ba clearly stated and sufficient information ,hould be provided to Suitable quality fn substance, paper color, end ink density for handling support that conclusion. and for reproduction by icfcroffl fng. The applicant or licensee IMY wish to submit, fn support of the acce1s 3. Page Margins author1zat1on plan, information that 1s not requirad by regulations and h not A margin of no less than 1 inch h to be 11111fnta1ned on the top, bottom, essential to the dascrfptfon of the plan. Such fnfoMHtion could include, for and binding side of all pages sl.NittAd. 9X1111Ple, historical data subllftted in defflon1tr11t1on of certain criteria, disc111sion of eltematives considered by the applicant or lfcenne, or 11upple-11111ntary data regarding aulllled IIOdels, data, or calculatfon1. Thh infon111tion should be provided in an appendix to the plan. vii vfff

4. Printing Public Disclosure Col!position: text pages should be single spaced.

Type face and style: IIIUSt be suitable for 11iCTOfilming. Reproduction: 111ay be mechanically or photographically rei;roducad. All Any proprietary or clusified infol'118tion should be clearly identified and 1ubalitteo in separate enclosures. Each such sutlllittal of proprietary informa-pages of the taxt may be printed on both sides, and ill!gH should be tion should request axemption frora public disclosure, as requlrtd in para-printed head to head. graph 2.790(b) of 10 CFR Part 2.

5. Bindings Pages should be punchad for 3-hole loose-leaf ring binding.

6. Page Nllllbering Pages should be llUllbered by chapter and saquentially within tha chaptar.

Do not ntmber tha entire plan sequentially (this entire Standard Fonuat has been m.111bered sequentially because the indfvidual chapters were too short for sequential nuabaring within each chapter to be naningful). Procedures for Updating or Reviling Pages The updating or revhing of data and text should be on a replac8119nt page bash. The changes or reviled portion of each page should be hlghl ighted by a vertical line. The lfne should be on the Mrgin opposite the binding 11argin for each lina changad or added. All pages subaitted to update, revise, or add pages to the report ere to show the date of change. The tran111ittal latter should include an index page lfsting the pages to be inserted and the paga1 to be remved. When ujor changes or additions are lllllde, pages for a revised uble of contenu should be provided. Ni.aber of Copies The applicant should subllit three copi111 of each required subaittal. ix X

1. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE AHO REQUIREMENTS of free speech, free a111ociation, and privacy, should be of primary concern to the licensee in the developaent and iaiplNQfltation of the access authorization This chapter provides guidance on 1188ting the requirBllentl of para- p~a111.

graph 73.56{b) of 10 CFR Part 73, which are as follows: Content (b) Th* licensee shall eatabli1h and maintain an access authorization progi-am which has as its objective preventing unescorted acceu to protected In this section, the licensee should: areas and vital islands to those individuals whose history, psychological profile or changes in behavioral patterns indicate a potential for c011111itting acts that

1. Describe the general parfofflance objective and intent of the access are inimical to the public health and safety or preaent a danger to life or authorization progr1111.

property. The unescorted access authorization proqri!III sh.Ill consist of a back-

2. Describe in general tem5 the basic components of the prog,-a111.

ground fnve1tigation progru, a psychological assessment progra.m, and a continual

3. Indicate the types of peraon, exempted froa the requirements of behavioral ob1&rvation program. The background investigation progra111 shall be the program.

designed to identify past actions that would be predictive of an individual's

4. Affir11 that the rights of individuals under the First AINndMnt to futUN reliability within a protected area or vital island of a nuclear power th* Constitution w111 not be i nfrf ngad upon through hip 1amentat ion reactor. The psychological assessaent program shall consist of written personality of the program and that dfscri~fnatory practices will not be test, and, 1f needed, clinical intervi- designed to provide personality profiles employed.

and to a1aes1 psychological abno!'llllllities. The continual behavioral observation progr11111 shall be designed to detect certain individual behavior or behavioral changes within the context of the job anviroMent which, 1f left undetected, could lead to acts ini~ical to the public health and safety or could present a danger to life or property. This behavioral observation prograJI shall include a supervisor training program and, ff needed, a new psychological a1ses-nt. Individuals who have received an unescorted acceas authorization to protected areas and vital islands prior t~ the effective data of these asendments are exeq>t fro11 having to meat the requfrnents of paragraph (c) for a background investigation and paragraph (d) for psychological aiisess1Nnt. Intent This section describe* the general objectives and ujor c011ponents of the lfcelllff'S accea1 authorization prograni. It includes a provision for the

• grandfathering" of certain eriployaes who have received unescorted access authorizations prior to the effective date of the rule. Preservation of an Individual's rights under the First Allendlllent to the Constitution, e.g., rights 1 2

2. BACKGROLff) INVESTIGATION actions, not hi* or her ideas, beliefs, reading habits, or social, ducational, or political associations. These evaluation criteria should be used by the This chapter provide* guidance on Meting the requir8118nt1 of para- license for detal'lllining if a pel'Son should be gnnted or c!Qnied unescorted graph 73. 56(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, which are u follows: access to protected areas or vital islands.

(c) The 11censaa shall conduct, or 1111ka arrangeaent.s for, background It is the intent of these regulations to require the licensee to carefully investigations that provide assurance that individUllls seeking unescortad exa ine and evaluate the inforniation developed through the inv stigativa proca111 access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power reactors are and to 1111ke a conscientious detel'llination whether an individual's behavioral reliable, trustworthy, and would act in a 11111Mer that would protect health and profile indicates that he or she 1111y pose an unacceptable danger to the public ini11ize danger to lifa and Pl'OP9rty. As a 11ini1DU11, this background investiga- hea 1th and safety if unescorted access to protect.ad areas and vi ta 1 is 1ands were tion ust verify an individual's true identity, 11111pl0)'1118nt history, educational granted. Further, Utt lic nsee should advise persons granted unescorted access history, credit history, criminal history, military servic , and character and authorization that they should pl'Ollptly report any circunstance (e.g., felony reputation. The licensee shal 1 require that individuals granted unescorted conviction, mental illness) that might be cause for terminating an accasa access under these provhiona report promptly to the 1icensee any subsequent authorization. occurrence or circU11Stanc (conviction, hospitalization, tc.) that ay have 11 bearing on such individual's continued accu1 authorization. 2.2 Investigative Criteria 2.1 General The background investigation required in accordanc* with pangraph 73.56(c) The intent of paragraph 73.56(c) is to detemine if infonetion exi1t1 is designed to provide II basis for d t.amining an individual's trustworthiness that would indicate that the prospective employ e ight c0111it an act detrimen-and relfabflity through inquiry into specific areas of an individual's past tal to th* pub.lie health and safety if granted unescorted access to protected history and background. Areas of inquiry relevant to such a determination are arell5 and vital islands. The rule sets forth a nUllber of ara111 in which infor-911ployment, credit, ducational, cri inal, and ~ilitary service histories. A ation ahould be sought, such a1 past et11Ployr,ent, education, credit rcord, retrospective period of 5 years or since the age of 18, whichever 1s 1hort r, cri inal, and military service history. In the av nt that a particular line 1s considered generally sufficient to 1tc:h1eve this objective. Extreme care of inquiry cannot be fully explored (e.g., the records were destroyed by fire should be exercised in the conduct of the background investigation to ensure 01' are maintained in files not accessible to the investigator), the licensee that areas of inquiry and any unfavorable inforation dev loped relat.a to a should docuaant in the eaployee's access authorization file the actions taken person's past actions and not to hia or her ideas or b liefs. In the pl'OIIUlga- to obtain such infoniat1on. The licensee should make a "good faith" effort to tion of the Acc s11 Authorization Rule, th* NRC does not in any way intend to fully satisfy all investigative criteria. In the absence of relevant infonna-infringe upon an individual's rights of free sp ech, free association, and t1on, the licensee is responsible for making the b st deter ination possible privacy protected by th* Fil'lt Amendment to the Constitution. conc rni ng the re 1i ab1l i ty and trustworthiness of the i ndi vi dua 1 using the infol"lllltion available. Information evaluation criteria, each having direct safeguards implica-tions, should be developtid for use by the licensee in evaluating the collected It is reca.nendad that all infomation subllitted on the employment appli-background infol'llllltion. These crft.ar1a should relate to a person's diract cation be verified to ensure that 11111terial inforvtation has not been 0111itted or 3 4

falsff1td. TIie lfcen11N should ensure that the persona N1ponsfbl* for con- background 1nfol'llllt1on such u I dhhonorable dhcharga f'l"OIII the e!"lllld forcM ducting auch 1nvutigat10M are qualified and trained and that the progr* IIONl than 5 yeart earlier. Thh 1nvHt1gat1on would ordinarily be accc..plhhed utab11shtd 11 adequate to detamfne whet.Mr the fnvutigat1ve criteria of through personal 1ntervil!IW1I with pM1Viou1 apl~ra and a check of IJIIPlOyMnt trustworthiness and rel1abflfty are met. records. To provide 1ufffc1ent back.ground lnfo!'llltion to Htablfsh I past history EDUCATIONAL HISTORY. Attendance at all secondary an<! higher level 1n,t1tu-of t!'Uatworthfnu, and re11ab111ty, the background fnvutigatfon 1111,t addnts t1ons during th* previou1 !5-year period should be verified. The type of fnfor-the following areas: aatfon 1ought should fnclud1 dhcfplfnary, psychological, or medfcil problams and the circU11Stance1 under llfflich the 1nd1vfdual left the in1titutfon1 (e.g., TRUE IDENTITY. The applicant'* present n8Da and any aliases, Social gl"aduattd, was axpelled, dropped out). Educational records may also aid fn Security nlllber, and date and place of birth should be verified to an1ura that verifying th* indfvfdual's nue(s) and data and place of birth. Thfl 1nwst1ga-the applicant fi who ha or 1he purports to be. A pre11ntation of a birth car- tfon would ordinarily be conducted through personal fntervfews with school t1ffate or driver', lfcanse h not considered to be suff1c1ent. A fingerprint officials and an fnvestfgatfon of the fndfvfdual's records. chick with the local police or the Federal Buruu of Invut1gat1on ii the pre-ferred IIIUllS of verifying 1i:utnt1ty. As an alternative, the applicant should be CREDIT HISTORY. The purposa of this portion of the backlJl"Ound fnYMtfga-asked to supply a racant photogr~h with the app11cat1on for una,corted ac:cea1. tfO('I hi to datal"tlfn whether an fndivfdual h ffnancfally responsible. Lff9a Thh photograph should be positively 1dentif1ed by at laHt two 1nd1viduals, fndlbtedness or the fnabflfty to obtain credit lllllY create sfgnfficant 1treu, such as a previou11 1upanf10r or coworker and a pnrvfous teacher. In th* event causing unre11abl* Hhavfor, or ca~e an individual to be 110re susceptfbl* to thl.t the applfcant 1 1 identity cannot be ver1ffad through eittitlr his or her coercion. Ordinarily a check with a local credit buruu and character refer-photograph or fingerprints, authorization for unescorted acce1s to protected nc:H will be 1ufffc1ent to datenalne ffnancfal rasponsfbflity. However, if '""' and vital islands should not be g-ranttd. unfavorable ffrlancfal fnfol'!latfon 1s obtained through tha cradft bureau, the hwHtfgator should attempt to verify the fnfoM11tfon through 1nvHtfgat1on of EMPLOYMEMT HISTORY. Elllploynnt hhtory during the last 5 years or since individual accounts. Such verfffcatfon 1s considered appropriate to ensure the age of 18, whichever period 1s shorter, should be verified. thl.t credit 1nfoMlltion 11 c011pleta, _..., to date, and at accurate u ponibla. The l!ll!)lOyMnt history 1nvut1gatfon fl not pri11111r11y intanrded to deter- CRIMINAL HISTORY. The purpose of the portion of the backlJl"Ound inYHt1gr Irina whether a pal'ion 11 qualf1'.1ed for a certain position. The pr111111ry fnt.nt tfon daa11ng with cr1iainal history fl to detanaine ~ther an ind1v1dua1 ha-I of the requfNNnt 11 to detel'ffrine whether such a history contains fnfol'llltion coa1tted cr1 1nal* offenses of a type that would 1nd1cata that an authorizetion fnd1clt1ng that the person would not be trustworthy or !'11l1able in a nuclear for unescorted accan to protected a!"Hs and vftal islands ay be contrary to anvfroraant. Pertinant fnforution would include any record of dfsc1pl1nary the public health and safety. The licensee should consider the nature of a action taken against the fnd1v1dual, unusual safety or accident r.cords, psycho- gfftll conviction to deter 1ne 1ts relevancy to pi:-otect.ing the public health and logfcal and INdfal racords, the reason for the fnd1v1dual '* ten11nat1on, and Hfety. Although a sfngle felony conviction MY be grounds to deny authoriza-his or her l"NIIPloyMnt potential. The fnfonaatfon aant1on9d above need only tion for unescorted accesa to protected areas and vftal islands, a pattern of b* collected for the previous 5 years. ti-Yer, all claimed N!)loyaent 1hoald other lesser offenses, fndfcatfve of habitual law vfolatfon, !MY also be cause be wir1ffad. Such a verification procedure incraasat the usurMCe that the to deny authorization for unescorted access to protected areas and vital hlandt. fnd1v1dual has not fa1'1fftd the employaent app11cat1on to concMl relevant Patterns of l01nr offen1et used to deny access to protected areu and vital 5 6

f11ands 1hould be keyed to the appropriate tnformatfon evaluation crft1r1a Tha affectAd individual IIIIIY sign an 1uthorh:atfon )Mll"lllitting the center. dhcuned in S.Ct1on Z.3 of thh guide. It 11 1nt.endei:t that the fndivfdual to furnish military history infon1ation directly to the licensff. Each request be protected from the dental of access for isolated instances of unacceptable should be signed by the fndfvicn.ial and should be notarized, and the following behav1or that may not be relevant to hfs or her suitability for unescortlld 1nfo!'1111tion should be included:. accu1 to protected a"as and v1tal islands. However, in cases where the unacceptable blthavtor has a d1"ct relationship to tha nuclear industry, such 1. Nmne(s) the individual usad while in military service, fnfol"lllltfon alone 11ay be used to deny authorization for unascortl>nc1, the 11censN IIIIY grant an 1nd1vfdual an Intar111 UMscorted Accen Since the l!l!)plicant is expected to lht references who will provide Authorization for 6 months or until this 1nfonnat1on fs re<:efved, whichever favorable infoniation, the prf ary value of such references h to assist the period is shorter, provided the other background investigative criteria are investigator in fdentffyfng developed charactar M!ferencas. At least two 1at1sfactor11y 1111t. Upon receipt of the criminal history fnfol"lllltion, the pe!'SO!ls who know the app 11 cant but who were not l hted as character referencu licensee should either grant or deny authorization for unescorted access to should be fdentHfed and interviewed. Inforation elicited through theH the individual. interviews should be used to obtain an integrated behavioral profile of the fndfvidual and should not nomally be used to deny unescorted access to MILITARY SERVICE. The purpose of the portion of the background invastfga- protected areu and vital islands without further verification. tfon dealing with m111tary service is to verify such service and to identify and record dhcfplinary probl8111S and the reasons and cfrcu stanc111 under which 11 person separated fro11 the armed forces. The licensee's fnqufry should be lfmited to thaae points. In this section, the licensee should: Infon111tion coru::ernfng an fndfvidual's past flftary service ay be 1. Confim that the background fnvestfgatfon will include the Jut obtained fl'O!II tha National Personnel Record& Center, 9700 Page Boulevard, 5 years or the period since the applicant was 18 yurs of age, whichever 11 St. Louf1, M1ssouri 63134. shorter. 7 8

2. Conffl'II that the 1nd1Yidua11 who wfll be perforaing the background 5. Is a habitual user of a contl"'Olled substance (u defined and lf1ted 1nve1tlgations wfll be trained to adequately p1rfol"ID such 1nvest1gat1ons and fn the Coaiprehan1fve Drug AbuH Prevention and Control Act of 1970, wfll ba knowledgQablt of the 1icense1'1 1nfomat1on eveluatfon crft.rfa. Pub. L. 91-513, 21 u. s. C. Seel. 801 It Hq.) without I prucription or has bffn without acklqu.te 1videnc1 of reh1bilftatfon;

3. Detcrfb* how fnforaatfon wfll be coll~. and 1dlntffy the types of 6. 11 a user of alcohol habitually and to excess, or has been 10 fn the M1COl"d1 or other sources of 1nfo1'1Ht1on that wfll be und to aathfy each of put without adequate ev1denc of rehabilftltfon; and the fnve1t1gat1va cr1ter11. 7. Has engaged 1n any other conduct, or 1s subject to any other cfrcuntance, that furnishes reason to bel1ove that the individual

4. DHcr1be the type of 1nfol'llllt1on that wfll b1 collected froa the 1J1Y act fn a anner contrary to the protection of health and the 1dllnt1f1ed recol"d1 or other sources of 1nfoniat1on, and explain fu relat1on- mfnimization of dang11r to life and property.

1h1p to the 1nforaat1on naluat1on criteria. The lfcentff should evaluate the specff1c fnfol"llllltfon received against 2.3 Infon1111t1on Evaluation Cr1ter1a doc..-nted cr1tar1a that contain direct safeguards f plfc1tion1. The Cl"ftaria listed above have been devalO'l)ed wfth thfa objective 1n mind and are belflftd to be relevant for the following reasons. The HctMee should review the beckground fnv111t1gat1on infonaation against 1. Acts of Sabotage 1nformt1on r.11lation cr1tarfa in paragraph 73.56(b)(3) to deteraine ff an fnd1v1dull lliy pose an unac:Cet)table risk to thl public health and 11fety 1f A hfltory of involv11111t1t fn acts of sabotag or dfftructfon of pl'01)erty fs granted unescorted acc,11 to the protectld arNs and vital hland1 of a nuclear indicative of an ind1v1dual'5 disregard for lw and order to achfev hf1 or power p1ant. her own ands. In 1111k1ng a detl1"111natfon for th* granting of an unescorted ecceu 2. Fraudulent Applic1tfon1 authorization, the 11cenMe should tpec1f1cally ccnt1der whether the 1ndfv1dull: An individual who deliberately falsfff1s his or her application or purpo...-

1. Has coafttld or atteepted to C011111ft, or aided or abetted another fully o ftl rtl1vant and requested fnforation does 10 because the disclnure who ca.itted or attapted to c01111it, any act of sabotage or other might j10p1.rdiz1 approval of the access authorization. Th* signature block on unlawful de1tructfon of property; U.. application should clearly state that the applicant verifies, to the best

2. Has dalfbtrately mfttad 1111tarial infol'lllltfon fl"OII or falJffied his of hh or her knowledge, the copl1teness and accuracy of the application and employaent or 1fte 1eeu1 app11catfon; that access authorization may be denftd or revoked ff aterial f1l1fficat1ons

3. HH or hat hed any lllnHa of a natuN which, fn thl opinion of a or 011issions are discovered.

qualified and, ff applicable, Stlltl-lic1n1eg psychologist or p1y-ch1atr1.lt, or medical doctor, uy cal.lh sfgnfficant defect in the 3. Enlot1onal or Mental Illnesses judgNnt or re11abflfty of th1 fndividull;

4. Ha* bNn c:onvfcted of any felony or 11riM of luur off1nu1 Emotional or mental fllnesses may fllll)air the individual's judgllent or indicating habitual eri fnal tendencf11; relflb111ty. A qualified ,nd, ff app11~1e, Stata*lfcll!Hd psychologist or 9 10

psychfatrfst ~ay M!Vfew fnfo!'llllltfon developed during the background investi- HO'wever, ff available records raise questions as to the individual's 111110tional gation and detel"lline that no further fnfomatfon about th* we11*befng of the stability and are inc0111Plet.4, th* individual should undergo a psychological individual fa nHded before rec0a111ndfng denial of the acc*ss authorization. assessment by a qlllllified psychologist or psychiatrist. Results of the In such cases, the licensee 11111y deny unescorted access based on tl"lfs finding. psychological assass11111nt should then be used by the qualified psychologist or psychiatrist to support any rec01111endatfon to deny the individual acc*ss If availabll records are c001plete and fndfcata an e!IOt1onal probl1111, authorfzatfon to protected areas or vital islands. a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist should use the following crfterfa for rec01aendfng denial of acce&I on the basfs of the p1ychfatrfc records alone: 4. Convictions for Felonies or Lesser Offenses

a. There ls evidence of the fndivfdual having left the hospital or Conviction of a felony or a serles of lesser offenses fndfcating habitual treatl!Klnt center against medical advice after voluntary adrlfssfon for treat- crf~inal tend1ncfes 11&y be sufficient cause to deny unescorted access. Some ment of an emotional disorder or of chemical dependency. State laws define habitual criminal tendencies. In such cases, the State's dafinftion should be used aa one of the licensee's criteria for granting or

b. The discharge SIIIW!Ary prognosis (after coq,leting treatment for an denying the access authorization. If the State does not define habitual emot1ornil disorder or chll!llfcal dependency) h poor or guarded. crf*inal tendencies or the State's d*finition involves cri~inal acts ov1r more than a 5-year period, the licensee 111ay deny unescorted acc*ss authorization

c. There is evidence of the individual not COIIJ)lying with orclel"S for to an individual on the basis of two or 1110re crimlnal convictions within the 11111dications prescribed for major QIIIOtional disorders. 5-yaar ratrotpective period. No attellpt is 11111de here to define a felony; ther9fore, the licensu should usa the dafinftion applicable to the Stat* in

d. There 11 evicktnc* that the individual has failed to follow through which the offense occurred.

on prescribed outpatient treatment.

5. Use of Controlled Substances

e. The individual has bun coaittad or hoapftalfzed involuntarily.

Habitual abuse of controlled substances may seriously impafr an individ-

f. There ii avfdence of the individual having been diagnosed but not ual's j ~ n t and reliability. In addition, an individual may be drfv*n to treated for a cheaifcal dependency problesn or an 1110tional disorder. perfor-a cri~inal acts fn order to sustain the habitual use of such substances and uy be 110re susceptible to coercion. If the background investigation Indicates

g. There 1s strong evidence that the individual 1s taking a medically that the person has been detected using a controlled substance on two or more prescribed drug that could have sid* affects that will interfere with the indf* instances fn the preceding 5 years without either a prescription or under a vfdual's judQllllnt or reliability. The specific effects of such Ndicatfons should doctor's direction, access authorization to protected areas and vital islands be deternfned through a personal interview with either a psychiatrist or qualified may be denied. 1ne presumption fs that the individual, knowing that the use of medical doctor. such substances is not legal, will attempt to conceal such use. While a single detection might not ordinarily be adequate for denial of access privileges (an exception ~ight be a heroin user detected whfle selling the drug), two d*U1Ctior11 an consfdllred sufficient to conclude that the p*rson is a habitual user.

ll 12

6. U1e of Alcohol c. Conffdentfal fntervfew wfth the fndfvfdual to deny or conffn11 the fnfoniatfon and develop possible l*ads to assist fn the review.

The intent of thfs crfterfon fs to exclude habitual, unrehabilftated abuser* of alcohol. The fndfvfdual who uses alcohol habitually and to excess raay present d. Followup 1nvest1gatfon as a result of the interview ff addf-a rfsk by either app*aring for work intoxicated or suffering from the *ff*ct1 tfonal laads have been uncovered. of such use. In *ither case, behavioral reliability cannot be ensured.

e. Documanted datamfnatfon, usfng fnfomation evaluation criteria,

7. Other Conduct on whether to allow unascortad access to th facflfty by the fndfvfdual.

The intent of this criterion is to provide the 11cansae with gufdalines for denying an unescorted access authorization to fndfvfduals who IHY ba suscaptible to coercion to act fn a manner contrary to protecting health and *1nfmfzing In thfs section, the 11cansee should: danger to life and property. The licensee should exercise axt.-- caution 1n thh matter since "susceptfbflfty *to coercion" fs, at bHt, an f111preche tena. 1. ldantffy how tha criteria wfll be used fn evaluating infol"lllatfon For uuple, s011e hocnosaxuals openly adrift their sexual preferences and, there- obtained through the background fnvestfgatfon, including fraquancfa1 and t1119 fore, ~1ght not be susceptible to coarcfon as a result. Unless disclosure of fr_, for repetitive conduct. the fnfonMtfon would reasonably result fn undesirable consequences for th* fndivfdual or extM!IIII ea-ban-auaent, fts usefulness as a coarcfve instruwent fs 2. Identify the safeguards relevancy of any proposed unique applications 111111ted. of the information evaluation criteria, and afffm that no fndividual's First AINndunt rights of fr.a speech and auociation wfll be violated by applfcatfon

8. Receipt of Derogatory Info1'118tion of tha avaluatfon criteria.

In the event of receipt of derogatory inforaatfon, licensee 11&11aget11911t 3. Identify procadures to be followed ff derogatory information h should conscientiously strive to validate the fnfonsatfon, bearing fn ind the received on an fndfvfdual. possible legal i plications ff the 1nfora&t1on should later be determined fal*** Possfbl* steps to be taken fn the conffration or denial of derogatory fnfol'ftlation include:

a. Judgunt on the relfabflfty of tha source of derogatory fnforaation. If the source 111ay be of questionable reliab11fty, e.g., a personal reference, the 1nformat1on should ba confinned by at least two additional sources.

b. Inspection of other fnfomatfon received as part of the back-ground 1nvestfgat1on to discover conflicts with or conffmation of derogatory information.

13 14

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 1111edad, clinical Interview, the psychiatrist or psychologist shall provide, in WT"ltlng to appropriate senior licenset! nnage9Mtnt, a rece>Mendation as to the This c:hlpter provides guidance for 111eetlng the requirements of para- individual's behavioral suitability for u11111corted acce11 to protected areas and graph 73.56(d), which IMI II follows: vital islands at nuclear power plants.

(d) The licensee shall establish and ~aintafn a psychological asses5!1111nt 3.1 General progrea to b1 adllinistared to all Individuals prior to granting thtlin unescorted acc:e11 to protected areas and vital islands. l1MI requirements of this para- The psychological assessaent should be comprfs1d of objective personality graph supp 1ant the r1qui MillHnts of Appendix B paragraph I. B. 2. b of thh Part tests and, as necessary, a clinical fnterviaw. The lntlnt of paragraph 73.56(d) for nuclear power reactor security personnel. This progrm, as a ~lni111.111, 11 to allow the use, as a screening IIKIChanfs~, of statlatfca11y based, ralfable, shall consist of: l'IO~tfve tast fnfonnatfon to allllllyz1 an Individual's behavioral charactlrlstlcs. Infol"lllltlon from these tests, along with axat11ples of the 1nd1vfdual's current (d)(l) Written pertollllllity tests which have been designed to furnish an and past behavior as detemfnad by th* background investigation, and, ff neces-objective evaluation of 1011111 of the 1111jor personality traits which Influence sary, lnfo~t1on obtained through a clinical interview are used to reach a Individual and interpersonal behavior. RHults of th* ;MtrsoM11ty tests shall reCOllllll!ndatfon concerning an 1ndlv1dual's suitability for unescorted access be evaluated by a qualified and, If applicable, state-licensed psychologist or authorization. psychiatrist. The tests chosen shall have predetennlned evaluation scales which a.-. statistically proven to have a high degree of reliability, shall have bNn The tests and the lntervil!W should be based on relevant criteria that are pl"OYen to be valid, shall IIM!ilt th& criteria of paragraph (d)(2) below, and shall 1119asures of behavioral unreliability 1n the nuclaar work setting. The behavioral coq,ly with the e,nployae selection procedure guidellnH II described In "lJn1fol"II un.-.11abllfty c:rftlria that a psychologist or psychfatrl1t uaes should include Guidelines on Ellployae Selection Procedures (1978)," 43 FR 38295 (August 25, at least the following: 1978), 29 CFR Part 1607.

1. ADiJin*ntatlve Hostility Toward Authority, including such behavior as (d)(2) Cl1n1cal 1nterv1ews for fndfviduals whose parsonal1ty test results l'llfusing to coaply with rules, bending rules, fighting with others on the job, are 1nconc:1uslve or indicate abnol'!Ml personalft.y traits. These Interviews or refusing to accept a supervisor's authority; shall be ar:IM1nfstared and conducted by a qualiff1d and, ff applicable, state-licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. The tests and Interview shall be de11gned 2. Irresponsibility, including such behavior as operating equipment to evaluate (1) an indlvid1.1.11l's curnnt behavioral rel11blllty, looking for carelessly, being frequently tardy or absent from the job, taking Impulsive traits wh1c:h would indicate that the fnd1vldual possesses a strong potential action, or playing pranks; for c01111fttfll{I acts detrl1111ntal to the public health, safety, or property, and (11) behavioral patterns which, if cOllblned with the e.iq:,&eted work environ-ment, c:ould develop into a high potential for c0111itt1ng acts detriaental to th*

public health, safety, or property. Based on the results of tha tests and, 1f 15 16

3. Def*nsive Inc0111pQt1nce, fncluding such beha*ior as covering up been etnpir1cally devaloped; (5) have a high level of tast-retaat reliability; mistakes, failing to fnform others of relevant 1nfonnat1on, being reluctant (6) require a professional clinician to interpret th* scores; (7) have scales to Kt without direct orders, or worrying excessively about radiation to detect subjects who have att.eapted to falsify infomatfon; and (8) demnstrate overexposure; validity in the fol'tl of statistical relationships between scores and bahavior.

While the licensee is free to choose any 11easu-nt fnstruaent that can be

4. Adv1rs1 Reaction to Stress, including such b4haviot H bec0111ng shown to satisfy these criteria, w Minnesota Hultiphasfc Personality indeefsfva or incapacitated fn -rgency situations and current chenikal abuse Inventory (MMl'l) is considered acceptable.

or dependency; and A second personality test geared toward the "non11l" adult population should

5. Eaotional and Personal In.!1d11ptabilfty, including such b41havior as be used to co!llplement the first. This test should be capabl* of detecting subtle mood swings, social isolation, disorientation, lack of approprfat* emotional indices of emotional instability and should include scales oriented toward inter-response, actfva hallucinations or delusion,, or extN!lle suspfcfous!lffs. personal 1ntaraction. Knowlldg* of how an indfvidual inuiracts w1th others is consfderlKI a vital sour1:e of 1nfol'tlat1on in an access author1zation progrn Each lfcensea should dev*lop a listing of the criteria to be used by the focusing oh behavioral 1111nffestations of emotional instabi11ty. The Sixteen psychologist or psychiatrist. P*1'11onalfty Factor Questionnaire (16PF) fs considered an accepbble instT'l.lllM!nt for the aeasuretNnt of interp*rsonal Mtlatfonsh1p styl*s in normal adult popula-3.2 Personality Tests tions. If the 11c*nsee intends to usa measurement instruaents other than the lfllPI or the 16PF, it should be established that the fnstl'Ullent used adheres to tha above standards. Appendix A to this guide contains an ex~le of a fOffl that raay ba provided for this docU11ent.atfon.

The intent of paragraph 73.56(d)(l) is to provida for personality tests that assess aajor personality traits for *ach employee requiring unescorted There are currantly s1v1ral cOll!)uter scoring and interpreutfon servicitS acc*ss to the protected araas and vital islands of a nuclear power plant. To offering MChanized system for rapid proc*ssing of personality tests, lllllking do this, a collb1nation of per110Mlfty tests is rec~d. Each of these thll t*sts attractive to organizations screening large nlllbbers of applicants. tests should contribute to the ability to predict tmotional instability in a The NRC haa no objection to 1111chan1zed scoring of such tests: howaver, para-unique way with 11fnf al redundancy. graph 73.56(d)(l) requires that the written personality tasts always be fnter-preud by a qu.alffied psychiatrist or psychologist. Appendix B to this guide A psychiatric population should b* the nona for on* teat. It would thus contains the C011111iss1on's reconmendat1on for the mini111U111 qualifications for the be geared toward "abnormil" behavioral pattarns. This test should be able to psychologist or psychiatrist. Ell!)hasis should be placed on the professioMl's detact those fndividuals on a lll0derata-to-extrtll4! range of a.itfonal instability, ****sYM!nt expertise and fu1liar1ty with the U1ployed population so that the including those who aight otherwise be able to conceal their unstable tendencies profess1onal's recOOllllendatlons are as job relevant as possible. Whenever test 1f they were not subjected to the ust. Th* intent of this regulation is that scoras fall outside nomal limits, or when the validity lrn:lfcators s1.J9QBst the personality inventories used - t the fol lowing sundards: They should (1) invalid results, thll 1111ployu should be given~ clinical interview. be written, objective tests with statistically validatad scores; (2) y1eld fnfo!'llllltion relevant to th* types of behavioral unreliability critaria listed above; (3) have scores that can *asily bl verified by a ,econd p*rson; (4) have 17 18

held, job cheng11, auigments, and relationshfps with p11trs and superiors; (3) currant lffe cfre1a11tanc11 such 11 job respon1fbflitf11, f*fly C(!laftllents, In thfs section, the 11c1n1ee should: the presence of stress or pres1uM1 fn the fndivfdual'* life, leisure tiae pursuits, 1111 of alcohol or drugs, the fndfvidual's 1atf1faction with hf1 or her

1. Provide the behavioral relfabilfty criteria to be used by the qua11f1ed life role, and 1elf-confidenca; (4) other topfc1 indfcatad by the personality and/or Stata-1fcen1ed psychiatrht or p1ychologht to deter11fne whether an fndf- inventories 1uch as accidents on and off the job, dfff1cu1ty with anger, control vidual '** emotional inst.abflfty h sufficient cause to d&ny acce11 *uthorizatfon. of impulses, ability to follow stringent rules and regulations, d1sclpllnary situations on the job or 1n the 11flitary, and health problams;* and (5) the indi-

2. Dhcuss the personality tests to be used. If tests other than the vidual's verbal and nonverbal behavior fn the intel"Yfew itself. The clfnicfan ltl'I and the l6PF aM1 used, provide* filled-out copy of the fol'II provided in 1hould investigate only areas that are relevant to the behavtoral reliab111ty Appendix A. crftarfa. The clfnicfan should also fntlrpret the Individual profiles on the personality 1nventor111 at the clo11 of the int1l"Yfew and may 1ndfcate any

3. Discun how tlMil personality tuts wfl 1 be scored and interpMlted. tentative lnterpret.tfon1.

4. Provide the acade!lfc and 8l!J)er1ence requfrments for th* Stata- Following the interview, the clfnfcfan should review and conpare the test 11censed psychfatrfst or psychologist. data and interview data to the criteria for behnforal unrel.1abi 11ty. If, In the clinfcfan 1 1 judgment, sufficient doubt exists about the individual's 3.3 Clinical Interviews 1tabflfty 1n tha job envfrol'lllflnt, a written rec~atfon 1hould be given to the senfor 11111nav-nt person, fncludfng a statecent gfvfng the bllsfs for th1 l'llCOIIIIHndatfon. No other data should be r1le1111d to the 11nfor raan~t person. In those ca1e1 where the 1nd1v1dua1 11 found to be acc1publ1, a TIMI fntant of paragraph 73.56(d)(2) fs to gather CUM"ent and put behavioral 1tataent tQ this affect should be 1uppl111d to the senfor 11&llll~nt parson.

data about the fndivfdual. Thh infol'IMltfon should then be evaluated against the behavioral unM1lfabflity crftarfa and the hypotheses rahed by the persona~fty Content profiles. The fntanfew should be at 111st 1 hour fn length and should be structured. The clinician 1hould explain the Med for p1ychol01Jfcal as1e11aent In thf1 saction, the licensee should: to the fndfv1dua1, as well as hh or her own role in 1111kfng an objective evalua-tion and rec-ndatfon. Toa clfnfcfan should also provfdll the indhfdual 1. Discuss the structure of the c11nfcal fntervf~ to be perfonaed. infol"Ntion on thl confidant1a11ty of the test profiles and interview data and should clearly stata exactly llfflat fnfol'lllltfon will be forwarded to the appro- 2. Describe how fncon1fstencl11, abnoT'lllll personality profiles, and priate senior NllllgetNnt penon. fnvalid profiles wfll b* althlr conf11'111!d or refuted through thl interview. Throughout the fntervfew, the cl1nfc1an should look for lndfcaton of behavioral unM111ab111ty by covering thl following areu: Cl) life history infol'IMtlon, including f*fly datll, educ*tlonal experf1nc11, and reJ1tioMhfp1 with others; (2) 1111)10)'Mflt hf1tory and 11flftary llq)ltri1nce, fncludfng jobs 19 20

3. Discuss how the interview findings and the results of the personality 4. CONTINUAL BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION PROGIWI tests w'I 11 b* 1ntegrated to recO!l'.Nlld e1thlr the granting or denying of unescorted access authorization to protected areas and vital islands. This chapter provides guidanca for aetfng the requfr-nts of para-graph 73.56(e), which are as follows:

4. Describe the report to be provided to th* senior raana~nt person for either an "acceptance" or "rejection" recOIIRndation. (e}(l) The licensee shall establish and maintain a continual behavioral observation prograa for indivfduah which 1s designed to have supervisors detect changes in an 1ndfvidual's on-the-job perforaance, judglllllnt level, or behavior, and after detecting a pattern of abnonaal behavior, refer the lnd1vfdual to 1enior licensN .anagement to ~*k* an initial decision on whether to uintafn or tesiporarf1y suspend th-a individual's unescorted access authorizatfon to protected areas and vital islands. In the case where the individual's behavioral actions repreHnt an illlllfMnt danger to the public tiulth and safety, the fndf-vfdual's supervisor shall 1-dfately susp nd the indfvldual's UfWlscorted ace***

authorization on a temporary basis and thi!n refer the individual to senior licensee unageinnt. (e)(2) The requirerienu of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section supplant the requfrmants of Appendix B parag,-aph I.B.2.c of this Part for nuclear power reactor securf ty personne 1. 4.1 General The intent of the requfraent fn paragraph 73.56(e) for a behavioral observation prog,-am fs to ensure the continuing relfability of ecployees having unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands. The background fnvestfgation and psychological assess1111nt described fn Chapters 2 and 3 of this 11',1ide are .et.hods of astablhhfog initial reliability and tro1tworthfnus but will not detect behavioral change over t1N. The objective of the behavioral observation progru1 1s to detect behavioral change before job perfoT'!lllnce det&rforates substantially. Supervisors are ln a unique position to observe both positiv* and negative changes In the behavior of their subordinates. The behavioral observation progr-1111 .ak11 us* of this 21 23

fact by requiring supervisors to bl!! alert .to behavioral changes in their to a person 110re qualified to decide what steps should be taken. ~ supervisors subordfnates that may be pre<:ur1ors of a decl"l!aH in the emp 1oyff' s abi 1i ty to must be 111de aware that the eaployea's rights and well-being 11M1 i111POl"tant perform job tasks in a reliable manner. considerations and that efforts ,hould be 11ade to assist and rehabilitate eniployees whether or not their access authorization fs suspended or revoked. The behavioral observation progru should be nonpunitfve to operate in an Addltfor,al 1nfor!ll8tion on behavioral observation progr11a1 can be found in an effective manner. One Ntc~ended means of enhancing the nonpunftfve aspect HRC contractor report entitled "Behavioral Reliability Progr111 for the Nuclear of thh progru 1s to establish an e111Ployee assistance progrlllll. Although an Industry," IIJREG/CR-2076. employee assistance progru fs not required, the NRC believes that prov1dfng a11i1tanc1 to llffll)loyus with identified probleais w111 increase the acceptability It is rec011111ended that each employee be infor!lld about the objectives of and effectiveness of the behavioral observation program. the behavioral observation program, how the progrui works, what records will be kept, who will have access to the recoros, how confidentiality of th* reeords If an eq>loyee assistance progr11.11 is established, iu scope should be clearly will b~ ensured, the consequern:es of severe behavioral deterioration, how tha defined and should Include incidents involving theft, vandalis, or the breaking facility will att1111pt to assist an l!lllployee who has behavioral problt111S, and of work rules. Major incidents should be handled on a sfta-spec:ff1c basis the extent of an eftlPloyee's appeal rights if accass ts revoked. This 111ployee according to existing labor relations policies and disciplinary procedures. notification should stress the nonpunftive nature of the progrart and the Minor dlscfplfnary actions, such as a foMNl warning to the t111ployee, ay also contribution ft akes to Mintainfng a safe working environment. be accoq>aniltd by a mandatory referral to the e11ploye1 assistance progrm ff the supervisor has noticed a pattern of declining work perfol'll!lnce. Th* nployee Although ft is rec0fflllll!ndlltd that the access authorization progru be assistance progr11111 should operate outside other hll!l&n resource departments and designed so that 8111)loyHs will not suffer 110netarily because of the tlll!porary should provide complete confidentiality to 111nployH-S who wish to uH the service. suspansfon of unescorted acca11, th* NRC believes that a lengthy suspension Under no circiastances should eirployee assistance pen.onnel be required to uka per1011 is both unfair and unnecessary. Therefore, the Coni1ssion NICO!aMOds jud!J118ntli concerning th* suitability of access authorization. Employee assistance that a decision be ude within 20 workdays to either reinstate or revoke the personnel should be a counseling, not an evaluative, resource. eaployee's unescorted access authorization. This -,unt of ticne is sufficient for the licensae to review the appropriate fnfo!'lllation and to 11ake a final Another i111POrtant factor in developing an effective, nonpunitive behavioral decision. oburvation prograa ts the developinent of a coMultant/c:onsultee relationship be'bieen the person responsible for adllinistering the acc,ss authorization 4.2 Detection of Behavioral Change progr* and the supervhors. The supervisor should feel free to discuss behavioral observations he or she has made and to seek advice without fear that the subject elll)loyee will autoietically have his or her access authorization suspended. Also, the supervisors should not be Mde to feel that referral of App1!1nd1x C to this gufde contains a suggested "Supervisor's Guide to an individual to licensee aanagement will neressarily result in suspension of Observing Behavioral Changes." Thfs 11aterial may be usaful in helping super-the indfvtdual's access authorization. The attitude should be that the visors focus on relevant indicators of ~havioral change. If the supervisor supervisor has detected certain behavioral changes and ts r*ferring the 111atter notices negative cflanges in job p1rfol"1111nc11 (which are not so extreme as to warrant f-diate suspension of access) in an lfl'4)1oyee's relationship with 24

othaN or 1n an 911Ploya'1 e110tfonal or phy*fc:al health, the supervisor should This training should be 11veral days in length and should involve ,uper-(l} continue to observe the eaployee; (2} dhcun tha behavior with the .Yisors fr011 a variety of departments and different levels 1n the plant hferarctly. aployee; (3} refer the 911PloyH to the e11Ployee uslstanc* program if one h Videotapes and fflM should be used 10 that superv1sora can practice obsarving available; Ind (4) report the changa11 to senior licensee 111n10-nt ff the and noting behaviors. The licensee should ensure that at least one of the indi-supervisor b*lfeve1 the tlllf)loyee's behavior or series of b41havfors poses a viduals involved in the design of the training Is a behavioral scientist with risk to reliable operations. experience 1n an 11sau1111nt progru. lf the licensee hu an llffiPloyu ushtance progrui, SOIIIIOne fro111 that progra11 should attend or be part of th* training It 11 the intent of thfa requirll6nt that the iuparv110r 1 1 re1pon1fbflftfe1 1taff. Materfall lfke the *supervisor's Guide to Observing Behavioral Changes* include observing employee behavior on a day-to-di)' bub. The supervisor (tee Appendix C to thh guide) should be introduced and used during the work-should be fM11iar with the various types of etnployN behavior of safeguards shop so that supervisors understand which behaviors require 110nitoring. The and 11fety Int.rest and IIIIY use Appendix C to this guide 111 a refresher for lfcensH should ensure that the supervisors are trained to observe and refar, this purpose. In ~dftion, Appendix C IAY be consulted when a supttrvfsor not to diagnose. The training session should cover tha problns of ct-teal suspacts behavioral change but cannot pfnpofnt the problM, or when he or she dependency and syiiptofl that 111ay be observed in the workplac*. SupervhoN detects a change 1n one 11*aa and needs guidanc to dtta1'111ne ff there are should be trained to recognize and deal with the dfl- they fac<<t fn observing ch.tn{lff fn other erau aa wall. It should be noted that ~endfx C fs 1111rely and confronting versus covering up for their eq,loy_ll:81. The fact that IIOllftor-a guide to behavioral change Ind not a psychoalatric instnaent. Thu1, super- fng the behavior of 1ij)ordinatas h contributing to the 1afe operation of the visors should not att41!11pt to uke fnferencH about an 1ndfvfdua1 1 1 eaotfonal faciltty and thus contributing to the 1111ntenanc of a safe work environment. ttabflity based on the use of this guidance. JudgNnts or dfagnosft on should be 1tre11ed in this training. The behavioral observation p't"O{Jl'M should

-tional stability al'II norMl ly !Nd1cal juclglNnts and should therefore be          be pl"Htnted u helpful and nonpunftive.

reserved to qualfffed Hdfcal penonnel. Tot Heenan ahould conduct an evaluation of tho training to 110nltor its To hive an effective progr*, each licensee should develop a behavioral *ffectivaness. The lfcensN shcM.lld also ensure that trainers have an under-obaervation trafnfng progr* for supervisors that fs designed to aeet the standing of the nuclear Industry and e11ployff reliability 1111uu. following objectives: (l) enable s~ervfsoN to identify and describe key behavior in the workplace; {2) help supervisors recognize behavioral change; Sup41rvi1ors should consult senior lfc1n1ee nianagesant concerning any (3) caution supttrvhors agafnat att.Nptfng to diagnose U-elvu or their gradual behavioral detarforatfon observed fn subon:linatu. However, tne 1uper-amployeH; (4) help supervisors recognize 1ign1 and 1)'11!1tomt of chMfcal vhor 111.11t refer a subordinate to senior licensee NnageNnt when significant dependlilncy: (5) help supervhora b1tcma IIOrt -re of coaon excuses for not changes in behavior are detected. The supervhor 11Ust aake juclgMnts about both uking tctton with HPlOYfls who show 1i1J111 of behavioral unraHabt11ty; the sevel'fty and th* prevalence of such behavioral changes. For ex11111pla, ff (6) help supen1sors understand the amfnhtrative steps to be followed when the anployee has rude a YU'Y serious !!rlstake and fails to report ft or deltber-signs of behavioral unreliabi11ty are observed; (7) help supervisors develop ataly daaagea fac111ty equfpaent, i-diata referral to Hnior licensH unage* practical tachnfquu for approaching the worker who showll behavioral change; nnt should result or the supervisor should iaadiataly suspend the tndivfCM1l'1 (8) help 1uperv1lors identify 1ign1 of stren 1n thelnlelves and others; and unescorted access authorization and then refer hf~ or her to sanfor lfcanaee (9) enable !IU"pQrvfsors to be !IIOre -ra of their role in creating a positive aanageftllt. However, if the incidents are of a relatively fnor nature (e.g., wrk' envirol'IIM!lt and in ensuring plant safety. the 1111ployee suddtnl~ starts CDlll)lafnfng about sleeping difffcultfe1), the supervisor should doc1111ent thh but shoul<I not refer the fndfvidual to Hn101' 26 'Z7

lic1n11e ~ n t on that ba1i1 alone. Th* MRC rec-,,c!a that fn cases a. Th* frequency of review by supervisort of the types of behevfor where the behavioral change has not bffl'l Hvere and no pattern has yet -rged,

• to look for.

the 1upervhor should consider s~ interi11 Masure to assist the lllll!)loyee. b. The r.eeords to be kept on each affected individual. If there fl! an lll!ployee auistanca progra11, the supervisor 111ay reconmend that c. To whan and under what c1rcurastancu these records will be the HIJ)loyee seek help. In the absence of an ecployu auhtance prograit, thil released. 1fcttn&ff fs encouraged to have sup1rvfsors counsel the einployee. HUREG/CR-2076 contains guidance on how to conduct such fnterviews for perforrMnca- and 2. Provide II description of the trafning to be provfded to 1uperv11ors discfplfne-type 1ftuations. so that they NY detect relevant bahavforal change in their subord1natu. Include a discussion of: For lndfvfdual1 referred to senfor licensee eanao-nt, the deef1ion to 111fntain or t8!1porar1ly suspend an individual's unescorted access authorization a. The topics to be covered. should only be reda after consultation with a qualiffed and, ff applicable, b. The qualifications of individuals who wfll present the trainfn,g. Stata-licensed psychologist, psychfatrfst, or ndical doctor, a, approprfatlit. c. The raanner fn which supervisors will practice observing TOllpOrary suspension of an individual's access authorization should not result behavioral change. fn a 1110Mtary Pfl)alty or loss of senforfty to that individual.

3. Dfscuu the objectfves of the training and how they will ba achieved.

The sup1rvf1ors should also perfodlcally prepare a behavioral observation report for each subordfnate. In preparing such a report, the supervisor should 4. Discuss how the effectiveness of the behavioral observation program consider changes fn work perfofflllnce, social interaction, and personal health. will be evaluatad. Then an 1s1eeslllf!nt should be made of both the severity and prevalence of any behavioral change and a conclusion reached concerning any action that should 5. Identify end describe any procedures that aay be fnstftutad for the be taken, such as referral to **nior licensee 111a11ageaent. Prior to llliking preparation of periodfc behavioral observation r1ports. thfs decision, tl"le supervisor should consult previous behavioral observation reports on the l'IIIPloyee to recal 1 the Hployee' s prior behavior and any 6. Describe the followup actfons to be taken when behavioral changQS not previous concerns. These reports should be confidential and should be dis* serious enough for ref*rral to s1nfor lfcensu ~anagement uy occur. cussed only with the 1111Ployee and, when appropriate, wfth senior lic,nsee 11a~nt, the psychologist, psychiatrist or 111edical doetor, or professfonal1 7. Describe, if applfcable, any eaployee assistance proijr* and proce-fl"OII the Mrployta assistance prograin. dures, or other for11 of a,ployee counHlfng, to be etRployed to attetlpt to rehabilitate employees or to reverse the process of behavforal detarforatfon. Content

8. Discuss the crfterfa to be used by supervisors to decide whether to In this section, the licensee should: refer fndfvfduals to senior licensee raanageRll!nt.

l. Describe the procedures to be followed to contfnually observe th* 9. Discuss the procedures to be followed after an individual has bten behavior of individuals having unescorted access to protected areas and vital referred to senior lfcensee 111an1~nt.

islands. Include a discussion of: 28 29

4.3 Se<:urity Pe1"11onnel 5. IIONLICENSEE EMPLOYEES ~ This chaptar provides guidance for Meting the requfreMnts of para-The intent of this requi1"9lllent 1s to emiun that security personnel l!ll'fl graph 73.56(f), which an,, as follows: subject to the continual behavioral ob11rvatlon progt"am of paragraph 73.56{1} rather than the bahavioral observation requiM!llents of Appendix B to 10 CFR (f){l) The licensee aay accept an unescorted access authorization granted Part 73. an eaployee of a 11111nufacturer, contractor, or aqufptent supplier by llIIOther lfcens*e, or a previous aaployee of anot!Nlr lfcans*** ff the individual's fllll)loyaent fn licensed nuclear pOWlr reactors hai not bN!l inUrrupt.lld for* continuotn f)1lrfod of 110N than 365 days and ff the original granting license, In this section, the licensee should provide assurance that all s*curfty sends to the gaining licensee a photograph of the individual and a written personnel wfll be subject to the continual behavioral observation requi-nts verification of the individual's un*scorted access authorization along with* of paragraph 73.56{e}. stateaent which fndicatH its clll"Nnt validity. For individuals who111 employ-nnt 1n lic*nsed nuclear power reactors hu been interrupted for a continuous period of nore than 365 days, th4t individual's activ1tfu aust be investigated

                                                                                  ..:cording to the applicable requi~ts of paragraph (c) of this section and

• new psychological auess1111nt iaade accord,fng to the requirennts of para-graph (d) of thh H'Ction.

{f)(2) Consistent with tha requirements of paragraph 50.70(b)(3} of this chapter, the licensee shall grant unescorted access authorization to p'l'Otected areas and vital islands without further investigation by the licensee with Ng&rd to the requil'Klen~ of th1s section to all eaployees of the Com11111on who hav* been certified by the NRC to have mat the intent of tM requ1rwants of thfs saction. {f)(3) During cold shutdown or refueling operations, ll5 specified in the facility's technical specifications, ar; required in 10 CFll 50. 36, the licensee has the option to grant a t.mporary unescorted acc*ss authorization to an 1.111ereened individual if: (1) The requfreent1 of 5 73.55 of th15 chapter are followed; and (if) The aff*cted fncliv1dual 11 subject to the continual behllvforal obllervatfon requf-nts of p*ragraph (e) of this section. 31

5.1 Acceptance of Unescorted Access Authorization Granted by Another Licensee background fnvestigation will ba lll)dated to cover the fndivfdual's activit1es from the date of the pravfous background investigation. !.!ll.!!!! 5.2 Unescorted Access for Certain NRC Employees It 1s the intent of paragraph 73.56{f)(l) that, since 11cens119s wfll be 911Ploying un1fomly effective progr11111s in deterainfng an fndfvfdual'* *ligf- Intent bility for unescorted acceu to powr reactor protected areas and vital Islands, eligfbflfty should be transferable. This option is available only ff It is th* intent of paragraph 73.56(f)(2) that certain NRC et11ploya1s such the individual's authorized unescorted access has not been interrupted for a as inspectors, Regional Adlninistrators, and other personnel who require unescorted continuous period of 1101'8 than 365 calendar days. The licensee who granted the access to protected ar,at or vital islands for the effective perfol"llance of access authorization 1111st furnish the licensee to wl\()IJ the access authorization their official duties w1ll be identified to the license* by the NRC. These 11 being transferred with a photograph of the aployee of a quality equivalent eq:iloyees will be cartffied by the NRC and should be wanted unescorted access to nonHl industrial fdentfficatfon badgils and with a written certiflcatfon that without furthar investigation by the licensee. (1) the person wu scruned in accordance w1th an approved accau authorization plan and granted uoescorted access authorization to prot.ectad areas and vital islands and (2) the unescorted access authorization has not been suspended or revoked and fs not being reviewed for possible 1u1pensfoo or revocation. Addi- In this section, the licensee should describe the 1119thods to be used in tionally, ft 1s fncU!llb1tnt upon the employing licensee, but not required, to gnnting unescorted access authorization to NRC employees based on a Couai11fon-detel'lllfne to the licensee's satfsfactfon the activities and 11111ploy.ent of the suppl1ed certification of screening. individual desiring unescorted access for the interval of time (less than 365 days) when the individual did not hold unescorted access authorization. The 5.3 Unescorted Access During Major Outages c1rtfficatfon should also contain the last data that the Individual exercised the unescorted access authorization by actually entering a p r o ~ area or Intent vital hland. Paragraphs 73.55(1) and 73.56(f}(3) recognize that, during 11ajor outages such as cold shutdown or Nfuel1ng operations, 110st equfpgent will not be vital within the aaning of paragraph 73.2(1). In such instances, the licensee NY In this section, th9 lfc*nsee should: elect to grant unescortltd access authorization to unscreened temporary workt1'11 provided (1) all other provfsfona of 10 CFR Part 73 r1111ain fn affect, Including

1. Describe the nthoda to be used fn obtaining, reviewing, and acting (a) 1111fntanance of all security organization N!l(Jllfrements, (b} maintenance of upon infon11tfon fl'OIII another licensee concerning an individual who claims to all physical barrier requfM!fflenta, (c} nialnt11nanc1 of full access controls and have previously been granted unescorted access to pl"OttcUtd areas and vital badging requfncents to the extant that the individual is isstMd a nll!llbered islands. ~ e Indicating th1I are.a(*) to which unescorted access is granted, (d) key and lock control to the extent practicable, (e) use of detection aids to the extent

2. Indicate that, in cases where the fndfvfdual's unescorted access practicable (compensatory 111easures such as the posting of guards should ba in authorization h&s not bun exercised for 1110re than 365 cal1ndar .days, the place in the event alal'II 1quii:-nt is placed in tile IICCHS oode to silence 32 33

nuisal'ICe alal'lls), (f) IIWlintenance of c~ications requiNl!llents, (g) testing 6. REVIEW PROCEDURES and 111afntenance, and (h) 111aintenance of the l"'Gsponse fum:tfon; (2) these unscreened individuals are subject to the continual behavioral observation This chapter provides guid&nce for 1111eting the requiM111ent.s of para-requf-nts of paragraph 73.56(e); and (3) procedures are employed to ans!Jl'Q graph 73.56(g), which are as follows: that areas an<l safety/safeguards equipment that""" acce5sible to unscreened persons are exMined and perforaance tasted before they are used in plant (g) The licensee's plan 1ubmftt.d pursuant to paragraph 73.56(a) of this operations. These l!Klasui-es soould include a visual ex11111ination of areas and section oost include a procedure for the r1tview of a denfal or revocation under equfPffl9flt by knowledgeable persons for tile purpose of locating apparent this section of an access authorization of an 111PloYea of the licensee, contractor, sabotage devices or signs of mechanical or electrical tampering and functional or supplier that has an adverse effect on the individual's 81111)1o}'lltlnt. The tasting of safety-related or vital equipant. procedure must provide notice and an opportunity for a fair evidantlary hearing and be consonant with fundallental principles of due process. The grievance review procedure contained fn tile collective bargaining agreement covering the bargaining unit of which the amployee is a 111811ber will noraally - t this In this section, the licensee should: requirement, and raay be u5ed for this purpose whether or not the denial or revocation of access authorization ls a grievlbla action under the contract.

1. Describe how II datan11fnat1on w11l bl rwle that granting unscreened persons unescorted access to certain plant areas and equii:-nt will not 6.1 General endanger the public health and safety.

Paragraph 73.56(g) provides for a Ntvfw procedure to bti used upon the

2. Ccnffl"II that all other protection 11111asures (1.e., protected area request of II licensee elll)loyea or contractor employee whose access 11uthorfza-entry nan:hes, control of access to plant areas) contained in the licensee's tfon has been revoked. Individuals who are not yet ll!IJ)loyeas of the l icensae physical security plan will r..ain in full effe~t, and describe the fn1pectfon1 or a contractor nHd not be provided with a raview proceduMI. Thi grievance of areas and tests of equipment that will be raada following unescorted access procedures contained fn typical collective bargaining a ~ t s are generally by unscreened parsons. accaptllble for this purpose. As an alternative, or if tile affected individual ls not covered by such II collective bargaining ag~nt or the 11greuient's

3. Describe tile steps to be taqn to ensure that unsCNened teltporary procedure fs inadequate, the licensee ay provide a revfew procedure that workers are sli>ject to a continual behavioral observation progrM. includes the fundamenul el111111nt1 of procedural due procHs. Regardless of whether II collective bargaining ag"81ent grievance proceduN or a licensn-designed review is used, the review of an access authorization denial or revocation should include notice and opportunity for a fair evidentiary hearing presided over by an objective and i111p11rtial person or persons. Such persoM uy be selected according to gener111ly accepted procedures for arbitrator selection, such 111 under the Voluntary Labor Arbitratfon Rules of the American 34 35

Arbitration Association, or the rules of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 7. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION Service, or by any other reasonable IM!lthod that ensures objectivity and impartiality on the part of the presidi"1l person. This section provides guidance for !Meting the requi-ts of para-Q1"111)h 73.S6(h), which are as follows: Intent (h)(l) Each licensee, contractor, or supplier who collects personal informa-The intent of these raquir111!l!nts fs to ensure that the individual has the tion on an employee for the purpose of cOffl!)lying with this section shall fullest opportunity to respond to and refute inforniation that leads to a denial establish and ufntain a syst.elll of files and procedures for the protection of or revocation of an unescorted access authorization and h protected fr011 abuses the personal information. of power and eM"or11 in judgment or interpretation on the part of licensee p1r1onnel (h)(2) The licensn, contractor, or supplier shall not disclose the pa!'11ona1 1nfo!'IDllt1on collected and Maintained to persons other than the subject indi-vidual, or hfs representative, or to those who have a need to have access to The lfcen1ee should: the information in perfonning assigned duties in the process of granting or danying accHs to protactad areas and vital islands.

1. Provide copies of the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining a ~ t to be used to review access authorization ravocatfons. (h)(3) The licensee shall have access to and periodically audit contractor records to ensure that the requir11Mnts of§ 73.56 are being 1!18t in accordance

2. Provide a description of the alternative review procedures, if any, with the licensee's approved physical protection plan.

to be used in lfeu of 1uch an agreesiant procedure. (h)(4) The licenset1 shall 11111.ke available files or doc~nts relied upon

3. Confirm that all procedures provide the due process eleaents described by the licensu, including nicords of audits done on the contractor's above. scrNning pr09ru, for exaalnat1on by an MRC inspector to allow the NRC to determine the 11cansae's c0111pl1ance 1n lmpl-nting 1ts approved plan.

(h)(~) The licensee shall retain the access author1zat1on file of an 1nd1-v1dual for three years after termination of the unescorted access authorization for protected areas and vital islands. 7.1 ~ In connection with th1!I access authorization progru and each of its ele-nnts, the licensee should 11tablish an effective privacy protection progl"IIII that a1n1mizes intrus1v1na11, maximizes fairness, and cr11ates l911iti111te, 36 37

enfor<:Qable fll(f)9Ctatfons on conffdentfal1ty. In all ca111 fn which personal the individual. The information fn an fndfvidual'* file should not be ude 1nfonution about an 1111Pl0YH or applicant h generat&d H part of the back~ available to any other aployee of the l1c111see except III necenary in the ground 1nvest1gatfon, psychological asses51119nt, behavioral obstrvation program, tuterc1s1ng of an fndfvfdual's appeal rights. In those cases, the licensu may or an ~loyae a11istance progra111, such fnformatfon should be kept separate 111ke the information upon which th1 denial or revocation of access authorfza-fl'OII 1111ployment data and general personnel ...cords. Consent forms should be tfon was based available to the individual and his or her representatives, ff required prior to gathering such infonutfon. Aho, the fnd1v1dual should bl any, and to the fnd1v1duah adjudfcatfng the appeal. Random sumary 1nfol'lllt1on 1nformed of the types of l'ICords that wf 11 be kept, where the records wfl 1 bl my be provided to individuals perfoming facflfty quality assurance audits. 1111fntafned, how long the records w111 be retained, wtiat right the fndfvfdual hu concerning access to the fnforaation, and to wholl and under what cfrcurr- As part of the behavioral observation prograa, fndfvfdual supervisors may stance1 the 1nfo!"lllation will be released. In addition, the licensee should be filling out reports on each subordinate. Thlse Nlports should be cOll!)ared ensure that the privacy protection progru c011pltes with al 1 Federal and State wfth other report$, particularly the 111011t recent, to identify potential 'blhavfol"ll privacy laws. Upon request, the licensee should Mke available to ltRC inspect.ors changes. Only the individual's supervisor and senior lfcensee manage.ant ahould any ffles that would assist fn dete!'lllfnfng a lfcensee's c:011plfance with the have acca11 to such rllfX)rts and should afntain them at the sa11e level of protec-regulations. tion as the background investigation data. For the purpose of audlta, random suanary inforatfon may be made available to facility quality assuranc* auditors. 7.2 Procedures and Records for Protect.ton of InfonMtfon Upon tenninatfng an ea,ployee's access authorization, these records IIN!Y be destroyed unless they form the baafs upon which the 1111Ployee was te!'lllfnated. If the licensee establishes an 1111PlOYff assistance program as part of the The f ntent of this requi l'ellllnt 1s to have 1l censees es tab 1hh procedures behavioral ob111rvatfon program, great care fn infoMN.tion handling should be to 11111ft dhtrfbution of records generated in corapliance with the requirecents exercised, particularly 1f the 11111Ployae refers himself or herself to the of paragraph 73.56(h). 81iPloyee assistance prograa. All l'ICOrds associated with the employee a11i1t* ance progran should be secure and treated with the strictest confidentiality. Background investigation 1nfomat1on should be transmitted directly fl'OII If the 911Ployee seeks assistance either through the suggestion or direction of the fndivfduah or organizations conducting the investfgatfon to a designated the iupervfsor, the supervisor should bt perfodfcally notified of th* progress fndfvfdual within the licensee's organization. The fnfonaation should be stored of the Nthabi11tat1on. The fact that an 9111ployee was or was not seekino assist-fn a locked ffle cabinet and the key to the storage location 1n which these ance, either voluntarily or mandatorially, should have no bearing on whethltr records are maintained should be controlled. The use of fnfortllltion should be his or her unescorted acce1s authorization to protected areas and vital islands lim1t.d to decisions on une1corted access autilorization. If the applicant 11 1s sustained or revoked through the behavioral observation progru. denied unescortad access because of derogatory 1nfol'flllltion fn h11 or her back-QT'O\Rld, the background investigation ffle should be retained for 5 years or The access authorization file that the licensee uintafns for each aaployN unt11 the applicant has axhausted all appeal rights. If unescorted access is granted unescortad access authorization to protected araas and vital islands granud but questionable infol'llllltfon was discovered, this should be docUllllntad should be retained for 3 years after the last instance of the use of such fn the 1nd1vfdual's access authorization file. An 1nd1v1dual's file should not authorization. bot trans1tted to a future 9111ployer unless 1pec1fically requ*stad fn wr1t1ng by 38

APPENDIX A ~ BASIS FOR USE OF PSYCHOMETRIC MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT In th1& section, the 11censee should discuss the following for each type of record generated through the access authorization program: Position T1tle(s) To Be Evaluated Dau of Submittal to NRC

1. Types of records to be stored. Thi purpose of this fonn is to docU1111nt adherence to sundards for psych01119tr1c

2. Manner in which records will be stored. mt11sur11111ent fnstrunnts different fr011 those suggested by the Nuclear Regulatory Co111111ss 1on.

3. Place records will be stored.

4. Indiv1dual5 by position or title who will hav1 access to records. 1. Tha selection procadures desired for use by this organization Include administration of the following Instruments:

S. To whom the records will be transittad and under what conditions.

6. Employee'* right-to access of records and under what conditions. a.

7. Length of time recordi will be retained. b.

8. Manner in which records wf11 be destroyed.

If th* proc&dur s desired for use are planned to vary accord1ng to posftfon, additional doclll!enutfon Indicating wh1ch procedures apply to which pos1-tlons (or categories of pos1tfons) along w1th accomp&nylng justlf1cat1on for these variations should be attached. For each fnstruunt listed above, a s parate justification stat.fllent (1nclud1ng relevant nifer nces) applying to aach of the following standards should be Included on this form (see Section 2). Attach xtra pa119s as necessary.

2. InstMM11ant:

Manufactun1r: HRC-suqgested 1nstrWlt!nt for which th1s fnstrt1111nt 1s a subst1tutfon:

a. Relfabflfty:*

Re11ab1lfty (I.a., consistency, depandab111ty, and reproducibility) 1'8fars to the consistency of measurament and to whethar a set of measures obtained can be replicatld. 41 40

b. V*11dtty:"" APPENDIX 8 TRAINING AM) QUAUFICATION STANOAADS FOR STATE-LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST 01!. PSYCHIATRIST

c. Coaipliance wtth Legal Issues, labor Relations, and Unifo!'III Guidelines on El!plo)'H Selection proceduN11:

The following are training and qualifying criteria Nt~nded for the selec-tion of profe11lonal1 to adlllnl1t1r and lnterpNtt psychological a1se11111nts.

1. Ooctoral-l1vel ptychologl1t In the areas of clinical, counseling, Of'

d. Personal Effecta on Applicants: Industrial psychology or a licensed physician with a formal rHldtffl:y 1n psychiatry. In addition, this Individual should hold the license or certification to practice psychology In States where this 11 applicable, or tht profeuional 111ay be board c1rt1ffed.

1. Suscept1b11fty to Faking: 2. Ffvt years of experience in an Individual a11e,_t context, at leut 2 years of which aus1; be p0stdoctoral.

3. At lust 1 year of general cl fnfcal or counstlf~ e,q>erfence wtth an out.-

patient population of 1111ployad adulU.

f. Reevaluation Consfdflratlons:

4. Knowle<!Qe of the nuclear Industry and 8111)1oyN reliuifllty issues gained through first-hand experience, training, or by a special orientation progr1111 provided by the particular facflfty.

3. It 1a understood by the ~ r organization and lnstriaent unufacturer(s) 5. Experience in useufng or counseling indlviul!l who are sl ilar to inctl-that the u1e of the lnstnaenta advocated hire 111U1t confol"II to the standards vfduals in the wrk force of the particular facility.

universally applfcabl* to 111 psychometric *uurement fnstrllll!elltl.

6. Knowllldge of, and substantial experience fn, the use of psycholletrfc and other *aiun*-nt proceduns used fn the psychological evaluation of individuals.

7. A coopreh1ns,fv1 knowhdge of, Ind exper1anc;e fn, applying odern inter-viewing and other observational strategies used to 111111ure fndfvfdual dtffeNtnces In noral and abnoral m.aan behavior.

The UHr organization, upon sub!littfng this docl&lllltetlon, wtll waft for a written Ntply fl"OII the NRC regarding thl acceptab11fty of the propo1ed fnstr~nt(s). It 11 understood th.It thf1 Ml'PlY 111y fndte1te any ll"NI of def1e1ency where fi.rrther ju1t1ffatton/doeiaentat1on 11 necessary. Dit.i Signed Signature of Authorized Repr11entativ* Position Within Organization V1lfdtty 11H111 the degrM to which a prediction auul"ff what ft fl Intended to IIHIUN or IIChfevu fts purpose. 43

APPENDIX C

7. Does the 1111ploy11 adhftre to COfWAHY !Q1fil?

SUPERVISOR'S GUIDE TO OBSERVING BEHAVIORAL CHANGES Staals or da1111ges property Disregards rules Th1s gufde !Jay be us1d by the supervisor as a resource. Listed ara behavioral Bends the rttlH cllang11 that can be obnrved fn an individual employee and are categorind into three areu: work performanca, social interactions, and personal hulth. B. Have you noticed the individual bacC111ing OVERCAUTIOUS? WORK PERFORMANCE: Eliployee's on*thrjob behavior and work habits that directly Overreacts to nol"ffllll conditions illl)act on efficiency and effectiveness of task acc09Plfshaent. Frtezes or disappears 1n an emergency I* overly concerned about details/accuracy

1. Hu the individual's work QUALITY or QUANTITY cllanged? Ooublachecks work too much Greatly cllanged speed of working 9. Has the 1111ploy19 bec011e OVERZEALOUS?

Changed level of work involv11111nt Never takes breaks

2. Has the 11Tploy11 Mde 1110r1 MISTAKES or BAO JUDGMENTS? Cous to work early Hangs around after shift Has nLDerous acc1 dents Volunteers for excessive amounts of overtinie Laugh* off erroNI or raprilllllnds Suddenly axceeds work axpactat1ons Denies mhtakas Unnecessarily condellns self for mistakes 10. Does the MrPloyee engage in a lot of RISK-TAKING?

3. Hu tha uployee' s EFFICIENCY lessened? Drivas recklessly Operates equipment carelessly on or off the job Has trouble arriving at decisions Shows pc.or judg-.ent 1n dangerous physical activftias Often fails to 11eet deadlfnas Gari>lH a lot Nftds repeated directions for easy tasks

11. Has the individual'* COOPERATION wfth CO-WORKERS changed?

4. Does the individual have more difficulty COffCOORATING?

Refuses to share equfp11ent or information Forgets important or obvious things Refuses to takll directions Acts without thinking Refuses to accept help from others Daydre111115 too IIIJCh Doodles exc1ssively SOCIAL INTERACTIONS: Type and quality of lllnPloyee's relationship with work Repeats Slllltl action over and over associetes that My impact on tau parfomance.

5. How IIIUCh ii the worker ABSENT~ THE J067 1. Doas th1 111ployee appear LESS SOCIABLE than before?

Is late or absent especially Monday or Friday I sol ated/wf thdrr.m Poor- eye contact Often ta.leas off half days Shallow friendships Lacks a sense of h~r Leaves work without notice S.1les and talks to self Ovtrly suspfcfous of othen Falsifies attendance records Refuses social contacts Holds grudges/sulk! Takes a lot of sick leav1 Gives i111Probabl1 excuses for absences 2. Has the individual bacoo TOO SOCIABLE?

6. h the IJlll)loyee ASSENT "ON THE JOB"? Talks too l'lllCh with other einployees Plays pranks/jokes Wanders around th1 plant a lot Monopolizes conversations Takes excessively long lunches and breaks Inappropriate sexual bahavfor Avoids a part of the plant because of f1ar Flashes 110ney Gets sick while at work 46

3. Ara there chan119s in the -.,loyn'* choice o f ~ ? PERSONAL HEALTH: Ellployee'* physical and Sll!Otional states that affect work behavior.

Especially for breaks/lunch or transportation Only those younger or H11ly dollinatad 1. Does the fndfv1dual show any sfgnt of "NERVES" or OOTIONAL UPSET? 5-parati set of friends just for drinking or gabling Headaches

4. Are there changes fn the way OTlfER WRKERS react to hf11 or h*r? Surtles aasf ly Cries easily IgonoMI or avofd MhtM.15t Shaky voice Get 8ngT'y with Play prankl on Becoae condescending Joke about 2. Does the individual usa AtCOHOL or DRUGS differently?

Coaplain about Drinks too 111uch

5. Doe1 the Hployee lhow n>re ~ Alcohol on brsath Preoccupied wfth drinking or drugs llll)at1ent A~ntative Gulps drinks, *specially the first few overreaction to rul or Phy1fcal fights Encourages others to use f11N1g1ntd crft1cf1111 T111per outbursts Frequently "on the wagonn Irritable

3. Ku the fndividual had unu1ual ILLNESS?

6. Dou ths tndfv1dual IWUPULATE others?

Claiu large uount1 of denul/Mdical, S110t1onal benefits Butld1 up brownie points LfH Slow reeovery fr011 illness Brao,/sx.eggerate1 Shows off Preoccupied with death or suddenly religious Acts naive or 1nnocsnt BoM'OWI mney Ignores own illness

7. Have you noticed any changes fn the 111Ployee 1 s SPEECH BEHAVIOR? 4. Has the fndfvfdual' I ENERGY illfil. cMnged?

Talkl 1l0"'1Sr/fa1ter Y!Mlf ng Talks aore/lHI Fatigue Stamer* RHtleUMH Fidgeting

8. Hu the aployee'1 SPEECH £QfilE!!! changad?

5. Are yau aware of any changes 1n ~ !JVING ROUTINE? fn ~ ROUTINE?

Jimp1 froa' topic to topic Talkl about hopelHI future Sl1ep d1fficulties Preoccupied wfth sufcfde, disasters, de1tructfon Change fn after-work hobb1aa, ac.tivftfe1 Preoccupied with one topic Change 1n -,unt/pattern of eating Never chats about fufly/fntel'fftl Rigidly follows HN pattern without reason

9. Dots the 1111Pl0Yff have -,re ct>>IPLAINTS about: 6. Kave you noticed any change1 1n the individual's GENERAL APPEARANCE?

Ptiysfcal a11ants Fuily/mnsy probl9111 Appears batter/acre poorly gro0111d Back pafh/11111cle achss Lack of priv11.<< Walks differently (slower, stulllble1) Co-workers or 1upariort Filling out required fOl'IN Change in postuM1 Being ignored/left out Hu stopped COllpla1ning

7. Have you noticed any FACIAL c!langes?

Blushing or paleness Red eyes Dry .,uth (frequent swallowing/lip wetting) Dilated pupils Puffy face Difficulty hearing

• 47 48

8. Have you noticed llllY changes 1n the 1nd1vfdual's .!!Q!r! or LIMBS? DRAFT VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT Shaky hands tqll biting A separate valut/illl)act statement hu not been prepared for thh ntgUla--

Weight loss/gain Cold, sweaty ti.nds tory guide. The guide wes developed to provide a standard fonMt and conU!nt Twitching for the acca11 authorization plans that applicants and lfcan1e11 aust subllft as Sweating, especially nonseasonal pal"t of a license application to operate a nuclur power plant in accordance

9. Has th* employee had any GASTROINTESTINAi. changes? with proposed I 73.56 of 10 CFR Part 73. A value/fll!J)act statetnent prepared for Nausea/v011itfng this proposed section was Ade available in the NRC Publfc Doctaent Roca at the Stomach aches/gas t111111 I 73. 56 WU pub 1hhed (August 1, 1984). Thfs statllllent fl a ho appro-Frequ41nt trips to the restrooe Excessive use of antacids, coffee/tea or other liquids, aspirin, prf ata to this regulatory guide.

cigarettes

10. Does the ell!)loyee have any CARDIOYASCUI.AR dfff1cu1t1es?

Oizz1ness/fafntfng Breathing irregularities

11. Have you noticed any changes in the eniployea's THINKING !amJY!:?

S.es things that aren't there (hallucinations) False beliefs (delusions) Bizarre or unusual ideas 49 51

Framingham, MauochllMHI 01701 (6171

• 172
• 1100 Public Service of New Hampshire NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION "84 ~rnv -9 p2 :oo October 30, 1984 SBN- 729 T.F. Bl.1.2 17.1.99 Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
• Attention:

References:

Docketing and Service Branch (a) (b) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 Draft Regulatory Guide and Value Impact Statement, "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants", September 1984

Subject:

Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide; Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants

Dear Sir:

We have enclosed our comments on the subject Draft Regulatory Guide, which was issued for comment in September 1984 *

• Very truly yours,

                                                  /;;D~nt::::::

Engineering and Licensing Director Enclosure cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List 1000ElmSt.. P.0.Box330.Monchester.NH03105

• Telephone(603)669-4000
• rw 7~2207595 Ac! no* l"' d"'-' d by card II 11

                                                                  ,. y .:.-             19 ~~/'X:_'. . ,

• William s. Jordan, III

.. Diane Curran Hannon, Weiss & Jordan 20001 S Street N.W.                    Brentwood Board of Selectmen Suite 430                              RED Dalton Road Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C. 20009 Robert G. Perlis Office of the Executive Legal Director Edward F. Meany U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission     Designated Representative of Washington, DC 20555                   the Town of Rye 155 Washington Road Robert A. Backus, Esquire              Rye, NH 03870 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516                           Calvin A. Canney Kancehster, NH 03105                   City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire                 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General             Portsmouth, NH 03801 Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333                      Dana Bisbee, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. John B. Tanzer                     Office of the Attorney General Designated Representative of           208 State House Annex the Town of Hampton                    Concord, NH 03301 5 Morningside Drive Hampton, NH 03842                      Anne Verge, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Roberta C. Pevear                      Town Hall Designated Representative of           South Hampton, NH 03842 the Town of Hampton Falls Drinkwater Road                        Patrick J. McKean Hampton Falls, NH 03844                Selectmen's Office 10 Centrd Road Mrs. Sandra Gavutis                    Rye, NH 03670 Designated Representative of the Town of Kensington                 Carole F. Kagan, Esq.

RFD 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel East Kingston, NH 03827 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, O.C. 20555 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Environmental Protection Bureau Chairman of the Board of Selectmen Department of the Attorney General Town of Newbury One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Newbury, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02108 Town Manager's Office Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town Hall - Friend Street U.S. Senate Amesbury, Ma . 01913 Washington, DC 20510 (Attn: Tom Burack) Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Diana P. Randall Concord, NH 03301 70 Collins Street (Attn: Herb Boynton) SEabrook, NH 03874 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor Donald E. Chick City Hall Town Manager Newburyport, MA 01950 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833

COMMENTS OF PROPOSED PUBLICATION Regulatory Guide Task SG301-4

Title:

Standard Format and Content Guide For Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants The regulatory guide, as written, provides a very detailed and prescriptive method of meeting the requirements of §73.56. In some instances the interpreta-tions of the intent of the rule appear to conflict with the rule requirements.

1. General Performance Objective and Requirements The protection of individual rights is a tenet of this company's hiring/employment practices. However, it appears that §75.66 and this regu-latory guide places these individual rights in jeopardy. Any inquiry into the past of an individual, even with consent is bound to result in some invasion of the individual's rights.

2. Background Investigation

            §75.56(c) requires the licensee to mandate that individuals report on them-selves should they become involved in incidents which may affect their access authorization. There is some concern regarding self incrimination posed by this requirement. This self reporting requirement appears to be in conflict with assistance programs which exist throughout the industry.

The regulation and guide appear to be in conflict since the regulation spe-cifies the "licensee shall require" and the guide indicates the "licensee should advise", when speaking about the self reporting requirement. We do not agree with the "5 year retrospective" specified in the guide. Since the security upgrade rule has been in effect most utilities have used a 3 year retrospective. Experience indicates there is little to be gained by broadening the scope. We do not agree with the need to use photos to identify true identity. You cannot equate the use of photos and fingerprints. Changes in personal appearance (e.g., addition/deletion of a beard, mustache and/or glasses) can create severe problems with such use. Problems are also anticipated in locating past supervisor and teachers and the impact of timi on their memories. If the first two people contacted fail to identify an individual from a photograph, should we deny access at that point or continue to seek two who can identify the individual? Once again, industry experience does not appear to warrant such procedures. We do not agree with the need to develop references. We agree that the per-son may provide the names of those from whom he expects favorable comments. However, discussions with experienced investigators indicate that these "safe" references often offer the most damning testimony against the indivi-dual being investigated.

' 3. Psychological Assessment Although we use both the MMPI and PF16 in our screening program, we do not agree with the need to require the use of both tests. The test portion of the screening program merely identifies personnel for further evaluation.

The test results are not used to deny access. Personnel who obtain abnormal test scores are referred for interview to determine the extent of the problem. The MMPI in itself is sufficient in most instances and requires no backup test.

4. Continual Behavioral Observation Program With the publication of the Fitness for Duty Rule §50.54(z) the requirement for a behavioral observation program becomes essentially redundant and unne-cessary. We believe that it should be dropped from this proposed guide *

• Box 355 LA 84-125 Westln~ouse Water Reae'fPt DEC 13 All :26 Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230-0355 Electric Corporation Divisions (JfflCE OF SE(.l\t:TAt1 DOCKETING & SEIN r*

BRANCH December 10, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissfon Washington, O. C. 20555 .. Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rule, 10CFR Parts 50 and 73

• Gentlemen:

Access Authorization Program By notice published in the Federal Register of August 1, 1984 (49 FR 30726), the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced proposed amendments to its regulations which would require an access authorization program for individuals seeking unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. In response to the invitation for public comments, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation offers the following comments for your consideration. In general, Westinghouse is in support of the need for an access authorization program. The domestic nuclear industry has already implemented such a program in conformance with the ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982 standard titled Security for Nuclear Power Plants 11 11

• However, the proposed program described in the Federal Register notice does differ in certain details which will pose major diff1cult1es in implementation for contractors, manufacturers and suppliers.

1) The program proposed by the NRC and the program currently being implemented by indust~y do provide a degree of assurance that persons being granted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable.

Westinghouse does not believe that these programs can provide a high degree of assurance that a person deliberately intending to commit an act of radiologica l sabotage would be identified.

2) As a ma jor contractor to the nuclear industry, Westinghouse supplies many temporary workers to the licensee sites. In order to meet the 11 11 current site specific access authorization programs , Westinghouse has implemented a program consisting of background investigations, psychological evaluations and continuous observations .

U.S. NUCLEf P. r crlf*. TC., .. DOCKET'~, ,,:* ~ :

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                                        '* ' CC MM ISSION
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                                                 ._  \,,,.,1
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                      * :: t,\,v:         ~s i. I

Under these arrangements, Westinghouse conducts the program and certifies to each licensee that the individual has been screened and meets the screening criteria identified in the ANSI/ANS 3.3-1982 standard. The program is further compli cated by the addition of various site specific requirements imposed on contr actors, manufacturers and suppliers of licensees. Numerous difficulties have been encountered in the implementation of the Westinghouse program due to differing details between the licensee programs. An example is the different letter formats required. Westinghouse currently has to use some 25 different visitation letter formats which differ only in details, not in substance. Such minor differences should be minimized. A standard visitation form established and required by the NRC should be identified for all licensees, *. contractors, manufacturers and suppliers to use. (For example, Form D0E-277). The program proposed by the NRC is not responsive to many of the current

• problems encountered in processing contractor, manufacturer and supplier employes for unescorted access status at the licensee's site. In fact, the proposed program appears to establish several new problems. Such difficulties would be eliminated if the NRC regulation s would permit the appro val by the NRC of personnel screening programs conducted by contractors, manufacturers and suppliers. In essence, the contractor would become an NRC licensee under the access authorization regulations for the purpose of screening individuals and certifying to other licensees that the individual identified should be granted unescorted access. The precedent for such an NRC license currently exists with the provisions in 10CFR71. 101 for Quality Assurance programs.

3) The proposed NRC program includes requirements for conducting credit checks as part of the background investigation. Westinghouse is opposed to the conduct of credit checks. Since the proposed rule in section 73.56 (b) (3) provides no guidelines upon which information obtained during a credit check should be evaluated, Westinghouse believes that there has been no basis established for conducting such checks and that the potential for misuse of such information is excessive.

4) Certain provisions are included in the proposed regulations for providing for 11 grandfathering 11 of current erup1oyes . These provisions permit 11 grandfathering 11 only by the licensee and for situations where the time has not exceeded 365 days since the last granting of unescorted access. Under these regulations, contractors would be required to do additional background investigations even for long term employes. Such additional background investigation and psychological testing is considered to be unwarranted in a situat ion where the individual has remained in the uninterrupted employment of the contractor for more than three years and has been in a program of continuou s observation even though the individual has not had reason to be granted unescorted access by a utility. As a minimum, Westinghouse req~ests the proposal be expanded to include the exemption of background investigations for all employes with more than three years continuous employment . This restrictive proposal would be eliminated if the concept of a contractor license as suggested in item 2 above were incorporated into the final rules .

5) The Regulatory Analysis provided with the notice does not appear to consider the substantial increased costs incurred by the contractors, manufacturers and suppliers if they are required to impl~ment the August 1, 1984 proposal. Such costs would be in addition to those costs already incurred in meeting the current program.

6) Section 73.56 (a) (4) does provide for the establishment of a generic plan by each licensee to be used by their contractors, manufacturers, or suppliers for screening their employes. While this does provide a mechanism by which Westinghouse would continue to conduct a screening program for Westinghouse employes, there is a major concern. It is anticipated that the generic programs established by the individual **

licensees will differ in many details. Since experienced Westinghouse employes require access at many utility sites, the effect is that Westinghouse must establish a screening program that meets the most

• restrictive aspects of all the programs. Compounding compliance of the

        .individual licensee security screening plans is the various interpretations by licensee auditors. These situations would also be eliminated if the concept of a contractor license option, as suggested in item 2 above, were incorporated into the final rules.

Westinghouse appreciates this opportunity to participate in the Co.mmission' s rulemaking process. In order to further elaborate on these comments and to better explain the type of problems being experienced by the m*a nufacturers, contractors and suppliers, Westinghouse would be pleased to participate in an informal meeting with NRC personnel.

• If you have any questions concerning the above information, please write to me at the above address.

1 11

• I )!_£ 1
• AJN/ jh

{~t%~n; gerion NES License Administr

S]J 73 tJOCKH NUM8ERPR lfflOP.O.SEO RULE - . , /,~, @ The Light DfJCKMEO USN""RC (,+q FR_ .!~72to) Houston L~ting & PoweF

• P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 228-9211

                                *~ urn 13 run :s2 December 10 , 1984 ST-HL-AE-1158 File Number: G3.ll Secretary of the Commissfon Attn: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Proposed Rule 10CFR Parts 50 and 73 - Access Authorization Program South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

Dear Sir:

Houston Lighting & Power Company has reviewed the NRC's proposed rule on Access Authorization Program published in the August 1, 1984 Federal Register. We offer the following comments. Searches of Individuals 10 CFR Part 73.55 (d) (1) When firearms and/or explosives detection equipment at a personnel access portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee may exempt persons granted unescorted access from a 100% pat-down search. However, a random 10% pat-down search of persons granted unescorted access shall be instituted until such time as either firearms or explosives detection equipment is operational. The 100% pat-down search requirement, in the event of equipment failure, will result in long delays and irate employees. The proposed screening requirement for unescorted access should establish a high degree of reliability for those persons granted unescorted access during periods of equipment failure. Personnel not screened for unescorted access should be subject to 100% pat-down search. On-duty armed security force members should be exempt from search as are on-duty law enforcement officers. The reasoning is the same as set forth in the logic for not searching law enforcement officers. Background Investigation 10 CFR 73.56 (c) HL&P concurs with the commission's recommendation for a five-year retrospective time frame for establishing employment, credit, educational, and criminal histories for both protected and vital area (vital island) authorization. Wl/LNRC/u

U.S. NUCLEAR. R;GUlA TORY COMMI SSIO DOCKETING & 5c .VICE SECTION mF !':E ex Tl !F SFCRETARY OF Tt:!: CO,\\flf.5SIC::

Houston Lighting & Power Company ST-HL-AE-1158 File Number: G3.11 Page 2 We are concerned with the requirement to "verify an individual 1 s true iden-tity **. " particularly when the Draft Regulatory Guide (Standard Fonnat and Content for Access Authorization Plans) states that we must 11 ensure 11 (guarantee)

   "that the applicant is who he or she purports to be 11 through a fingerprint check with law enforcement agencies or a photograph to be positively identified by at least two individuals. To 11 guarantee 11 true identity through the use of a fingerprint check may not be possible. Civil fingerprint cards are not nonnally checked in the review of applicant prints. No fingerprint identification may be possible if the applicant has no prior criminal record. The matching of an applicant's prints with those of a criminal may also not 11 guarantee 11 "true identify" as the identity of the name on the criminal card may be incorrect or false .

• We support the alternative to have a recent photograph positively identified by at least two individuals.

One other method that would be acceptable would be presentation of a birth certificate and a valid photo identification badge, such as a drivers license. Background Investigation Evaluation Criteria 73.56 (b) (1) Add, the following exemption subsequent to the exemptions granted for those with unescorted access prior to the effective date of the proposed amendment: exempt all licensee or contractor employees with 36 months of continuous service without display of aberrant behavior. Psychological Assessment 73.56 (d) We concur with the inclusion of psychological assessment in the amendment as stated. In addition to the above corrments attached are our responses to the specific questions on Psychological Testing and Behavioral Observation. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. A. 0. Hill at 713, 922-2040. ours,

                                                          -~

urg, Manager ear Licensing Attachment MAM/syt cc: J. H. Goldberg J. G. Dewease A. 0. Hill G. G. Parker W. H. Kinsey Wl/LNRC/u

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page _1_ of .!Q Specific questions for public comment on Psychological Testing/Behavioral Observation

1) To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rule already in place in the cormiercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessments and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

• a.

b. HL&P currently uses ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982 as a standard for the screening program. The psychological assessment tool used by HL&P is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and an interview with a licensed Psychologist, if necessary, based on the results of the MMPI.

2) What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns,

• or both?

Consistent with ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982, 5.4.5.1, the purpose of HL&P's psychological assessment program is to provide reasonable assurance that security-cleared personnel do not possess a mental illness or emotional instability which might cause a significant defect in judgment or reliability. HL&P believes that Psychological assessment, therefore, is useful in addressing both fitness-for-duty and radiological sabotage concerns. Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page 2 of 10

3) What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific corrments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives .

• Any psychological assessment or behavioral observation screening program is invasive of privacy to an extent. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to the justification of these procedures in light of their impact upon those being assessed. HL&P considers psychological assessment programs to be appropriate only in evaluating candidates for employment positions which have a critical relation to public health and safety of others. For example, personality testing is frequently utilized in the screening of police officers, security officers, air traffic controllers, and military personnel. In such a
• context, the right of the individual voluntarily choosing to pursue employment is balanced against the rights of the public to safety.

those persons requiring unescorted access clearance, HL&P regards For psychological assessment to be a reasonable and responsible method of protecting the safety of the public. Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page _3_ of 10

4) What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessments by licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in detennining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

• The validity of the MMPI as an instrument for measuring psychopathology has been well established in several thousand research studies. In fact, HL&P's research indicates that the MMPI is so well accepted in this role that it is often used as a criterion to judge the effective-ness of mental-health treatments and as a criterion for the validity of other diagnostic procedures. The instrument is also well established as a tool for overall clinical assessments. It has been used in that application to screen medical, nursing, ministerial, and graduate psychological students as well as police, fire department, military,
• and airline personnel. After a thorough review of the evidence support-ing the use of the MMPI in that context, a 1978 court decision (Mc~enna vs. Fargo, Federal Supplement 1355) found the use of the MMPI to screen applicants for the Jersey City Fire Department to be constitutional.

The decision supported the defendant's contention that such assessment was reasonable since the task of fighting fires depends in a critical fashion on the psychological capabilities of firemen. Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page __.i._ of 10 As part of the HL&P psychological assessment program, HL&P utilizes the MMPI as a tool to yield behavioral hypotheses. Test results will be interpreted by licensed clinical psychologists who possess training and expertise in psychometric assessment with the MMPI. HL&P also recommends that these psychologists also make use of extensive normative data which they have collected on the use of the MMPI in screening nuclear power plant personnel and which they have shared

• through professional co111T1unications with the industry as a whole.

Should the decision be made to not recorranend security clearance due to psychological factors, it will not be done on the basis of arbitrary or capricious use of isolated test scores. Rather such decisions will be based upon professional judgment utilizing test information in light of the clinical interview. Such professional involvement is analogous to the need that medical laboratory findings suggesting a health-threatening condition be interpreted by a qualified physician who also takes into consideration health history and medical examination

• data.

5) What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives or false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

HL&P's research indicates that certain recognized disorders of personality may well relate in a direct manner to risk of radiological sabotage. For example, persons exhibiting an antisocial personality Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.ll Page _5_ of 10 frequently experience conflicts with authority, and display aggressive behavior, impulsivity, and a willingness to defy rules and regulations. Such characteristics would seem to indicate an increased risk for acts of sabotage. Other fonns of psychological disorders would be expected to relate less directly to sabotage but more directly to risk of an accident. The use of psychological assessment, to predict infrequent events, has

• long been recognized as inherently entailing a large ratio of "false positive 11 decisions. Despite the inherent methodological problems, HL&P believes that the severe consequences of sabotage or accidents are such that clear benefit is derived from psychological assessment programs even when only a small number of true high-risk cases are identified and thus restricted from unescorted access. The combined use of background investigation, psychological assessment and continual observation is the most effective means of screening and maintaing behavioral reliability.

These techniques are well established and can be conducted by qualified

• professionals.

6) Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

HL&P believes that psychological assessment can be used to detennine fitness-for-duty. This relates to individuals who are more likely to be Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File #: G3.11 Page ~ of 10 involved in unintentional events or accidents, who are likely to have difficulty in *adjusting to a heavy regulated work environment and who have a history of being involved in events less catastrophic than sabotage, but which include theft, vandalism, deliberate accidents and so on. HL&P realizes that there is no acceptable criterion available for measuring 11 risk of radiological sabotage 11

• Without such a criterion, the determination of the relative
• contribution of different approaches to risk reduction is also not feasible. HL&P views psychological assessment as complementing other methods of sabotage risk reduction. While it may identify a small proportion of potential saboteurs, psychological assessment is seen as uniquely capable of identifying some persons who may present a special risk of sabotage due to abnormal or antisocial personality adjustment.

7) Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

• HL&P believes justification of psychological assessment for this dual purpose is valid. As previously discussed, HL&P will develope a psychological assessment program intended to provide reasonable assurance that security cleared personnel do not possess mental illness or emotional instability which could cause a significant defect in judgment or reliability. If present, such characteristics could be expected to increase vulnerability to either unintentional accident or deliberate sabotage capable of affecting public safety. The justification for such assessment ultimately depends upon a judgment as Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page _7_ of 10 to what constitutes an acceptable cost/benefit ratio. HL&P s opinion is 1 that psychological assessment represents a reasonable and cost effective precaution to help assure that security cleared personnel are reliable, trustworthy, and not at special risk of mental error or misjudgment.

8) To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effected without preemployment psychological

• assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of the screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

HL&P believes that psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs complement each other. Psychological assessment utilizes accepted clinical procedures to arrive at a professional judgment as to whether significant risk for mental error, misjudgment, or sabotage exists due to emotional instability or mental illness. Behavioral

• reliability programs are intended to detect at an early stage signs of such characteristics in employment-related behavior. Without prior assessment, there would be risk that psychologically vulnerable persons who would have been identified through routine screening might not evidence overt behavioral unreltability until after a critical incident.

If, in addition, behavioral reliability were also excluded from security clearance programs, there would be risk that psychologically vulnerable persons even when displaying signals of behavioral unreliability might not be detected until after a critical incident. Such Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-ll58 File#: 63.11 Page ~ of .!Q risks are unacceptable to HL&P since both psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs are considered reasonable safeguards which may be implemented in a cost-effective manner.

9) What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigation, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

• Research by our staff found, as a result of psychological assessment, utilities have "screened out 11 individuals displaying disturbances in reality testing, severe depression, substance abuse, behavioral agitation, pronounced interpersonal withdrawal, and adjustment patterns marked by conflict with others, impulsivity, aggressiveness, and weak behavioral controls. Research also indicated that some individuals were actively psychotic, displaying frankly delusional beliefs or admitting to hallucinatory experiences. HL&P found that some of these experiences were of a well circumscribed nature not reaGily
• evident without specific effort at psychological assessment. Many of these persons accepted referral to mental health treatment resources where they were often prescribed medications. All were considered to display clear signs of mental illness or emotional instability raising significant questions as to the adequacy of their judgment or reliability.

As a result of the behavioral reliability program, utility emp1oyees have been judged by supervisors and co-workers to be in need of medical evaluation due to behavior change, or work Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page _9_ of 10 performance deficiency. Such persons have often subsequently been found to be chemically dependent and in need of treatment.

10) What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigation and behavioral reliability programs?

HL&P is aware of no management abuses of its professionally-directed programs. Most utilities use a system of checks and balances as well as

• an appeal process to prevent abuses.

11) How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

HL&P has found through contacting various utilities, its own experience and polling current employees that the great majority of employees understand and appreciate the rationale for psychological assessment. HL&P believes this is attributable to considerable efforts which have been made by utilities to corrununicate to all those individuals that were

• assessed the purpose and limited use of psychological assessment.

will inform all tested employees that they may request an individual HL&P appointment with a clinical psychologist to obtain personal feedback on the content of assessment data gathered on them. Psychologists will also be made available to employee groups to discuss issues surrounding psychological assessment and to answer questions. In fact, HL&P believes that most employees will view psychological assessment in quite a positive fashion. HL&P believes employees feel assessment will provide them an opportunity to discuss personally stressful issues with Wl/LNRC/v

Attachment ST-HL-AE-1158 File#: G3.11 Page 10 of 10 a trained professional in a confidential context. The HL&P Personnel Relations staff effort has already increased employee awareness of counseling and employee assistance resources available to them. HL&P is aware of no fonnal complaints or concerns expressed by employee organizations concerning psychological assessment. These employee attitudes are not seen as likely to change, as a result of the proposed rule, as most psychological assessment programs are

• already considered to comply with that rule and major modification in the program is not anticipated .

Wl/LNRC/v

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{_;4C/ /:=/!., ~o 72.<o KINO 00CK£T£Q USNRC COMMUNl1Y HOSPITAL ~ (EC 11 Al0:59 2800 E. AJO WAY/TUCSON, AZ 85713 PHONE 294-+PI OFfJC[ OF Cf "O:, , , flCKET/NG ..,is"t J,. r,

• ltANtH t ~Vlr:r December 4, 1984 Secretary of the Ccmnission U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission
• Washington, D.C . 20555

Dear Sirs:

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch I received the enclosed letter fran Dr. Mantell this noming and wish to make a fE!W caments which may be helpful regarding psychological screening of anployees of nuclear power facilities . As a career military psychologist I served two tours of duty at the U.S . Anny Air Defense Center, Ft. Bliss, Texas, 1962-1964 and 1967-1970. As senior consultant at the Mental Hygiene Consultation Center I was responsible for psychological evaluation of officers and nen whose security clearance was in question. Ft . Bliss was (and probably still is) a high security installation - - a popular saying was to the effect that "you had to have a ' top secret ' clearance to anpty a wastebasket". Based on my experience, I wish to point out that there is a need for a continual nonitoring on the part of Camlanders , particularly first-line supervisors, to detect significant changes in the nental health status of the individual. For example , an anployee may be undergoing serious family or financial problems and as a result becane so pre-occupied that (in the case of a pilot) he fails to notice a critical gage reading, or having noticed such a warning, simply fails to take appropriate action and the aircraft crashes killing all on board . There is a tendency to stay out of the personal lives of subordinates unless it is effecting their work. In dealing with high risk situations having life and death potential, I do not think we can afford that luxury. Supervisors must be alert and must intervene before enotional problans effect the anployees work. To wait until the work is actually effected may be too late. The second point regards selection. Having spent 14 years as a police psychologist after my retirerrent fran the Anny, I might approach this problem in the manner of a policy psychologist analyzing a crilre scene in an attempt to "profile" the perpetrator. When confronted by a

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particularly henious crime, i.e., lust nn.itilation nn.irder) the :r;:olice psychologist ask "What kin:!l of a person "v.Ould conmit this crime and in this manner?" I think one could ask himself "What kind of person "v.Ould deliberately and with malice of foretoought, attempt to sabatoge a nuclear facility?" Two types of mental cases cane to mind: the paranoid individual (to include, but not limited to, religious or p::>li-tical fanatics) and the psychopath (the anti-social personality disorder).

• Applicants who exhibit such traits (test-wise, on interview, or in history) soould be rejected. Any error soould be on the side of reject-ion rather than acceptance. The one caution here is to make sure that applicants are referr~ to psychologist/psychiatrists who know sanathing about these two disorders, particularly the psychopath. In my -work as a :r;:olice psychologist, I have seen oolleagues fran both professions who oould not reoognize what to me were clear signs of a psychopathic personality. In fact, some clinicians, whose practice is limted to the usual run of mildly or rroderately sick patients, do not even believe this diagnostic category really exists.

I trust these tooughts will be of sane value to you. If you wish further infonnation or clarification, please feel free to contact me by letter or telephone (602-294-4471, ext. 4564 or ext. 2810). Thank you for your attention. Sincerely,

                                         ~ h . D . , SMHyg Col. USA (Ret. )

2615 Camino del Rio Suite 300 San Diego, CA 92108

Dear Colleague:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently released proposed amendments to regulations regarding psychological testing and interviewing of individuals who will have access to nuclear power facilities. Since many of us are involved in screening for high risk occupations, it would be appropriate for us to respond to these proposed regulations. The NRC has report ed th a t they will acc ept comments about their regulations until Dec. 7, 1984. Since this does not leave much time, I have enclosed the most relevant section of the propoP-ed regulations for your review. If you would like a complete document, these can be obtained by calling the NRC (see enclosed materials). If you have concerns about the guidelines as stated, please write to the NRC as soon as possible. Since there is not enough time for us to respond as a group, I would appreciate it if you would also send me a copy of your comments so that we can better understand the views of our members. If there is a consensus of opinion, we may, in the future, be able to respond to calls for comment as a group *

• I look forward to hearing from you.

Ph.D. President, Police Psychology Section, Division 18, APA P.S. If you have any further questions, feel free to contact me at the above address or at 619-236-6566.

(' LJ. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOS DOCKETING & SERVICE Si:CTION OFFICE OF THE 'T.RCT RY OF THE COMMISSION Document St 3: isl i cs J>ostmark Date _oJU~ ---- Copies Rec,; vcd / ~dd' I Copi .is Reproduced - ;,,,,, Special Distribution /! /./)S.=,-~~-- - .µ.,,y, ~ ~~~

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                                                                                                                    ~)  YORIC STATE ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

• 89 EAST ~ N~ C A<!bH~~ ~ N. Y. 14649~0001 oFFlCE OF c:.Ectn:ti."
• ROGER W . KOBER V IC E PR ESIDENT ii *siJ,i.V! .. r TELEPHONE ELECTR IC & S T EA M PRODUCTIO N OOCK£'l1NG & li R E ~ "2 o oE 7 16 5 4 6-2700 i'RANCtt December 4, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Proposed Rule 10 CFR Section 73.56 and Related Draft Regulatory Guide

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is submitted on behalf of Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation ("RG&E") in response to the Commission's request for comments on the proposed rule and draft regulatory guide regarding the establishment of unescorted access authorization programs at nuclear power plants. RG&E is one of the utilities joining in comments being submitted by KMC, Inc. and generally supports that effort insofar as it relates to all utilities. In addi-tion, however, these proposals relate somewhat uniquely to RG&E because of our existing corporate practices, our subjection to the laws of New York State, our past employment experience, and our unique employee-management relations. Accordingly, RG&E is submitting these additional comments individually to further assist the Commission in i ts deliberations. RG&E ' s experience with NRC regulatory guides has shown that, as a practical matter, such guides tend to form the principal focal point for the actual implementa-tion of most regulatory changes. Therefore, although the comments presented below also address the proposed rule, primary emphasis is placed on the more detailed provisions of the draft guide. Page references listed with each comment relate to the guide; section numbers refer to the proposed rule.

0. S. NUCL~M R~GUlATORY COMMISSIOJ!I DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION

0 ROCH ESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 2 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samue.l J . . Chilk

1. The exemp tion provided to employ e e s with exist i ng unescorted access authorization should be e x panded .

[P . l; Sec t ion 73 .56 ( b ) .} RG&E is pleased that employees with pre-existing unescorted access authorization are exempted from the background investigation and psychological assessment requirements of the proposed program. RG&E submits, however, that the exemption should not be limited strictly to those who have such authorization on the date the proposed rule becomes effective, but should include all company employees with three or more years of continuous service as well. An individual's day-to-day performance on the job over the course of several years is certainly a

• more reliable indicator of his or her true character than any background investigation or psychological exam.

Moreover, valued and trusted employees should not be subjected to the indignities and embarrassment of these p ers onal intrusions where it is demonstrably unnecessary. We request, therefore , that the exemption provisions of the rule and guide be expanded accordingly.

2. The provisions for employee self-incrimination should be deleted. [P. 4; Section 73.56(c).]

The proposed rule provides in part that the licensee "shall require that individuals granted unescorted access under these provisions report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance (conviction, hospitalization, etc.) that may have a bearing on such individual's continued access authorization . " [Emphasis added.} The corresponding provision contained in the draft regulatory guide states only that " the licensee should advise persons granted unescorted access authorization that they should promptly report any circumstance (e.g ., felony conviction, mental illness) that might be cause for terminating an access authorization." [Emphasis added.} In addition to the potential confusion caused by these differences in wording between the proposed rule and the draft guide (highlighted by the underscored language), RG&E foresees two problems with this aspect of the suggested program. First, it is essentially useless to mandate such self-incrimination because it cannot be effectively enforced; employees with a felt need to hide their personal problems would not be expected to come forward in any event. Second, it is inconsistent with the purpose and goals of an effective and confidential employee assistance program, which is also affirmatively

ROCH.E STER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 3 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samue.l J. *chilk endorsed. As noted on p. 24 of the guide, such a program "should provide complete confidentiality to employees who wish to use the service." Obviously, a directive from the company that employees disclose their personal problems for purposes of determining their continued access authorization would present conflicting signals to the troubled employee, tending to discourage voluntary submission to an assistance program. RG&E presently has an employee assistance program. We believe that the success of the program depends greatly upon our employees' faith in its confidentiality. We fear that this very valuable program will be jeopardized by communicating to our employees that

• they are obliged to incriminate themselves to the company in addition to seeking its help. We suggest, therefore, that this element of the proposed program be deleted.

3. The prescribed background investigation poses potential problems with equal employment opportunity law and policy. [Pp. 5-6.}

The draft regulatory guide prescribes that the background investigation to be conducted include the acquisition of the applicant's photograph and determination of the date and place of his birth. Guidelines published by the New York State Division of Human Rights state that it is contrary to this State's civil rights laws to seek from an applicant information which indirectly will reveal, among other things, his or her race, creed, color, national origin, or age. Specifically ruled unlawful are: (1) a requirement or option that an applicant affix a photograph to an employment form at any time before hiring, and (2) an inquiry into the applicant's date or place of birth. Some measure of protection against legal liability is recognized for conflicting directives of governmental agencies, but RG&E remains deeply concerned that adverse legal consequences may ensue if it were to follow these procedures, especially if it is expected to do so on only the authority of the NRC's "guidance." RG&E is also concerned about the requirement that applicants' credit histories be investigated. Use of credit histories may have a disproportionately burdensome effect upon minority and women applicants if used in the hiring decision. Accordingly, we submit that the draft regulatory guide should be modified to allow each utility the freedom

ROCH.ESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO. 4 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samuel J. , Ch ilk to fashion a background investigation that is most compatible with the equal employment opportunity laws applicable to it and its own equal employment opportunity objectives.

4. A fingerprint check adds needless delay and should not be required. [P. 5.)

The draft regulatory guide proposes a fingerprint check with local police or the FBI as the preferred means of establishing identity. We submit that this proposal will add delay to the screening process without a commensurate contribution to its effectiveness because, in most cases, neither local police nor the FBI would be

• expected to have fingerprints of the applicant on file
• Hence, a fingerprint check should be deleted as the preferred means of establishing identity.

5. guide reflects unrealist ic e xpe ctations for em lo ment and educational histor investigations. Pp. 5-6.)

RG&E's experience has shown that former employers and educational institutions generally will not provide the prescribed in-depth, detailed personal information about individuals, such as their psychological and disciplinary records. Former employers, particularly large companies, typically will only verify dates of employment and job titles. If such information is considered essential, as the present wording of the regulatory guide suggests it is, then licensees should be granted effective legal authority to demand such information from former employers and schools. Otherwise, the wording of the regulatory guide should be modified to make clear that a good faith effort to obtain all of the information that reasonably can be obtained on consent of the applicant will suffice.

6. The role of a criminal record should be clarified and timely access to criminal histories guaranteed. [Pp.

6-7.] The draft regulatory guide states that

    "[a]lthough a single felony conviction may be grounds to deny authorization for unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands, a pattern of other lesser offenses, indicative of habitual law violation, may also be cause to deny authorization * * * * " But the guide also states that "[t]he licensee should not base the denial of authorization for access to protected areas and

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 5 DATE December 4, 19 84 TO Mr. Samuel J . . Chilk vital islands solely on a person's conviction record." RG&E submits that these apparently conflicting directives be reconciled and guidance on the proper role of criminal records be clarified. The need for a clear directive is especially acute for RG&E (and other New York utilities) because state law provides that a job applicant may not be denied employment because of a conviction record unless there is "a direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific license or employment sought" or hiring the applicant "would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public." N.Y.

• CORRECT. LAW§ 753 (McKinney 1983-84 Supp.). See also N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 296, subd. 15 (McKinney 1982).

Obviously, with an obligation under state law to disregard criminal conviction records in hiring, except under pre sc ribe d circumstanc e s, a cl e ar and consi ste nt dir e ctive from the Commission in this regard is imperative. The regulatory guide also apparently assumes that criminal records of individuals may be obtained by the private sector, albeit with some delay. Such is not the case in New York, however. Criminal histories are not generally available to the private sector in this State. Moreover, even if such information were available with a delay of several months, as the regulatory guide suggests, the proposed temporary access authorization during the interim is utterly incongruous with the intent of the proposed program. If the discovery of past criminal conduct is important -- and we do not dispute that it is

    -- then the utilities should be legally empowered to obtain promptly a full criminal history of an applicant, including any pending charges, before the applicant is employed.

7. The military service investigation recommended is unduly extensive. [Pp. 7-8.]

The apparent directive that inquiries routinely be made to the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri, adds a needless extension of time required to conduct the background investigation. RG&E has found that a check of the applicant's DD-214 is generally sufficient. Only where the DD-214 contains information which might need clarification or elaboration would an additional inquiry to the Personnel Records Center appear to be justified.

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 6 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samue l J.

• chilk

8. Psychological testing is of unproven validity and should be deleted. [Pp. 17-18; Section 73.56 (d) .]

RG&E presently administers a psychological examination to all prospective employees, but we oppose the mandatory testing outlined in the proposed program because, at least insofar as our Testing Specialist has been able to determine, no personality test has ever proven its validity for the purpose proposed. Specifically with regard to the two tests suggested in the draft regulatory guide, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and Sixteen PF, our Testing Specialist has been unable to find any evidence of the proven validity of either test in this context *

• Concerning MMPI, for example, our Testing Specialist notes that the test was developed on a population of mental patients who obviously lack the same incentives to conceal problems and to deceive the examiner when compared to employment applicants. He notes as well that the Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook reports that in a differently motivated population MMPI is not valid and, in fact, can be grossly misleading. The same source also reports that MMPI is not applicable for Blacks.

Unless and until mental health professionals firmly establish that one or more written personality tests are valid for the purpose proposed, RG&E does not believe that it (or any other utility) should be compelled to administer any such test as a part of its screening process. Instead, emphasis should be placed on other, more reliable, screening techniques. We submit, therefore, that the proposed testing requirement be eliminated in its entirety.

9. The proposed continual behavioral observation program i s a potentially disruptive influence on employee morale and employee-management relations. [Pp. 23-30, Appendix C; Section 73.56(e) .]

RG&E is convinced that a proposed program to continually scrutinize every behavioral nuance of its employees with unescorted access authorization will have a significant demoralizing effect on them. These employees are already asked to comply with innumerable rules, regulations, and guidelines. To add this additional burden, with no discernible proof that it is either necessary or workable, is patently unreasonable and should be rejected.

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO. 7 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samuel J. Chilk The proposed program simply cannot be insulated from its demoralizing effects, as the draft regulatory guide appears to suggest. For example, to declare that the program should be "nonpunitive" is to overlook the very real consequences to an employee who is perceived as having experienced negative behavioral changes. In addition to the more obvious consequences of a loss of access authorization, employees at RG&E would suffer an immediate and significant financial impact as well because of the company's pay structure. Also, it is unrealistic to assume, as the draft regulatory guide does, that a decision can be reached within 20 workdays in most cases where unescorted access authorization is temporarily revoked as a result of observed behavioral change *

• We are concerned as well about requiring our supervisors to assume roles as amateur psychologists and the sense of unfairness, real or perceived, that their behavioral reports might engender among our employees. In addition to the obvious potential for actual or imagined abuse, the behavioral observation program appears to us to constitute an unnecessary and inappropriate invasion of privacy. Appendix C of the draft regulatory guide, which lists in excruciating detail the behavior to be monitored, speaks for itself in this regard.

10. The provisions in the regulatory guide regarding employee assistance programs should be modified.

[Pp. 24, 28.] As noted above, RG&E already provides a confidential employee assistance program. The program operates within the company's Employee Relations Department and is designed to help employees with personal problems such as family difficulties, substance abuse, and emotional stress. Matters relating to theft, vandalism and the breaking of work rules are disciplinary in nature and so are considered more appropriate to disciplinary procedures outside the scope of the program. According to the draft regulatory guide, such programs are to operate outside of other "human resource" departments and are to include incidents of theft, vandalism, and breaking of company rules. These dictates obviously conflict with RG&E's established program, and the company believes that they are wholly inappropriate and unnecessary. Common sense suggests that the individual companies are in the best position to determine where within their corporate structures such a program

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 8 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samuel J. ' chilk belongs and to delineate the appropriate limits to the program's scope. In matters of this sort, company management should maintain a full measure of flexibility to design a program best suited to its individual needs. Therefore, we submit that the draft regulatory guide be modified to better reflect a need for flexibility in this regard.

11. The formal review procedures prescribed should be deleted. [Pp. 35-36~ Section 73.56(9).]

RG&E is a non-union company whose employees enjoy the opportunity to directly express their positions in any matter to any member of management. This flexible and

• informal "open door" policy provides adequate "due process" protection to our employees and promotes good employee-management relations. We fear that institution of cumbersome, formal review procedures similar to those found in union contracts will endanger the present working relationship and hamstring our company's management in revoking access authorization as necessary to protect our nuclear facility. Hence, we view this aspect of the proposed program as an unwarranted provision and a needless intrusion into the conduct of corporate affairs.

It should be deleted.

12. Unescorted access during cold shut-down or refueling operations should be extended when necessary. [Pp.

33-34, Section 73.56(f) (3) .] RG&E supports the concept of granting special access to temporary workers during cold shut-downs or refueling operations. We are concerned, however, about the status of workers who might still be needed on site to complete a modification or repair beyond the period of cold shutdown or refueling. Because our experience has shown that such circumstances do arise , some accommodating modification to the proposed rule and draft regulatory guide addressed to this eventuality appears to be necessary and appropriate.

13. Confidentiality in the employee assistance program should not be compromised by a requirement to report progress to supervisors. [P. 39.]

As noted above, confidentiality in employee assistance programs is considered important in the draft regulatory guide and is a mainstay ingredient in RG&E ' s existing program. It is with some surprise and concern, therefore, that we find within the draft regulatory guide

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 9 DATE December 4, 1984 TO Mr. Samuel J * . Chilk a statement that "the supervisor should be periodically notified of the progress of the rehabilitation" in certain instances. We submit that this unnecessary and inconsistent provision should be deleted.

SUMMARY

For all of the foregoing reasons, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation opposes the adoption of the proposed rule and draft regulatory guide in their present forms. RG&E strongly supports the making of every reasonable effort to assure the reliability of those employees who are granted unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands of nuclear power plants. We do

• not believe, however, that the present proposals are best designed to achieve that goal.

Background investigations are undeniably important in granting unescort e d acc ess authorization, but the proposed rules and guidelines, which dictate the precise nature and extent of such investigations in every case, are unjustified. They represent an unnecessary infringement upon the province of management and may, in fact, prove detrimental to safety and other goals by removing flexibility in the best use of screening resources, adding needless delay to the deployment of necessary personnel, and creating problems in providing equal employment opportunities. The prescribed psychological assessment is similarly unwarranted. With only a speculative, unproven contribution toward improving the screening process, this requirement needlessly adds costs and delay to the hiring process. Also with at best unproven benefits , the proposed behavioral observation program and prescriptions regarding employee assistance programs are potentially demoralizing and may tend to undermine the goodwill, trust, and open communication which characterize our present employee-management relations. These harmful consequences might be expected to have adverse effects on safety and efficiency as well. Our company already conducts its nuclear operations with effective access authorization screening and related behavioral observation and employee assistance programs. With 15 years of experience to guide us, and proven success with our existing programs, we see no need for the sort of detailed regulatory restrictions now being

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP . SHEET NO . 10 DATE December 4, 19 84 TO Mr. Samuel J.* Chilk proposed. Accordingly, we submit that the presently proposed rule and draft regulatory guide be rejected and the matter of unescorted access authorization reconsidered in light of the comments set forth above. Your careful consideration of these comments is appreciated *

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{_M Ffl 8072-~J (',4-q Fil 3fJ 73.s) .*, (_,4q !=I! &a 73f'J *** Was ington Public Power Supply System DOC;Kt.T,o 3000 George Washington Way P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 (509)3~.Moo December 3, 1984 602-84-629 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .. Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Subject:

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES 10CFR PART 73

• On 27 July, 1984, the Commission published three proposed rules concerning physical protection of nuclear power plants. The Washington Public Power Supply System, an NRC Licensee, has reviewed these proposed rules and offers the following co11111ents for your consideration.

In general, we support the need for rulemaking with respect to vital island protection concepts (10CFR73.2), entry searches (10CFR 73.55) and Access Authorization Programs (10CFR 73.55). We are concerned, however, that the proposed access authorization requirements (10CFR73.56) place a significant administrative burden on plant licensees with no objective evidence that program effectiveness is increased. At present, we have an established screening program based on ANSI Nl8.17 - 1973, which we consider to be a workable, effective program. If the Commission feels that there is a need to codify access

• authorization programs, then we suggest that the rule adopt ANSI Nl8.17 - 1973 as the required program. This would establish a consistent program throughout the industry and reduce licensee liability concerns inherent in denying plant access.

Provisions such as credit checks, multiple psychological assessment and formal grievance procedures add to licensee costs and delay granting of access authorization while providing negligible and intangible benefits. The regulatory analysis associated with this proposed rule indicates a net initial cost to the NRC due to time spent in reviewing proposed Access Authorization Plans of $510,000 with an estimated annual cost impact of $211,000. The net cost increase per applicant and licensee in implementing these requirements is estimated (by NRC) to be $155,000 initially and $348,000 per year thereafter. Past experience with NRC cost estimates has shown their estimates to be low in most cases so actual costs may well be considerably higher than estimated. In any case, we see no overriding benefit which would justify these costs and consider them to be a waste of taxpayer and ratepayer monies.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Page Two The Commission has recently been discussing the issue of "fitness for duty with industry representatives through NUMARC. We recommend that 11 details of an access authorization program consistent with ANSI NlB.17 be developed by the industry through NUMARC/INPO and that the proposed 11 10CFR73.56 be eliminated along with the recently proposed Standard Fonnat and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants (Draft Regulatory Guide, Task SG 301-4, September 1984). 11 Detailed comments on the proposed rules are attached. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these proposals. Very truly yours,

 /~~

G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs GCS/kd

Attachment:

As stated

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE MAKING 10CFR73.2 73.2 (nn) No Conment 10 CFR 73.55 73.55 (a) No Conment 73.55 (c)(l) Last sentence - Reference to 11 onsite water supplies (excluding piping) required for achieving plant hot shutdown or hot standby" is taken to mean pumping equipment and controls and not the actual water supply. For example, the standby service water pumphouses would be protected but the actual Spray Ponds would not. It would be impossible to physically protect the ponds themselves.

• 73.55 (d) (7) (i) (D) Revise to read "Lock and protect by an active intrusion alann system unoccupied vital islands and all doors into vital islands which are not otherwise control 1ed. 11 Comment: Locking and alarming all exterior doors which may ultimately lead to a vital island is not practical or necessary. This would, in many cases, require the locking and alarming of every exterior door to the entire plant island.

73.55 (d) (7) (if) (B) Revise to read: 11 Revfew physical security plans and contingency plans and procedures annually to evaluate their potential impact on plant and personnel safety." Comment: All new plans and procedures and revisions thereto are reviewed for safety impact by plant POC's. Therefore, an annual overall review fs more th an adequate. The term *periodf c" f s not an enforceab1e ti me frame.

73. 55 (d) ( 9) In the 1st sentence; delete: 11 or inadequate work performance"

• Comment: Inadequate work perfonnance fs not automatically cause to suspect that an individual is fn any way motivated to compromise key/lock security. A dfstfnctfon between misconduct and inability to perform fs a prerequisite to establishing one's trustworthiness and relfabflicy.

73.55 (e) (1) Revise the last sentence to read: "On site secondary power supplies (excluding distribution systems) for alann annunciator equipment and non portable connnunications equipment located in the central and secondary alann stations as required in paragraph (f) of this section must be located within vital islands."

I 10 CFR73.56: General Comnents

1. Our experience indicates that the vast majority of utilties currently have in place consistent programs addressing the bulk of those items proposed by 10CFR 73.56. Background investigations and psychological assessment based upon ANSI Nl8.17 are almost universally employed.

Elements of 10CFR 73.56 which are not widely implemented are: 1) verification of true identity as proposed in the rule; 2) establishment of a formal "due process II appeals mechanism; 3) automatic credit verification 4) use of multiple psychological assessments in addition to MMPI; 5) granting of unescorted access to unscreened individuals during outages, and 6) a requirement for individuals to report to the licensee any derogatory information which may influence access authorization status. With the exception of item 5, which is ,sorely needed and would not reduce program effectiveness, the remaining items offer no significant improvement in program efficacy and would increase the time and expense required to screen personnel.

2. Within Washington State, a number of civil liability concerns are raised by specific elements of the proposed rule. These stem, in part, from the fact that once again the NRC is attempting to impose a duzy upon the licensee to exclude certain individuals from access to, and therefore employment at, a licensed facility,. without granting the licensee any legal authority for such action.

(1) Washington law prohibits use of misdemeanor convictfons to establish a "history of habitual criminal tendencies" and further requires that any felony conviction be directly related to the job applied for, i.e. a bank teller with previous embezzlement charges could be denied employment. To be categorfed as a habitual offender a minimum of 3, rather than 2, felony convictions are required. (2) Washfngon law specf ff cal ly prohibits requestf ng a "photograph mandatorfly or optionally at any time before hfrf ng. 11 (3) Washington law specifically prohibits requests for "type or condition of military discharge" prior to or as a condition of employment * (4) The professional psychological assessment service used by the Supply System evaluates applicants against criteria furnished by the Supply System from 10CFR Part 73, Appendix Band ANSI Nl8.17. The psychological consultant has refused to confirm the validity of these criteria in court. This leaves the licensee in the position of establishing the validity of criteria imposed by the NRC under 10CFR 73.56 and the proposed Regulatory Guide SG 301-4 without any legal authority or professional objective rationale. (5) The proposed rule exempts NRC officials from the screening criteria of 10CFR 73.56. This fs blatantly discriminatory and forms the basis for a rash of union grievances and/or class action suft,'s.

Items 1 thru 5 are at odds with specific requirements of the proposed rule and pl ace an unacceptable liability with the licensee. This may be overcome only if; 1) the law specifically grants authority to the licensee to implement this proposal and idemnifies the licensee for such action, or; (2) the NRC assumes the responsibility for implementing this program as a federal agency, similar to the military clearance program

• 10CFR 73.56: Specific Conwnents

1. Page 27, 73.55 (d) (i) (1) (2) (3) These elements authorize licensees to grant temporary access authorizations during refueling and maintenance outages. This authority is much needed and will allow prompt access for craft personnel who are transient in nature and, therefore, difficult to screen effectively. This provision does not reduce security effectiveness since the reactor is in cold shutdown and search and test procedures assure that no sabotage has occurred prior to restart.

2. Page 28, 73.56 (a) (4) This section makes the licensee responsible for contractor performance under 73.56. Since the purpose of the rule is to provide unifonn application of screening throughout the industry, each entity which perfonns screening (not just licensees) should be required to submit an access authorization plan to the NRC for approval. This places responsibility for enforcement where it belongs, with the federal regulatory authority. Absent such a requirement, each licensee will have to perform screening for all personnel or risk a penalty because of poor

• contractor performance
• Page 29, 73.56 (b) (3) (i) Suggest an addition of the words: "or incitement to violently resist or unlawfully alter established legal authority."

Page 30, 73.56 (b) (3) (iv) This wording violates state law in that "any felony" may not be job related and "lesser offenses" (which means misdemeanors) may not be used to define "habitual criminal tendencies". Suggest the words:~as been convicted of a felony involving violence, destruction of property, arson, or other crime which significantly relates to the individual's ability to perform nulear reactor plant assignments in a trustworthy and rel fable manner." Page 30, 73.56 (b) (3) (v) and (vi) The words "habitual user" should be defined or deleted. The regulatory guide defines as a habitual user an individual identified using a drug on 2 or more occassions. This does not conform to psychological criteria which define "habitual" in terms of frequency of use and psychological/physiological dependency. Page 30, 73.56 (b) (3) (vii) This section is entirely too vague and unenforceable in an objective way. It invites abuse and should be deleted. Page 30 (c) Background Investigation "Credit history" should not be a mandatory screening item except in cases where there is a reason, based upon other findings, to believe that indebtedness is probable. Credit checks raise liability issues, are expensive, and will delay completion of screening. Page 31 (d) (l) This section requires "written personality tests" rather than a single test instrument. There is no objective evidence provided by the NRC to sh<M that additional testing beyond the conmonly used MMPI will achieve increased validity of psychological testing. As is the case of credit checks, this requirement increases licensee costs with no apparent benefit.

Page 32 (f) (2) This section exempts NRC Personnel from all screening with no objective basis for this exemption. There is no reason to believe that NRC staff members are any more trustworthy and reliable than licensee employees. A simple L clearance based upon a National Agency Check (NAC) is no substitute for a five year backgound investigation and psychological assessment. If the L clearance is equivalent, then licensees should be authorized to contract for such clearances with the government in lieu of screening

• 1

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THE PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY GOVERNMENT 00(..'KEf.tl IJ!HRC December 6, 1984 .84 DEC 10 P4 :30 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

I am responding to the specifications stated in the proposed amendments to regulations for psychological testing and interviewing of individuals who have access to nuclear power facilities .

• The standards that you have cited for inclusion that the psychologists or psychiatrists should use in their behavioral interview are the same symptoms manifested by desynchronization of circadian rhythms (i.e., argumentative, hostility towards authority, irresponsibility, defensive incompetence, adverse reaction to stress and emotional and personable indaptability). It would behoove the NRC to consider whether their policies and practices in fact produce some of the symptoms that would then require an individual to be examined for psychological competence. It would seem prudent for the NRC to enact some preventative and proactive approach to reducing these symptoms prior to psychological intervention. There is ample literature to suggest that circadian desynchronization does in fact help to promote and create these kinds of circumstances and conditions in employees who are l) particularly vulnerable to them but 2) to most individuals after a protracted period of time.

Standards for screening of these individuals or training for adaptibility through nutrition and/or scheduling habits might minimize the ill effects of such circadian desynchronization. In short, an individual may be screened and found fit for employment, but the circadian disruption may produce the symptoms that you have delineated as justification to screen an individual out

• Sin::z * (2. ~

ac e y ~ t e i n , Ph.D.

• ector Psychological Services Unit Prince George's County Police HEADQUARTERS: 3415 N. Forestedge Road, Forestville, Md. 20747

,$; 'NUCLEAR R~GULATORY COMMISSlbB DOCKETING ?, Sff::IG: SECTION OFFICE OF TH: ScC~ETARY Or- Thi: C()iA,\\!:;'.",JON

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Pacific Graduate School of PsfclitJ~ 7z:~) . .#< <!Y OO(;KETEOl:I Professional Doctoral Studies usNRC 431 Burgess Drive Menlo Park, Callfomla 940~ DEC 10 P4 :19 OFFICE OF SE~Rt::TAt, / BOARD OOCKe'TING & S£RVICI. OFFICERS: IAAHeff December 3, 1984 Ray Jacobson. Chairman Murray Tondow. Ed.D .. Co-Chairman Wilbur Morton. Secretary MEMBERS Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Leonard C. Beckum. Ph.D. Secretary of the Commission Frederick L. Behling. M.D. U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Patrick H. Bitter, M.D. John Black. Ph.D. Washington, D.C. 20555 Rev. Gerald Brown. S.S. Rev. Fra ncis J. Buckley. S.J. las C. Cochran Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Collins Re: Proposed Rule: Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

• David Davis. D.H.L.

Teresa De Luca Access Authorization Program, and Psychological Donald Ehrman. Ph.D. Assessment. See Federal Register, August I, 1984 Morey Greenstein Kurt Gronowski (JO CFR part s SO and 73). Marshall Kane Daniel Kostenbauder. J.D. James C. Nunan

Dear Mr. Ch ilk:

Janet Redman. Ph.D. Elizabeth M. Richards. M.D. Rodger S. Rickard. Ed.D. I am writing to urge a public hearing for the rule captioned David J. Sanchez. Jr.. Ph.D. above. Antoinette Sher>-Maclntyre. Ed.D. Rev. James Tucker. Ph.D. John Vasconcellos. J. D. As a member of the professional community, I support the Allen Calvin. Ph.D .. Ex-Oflicio President proposed requirements that personnel having "unescorted access" to vital areas of nuclear power plants be cleared by all three: ADMINISTRATORS I) background investigation, 2) psychological screening and Ruth Abraham. Ph.D. 3) continual behavioral observation. Dean of Students Philip E. Berghausen. Jr., Ph.D. Dean of Clinical Training In regard to psychological screening, in my professional

          . Botsford rar opinion as a Board Certified Psychiatrist with over twenty

• ne Brumer. Ph.D. years of clinical experience, I recommend that applicants Dean of Academic Aflairs receive both clinical interviews and psychological assessment Richard F. Chapman. M.D.

Dean of Faculty in order to arrive at the most comprehensive and accurate Abbie da Roza evaluation of emotional and mental stability. Background Recruitment Officer Stig Peterson investigation alone is insufficientl and needs to be supple-Business Manager mented by objective measurement of "here and now" psychological Jane E. Riss functioning for which the clinical interview and psychological Librarian Murray Tondow. Ed. D. testing have no substitutes. Dean of Research Your Commission is charged with maintaining the highest possible standards of physical safety in our nuclear power plants. I advise you to utilize the highest standards of Administration ( 415) 321-1895 ~ Registrar ( 415) 326-PGSP

                                                                   ~

lJ. S. NUCLEAR R[GUhATORY COMM! SSIO~ DOCKETING & SERVICE Sl:C 11v1 1 OFFICE OF T~:~ St :'.~~T A1<.Y OF THE CC.'.'tM! SSiO . Postmark D.:1 te . _jJJ.r')/4 Copi .:s Rec (:: ved- _-__ _'---r 4 Add' I Cor,i -:;s Re"l(duced ,,,,_ Special Distributio, /])_s- _ =1n, __l'UW"',

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thoroughness in the evaluation process by which you select the personnel to operate our nuclear power plants. Compre-hensive psychological screening utilizing both individual clinical interviews by licensed psychiatrists and clinical psychologists and psychological assessment (testing), when combined with background investigation and continued be-harioral observation represent the best available present methods for selecting personnel who are to have "unescorted access" to protected areas of our nuclear power plants. Cordially yours ,

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Richard F. Chapman, M.D. Dean of Faculty and Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University Medical School

r ,, . I O~t tAAtetff l>ROf>.DS£0 RULE p*R-5~, 73 ~ C,t!f C/ ~--- - (!..BJ DOCKETED . USNftC DEC 10 P4:18 Edward J. Carlough SHEET 1750 New York Avenue, N.W. General President METAL OFFICE OF SECl?.t'fA~ v OOCKfTING & 1SEftVICF Washington, D.C. WORKERS' I RANCH 20006 HAND INTERNATIONAL 202/783-S880 ASSOCIATION DELIVERED December 5, 1984 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary of the Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch To Whom It May Concern: The Sheet Metal Workers International Association wishes to go on record on its position to oppose the proposed rule of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the Access Authorization Program (10 CFR Parts 50 *and *73) *for the following reasons:

1) Psychological testing or any other similar testing has never proven to be conclusive in their findings.

2) Historically, many previous government . projects requiring security and access have received full support from the construction workers without individual psychological te*sting.

3) Beha~ioral observation has always existed in the construction and maintenance of nuclear power plants. This supervision is a part of management's rights, and to place the worker and supervisor under the proposed guidelines as suggested by this proposed rule will create an enormous problem which presently does not exist.

4) Psychological testing & behavioral observation under this proposed rule involves the basic fundamental rights guaranteed the worker by the Constitution of this country. Any or all initial findings affecting a qualified worker's livelihood would bring about second or even third time requests for re-evaluation by that worker.

5) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should allo~ *the construction worker to stand on the past practice of access authorization by employment and supervision through management.

&J.S. NUCLEAR REGLJlAfO~Y COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFIC: OF THE SECF:ET ARY OF Tt-:E COMMISSION Dc,cumcr.l Stati stics l>o!lmark Date __ !__2-/4#_* _____ Copies ifoce: vr::ci I Add ' I Copies K>eproc'.c.ced ~ pecial Distribution /1>8,~

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To: Nuclear Regulatory Coumission - 2 - December 5, 1984

6) Additional rules concerning the worketswill only place them in dissension and would have damaging results in their workmanship.

Trusting this will clarify our position, I am Sincerely yours, / 7 a- ~

                                       /v-         //~
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EDWARD J. CARLOUGH General President EJC:tmf cc: Robert Georgine Gerry Olejniczak, NTF James Nixon, I.R

• UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY* DAVIS
• IRVINE
• LOS ANGELES
• RIVERSIDE
• SAN DIEGO
• SAN FRANCISCO INSTITUTE OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 3657 TOLMAN HALbf_EJC~SE~Bkl:fc1*

AND RESEARCH BERKELEY, CALIF<tftSe<<a;.ilftA~~

• December 4, 1984 Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Dr. Chilk:

I am writing in regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Commission on the issue of personnel screening for employment in nuclear plants and positions of similar sensitivity. As I understand current practices, applicants are now evaluated on the basis of (a) background information, (b) psychological testing, and (c) interviewing by a professional trained person who has available the information produced by the background check and the psychological testing. My purpose is to submit the strongest possible endorsement for the continuation of all three steps on the screening process. In particular, I want to write in favor of the testing and of the professional interview in which results from the testing can be evaluated and verified. Dropping of any one of the three phases of the screening and evaluational process would be a serious and probably tragic error. This is the basis for my statement of opinion. I hold a doctorate in clinical psychology from the University of Minnesota (1949),and prior to that served for a number of years in the armed forces in World War II as a psychological testing assistant in the air crew selection program, and later as a clinical psychologist in a station hospital. After receipt of my Ph.D. degree I was appointed to the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley, where I am now a full professor teaching courses in psychological testing and assessment. For five years I was chairman on the Department of Psychology at Berkeley,

• and for 10 years was Director of the Institute of Personality Assessment and Re search.

During President's Reagan's tenure as Governor of California I was a member of his Mental Health Advisory Committee, and was his appointee to the Citizens Advisory Committee for the State Department of Mental Hygiene. I served as member and as chairman of the Research Advisory Committee of the State Department of Mental Hygiene, and also as a member for some seven years of the Research Advisory Committee for the California State Department of Corrections. In the Federal system, I have been a member and also chairman of a research grant review committee in the National Institute of Mental Health. From these administrative and research affiliations, and from my own lifetime career of research and teaching in the fields of testing and assessment I believe I am qualified to express opinions the opinions submitted in this letter.

.U. S. NUCLEAR REGV~ATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING 8t SE? VICE SECTION OFFICE er- *:~ ~'.:' 'f ; T,\ RY o;: T .. ~ *.:, . '.'.'* ' ~*: 1* *i r,... Add' i <..c1i * ,+

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S. Chilk December 4, 1984 page 2 A review of background information is obviously vital for anyone being considered for employment in a sensitive post in the nuclear industry. Psychological testing can add something to this evaluation beyond what can be gleaned from background information alone. For example, the MMPI which has frequently been used in the nuclear industry is a sophisticated, powerful test that can add distinct validity to the evaluational process. However, even a device like the MMPI should never be used by itself, without the guidance and interpretat i on of a qualified *professional. The analogy to a sound laboratory test in medical diagnosis is reasonable. The organizing, integrating judgment of the professional person must be applied to the laboratory or psychological test findings if an acceptable and proper level of accuracy is to be obtained. I hope and trust that the Commission will see fit to maintain and continue

• all three stages of review -- background checking, psychological testing, and professional interviewing -- in its procedures for selection of personnel for the nuclear industry.

Sincerely,

                                                  ~A ./

Harrison G. Gou; (~ ' - \ Professor of Psychology lsg

OOCKft Itutt~R pR'. eROOOSED RULE -5.~-°1 ,3@ C49 1=£ jtJ7~) "' 4073 Yuma Ct. Ione, ca. 95640 0GtKETE0 USNltC Decerrber 4, 1984

                                                            ~ DEC 10 P3 =44 OFFICE Of SEt:1**.fA1:1

• DOCKff JNG 4 1S VICf PANCH -

SECREn'ARY OF THE C01MISSION U S NOCLE'AR RmUIATORY CCJt1l'1ISSION WASHimIDN DC 20555 ATl'ENI'ION rx:x::Km'IN; AID SERVICE BRA?CH SUBJOCT: ACCFSS AUI'IDRIZATION PROORAM Gentlenen: I am opposed to the "Psychological Assessment" requirement in the proposed Access Authorization Program. In rey opinion as psychology is not an "exacting" science, the assessnent test could be used subjectively and possibly unfairly by biased supervisors. A persons career could rest on "interpretations" of findings, and not on black and white facts. Also, I feel it infringes upon personal rights of privacy and could open the door to unreasonable investigations into non-work related private natters. In conclusion, I urge that this requirement not be included into the proposed Access Authorization Program. 'Ibis would greatly damage the already ailing nuclear industry in this country by intimidating nany experienced nuclear errq;,loyees out of the nuclear field *

• Very truly yours, 4;1a~

Terry A. Beeves

U.S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION 0OCKET!i-'G f.. :;~~\' IC~ ~i:.,-~!C> ~ orci~~ * ;. *.* *-* ,-. r; *f{

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December 2, 1984 nocmrraD Mr. Samuel J. Chilk cl:) 1984 / Secretary of the Commission DO~G &

• S"'R\/lCE 11BANC,l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .. stCY-URC Washington, D.C. 20555 ~

Dear Mr. Chilk:

• I am concerned that we are inadequately screening the people involved w1th our nuclear program. I am familiar with the MMPI, an instrument I have used clinically for over twenty years. However, I believe that 1t is effective only as part of a total picture - that it, alone, is inadequate in evaluating a person in terms of his clinical state and his long-term emotional stability.

It seems to me to be imprudent to screen people for employment in the nuclear industry with ony the MMPI as a screening device. The results can be made more effectlve if a trained professional assists in this screening process, and I am writing to you to advise you of my concerns in this arett I would hope we do all we can to insure the safety of the nation by carefully screening those people who will be involved in this potentially

• highly dangerous area.

Sincerely, Ivan B. Gendzel, M.D. Fellow, American Psychiatric Association Clinical Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry & Behavioral Sci enc es Stanford School of Medicine cc: Gary M. Olson, Ph. D. ao 1 Welch Road Palo Alto, CA 94301

       -I ii t1t\

FIFIP Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

We are taking this opportunity to comment on the Commission's proposed rules regarding its Access Authorization Program, as they appear in 49 FR 30726-30739, August 1, 1984, as well as the associated Regulatory Guide. The Commission maintains that it "is not persuaded at this time that the psychological assessment and behavioral observation elements are appropriate requirements for this agency to adopt." The Association for the Advancement of Psychology, which includes psychologists in all areas of academic, sci-entific, and professional endeavor, believes that verified knowledge and experience of the science a~d profession of psychology provide a sound basis for devel oping an effective, efficient, equitable, and humane access authorization program. Each mechanical component of a nuclear power plant is inspected and tested with extreme scrutiny; it is crucial that the people comprising the human component of these systems undergo thorough evaluation as well. We understand that these tests are to be administered to personnel who seek unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. Our comments address the questions specifically raised by the Commission in 49 FR 30730-30731. Question: What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both? Both inside and outside the commercial reactor industry psychological assessment procedures are used to screen employees for emotional instability and behavioral response styles which are in conflict with specific job requirements. For example, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company and the Virginia Electric Power Company have used *psychological screening programs for several years with a high level of success (see the enclosed descriptions of their programs). Historically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has addressed the question of employee reliability in terms of trying to prevent radiological sabotage. Sabotage, however, is only one of a large number of behaviors any one of which, if perpetrated by unreliable employees, would be hazardous to public safety and property. 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington , D.C. 20036

• Phone (202) 466-5757

U.S. NUClEAR R~GU hATORY COMMI SSIO~ DOCKET! ~G ti. ~i.'P"'CE SECTION OF Flr F. ,v ** 1r * * , .- ;-T' RY Ponmc1 1,  !"* tz-/'1/J"A Ccpio~ : , / Add'i C. ,if- _ ~:J.i~~i ~~-~~

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 Within the general area of employee reliability, psychological assessment procedures are typically thought of as a tool (along with back-ground investigations and drug screening) to be used for minimizing the selection of unreliable employees. In this broad context, there is little question that psycholgical assessment plays an important role as a means of screening out individuals who are likely to act in an unreliable fashion because of emotional instability and/or the presence of behavioral response styles which are in conflict with specific job requirements. Question: How do the proposed,procedures contribute to decreasing the risk of sabotage? Does the benefit outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives, While in a strict scientific sense it is not possible to conclude that the psychological assessment procedures described in the proposed rules have been demonstrated to reduce the specific risk of sabotage, there is abundant evidence that these procedures are extremely effective in detecting individuals who are unreliable employees by reason of emotional instability. It is noteworthy that few, if any, instances of radiological sabotage have occurred in this nation's commercial power reactor industry. It is probable that psychological screening programs already in place have contributed to this safety record be detecting emotionally unstable applicants who might have endangered workers in the reactors or the public at large. The two tests proposed by the Comrnission--MMPI and 16PF--have records of demonstrated reliability with respect to measuring emotional instability. Furthermore, the issue of emotional stability is clearly relevant to the commercial power reactor industry. For these reasons, individual rights should be well protected under the proposed rule, which also has safeguards regarding privacy. The personnel qualified to carry out such procedures are defined in Section 73.56(d) of the proposed rule, and_in_Chapter 3 and Appendix B ofi the associated Regulatory Guide

• These professionals are bound by very strict guidelines regarding matters of confidentiality. For example, psychologists are bound by a code of ethical principles and by Standards for Providers of Psychological Services which insure the safeguarding in individual privacy and confidentiality.

Furthermore, the proposed psychological assessment is certainly less intrusive into the privacy of the applicant than the standard background investigation which requires multiple interviews concerning the applicant with neighbors, friends, former employers, etc. The components of the psychological assessment program contained in Section 73.56(d) of the proposed rule and in Chapter 3 of the associated Regulatory Guide conform completely to the provisions of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, with respect to validity and relevance of the assessment procedures. When the assessment procedures being measured (in this case emotional instability), and what is being measure is relevant ot the job, then the courts have consistently found psychological assessment procedures acceptable.

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 We strongly emphasize that psychological tests should never be used alone, or without interpretation, as a basis for decision making. The notion that certain tests can be used in isolation for decision making is erroneous. While psychological tests_are important, sometimes in-valuable, tools in the evaluation oI an individual, they must be combined with professional interpretation to have any large-scale validity. The professional codes of ethics require that interpretation accompany testing, and the proposed rules should also reflect this reality. Question: What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors? The two-tiered approach to psychological assessment reflected in the proposed rule (written test followed by a structured clinical interview) is a logical and widely used approach to screening for employee reliability purposes. Tes.ts such as the MMPI and 16PF were specifically designed for screenip_g, ,purposes. There are over a thousand research articles in which the validity of these tests for detecting emotional in-stability has been consistently demonstrated (e.g., Dahlstrom & Welsh, 1960; Graham, 1977), The use of a clinical interview to intensively investigate the specific areas of psychological fuactioning which have been highlighted by the screening test is a widely used practice by psychologists and psychiatrists when assessing individuals with regard to emotional instability. Question: What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives

• and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRG proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

The standard scientific approach to minimizing the inevitable statistical error that can occur when only a single assessment procedure is used (e.g., use of only background investigations, d~ug screening, or psychological assessments) is the utilization of a number of different investigative tools in combination with e~ch other (e.g., background investigations along with psychological assessment procedures and continual behavioral observation). Keeping in mind that no employee reliability program is 100% perfect, errors can be minimized by implementing a two-tier system of p~ychological assessment, namely, written personality tests followed by a clinical interview. Tondow, Schultz, and Olson (1984) reported in their study of almost 15,000 people that had been both tested and interviewed that 38% of those individuals who, following an interview, were judged to be psychologically unsuitable for unescorted access had not manifested serious emotional problems on the MMPI. That is, a 38% false negative rate occurred when only written psycholo,gical tests were administered. This

Access Authorization Program 12/4/82 may have resulted for a variety of reasons, including certain applicants' test savvy, not taking the inventory seriously, testing at an inappropriate time (on day off, or after a long shift), language difficulties due to cultural background, etc. Such problems, which might result i~ false positives or false negatives, could be caught during the clinical interview. In brief, psychological testing cannot be used in isolation, and it cannot be viewed as an infallible decision-maker in the absence of professional involvement, clinical assessment, and a personal interview. The considerable experience of psychologists who are currently screening employees for nuclear facility work, using methods as outlined in the proposed rules, makes clear the necessity of follow-up interviews after testing. These interviews can help overturn a possibly negative decision, and can help eliminate potential employees who do not exhibit emotional instability on the MMPI alone. The clinical interview is of considerable value in reducing the

• extent of some false positives and false negatives
• Psychological testing with a follow-up clinical interview, combined with a background investigation and continued behavioral observation, is the most effective and practical procedure available.

Question: Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs? It has already been noted that sabotage is merely one of a large number of behaviors any one of which, if perpetrated by unreliable employees, would be hazardous to public safety and property. Thus, the cost of psychological assessment to the commercial nuclear industry is small relative to the potential damage which might be done by emotionally unstable, unreliable individuals hired in the absence of such an assessment program. Risk reduction could only be quantified if access authorization programs were established at some sites while, at the same time, not established at other sites. A comparison of the results could then be made. It would be irresponsible and dangerous, of course, to conduct an experiment that would knowingly increase the risk of emotionally unstable, unreliable employee behavior. Question: To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed--behri:t.ora.1-:relia-bility program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What specific. risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening programs, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted? The purpose of each program element, and the type of behavior assessed by each, is very different.

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 The purpose of the pre-employment psychological assessment procedures is to detect emotionally unstable individuals within a general pool of applicants who are seeking employment in the commercial- power reactor industry. To do this requires significant knowledge and expertise regarding the manifestations and demensions of emotional stability and emotional instability. More specifically, this requires the skills of professional psychologists and psychiatrists with qualifications matching those contained in Appendix B of the Regulatory Guide, In contrast, the continual behavioral observation program is meant to detect changes in the behavior of otherwise emotionally stable individuals. It is our understanding that the goal is to teach supervisory personnel how to detect changes in the behavior of individuals already well known to them-- changes which may be indicative of emotional unreliability--secondary to changes in the person's life circumstances *

• For this reason, the psychological assessment procedures and the continual behavioral observation component are not equivalent programs in terms of their purpose, scope, and requirements. Rather, they are complementary programs, both of which are essential ingredients of a comprehensive employee reliability program such as that envisioned by the proposed rule.

Question: What kinds of individuals have been "screened out" of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs? According to Tondow, Schultz, and Olson (1984) and Raleigh (1981, enclosed), the individuals who have been "screened out" have been individuals who are emotionally unstable. As discussed earlier, the psychologic?l assessment procedures have been developed and validated for the specific purpose of detecting emotional instability. When these procedures are used for this

• purpose, they are as accurate as is scientifically possible
• With respect to the proposed continual behavioral observation program, it is our understanding that this program is not intended to "screen out" employees, but is meant to be a constructive one in the best sense of the term. When supervisors observe that employees have undergone a change in their on the job behavior, one of the program's goals is to assist the em-ployee in taking remedial and/or therapeutic action to correct the situation that has caused the employeets behavior to deteriorate. In this sense, the program is an ideal one in that it not only serves to minimize acts that are hazardous to public safety but it also helps an employee to become a more productive individual as well.

Question: What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs? Management abuse can be minimized by insuring that psychological

Access Authorization Program 12/4/84 assessment is carried out only by the types of qualified psychologists and psychiatrists defined in Appendix B of the Regulatory Guide. Professional psychologists and psychiatrists comply with their respective code of ethics and stI3-ndaz:ds o.f _practice. The provisions_ of these codes and standards preclude these professionals from recommending action on any basis other than the objective results of the data they obtain. Psychologists who do not adhere to ethical standards are subject to censure or expulsion from the American Psychological Association, as well as malpractice lawsuits brought by the client whose privacy was violated. If management abuses have been documented by others, it should be stressed that such abuse is by no means inherent in the use of psychological assessment procedures for employee reliability purposes. On the contrary, the correct use of such procedures is one of the best safeguards against management abuse in selecting and maintaining reliable employees *

• Miscellaneous Comments Regarding Regulatory Guide On page 26 of the Guide, at the end of the first full paragraph on that page, reference is made to the following statement:

       "Judgements [sic] or diagnosis on emotional stability are normally medical judgements [sic] and should therefore be reserved to qualified medical personnel. 11 In addition  to being factually inaccurate, this statement is unsupported by case law  within the Federal courts. For this reason, we suggest that the wording  used in the first full paragraph on page 28 of the Guide also be used in the  above reference sentence on page 26, Thus, the passage would read:
       "Judgments or diagnosis of emotional stability should be made only by a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or medical doctor, as appropriate.n In sum, we strongly support the use of the proposed two-tier system of psychological assessment, including valid and reliable psychological tests as well as a follow-up clinical interview, conducted by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist. This psychological assessment program, complemented by the background check and continued behavioral observation program, will yield the most effective, efficient, equitable, and humane access authorization program available. Furthermore, we strongly recommend that public hearings be held before the Commission takes final action on the proposed regulations in order to solicit testimony from experts in the field of psychodiagnosis and psychometrics.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment. CJM/leg

REFERENCES Dahlstrom, W. G., and Welsh, G. S. An MMPI Handbook: A guide to use in Clinical practice and research. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960. Graham, J. R., The MMPI: A practical guide. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. Raleigh, D.L., "The Assessment of Emotional Instability in Nuclear Power Plant Applicants." Unpublished manuscript, 1981. Available from the Association for the Advancement of Psychology, 1200 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 2~0, Washington, D. C. 20036. Tondow, M., Schultz, D. S., and Olson, G. M., "Psychological Screening for Unescorted Access to Nuclear Power Plants." Paper presented at the 65th annual meeting of the Pacific Division, American Association for the Advancement of Science, San Francisco State University, June 10-15,

• 1984
• THE ASSESSMENT OF EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT APPLICANTS Diane L. Raleigh, Ph.D.

Palisades, New York Abstract Emotional instability is a prime factor in the screening of nuclear

• power plant This study Behaviordyne employee~

examined the Psychological for unescorted screening access potential Corporation, and of to fo-und nuclear the MMPI that facilities. as used by it adequately measured the majority of behavioral criteria deemed to pose risk to the nuclear industry. The study resulted in a mre precise definition of risk in regards to nuclear facilities, and contributed toward a more clinically definable description of the non-certifiable nuclear employee

• Suggestions for further research are made.
• The question of whether Introduction the United States should continue to develop nuclear power to help meet the energy demands of the future remains a very controversial issue. Central to the issue is the concern that adequate safeguards be developed to protect the public from expo-sure to radiation. While physical protective systems are essential, also important to the safety of the nation are safeguards aimed at en-suring that responsibility be placed in the hands of emotionally stable

2 individuals who are capable of working on a daily basis in a potentially dangerous environment, and who can act appropriately under high stress, emergepcy conditions. Emotional stability is thus a prime factor in the screening of nuclear power plant employees for unescorted access to nuclear facili-ties. Since 1977, the Nuclear "Regulatory Commission bas been addressing the need to formulate screening regulations focused specifically on emotional instability. While no formal regulations have yet been estab-lished by the Commission, the NRC staff bas repeatedly recommended

• uniform screening clinical interviews.

requirements

                           .            including In the absence of specific guidelines, psychological    testing the quality and depth of and screening of    employees for nucleal". facilities varies greatly..       While some utilities are conducting comprehensive screening programs, others are meeting the minimum requirements with minimum evaluations.            In an attempt   to   provide   110re specific   guidelines,   the  American National Standards Institute last year proposed ANS 3.3 (American, 1982).           These guidelines    include   safeguard   standards   agreed   upon  by  the  nuclear industry. In the area _concerned with psychological screening, ANS 3. 3 states:
     "Reliability and stability shall be indicated by the results of a reliable and valid written personality test or by other professionally accepted.clinical assessment procedure adminis-tered by or under the supervision Of a licensed ps-ychologist or psychiatrist cogni;ant of this standard" (American, 1982, P* 11)

• 3 The publication of ANS 3.3 is indicative of the* industry's concern for thorough evaluation. With the recognition of the need for psycho-logic~l testing, specific testing instruments must be evaluated in view

 -<>f meeting the specific requirements of       the nuclear industry.        This study examined    the screening potential of      the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality   Inventory   (MMPI)  as   used  by  Behaviordyne     Psychological Corporation, for its relevance to the nuclear industry's perceptions of what constitutes instability in membe-rs of its work force.            This was accomplished by statistically analyzing the MMPI test scores obtained by

• 807 nuclear plant employees who had received a status of interim cer-tification or non-certif'icatiop as an procedure used by three nuclear power plants.

initial step in a screening In order to obtain a definition of elllOtional instability, this author relied upon the only two research projects (Frank, Lindley and Cohen, 1980; Buchanan, Davis and Dunnette, 1980) aimed at establishing criteria for defining risk in a nuclear environment.. Tflese research teams, from their work with nuclear supervisory personnel, compiled a list of behavioral descriptions which they deemed represented risks to the security of nuclear plants. This study relates these dimensions of emotional instability to the personality charact.eristics identified with those employees who received interim non-certification. Method Subjects The sample consisted of 807 employees in three nuclear power plants during the years 1978, 1979 and 1980. The socio-economic and

4 educational levels of the _employees varied greatly, inasmuch as screening covered all positions within the nuclear facilities. Data The data were obtained from the files of Behaviordyne Psychological Corporation, an organization employed by several nuclear facilities to assess the emotional stability of employees. The Behaviordyne Program is an assessment instrument used as part of an overall evaluation pro-cess. It is based on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality InventQry

• (MMPI) devised by Hathaway and McKinlay (1951).

false inventoTy consisting of 566 items.

                                                        'lhe MMPI is a true-The items range widely in content, covering such areas as health, psyc.=,osomatic symptom, neuro-logical disorders, and motor disturbances; sexual, religious, political and social attitudes;     educational,  occupational,    family and urital statements; as well as ~eurotic and psychotic behavioral manifestations (Anastasi,   1976). The MMPI scores the 566 items into ten clinical scales and three validity scales. It was developed to furnish an objec-tive evaluation of the major personality characteristics which influence individual   and  interpersonal   adjustment. The   Behaviordyne Program contains the original 13 MMPI scales along with 153 additional research scales derived from studies utilizing the MMPI.       The Program scores by computer each scale, and combination of scales, and provides a narrative interpretation of the results.

The Behaviordyne Program was administered to all employees by the personnel departments of the nuclear power plants as part of a*screen-ing process for unescorted *access. Each inventory was evaluated by a licensed psychologist. On the basis of this evaluation, a clinical

5 judgment was made regarding interim certification or non-certification. As the Behaviordyne Program constitutes only one part of the assessment for ~tional instability, final certification or non-certification is obtained after a c:linfoal interview.

• This analysis considers only-the judgments based on this reading of the MMPI inventoey without interview data.

From the Behaviordyne files, consisting of over 3,000 test inventories obtained from the three nuclear power plants, 807 test inventories were selected for this study: 530 randomly selected from employees who received interim certification, and 277 inventories of employees who received interim non-certification status. The 277 in-ventories constituted the entire sample of employees receiving interim non-certification. Procedure The Behaviordyne data were used to test for statistically signifi-cant differences in MMPI scale scores between the interim certified and non-certified groups using analysis of variance techniques. A discrim-inant model was developed to determine the strongest 'discriminators between the two populations in order to obtain a description of each population with a view toward later deriving clinical profiles of each. Finally, matrices were constructed to quantify the relationship between the scales discriminating between certified and non-certified groups, and the behavioral criteria representing the industey's descriptions of

• emotional instability.

The author and three clinical psychologists with many years of e:.q>erience with the MMPI judged the appropriateness of the scales as (1 measures of the behavioral criteria.

6 To test whether the scales having greatest discriminatory power measure the most risk-laden behavioral characteristics, a matrix (Table

1) was. constructed in which the behavioral characteristics were weighted according to the psychologists' judgment as to toe degree of risk they represent. Risk was defined as behavior endangering the safety of a nuclear plant displayed by an individual who cannot, or will not, because of his emotional state, consistently discharge his duties in a manner which insures that safety. Assignment of risk was accomplished by developing a Liltert-type scale comprised of five degrees of rislt,

• ranging from ~gligible to extreme. The psychologists assessed the rel-ative risk associated with each criterion and assigned a weight to each.

This assignment was arrived at by consensus via discussion. The weights were recorded on the matrix. Each scale was then given a sum of the weighted correlations with each behavioral criterion. This sum was labelled the risk factor. Results Examination of the analysis of variance found the paired means (certified vs. non-certified) of 86 variables of the 166 Behaviordyne scales to be significantly different at the 0.0('_1 level. The dis-criminant analysis resulted in the reduction of the variable set, and identified 22 important scales which, as a set, statistically discrimi-nated between those employees that received interim certification and those that did not with about 85% precision. The stepwise discriminant process was conducted by initially computing an  !. - value for each vari-able. ntis measured the discriminatory power, i.e. partial correlation, of each variable. Table 2 lists the F - values of the 22 scales which most strongly discriminate between the two populations.

7 It can be concluded from the discriminant analysis that Behaviordyne' s interim classification depends heavily on a lilDi ted set of variables. This conclusion is significant because it allows for cross comparison of the clinical descriptions of the 22 Behaviordyne scal~s to the behavioral criteria given by the nuclear industry. The second step required to assess Behaviordyne' s Program involved a reduction of the behavioral descriptions given by Frank et al. (1980) and Buchanan et al. (1980) to a manageable number of variables. This reduced set of beh~vioral criteria heads the columns of the matrix in

• Table 1 where they ar~ correlated by the psychologists consulted in this study with the clinical descriptions of the MMPI scales. To refine the correlation further, the weighted values of the risk associated with the behavioral criteria were assigned to each cell and summed across the rows corresponding to the 22 Behaviordyne scales. These summed weights, or risk factors, should be roughly proportional to the F - values for the 22 scales if the Behaviordyne Program gives comparable weight to those criteria considered most undesirable by the industry.

The correlations in Table 2 between risk factors and F - values for Behaviordyne's scales are strongest for those scales indicating psychopathology, addiction and alcoholism. The scales identifying psychopathic manipulation, paranoia, alcoholism, schizophrenia, psychas-thenia, and projection of hostility have 7 of the highest  !.. - values from the analysis of Behaviordyne's scales, and also score in the highest 10 of the 22 risk factor,. The higher risk factors for some of the remaining scales having a lower  !. - value, namely Addiction, Poor Reality Testing, Alcoholism (Finney), and Responsibility, are a result of the process included in the discriminant analysis. The analysi a

8 diminishes the discriminatory power of a scale when the scale synony-mously measures another stronger scale. The descriptors measured in these .four scales are included in the stronger discriminating scales of Alcoholism (MacAndrew), Alcoholic vs. Addict, and in the scales which iden~ify psychopathology. There are several significant Behaviordyne scales which are accord-ed a low risk factor. These include Lie, Sensitivity, Exhibitionism, Narcissism, Control, and Orderliness. While elevated scores on these scales may indicate undesirable personality traits, those traits do not

• appear to constitute high risk. Two scales found to be significant, Masculinity-Femininity and Sex Difference, appear to have no relation-ship to the behavioral criteria.

In viewing the behavioral criteria on the matrix, it can be seen that no scales measure physically caused instability, or symptoms asso-ciated with organic brain syndrome. It is questionable as to whether the MMPI is capable of identifying those characteristics. Discussion The Behaviordyne scales which statistically differentiated those employees who received interim certifiability from those that did not, strongly relate to the behavioral criteria deemed to pose high risk to the nuclear industry. While not all of the significant scales are associated with high risk factors, it appears that the Behaviordyne Program can serve as an effective initial screening tool in identifying emotional instability as it'relates to the industry.

9 Two of the major implications which result from_th~ interpretation of the matrices are a more precise definition of risk, and a roore clini-cally . definable description of the non-certifiable nuclear employee. Through the reduction in the number of variables defining risk, and the assignment of weights according to the degree of risk, this study repre-sents ij further step toward the future establishment of an operational definition of tisk. It contributes toward a uniformity of application and interpretation by emmining psychologists. Furthermore, an examina-tion of the personality characteristics measured by the scales which

• differentiated, and t1!ereby def~ned, the non-certifiable employee, can serve as a further step in th~ establishment of a clinically useful con-struct of emotional instability as it pertains to the nuclear industry.

Recommendations for Further Research The major limitation of this study is the lack of verification through longitudinal studies of criteria used for certification for emotional instability in the nuclear industry. The clinical judgments made by Behaviordyne were based on empirically derived personality mea-surements, and are a priori inasmuch as there has been no demonstrable relationship between the criteria for selection and actual performance in nuclear environments. No research on the job performance of previ-

 . ously screened employees has been conducted, Verification of criteria for selection of nuclear personnel is critically important. Witbout longitudinal studies examining the job performance    of  certified   employees,  the problems   surrounding  the validity of criteria will remain unsolved.

10 In the absence of post employment studies, this study has attempted to bring the .criteria for selection closer to the behavioral criteria deemed* by the industry to pose risk. The behavioral criteria them-selves, while empirically derived from observations by supervisory personnel, have not been subjected to any formal measurement. Tbese criteria could be further refined by the development of a quantifiable measure of behavior used to evaluate those employees whose behaviors clearly present risk to the security of nuclear plants. Such a longi-tudinal evaluation could be instituted on an industry-wide basis in a systematic and unifot'11l manner. This could be accomplished* through the behavioral observation programs now being developed, and could be coordinated through such national organizations as the American Nu~lear Society. This focus by the industry on a definition of risk would improve the effectiveness of screening programs by giving psychologists uniform guidelines specific to the needs of the industry. Tbe foregoing suggestions for research and improvements in screen-ing procedures may be a useful addition to progralllS that are already sophisticated amalgams of the current methods used in psychological screening for emotional instability. But all such improvements in the absence of on-the-job verification of ~e validity of screening programs will not suffice to ensure against the extraordinary consequences of a single act of sabotage or inadvertence which results in catastrophic failures in nuclear plants. Currently, the rate of success in screening out potentially dangerous employees is unknown. Until extensive study of the causes of failure in the screening process are cQnducted, the probability of human failure or ill intent will remain the most poorly defined, imponderable risk to human life in the vicinity of nuclear plants.

11 Table 1 Behavioral criteria weighted according to relative risk, and related to Behaviordyne scales BEHAIIOBAL CRITERIA 0:: I -...... C ,,.:i

                                                                                  ,,.:i     !
                                                                                                         ...z ~
                                     <ll IEY                                ~
                                     ~ ; I II:!

0::

                                                                                  ~         6       &l                     fJ             Cd ll, I.Little to no riu: ...~

C

                                                ~                                 ,..gJ
                                                                                  -CH
                                                                                        §i                                <ll 5 .......i~... ~a~~ fflCll... z     8
                                                                                                                                         ~ ~

t; Q

                                         ~~ !5        ,,.:i
                                                            ~

l!l ~~ Ill l!l11i a:8 5 .... ~ 2.Minim.ml rialt ~ t::;-i IIIU ...

                                                      ,(

t: !:ti ~5 Ill C)

                                                                                                    ~
                                                                                                         ... u   >,o,,.:i
                                                                                                                                               ~~        u

ic:: :s ~

                                                                                                         ~~                              ~

u ...

                                     ! I 9i 5~ ...~ i... I t~~

M ,-llCI ,,.:itc1 e-ffi a; 8~

                                                                          ......                                                   u~                   w.

CLIM ll,

                                                                                            !ll     .;I
                                                                                                         .......          ~i; f~... I ! I !a t:~ I~ ~~ ~~ :......
                                                                                                                                               ...C&.,

3.Moderate risk "-"" en ~,( ,...Q ,,.:i l:llO

3

                               ...u UC>

4.High rilllk CE-Ill lie 111111

                                                                                                                                               "'z 5.zxtreme   risk
                               !     <   §l     ~
                                                                    ~E-u Cll Q       C)

Ill Q u 0 i:.:i,.. C

• IIU IEIIRTIIU PS;$£~ffifON PARANOIA ALCOHOLISM (M) 5 3 3

3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 4 3 4 3 I 3 3 4 4 5 3 5 5 2 3 4 4 4 5 2 4 3 5 3 3 3 38 3 28 23 SCHIZOPHRENIA 5 _3 4 3 3 4 5 2 4 3 36 ALCOHOLIC VS, ADDICT 4 4 5 4 5 5 3 30 VALIDITY 3 4 5 4 16 MASC'!JLINITY-FEMININITY ACHIEVEMENT BY 5 3 4 4 16 0 CCNFORMITY

    ,c u         PSYCKASTHENll    5 3                                   I     3       4        3       3                                                   22 a;

c:, PROJ!:CTIOO OP' LIE HOSTILITY SENSITIVITY 3 4 5 3 4 4 3 3 17 5 7

    ,c
 -  1111:

EXHIBITICWISM 3 3 I.I.I ADDICTICW 3 5 4 3 3 4 5 3 30 NARCISSISM 4 3 4 II STUBBORNNESS 4 4 8 POOR REALITY TESTING 5 3 3 4 5 3 23 SEX DIFFER.ENCE 0 CONTROL 4 4 8 ORDERLINESS I I ALCOHOLISM (F) 5 3 4 3 4 5 24 RBS~SIBILITr 5 3 5 4 3 2 22

12 Table 2 Comparison of F-Val?es and Risk Factors of Significant Scales Scale P'-Value Risk Factor

• Psychopathic manipulation Paranoia Alcoholism (Mac A.)

252.7 71.9 73.3 28 38 23 Schizophrenia 37 .5 36 Alcoholic vs. Addict 26.8 30

  .. Validity                                   23.8                 16 Masculinity-femininity, male               11.9                  0 Achievement by conformity                  17.2                 16 Psychasthenia                              12.s                 27

(. Projection of hostility Lie Sensitivity Exhibitionism 10.6 9.3 6.9 8.4 17 5 7 3 Addiction 5.4 ~ . ,. 30 Narcissism 4.4 11 Stubbornness 5.3 8 Poor Reality Testing 3.7 23 Sex difference 4.4 0 Control 3.5 8 Crderliness 4.3 2 Alcoholism (Finney) 3.7 24 Responsibility 4.2 17

13 References American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ANS 3.3-1982. Security for nuclear po;,,er plants. American Nuclear Society. Anastasi, A. Psychological Testing. 4th Ed. New York: Macmillan, 1976. Buchanan, J. c., Davis, S. o. & Dunnette, M. Behavioral reliability

• program for the nuclear industry. Minneapolis:

Decisions, Inc., USNRC Contract No. 01-79-003, December 1980. Personnel Frank, F., Lindley, B. & Cohen, R. St.andards for Psychlogical Assess-ment of Nuclear Facility Personnel- Orlando: Assessment Designs, Inc., USNRC Contract No. 01-79-002, December 1980. Hathaway, s. R. & McKinley, J. c. The Minnesota Hultiphasic Personality Inventory Hanual, Revised. New york: The Psychological Corp., 1951.

Medical College of Virginia Virginia Commonwealth Universitr September 5, 1984 Clarance Martin, Esq. Executive Director Assoc.iation for the Advancement of Psychology 1200 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Clarance:

This letter is in reference to the NRC 1 s proposal for psychological screening of perspective employees with the co11111ensurate change in regulation *

• I would endorse*such a eolicy and would believe with appropriate safeguards this could be of advantage to the nuclear regulatory commission and the nuclear power industry.

The system is used by a local power company utilizes outside consultants for the assessment program rather than an in-house system. This allows for greater confidentiality and distance from those people making final decisions, thereby, eliminating the possible conflict of interest as a full-time paid employee. Basically, the system is set up whereby thg instrument used is the MMPI and is administered by the power company s different stations. This is 1 done after a training program. The VEPCO person in charge of the program is a Ph.D. psychologfst in the industrial/organization area. Completed MMPI 1 s are sent to the consultants office for interpretation and filing. The MMPI is never returned to the Power Company nor do they see the results. That is, a completed MMPI is forwarded to the consultant's office where it is scored and interpreted. A form letter is utilized using a check-off to indicate the degree of confidence or concern about the candidate 1 s ability to withstand job related stress. This is umbrella statement to cover not only potential substance abuse but also problems in thinking logically, sequentially, coherently and goal directed under periods of stress, or for that matter, under periods of low stress. Thus,

  ' the fonn letter does not deal with psychiatric entities.

11 11 If a modicum of concern is raised on the MMPI screening, then arrangements are made for a clinical interview with the employee or perspective employee and the consultant. Based upon that and further psychological assessment, if necessary, a follCM-up fonn letter is utilized once again. In this letter, like its predecessor, details are not dealt with but rather a single state-ment regarding job related stress is utilized.

• For new applicants, the MMPI screening is part of the overall pre-employment

process which includes physical and security checks. The local power canpal'\}'

l! j DM111on 11 Clinical Paychowgy

• P.O. Box 710
• Richmond, VIJ-&ini& 23298 * (804) 788-91157 I

decided for any present employee transfering to a nuclear facility, .the screening and interview would be used once again. Should a candidate be unsuccessful in the screening process, he has the right to appeal the consultant's decision. This is accomplished by obtaining a second opinion, at the employees. expense,-regarding the. issues of job*related stress. Should the second opinion be contrary to the consultant's, then a third opinion is saught by a psychologist agreeable to both the power company and employee and that decis.ion is binding on both parties.

• On balance this appears to be a very equitable arrangement that safeguards the privacy and confidentiality of the employee and keeps them well aware of his status, vis-a-vis, the psychological screening. In my view, it does not appear to be an invasion of privacy nor is it invasive given the potential benefits for

    *those who must work in the nuclear field.

I hope this gives you some information that may be useful in formulatin~ a response to the regulation. If I can provide any thing else, please do not hesitate to let me know. Kindness personal regards. Sincerely yours,

 ,  *.p~

Robert J. Resnick, Ph.D. _Associate Professor of Psychiatry Chairman, Division of Clinical Psychology P.S. Clarance, I have asked intermittently over the last 3 years employees of the power company about the system and I have hea.rd virtually no negatives about the program. Most believe it-to be fair and equitable, even those who were denied employment or access to a nuclear facility.

Testimony Before the Hearing Board United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Corrmlssion

• On the- Mattes:- of -Amendment of 10 CFR Parts- 11 , 50 *and 70

[Authority for Access to or Control over Special Nuclear Material] by Association for the Advancement of Psychology

1. INTRODUCTION

• This testimony is prqvlded to present our views on the proposal to establish a clearance program affecting employees of commercial nuclear power plpnts who may have access to or control o er Special Nuclear Material.

Our testimony is in opposition to the introduction of the program as proposed in the Federal Register (42 F.R. 11880). Our Association, which Includes psychologists in all areas of academic, scientific and profes-sional endeavor, feels that verified knowledge and experience of the science and profession of psychology provides a sound basis for developing an effective, efficient, equitable and humane clearance program. We believe that the program proposed by the Commission is needlessly costly and not likely to be effective In achieving Its stated alms. 11 Our testimony relates to the Cormiission's request for the identifica-tion and advantages/disadvantages of alternative programs, such as psycho-logical testing administered by licensees *** 11 (42 F.R. 64704). One such alternative program, developed by the Baltimore Gas aod Electric Company, which combines psychqloglca1 testing and Interviewing with care-ful recruitment and pre-employment screening, Is described in our testimony.

2 I I. Statement of Position We believe the program proposed by the Convnlssion Is undesirable for the following reasons: A. The decision process in the proposed program does not specify the procedures to be used. Therefore, it cannot be assessed by the usual statistical measures. Without these Indices It will not be possi-ble to ascertain whether these procedures actually operate efficiently to differentially screen out potential "risks" from trustworthy employees.

• B. Since the procedures place all control and responsibility In the hands of governmental employees, it seems clear that liability resulting from the actions of those governmental employees should and will be a Federal obligation, and no liability should or will attach to the utility employing any Individual cleared by a governmental agency. Since the procedure Itself may well be the basis for litigation by an aggrieved applicant, th'e burden of defending such litigation should properly be assumed by the Federal agency Involved and not by the utility.

The proposed regulations fall to make clear the allocation of lia-bility, and we believe the final regulations should do so, In the event that the proposed program Is adopted.

c. The program does not provide any mechanism for review or appeal by applicants, employees or utilities.

D. The clearance procedures are based on anunproven and improbable hypothesis that (1) the history of an employee's or applicant's presumably "derogatory' acts, and (2) allegations, unspecified as to number, nature, source, relevance, or relative lmportanct:,can be synthesized by unspeci-fied individuals within the Civil Service Commission to produce consist-ent reliable predictions of future behavior.

                        ¢*

3 E. The program does not provide any mechanism for evaluation of Its effects or effectiveness or for Input from the utilities Into such an evaluation. -:.. F. The program Incorporates no flexibility to adapt procedures to differing local and prevailing cultural environments which may affect the nature and quality of data acquired by Investigators. G. The proposed clearance fees are excessive. H. The program has the potentiality for establishing an unmonitored

• and unresponsive bureaucracy
• I. The program may Infringe on the rights of individuals to privacy and to equal employment opportunity.

We believe that alternative programs significantly re'lylng on data, procedures, techniques and skills developed by the science and profession of psychology can be instituted with many advantages. Alternative pro-grams, like the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company program, can be developed which will be consistent with ANSI 18.17 ("Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants") which is Incorporated by reference In Acceptance Criterion 1.3. 1.A In NUREG-0220, and which previously had been incorporated by reference in AEC Regulatory Gulde 1.17 (July 1973). We see the following advantages: A. Utilization of procedures of known consistency (internal and ex-ternal) which are amenable to modification to Improve predictive effec-t lveness.

8. Primary responsibility for development and administration of the clearance program on the utility.

C. The opportunity for continuous review, evaluation and modification of both predicting instruments/procedures and criterion measures (Identi-fiable desirable and undesirable behaviors).

D. The making of assessments and predictions based on measurements of each applicant's/employee's current personality {vulnerabilities, defenses, resources to cope with stress, etc.) and relevant historical data. This procedure operates on the hypothesis that qualified psychologists and other professionals trained In the Identification of aberrant behavior can detect Individuals with characteristics that are associated with a significant probability of future behavior which could present an unneces-sary risk to the safety and security of the facility.

• E.

F. Adaptability to varying local and cultural environments

• Opportunity for the scientists and professionals participating in various programs to develop and test innovations which may Improve effec-tiveness of local programs and, through the appropriate channels of scientific and professional communication, share such findings to be further val !dated and, If found valid, to be used to extend the Improve-ments to other programs.

G. Prompt, efficient and credible feedback to applicants/employees. H* Lower costs.

• I*

J. K. Cred I b 11 I ty to applicants, employees and the general public. Respect for the privacy of applicants and employees. Opportunity for employees with current vulnerabilities to remed-late these conditions with consequent reduction in turnover in categories of scarce personnel. 111. A "Hodel" Clearance Program: The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company The material in this section describes the program developed over the past several years and Implemented in the detail described below In 1977 by the management and staff of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company which operates a nuclear powered generating facility In Calvert County,

5 Maryland, the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP). The conclusions and interpretations presented are those of the Association for the Advance-ment of-Psycholoty, not necessarily those of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, although appropriate members of the management and legal staff of that firm have reviewed and confirmed that the description of their program In this statement Is accurate. The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company has In place a program of clear-ance for access to or control of Special Nuclear Materials which has been

• designed to conform to ANSI 18.17 ("Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants"). A central feature of the program Is the utilization of:

a. standardized psychological tests for screening; b. feedback to each Individual tested; c. Individual Interviews conducted by a consulting clinical psychologist with Individuals whose test scores or personnel records Indicate a potential problem; d. optional counseling services for employees whose nature and level of personal distress indicates potential for rehabili-tation.

When the program was Initiated all Individuals who had been extensively evaluated with psychological tests and interview procedures through an existing company program were exempted since their participation In the program would have been essentially redundant. Except for these Individuals, all company personnel at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) have taken part In the program. In addition, all applicants for employment at the CCNPP since October 1977 have participated. The outline of the program Is described below: A. Procedures for current Permanent Employees:

1. Administration of standardized psychological tests:

Minnesota Multlphaslc Personality Inventory (HHPI); Guilford-Zimmerman Tempera~nt Survey (GZTS); Army General

6 Classification Test - Civilian Edition (AGCT); Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS).

2. Employees whose scores are within the pre-determined "normal" range receive a confidential printed feedback which ts Indivi-dualized to reflect their particular scores. These feedback reports are prepared by the Psychological Services section of Baltimore Gas and Electric Company.

3. If test scores deviate from established criteria, the employee's

• personnel folder Is reviewed by a member of the Psychological Service staff.

4. If, after review of both the test scores and personnel folder, the staff member feels a potential problem exists, the employee Is Interviewed by a consulting clinical psychologist.

5. During the interview with employees having suspect scores or personnel records the consulting clinical psychologist provides verbal feedback of test results. (This has the advantage of enabling the employee to provide data, Including rebuttal opinions, which would enable the psychologist to reinterpret the data in the light of relevant Information provided by the employee.)

6. The consulting psychologist prepares a report sunwnarlzlng the Interview, findings and recomnendatlons. This confidential report Is retained In Psychological Services for documentation purposes. These reports are not accessible to members of the Employment Unit or other Baltimore Gas and Electric employees.

7

7. If, in the Judgment of the consulting cHn-ical psychologist the employee's condition presents a potential for risk for con-tinued employment at* CCNPP, one of the followlng*options Is recommended:

a. Readmlntstration of the psychological tests If their representativeness Is questionable. (If the retest also results in deviant scores, options b., c., or d. below are considered.)

b. Counseling/psychotherapy to improve the employee's adjust-ment (marital counseling, substance-abuse counseling, personal adjustment counseling, etc.)

c. Reassignment to a non-nuclear responsibility

d. Termination of employment B. Procedures For Applicants For Employment at CCNPP.

1. The Employment Unit ts respons I b1e for procedures re 1at i ng to recruitment and processing .to the point of employment.

a. All applicants for employment at CCNPP are required to com-plete an application form. The applicant ts then interviewed by the Employment Representative. In this Interview the Employment Representative investigates in detail the appli-cant's education, training, work experience and, if appli-cable, military experlence. If the Employment Representa-tive feels that the applicant possesses satisfactory cre-dentials the applicant is further interviewed by the individual who would be the applicant's supervisor in the event the applicant Is hired. The prospective supervisor further questions the applicant In relation to the applicant's expertise.

8

b. If both the prospective Supervisor and the Employment Rep-resentative agree that an offer should be made the appli-cant ts advised that employment has bee~ recommended con-tingent upon satisfactory clearance following psychological and medical evaluations.

Applicants for positions as security guards a~ brought to

• the Baltimore headquarters for the following processing:

(1) Applicants sign a statement authorizing BG & E to

• fingerprint them. The finger printing ts conducted by trained members of the Security Services Unit. The finger print record ls then hand-carried to the Maryland State Po-lice, the central gathering agency for all counties In the State. The sealed report of the Maryland State Police is hand-carried back to the company where It ts opened and read by Mr. James Gleasen, Security Specialist. Hr. Gleasen is the only person In the company who sees the report. If the report contains no adverse information the Employment Rep-
• resentative is so advised. If the report contains Informa-tion which raises questions about the applicant's ability to perform duties in a safe and secure fashion the Security Specialist consults with the Supervisor of Employment on the matter. If the outcome of this discussion Is to withdraw the offer the Employment Unit is advised, the applicant is lnfonned and the offer Is withdrawn. If the Joint decision Is that the Information does not require withdrawal of the offer, processing continues as described below.

9 (2) For all applicants psychological assessment is conducted: (a) Applicants are given the Minnesota Hultlphaslc ~ersonallty Inventory, Gullford-Zi1M1erman Temperament Survey, and the Army General Classlfl-

         . cation Test (Civilian Edition).

(b) All applicants (regardless of the pattern of their test scores) are Interviewed by a consulting clinical psychologist who has been supplied with copies of test results and the Individual's applica-tion for employment. (c) Based on the interview, test results and application information the consulting psychologist reconmends that the applicant be Cleared

• or Not Cleared for further employment consideration.

(d) Feedback to each applicant concerning test scores is provided by the consulting clinical psychologist during the Interview. (e) The consulting psychologist prepares a report summarizing the Inter-view, findings and recommendations. This confidential report is retained In Psychological Services for documentation purposes. These reports are not available to members of the Employment Unit or other Baltimore Gas and Electric employees. (3) A medical examination is conducted. (4) A check is made of the applicant's references. This includes obtain-ing school records to verify claimed credentials ~nd times and per-iods of attendance. It also permits an opportunity to Identify any gaps in the applicant's chronology of life events and to disclose any overlaps or apparent contradictions in time, residence, employment, etc. Previous employers are asked to verify applicant-supplied data regarding positions held, responsibilities, salary, dijtes of employment, etc. Applicants with a record of military service

10 are required to present their DD 214 form and their quart-erly marks and class standings where applicable. C.* Current B. G. & E. Employees Tem*porari1y Assigned to CCNPP (Supplementary \obrk Forces for Outages, etc.)

           .1. Supervisors cognizant of criteria set out in ANSI 18. 17 de-slgrate employees to participate In a Supplementary Work Force (SWF).

2. Personnel records are reviewed by Employee Services.

3. Minnesota Mu1tlphasic Personality Inventory is administered .

• 4. If the MMPI sc?re(s) indicate a potential problem, the Indivi-dual's personnel folder Is reviewed by a professional member of the Psycho1ogica1 Services Unit.

5. If, after this review, a potential problem Is felt to exist, the employee is Interviewed by the consulting c1 inica1 psychologist.

6. If the consulting psychologist judges that the employee might present a risk if assigned to CCNPP, the employee ts not assigned.

7. The consulting psychologist prepares a report of the interview

• • IV.

and reconmendations which is retained for documentation purposes In the Psychological Services Unit as confidential data. Experience With the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Program A. Overview As of ~9~ total of 575 individuals have been processed by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Program. This number does not In-clude Individuals comprehensively evaluated under earlier procedures. All employees at the CCNPP, a total of 300 employees, have beer:i tested and processed. Twenty-five (25) applicants have been processed.

11 In the total are 250 employees from other components of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company selected as members of a Supplementary Work Fgrce (SWF) to assist at the time of outages, etc. To date a total of 7 Individuals have been Identified as having po-tential for behavior which could present an unnecessary risk to the safety and security of the facility. This has included 2 applicants, 3 employees being processed for participation In the SWF and 2 employees at the CCNPP. The applicants were withdrawn from further considerations.

• The SWF candidates were not permitted to work at CCNPP.

B. of the two employees at CCNPP Is discussed below. Current CCNPP Employees with Problems The disposition Psychological counseling was suggested to the two current CCNPP em-ployees Identified as having significant adjustment problems. One employee who had revealed in his interview with the consulting psychologist that he was very tense and fearful about making mistakes while ~t work (none had actua11y occurred) acknowledged a desire for help. He was given the names of several psychotherapists known to the B.G. & E. consulting psychologist. After a relatively' short course of treatment the employee and the treating psychologist felt that the problem symptoms were under control. In accordance with arrangements between the employee, the treating psychologist and the consulting psychologist, a clearance statement was executed by the treating psychologist for Incorporation in the confidential files of B.G. & E. Psychological Services. The employee remained on the job at CCNPP during the course of his treatment. The second employee to whom psychotherapy was suggested by the consult-Ing psychologist had a history of stubborn independence with $trong but rarely expressed angry feelings toward authority figures which had

12 occasJonally surfaced Jn passJve-aggresslve slow downs by 11 golng the long way around", etc. This employee recognized that his continued surliness and grudging cooperation could restrict his career advancement and af-fect his home adjustment as well. Nevertheless, continuing his Independent stance, he told the consulting psychologist that he wanted to try to work out these issues on his own, relying heavily on discussions with his very supportive wife. Since there were no Indications of potential explosive-ness or loss of control the posture of the utility has been to limited

• to encouraging the employee to consider seriously the option of psycho-therapeutic sessions.

C. SWF Candidates Who Were Not Accepted The three employees originally named for participation in the SWF who were considered to present hazards If assigned to the CCNPP were not as-signed. Their places on the SWF were filled by other employees of com-parable skills who presented no evidence of potential adverse response to the circumstances they might encounter on such an assignment. Among the rejected employees for the SWF were:

1. An employee with an acknowledged history of restlessness, exces-sive "practical-Joke" behavior and strong parental expression of concern and fear over his assignment. His personality test scores were quite abnormal.

2. An employee whose marriage was fragile following several separ-ations, in-law problems, financial pressures, excessive alcohol usage and the proximate delivery of a child. It was felt that In view of the employee's background and circumstances, the alternatives of extensive dally commuting (200 miles round trip per day) or prolonged absence from his family (If the employee

1.3 boarded near CCNPP} and the rigorous outage work schedule \\Ould adversely affect the employee's somewhat shaky personality ad-Judgment w~th* a- resu-1 tant Increased probabl 1 lty of behavior that could present a safety or security hazard. D.. Conrnent These illustrations are offered to indicate the sensitivity of the B.G. & E. program In detecting potential problems and the preventive mental health and rehabilitative philosophy which such a program can en-compass. No such possibility exists with the program proposed by the Commission.

                                                      ,\*

V. Essential Components of an Effective Clearance Program Since there have not been reported, to date, any Instances of diver-sion, misuse or sabotage of Special Nuclear Material there are no exist-Ing criteria against which any proposed programs can be measured. The following criterion elements are recommended for comparing proposed al-ternative methodologies for a clearance program: A. Protection of the Civil Rights of Employees and Applicants:

1. Privacy

2. Confidentiality

3. Avoidance of stigma (protection against potential "black listing"}

B. Job-Relevance of Data Collected and Utilized C. Consistency of Policies and Procedures Between Units of Public Utilities Generating Energy Through both Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Means The training and experience of many employees of electrical generating utilities is useful in both nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. To pose

14 unreal lstic or costly barriers for the utility and the employee which would restrict or confine these capabilities to one type of facility does a* itsservlce to a11 concer~ed. (The proposed NRC Pr6"gram, In addition to Its extreme expense, makes no provision for eliminating or control-llng the delay while an otherwise qualified employee waits for the NRC procedures to be initiated and colf()leted.) Utilities must be sensitive to employee morale. If employees at the nuclear facility feel that they are not treated equally with employees

• in other areas of the company, morale will be adversely effected. Simi-larly, employees in the non-nuclear facilities might feel that the em-ployees in the nuclear unit receive special attention. This differentia-tion with Its possibility for eroding morale is an issue to which the utility must be continually alert.

D. Employee Retention Many nuclear generating facilities are located In somewhat remote areas. Therefore, the turnover of employees may be a matter of special concern. As a consequence, both during initial recruitment and evaluation as well as during supervisory conferences at regular intervals, ft is desirable to recognize and deal with the employee's attitudes and feelings about all aspects of the work and living environment. There are high costs associated with recruitment of some special categories of employees in nuclear plants. Therefore, it is particularly Important, from the point of view of cost containment, to make every effort to keep the turnover to a minimum. The proposed NRC Clearance Program Is completely unresponsive to this Issue. It ls, however, a matter of vital concern to the overall operation of the utility.

15 An Important part of programs to enhance employee adjustment and to facilitate retention of valued employees and thus to keep down the turn-over and assocfated costs Is the provision of counseling support. The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company has had for a number of years a program of employee counseling which is available to individuals exper-iencing personal distress or ineffectiveness for a variety of reasons. The program of evaluation currently In operation at the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company permits an Identification of Individuals who may

• be in the early stages of strain, the time when professional help has the greatest likelihood of success with. a minimum of Interference In the individual's family and work effectiveness. In addition to helping the employee and reducing costs due to loss of employee work-time, counseling efforts are likely to strengthen the employee's loyalty and commitment to the Utility.

The retention of employees Is possibly correlated with Job satisfaction. In our opinion this is a very Important Issue which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would do well to consider. Since there have been no reported Incidents of misuse or diversion of special nuclear material, It Is not possible to Identify the characteristics of potential su.spect Individuals. Saboteurs trained by governments hostile to the United States or by non-governmental 11 terrorist 11 groups who might attempt to lnfl ltrate the work force of a nuclear generating facility would probably have carefully dev~l-oped "Identities" and credentials to minimize the risk of detection by traditional clearance techniques, since ,these could probably be predicted and avoided by such hostile entitles. The pool of Individuals who might become disaffected, however, will be significantly reduced If the employees

16 of nuclear generating facilities are generally satisfied In their employ-ment situation. Company efforts, such as providing a variety of counseling procedures, seem likely to reduce the vulnerability of employees to self-induced sabotage and strengthen the resistance of employees to seduction and/or blackmail. E. Credible Bases for Non-Clearance The NRC's proposed regulation would provide neither applicant, employee nor employer with any information about the basis for a decision not to

• extend clearance. A multitude of questions have been posed in the past about similar kinds of clearance decisions in which the non-cleared individual had no opportunity to confront witnesses or to challenge the validity of derogatory statements. Because of this approach the credi-bility of the entire system is threatened; all the interested parties are kept completely In the dark. It can be predicted with a high degree of confidence that the adoption of the NRC's proposed program would result in dissatisfaction, irritation, anger and possibly litigation by individuals who are refused clearance and by utilities who have invested in recruit-ment of scarce and valuable potential employees when they are informed that the individual cannot be employed, for reasons undisclosed to anyone.

The utility would, for example, be left unaware as to whether the disquali-fying factor should also serve to exclude the individual from employment opportunities elsewhere In the Company. In contrast, the current program at the Baltimore Gas and Electric Com-pany is easily understood by all parties concerned. Employees and appli-cants alike do not question the logic which would deny access to hazardous materials and to facilities utilizing and processing such hazardous mater-ials to individuals whose emotional stability can be called in question as

17 a result of historical data and/or present psychometric and clinical In-formation. This logical connection would also be easily understood by the lay publ le. This kind of 11 security measure" would undoubtedly win widespread endorsement, particularly In contrast to the clandestine and unappealable procedures proposed by NRC. Applicants or employees may not like the fact that their current ad-justment status warrants their being considered as a potential risk, but they cannot refute the logic inherent in the program in light of the

• security needs which we all agree must be satisfactorily addressed
• VI. Conclusion Electrtc generating utilities, like enlightened industry generally, have experience over many years with the contributions of the science and profession of psychology. Many uttlltles, like the Baltlioore Gas and Electric Company, have In-house units employing psychologists in a wide variety of tasks. Other utilities make use of consulting psycho-logists. No utlltty~site is likely to be too remote geographically to be accessible to competent psychological consultation. We believe that the Corrmlsslon would be prudent to adopt a program similar to that cur-rently utilized by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company as described in this testimony. We predict with confidence that no affected utility would be delayed in implementing such a .program by the lack of availability of qualified psychological personnel. We are also confident that each utility, under the program we recorrmend, will find the psychologists Interested and resourceful fn adapting to local circumstan~es while meet-Ing NRC objectives.

In this testimony the Association for the Advancement of Psychology has advocated that qualified psychologists utilizing scientifically

V 18 developed and validated tests and inventories can efficiently Identify individuals whose personal lty characteristics or adjustment are associated with Increased probability of behaviors which may be hazardous if these individuals were involved in the handling of Special Nuclear Materials. We reiterate our concern that the NRC's current proposal advocates procedures which have not been scientifically validated and which, by the nature of the data acquisition and processing, can never be evaluated. In contrast, the tests and Inventories developed by psychologists and used

• In wide variety of Industrial, military, institutional and governmental agency settings can be continually evaluated for their internal consis-tency and accuracy of prediction.

I The experience of psychologists and of the organizations which have used their skills and procedures is that Improved predictions and more efficient employee assignments are possible as data are accumulated and evaluated against appropriate on-the-job cri-teria. While it is not our contention that only psychologists are profession-ally prepared to ascertain indications of potential aberrant behavior, we strongly affirm the conviction that in any professional undertaking such assessments will be significantly aided by utilizing the results of appropriate personality tests and inventories. In addition, we be-lieve that the widespread usage and acceptance of such tests and Inven-tories can legitimately enhance the credibility of the Clearance Program the NRC wishes to establish. In its report to the Commission we trust that the Hearing Board will c0fllllUnicate our contention that the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Clearance Program has the following advantages over the program proposed by the Convnisslon:

19 A. Scientifically based Instruments B. Opportunity for continuous monitoring of employee behavior and adjustment ratner than -recerttflcatlon on a periodic basis with *no at-tention to behavior/adjustment between recertification dates. C. Minimal intrusion in the privacy of employees and applicants. D. Utilization of identified Job-relevant factors In filling positions. E. Decentralized, that Is, utility-based, assessment rather than centralized, agency-based, assessment *

• F.

G. Lower Costs Consistent coordination with the company-wide program to improve working conditions and morale. H. Compatibility with the company research effort to identify indi-viduals with potential for future development and advancement. I. Coordination with the company program to provide appropriate couns-eling services to its employees on a preventive mental health model.

20 This testimony was prepared for the Association for the Advancement of Psychology by Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Dr. Roseman completed his Doctoral training In 1949 at Duke University. He ls~a Certified Psychologist Jn the State of Maryland, a Dlplomate In Clinical Psychology of the American Board of Professional Psychology, a Fellow of the American Psychological Assocfation and currently the Representative of the Maryland Psychologi-cal Association to the Council of Representatives of the American Psycho-logfcal Association. For a number of years he has provided consultation

• to individuals, industrial organizations and institutions on a variety of problems. These have Included diagnostic studies, educational and career counseling evaluations and consultations, studies for selection of management and executive personnel and provision of psychotherapy to Individuals In various stages of personal distress.

This testimony draws heavily on Dr. Roseman's experience In provid-ing consultation to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company In connection with their program of minimizing safety and security hazards as a conse-quence of possible "mental aberrations" among personnel having access to the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP). This testimony Is not to be considered as testi11Dny of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company although appropriate members of the management and legal staff of that firm have reviewed and confirmed that the description of their program In this statement is accurate. f, ve Director &

                                                                      ..        JUCKU NUMBER      p PROPOSED RULE        R-5/J, 73@

ARTHUR M. BODIN, PH.D. (,4C/ P£ _g() 7tfl~ ~ 555 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94301 (415) 328-3000 o *KETED

                                                                                   ~ $NC DIPLOMATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY                                                 DIPLOMATE IN FORENSIC PSYCII.OLOOY AM.ERIOAN BOARD OF PltOB'BSSJ.O AL PSYOHOLOOY                                       AMERCCA  BOARD OF FORENSIC PSYOHOLOOY 114 DEC 10 Pl2 :o1 Mr . Samuel J. Chilk s :e cretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

I am writing to you regarding the proposed rule of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Access Authorizaton Program and Psychological Assessment. I understand that this Commission

• has invited comment on revised regulations proposed to provide screening procedl.res to individuals with unescorted access to or control over special nuclear materials.

The current proposal is, in my opinion, much better than the 1977 proposal which was limited to full field background investigation and omitted any emotional stability certif.ication requirements. The current proposal requires a psychological assessment consistingof two components: written personality tests and a clinical interview by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist for individuals whose personality test results are either inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits. It is of great concern to me that psychological inventories alone be used to certify someone's emotional stability. These test results must be combined with a clinical irterview in every

• case to be valid. Especially considering that the evaluation of these individuals affects the safety of a nuclear plant, it

           }S absolutely imperative that both psychological tests and clinical interview be mandatory.

I heartily support the proposed requirement of a continual a behavioral observation program to be performed by the individual's supervisor. Jn addition, I would propose counseling services for those employees who pass the original screening but whose behavior manges are picked up by their supervisors. In the interest of public health and safety which could be placed in serious jeapardy should any human error or deliberate act occur which disrupts the normal functioning of a nuclear plant, I would respectfully request public hearings on this issue .

                                                          .-)

A .. . Clinical Psychologist

• CLCNlOAL PSYCHOLOGIST PL3007 MARRIAGE, FAMILY & CHILD COt.'NSELOR M2707

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                                                                                            ~      DEC 10 All :36 November OFFICERS President ROGERS H. WRIGHT, Ph.D.        Mr. Samuel J. Chilk President-Elect RUTH HOCHBERG, Ph.D.

Secretary of the Commission Past-President U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JERRY H. CLARK, Ph .D. Secretary Washington, D.C. 20555 DENNIS D. STEELE, Ph.D. Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Treasurer MILDRED G. MAYNE, M .A. Treasurer-Elect

Subject:

Proposed Regulation for Unescorted Access STEVEN T. PADGITT, Ph.D. Authorization (Psychological Assessment)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

DIRECTO RS Region I ANTONIA M. BERCOVICI , Ph.D. It has come to my attention that under these new Reg ion II CHARLES ANSELL, Ed .D. proposed regulations, psychological assessment would be Region Ill SHERRY L. SKIDMORE, Ph .D. effectively limited to evaluation by psychological tests Region IV JOAN ROTH, Ph .D. exclusively. As a professional consultant to management Region V GAIL FRANKEL, Ph .D. for some twenty-five years and as a clinical psychologist Division I MU RRAY BILMES, Ph.D. functioning in the complex area of human assessment for CHARLES A. FALTZ, Ph.D. RICHARD A. ROGAL, Ph.D. some thirty plus years, I am concerned that such regu-Division II lations will not adequately screen the subject population. Division 111 JACK STEINGART, Ed .D. Division IV STEPHEN J. DONOVIEL, Ph.D. Additionally, I know of no other instances (except Division V IVY M . MOORING, Ph.D. the most superficial of screening assessments) where Division VI JACQUELINE C. BOUHOUTSOS, Ph.D. psychological evaluation is exclusively limited to the Coalition JOAN C. CARTWRIGHT, Ph.D. outcome of psychological tests. It is axiomatic in DURAND F. JACOBS , Ph.D. APA Rep the field of psychodiagnosis and psychological evaluation MAURICE J. ZEMLICK, Ph.D. that any sensitive or predictive screening must be on the basis of both psychological tests and clinical

• LEGISLATIVE ADVOCATES LEWIS G. CARPENTER , Ph.D.

HER BERT DORKEN, Ph.D. interviews. Certainly access to nuclear sensitive areas require the highest level of prediction possible. is simply not forthcoming when psychological evaluation is limited to the results of psychological tests. Finally as one familiar with the mental health This NEWSL ETTER EDITOR problems of the nuclear industry, I am additionally DIANNE KROPP, M.A. concerned that the commission is playing Russian roulette OPERATIONS MANAGER with the selection process; no matp;;;he intent of such KAREN McCAULEY, M.A. counter productive effot. . /'JJ,A (;J_/ i ~~, f/..J; Ci_,..-- , CHAPTERS ALA MEDA CONTRA COSTA Rogers H. 1 right, Ph.D. INLAND SOUTHERN LONG BEACH Senior Partner, Fiske, Levy & Wright LOS ANGELES COUNTY MARIN Consultants to Management MID-COAST NAPA President, California State ORANGE COUNTY PASADE NA Psychological Association REDWOOD SACRAMENTO Chair, American Psychological Association SAN DIEGO SAN FERNANDO VALLEY SAN FRANCISCO Committee on Professional SAN JOAQUIN VAL LEY SAN MATEO Services Review SANTA BARBARA SANTA CLARA Former Member, Board of Directors STANISLAU S VENTURA American Psvchological Association Affiliated with the American Psychological Aisociation RHW:kr

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WILLIAM J. FEISTER, PH.D. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST LICENSE NO. PG5350 2140 PERALTA BLVD., SUITE 204 FREMONT, CALI FORNIA 94536 (415) 792-7323 December 3, 1984 Samuel J . Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

• Attn: Docketing & Service Branch

Dear Secretary Chilk:

I am writing concerning the proposed regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register on August l, 1984 - "Access Authorization Program" - (10 CFR Parts 50 & 73). I am a clinical psychologist, licensed in the state of California. For the past three years I have provided psychological assessments to the nuclear industry, as a clinical psychologist under contract with Behaviordyne Psychological Corporation of Palo Alto, California. Dur-ing that period of time I have conducted over 700 clinical intervi ews with a broad spectrum of employees, including steel workers, pipe fit-ters, welders, painters, office personnel, engineers, and control room operators .

• In addition to my work with the nuclear industry, I was the Clinical Director of a drug and alcohol treatment program for six years. I am currently the Executive Director of that program, have nine years of experience as a faculty member at various institutions of higher edu -

cation, and am a member of the American Psychological Association, California State Psychological Association, and the Alameda County Psy-chological Association. I received my license from the state of Cali-fornia in March of 1978 . I hold a Ph.D. in Education from the Univer-sity of Iowa and a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the California School of Professional Psychology. As a psychologist with extensive experience in the nuclear energy field, and having listened to a large number of employees express their concerns for plant safety, I hold the position that the NRC has a very real responsibility to establish the highest reasonable standards for the Access Authorization Program in order to assure the safety and security of the public. A thorough psychological evaluation of each and every employee is a necessary ingredient to the maintenance and improvement of public support for this industry.

U.S. NUCLEAR R(GU', \TO~Y COMMISSION POCKmw; a ,,,. '-'lC[ !"'CTION oi,;1c1: ("<~ 1 : : .r:t  ! i< 'f Ct 'rH~ CO' '/, ~ I ' ' Pa.tfmttr~ t'J*,.. ;z./4/~~ __ (;5,,i&§ b.' 0 * ,. ' / A.Jc!' I Co~!, R, - ,~.', u .1 ~ ~

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Page 2 Samue 1 J. Chil k It is my position that a good psychological evaluation can address both fitness for employment issues and radiological sabotage concerns. I have given negative evaluations to individuals with severe emotional problems, drug problems, and alcohol addictions. These individuals were clearly not fit for duty at a nuclear plant. It is my understanding that thus far, all attempts at sabotage or acts of sabotage have been committed by unhappy employees who were suffering from emotional problems. I want to emphasize that this procedure not only can, but needs to be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy of each employee. The system used by Behaviordyne, where the utility receives only a form letter, while all records are held as privileged and confidential, in-sures employee privacy. In connection with the issue of privacy, I would strongly argue against

• a policy of interviews by exception only. Such a system inappropriately identifies those individuals who are interviewed as having 11 flunked 11 the test, raises questions among their co-workers as to their emotional sta-bility, and violates their privacy by holding them up to be an exception.

Recently, while interviewing a particularly anxious employee at the Diablo Canyon site, I learned that he had previously worked at a nuclear plant that used the interview by exception procedure. Since I was inter-viewing him, he was certain that he had 11 flunked the MMPI", and that he might very possibly be up for dismissal. His manner and behavior changed considerably upon learning that everyone was given a clinical interview at this work site. He felt this was a much fairer system. The interview, in addition to serving as a vital source of psycholo-gical data, allows the employee to obtain useful feedback regarding the results of his/her written psychological screening. I find the vast ma-jority (80%-90%) value this opportunity to consult with a psychologist, and find the feedback useful and interesting. Many workers have remarked

• how they have taken the MMPI or similar tests several times, but that this was the first time they were ever given any results. And they appreciate getting somethdng in return for the time and effort that t hey put into completing the inventory.

Finally, on occasion the interview allows me to recommend counseling to an employee who may be experiencing minor transitory or marital pro-blems, but for whom certification is still appropriate. I believe that can produce a more committed and stable employee. In summary, I strongly recommend the inclusion of a psychological evaluation as a part of the Access Authorization Program. I am quite certain that the .process needs to include both psychological testing and a clinical interview. I strongly urge you to hold public hearings before the Commission acts on the proposed regulations.

Page 3 Thank you for your time and consideration. Sincerely, 6/if!Z~ Clinical Psychologist WJF:dch

Telephone (412) 393-6000 Nuclear Division P. 0. Box 4 OCtKETEEl Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 USNRC December 3, 1984 Secretary of the Commission ~ DEC -7 P2 :44 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Off IC~ OF SEGRt. iAH Y Attn: Docketing and Service Branch OOCKHtNG & SERVICf BRANCH .

Reference:

Proposed Rule; 10CFR Parts 50 and 73, Access Authorization Program (49 FR 30726) and, Draft Regulatory Guide and Value/Impact Statement on Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants, September 1984.

• Gentlemen:

The Duquesne Light Company welcomes the opportunity to comment on the proposed Access Authorization Program as referenced above. It is understood that prior to granting an individual access to a protected or vital area in a nuclear power plant, a thorough investigation of an individuals identity, behavior and trustworthiness must be completed. We agree that such investiga-tions are important for the continued assurance that nuclear power plants are operated and maintained in such a way that the separate actions of an indi-vidual would not jeopardize the ability to safely operate and shut down any plant. The background investigation as described in the proposed rule when combined with psychological assessment could have a significant cost impact on the operation of nuclear power plants. In order to determine and be able to predict that individuals seeking unescorted access would act in a manner that would protect public health and minimize danger to life and property would require increased time to adequately perform the necessary eva 1uations. In order to utilize temporary employees during periods of operation or shutdown, it is necessary to first hire these individuals and then perform background and psychological checks. During this period of time, these employees would not have unescorted access to the restricted areas in the plant and continuous escorting would be required. The cost of employment for minimally productive work along with the cost for escorts does not appear to be adequately addressed for the period of time it would take to complete background investigations and psychological assessments. It is recommended that before a final rule on access authorization is implemented, a complete cost/benefit analyses be performed. The proposed rule, as written, appears to represent an effort to protect a nuclear plant from the actions of an individual in an absolute fashion . While desirable, the achievement of absolute assurances that adequate programs are in place to protect against individual abhorent behavior may not be possible. The use of written tests to predict whether licensee's employees or

U.S. 1-/UCLEAR REGrJ, .( f6RV COMM( ssror-1 DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE Of THE SECRET A.RY OF THE COMMIS:.ICN Postmark 0 111~ . Copies Re<'er -*~ ;

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Proposed Rule; 10CFR Parts 50 and 73, Access Authorization Program (49 FR 30726) and, Draft Regulatory Gui de and Value/Impact Statement on Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants, September 1984. Page 2 . contractor personnel have a potential for commiting acts that are inimical to the public health and safety or present a danger to life or property has not been established. The draft Regulatory Guide and Value/Impact Statement on Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants (September 1984) states that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF) are considered acceptable for predicting emotional instability. With respect to the use of the MMPI, the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) recently quoted an expert at the National Institute of Mental Health in a letter to the NRC Director of the Office of Administration (dated September 27, 1984) by saying, 11 It must be recognized that the MMPI, or any other personality measure that might be used, has questionable predictive value for behavior of concern to the NRC. 11 In addition, as indicated in the 0MB letter, the NRC staff was 11 unable to validate any data base that this test was used for the purpose that we would try to adapt it to. 11 It is my opinion that the use of invalidated methods for psychological assessments will result in very subjective conclusions and that consistent and absolute results are highly unlikely. There are decided differences of opinion between experts in the field of psychological assessment. Correspondence between the Office of Management and Budget and the National Institute of Mental Health has questioned whether there existed any psychological evaluation that could be considered valid in predicting the future behavior of individuals when the criteria set forth in this proposed rule has been applied. The value of such an assessment is too much in question and the results may be too inconclusive to be useful. Therefore, it is recommended that the section on psychological assessment in the proposed rule be deleted. Rather, it would be more useful that while performing background investigations, guidelines be developed that would permit i dentifi cation of undesirable psychol ogi ca 1 traits when i ntervi ewi ng individuals cognizant of an applicants behavior.

• The section of the proposed rule addressing continual behavioral obser-vations appears to also have some shortcomings. The successful safe operation of a nuclear plant is a result of a series of checks and verifications that all systems are properly aligned and in proper operating order. The existing practices which include performance testing of components following maintenance activities and the redundant verification of systems operability combined with the inherent design of nuclear plants to be capable of being safely shut down following postulated equipment failures preclude the need to further investigate an individuals potential to individually place the plant in an unsafe condition.

Successful operation of a nuclear plant is also a function of good employee morale. Incorporation of a continual behavioral observation program would serve to undermine steps taken to maintain high employee morale. It is my opinion that the issue of the demoralizing effect on employees due to the implementation of a program of this type has not been adequately considered. Such a program may, in fact, result in employee behavior becoming adverse to safety.

 .. Proposed Rule; 10CFR Parts 50 and 73, Access Authorization Program (49 FR 30726) and, Draft Regulatory Gui de and Value/ Impact Statement on Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants, September 1984.

Page 3 The success of this type of program is heavily dependent on a very extensive training program for all employees since it relies on subjective determinations. Supervisors are not qualified to evaluate changes in behavior patterns except in extreme cases, and even then it would not necessarily indicate that the individual would or could compromize plant safety. The formation of "amateur psychologists" has every potential for creating issues on employee behavior where they do not exist. The 0MB letter references the Ethical Pri nci pl es of Psychologists and quotes, 11 Psychologists do not encourage or promote the use of psychological assessment techniques by inappropriately trained or otherwise unqualified persons through teaching, sponsorship, or supervision. 11 We do not feel that a training program of any duration can be given which would qualify individuals to make the type of judgements called for in this section or provide any greater assurances that continued safe operation is threatened. Existing practices for assuring continued safe operation are adequate and therefore, we recommend that the section on continual behavioral observation be deleted from the proposed rule. When performing routine evaluations of an employees performance, it would be more acceptable to consider at that time his behavior and if his behavior trends are changing. Current programs exist to evaluate an employees perfor-mance and key indicators could be added which would allow some assessment of his behavior rather than attempting to incorporate the extensive guidelines provided in the proposed rule. We feel very strongly that the requirements in this proposed rule are excessive when compared to other similar private industries that have the potential to have as much, or more, impact on the health and safety of the general public. Very truly yours,

                                                                ~

J. Carey ce President, Nuclear

• l1 11:lnileb 78r.oll!erl!nob of O}arpenfers nnb ~oiners of ),merica WILLIAM A. McGOWAN 101 CONSTITUTION AV E ., N. W.

GENERAL COUNSEL WASHINGTON, D. C. 2 0001 KATHY L. KRIEGER 202-546-6206 ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL

                                                                      @ ~ *1 EDWARD J. GORMAN, Ill ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL uOCKET rqtJ MBER PR 0

R0POSED RULE -52J, 73 ~ December 7, {_.fCI /=/!, Je; 7 zt) ~ Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,D.C.20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

• Re:

Dear Mr. Ch ilk:

Proposed Rule on Personnel Access 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 (49 Fed.Reg. 30726 - 30739 (August 1,1984)] This letter is submitted in response to the Commission's notice published on August 1, 1984, soliciting public comment on proposed regulatory amendments governing authorization of unescorted access to protected areas and vital islands at nuclear power plants. The membership of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America includes numerous employees who work for contractors involved in construction, alteration, repair, equipment installation, maintenance and cleanup tasks associated with nuclear power facilities. This labor organization, while recognizing security needs, is also concerned that the competent and reliable employees we represent not be unfairly excluded from employment at such facilities through arbitrary or unreliable screening processes, or in circumstances where the individual has no adequate means of redress. A recurring problem arises where the licensee utility controls the security and psychological screening process - often contracted out to other private firms - - through which all contractors working at the facility must clear their own personnel. We have seen situations in which a capable and exemplary employee, with many years' experience working at the utility jobsite, is sent out to work for a contractor but is rejected by the licensee's screening or testing firm. This rejection could arise from, for example, poor performance on a one-shot psychological assessment when the employee was simply having a "bad day"; a false positive reading in some medical screening test; inaccurate information obtained in a background check; or any number of other circumstances that would not in fact warrant exclusion from the jobsite. Whatever the basis for

Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 exclusion, the employee may be deprived of effective redress. Even if his immediate employer is signatory to a collective bargaining agreement containing a fair grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration, that employer is not the party who excluded the employee and is not able to rectify the erroneous exclusion. Where the licensee or its screening firms, who actually control the matter, is not bound by the results of the grievance proceeding and is not required to deal with the Uni on , we may be effectively powerless to protect an innocent employee's rights. This situation could be ameliorated if the licensee were required to participate in the contractual grievance procedure along with the affected contractor. The problem of workers penalized without redress is exacerbat e d when the licensee uses procedures or criteria that are unreliable, unproven, subject to abuse, or administered by personnel without special expertise in making sophisticated objective behavioral evaluations. Some of the proposed supervisors' monitoring guidelines, for example EAppendix C), seem to lend themselves to abuse or arbitrary, subjective application in practice. And unions are all too familiar with the use of psychological or personality testing to identify and weed out "troublemakers" such as union activists. When medical tests are used, employees would be batter protected if there were some guidelines or safeguards to ensure the validity of tests and minimize the possibility of rejection for false positive readings

• on overly sensitive tests
• We thank the Commission for the opportunity to register some of our concerns in this area.

Sincerely,

                                             ;J{J(4{/u KLK/elp                                  Kathy L. Krieger Associate General Counsel

Edward J, Carlough SHEET *, I I, 1750 New York Avenue, N .W . General President METAL Washington, D.C. WORKFM' OEC - 7 P3 :53 20006 HAND INTERNATIONAL 202/783-5880 DE L I VE R E D Assogfy~!<?N ... L - t : :.. ~ 0 ~ TING . S VI ,f. December 5, 1 CH

• U. S. Nuclear Regulat ory Commission Secretary of the Commission Washington , D. C.

ATTENTION : 20555 Docketing and Service Branch To Whom It. May Concern : The Sheet Metal Workers Inte rnational Association wishes to go on record on its position to oppose the proposed rule of the Nuclear Regulatory Connnission regarding the Access Authorization Program (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73) for the following reasons:

1) Psychological testing or any other similar testing has never proven to be conclusive in their findi ngs .

• • 2) Historically , many previous government projects requiring security and access have received full support from t he constr uction workers without individual psychological testing .

3) Beha~ioral observation has always existed in the construction and maintenance of nuclear power plants . This supervision is a part of management ' s rights, and to place the worker and supervisor under the proposed guidelines as suggested by this proposed rule will create an enor mous problem which presently does not exist.

4) Psychological testing & behavioral observation under this proposed rule involves the basic fundamental r i ghts guaranteed the worker by the Constitution of this country. Any or all initial findings affecting a qualified worker's livelihood would bring about second or even third time requests for re-evaluation by that worker,

5) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shoul d al lo,;v the construction worker to stand on the past practice of access author i zation by employment and supervision through management.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGUt ATO~Y COMMISSION DOCKET!, G & SEHICE SECTION o* r*-~ r .~ T *~ ::F"i:'.~ f .O Y

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6) Additional rules concerning the workemwill only place them in dissension and would have damaging results in their workmanship .

Trusting this will clarify our position , I am

• EJC:tmf EDWARD J. CARLOUGH General President cc : Robert Georgine Gerry Olejniczak, NTF James Nixon, I.R .

OOCKH NUMBtR-PR-

                                                                               !?ROPOS£0 RULE      -5°a 73 ~

EQUIFAX {4q ;::~ .J~ 72~) SERVICES Home Office 1600 Peachtree Street, N.W. Post Office Box 4081 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 OOCKETEfl (404) 885-8000 USNRC December 6, 1984 OFFiCE OF SEGRt iAH" Secretary OOCKfi 1NG & SERVICi, United States Nuclear BRANCH Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Docketing & Service Branch

• On behalf of Equifax Services Inc., I am writing to respond to your request for public comment on proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73, which would establish new requirements for an Access Authorization Program, inc l ud i ng . mandatory background investigations.

Equifax Services presently provides background investigations on employees and prospective employees to over 9,000 clients across North America, including both private industry and government agencies. Our experience in gathering and reporting information goes back over 80 years, and we complete over 300,000 individual reports each year. We have served the nuclear industry since the late 1970's, and our clients include approximately 200 nuclear utilities and contractors -- comprising about 45% of all nuclear licensees. A sample of our report services to the nuclear power industry is attached to this letter.

• Comment was specifically requested on eleven questions concerning
• the proposed requirements . Not all of these questions touch on matters with which Equifax Services has had direct experience; however, we would like to comment with specific respect to the proposal to conduct mandatory background investigations of employees and prospective employees who are seeking unescorted access to protected areas and/or vital islands at nuclear power plants.

1. " To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commer-cial power reactor industry?"

Use of background investigations is an accepted selection and screening tool . In our experience, it appears that the ma j ority of licensees use some form of background investigation -- although the scope and detail of investigations often varies significantly from one utility to another . Most such programs cover utility employees who require unescorted access; less attention is typically given to contractor personnel, although they Equifax Services Inc., an Equifax Inc. Company

• Home Office Atlanta, Georgia

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO~ DOCKETING & SERVICE SECT ION OFFICE CF THE :.ECRET ARY OF T!~~ -, -~ * * "*<: c; lCN Postm*rk ! *:,, Coitici r.., *

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I logically represent the same threat of insider sabotage.

     "To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?"

Equifax Services is not in the business of conducting either psychological assessment programs or behavioral reliability programs. However, as a normal component of our services to the nuclear industry, we often arrange for such programs to be con-ducted by appropriate professionals, coordinating these programs with our background investigations to provide a comprehensive nuclear security package. From our knowledge of the nuclear industry, we estimate that 90% of licensees include some form of psychological assessment and/or behavorial reliability tool as part of their physical security plan *

3. "What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed a ccess a uthori z ation rul e ?"

With respect to background investigations which may affect a person's conditions of employment, civil liberties concerns have already been addressed by federal law. Consumer reporting agencies such as Equifax Services are required by The Fair Credit Reporting Act (U.s.c. 1681) to "adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce, for *** information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy and proper utilization of such information *** " Thus, employees and prospective employees of licensees are given important legal rights when background investigations are completed by consumer reporting agencies . These very specific protections in the area of collection, maintenance and distribution of personal

• information include the following points:

A reporting agency may issue a report on an individual only in connection with a legitimate transaction involving that indi-vidual, such as consideration for an employment assignment, promotion or transfer. Strict procedures must be maintained to insure that, when public record information is likely to have an adverse effect on con-ditions of employment, it is complete and up-to-date at the time the report is completed. This includes public records relating to arrests, indictments, convictions, suits, tax liens and out-standing judgments. If an individual should actually be denied employment, either wholly or partially because of information s upplied by a consumer reporting agency, he or she must be notified of that fact by the prospective employer, and supplied with the name and address of the reporting agency.

I Upon request, an individual has the right to disclosure of information concerning the investigation in the reporting agency ' s files . Such information may be obtained in person or by telephone. A reporting agency must reinvestigate the completeness or accuracy of any information in the files that is disputed by the individual. Any disputed information which cannot currently be reconfirmed by the reporting agency must be deleted from its files, and - at the individual's request - a corrected report must be sent to those who have received the deleted information within the prior two years. Every individual has the right to make a written statement concerning disputed information which has been reconfirmed, and that statement must be included in all future reports which contain the reconfirmed information . As a result of these provisions and others, when background invest-igations are obtained from a consumer reporting agency, the areas of potential concern in the proposed rule have been addressed by federal law.

6. "Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by *** background investi-gations *** ?"

Equifax Services has no information which would directly equate the criteria indicating a potential risk or exposure with an actual future act of insider sabotage. However, it may be helpful to illustrate the degree to which these exposures may exist in the

• general population of prospective employees. In a recent study completed on over 4,000 background investigations over 2 . 5%

developed criminal convictions not admitted on the application. In another study, background investigations developed information which differed from that provided on the employment application in 46% of the cases . Of these, 26% involved conflicts in employment data , and 14% in education data supplied by the applicant. In a third study, 60% of the investigations developed conflicts in employ-ment, education or criminal history. In addition to the preceding comments on points where comment was specifically requested, Equifax Services would like to suggest the following additional points for consideration. I. An effective access authorization program, to fulfill its intent, should require standardized background investigations on all people who are seeking unescorted access into protected areas and/or vital islands at a nuclear power plant. The 1980

I U.S. NRC study, NUREG-0703 - Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders, indicated that typical insider saboteurs were motivated by psychological problems, disgruntlement and revenge, and acted within two years of being hired. These characteristics, plus the fact that plant employees are usually the most knowledgeable about the loca-tion of vital equipment, how it works and routine plant operations, suggest that present employees could represent a serious source of potential sabotage. It seems therefore, that background investigations should cover recent hires who currently have unescorted access clearance, obtained prior to adoption of consistant standards. II. Legislation permitting access to National Crime Information Center records in connection with nuclear security programs was introduced in the 98th Congress but failed passage. If similar legislation is enacted by the 99th Congress it should still be recognized that a check of NCIC records alone does not provide assurance that complete criminal history will be obtaine d. NCIC i s totally dependa nt on input from state and local agencies and therefore the records may not be complete and up-to-date at any given time. Although licensee access to NCIC records is helpful, more may be needed. Recently, in response to an inquiry from Equifax Services, an FBI official estimated that NCIC received notice of less than 50% of the twelve million felony and misdemeanor arrests in the U.S. each year. Consideration should be given to: 0 The need for auxiliary criminal record checks, i.e., public record conviction information, in the counties of residence for the specified time period of the backg r ound investigation.

• The thousands of contractor employees who must be cleared for 0

unescorted access and therefore must be fingerprinted in order to process through NCIC. Delays in permanent clearances are inevitable, and local record checks provide a way to speed the clearance process.

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CDiifrol

• Offices Nationwide
• Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Att: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

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Dear Secretary of the Commission:

DOCf(.f;- 11 , 0 ~ \{l* lil. .< BRANCH KV /Cf. This letter is in response to the request for comments on the proposed assess regulation whdch appeared in the federal register. Corporate StressControl Services*, Inc.

• has been providing psychological screening for Un-escor~edAssess Authorization and Continuous Bepavior Observation Training Programs to both nuclear plant licensees and contractors since 1978. Since that time we have conducted in excess of 15,000 scr een ings and trained in excess of 2,000 supervisors. StressControl also participated in the research efforts resulting in NU REG'S 2075 and 2076.

Our Unescorted Assess Authorization screening procedure employee the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality In-ventory, and a proprietary instrument, the Client Information Booklet, which investigates areas of social development, task performance, prudence, stress, substance abuse and honesty, each area investigated from a historical, attitudinal and behavioral per-spective. In addition, a face to face structured interview is conducted by a licenced psychologist *

• Our rejection rate from the inception of our testing program has averaged 3.2%. The majority of these cases received second opinion interviews and in some cases thrid opinion interviews. It is worthy of note that in a recent study conducted by Stress Control of the last fifty individuals found un-acceptable for Unescorted Assess Authorization only one of these individuals had disqualifying factors appear on his background information. The fact that only one of these was found between background in-vestigations and psychological screenings suggests strongly that these two screening procedures are both nesessary and independent of one another. Individuals which we have rejected were experiencing a broad range of problems including schizophrenia, mania, major depressive episodes,paranoia, psychopathology, impulse control problems,ect. Upon investigation many of these individuals were found to have on the job behavioral histories consistent with our findings. These quite frequently include:

Corporate StressControl Services, Inc. 320 E. 65th Street New York, New York 10021 (212) 288-2220

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which did not show up on background information. On our Continuous Behavior Observation Training Program we have trained over 2,000 supervisors and managers to identify early symptoms of aberrant behavior which if left unchecked would compromise the safety and health of the individual involved or his co-workers. Our statistics show an increase of 13.4% manager and supervisory referrals to our counseling programs in the months following these presentations. Once again this would seem to argue in fa~or of *the *e tficaay of such training programs to reduce the likelihood of destructive behavior in the work environment. Our training programs are one full day and involve didactic sections, esper-iental componenets and video-tapes. A note on our counseling services. National Utilization Statistics show that over the course of a year ap-proximately four to six percent of employees will use a corporate sponsered utilization rates averaging over 8% and soaring as high as 18% for certain groups of individauls such as control room operators. These high utilization rates clearly indicate that stress levels among muclear plant employees are higher than average, thus, pointing out the need for psychological screening in areas such as stress tolerance *

• In summary, we feel strongly about the crucial importance of including both psychological screening and Continuous Behavior Observation Training along with background investigations as part of the package in any forthcoming regulations.

Sincerely,

                         \ 10lvwd 1 ~~M 1-~

Howard I. Glazer, Ph.D President, Corporate StressControl Services, Inc. P.S. _we req1;1est a1; opportunity to participate in any public hearing which are scheduled on this matter. Corporate StressControl Services, Inc. 320 E. 65th Street New York, New York 10021 (212) 288-2220

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• r~ Central California I. M. Abou-Ghorra, Ph.D.

Psychological Services DCU'EY: President U5NRC November 30, 1984 To: Mr. Samuel J. Chilk <34 DEC -7 P2 :o4 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch From: I.M. Abou-Ghorra, Ph.D. Psychologist I am writing with regard to the revised regulations proposed to provide screening procedures to individuals with unescorted access to or control over special nunclear

• materials, (Federal Register Vol. 49, No. 149, 8/1/84, pp. 30726-30734.)

As a Clinical and Industrial/Organizational Psychologist (for the past 28 years), I wish to corrmend the Commission on its recognition of the value of psychological assessment of personnel in Nuclear Industry. Psychological evaluations are most useful when they combine standardized testing, individual clinical interviews and behavioral observations. All components of the assessment compliment each other to provide the most valid index of the fitness of the employee. "False Positives and False Negatives" in psychological testing, is a phenomenon that must not be ignored. All test results must be examined and understood in the light of face to face inter-views and observations. It is necessary to gain full insight into the individual from data obtained from the knowledge of the employee's history, present functioning, intellectual style, emotional stability, frustration tolerance and crisis/stress management ..* Considering the dangers of negligence and mishandling of nuclear operations and materials, care and precaution must be taken in selecting the responsible personnel with unescorted access to or control over nuclear materials. I urge the adoption

• of a strong psychological assessment program which includes both psychological testing and clinical interviews simulataneously.

I.M. Abou-Ghorra, Ph.D. Professor of Psychology IMA:ss lOH W t13X:~~~ ~K& X~-i<

• Fresno, Callfornia:i9.elal
• 209/2~6603 P.0. Box 8219 93747

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(.+c; Pe j() 7~) ~ MORRIS ROSEMAN, Ph.D., P.A. DIRECT All CORRESPONDENCE TO: DIPLOMATE IN CLINICAi. PSYCHOLOGY, SUITE 318 AMER ICAN BOARD Of PROFESSIONAi. PSYCHOLOGY SUITE 3602 2360 JOPPA ROAD 222 SAINT PAUL PLACE BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21093 OOCK Mtl'MORE, MARYLAND 21202 (301) 837-0830 USN ,.. (301) 837-0830 (GREENSPRING STATION) " (TREMONT PLAZA HOTEL)

                                                                                              .84 DEG - 7 P12 :sa December 5, 1 984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.       20555 ATTENTION:     Docke ting and Service Branch RE:     Proposed Rul e - Access Authorization Program - 10CFR Parts 50 and 73 (Federal Register Vol. 49, No. 149, 8-01-84, pp. 30726 - 30734)

Dear Sir:

My comments on the p roposed Rule are based on my extensive experience in psychological assessment and, more specifically, in the assessment of individuals employed or seeking employment in nuclear power plants. The Commission has 1 isted eleven specific questions for

• public comment. In my remarks below I will detail my reactions to these specific questions.

First, I would 1 ike to state my opinion--very emphatically-- that the strength of the proposal is its recognition that all three parts of the personnel screening program--Background Investi-gation; Psychological Assessment; Continuous Behavioral Observa-tion--are essential and integral parts of the program to assess the reliability and trustworthiness of employees in nuclea r power plants. I believe the proposed Rule will serve the commercial power reactor industry well, will protect employees and those seeking employment and, above all, reinforce the confidence of the general public that appropriate steps--under the critical supervision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--are being taken to protect the environment and the health, safety and security of the public.

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RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 2 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. The combination of three components In the proposed access authorization program reflects an awareness that l lvlng is a d y n a mi c p r o c e s s ; I f we kn-ow t h e p e r s o n ' s pa s t ( Ba c kg r o u n d Investigation) and present status (Psychological Assessment) we can make effective predictions about future behavior that can be monitored (Continual Behavioral Observation). PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS:

• My Ph.D. In psychology was received from Duke Univer-sity In 1949. I am a Diplomate In Clinical Psychology of the American Board of Professional Psychology, am a licensed psycholo-
• gist In the State of Maryland (#2), and am 1 isted in the National Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology.
• From 1949 through 1966 I worked for the Veteran's Administration in several psychiatric hospitals and in a mental hygiene clinic as Assistant Chief Clinical Psychologist and Chief Clinical Psychologist at those facilities.
• From 1966 through 1969 I was Associate Professor at the School of Dentistry of the University of Maryland and taught courses In human behavior. In addition, over the years have taught undergraduate and graduate courses in psychology at the University of Kentucky, Morgan State University, Johns Hopkins University and the University of Baltimore
• I have taught courses
• in abnormal 1956.

psychology and In advanced assessment techniques. Since July, 1979, In my Independent practice I have been in full practice, continuing the part-time activities which I began In time Independent provide consultation to industry as well as diagnosis and treatment of Individuals ex-periencing a wide variety of psychological difficulties.

• Since 1977 I have been a consultant to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company In the planning and conduct of their program to screen applicants and employees at the Calvert Cl lffs Nuclear Power Plant.
• I participated in the proceedings of the NRC Hearing Board (July 10, 1978 - July 12, 1978) both via written testimony presented by the Association for the Advancement of Psychology and In direct testimony to the Hearing Board.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 3 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D.

• With the late Dr. Theodore E. Hariton, then Director of Psychological Services of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, I presented a paper on 11 Rel iable Human Performance in Nuclear Power Plants: A Behavioral Science Approach 11 at the American Nuclear Society, Atlanta, Georgia, June, 1979.
• I served as consultant to Assessment Designs, Incor-porated, in del lberations which led to the preparation of the August, 1980, Job Analysi~ Report (Position: security personnel) under NRC Contract RS.-0SD-70-002. I also served as a consultant to Personnel Decisions Research Institute In the preparation of their technical report Number 62, 11 Predlctlon of Inappropriate, Unrel fable, or Aberrant Job Beha.vlor In Nuclear Power Plant Se,ttlng 11 pub.1 !shed by the Edison Electric Institute In 1981.
• I organized and conducted a symposium at the 1980 meeting of the American Psychological Association on 11 Psychologi-cal Evaluations of Nuclear Power Employees: Social/Ethical/

Methodological lssues. 11

• Since 1977 I have personally Interviewed over 2,000 Individuals who were being processed for proposed unescorted access at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The people have Interviewed range from technical experts to gardeners and janitors, included men and women from late adolescence to their late sixties, union members and non-union workers, permanent
• company employees and itinerant special lsts such as health physics technicians.

With this background of training and experience and direct involvement with the philosophy, planning and administration of a screening program for nuclear power plant personnel I feel very keenly the responslbil ity to offer comments on the proposed Rule. have some appreciation of the nature and extent ,of del lbera-tlons within the NRC which have been Involved In the generation of the proposed Ru~e. In my opinion, the proposed Rule, long awaited, when modified with suggestions such as I *have made, will serve all interested parties well. MR:mfg

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 4 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question l: 11 To what extent are the proposals contained In the proposed access authorization rules already In place in the commercial power reactor Industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear Industry as part of employee screening programs? 11 The best source of data I know is contained in Figure l of SECY-83-311A (September 15, 1983) relating to the Proposed Insider Safeguard Rules. That Figure (Pages 16 - 18 of Attachment 3 to Enclosure A) shows that of 39 licensees surveyed all reported that they used parts of the Background Investigation, all except nine

• had some form of Psychological Assessment Procedure and all ex-cept eleven had some formal Behavioral Observation program.

Interviewees who have worked In facilities all over the country have commented to me during cl lnlcal Interviews that they have been given psychological tests at most of these facll itles. Many of these individuals have also been Interviewed by psycholo-gists or psychiatrists. At professional meetings and conventions I have talked to many psychologists who provide psychological services as employees or consultants to the commercial power reactor industry. They report being Involved in the establishment, administration, conduct, monitoring and evaluation of the Psychological Assess-

• ment component of the access authorization program of the utll itles they serve.

A number of the psychologists have told me that they are also participating In the establishment of Continual Behavioral Observation (CBO) programs. Based on the data available In SECY-83-311A and my personal Impression, it would appear that all commercial power reactor In-dustry facilities currently Include some kind of Background Investigation, while approximately 75% of such facilities also have programs which include the Psychological Assessment and Continual Behavior Observation components.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 5 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 2: 11 What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear Industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both7 11 The Psychological Assessment procedures proposed In the Rule would screen out Individuals with a high probability of behaving Irrationally and exhibiting poor judgment. It would therefore protect against the threat of serious and possibly catastrophic accidents due to Impaired psychological functioning, emotional

• instability or other forms of unreliable behavior. The Psychologi-cal Assessment procedures would significantly reduce the l ikel I-hood that Individuals who were intolerant of the occupational stresses 1 ikely to be experienced in commercial power reactor activity would be able to obtain access. Among the groups of individuals that would be excluded are individuals with histories of dishonesty and criminal behavior, alcohol ism and/or substance abuse, persons who are emotionally unstable and individuals who are accident prone, Impulsive and Inattentive.

Radiological sabotage in which radioactive materials are Inadvertently released Into the environment Is an event which Howe,ve r, it Is my cannot be discounted as a matter of concern. understanding that there has never been such an Incident verified in the history of the commercial power reactor Industry In the United States. To establish a program which would have as its major focus protection against an event of such low apparent probability would be illogical. To choose the limited criterion of radiological sabotage alone would be to overlook the pressing concern to reduce the probabl l lty of unrel table behavior that could result In Industrial sabotage or malicious mischief. Psychological assessment programs such as those outlined In the proposed Rule are very well adapted and have demonstrated their effectiveness when used for this purpose. Fitness for duty deals with the moment-to-moment status of an individual to deal with the specific task requirements assigned

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 6 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman Response to Question 2, Cont'd. in the regular operation of the uti l lty and with the specialized needs which might occur In an emergency situation. Psychological assessment proyides a general Indication of the Individual 1 s ability to adjust and to cope. It can estimate the lndlvidual 1 s likelihood of behaving Inappropriately under additional strains such as fatigue, illness and psychological trauma. The probabili-ty is high that there are many lndlvlduals--especlally if they have been selected initially in a fashion which will ensure their emotional stabll lty at the time of access authorization--who would voluntarily remove themselves from work situations when they question their own fitness for duty. recall one situation in which an armed security guard, who was under severe emotional stress because of family problems, requested that he be relieved from his duties because he felt that he could not function adequately or safely. In many instances, individuals who 11 call in sick 11 are effectively recognizing that at that time, they are 11 not fit for duty. 11 The program of Continual Behavioral Observation, In my opinion, represents the most efficient technique currently avail-able for monitoring fitness for duy. It seems 1 ikely that in the future some 11 sign-on 11 procedures could be developed which would sample psychological and physiological variables such as abll lty

• to maintain attention in the face of distractions, heart rate, blood pressure, etc. which could then serve to Identify individuals whose Immediate fitness is questionable. Developing such pro-cedures would be quite expensive since the research required to designate appropriate criteria would be extremely complex because the criteria would vary from position to position. For example, a very slight Impairment in the ability to resist distraction might significantly reduce the fitness for duty of control room operators while the same level of dlstractabil tty would have only minimal impact on the fitness for duty of a decontamination technician.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 7 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 3: "What are the particular concerns about infringe-ments on civil 1 iberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested In specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequate-ly demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives. In my opinion there is no necessary connection between the components of the proposed access authorization Rule and any

• potential infringement on civil liberties. As components can be administered In a fashion which will not diminish, the civil I see it, the protect, liberties of applicants and employees.

(I am now and have been a member of the American Civil Liberties Union for many years.) Applicants and employees for many jobs--certainly those In-volving sensitive duties such as air traffic controller, law enforcement officers, etc.--are expected to undergo evaluations similar to those of the proposed Rule. The process of Investi-gation, per~* does not constitute a curtailment of civil liberties and It does not necessarily produce a "chilling effect. 11 The proposed Rules specifically prohibit rejection of an Indivi-

• dual for political affiliation, association, etc.

As individual I read the propose Rule, 1 it would not curtail the s rights of privacy, freedom of dissent, freedom of speech, freedom of association or 1 lmlt access to legal due process. The proposed Rule ls very explicit In indicating the procedures to be followed to protect the data developed during the Background Investigations, in the Psychological Assessment procedures and In Continual Behavioral Observations. It must be recognized that many of the data relevant to the Background Investigation are matters of publ le knowledge and pub*l le record. The proposed Rule expl icltly requires that

                                     )

derogatory information be substantiated by Independent observers. This Insures that gossip and personal malevolence will not inter-fere with an indlvldual 1 s ability to be employed in the commercial power reactor industry.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 8 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Response to Question 3, Cont 1 d. know of no data which would suggest that the management of any nuclear power facll lty has ever initiated reprisals against an employee because of opinions or associations. If such Indivi-duals decide to curtail their expression out of a fear of poten-tial reprisal by manag~ment or fellow employees this ls clearly not a function of the access authorization program. Nothing re-lated to the Background Investigation component, the Psychological Assessment component or Continuous Behavioral Observation com-ponent can produce this result. A study conducted by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

• (transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Pol icy Evaluation, on November 28, 1983) clearly demonstrates that the Psychological Assessment component was non-discriminatory as to race and sex.

Even individuals with low literacy or poor comprehension are not denied employment on the basis of psychological test performance. Audio-tape versions of the M~PI, for example, are available and have been used extensively In facll I ties where I have served as a consultant. For individuals who are completely unable to respond to the standard format of the psychological tests--because of language difficulties, prlmarily--lnterviews are conducted to Insure that their probability of employment ls no different than

• that of their l Iterate peers.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 9 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman 11 Question 4: What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to Initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assess-ment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an Individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors? Objective diagnostic tests have been widely used by psycholo-gists for a variety of purposes. The Initiation of overall clinical assessments Is one such purpose. Textbooks on psycholo-glcal assessment procedures provide excellent reviews of the development, util lty and effectiveness of such tools. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission contracted with Assessment Designs, Incor-porated, of Orlando, Florida (Contract Number RS-OSD-70-002), to identify the critical demands and activities of the security personnel in nuclear plants. One of the tasks accompl !shed by this contract was to evaluate the utility and appropriateness of various measurement Instruments to select nuclear plant security guards based on their emotional stability. The report of this contract details a very thorough 1 iterature review and provides a very careful and meticulously thorough analysis on five objec-tive diagnostic tests. These include the MMPI, the 16 PF, the California Psychological Inventory, the Gordon Personal lty Pro-file and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Appendix C of that report provides detailed information on the history of each of these tests, the measurement considerations (reliability and validity), and deals with cost of development and administration, compliance with legal guidelines, etc. It would be Inappropriate to repeat that detailed material here but the Commission should not overlook its own archives and data--especlal ly when they are as Informative as the report prepared by Assessment Designs, Incor-porated. The Commission might wish to note that the contractor prepared a tabulation (Page 24 - 7.4 matrix) which rates the personality tests, a variety of physiological measurement instru-ments, pre-employment interviews, background reference checks and

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 10 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman Response to Question 4, Cont'd. a variety of other measurement Instruments on many variables relevant to determining their util lty for screening certain categories of personnel in the commercial power reactor Industry. I have taken the 1 iberty to reproduce Table 1 from Appendix A of that Report which 1 lsts behaviors and behavioral patterns associated with risks to nuclear facll lty security. Because of the Commission's concern for the val ldlty of any procedure utll ized f~r employee screening, would commend to the Commissioners the detailed discussion of both the theory and application of val ldlty In the Assessment Designs report (Page A-16

• through A-28). I believe that the Commission will find it especially instructive to review some of the issues relevant to establishing a criterion. Only if the criterion ls well-defined and can be measured accurately. can any predictor (personal lty test, interview, rating, etc.) be appropriately evaluated.

In my teaching responslbll !ties, both at the undergraduate and graduate level, have taught about these instruments and I know them thoroughly. I have used the MMPI in research and in case reports presented to professional meetings. I have taught the use of both the MMPI and 16 PF In professional workshops for psychologists and related professionals. In my Independent professional practice I have used both tools with clients whose

• problems ranged from career selection to severe emotional distress.

I know these instruments wel 1. 1 imitations and I know their potentialities and I recognize that one test alone--or tests alone-- do not convey the full picture of an individual. Therefore, it ls clear to me that the two-tiered approach, originally recommend-ed In ANSI 18.17 (1973), utilizing a clinical Interview conducted by appropriately qual I fled psychologists and psychiatrists for individuals whose psychological test data are suspect was--and still ls--the most appropriate procedure to follow. I am sure that the Commission is well aware that this type of approach, the two-tiered approach to assessment, ls standard practice and widely used in both employment and clinical situa-tions.

RE: Proposed NRG Rule Page 11 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Response to Question 4, Cont 1 d. The report submitted to the Commission In response to SECY-83-311A by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (See Question 3) provides specific examples about the kinds of Individuals screened out through the combined use of psycholo-gical testing and clinical interviews. I believe that those data and case reports are similar to the experience of other utilities and I consider this to be unequivocal support of the concept that clinical assessment by a qualified 1 icensed psychologist or psychiatrist Is a fundamental and lndispenslble consideration In determining whether or not an Individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear reactors .

Page 12 of 30 Pages TABLE I Behaviors and Behavioral Patterns Associated With Risks to Nuclear Facility Security Panic Reactions to Crisis Situations - responds impulsive-ly/inappropriately or not at all; retreats from situation; loses ability to discriminate problem and action needed, is unable to effectively communicate crisis to others. 0 Reaction to Accumulated Effects of Constant Stress - deve-lops mood changes, hypersensitivity, psychosomatic sympto-matology, deteriorating performance, increased subjective tension, confusion, lowered frustration tolerance, personal (i.e., family) ramifications leading to further behavioral deterioration. Insolence Toward Authority - refuses to follow orders; challenges supervisor's authority; expresses critical and arrogant attitudes toward company; exhibits frustration or non-compliance with procedural requirements; is reluctant or refuses to comply with established procedures ands ety precautions; fails to follow appropriate chain of commandi engages in "personal vendettas" toward co-workers or superiors. Q Violent Behavioral Tendencies - exhibits temper tantrums; argues or fights with others; uses profanity; screams; be-comes subject to rage attacks when questioned, crossed, or

• reprimanded .

Antisocial Behavioral Tendencies - engages in theft, sabo-tage, vandalism, etc., and shows no signs of associated re-morse; tries to entice other employees to join his "league". Deceptive Tendencies - Engages in lying, cheating; displays false pretenses; provides incorrect or inaccurate in-formation when questioned. Extemporaneousness - acts impulsively, tends to choose most apparent or convenient alternative, displays inability to consider host of alternatives in times of eris

• Immaturity - fails to regard work with proper seriousness; is careless in performing duties; often tardy or ab-sent; appears unconcerned with disciplinary measures; per-forms duties in sloppy or incomplete fashioni views job only as a "source of paychecko"

Page 13 of 30 Pages I Compulsive Tendencies - is highly rigid and inflexible; double checks and re-checks operations at possible expense of not noting a problem elsewhere; becomes agitated if rituals are interfered with. Intense Fear or Inappropriate Avoidance of Contaminated Areas - declines to enter such areas and ruminates about possible radiation exposure, thus hampering attentiveness to other areas. Interpersonal Skill Deficiencies - displays hypersensiti-vity to criticism from others; shows lack of proper asser-tion; tends toward social isolation or withdrawal; displays excessive need for approval; exhibits ineffective oral com-munication, expecially in times of crisis (e.g., stutter-ing, providing incomplete/inaccurate information); demon-strates ineffective written communication; displays inabi-lity to appropriately respond to performance appraisals and recommendations. 0 Thought Disorders - may display any combination of the fol-lowing traits: blunted affect, lack of attention to per-sonal appearance; tangential thinking; inappropriate emo-tional responding; difficulty comprehending and responding to questions; excessive suspiciousness with tendencies to withhold information; statements suggesting that others are "out to get him"; statements and behaviors indicative of individual's belief that he can perfonn the job singlehand-edly; the expression of sensory hallucinations; the use of meaningless words or phrases. Depressive Reactions - displays flattened emotionality; apathy; crying spells; appetite changes; insomnia; chronic fatigue; self-deprecatory statements; suicidal threats; lack of concentration *

• 0 Recurrent Patterns of Mood Swings - displays alternating patterns of mood, ranging from extreme euphoria to extreme depression.

General Ineptness - displays inability to make sound (if any) Judgments; exhibits chronic low stamina and energy level; exhibits excessive dependency; tends to "freeze" or cower in a crisis; is unable to behave independently in novel situations. o Deficiencies in Vigilance - displays low boredom tolerance resulting in loss of alertness; possible tendency to become drowsy and/or fall asleep during monotonous tasks; displays low tolerance for job routines and everyday activities with possible abnormal behavioral reactions designed to create some sort of stimulation .

Page 14 of 30 Pages I Ina ro riate Behaviors Resultin From Medical/Ph sical Syndromes - cardiac circulatory 1 lnesses, ep1 epsy, vertigo, color blindness, poor vision or hearing, chronic back problems, rheumatoid arthritis, migraine/tension head-aches, gastro-intestinal disorders, asthma, diabetes, over-weight, malnourishment, general physical unfitness and low energy level, chronic alcohol or drug use. Inappropriate Behaviors Resulting From Possible Organic Brain Syndrome or Psychomotor Deficits - may display delay-ed reaction time, poor eye-hand coordination, poor manual dexterity, memory loss, slurred speech, loss of concentra-tion, disorientation, impaired intellectual functioning

• RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 15 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D.

Question 5: "What specific characteristics are Identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negative {Type I and Type I I errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical? As I observed In my response to Question 2 above, the concern for radiological sabotage~~ does not address the major issues which the proposed Rule for access authorization confronts. The proposed program deals with the concern for the assurance

 --to the highest degree possible with available scientific and clinical    tools--that Individuals authorized unescorted access in commercial     power reactor fact l ltles wi 11 demonstrate behavioral rel lab! l ity and   trustworthiness and will act in a manner to protect health and minimize danger to l lfe and property.         Given this focus,     the three components recommended In the proposed Rule will contribute to risk reduction by eliminating virtually all  Individuals who are likely to behave in an unreliable or untrustworthy fashion.      This will    lnsure--to the highest degree

• possible with available tools--that persons working In the Industry are ones who will adhere to rules, will servant, responsive and cooperative.

be alert, ob-In confronting the issue about the percentage of false posi-tives and false negatives that can be expected from using the NRC proposed Psychological Assessment procedure, the Commission will want to consider the ratio of clearances to non-clearances which characterize the present system. To my knowledge, no systematic study of this has been done. However, I have shared information informally with psychologists practicing on the West Coast, In the Mid-west and on the East Coast who are pro-vi ding consultative services to various utll I ties. The rejection rates--accordlng to my geographically dispersed informants--are almost Identical. Approximately three to four percent of all

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 16 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Response to Question 5, Cont 1 d. Individuals who are processed for clearance are ultimately re-jected. (This rate has been stable since I Informally began comparing my own experience with that of other psychologists In 1978.) Using these data, the maximum percentage of false posi-tives is about four percent. Thus, even If every one of the individuals rejected for unescorted access would have been denied access in error--a highly unlikely posslblllty--the maximum per-centage of false positives is four percent. It Is very difficult to conceive a situation in which one would be able to make an estimate about the proportion of false negatives. In the strict scientific sense of the term, a 11 false negative 11 would be an Individual who is assesse_d as emotionally stable who Is actually an emotionally unstable person at the time the decision is made. Where individuals who were Initially clear-ed had to be denied access later, It is difficult--lf not lmpos-sible--to ascribe this subsequent withdrawal of access solely to conditions which existed at the time of the original clearance. If the Commission wishes to derive of an estimate of the proportion of false negatives it might wish to undertake a study of Individuals whose clearances have been withdrawn for psycholo-gically related factors. The study would have to specify some temporal cut-of~ point prior to which It would ascribe pre-employment emotional conditions as continuing to be relevant

• For example, the researchers might determine--qulte arbitrarily--

that withdrawal of access within a month following clearance constituted a case of a false negative. The investigators might choose some other time span but any time span used would be arbitrary. Only a careful case study of each Individual situation would permit one to ascertain whether the conditions warranting the withdrawal of access existed prior to clearance or whether they developed from post-clearance experiences such as death of a spouse, death of a child, severe financial reverses, rejection by a lover, etc. The variety of situations which could warrant withdrawal of access ls very great.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 17 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Response to Question 5, Cont 1 d. The statistical concept of false negatives and false posi-tives ls appropriate when one ls deal Ing with a single disease organism which can be isolated and unequivocally identified; to apply that statistical concept in clearance withdrawal decisions in the commercial power reactor industry where a multitude of factors must combine in a unique fashion for an individual to be rejected is quite inappropriate. A well developed and effective program of Continual Behavior-al Observation will help detect the false negatives; individuals who are emotionally unstable will be identified quickly and efficiently. The percent of false positives ls kept low by the fact that the program combines Background Investigation with Psychological Assessment--ltself a two-tiered process. Thus procedures of significant util lty reinforce each other. Emotionally stable individuals who are incorrectly denied access can attempt to redress the situation in the clearance programs which include a review process. Some facilities where union contracts are in force may have review provisions Included in the contracts. Thus an individual who disputes a non-clearance recommendation may be re-evaluated by an Impartial qual if led clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Utilities with non-union personnel typically have formal grievance procedures. While 1 such arrangements wl 11 not cover al 1 appl !cants or contractors employees, the individual denied access can challenge the decision through legal avenues. Apparently there have been a few instances in the commercial nuclear power Industry where legal redress has been sought via suit or arbitration. While this is hardly a 11 scientiflc 11 basis for judgment it would appear that--ln practical terms-- 11false posltve 11 persons make the decision that it ls more appropriate for them to invest their energies in finding work elsewhere than to go through the legal process to seek redress. Since the proportion of indlvlduals--the maximum ls 4 percent-- is so small it is my view that, for all practical purposes, the false positive rate Is infinitesimal.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 18 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 6: 11 Can the use of psychological assessment In the commercial nuclear Industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent, If any, of risk reduction suppl led by psychological assessment, background Investigations, and behavioral reliability pro-grams.11 As noted in my responses above to Questions Number 2 and 5 there is no way to quantify risk of radiological sabotage.

• Therefore, It is not possible to make any judgments about the degree to which the three components In the proposed rule would contribute to risk reduction.

A much more relevant Issue ls that of Industrial sabotage, mal lcious mischief and careless, irresponsible behavior. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has documentation of many Incidents of this nature which can be quantified. A study of these records could conceivably provide evidence on the differential frequency of these Identified events among sites which vary in their clearance programs. The assessment procedures contained in the proposed Rule have been demonstrated in other industrial situations to be very

• effective in detecting emotional instability among employees.

Emotionally unstable persons are much more l lkely to become in-volved in careless and Irresponsible behavior and their elimina-tion from the work force could be expected to have a significant benefit in reducing the risks which could compromise health, safety, and the environment.

RE: Proposed NRG Rule Page 19 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 7: "Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear Industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duy and radiological sabotage concerns? 11 In my comments above to Questions 2, 5, and 6 I have Indi-cated that I bel !eve that exclusive focus on radiological sabotage diverts attention from problems with a measurable fre-quency. Psychological Assessment can address many aspects of the

• fitness for duty concern but, fitness for duty.

in my opinion, the Continual Behavioral Observation component is best suited to deal with Obviously, for a Continual Behavioral Observa-tion program to be effective there must be good rapport and trust between employees and supervisors. In my response to Question 2 dealt with some considera-tions regarding fitness for duty. stressed the fact that specifications of the fitness for duty requirement will vary depending upon the job function considered. It is possible that one might be able to state some minimal fitness requirement appropriate f o r ~ job in the commercial power reactor industry. For example, all employees should be alert, not fatigued, not

• distractable, exhibit cognitive Integrity, manifest the minimum physical functioning Integrity required for the particular job, and be able to function competently at times of peak Job re-quirements.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 20 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 8: 11 To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral rel labi l lty program? Would the proposed behavioral rel ia-bl l ity program be effective without preemploy-ment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assess-ment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of a screening program, i.e., If only back-ground Investigations were adopted? 11 The committee which developed ANSI 18.17 (1973) and a sub-sequent revision (1980) understood the interrelationship and

• Interdependence of the three components--Background Investigation, Psychological Assessment, and Continual Behavioral Observation.

Their appreciation that each of the components Is ls still valid. lndlspensible With these components in place a utility can effectively select qualified and emotionally stable Individuals. On-the-job performance is then monitored so that persons who exhibit a deterioration in performance can be provided with assistance and, if this is not feasable or successful, the access authorization can be withdrawn. It would be an error to assume that the three components are equivalent or serve the same function. The Background Invest!- gatlon provides data relating to pre-employment behavior patterns which could potentially compromise an Individual 1 s reliability and trustworthiness In a nuclear power plant. The Psychological Assessment procedures are designed to detect individuals with a high potentiality for emotional Instability. The Continual Behavioral Observation program ls designed to monitor changes in Individuals. If any of the three components were deleted there would be a significant Increase In the risk: some Individuals with a high potentiality for unrel I able and untrustworthy behavior might be authorized access. I f ~ the Background Investigation was adopted as a methodology some very slgnficant problems would exist. Many of the individuals whom I have found unqual )fled for unescorted

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 21 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Response to Question 8, Cont'd. access--based on their psychological status--had in their files 11 11 good guy letters from unions, previous employers, schools, and colleges. Background Investigations frequently encounter delays In obtaining relevant data. Individuals misrepresent and l le about their name, address and criminal record. This would not be a problem if there were ample time to wait for the verlfl-cation of these data. However, very often the work cannot be shutdown or deferred or delayed. This is especially true at times of shutdown or outage when the time pressure precludes 11 advance 11 clearances. Craftsmen--often highly pald--wlll not stand around waiting for clearances unless they are paid . Collecting data on some of the components of the Background Investigation often takes considerable time. Obviously, criminal behavior cannot be adequately researched If an individual has misrepresented his place(s) of residence. The same ls trueilf an individual does not volunteer information about a history of mental Illness or use of consciousness-altering substances. A 1 so, Individuals may not acknowledge employment experiences In which their performance was less than exemplary. It is not possible to quantify the effect of a 11 threat 11 of psychological evaluation. The prospect of being required to undergo a Psychological Assessment may contribute to effective

• screening by voluntary self-deselectlon of Individuals who feel they could not 11 pass 11 such an assessment.

vldual 1s apprehension about 11 If a marginal indi-passlng 11 a Psychological Assessment deters them from applying for employment the qual lty of, the pool of potential employees ls improved.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 22 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 9: 11 What kinds of Individuals have been 11 screened out 11 of nuclear industry by the use of psycholo-gical assessment, by the use of background investi-gations and behavioral reliability programs? 11 While all three components of the access authorization program proposed Rule are designed to 11 screen out 11 individuals who have a high probability of behaving In a fashion which would compromise the safety and security of employees or would repre-sent a hazard to continuous and safe operation of a facility

• there are unique contributions each component can make.

Background Investigations can screen out individuals who have falsified records, have exhibited drug and alcohol abuse, have a pattern of criminal convictions and criminal behavior, have demonstrated problems in managing hostll lty, have records of poor employment and have exhibited lrresponsibll ity in financial management. The psychological test portion of the Psychological Assess-ment may also be helpful In Identifying Individuals with problems In managing drugs and alcohol and Individuals who have difficulty in dealing with hostility. The Interview portion of the Psycho-logical Assessment can, in addition, detect individuals with marginal or severe emotional problems, impulsiveness, low stress tolerance, and a propensity to resist and rebel against rules, as well as Individuals who might resort to vandalism and those who have a low threshold for violent behavior. The Continual Behavioral Observation program can spot Individuals experiencing emotional stress and those exhibiting impairment In attention, problem solving skills and memory prob-lems. Continual Behavioral Observation can detect those who are unwilling to follow instructions, who develop a dependency on alcohol or drugs, and persons who have a reduced level of vigilance which could Impair their ability to respond in emergency situations.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 23 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Question 10: 11 What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, Including psychological assessment, background Investi-gations and behavioral reliability programs? 11 Throughout my years of association with the commercial nuclear power Industry and In my professional discussions with colleagues from various parts of the country I have not heard of any management abuses of the screening procedures contained in the proposed Rule .

• In my opinion, there are a number of protections agains management abuse which make the l lkel I hood of abuses very small.

One such protection ls the ultimate power of the Nuclear Regula-tory Commission to deal with violators. Licensees can be fined or otherwise disciplined. Another sourc!:l of protection is the power of publ le opinion. Obviously, civil rights advocates and other citlzen 1 s groups would closely monitor and be vigilant about any abuses which might be noted and brought to their attention. Labor unions and other employee groups may, through contract provisions and grievance procedures, expose and attempt to counter any potential .management abuses. Since many of the crltl-

• cal specialists who work at a nuclear power plant are Itinerants (health physics technicians, for example), word-of-mouth communi-cation that management in a particular facility abuses the screen-ing procedures might result In reluctance of such specialists to 11 11 work at such fact 1 ities and thus generate a reprlsal threat.

While professional psychologists and psychiatrists do not have any leverage over management, the ethical guldel ines of the professions Involved [particularly if the professionals meet the training and qual ificatlon standards In Appendix B to SECY-83-311A (Page 43)] will insure these professionals will not continue to associate themselves with a program which would violate the In-tent of the NRC rule.

RE: Proposed NRG Rule Page 24 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. Response to Question 10, Cont'd. Another protection is the multiple level--three component-- screening procedure. The care with which the program has been fashioned in the proposed Rule and the kind of Implementation of of the concept which already exists in the field Insures a high level of acceptability by employees. A number of people--even some whom I have rejected for clearance--have told me that they are relieved to know that the process exists. They feel comfort-able that their own safety and welfare ls being protected. Some individuals whom I have rejected have expressed their gratitude to me for preventing them from exposure to a situation which they

• recognized could produce additional stress beyond their threshold .

(Very often such individuals gratefully accept recommendations for persona 1 or f am i 1 y counse 1 i ng.) With the review procedures Incorporated in the proposed Rule there is very little 1 ikel !hood that basic due process and fair treatment will be circumvented by management .

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 25 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman Question 11 11 How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules? 11 have spoken with a number of officials in labor unions who, off the record, expressed their gratification with the pro-posed Rule. Some aspects of the Rule may pose burdens for unions and other labor organizations who may not wish to serve as a source of derogatory Information about members of their group . However, the individuals whom I have interviewed have almost unani-mously endorsed and supported the current procedures as reasonable and desirable. As one individual put It to me, they are glad to 11 have 11 the bad apples out of the barrel . They appreciate that their welfare is enhanced if Individuals who could constitute a threat to their safety and security are screened out. can recall only two persons who objected to the procedure. One was an individual who was ultimately denied access based, In part, on a long history of criminal activity. He told me that had he known the kind of Inquiry he encountered in the Interview pro-cedure he would have Insisted that he be accompanied by his attorney. The other individual was a person for whom I recommended clearance . He was a man with a very specialized technical skill who was In great demand. He travelled to various parts of the country. He felt that his trustworthiness had been established at other plants and he resented having to be processed again at the facili-ty where I was providing consultation. When employees know that the program is appl led fairly, that it is effective and unbiased, there will be no problem about Its acceptance.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 26 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D.

GENERAL COMMENT

S ON THE DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE In my opinion the proposed Rule is generally very carefully contructed and provides an excellent framework for access authorization which will be acceptable to management, employees and to the general public. It safeguards the Interests of all without infringing on the rights of any. There are some specific provisions which I bel !eve could be altered with profit. These are as follows:

1. There ls an Inconsistency In Section 4.2 (Page 26 as compared to Page 28). The former statement (Page 26) that

• "judgments or diagnosis for emotional stability are normally medical Judgments and should therefore be reserved to qualified medical personnel" (underlining added) ly factually and legally inaccurate.

is certain-In the state of Mary-land, for example, 1 icensed cl lnlcal psychologists are authorized by law to be one of two professionals who may recommend Involuntary hospital lzation for Individuals with psychological problems. I believe that the Commlssion 1 s In-tent as stated In first full paragraph on Page 28 is more ap-propriate. That is, "Judgments or diagnosis of emotional stability should be made only by a qualified and, If applicable, state-1 icensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or medical doctor,

• as approprlate.

2. 11 In the chapter on Background Investigation it is recommended that "all claimed employment should be verifled. Some individuals may omit parts of their employment history 11 If they assume that a potentially derogatory reference would be forthcoming. It might be helpful to suggest that the background investigators be alert to gaps In employment to cover the possibility of concealment In this regard.

3. The Issue of criminal history Information ls a knotty one. As the Gulde notes, obtaining such a history may take several months. In such circumstances "the 1 icensee may grant an Individual an Interim Unescorted Access authorization for six months or until this information ls received, whichever

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 27 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. General Comments on the Draft Regulatory Guide, Cont'd. period is shorter, provided the other background Investiga-tive criteria are satisfactorily met." am personally un-comfortable with this potential loophole. believe it would be helpful if Individuals granted such an Interim Unescorted Access Authori~atlon, regardless of the outcome of their psychological test, automatically be Interviewed by a qualified clinical psychologist or psychiatrist.

4. I have had long experience In using both the MMPI and the 16 PF. regard both tests as appropriate and val Id for the screening purpose intended In the draft rule. However, It is my opinion that to require both tests ls overkill .

Either test would serve the screening purpose well. My personal preference would be for the MMPI because It Is somewhat more geared to provide cues to the cl inlcal Inter-viewer. Essentially, do not bel !eve that the Increment of information obtained by requiring two tests is justified economically. Also, I am certain that many employees or applicants would find the testing time burdensome. (Some Individuals require as much as three hours to complete the MMPI even when it is administered via audio tape.) 5, It has been a standard procedure with the utility have served as a consultant to have every individual sign

• a consent form acknowledging that they understand the pur-pose of the psychological testing and, clinical Interview.

consent forms if needed, the In practice, many employees sign such in a proforma fashion without reading them or understanding them. They often acknowledge this to me when I am conducting the Interviews. I do not have a suggestion regarding specific language which might reinforce the concept that lndividu~ls be told--very expl icltly--about the meaning and purpose of the procedures but I would recommend to the Commission that a more expl I cit statement regarding Informed consent would be helpful to all parties.

6. The success of the Continual Behavioral Observation program depends upon first] lne supervisors being able to

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 28 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. General Comments on the Draft Regulatory Guide, Cont 1 d. observe and detect crucial behavioral changes * . Since super-visors are not necessarily 11 psychologically sophisticated'.', a careful and continuous training program for these super-visors ,Is essential. While I endorse the concept of alert-ing the supervisors to the various behavioral changes noted in Appendix C of the Gulde, It Is my opinion that the specification of such, behavior in an officl,al document might introduce undue apprehension on the part of employees and might serve to lead some supervisors to believe that only those behavioral changes listed in the publication are of importance. I would feel much more comfortable If It were left to the professionals conducting the Continual Behavioral Observation program to adapt their instructional guide to the particular environment In which their supervisors will be operating. I believe the Guide philosophy and language deals in a positive way with some particular issues I consider to be of great importance:

1. Chapter Three, which deals with the Psychological Assessment is clear and specific and will be very helpful to

• a licensee *

2. I want to underscore a requirement that written personality tests always be interpreted by a qualified pro-fessional and that computerized processing can be rel led upon for scoring but not for interpretation.

3, The description of the intent and procedure of the clfnical interview is well stated. I especially endorse t he s t a t em en t t h a t 11 t he l n t e r v i e w s ho u 1 d be a t I e.a s t on e hour In length and should be structured. 11 I have the opinion that in a number of facilities in the commercial nuclear power industry some of the Interviews are conducted in a relatively superficial fashion. The Commission 1 s explicit requirement will ensure that this will not occur once the Rule is adopted.

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 29 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman, Ph.D. General Comments on the Draft Regulatory Gulde, Cont'd.

4. The care and concern for the protection of Information of a sensitive nature ls commendable. My practice Is to assure each interviewee that the data obtain will be dealt with in the most circumspect fashion to protect privacy.

Under such guarantee I have found that individuals are willing to disclose not only personal and intimate Informa-tion but information which they recognize is so derogatory and damaging to their own case that they will be rejected for access. If this assurance of confidentiality were not legitimate and real I bel !eve that the effectiveness of the clinical Interview would be significantly curtailed. Without such assurances the procedures would certainly be a target for critical evaluation by civil rights advocates.

5. The section on Character and Reputation has the great-est potentiality for an unintentional "chilling effect" which concerns civil 1 iberties advocates. I believe that the admonitions incorporated In the draft Rule are sufficient to ensure that individuals conducting background investiga-tions do not unintentionally stigmatize an appl leant or employee. have no specific suggestions about language which would underscore or reinforce the admonitions in the document. I believe they are very clear.

• 6. The admonition of the Commission In Section 4.1 deal-ing with the Continual Behavioral Observation program that Employee Assistance Programs, if established, be totally separate from the access authorization program, ls extremely Important. There may be a temptation to use the same qual i-fied cl inlcal personnel to serve both functions. That would produce a significant potentiality for confl let of Interest and the Commission's admonition is very well taken.

7. I strongly commend the Commission for the explicit statement regarding the qual iflcatlons of professionals to administer and interpret the Psychological Assessment com-ponent of the draft Rule.

8. The proposed Rule makes it clear that screening Individuals for access to commercial power reactor facilities

RE: Proposed NRC Rule Page 30 of 30 Pages By Morris Roseman General Comments on the Draft Regulatory Guide, Cont'd. is a separate and distinct functlon--and serves a totally different purpose--than selecting employees who can perform certain tasks with competence. The screening function is designed to Insure that Individuals having access to the facil !ties are trustworthy and reliable--that ls a function properly monitored and controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The selection function is an industry responsibility

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0 ROPOSED RULE_~_-JO 7v @ {--49 rle ~d?-Uj ~ American Psychological Association DOC:l'ETCD USNRC

                                                       .84 DEC - 7 Pl2 :58 December 7, 1984                                  (JFfll,_ .        .. 1A OOCi,i:T I      ERVICI.

BRANCH Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

We are writing in response to the NRC' s proposed rule relating to Access Authorization Programs (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73) that was published in the August 1, 1984 Fed eral Register . We present our views on behalf of the 76,000 Fellows, Members and Associates of the American Psychological Association. These views represent a synthesis of the scientific as well as professional areas of the discipline of psychology. We commend your basic intent in proposing to require an Access Authorization Program at nuclear power plants -- to protect the health and safety of the populace. While we have some significant reservations about the specific regulations as proposed, *we endorse the general direction -- to use available scientific and clinical psychological knowledge to help promote better employee selection, and to help ensure that potential employees are evaluated for suitability in a manner that is the least intrusive on their civil and constitutional rights. Numerous federal and state programs currently acknowledge the fact that psychology is the lead discipline in testing and evaluation. Unfortunately, there are significant misunderstandings about psychological testing and the limitations that must be imposed when making decisions based these tests. Thus, while we can endorse your proposed use of psychological testing as one part of the screening for potential employees, we must offer caveats and suggest some alternative practices to those in the proposed rules. In addition , issues of confidentiality of records need to be further addressed, and valid concerns about possible abuse need to be considered. You have stated in your introduction (at page 30728) "The use of a qualified professional (in the psychological assessment part of the Access Authorization Program) will help assure that an individual is not subject to an arbitrary 1200 Seventeenth St.. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-7600

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Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 Page Two and capricious decision by a supervisor." We agree, and we must note other positive effects should also be considered. Most importantly, psychologists are bound by a professional code of ethics, a full-time APA-based Committee on Scientific and Professional Ethics and Conduct, and parallel ethics committees in each state. Many of the concerns that you have expressed, and that will undoubtedly be mentioned as part of other public comments on these proposed rules, can be effectively answered by consideration of the ethical obligations of psychologists, and the national/state enforcement committees specified above *

• For instance, individual items on one suggested test {the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI) should not be viewed out of the context of the forced-choice forma~ of a long, complex and multi-faceted test. The concern i s that responses to individual test items could be used to refuse to hire an employee. However, the professional code of ethics precludes such a result by requiring that only evaluated test results are used for interpretation -- the individual item responses are kept confidential because, by themselves, they have no meaning and cannot be interpreted.

Another concern that may be expressed is that the use of psychological testing wi l l lead to discrimination on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences. Some tests, such as IQ tests and aptitude tests, have been actively challenged on grounds that they are racially/culturally biased. It need~ to be understood, however, that personality tests such as the MMPI are not scored on a similar pass/fail or numerical ranking format -- but must be expertly interpreted for balance and leanings on various scales. Such tests are designed to highlight individual differences, not to contrast an individual against some hypothetical norm. The major point that we must make, and emphasize strongly, is that psychological tests should never be used alone, and should never be used without i nterpretation by a qualified professional, as a basis for decision making. The widespread belief that certain tests can be used alone to make determinations is simply wrong. Psychological tests are important, sometimes invaluable, tools i n the evaluation of an individual -- but they must be combined with professional interpretation to have the necessary reliability and valid ity . Again, the APA code of ethics requires that interpretation accompany testing, and t he proposed rules should also reflect this reality. It seems to us that there are significant issues other than "radiological sabotage" to be considered in screening employees. The complex mechanical safety features required by the NRC at any nuclear facility cannot function

Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 Page Three without human assistance. There is a necessity for close monitoring, accurate and thorough visual checks of supply lines, vigilance in personal safety, open and direct communication between employees, and quick response to possible c rises. Screening out of potential employees who could not, or would not, exercise the appropriate level of care in these areas is important. Individuals whose personality causes them to exhibit certain anti-social or careless behaviors could be just as problematic as t hose who might consider direct sabotage of the facility.

• You have asked whether some aspects of the Access Authorization Program --

proposed to include a background investigation, psychological testing, clinical interviews, and behavioral observation -- could be deleted, and at what price f or each. This question suggests that perhaps any one of these could be considered as necessary and sufficient to 1,clude all possible good choices and eliminate all possible bad choices. We cannot concur in this suggestion. Based on our conversations with officials from other federal agencies concerned with security issues, we conclude that background investigations, of 2-year or 5-year depth as suggested, are not overwhelmingly valuable considering their cost in time, money and privacy intrusion--but they appear to be sufficiently valuable to be included. Similarly, while psychological testing and clinical interviews are not inexpensive and are somewhat intrusive, they, alone or in combination, cannot guarantee that all possible problems will be eliminated. Behavioral observat i on may appear distressingly intrusive and subject to abuse, but good supervisors are going to observe their employees in any case -- and the proposed addition of specific training in behavioral observation may make this part of the Access Authorization Program a most useful adjunct. Our point, then, is that no single test or interview or investigation or observation program is likely to be effective in eliminating poor employment choices. Used together and guided by continual improvements, however, such a program should be of considerable value in protecting nuclear plant safety and the welfare of the general public. With these general comments in mind, we would like to offer some specif ic comments and suggestions on the proposed rules. Sec. 73.56(b)(l) The description of the psychological assessment should include the requirement that these tests be administered and interpreted by trained, credentialed professionals, preferably psychologists. The use of individual s who have been specifically trained in test administration and interpretat i on i s mandatory.

Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 Page Four The proposed rule states that the "psychological assessment program shall consist of written personality tests and, if needed, clinical interviews *** " We must state, for the reasons mentioned above, that the clinical interviews must follow the psychological testing -- for individuals whose test results indicate no risk, for those whose results are inconclusive, a~i for those whose test results indicate the possibility of risk. Psychological testing cannot be used in isolation, and it cannot be viewed as an infallible decision-maker in the absence of professional involvement, clinical assessment, and a personal appraisal. The considerable experience of psychologists who are currently screening employees for nuclear facility work, using methods as outlined in the proposed rules, makes clear to us the necessity of follow-up interviews after testing. Similarly, the use of the MMPI in screening candidates for police departments has shown that clinical interviews must be integral parts of the process. These interviews can help overturn a possibly negative decision, and can help eliminate potential employees who appear fully satisfactory based only on the written test. That is, a small percentage of false negatives as well as false positives will result from any written test -- and the clinical interview is of considerable assistance in reducing the extent of these two types of errors. We suggest an additional paragraph in this section addressing those applicants for employment who refuse to cooperate with the psychological test and/or clinical interview -- whether on privacy grounds or any other. We suggest that such individuals be given the opportunity to talk about the Access Authorization Program with a psychologist, so that issues of confidentiality can be discussed, the tests can be explained, the professional ethics and responsibilities can be spelled out (including necessary limits to privacy of records), and the individual can make a second, and more informed, decision. Initial refusal to undergo psychological assessment should not be considered against any applicant -- and, in fact, may simply be the expression of a healthy skepticism about the process and its implicatons. A continued refusal to participate in the psychological assessment would, however, remove the applicant from consideration. Sec. 73. 56(b)(3)(iii) This section states that "in making a determination *** for the denial, revocation or suspension of access authorization based on data derived from a background investigation," it should be considered whether the applicant "has or has had any illness of a nature which, in the opinion of a qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologist, or psychiatrist, or medical doctor, may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the individual."

Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 Page Five We strongly suggest that this section be modified so as not to preclude the employment of individuals who have, in the past, had certain problems, but who currently present no danger. We suggest the additional phrase: "without evidence of full recovery or sufficient rehabilitation." Sec. 73.56(d)(2) The specific rules for the clinical interview part of the psychological assessment should be modified slightly. First, as stated above, the clinical interview should be a requirement for all applicants -- not just those "whose personality test results are inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits."

• Se c ond, the test and interview sequence should also be examining whether the individual has problems -- other than radiological sabotage potential -- that would make him or her clearly unsuitable for employment in a nuclear facility. It is not just "the potential for committing acts detrimental to the public health and safety or property" that should be screened, but also the potential for unsafe, anti-social, or un-careful behavior.

Sec. 73.56(h)(2) This section, dealing with protection of infonnation, should be strengthened somewhat, we believe. It is stated that personnel information shall not be disclosed except to the individual tested, his or her representative, "or to those who have a need to have access to the information in perfonning assigned duties in the process of granting or d~nying access to protected areas and vital islands." We fear that this third exception is too broad and too unspecific. Experience with confidential information in other arenas -- most specifically drug abuse treatment clinics and mental health treatment clinics -- has shown that this "need to have access" exception needs to be interpreted in a most narrow fashion. The fears of abuse as stated by Commissioner Gilinsky can be assuaged only by strong words in the regulations limiting access to records. There should be no open, easy access to these records. The report of the psychologist should be available only as appropriate and necessary, and the actual testing materials should never be released except to another qualified, credentialed professional. (This is a part of the ethical code for psychologists, and is based on sound professional, as well as personal privacy, grounds.) The option of releasing information to a "representative" of the individual should be spelled out more specifically -- such as the legal representative with a signed Power of Attorney, or similar appropriate safeguard.

Samuel J. Chilk December 7, 1984 Page Six We appreciate this opportunity to respond to your proposed rule, and we hope our comments have been helpful. Sincerely yours, 9:::s: .4!::::- Pr esident Robert Perloff, Ph.D. President-elect

• 1:::::1 -:![~1:

Executive Of f icer

rnrn T .M. London House, December 6, '34 DEG - 7 Al 1:Q5 Inc. 1550 Northwest Highway Mr . Samuel J . Chilk , Secretary Park Ridge, Illinois 60068 U. S. Nuclear Regularory Connnission ATTN : Docketing and Service Branch .,_x (312) 298-7311 9 10-2530-338 . J l e Address: LHMC PRID Washington , DC 20555 Re: NRC Access Authorization Program

Dear Mr . Chilk:

As Director of Testing Services for a psychological testing company, I would like to respond to your call for public connnent in the Federal Register regarding public connnent on the proposed Access Authorization Program. After reviewing some of the connnissions questions about psychological testing , it became apparent to me that there is a great deal of misunderstanding about this type of testing . First , it appeared that the connnission had difficulty differentiating between pre-employment screening for security and emotional stability issues , and follow-up current employee testing . Secondly, the questions implied that those tests would be applicable only as clinical evaluation tools , used in conjunction with a Behavioral Observation Program. While it is true that certain tests , like the MMPI , were designed as clinical evaluation tools and do rely on a psychologist or psychiatrist for interpretation , they may not be the type of test you need in your industry . I don't believe that the MMPI , for example , has even been validated with nuclear facility employees . Additionally, it may not be addressing the areas of concern to the NRC . Certainly , emotional instability is a concern . But most nuclear crimes are probably connnitted by individuals who have substance abuse problems , financial difficulties (integrity issues) or revenge motivation . I believe that many sabotage cases are caused by people with violence tendencies who are seeking revenge . But I doubt that these people have mental problems which would be identified by a psychiatric evaluation. Acknowledged by ca, d *

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My firm developed a test called The Personnel Selection Inventory which measures three critical areas: Dishonesty, Violence tendencies and Substance abuse tendencies . It is easy to administer and score (no psychologist or psychiatrist necessary) cost effective and valid. The PSI has over thirty published or scientifically accepted validity studies. It functions as an integral part of your pre screening program in conjunction with an interview and a background check. We would be happy to conduct any type of validity study the commission desires to prove it's effectiveness. I hope the commission will take into consideration the important part psychological testing can play in your employee screening, provided the proper tool is used for the right job. If you have any questions regarding psychological security testing, please feel free to contact me. Sincerely,

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BosTON Eo1soN COMPANY (49 J:/2 ~CJ 72.6) BOO BOYLS T ON STREET BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02199

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WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON

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8 EN I DR V I C E ~ R ES IDENT NU CL.EAR c; D()CKETEO BECo #84-202 USNRC December 3, 1984

                                                                                                              ~84 DEC - 7 A10 :52 I  _  ,...     **   -  ('*

1,4,, .,, . ..... Mr. Samuel J. Chilk - ,. Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

• ATTENTION:

Dear Secretary Chilk:

RE: Docketing and Service Branch Proposed Amendment to 10 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 73:

                                              *Access Authorization Program*

49 Fed. Reg. 30726 (August l, 1984) Boston Edison Company (the "Company") submits the following comments concerning the Proposed Rule of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 11 Commission") and accompanying commentary entitled "Access Authorization Program" published on August l, 1984 in Volume 49 of the Federal Register at Pages 30126-39 (the "Proposed Rule 11 ) and the companion Draft Regulatory Guide entitled "Standard Format and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" issued by the Commission's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research dated September, 1984 (the "Draft Regulatory Guide"). The Company is the owner and operator of Pilgri m Nuclear Power Station, a nuclear power

• plant located in Plymouth, Massachusetts licensed under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Commission promulgated thereunder, and as such has a substantial interest in the issues raised by the Proposed Rule and Draft Regulatory Guide.

For the past several years, the Company has had in effect an access authorization program at Pilgrim Station which is in many respects similar to that proposed by the Commission in the present rulemaking. The Company's screening program consists of a Massachusetts criminal records check, the administration of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory examination coupled with a personal interview with a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist and Acknowledged by cc, J,, 1,1/1./r!:;'£_ ()

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the conduct of a continual behavioral observation program. The Company's experience with this program over a period of time has shown it to provide a comprehensive and reliable approach to station security and the Company would endorse any Commission rulemak1ng containing these elements. The rule presently proposed by the Conmission, however, in some respects goes beyond what the Company has found to be necessary or appropriate and, particularly in the area of the background investigation, would impose certain requirements which the Company's experience has shown to be either impossible to perform, unduly burdensome or of no real efficacy toward the intended goal. The Company's comments on the Conrn1ssion's proposal are set forth and discussed below. I. The Need for a Rulemaking in This Area The Company agrees that the issue of access authorization 1s a proper subject for a Comission rulemaking. Uniform and specific guidelines in this area will provide necessary guidance to licensees

• and reassurance to the general public. A consistent rule promulgated by the Conmission and made applicable to all nuclear sites will also do much to alleviate employee resentment and promote acceptance of screening programs in general. Finally, the adoption of uniform screening requirements at all nuclear sites will permit a continuous process of refinement and perfection of the screening tools which will result in greater reliability and efficiency in the employment of these methods. In order to accomplish these goals, however, it is the Company's belief that the Proposed Rule should be modified as indicated below.

II. The Background Investigation

1. Verification of an Applicant's True Identity.

Read together, Proposed Rule §73.56(c) and the Draft Regulatory Guide at page 5 specify that access authorization is to be denied unless an applicant's identity can be verified through fingerprints or

• by a recent photograph identified by at least two individuals. While fingerprinting is indeed a reliable method of identification if a local, state or national fingerprint comparison file is available, in the case of persons who have not served 1n the armed forces or been arrested there will be no means of comparison available. As to these individuals, fingerprinting will be of no efficacy. One option which would make fingerprinting of nuclear workers feasible would be to approach the issue on a federal level by setting up a nuclear worker fingerprint comparison file with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Licensees would then be able to check an applicant 1 s prints against those previously put on file. This would provide a ready and reliable me~ns of confirming workers' identities and is a step which the Commission should consider. Barring such a comprehensive approach on the federal level, however, fingerprinting of workers will be extremely burdensome and will be too haphazard to constitute a reliable way of verifying identity. The alternative proposed to fingerprint1ng, a recent photograph attested to by two individuals, is equally problematic. Neither the Proposed Rule nor the Draft Regulatory Guide specify in what way the two attestations are to be obtained. If it is sufficient for the applicant to submit two written affidavits attesting to the identity of the photograph, the licensee will have no way of assessing the veracity of the aff1ants. If, on the other hand, the applicant is required to produce two individuals in person, the procedure becomes extremely time-consuming and expensive, particularly in the case of an applicant who comes from out of stat~. Moreover, even if the two witnesses appear in person, there is no guarantee that they are honestly identifying the applicant. Whether the two attest by affidavit or in person, this means of identification is inherently unreliable. Accordingly, it is the Company's reconunendation that the Commission, in conjunction with the FBI, establish a national fingerprint comparison file for nuclear workers. Barring this, there

• is no way that licensees can *ensure*, to use the Draft Regulatory Guide's terminology, that the applicant is who he purports to be. The Company therefore recommends that the Commission delete the word 0

ensureu and specify instead that licensees "take reasonable steps to verify name, aliases, social security number, etc. through the evaluation of documents, including photographs, and the cumulative results of the background and psychological investigations". The limitation of verification of identity to photographs and fingerprints should be eliminated.

2. Educational and Employment History The Draft Regulatory Guide at page 3 proposes a five year retrospective period for verifying employment and educational history. The Company suggests that three years provides an adequate period of examination. Moreover, the Company recommends that an investigation of an individual's employment and educational records should be accepted as a sufficient means of review. The suggestion in

• the Draft Regulatory Guide that licensees conduct personal interviews with previous employers and officials of schools attended by applicants, many of whom come from out of state, would create a requirement so burdensome that it would paralyze the hiring process.

The Draft Regulatory Guide indicates that the educational and employment checks should seek to obtain informat1on relating to any disciplinary action taken, unusual safety or accident records, psychological and medical records, reasons for termination of employment or leaving an educat1onal institution and re-employment potential. The C011111ission should be aware, however, that due to the litigation potential inherent when personal 1nformat1on is disclosed, it is extremely unlikely that employers or educational institutions will make information of this nature available.

3. Criminal and Military History The Company agrees that an applicant 1 s criminal history provides relevant 1nfonnat1on for access authorization purposes. The Company suggests, however, that the C011111ission clarify that it is criminal convictions, and not arrests not resulting in convictions, with which the licensee should be concerned. Such a clarification would be consistent with the doctrine of presumption of innocence and also with the dictates of many state laws. (See, .!L.9..:., Mass. Gen. Laws

c. 1518, §4(9), which makes it unlawful for an employer or his agent to request infonnation regarding arrests not resulting in conviction or certain misdemeanors.) Similarly, the Company suggests that the reference at page 6 of the Draft Regulatory Guide to a single felony being grounds for a denial of access authorization be clarified to recognize that not all felonies (adultery, for example) are relevant to an applicant's fitness for access and that only relevant felonies or lesser offenses should properly be considered.

• In conducting criminal records investigations, the Company has found that although it is possible to obtain Massachusetts criminal records information by making application to the Massachusetts Criminal Offender Record Information System, law enforcement agencies from other states do not make this infonnation available. For this reason, the Company suggests that the Commission should consider what steps can be taken on the federal level to enable licensees to obtain relevant interstate criminal history infonnation. Without such a comprehensive approach to the problem, out of state criminal investigations cannot be perfonned.

The Company believes that the period for reviewing military records should be limited to the same time frame as that app11ed to educational and employment history. Mil1tary information outside of this period can take a long time to obtain and is not in the Company 1 s view particularly relevant for screening purposes.

4. Character and Reputation

• The Draft Regulatory Guide at page 8 requires licensees to identify and interview two persons who know the applicant but are not listed as character references by him. Given the size of a licensee 1 s in-house and contractor work force and the fact that much of the latter may come from out of state, the Company submits that this requirement is burdensome in the extreme and should be deleted.

5. Self-Reporting Requirement Section 73.56(c) of the Proposed Rule specifies that individuals who are granted unescorted access are required to report promptly to the licensee any subsequent occurrence or circumstance that may have a bearing on their continued access authorization. The Company believes it most unlikely that individuals will make such disclosures which could result in a loss of their employment. This requirement is therefore unrealistic and impossible to enforce and should be deleted. The Company also notes an anomaly posed by the recomnendation in the Draft Regulatory Guide at page 24 that licensees establish employee assistance programs which are non-punitive, for counseling purposes only and which provide complete confidentiality.

Should such programs turn up information which could indicate that station security may be imperilled, the licensee would be placed in a very serious conflict of interest situation. It is submitted, therefore, that the licensees' primary duty of protecting nuclear site security should not be compromised by requiring them also to perfom the inconsistent role of confidential counselors.

6. Interim Unescorted Access Authorization In the case of a criminal records check which can take several

• months to accomplish, the Draft Regulatory Guide provides at page 7 for the grant of Interim Unescorted Access Authorization for six months or until the necessary information is'received, whichever is shorter, provided that other background investigative criteria are satisfactorily met. In conducting its present access authorization program the Company has found that other background information can also take a lengthy period of time to obtain. Accordingly, the Company proposes that the Proposed Rule and Draft Regulatory Guide be amended to pemit the grant of Interim Unescorted Access Authorization on the basis of a favorable psychological assessment pending completion of the full background investigation.

III. The Psychological Assessment and Continual Behavioral Observat1on Program The Company agrees with the adoption of a psychological assessment for access authorization screening purposes. The Company's experience has shown that it is necessary to perfom a formal

• structured psychological assessment to determine whether an individual is sufficiently emotionally stable and reliable to be granted access.

The Company believes that this assessment should be mandatory and that clear guidelines describing a prescribed assessment should be developed so that a uniform standard procedure can be carried out throughout the nuclear power industry. A consensus can be, and apparently has been, developed that the elements to be included are a psychological test and an interview with a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist. A uniform standardized mandatory evaluation will minimize labor and legal problems and ultimately be acceptable to all concerned. The psychological test of choice in the Company's opinion is the Minnesota Hultiphasic Personality Inventory ( 0 MHPI 0 } , which should be given as a part of the assessment. It should not, however, become the sole detenninant of acceptance. The procedure should also include scrutiny of the applicant's health and work records and an interview with a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist who reviews the historical data and uses the infonnation obtained through the MMPI in a structured standard interview. The Proposed Rule's suggestion that interviews be given only to those who show deviations from the nonns on the written test would allow a great deal of important information regarding health, work history and other relevant material to escape scrutiny. Neither an interview alone nor a written test alone should be relied upon. The MMPI, with its long history of use, validation and legal review, constitutes a sufficient written test. The addition of a second test such as the l6PF is in the Company's view completely superfluous. To require the administration of this second written test would add to both the time and cost required for reviewing applicants, resources which the Company believes would be better spent

• in arranging an interview in which the HMPI test results and historical data obtained can be reviewed by a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist.

The Company endorses the adoption of a continual behavioral observation program. The Company believes, however, that the / guidelines set forth in Appendix C to the Draft Regulatory Guide are too detailed and are inappropriately based on supervisor observation of minor, subtle and trivial changes in employee behavior. The Company believes that the program should be based on broad and well known behavioral changes, such as work performance, safety performance, gross social behavioral changes, etc., the observance of which supervisors have been trained to perform as part of their respons1bilitie~ as managers. The Company also believes that the provision in the Proposed Rule that supervisors detecting a pattern of abnormal behavior refer the matter to usenior* management be amended to read 0 appropriateu management so that licensees may develop their own internal procedures for reporting .

• IV. Review Procedure The Company strongly reconmends that §73.56(g) of the Proposed Rule and Section 6 of the Draft Regulatory Guide which require licensees to establish a review procedure for denials or revocations of access be deleted in their en.tirety. Ample recourse for the redress of such grievances is presently available under existing law.

By instituting an additional review procedure, the Commission is, attempting to create new law in an area not within the Commission's expertise, which is an action in excess of the Commission's regulatory authority. It is also, in the Company's view, a most unwise step which could result in the serious impainnent of the very security the Proposed Rule seeks to promote. By removing the ultimate decision regarding access from the licensee and placing it instead in the hands of a third party who is not subject to Commission jurisdiction and who may be motivated by concerns other than the security of the nuclear site, the CofTlllission is opening the door to the situation in which a licensee will be ordered to grant access to a person whom the licensee has detennined to pose a potential threat to site security. The Company submits that it is untenable for a licensee, which bears the ultimate responsibility for the security of its nuclear site, to be overruled in this fashion. The licensee is responsible to the C011111ission and to the general public for preserving site security. An arbitrator's responsibility is different; his mandate is solely to interpret the contract or resolve the dispute before him. If an arbitrator were to overrule a licensee on an access decision, under the Proposed Rule the licensee would be required to reinstate that person even if the licensee felt the security of the station would be compromised thereby. The Company does not see how the Commission, consistent with its mandate to oversee the security of nuclear sites, can establish a system under which hundreds of arbitrators all over the country, applying different standards, motivated by different

• concerns, without expertise in the workings of nuclear plants and not subject to Commission regulation or oversight, are made the final decision makers on questions of access.

The CofTlllission should also recognize the burden in time and expense which the addition of a new review procedure to those already provided under existing law will impose. If such a system is adopted, it can be anticipated that most if not all rejected applicants will make application thereunder, regardless of the merit of their claims. Inasmuch as licensees do not enter into collective bargaining agreements with employees of contractors, the number of rejected applicants who would have recourse to the new review system would be substant1a1. The Company submits that, given the remedies presently available to rejected applicants under existing law, the COfTlllission's proposed review procedure is redundant, unduly burdensome and would impose an unwarranted expenditure of resources better devoted elsewhere .

• For these reasons, the Company suggests that the portion of the Proposed Rule dealing with the rev1ew procedure be deleted.

Alternatively, if the CofTlllission finds a review procedure to be imperative, the Company believes that the only two parties to whom this responsibility can be entrusted without ultimate impairment of nuclear site security are the Comnission or the licensee itself. Accordingly, if there must be a review procedure adopted, the Company suggests that the Commission establ1sh its own board for perfonning such reviews or provide that an in-house rev1ew by the licensee itself is sufficient. Only by these means can the Co1J111ission be assured that appropriate concern for site security will be maintained. Finally, the Company notes a discrepancy between the Proposed Rule and the Draft Regulatory Guide. The Proposed Rule indicates that the review procedure is to apply to access denials as well as revocations. The Draft Regulatory Guide, on the other hand, specifies on page 35 that the review procedure is limited to revocations of access authorization and need not be provided to individuals who are not yet employees of the licensee or a contractor. In the Company 1 s view, the position taken by the Draft Regulatory Guide reduces the concerns expressed above although it does not eliminate them altogether.

• V. Additional Miscellaneous Comments

l. Proposed Rule S73.55(a) and (d)(i). The Company concurs in the Proposed Rule 1 s provision that any safeguards measure implemented pursuant to §73.55 may be suspended if necessary to facilitate response to emergency conditions, provided that all safeguard measures are restored as soon as possible following such an emergency. The Company also concurs in the provision of Proposed Rule §73.55(d)(i) that temporary unescorted access authorizations may be granted to unscreened individuals during cold shutdown or refueling operations

• provided that specified conditions are met .

2. Proposed Rule §73.55(d)(l). The Company suggests that on-duty armed security officers should receive the same exemption from search extended to on-duty law enforcement officers inasmuch as the same considerations apply. All anned security officers at Pilgrim Station are designated Special Police Officers for the Town of Plymouth and have been granted powers of arrest on Company property in Plymouth.

3. Proposed Rule §73.56{h)(2). The Company suggests that the portion of the Proposed Rule dealing with protection of confidential information be amended to make clear that licensees may disclose the information to legal counsel representing licensees in connection with denials or revocations of access.

VI . Responses to Comission's Questions

• At pages 30730-31 of the Federal Register, the Conmission posits several questions for specific public comment. These are set forth and answered below.

l. To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rule already in place in the commercial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessments and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

Answer: Psychological assessments apparently are being used throughout the industry. These range from (a) a cursory and superficial questioning of the employee by a non-psychiatric doctor perfonning a pre-employment physical examination; (b) the administering of a written test such as the MMPI-560, the MMPI-168, or the 16PF which is commercially scored and evaluated; and (c) the administering of one of the foregoing written tests combined with the conduct of structured interviews with all candidates.

2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psychological assessment used to address fitness for duty concerns. radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Answer: Psychological assessment is useful in identifying individuals (a} who are emotionally or mentally ill and should not be working at all; (b) who may have personality or character traits that would have a serious impact on their trustworthiness, reliability and sense of responsibility for performing high quality, safe work; (c) who resist authority to the extent that they will not follow instructions properly; (d) who may have substance abuse problems (the McAndrews scale for evaluating the MMPI is designed to detect this

• probability); and (e) who may be ideologically determined to commit sabotage. Both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns may be addressed by this type of assessment, the former being much more conunon than the latter.

3. What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringements on individual privacy associated with the initiatives.

Answer: All screening procedures and medical and psychological examinations infringe to some extent on individual privacy. ~roper performance of testing and interviewing procedures, with careful attention to confidentiality and privacy, should reduce these concerns, which are adequately addressed in the section of the

• Proposed Rule entitled *Protection of Infonnation".

4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments? What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessments by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in detemining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors?

Answer: Although it must be recognized that there is no such thing as the perfect test, the MMPI, which has been in use for 40 years, has been validated and studied in both pathologic and non-pathologic populations in clinical and industrial settings and therefore seems to be the most trustworthy instrument available. The MMPI has been subjected to extensive legal review by both arbitrators and courts and has been widely used in the nuclear power industry. Boston Edison Company recently reviewed 452 of its employees who were evaluated psychologically for access authorization purposes in the period prior to June, 1982. Each took the MMPI, which was scored and evaluated by Caldwell Reports of Santa Monica, California, and was interviewed by a consulting psychiatrist with a special interest in industrial psychiatry, who studied both the employee 1 s Company medical chart and personnel record where available as part of the assessment. At the time of the study, 82 had left for other employment while 370 remained with the Company. The records of the 370 remaining employees were evaluated for performance in the years following the psychological assessment. The following were studied: (a) accident and license event reports; (b) perfonnance evaluation; (c) disciplinary measures; (d) absences; and (e) radiological exposure. It was found that the psychological assessments consisting

• of the MMPI and the structured interview and analysis of personnel and medical records were generally good screening predictors. None of these elements alone was as reliable a tool as the entire process taken together.

5. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives or false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRC proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

Answer: Individuals have been identified by psychological assessment who demonstrate the following characteristics listed on pages 16-17 of the Draft Regulatory Guide: (1) argumentative hostility to authority; (2) irresponsib11ity/impulsivity; (3) defensive incompetence; (4) substance abuse; and (5) emotional inadaptability (psychopathology). A direct relationship to the

• potential for radiological sabotage probably exists with characteristics (1) and (5).

Regarding errors in testing results, false negatives occur when individuals are accepted for access when they have undiscovered, unacceptable characteristics. This is a relatively rare occurence, and of those who have their access subsequently revoked it should be noted that some may have developed problems after acceptance and may not have been erroneously evaluated. A good behavioral surveillance program, in conjunction with a good pre-employment evaluation, should pick up those who are missed. False positives occur when individuals are wrongly declared to have undesirable characteristics. It is difficult to determine how often false positives occur but provision for re-evaluation of rejected individuals in appropriate cases should greatly reduce the frequency of any such errors.

6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the conmercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? Is there any evidence which would help quantify the extent. if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations. and behavioral reliability programs?

Answer: Radiological sabotage may be carried out by two types of individuals. A determined ideologue or mercenary intent on escaping detection and accomplishing his mission is not emotionally or mentally 111, except in the broadest sense, and will, if clever enough, be able to escape detection. This is, however, a rare and unlikely risk. The other potential saboteur is the emotionally unstable or 111 individual who does not work properly because of his

• illness or does intentional damage due to anger, impulsiveness, paranoia, etc. This is a more likely risk, and this type of saboteur should be detected by psychological assessment.

7. Can the use of psychological assessment in the conmercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

Answer: Psychological assessment can in general be justified on the basis of both fitness and sabotage concerns. Specific fitness determinations on any day can be made by observation of employee behavior. physical status and, where indicated, body fluid analysis.

8. To what extent is the use of psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program? Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without preemployment psychological assessment? What specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not

• part of the screening program, i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

Answer: In the Company's view, both the psychological assessment and the behavioral observation program are important components of a screening program. A pre-employment psychological assessment can identify individuals who, although acceptable, should

 . be under some surveillance in a behavioral observation program. A behavioral observation program is not performed by professionals, as is a psychological assessment, and therefore should not substitute for but rather supplement the psychological assessment. Psychological assessments can arrive at diagnoses. In behavioral observation programs supervisors are directed not to deal with diagnoses but merely with observation of work performance, behavior, etc.

If neither behavioral nor psychological assessment programs are included, an important group of individuals with psychopathology will not be screened out before hiring, or will not be detected at work before ~ccidents happen. The use of psychological assessment and behavioral observation is directed toward preventing these events, rather than reacting to them afterwards. The failure to detect problem work~rs and prevent such events from occurring can result in loss to the industry and to the employee involved, who might have been helped 1f his condition had been recognized before the event.

9. What kinds of individuals have been "screened out* of the nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment. by the use of background investigation, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Answer: A variety of conditions have been discovered in the Company 1 s psychological assessment programs, including sociopathic deviance or severe impulse control problems associated with antisocial

• or destructive behavior; problems of mentation or mental status (memory, orientation or mental control); mental illness (manic-depressive illness, paranoia, major depression, schizoid thinking); alcohol and/or drug abuse; blatant misrepresentation and/or hostile evasion; and gross observable instability manifested by aggressive behavior to the interviewer. The behavioral observation program has detected substance abuse problems; memory, attention and orientation problems; and mental illness of a gross nature.

10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures, including psychological assessment, background investigation and behavioral reliability programs?

Answer: Management abuses of psychological assessment could occur if incorrect criteria for acceptance, either too restrictive or not restrictive enough, were adopted. Re-evaluation in appropriate cases can overcome such problems by giving those rejected a second chance. A proper behavioral observation program also helps by

• allowing those not detected initially to be found if and when a problem arises.

Abuses in a behavioral observation program conducted by supervisors could arise from the application of too strict, or not strict enough, criteria. Careful and repeated training of supervisors should obviate such problems.

11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present screening programs? How do they feel about the proposed access authorization rules?

Answer: Employees may resent being given psycholog1cal assessments on general terms, and may object to questions on written tests such as the HHPI that deal with sex, religion, criminal behavior and the like. Careful explanation of the role of these tests as tools in detemining employees* attitudes toward life, work, etc., and not in collecting information on specific acts by employees, may ameliorate such resentment. Moreover, a program of psychological assessment and behavioral observation which is mandated by Commission regulation, with specific guidelines developed by consensus, should reduce these objections and conflicts. VII. Conclusion In conclusion, the Company believes that the issue of access authorization is a proper subject for a Commission rulemaking. The setting of unifom and specific guidelines in this area will enhance the security of nuclear sites. As indicated above, the Company does take the position that various modifications to the Proposed Rule should be made. With the adoption of these modifications, however, it is the Company's view that the Proposed Rule will provide a comprehensive and reliable approach to assuring site security . Very truly yours, BOSTON EDISON COMPANY lV By: William D. Harrin Senior Vice Presi

     /dm DOCKET NUMBER OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAW PR0GRAM          *'4-9 ROPOSfD RULE p -54 73(@

COLLEGE OF LAW WEST VIRGINIA UNIVE RSITY 0 /=/2, -..JO~ 72 ~ CL)t) MORGANTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA 26506 304-293-5301 00CK£T£D USNRC The Occupational Health Law Program at the West Virg in~ DEC - 7 AlO University College of Law in Morgantown, West Virginia submits CFF;c: the following comments in response to the Nuclear Regul ato~9CKt=; ~E~1f4

                                                                           **        BRANC."1  VJC Commission's proposed access authorization program, 49 fed.

Reg. 30726 (1984) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 73). These comments will specifically address the following

• issues: 1 ) the reliability of psychological tests in predicting high risk potential employees; (2) the dangers of abuse of the information generated by such psychological tests; 3) the extent of infringement on applicants' or employees' civil liberties by the background investigation, pyschological testing, and behavior observation components of the proposed authorization program; and 4) the need for strict controls on access to information generated by this program.

The need for mechanisms to ensure a trustworthy and reliable

• workforce is especially clear in the nuclear power industry, in light of the severe consequences which could result from employee sabatage or misconduct. In addition to the employer's legitimate concerns, there are s ignificant public health and .safety interests involved. These concerns, however must be balanced against the constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties of individual employees.

I. PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), knowbtlged by Cjr

specifically mentioned in the proposed regulations as a test to be used in the screening of nuclear power plant workers, i s of questionable effectiveness in identifying high risk potential employees. Although the test has been used for a number of years and has been adequately validated for certain purposes (for example, in providing guidelines for mental health professionals involved in counseling and providing therapy to individuals) there is inadequate evidence that the MMPI is a reliable pre-

• dictor of individuals who will be significant security risks in settings such as nuclear power p l ants.

Our research of the psychological literature covering the last ten years, shows that there have been very few studies of the accuracy of psychological testing to predict individuals who pose significant safety risks. The one study we found specifically addressing the use of psychological testing for security screening in the nuclear power plant environment, suggests that such tests may have some predictive value, but

• the accuracy of the results may be lessened by applicants, labeled "fake desirables", who are able to manipulate the tests in their favor. S.E. Krug, Multivariate Experimental Clinical Research, Vol. 5 (3), 109-23, (1981) .

0 II. POTENTIAL ABUSE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION Because psychological tests will elicit highly sensitive and personal information unrelated to the employer's legitimate concerns regarding potential security risks, there is a signif~- cant potential for abuse of t h e information generated by these tests. The following sample of questions from the 566 questions in the MMPI demonstrates the sensitive nature of the questions and the potential for embarrassment of the individual and abuse of the results: True or False

14. I have diarrhea once a month or more.

20. My sex life is satisfactory.

38

• During one period when I was a youngste r I engaged in
• 65.

69. petty thievery. I loved my father. I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex. 133. I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices. 154. I have never had a fit or convulsion. 177. My mother was a good woman. 208. I like to flirt. 215. I have used alcohol extensively. 320

• Many of my dreams are about sex matters.
• 432.

488. I have strong political opinions. I pray several times every week. Employers should not be permitted to use any information

• unrelated to their legitimate concerns, for the purpose of to weed out other "undesirable" applicants based on their union sympathies, political beliefs, sexual preferences, or personality traits that are unrelated to security risks.

Furthermore, we are concerned that employers could use this information to hire a workforce composed of only the most docile and submissive employees. For further documentation of how such information has actually been abused see, Pressure In Today's Workplace: Report of the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The combination of questionable predictive capacity with

• respect to security risk and the high potential for abuse of other information generated by these tests suggests that con-sideration should be given to limiting or eliminating psycholo-gical testing from the access authorization program.

At a minimum, in order to insure that test results are used solely for predicting security risks, we suggest that once an initial determination is reached that a potential employee is not a high security risk, the test results and any extraneous evaluation of those results be immediately

• destroyed. Also, if an app l icant is not hired based on a finding of security risk, those test results should be immediately destroyed. If the regulations were redrafted to require such immediate destruction of test results in both situations the risks of emp l oyer abuse of sensitive personal data will be significantly reduced.

III. INFRINGEMENT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES We are concerned that the background investigation may raise a number of civil liberties issues. The proposal in the regulations that the background inves-tigation for protected area workers be increased from two years to five years is perhaps unwarranted. The Commission appears to believe that the increased number of years will not pose a signif icant financial burden on employers or licensees. Our concern, however, is that the additional information is unnecessary and therefore is a needless intrusion into the applicants' backgrounds. If a two year investigation is adequate to provide the information necessary to screen out security risks, it should be limited to that duration. The background check also should be limited to investi-gating areas likely to provide information relevant to the applicant's security risk. Unnecessary investigation should be avoided. As a final concern, once an extensive background investi-gation is completed, there may be no need for psychological testing and behavior observation. Unless psychological testing can provide information absolutely unavailable elsewhere, it must be considered mere surplusage and an unnecessary intrusion into the individuals' private lives . The proposed extensive and continuous surveillance of workers raises special privacy concerns. As with the psychological tests, there are significant risks that surveillance will be used for improper purposes, such as weeding out union supporters and others considered to be undesirable by the employer. Also, there are no assurances that the supervisory personnel who will be conducting the surveillance will be adequately trained to evaluate abnormal or questionable employee behavior. Sur-veillance under these conditions presents serious potential for abuse. Furthermore, if such surveillance in any form is to be permitted, to protect employee privacy it should be strictly limited to the actual work areas. Employees' non-workplace behavior should be exempt from surveillance. IV. INFORMATION ACCESS The guidelines in the proposed regulations dealing with retention, storage, and access to sensitive personal information governed by the access authorization program are woefully inadequate. The simple "need to know" qualification set forth in the regulations does not protect the privacy interests of employees in limiting the dissemination of such highly sen-sitive and private data. Specifically, we believe the regula-tions need to address the following concerns related to access

• to personnel files: 1) handling of information on applicants not hired by a licensee; 2) identifying which individuals within a licensee organization need to know the voluminous data generated by the access authorization program; 3) prescribing how much information a licensee may transmit to other licensees or other prospective employers; 4) detailing special controls and strict access limitations for information stored in

computer memory banks (including whether such information may be accessed merely by keying in an employee social secur ity number) ; and 5) indicating to what extent employees have continuous rights of access to their own personal information files. In conclusion, there are serious doubts as to whether the program as proposed gives sufficient consideration to privacy interests of employees. It appears that the consideration of security needs has been given excessive weight while the

• privacy concerns of employees have been seriously underanalyzed.

Mark A. Rothstein Professor of Law Director, Occupational He alth Law Program Wendel Turner Linda Williams Legal Interns

                                                                         ,ocK£T rrnr.rnrn JROflOSED RULE   PR -..54 73 (ij)

C,4q p,e Jd7;l, LEONARD J. DONK, M.A., Ph.D. UQNSl:D PSYCHOLOGIST AFFILIATED PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, P.C. 3145 HENRY STREET / SUITE 203 / MUSKEGON FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN BUILDING MUSKEGON, MICHIGAN 49441 / PHONE 616-759--0tl? OOtKETEO USNRC

                                                                                  *84 DEC - 7 AlO :Q3 OFFICE OF SlCKtiARV December 5, 1984                                                      OOCKETING & SERV!CI.

BRANCH Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Conunission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Secretary Chilk:

This letter is with regard to the proposed regulations of the NRC as recently published in the Federal Register, August 1, 1984, Vol-ume 49, Number 149. In particular, I am concerned with section 10 CFR, parts 50 and 73, Access Authorization program as it relates to the screening of employees for "unescorted access" in nuclear power plants. As I read the proposed regulations, there is to be a psychological or psychiatric screening test, some form of objective personality test-ing or procedure for all applicants, with a psychological, clinical interview proposed as a requirement only for those applicants whose test results are "inconclusive or indicate abnormal personality traits." This proposed requirement of~ psychological test for all applicants and a professional, clinical interview for only an inconclusive or

• abnormal subset of applicants vis a vis the psychological test re-sults, is seriously flawed and d.!lngerously defective.

This proposed regulation is in direct and total contradiction to all well established principles and practices regarding the use of psychological tests for the purposes of personality screening . In all clinical and diagnostic practices, in all fields, there is a long established principle that no single diagnostic procedure or laboratory test per se can or should be used to give the diagnosis, but rather that all such diagnostic indices must be integrated with other information to provide for expert, professional interpretation. This regulation makes the worst of all possible assumptions for the nuclear industry and the American public, i.e., that all such psych-ological and psychiatric tests or procedures have a zero rate of false negatives. In other words, the assumption is that no one, no indiv-idual with significant personality aberrations, with significant emotional disturbances will successfully "pass" the test. The psycho-metric literature provides consistent and persistent evidence that this is a totally invalid assumption.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Page Two Indeed, the tragedy of the situation is that the individuals who are most commonly referred to diagnostically as "sociopathic personalities" in diagnostic schemata, and which include those established by social history and clinical interview as paranoid personalities and personality disorders, are those who most frequently produce a "normal" profile on such tests, who are most frequently among the "false negatives." It is these very individuals who are often most seriously disturbed, often psychiatrically hospitalized, and who, because of the nature of their pathology and behaviors, would be of greatest risk to the security of any nuclear plant, and therefore, to the public of this country and the world. This writer has performed approximately two thousand (2000) of the type of screening evaluations within the nuclear industry that is ad-dressed in these proposed regulations. I have done these in both the states of Michigan and California during a period from 1978 to the present as a contractive service provider for Behaviordyne Psychological Corporation. One of the main reasons I have been associated with this group of professional psychologists is that they do not compromise on their insistence that the screening procedure consist of both the best psychological testing available from the standpoint of statis-tical validity and reliability and a full clinical interview with questions collectively conceived by their own staff and their full complement of experienced providers. I can truthfully attest that all too often, I have received "valid", seemingly non-pathological, "normal" test results from an exceedingly complex computer analysis far beyond the capability of any single clinician, only to find sig-nificant emotional instability upon full-fledged clinical interview and comparison of test data with that interview. The obverse has also been frequently true and clinical interview data comparison to the test, has righted the erroneous assignment of individuals to a group of "false positives." That is to say, the clinical interview has estab-lished the emotional stability of an individual whose test results reveal pathology

• Finally, it is the combination of the best test results available with a thoroughly competent and professional clinical interview that provides the maximum discrimination and differentiation for cost effective, safe screening in the nuclear industry in my professional experience and opinion.

I, for one, in particular, and all thoroughly competent and profes-sionally qualified psychologists, in general, would consider partic-ipation in the type of screening procedure as defined in the current proposed regulations as a serious violation of both the professional ethics relative to Assessment Technique (Principle 8) and professional standards (standard 3 Accountability, from Standards for Providers of Psychological Services). This, in turn, should and would result in chaotic difficulties for any contractor to provide and/or arFange suit-able psychological consultation and a hamstring link in the provision of safety and accountability to the consumer. It is of the utmost irony

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Page Three and tragedythat multiple backup systems are provided for the mechanical, electronic, and technical aspects of nuclear power provision, whereas the flimsiest and most shoddy of systems is proposed for the screening of employees for "unescorted access." Again, the professional literature has consistently and persistently shown t hat the human factors are the weakest link in the nuclear industry relative to critical incidents in the nuclear industry and that more incidents have arisen from human factors than from any other factors. Therefore, as a fellow professional, I respectfully request and, as a private citizen, I very strongly urge open public hearings on these proposed regulations for presentation of data and arguments relative to the revision of these regulations for the best interest and ultimate safety of all individuals involved. I re i terate that it is my profes-sional, experienced opinion that it is imperative that minimum standards dictate at least both objective psychological testing of the highest validityand reliability and a full-scale, competent, professionally conducted clinical psychological interview of all applicants for sec-urity-sensitive positions. I am, Res:_*; full'?/io7f),,/. Lel : 1 . ~k , M.A., Ph.D. Licensed Psychologist c. LJD/rkd

OROPO E.u Lowell W. Hellervik, Ph.D. President {44Rl PERSONNEL DECISIONS, INC. Foshay Tower, Suite 2300 821 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 (612) 339-0927 5 December 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

• I am writing to support a psycholog ical screening and c l inical inte r -

view process as part of an emotional stability screening program for nuclear power plant personnel. Personnel Decisions, Inc. (POI) is a psychological consulting firm specializing in individual and organizational development. Our pro-fessional staff members are Ph.D. level psychologists who are licensed consultdnts and licensed psychologists in Minnesota. Our organization has been part of Northern States Power's screening program for nuclear power plant personnel since 1977. We also conduct Behavioral Liability workshops, the purpose of which is to train supervisors as part of a continual behavioral observation program. These workshops have been conducted at various nuclear facilities throughout the United States. The process used by NSP includes completion of the Minnesota Multi-phasic Psychological Inventory and the California Psychological In-ventory. All tests are screened at POI. Potential employees who have produced abnormal, defensive, or suspicious profiles are asked to come in for a clinical interview. Testing and interview screening procedures have identified many individuals who would be poor risks at meeting the reliability and trustworthiness standards. For example, such pro-cedures are effective in identifying individuals who may have diffi-culty following directions, dea ling wi th authority, mana g ing stress, and reacting quickly and responsibly in a crisis situation. In ad-dition, individuals who are abusing, or have potential to abuse, chemicals and drugs can be identified. On the other hand, some in-dividuals produced defensive profiles because t hey want to look good in order to secure employment. The clinical interview suggests that they do meet trustworthiness and reliability standards even though they produced a defensive profile on the testing. Results of testing and the interview are confidential in the screening program in which we participate. Only a standardized letter stating whether the applicant meets the requirements or doesn't goes to NSP. Psychology Applied

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 5 December 1984 Page Two Specific personal information is confidential. All records are held as privileged and confidential by our organization. They are not released without a written request from the individual to send them to a licensed professional. The cost of making a selection error is greater in a nuclear facility than in most other settings. We strongly believe that the NRC has a responsibility to establish and carry out the highest reasonable standards for the Access Authorization Program to assure the safety and security of the public .

• Sincerely, Lowell W. Hellervik President Licensed Consulting Psychologist LWH/rn cc: Clarence J. Martin

l .I Dennis L. Johnson. Ph.D. 1025 S.W. Martin Downs Blvd. Suite 202 Clinical Director P.O. Box*asa M. Ray Smith, M.S. /Jo Palm City. Florida 33490 Administrator. Professional Services iZ:  !@!J) 286-6248 (., December 7, 1984

• Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docketing and Service Branch Room 1 121 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Secretary:

I am writing with respect to proposed regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register of August 1, 1984 - "Access Authorization Program" - (10 CFR Parts 50 & 73). It is formally requested that a public hearing occur prior to Commission action of 10 CFR 73.56. I am a licensed psychologist trained in clinical psychology. My involvement in psychological consultation to the nuclear power industry spans three and one-half (31/2) years. I have experience with over 3500 psychological screening cases related to unescorted access authorization . A regulatory program of psychological safe-guards (i.e. psychological testing and behavioral observation) represents the highest reasonable standards to assure safety, security, and health of the public. Psychological safeguards have been successfully implemented within many fire departments, police departments, and security forces. It is noteworthy that at least one state (California) has a statute requiring psychological screening of law enforcement officers. Also, litigation (i.e. Bonsignore~ City of New York; $425 ,000. judgement) has occurred finding jurisdictions negligent for not having a psychological Acknow:cci5cd by card . .!d?.k1.,-;;_:: CORPORATE CONSULTATION AND CLINICAL PRACTICE I

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screening-procedure in place where public-health and safety is involved. All examples- are withi~ the context. of public health and safety. The concept and successful practice of psychological screening.is_also seen in the CIA, National

        ?ec~rity Agen~y, FBI, F~, etc. Add~tionally, p~ychological
      - s_cr*eening is a safeguard in settings w_hich are stressful and can adversely af~ec_t be?,avior. There _are several issues-, in my opinion, which should be ad~ressed prior to a brief re-sponse to the specific commission questions.

Two Tests :i Ope Test:- The NRG proposed rule language constitutes an exclusionary psychological - screening procedure.*

• One is not attempting to include persons but rather to exclude per~ons who_present potential threats to public health and safety. Thus, 6nly Qlli!. psychological test- with an interview,

 - ,.

• if needed, should be required. A process of two te*sts--iS neither cost effective, efficient, nor necessary from a professional perspective~ It is noted that t h e ~ has both psychiatric (abnormal) norms as well as norms from a normal population (i.e. The MHP,I:A Contemporary Hormative Study.

1983). Thus, such a single instrumBnt could function as the test of choice. Issue of Erediction: It is obvious that what question one

• asks will determine the focus and content of the answer. There is, I believ~, some confusion about the issue of psychologi~al test "predic*tabili tyn. Psychological screening for unescorted access authorization has as a purpose the determination of initial reliability of a person prior to access to vital and protected areas. Thus, it is a current assessment of emotional stability, not a predictive assessment projecting well into the future. Continuing behavioral stability is within the domain of behavioral observation programs.

Issue of Validity: It is interesting to note that there much

3

• questioning of the validity -of a given psychological test without an inquiry of_ the psych9logical process embedded in unescorted access. A psychological test (i.e. MMPI) is used as a screening instrument in conjunction with a clinical interview if required. Thus, there is a psychological screen-ing process and not a singular reliance on a test. If the test cannot be interpreted or reflects potential behavioral unreliability, the clinical interview occurs. This consti-tutes a highly valid clinical procedure. It is noted that our firm, and others, have developed clinical interviewing formats specifically tailored to the nuclear industry and
• unescorted access authorization. Given the enormous cost factor (and benefit) of nuclear power production, maintenance and physical safeguards, it seems that the absence of psych-ological safeguar~e ignores the most important factor overall, the human resource. Credibility to the public is reduced and actual public health and safety is compromised without a
• psychological screening program in place. It is also note-worthy that psychological testing is the least expensive human factor safeguard.

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC COMMISSION QUESTIONS REGARDING PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION

• RULES

1. To what extent are the proposals contained in the proposed access authorization rules already in place in the commer-cial power reactor industry? To what extent are psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs already used by the nuclear industry as part of employee screening programs?

Staff and licensed network psychologists of Behavior Analysts & Consultants have been involved with psychological screening for unescorted access recommendations and behavioral observation for approximately four (4) yea.rs. Current consultation is with six (6) utilities and 40 plus contractors (subcontractors)

• 4
• In 1982, Tennessee Valey Authority surveyed 21 other utilities.

At that time, all 21 were utilizing psychologcial screening with programs implemented. From our own sampling nationally, it appears that approximately 80% of utilities incorporate psychological screening for unescorted access decisions. Most programs consist of a psychological test (typically the MMPI) wi~h selective interviews if psychometric testing is inconclu-sive or abnormal. Most utilities have designed procedures consistent with ANSI 18.17 and/or ANS 3.3. Behavior Analysts & Consultants has had an ongoing behavioral

• observation program for three (3) years. Our program starts with the MMPI data from the initial unescorted access decision and continues .with structured supervisory SummarI of Behavioral Observation forms. This process monitors work performance, social interaction and health factors related to potential behavioral unreliability. In each case, the forms are sent
• to our offices for professional review and monitoring.

Supervisors are contacted directly, and upon the occurrence of possible behavioral unreliability, with action taken via a supervisory interview with the employee, referral to EAP (Employee Assistance Program), or psychological evaluation for current unescorted access authorization. Our experience

• with this program has been exceedingly positive. Not only have persons been removed from sites for dysfunctional behavior but also many employees have received positive professional assistance from EAP as well as a general enhancement of communi-cation within the organization. Paperwork and supervisory time are at a minimum with this developed process. Additionally, a supervisors training sequence has been organized to integrate responsibilities for observation, referral, badge reviews, etc
• 5
• 2. What purposes are being served by the use of psychological assessment procedures in the nuclear industry? Is psycho-logical assessment used to address fitness for duty con-cerns, radiological sabotage concerns, or both?

Utilities that we serve utilize psychological assessment primarily within the content of identifying aberrant behavior which may compromise public health and safety. Component parts are radiological sabotage, health and safety, and fitness for duty. It should be noted that a psychological process is implemented. Specifically, an initial psychological assessment for unescorted access which addresses stress-prone persons, alcohol/drug tendencies, antisocial features, psychopathology,

• hostility, defensiveness, potential for violence, irrespon-sibility, etc. is utilized. A clinical interview follows when results are abnormal or inconclusive. All results are provided via a single form which is either "clear" or currently "not clear 11
• Such a format, enhances privacy and confidentiality with respect to personal material
• The overall goal is to deny unescorted access to persons who exhibit psychological dysfunctioning or emotional instability which could cause a significant defect in judgement and reliability. In our experience, psychological screening (testing and interview, if needed) has been used to address
• radiological sabotage, fitness for duty (drug and alcohol),

and issues of persons who, when in interaction with the power plant environment, compromise public health and safety.

3. What are the particular concerns about infringements on civil liberties associated with each of the components of the proposed access authorization rule? The Commission is also interested in specific comments regarding the contribution of the specific provisions of the proposed rule in decreasing the risk of sabotage and whether they have been adequately demonstrated to outweigh the infringe-ments on individual privacy associated with the initiatives

• 6 Pre-employment screening, psychological and otherwise, is commonplace for positions involving public trust. Extensive precedent has been set within police departments, fire depart-ments, air traffic controllers, flight crews, etc. In fact, cities have been 'round negligent for failure to develop psych-ological screening for persons in positions of public health and safety (Bonsignore v. City of New York, 521 F. Supp. 394.,

SDNY. 1981). Behavior Analysts & Consultants regards psych-ological assessment to be a reasonable and responsible method of protecting the rights of the public. Psychological assessment is an invasion of privacy to an extent. In the current context, the requests of the unescorted access candidate are straight-

• forward (i.e. informed consent) with confidentiality safeguards
• The advantages of public health and safety appear to outweigh the privacy demands which would be professionally implemented with appeal procedures.

Radiological sabotage is a complex phenomenom. The component

• parts would include immaturity, antisocial features, suspicious-ness, social alienation, and aggressive potential. Documentation of organized radiological sabotage (i.e. terroristic activity) is extremely limited. However, cases of persons manifesting clear signs of psychological disturbance (psychosis, substance abuse, focused hostility, clinical depression and suicidal intent) have
• occurred with security clearances withheld. Behavior Analysts &

Consultants believes that the public shares the assumption that persons in environments where safety could be compromised should be screened. It is noted that Behavior Analysts & Consultants utilizes several safeguards to individual privacy. First, an informed consent and authorization form is signed by each unescorted access candidate which serves as a right to release information. Second, EEOC statistics are kept (age, race, sex, etc.) for all persons

7 whether receiving 11 clear 11 or "not clear" recommendations

• Thus, we can show that there is no disproportionate impact of protected class members. Third, confidentiality is -

preserved by not disclosing specifics of a case with management or personnel services. Only the recommendation to extend ( 11 clear) or withhold security clearance ( "not clear") is provided. The psychological screening with informed consent with behavioral observation provide minimal threat to civil liberty. Conversely, pre-employment background investigation appears to hold for greater potential for abuse and privacy invasion.

• 4. What evidence does or does not support the use of objective diagnostic tests such as the MMPI as screening tools when specifically used only to initiate overall clinical assessments?

What evidence does or does not support the use of clinical assessment by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a consideration in determining whether or not an individual should be granted unescorted access to commercial nuclear power reactors? The validity of the MMPI as an instrument for measuring psycho-pathology has been well established in over 6,000 research studies. The instrument has extensive application as a tool to initiate overall clinical assessment of both normal and abnormal persons. After a thorough review of the evidence supporting the use of the MMPI in that context, a'1978 court decision (McKenna v. Fargo, Federal Supplement .1..2.22) found

• the use of the MMPI to screen applicants for the Jersey City Fire Department to be constitutional. As previously noted, jurisdictions have been found negligent in not screening persons who could pose threat to public health and safety.

In its psychological assessment program, Behavior Analysts & Consultants utilizes the MMPI as a tool to assess behavioral unreliability. Test results are interpreted by licensed clinical psychologists who possess training and expertise in

8 psychometric assessment with the MMPI. In its overall assessment Behavior Analysts & Consultants review the MMPI in light of data from normal, psychiatric and nuclear power reactor populations. When MMPI data are inconclusive or reflective of instability, a structured clinical interview developed for the nuclear context is conducted.

5. What specific characteristics are identified by a clinical psychological assessment that relate directly or indirectly to reducing the risk of radiological sabotage? What percentage of false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors) can be expected from using the NRG proposed psychological assessment procedure? Are more effective procedures available and practical?

• Certain psychological disorders relate in a direct manner to the risk of radiological sabotage. Specifically, persons of antisocial personality adjustment frequently exhibit conflicts with authority, aggressive behavior, impulsivity, and a willing-ness to defy rules, regulations and the norms of society.
• Such characteristics would result in an increased risk for acts of sabotage. Additionally, persons who are paranoid, hostile, immature and defensive pose risk related to sabotage. Other forms of psychological disorders would be expected to relate less directly to sabotage but more directly to risk of accident.

Persons displaying significant mental confusion, depression, or anxiety could be at increased risk of mental lapse or error comparable in its effects to that of deliberate sabotage. Moreover, persons who because of increased stress levels would interact negatively in a nuclear environment should be reviewed as security risks. Behavior Analysts & Consultants regards professionally directed psychological assessment to be capable of detecting some of those persons who display such character-istics and who pose such associated heightened risk of sabotage or accident

• 9
• The NRG proposed assessment procedure is actually a professional psychological process. Thus, the tests (i.e. MMPI) works in conjunction with a clinical interview when behavioral unreli-ability is suspected. A percentage of false positives and false negatives cannot, at present, be accurately communicated.

It is our staff and licensed network psychologists impression that the rates are quite low (given the interviews) and clearly outweigh the risk of not screening.

6. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified solely on the basis of re-ducing risk of radiological sabotage? Is there evidence which would help quantify the extent, if any, of risk reduction supplied by psychological assessment, background investigations, and behavioral reliability programs?

Behavior Analysts & Consultants has utilized psychological evaluation-for fitness for duty, excessive stress, public health and safety, as well as sabotage. Formalized behavioral observation programs have addressed the same issues. The referral question is what is current psychological status of an employee with respect to his/her ability to discharge duties in a fashion which would not pose harm to the person or others. The assessment parallels medical/physical screening. One does not want 11 brittle 11 diabetics or low threshold seizure disorders around equipment or in circumstances of critical demands *

• Further, one would exclude psychological dysfunctioning such as psychosis, depression, antisocial features, etc. The concept of radiological sabotage is not easily quantifiable. However, a percentage of persons who are excluded for their own safety and that of others is approximately 2-3%. Also, psychological screening assists the po tive functioning of employee assistance and fitness for duty.

7. Can the use of psychological assessment in the commercial nuclear industry be justified on the basis of addressing both fitness for duty and radiological sabotage concerns?

• Behavior Analysts & Consultants believes justification of psychological assessment for both sabotage and fitness for duty

                                                             ,o

• is valid. Behavior Analysts & Consultants psychological assessment program i~ intended to provide reasonable assurance that security cleared personnel do not possess psychological dysfunctioning or emotional instability which could cause a significant defect in judgment or reliability. If present, such characteristics could be expected to increase vulner-ability to either unintentional accident or deliberate sabotage capable of affecting public health and safety. The justification for such assessment ultimately depends upon a judgment as to what constitutes an acceptable cost/benefit ratio. The utilities, contractors and subcontractors served by Behavior Analysts & Consultants have the opinion that
• psychological assessment represents a reasonable and cost effective precaution to help assure that security cleared personnel are reliable, trustworthy, and not at special risk of mental error or misjudgment. Psychological screening programs are highly cost effective and easily interact with
• fitness for duty and employee assistance endeavors *

8. To what extent is the use of*psychological assessment related to a behavioral reliability program?. Would the proposed behavioral reliability program be effective without pre-employment psychological assessment? What. specific risks would remain if both psychological assessment and a behavioral reliability program were not part of the screening program; i.e., if only background investigations were adopted?

Psychological assessment and behavioral reliability programs complement each other. Psychological assessment utilizes accepted clinical procedures to arrive at a professional judgment as to whether significant risk for mental error, misjudgment, or sabotage exists due to emotional instability or psychological dysfunctioning. Behavioral reliability programs are intended to detect at an early stage signs of such characteristics in employment-related behavior. Without prior assessment there would be risk that psychologically vulnerable persons who

                                                            , 1 would have been identified through routine screening might not evidence overt behavioral unreliability until after a critical incident. If, in addition, behavioral reliability were also excluded from security clearance programs, there would be risk that psychologically vulnerable persons even when displaying signals of behavioral unreliability might not be detected until after a critical incident. Such risks are unacceptable to public health and safety since both psycholog-ical assessment and behavioral reliability programs are con-sidered reasonable safeguards which may be implemented in a cost-effective manner. Psychological assessment determines initial trustworthiness and psychological competence. Behav-

• ioral observation insures continuing reliability. Background investigation cannot determine the current status of a person's functioning. It is generally more important, in a nuclear environment, to determine what the person currently is as opposed to what he/she was *
• 9. What kinds of individuals have been "screened outn of nuclear industry by the use of psychological assessment, by the use of background investigations, or by the use of behavioral reliability programs?

Behavior Analysts & Consultants has "screened out 11 individuals displaying disturbances in reality testing (psychosis), severe depression, substance abuse, pronounced behavioral agitation,

• serious interpersonal withdrawal, adjustment patterns marked by conflict with others, impulsivity, aggressiveness, hostility and defensiveness and superficial behavioral controls. Some individuals were actively psychotic, displaying delusional beliefs or admitting to hallucinatory .experiences usually of a well circumscribed nature not readily evident without specific effort at psychological assessment. Many of these persons accepted referral to mental health treatment resources or employee assistance programs. All were considered to display

12 clear signs of psychological dysfunctioning or emotional instability,raising significant questions as to the adequacy of their judgment and threat to public health and safety. The psychological assessment services have coalesced nicely with employee assistance, fitness for duty, behavioral observation and unescorted access. Once management and employees experience a non-punitive process which enhances overall organizational effectiveness, support is offered by most all concerned. Persons violating law or who present an immediate threat are escorted off-site, employee assistance is utilized, community referral is also a component. The

• public and the individual are both served *

10. What examples, if any, exist of management abuses of screening procedures including psychological assessments, backgrou.nd investigations and behav'ioral reliability programs?

• Behavior Analysts & Consultants is aware of no management abuses of these programs. Rather, after implementation with safeguards of informed consent, confidentiality, EEOC statistics, employee assistance support (separate function) and fitness for duty, management is typically pleased with bottom line results.

The rights of the individual have been balanced with public health and safety in a professionally administered program *

• 11. How do employees and employee organizations feel about past and present use of screening programs? How do they feel about proposed access authorization rules?

Behavioral Analysts & Consultants experience has been that the great majority of employees understand and appreciate the rationale for psychological assessment. Most of the utilities and contractors we serve mak:e sure to communicate to all those assessed the purpose and limited use of psychological assess-ment. All tested employees are made aware of the purpose of

13

• screening by signing an informed consent/authorization form.

In some cases psychologists also make themselves available to employee groups to discuss issues surrounding psychological assessment and to answer questions. In conjunction with an independent employee assistance program Behavior Analysts & Consultants is aware of numerous employees who view psych-ological assessment in a quite positive fashion. These employees feel assessment provided them an opportunity to discuss personally stressful issues with a trained professional in a confidential context and increased their awareness of counseling and employee assistance resources available to them. Behavior Analysts & Consultants is aware of no formal complaints or concerns expressed by employee organizations concerning psychological assessment. A high percentage of utilities currently have psychological screening procedures. Some have functioned for a number of years. An NRC rule would provide much needed consistency in the implementation of programs and

• further insure consistency and accountability. Public health and safety would be best served by such consistency *
• Respectfully submitted to the Commission by;

   >>~L~-

Dennis L. Johnson, Ph.D. Licensed Psychologist

Aft BEHAVIORDVNE PSYCHOLOGICAL ."' *, CORPORATION F :JS oe*cember 6, .l~i1l,cE * [;DC :~ Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Corrmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission . Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 73 as described in the Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 149, 1 Aug 84.

Dear Secretary Chilk:

I would like to submit comments pertaining to the above indicated proposed regulations. Our organization is a professional psycho-logical corporation which, since 1975, has provided psychological assessment services to the commercial nuclear industry. We have contracts with four major utilities as well as security organizations and a number of technical sub-contractor companies. Over the past nine years we have evaluated over 20,000 people for unescorted access to nuclear facilities. We currently have twenty five experienced, licensed, clinical psychologists who do interviewing for us as independent contractors. In 1977 we submitted corrments on the proposed arrmendments to the NRC Access Authorization Program {42 FR 14880) and provided both written and oral testimony to the Hearing Board appointed by the NRC. At that time, we gave testimony supporting the adoption of ANSI Guideline 18.17 (1973) as a more specific regulation. The Hearing Board later (April 1979) supported this position. I understand the basis for the current proposed regulations are based on the findings of the Hearing Board, after four years and five months. It is extremely unfortunate that occurrences such as the Three Mile incident have demanded so much of the Commission's time during that period but it is also reasonable to assume that the issue of Access Authorization has not been presented to the Commission prior to this time due to conflict within the NRC Staff. Unfortunately, the entire membership of th e Co mm i s s i on has c han ged s i nce the pub1 i cat i on of the prop os e d changes to the regulations were published in 1977 and the recommendations of the Hearing Board were submitted in April 1979. The only information regarding the importance of the current proposed regulations have therefore been provided by the NRC Staff members. r,~knowle:d,1ed by card . */t9J?f#.:...-r 599 COLLEGE AVENUE, SUITE ONE

• PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94306
• TELEPHONE (415) 857-0712

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Secretary Samuel J. Chilk Re: Proposed Access Authorization Program 6 December 84 Page Two We commend the Commission for publishing and requesting comments on the proposed regulation (10 CFR Parts 50 and 73). The public safety and welfare is undoubtedly the most important issue in the operation of a commercial nuclear facility. All of the studies, including Three Mile Island, have indicated that human error is the primary cause of any incident that has involved the safety of the public. As a professional organization that has had more experience in providing psychological services to the nuclear industry than any otherconsulting group, we have accumlated a great deal of data which should have a bearing on the decisions made by the Corrmission. According to the information we have received today from the Office of the Secretary, Docketing and Service Branch (William Clements, Acting Chief), the date for comments on the proposed regulations has been advanced 90 days from December 7, 1984. We may submit additional comments during that period. Sincerely,

                                   ~ ~ , . . r . , " ~

S. Don Schultz, Ph.D . President ,. SDS:sbm

J-Ot:~U hUMB~H pR-Jo 73 \JOCKU NUMBEH PROP.O.Si:D RULE pR-rJ$ t.: , , P. 0. BOX 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408 QROROSfQ RULE {_44 p,e .J~7Z~)

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(-44 r~ 3tJ 7U] .. FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY December 5 , 1984 L-84-359 Samuel J. Chilk Off ice of the Secretary r _ U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission Ooc).{"(r.,tG-*--:..." Jc...

• Washington, D.C. 20555 BRAttcREH VJC; .

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Re: Request for Extension to Respond to Proposed Rules

• Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) is requesting a ninety day extension in responding to the following proposed rules published I August 1984:

Access Authorization Program (49 Fed. Reg. 30726-30735) Miscellaneous Amendment Concerning Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants (49 Fed. Reg. 30735-30738) Searches of Individuals at Power Reactor Facilities (49 Fed. Reg. 30738-30739) Since the publishing of these proposed rules, FPL has been developing its response to them and has been working with other utilities through various industrial associations. FPL intends to submit general comments, as well as respond to the many questions raised in the text of the proposed rules. Because the potential impact of these proposed rules upon us and other utilities is significant, both in time and manpower, sufficient time should be allowed to fully respond to these proposed rules. For this reason, FPL requests a ninety day extension for filing our comments

• Thank you for considering this request at such a late date.

Yours truly,

               ~~(_

J. W. Wit Ii ams, Jr. Group Vice President Nuclear Energy JWW /DAB/kgn cc: K. L. Caldwell, FPL M. Sauser, Newman & Holtzinger PEOPLE . . . SERVING PEOPLE

u'. ;, NUc'.LE-AR REGlJ~A foRv* cdMM( SStOS DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRET ARY OF THE CO MM ISSION Docume nt St3!i; t ics

J AMES N. BUTCHER, PHD 9800 EDGEWOOD ROAD ooc;KETED BLOOMINGTON, MI NNESOTAJS. RC 55438

                                          *a4 DEC - 6 Al 1 :21
 '                                        OFFICE QF SEC~t._TA.,Y OOCKE:11 f'i&Clf1i.btlf.lr, 3' BRANCH 1984 Mr. Samuel Chilk, Secretary Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dear Secretary Chilk; I am responding to your request for public comment published in the Federal Registry,        Volume 49, No.                149, issued on August 1,      1984. I am specifically writing in

- regard to the use of objective psychological assessment procedures, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI>, for evaluating personnel for nuclear powerplant control room operation. I encourage your commission to include psychological testing procedures, especially clinically based and valid tests, as part of the required assessment program for positions in nuclear power plant control rooms. Procedures like the MMPI are important and unique sources of information about an applicant's

• psychological adjustment and potential behavior problems that are typically not available through interview or background checks.

I am a practicing clinical psychologist who has been working in the personnel selection area for about twenty years. I have been using the MMPI to evaluate candidates for various critical occupations, such as law enforcement, airline flight crews and nuclear control room operations, where a high degree of public responsibility is involved. Moreover, I have prepared a computerized version of an MMPI interpretive approach ( Copyright: University of Minnesota Press) based on the empirical MMPI literature and my experience using the test in personnel selection. The MMPI is the most widely used psychological test with an empirical base of around 9,000 books and articles published on it. ( See enclosed TOPIC on MMPI use ). The MMPI has been widely validated in "normal" range populations and has been shown to have both relevance and utility in 1 Acknowlcd.zed by card. /~~1f...: I'

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personnel selection. The MMPI has been validated on several populations related to nuclear power plant operations including some projects in the military for selecting personnel for nuclear submarine operations. I am attaching a copy of an article I published in 1979 that details some of the issues raised in the Federal Registry request for public comment. In addition to my clinical-industrial practice involving the use of the MMPI in the selection of personnel for positions of public responsibility I am also a faculty member at the University of Minnesota where I engage in teaching courses in psychology and in conducting research on personality assessment. I am enclosing a copy of my Curriculum Vita for your information. I would be happy to provide any further information that I have available on the use of the MMPI in personnel selection if I can be of further assistance. Sincerely; Butcher, PhD Consulting Psychologist Minnesota

MMPI Topics in MMPI Interpretation University of Minnesotall5il Notes Number 1 CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE MMPI Why Use the f44PI? Edited by: James N. Butcher and John R. Graham Prepared by: James N. Butcher The MMPI is the most widely used psychological test today (Lubin, Larsen, & Matarazzo, 1984). There have been over 8,000 books and articles published on the MMPI. Its inter-national use is extensive: there have been over 100 trans-ations of the inventory and it is used in over 50 different ountries. How did it attain its respected status in the field of psychological assessment? The best answer

• is simply that the MMPI is a valid and reliable diagnostic aid . . . it assists the clinician in obtaining an objective accurate picture of an individual's personality pattern and symptomatic behavior. Once professional psychologists become acquainted with the information obta i nab 1e through the test they frequently become avid users. The interpretive A information available on the MMPI has been widely researched w, through more than 40 years of clinical use. Extensive data are available concerning personality description, clinical diagnosis, and treatment evaluation. A number of factors account for its success:

1) The information available from the MMPI is relevant to man personality-based decisions: the profile provides 1

the c inician with a visual comparison of important persona 1 ity information, p 1otted on an easy-to-read graph, on each new case with extensive normative and

• clinical data. It provides an objective evaluation of subject's personality characteristics, symptom patterns and personal attitudes that have been shown to be relevan t to many aspects of his or her clinial picture and prognosis.

2) A wide range of descriptive information is available on numerous clinical groups in the published literature.

3) It is one of the easiest personality assessment instrumen t s to use. Administration of the MMPI is simple: a technician can be trained to administer, score, and draw the profile.

4) It is extremely cost effective since very little professional time is required to obtain the necessary interpretive information. For example, in clinical settings, it takes a patient only about 1 1/2 hours to answer t he items; it takes a cl erk about 15 minutes to hand score For further information on MMPI workshops, contact: Gordon Amundson, Department of Conferences, Continuing Education and Extension, University of Minnesota, 207 Nolle Center, 315 PIiisbury Drive S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455; (612) 373-7839.

Copyright by Clinical Appllcationa of the MMPI Workshop Sertee; Department ot Conferences: Unlvenlty ot Mlnneaota. This publicat1on 1s protected under copyright No part of 11 may be reproduced stored in a retrieval system_ or transm1Ued 1n any form or by any means, electronic. mechanical. photocopying, recording . or otherwise without written permission from lhe publisher

MMPl Topics in MMPI Interpretation University of Minnesotallm Notes and construct a prof i 1e; and it takes an experienced interpreter between 15 to 30 minutes to prepare a profile interpretation.

5) The MMPI administration, scoring, profile plotting, and even interpretation, can be accomplished by electronic computer. Automated MMPI reports can provide a very detailed and accurate clinical evaluation of a profile.

6) The University of Minnesota's continuing education programs on the MMPI provide the working clinician with training in the use of the test and frequent updating of new practical information on test use. Workshops on the Clinical Applications of the MMPI have been conducted through the Department of Conferences of the University of Minnesota for the past 20 years *

        ) The MMPI ublishers the Universit of Minnesota Press

• and National Com uter S stems P.O. Box 14 6 Minnea olis Minnesota 55440 rovi de u -to-date user-oriented test materials and advanced computer scoring technology for most MMPI applications.

It is relatively easy to become familiar with the MMPI 1 s interpretive base. There is an abundance of published material on MMPI inter retation for the be innin inter-preter. ome suggested sources are: Butcher, J . N. & Finn, S. (1983). Objective personality assessment in clinical settings. In M. Hersen, A.E. Kaz-din, &A.S. Bellack (Eds.), The clinical psychologyhandbook. New York: Pergamon Press. Carson, R.C. {1969). Interpretive manual to the MMPI. In J. N* Butcher (Ed.), MMP I: Research deve 1opments and clinical a lications. NewYork: McGraw-Hill. ahlstrom, W.G., Welsh, G.S. & Dahlstrom, L.E. (1972). An MMPI handbook: Volume I. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Graham, J.R. (1977). The MMPI: A practical guide. Balti-more: Oxford University Press. For further Information on MMPI workshops, contact: Gordon Amundson, Department of Conferences, Continuing Education and Extension, University of Minnesota, 207 Nolte Center, 315 Pillsbury Drive S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455; (612) 373-7839. Copyngh1 by Cllnlcel AppUc:1llon, of the MMPI Workahop Series; Depar1ment of Conferences: Unlveralty ot Mlnn 1ota . This pubilcat,on 1s protect ed under copyright No part of ,t may be reproduced stored 1n a retnevat system. or transmmed in any form or by any means, electronic. mechanical. photocopying, recording or 01herw 1se, without wntten perm1ss1on from the publisher

CUIUUCULUM ViIAE James Neal Butcher Home Address: 9800 Edgewood Road Bloomington, Minnesota 55438 Home Telephone: (612) 835-7653 Office: Department of Psychology N428 Elliott Hall University of Minnesota 75 East River Road Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455

• Office Telephone:

Date of Birth: Place of Birth: (612) 373-4164 November 20, 1933 Bergoo, West Virginia Military Status: U.S. Army Airborne Infantry, 1951-54 Korean Service, 1952-53 Education: B.A. 1960 Guilford College M.A. 1962 University of North Carolina Ph.D. 1964 University of No,th Carolina EMPLOYMENT AND EXPERIENCE: July, 1970 - Present: Professor, Department of Psychology University of Minnesota September, 1974 -1983: Director, Graduate Training in Clinical Psychology, University of Minnesota 1964-1974: Associate Director of Clinical Psychology University of Minnesota, September, 1964 - Assistant Professor June, 1967: University of Minnesota September, 1963: Instructor, University of North Carolina September, 1%3: Visiting Instructor, North Carolina College Durham, North Carolina September, 1962 - Psychology Intern, Veterans Administration Hospital

  ! Augu~ 1963:             Durham, North Carolina

September, 1962 - Assistant Assessment Officer December, 1962: Peace Corps Training Program June, 1%1 - Psychology Trainee, Raleigh Mental Health Center September, 1962: Raleigh, North Carolina June, 1961 - Part - time Instructor, Department of Psychology September, 1962: University of North Carolina MEMBERSHIP !N PROFESSIONAL AND HONORARY SOCIETIES:

• Guilford Scholarship Society American Psychological Association Council of University Clinical Directors Minnesota Psychological Association Symposium Series Coordinator: Organize and coordinate the annual Symposium for Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI (20th <\nnual in 1984 - 85)

Organized nine International Conferences on Personality Assessment (in Mexico,

 !srae!, Italy, Japan, Hawaii, and Denmark)

Co - organized an international confe*rence on Managing the Problems of an Aircraft Disaster: Logistical, Medical, Psych of ogical and Legal Aspects.

• RESEARCH INTERESTS:

Crisis intervention and brief psychotherapy Cross - cultural study of personality Sub - cultural influences on personality Research methodology Computer based personality assessment Personality assessment in indu~trial settings

James Neal Butcher Page 3 PUBLICATIONS: Books Butcher, J. N. (ed.) {1969). MMPI: Research developments and clinical appli-cations. New York: McGraw-Hill. Butcher, J. N. Abnormal psychology (1971). Belmontt California: Brooks-Cole. Butcher, J. N. {ed.) (1972). Objective personality assessment: Changing perspectives. New Yark: Academic Press. Butcher, J. N., and Pancheri, P. (1976). Handbook of cross-national MMPI research

• Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Butcher, J. N., Hama, H., and Matsuyamaj Y. {1979) Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Personality Assessment. Ooshisha University, Japan. Butcher, J. N. (ed.f (1979). New directions in MMPI research. Minnedpolis: University of Minnesota Press. Coleman, J.C., Butcher, J. N., and Carson, R. C. {1980). Abnormal psychology and modern life. Glenview, Illinois: Scott-Foresman. Coleman, J.C., Butcher, J. N., and Carson, R. C. (1984). Abnormal psychology and Modern Life {7th ed). Kendall, P. C., and Butcher, J. N. (1982). Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology. New York: Wiley *

• Spielberger, C. D., and Butcher, J. N. (1981). Advances in personality assessment. Volume I. New Jersey: Lawrence Erl baum Company.

Butcher, J. N., and Spielberger, C. D. (Eds.) (1982). Advances in personality assessment. Volume II. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Company. Sp1e1berger, C. D., and Butcher, J. N. (Eds.) (1983). Advances in Personality Assessment 2 Volume 3. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Pubiishing Inc. Butcher, J. N., & Spielberger, C. D. (Eds.} (1984). Advances in Personality Assessment: Volume 4. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishing Inc.

 ,, Chapters Butcher, J *. N. (1971). Objective personality assessment. New York:   General Learning Press.                       .-

James Neal Butcher Page 4 Butcher, J. N. (1972). Personality assessment: Problems and perspectives. In J. N. Butcher (ed.), Objective personality assessment: Changing perspectives. New York: Academic Press. Butcher> J. N. (1979). Use of the MMPI in personnel selection. In Butcher, J. N. (ed.), New directions in MMPI research. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Butcher, J. N. {1979). Personality assessment in the year 2000: A projec-tion. In T. A. Williams and J. H. Johnson (eds.), Mental health in the 21st century. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Press. Butcher~ J. N. (1979). Crisis intervention with sensoria11y impaired. In A. Leon (ed.}, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Lifestyle and Health. University of Minnesota. Butcher, J. N. (in press). Perspectives an International MMPI use. In J. N. Butcher and C. D. Spielberger (eds.), Advances in personality assessment: Vo1 ume 4. New Jersey: Lawrence Erl baum Publishing. Butcher, J. N., and C1ark, L.A. (1979). Recent developments in cross-cultural research. In J.N. Butcher (ed.), N~N directions in MMPI research. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Butcher, J. N., and Koss, M. P. (1978) Evaluation of brief and crisis fotervention therapies. In S. L. Garfield and A. Bergin (eds.), Handbook of psychotherapy (revised edition). New York: Wiley. Butcher, J. N., and Maudal, G. (1976). £risis intervention. In l. Weiner (ed.),Handbook of clinical methods. New York: Wiley Interscience. Butcher, J. N., and Owen, P. {1978). Survey of personality inventories: Recent research developments and contemporary issues. In B. Wolman red.), Handbook of clinical diagnosis. New York: Plenum. Hafner, A., Butcher, J. N., Hall, M., and Quast, W. (1969). Parent personality and childhood disorder: A review of MMPI findings. In J. N. Butcher (ed.), MMPI: Research developments and clinical applications. New York: McGraw-Hill. 0\'len, P. L., and Butcher, J. N. (1979). Personality factors in problem drinking: A review of the evidence and some suggested directions. In R. Pickens and L. L. Heston (eds.), Psychiatric factors in drug abuse. New York: Grune and Stratton. Tellegen, A., Gerrard, N., Gerrard, L., and Butcher, J. N. (1969). Personality characteristics of members of a serpent-handling religious cult. In J. N. Butcher (ed.), MMPI: Research developments and clinical applications. New York: McGraw-Hill.

James Neal Butcher Page 5 Butcher, J. N. (1982). Cross-cultural research methods fn clinical psycho-logy. Chapter in P. Kendall and J.N. Butcher (eds.), Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology. New York: Wiley. Butcher, J. N., and Herzog, J. (1982). Assessment in crisis intervention. Chapter in D. Spielberger and J. N. Butcher (eds.), Advances in per-sonality assessment. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, Inc. Butcher, J. N., Stelmachers, z., and Maudal, G. R. (1983). Crisis intervention and emergency psychotherapy. In I. Weiner (ed.), Handbook of clinical methods (2nd edition). New York: Wiley. Butcher, J. N., and Bemis, K. M. (1983). Abnormal behavior in cultural context. Chapter in H. Adams and P. Sutker (eds.), Comprehensive handbook of psycho-pathology. Plenum. Butcher) J. N., and Finn, S. (in press). Objective personality in clinical settings. In M. Hersen, A.E. Kazdin and A.S. Bellack (eds.)l The clini 1 psychology handbook. New York: Pergamon Press. -- Butcher, J. N., and Keller, L. (in press). Objective personality assessment: Present status and future.direcitons. In G. Goldstein and M. Hersen (Eds.} Handbook of Psychological As~essment. New York: Pergamon Press. Articles Butcher, J. N. (1965). Manifest aggression: MMPI correlates in normal boys. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 29, 446-455. Butcher, J. N. (1965). Analysis of post conference questionnaire. In R.D.

• Wirt (ed.), Professional education in clinical psychologr. Stillwater, Minnesota.

Butcher, J. N. (1967). Personality tests and the invasion of privacy. NEA Journal, 56 (8), 51-522. (Abstracted in The Education Digest, January-- 1968). - Butcher, J. N. (1978). Present status of computerized MMPI reporting devices. Review in 0. Buros {ed.), Eighth mental measurements yearbook. Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press. Butcher, J. N. (1978). Automated Psychological Asse$Sment. Review in 0. Buras (ed.), Eighth mental measurements yearboo~. Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press. Butcher, J. N. (1978). Behaviordyne Psychodiagnostic Laboratory Service. Review in O. Buros (ed.), Eighth mental measurements yearbook. Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press.

James Neal Butcher Page 6 Butcher, J. N. (1978). The Caldwell Report. Review in 0. Buros (ed.), Eighth mental measurements yearbook. Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press. Butcher, J. N. (1978). Institute of Clini~al Analysts - MMPI Report. Review in 0. Buras (ed.), Eighth mental measurements yearbook. Hidhland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press. Butcher, J. N. (1978). Psychological Assessment Services. Review in O. Buros (ed.), Eighth mental measurements yearbook. Highland Park) New Jersey: Gyphon Press. Butcher, J. N. {1978}. The Psychological Corporation/National Computer systems MMPI Reporting Service. Review in O. Buras (ed.), Eighth mental measure-ments yearbook. Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press

• Butcher, J. N. (1978). The Roche Psychiatric Service Institute: MMPI Interpretation System. Review in 0. Buros (ed.), Eighth mental measure-ments yearbook. Highland Park, Ne\'J Jersey: Gryphon Press.

Butch1r, J. N. (1980). The role of crisis intervention in an airport disaster plan. Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, Nov., 1260-1262. Butcher, J. N., and Amundson, G. (1975). The peripatetic mult-cult: Or, how to conduct a multiphasic road show. Continuing Professional Development, ll, l 0-12. Butcher, J. N., and Garcia, R. (1978). Cross-national study of personality. Personnel and Guidance Journal, 56, 4-72-475. Butcher, J. N., and Gur, R. {1974). A Hebrew translation of the MMPI: An assessment of translation adequacy and preliminary validatio11. Journal of

• Cross-cultural Psychology, i, 220-228
• Butcher, J. N., and Kolotkin, R. (1979). Outcome of brief psychotherapy.

Psychiatric Clinics of North America, I (1), 157-169. Butcher, J. N., and Messick, D. (1966). Parent-child profile similarity and aggression: A preliminary study. Psychological Reports, 30, 440-442. Butcher, J. N., and Ryan, M. (1974). Personality stability and adjustment to an extreme environment. Journal of App 1i ed Psycho logy, 59, 107-l 09. Butcher, J. N., and Tellegen, A. (1966). Objections to MMPI items. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 30, 527-534. Butcher, J. N., and Tellegen, A. (1978). MMPI research: Methodological problems and some current issues. Journal of Consu1ting and Clinical Psychology, 46 (4), 620-628.

James Neal Butcher Page 7 Butcher, J. N., Ball, B., and Ray, E. (1964). Effects of socio-economic level of MMPI difference in Negro-White college students. Journal of Consulting Psychology, .ll, 83-87. Butcher, J. N., Kendall, P., and Hoffmann, N. G. (1980). MMPI short forms: CAUTION. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 48 (2), 275 .. 278. Benoist, I., and Butcher, J. N. (1977). Nonverbal cues to sex-role attitudes. Journal of Research in Personality, .:U., 431-442. Clavelle, P. R., and Butcher, J. N. (1977). An adaptive typological aoproach to psychological screening. Journal of Consulting arid Clinical Pyschology, 45 ( 5), 851-859 *

• Fillenbau:n, S., Schiffman, R., and Butcher, J. N. (1965). Perception of off-size versions of objects under conditions of rich information. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69, 298-303.

Fink, A., and Butcher, J. N. (1972). Reducing objections to personality inventories with special instructions. Educational and Psychological Measurements, R (3), 631~ Hoffman, N., and Butcher, J. N. (1975). Clinical limitations of MMPI short forms. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 32-39. Hunter, S., 0verall J., and Butcher, J. N. (1974). Factor structure of the 9 MMPJ in a psychiatric popuJation. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 1, 283-302. Koss, M., and Butcher, J. N. (1913). A comparison of psychiatric patients* self-repqrt with other sources of clinical information. Journal of

• Experimental Research in Personality, 7, 225-236
• Koss) M., Butcher, J. N., and Hoffman, IC (1976). The MMPI critical items:

Hm*, well do they work? Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 44 (6), 921-928. Lubinski,* D., Tellegen, A., and Butcher, J. N. (1981). The relationship bet-ween androgyny and subjective indicators of emotional well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, (4), 727-730. Maudal, G., Butcher, J. N., and Mauger~ P. (1974). A multivariate study of personality and academic factors in college attrition. Journal of Counseling Psychology,.£!_, 560-567. Overall, J., Butcher, J. N., and Hunter, S. (1975). Validity of MMPI-168 for psychiatric screening. Educational and Psychological Measurement,~, 393-400.

James Neal Butcher Page 8 Overall, J.E., Hunter, S., and Butcher, J. N. (1973). Factor structure of the MMPI-168 among a psychiatric population. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, .11_, 284-286. Lubinski, D., Te1legen, A., and Butcher, J. N. (1983). Ma~culinity, feminity and androgyny viewed as distinct concepts. Journal of Personality and Socia 1 Psychology_, 44 ( 2), 428-439. Leon, G. L., Butcher, J. N., Kleinman, M., Goldberg, A., and Almagor, M. (1981). Survivors of the holocaust and their children: Current status and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, _il, (3), 503-516. Merebaum, M., and Butcher, J. N. (1982). Therapists' liking of their psychotherapy patients: Some issues related to severity of disorder and treatability. Psychotherapy, Research and Practice? 19, (1), 69-76. Johnson, J., Butcher, J. N., Null, C. and Johnson. In press. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Butcher, J. N., Braswell, L., and Raney, D. (1983). Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psycholo91., 2.!_, (4), 587-594. Book Reviews Butcher, J. N. (1971). Review of the Psychological Screening Inventory. Journal of Professional Psychology, _g_, 416-418. Butcher, J. N. Problems with problem solving? A review of Kjell Raaheim's Problem solving and intelligence. Con.temporary Psychology. Butcher, J. N. (1977). Foreward to John R. Graham's A clinician's guide to

• the MMPI. Williams and Wilkins
• Butcher, J. N.

Psychiatry. A good synposis of some psychological tests. Comprehensive Butcher, J. N. (1980). A review of Crisis in the family (Umana, Gross and Mcconville). New York: Gardner Press. Test Translations {Publications) Cohan, D., Erdberg, D., and Butcher, J. N. Vietnamese translation of the MMPI. Montag, I., Gur, R., and Butcher, J. N. Hebrew version of the MMPI. Tel Aviv, I srae 1: Ramot. Pongpanich, L. and Butcher, J. N. Thai translation of the MMPI.

James Neal Butcher Page 9 Rissetti, F., Butcher, J. N., Montiel, F., et al. Chilean version of the MMPI. Santiago, Chile: Catholic University of Chile. Garcia, R., Azan, A., Hoffman, N., :1nd Butcher, J. N. (1983}. Spanish Translation of the MMPI for Hispanic Americans. university of Minnesota Press CONFERENCE AND CONVENTION PAPERS: Decreased resistance to extinction as a function of reinforcement (with R. King and P. Wood). American Psychological Association, New York City, New York, 1961. (American Psychologist, 1961, 1..§_, 468.) MMPI characteristics of externalizing and internalizing boys. Conference on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI. Minneapolis, Minnesota,

• 1966
• Psychological research in the public schools. Minnesota Psychological As~ociation, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1966.

Adolescent performance on the MMPI. Conference on Adolescence~ Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, Brainerd, Minnesota, 1966. Assessing motivation for psychotherapy. Conference on Treatment of Ado1escent Problems, sponsored by the Minnesota Department of Corrections" Brainerd, Minnesota, 1966. Crisis in personality assessment: A deja vu7 Minnesota Psychological Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1972. Clinical limitations of MMPI short forms: And a strategy for developing a tailor-made MMPI short fonn (with Paul Clavelle and Norman Hoffmann). American Psychological Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1974

• Personality characteristics of therapists and patients (with Michael Merbaum).

Minnesota Conference on Psychotherapy, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1978. Crisis interventions with the sensorially impaired. First International Conference on Lifestyle and Health, HMS Southward, 1978. Personality factors in chemical abuse (with Patricia Owen). Conference on Psychiatric Factors in Drug Abuse, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1979. Future of cross-cultural psychology. Sixth International Conference on Personality Assessment, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, 1979. Crisis intervention in aircraft disasters. Aerospace Medicine Association meeting, Anaheim, California, May 1980.

James Neal Butcher Page 10 INVITED ADDRESSES: Invasion of privacy: Reasons for objecting to personality test questions. Symposium: Louisiana State University Medical School, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1969. Issues in the invasion of privacy. Invited address: University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, 1971 Future directions in clinical psychology. University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, 1973. Current instabilities in clinical psychology. University of Texas Medical Branch~ Galveston, Texas, 1974

• Methodological problems in cross-cultural research.

University of Tehran,Tehran, Iran, 1975. Invited address: Crisis intervention therapy. Psychoanalytic Associ~tion of the Institute of Psychiatry, University of Rome, Italy, 1978. Use of the MMPI in a medical setting. Invited address: Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washingtoh, D.C., 1978. Cross-cultural study of abnormal personality. Invited address: Chilean Psychological Association, Santiago, Chile, 1978. Assessment in crisis intervention. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1979. New directions in objective personality assessment. Distinguished Lecturer Series, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, 1979 *

• • SEMINARS AND SYMPOSIA:

Problems in the revision of the MMPI. Symposia on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1969. Cross-cultural application of personality inventories. Symposium on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI, Mexico City, Mexico, 1970. Cross-national validity of the MMPI (with Paolo Pancheri). Ninth Annual sheosium on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPit Los Angeles, Ca 1fornia, 1973. Teaching of cross-cultural psychology. Symposium at Second Annual International Conference on Cross-cultural Ps cholo , Kingston, Ontario, Cana a, 9

• James Nea1 Butcher Page 11 Who owns test item content: Present confusions and anxieties about 1984.

Tenth Annual Symposium on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI, Tampa, Florida, 1975. Haunting problems with the use of the automated MMPI. Eleventh Annual Symposium Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI, Mir.neapolts, Minnesota, 1976. V Seminar on personality assessme~t and clinical psychology. Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 1976. Personality and the selection of police officer candidates. Symposium on Legal Liabi1ities and Psychological Evaluation, Moro Bay, California, 1976.

• MMPI bl ind interpretation and internal structure of the MMPI. 12th Annual Sym osium on Recent Develo ments in the Use of the MMPI. St. Petersburg, orida, 9 7.

Use of the MMPI in personnel screening. 14th Annual Symposium on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI, Tampa, Florida, 1979. Cross-cultural study of personality 1vith the MMPI (with Lee Anna Clark). 14th Annual Symposium on Recent Developments in the Use of the MMPI. Tfu~pa~ F1orida, 1979. Symposium in Objective Assessment of Psychological Problems Across Cultures. Western Psychological Association~ Hono1ulu, Hawaii, 1979. Psychological test interpretation: Integration of Rorschach and MMP}}