ML23151A610

PR-070, 072, 073, 075 - 54FR33570 - Minor Amendments to the Physical Protection Requirements

ML23151A610
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/15/1989
From:	Taylor J NRC/EDO
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References
PR-070, PR-072, PR-073, PR-075, 54FR33570
Download: ML23151A610 (1)

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KEYWORD: ADAMS Template: SECY-067 08/15/1989 PR-070,072,073,075 - 54FR33570 - MINOR AMENDMENTS TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS PR-070,072,073,075 54FR33570 RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF RULEMAICING PROPOSED RULE: PR-070,072,073 1 075 OPEN ITEM (Y/N) N RULE NAME: MINOR AMENDMENTS TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 54FR33570 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 08/15/89 ORIGIN~.£.1\TE FOR COMMENTS: 09/29/89 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: EXTENSION DATE: I I 3 FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 57FR33426 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 07/29/82 NOTES ON EDO SIGNED PROPOSED AND FINAL RULES. FILE LOCATED ON P1. STATUS OF RULE TO FIND THE STAFF CONTACT OR VIEW THE RULEMAKING HISTORY PRESS PAGE DOWN KEY HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-070,072,073,075 RULE TITLE: PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: MINOR AMENDMENTS TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED RULE SRM DATE: FINAL RULE SRM DATE: I I I I DATE PROPOSED RULE SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 07/31/89 DATE FINAL RULE SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 07/14/92 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACT1: STANLEY DOLINS CONTACT2: PRISCILLA DWYER MAIL STOP: NLS 129 PHONE: 492-3745 MAIL STOP: WFN-4E4 PHONE: 492-0478

DOCKET NO. PR-070,072,073,075 (54FR33570) In the Matter of MINOR AMENDMENTS TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIR EMENTS DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 08/30/89 07/31/89 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE 09/29/89 09/29/89 COMMENT OF NUMARC (JOE COLVIN, VICE PRESIDENT) 10/02/89 09/27/89 COMMENT OF WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY (C. W. FAY, VICE PRESIDENT) (

2) 10/06/89 10/03/89 COMMENT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (LESLIE HOLDEN, REGULATORY ENGINEER) (

3) 07/22/92 07/14/92 FEDERAL REG ISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE

(

1)

OOCK[T ED USNRC [7590-01]

• 92 JUL 22 p 3 :11 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PARTS 70, 72, 73, and j{

R IN: 3 l 50-AD03 Minor Amendments to the Physical Protection Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations that cover the physical protection of special nuclear material. These amendments will (1) supplement the definitions section, (2) delete action dates that no longer apply, (3) correct outdated terms and cross references, (4) clarify wording that is susceptible to differing interpretations, (5) correct typographical errors, and (6) make other minor changes. The amendments are the result of a systematic review of NRC's safeguards regulations. EFFECTIVE DATE: [Insert a date 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.] 1

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: *Stanley P. Turel, Regulation Development Branch, Division of Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 492-3739; Priscilla Dwyer, Domestic Safeguards Branch, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 504-2478; or Donald M. Carlson, Reactor Safeguards Branch, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission, Washington, DC

20555, Telephone (301) 504-3212.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NRC Safeguards Interoffice Review Group has conducted a systematic review of the Agency's safeguards regulations and guidance documents to identify areas in the regulations that are out of date, inconsistent, or susceptible to differing interpretations. In doing so, the review group e, identified other areas in the regulations where minor changes are warranted. The NRC published in the Federal Register on August 15, 1989 (54 FR 33570), proposed amendments consisting of minor corrections and changes to its ,regulations identified by the review group that cover the physical protection of special nuclear material. The co111T1ent period ended on September 29, 1989. The changes are summarized here with a brief discussion.

1.

The substance of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 10 CFR 73.40 has been moved to Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 and combined with the safeguards contingency plan specifications already there. The requirement for having a 2 4

safeguards contingency plan is included in each of the sections of the regulations covering security requirements for the specific class of licensee (i.e., §§ 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.40, 73.46, 73.55, 73.60).

2.

To avoid possible confusion, definitions of the commonly used terms Category I, Category II, and Category III have been added to the definitions sections of 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73. A formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material is sometimes referred to as a Category I quantity of material; special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance is sometimes referred to as a Category II quantity of material; and special nuclear material of low strategic significance is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity of material. The current regulations do not include these category designations, although they are sometimes used.

3.

Inconsistencies among the general auditing requirements have been removed for the safeguards contingency plans and physical security programs of transportation and fuel cycle licensees who possess Category I material. Inconsistencies in both the content of the audits and resultant follow-up actions have been eliminated. The record retention period for results of, these audits is being made consistent at 3 years.

4.

A definition for the term "contiguous sites" has been added to 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73. In the final definition, the words "... means locations subject to the control of a licensee,... " have been grammatically changed to read "... means licensee controlled locations,.... " In addition, the words "... and for the possession, use, or storage of special nuclear material... " have been deleted from the definition since they generally appear in the introductory language of applicable regulations. Action dates that have 3

passed have been eliminated. The outdated term "industrial sabotage" has been replaced by the current term "radiological sabotage." Incorrect references to parts of the regulations that have been moved or deleted have been corrected. Paragraph designations in references, in other parts of the regulations, to definitions in § 70.4 have been removed because those designations were deleted in an amendment published in the Federal Register on April 28, 1989 (54 FR 14051). Several areas in the regulations have been clarified where the wording was susceptible to differing interpretations. The notification requirement for changes to the safeguards contingency plan that do not decrease the plan's effectiveness has been revised to require that the original be sent to the NRC headquarters office with a copy to the regional office, instead of vice versa. Finally, several typographical errors have been corrected.

SUMMARY

OF PUBLIC COMMENTS Three letters of comment were received: two from nuclear power plant licensees and one from NUMARC, an umbrella organization of the nuclear power industry whose membership includes every utility responsible for constructing or operating a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States. Copies of comment letters are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC eublic Document Room at 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. All three commenters addressed only the amendment that would restore the sentence inadvertently omitted, while amending the physical protection requirements in 1986, from§ 73.55 (d), Access Requirements. It reads: 4

"Access to vital areas for the purpose of general familiarization and other nonwork-related activities may not be authorized except for good cause shown to the licensee." This sentence follows the requirement in § 73.55 (d)(7)(i) that the licensee "Establish an access authorization system to limit unescorted access to vital areas during non-emergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties." The first corrmenter stated that the restrictions, presumably made explicit by the inserted sentence, should be withdrawn to allow tours with the provision of appropriate security measures to ensure plant safety and that "This change would limit access to nuclear plant vital areas even when under escort.N Another co11111enter asserted that the inserted sentence Rneeds clarification" but did not specify what additional clarification was required. The third co11111enter stated that it would be beneficial if a definition of "good cause" were provided by the Co11111ission in the rule and if additional guidance were provided as to what constitutes nonwork-related activities. The NRC agrees that the subject sentence is not clear, particularly with respect to how it applies to escorted persons, and has decided not to reinsert the sentence. As stated in item 5 of the Supplementary Information published with the proposed rule, the NRC was concerned that the inadvertent omission of the sentence would be construed as a "'signal' that vital areas could be 'opened up' to 'public sightseeing tours' or 'open house visits' without close licensee oversight.a The NRC continues to be concerned about unnecessary escorted personnel traffic in vital areas, especially the control room, but considers that licensee security plans generally provide an adequate basis for ~ the control of such practice. The NRC concludes that licensee security plans, in implementing 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7), would not permit licensees to grant access 5

to persons, either unescorted or escorted, who have no legitimate purpose for such access. Further, prior to granting escorted access, licensees would consider the number of visitors each escort would be allowed to monitor and other controls. Means of achieving the purpose of the visit without entering vital areas also would be considered (e.g., touring the control room simulator rather than the control room). Examples of legitimate small tours, which might include brief access to vital areas, are visits by government officials, the press, or local science teachers. In summary, visitors should not be permitted access to vital areas at operating sites unless there is a good reason and due consideration is given to plant and personnel safety and radiological concerns. Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The NRC has determined that this final rule is the type of action described in the categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(2). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this regulation. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved under the Office of Management and Budget approval number 3150-0009 for Part 70, approval number 3150-0132 for Part 72, approval number 3150-0002 for Part 73, and approval number 3150-0055 6

for Part 75. Regulatory Analysis These minor amendments impose no new restrictions or requirements, and therefore, have no significant impact. Accordingly, a regulatory analysis is considered not necessary and has not been prepared. Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 ( 5 u:s.c. 605{b)), the Commission certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The amendments, as promulgated, are very minor in nature and the impact on any licensee is minimal. In the matter of reporting certain changes to the security program, the amendments merely reverse who receives the original and who receives the copy. The other changes are of an administrative nature and, therefore, do not alter the current implementation *of the regulations by a licensee. Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this final _rule because these amendments do not impose requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not required for this final rule. 7

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 75 Part 70 - Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials - Transportation, Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures, Special nuclear material. Part 72 - Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel. Part 73 - Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials - Transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. Part 75 - Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 75. PART 70 -- DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

1.

The authority citation for Part 70 is revised to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 204, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 8

as amended, 1244, 1245, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5845, 5846}. Sections 70.1 {c} and 70.20a (b) also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 {42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 70.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 70.2l(g) also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Section 70.31 also issued under sec. 57d, Pub. L. 93-377, 88 Stat. 475 (42 U.S.C. 2077). Sections 70.36 and 70.44 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 70.61 also issued under secs. 186, 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236, 2237}. Section 70.62 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2273); §§ 70.3, 70.7(g), 70.l9(c), 70.21(c), 70.22{a), {b), {d)-(k), 70.24 (a) and (b), 70.32{a){3),{5),{6),{d), and {i), 70.36, 70.39 (b) and (c), 70.4l(a), 70.42 (a) and (c), 70.56, 70.57 {b), (c), and (d}, 70.58 (a)-{g}{3), and (h)- (j) are issued under sec. 161b, 161i, and 1610, 68 Stat. 948, 949, and 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l{b), 2201(1) and 2201(0)); §§ 70.7, 70.20a {a) and (d), 70.20b (c) and (e), 70.2l{c}, 70.24(b), 70.32 (a}(6), (c), {d), (e), and {g), 70.36, 70.51 (c)-{g), 70.56, 70.57 (b} and (d), and 70.58 (a}-{g)(3) and (h)-(j) are issued under sec. 16li, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l(i)); and §§ 70.5, 70.9, 70.20b (d) and (e}, 70.38, 70.51 (b) and {i), 70.52, 70.53, 70.54, 70.55, 70.58 (g)(4), (k) and (1), 70.59, and 70.60 {b) and {c) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201{0)). 9

2.

Section 70.4 is amended by adding a definition for "Contiguous sites" in proper alphabetical sequence; revising the definition of "Formula quantity," revising paragraph (2) of the definition "Plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant," revising paragraph (1) of the definition "Special nuclear material of low strategic significance," and revising the definition of "Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance" to read as follows: § 70.4 Definitions. "Contiguous sites" means licensee controlled locations, deemed by the Commission to be in close enough proximity to each other, that the special nuclear material must be considered in the aggregate for the purpose of physical protection. "Formula quantity" means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams= (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category I quantity of material. "Plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant" *** (2) research and development activities involving any of the operations described in paragraph (I) of this definition except for research and development activities utilizing unsubstantial amounts of plutonium. 10

"Special nuclear material of low strategic significance" means: (1) Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance as defined in paragraph (1) of the definition of strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance in this section, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of - plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the equation, grams~ (grams contained U-235) + (grams plutonium)+ (grams U-233); or (2) Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope); or (3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 Isotope). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity of material. "Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance" means: (1) Less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combined quantity of more than 1000 grams when computed by the equation, grams=(grams contained U-235) + 2(grams U-233 + grams plutonium); or (2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope). 11

This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category II quantity of material.

3.

In § 70.19, paragraph (a)(2) is revised to read as follows: § 70.19 General license for calibration or reference sources. (a) (2) Any Government agency as defined in § 70.4 that holds a specific license issued by the Commission that authorizes it to receive, possess, use, or transfer byproduct material, source material, or special nuclear material; and

4.

In § 70.22, paragraphs (h){l) and {k) are revised to read as follows: § 70.22 Contents of applications. {h){l) Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to licensee control, a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material as defined in § 70.4, other than a license for possession or use of this material in the operation of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, must include a physical security plan consisting of two parts. Part I must address vital equipment, vital areas, and isolation zones, and must demonstrate how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of§§ 73.20, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.60, 73.70, and 73.71 of this chapter in the conduct of the activity to be licensed, including the identification and description of jobs as required by 10 CFR 11.ll(a). Part II must list tests, inspections, and other means to 12

demonstrate compliance with such requirements. (k) Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to licensee control, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance as defined under§ 70.4, other than a license for possession or use of this material in the operation of a nuclear power reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, must include a physical security plan that demonstrates how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g) of§ 73.67, as appropriate. The licensee shall retain a copy of this physical security plan as a record for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material under each license, and if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion of the plan for 3 years after the effective date of the change.

5.

In § 70.32, paragraph (c)(3) is removed and paragraph (g) is revised to read as follows: § 70.32 Conditions of licenses. (g) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures in accordance with Appendix C to Part 73 of this chapter for bringing about the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of its safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall retain the current safeguards contingency plan procedures as a record for the entire period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity 13

of special nuclear material under each license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of the change. The licensee shall not make a change that would decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the first four categories of information (i.e., Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix) contained in any licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared pursuant to §§ 70.22(g), 70.22(j), 72.184, 73.20(c), 73.26(e)(l), 73.46(h)(l), or 73.SO(g)(l) of this chapter without the prior approval of the NRC. A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for an amendment to its license pursuant to § 70.34. The licensee may make changes to the licensee safeguards contingency plan without prior NRC approval if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. The licensee must maintain each change to the plan made without prior approval as a record during the period for which possession of a formula quantity of special nuclear material is authorized under a license and retain the superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of the change and shall furnish a report containing a description of each change within 60 days after the change is made to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office as specified in Appendix A to Part 73 of this chapter. 14

PART 72 -- LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

6.

The authority citation for Part 72 is revised to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, l244, 1246 {42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 {42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168). Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142{b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162{b), 10168(c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec.. 189, 68, Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154}. Section 72.96(d} also issued under sec. 145(g}, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(9)). Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 14l(h), Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2244, (42 U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a), 1016l(h)}. Subparts Kand Lare also issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198). 15

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273); §§ 72.6, 72.22, 72.24, 72.26, 72.28(d), 72.30, 72.32, 72.44(a), (b)(l), (4), (5), (c), (d)(l), (2), (e), (f), 72.48(a), 72.50(a), 72.52(b), 72.72(b), (c), 72.74(a), (b), 72.76, 72.78, 72.104, 72.106, 72.120, 72.122, 72.124, 72.126, 72.128, 72.130, 72.140(b), (c), 72.148, 72.154, 72.156, 72.160, 72.166, 72.168, 72.170, 72.172, 72.176, 72.180, 72.184, 72.186, are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l(b)); §§ 72.l0(a), (e), 72.22, 72.24, 72.26, 72.28, 72.30, 72.32, 72.44,(a),(b)(l), (4), (5), (c), (d)(l),(2),(e), (f), 72.48(a), 72.50(a), 72.52(b), 72.90(a)-(d), (f), 72.92, 72.94, 72.98, 72.100, 72.102(c), (d), (f), 72.104, 72.106, 72.120, 72.122, 72.124, 72.126, 72.128, 72.130, 72.140(b), (c), 72.142, 72.144, 72.146, 72.148, 72.150, 72.152, 72.154, 72.156, 72.158, 72.160, 72.162, 72.164, 72.166, 72.168, 72.170, 72.172, 72.176, 72.180, 72.182, 72.184, 72.186, 72.190, 72.192, 72.194 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and §§ 72.l0(e), 72.11, 72.16, 72.22, 72.24, 72.26, 72.28, 72.30, 72.32, 72.44(b)(3), (c)(5), (d)(3), (e), (f), 72.48(b}, (c), 72.50(b), 72.54(a), (b), (c), 72.56, 72.70, 72.72, 72.74(a), (b), 72.76(a), 72.78(a), 72.80, 72.82, 72.92(b), 72.94(b), 72.140 (b), (c), (d), 72.144(a), 72.146, 72.148, 72.150, 72.152, 72.154 (a), (b), 72.156, 72.160, 72.162, 72.168, 72.170, 72.172, 72.174, 72.176, 72.180, 72.184, 72.186, 72.192, 72.212(b), 72.216, 72.218, 72.230, 72.234(e) and (g) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

7.

In § 72.184, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows: § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan. (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for 16

responding to threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in Appendix C to Part 73 of this chapter. This plan must include Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities licensed under Part 50 of this chapter. (The fifth and last category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.) PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

8.

The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as *follows: Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); secs. 201 as amended 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844). Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2273); §§ 73.21, 73.37{g), and 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l(b)); §§ 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 16li, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l(i)); and §§ 73.20{c)(l), 73.24(b)(l),. 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37{f), 73.40{b) and {d), 73.46{g)(6) and (h){2), 73.50(9)(2), {3)(iii)(B), and (h), 73.55(h)(2) and (4){iii)(B), 73.57, 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 17

Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

9. Section 73.2 is amended by adding a definition for "Contiguous sites" in proper alphabetical sequence, and revising the definitions of "Formula quantity," "Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance," and "Special nuclear material of low strategic significance" to read as follows:

§ 73.2 Definitions. "Contiguous sites" means licensee controlled locations, deemed by the Commission to be in close enough proximity to each other, that the special nuclear material must be considered in the aggregate for the purpose of physical protection. "Formula quantity" means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams= (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category I quantity of material. "Speci~l nuclear material of low strategic significance" means: (1) Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance as defined in paragraph (1) of the definition of strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance in this section, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the equation, 18

grams= (grams contained U-235) + (grams plutonium)+ (grams U-233); or (2) Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope); or (3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 Isotope). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity of material. 11Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance" means: (1) Less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combined quantity of more than 1000 grams when computed by the equation, grams=(grams contained U-235)+2(grams U-233+grams plutonium); or (2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent 1n the U-235 igotope). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category II quantity of material.

10.

In § 73.20, paragraph (b)(3) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(4), a new paragraph (b)(3) is added, and paragraphs (b)(2) and (c) are revised to read as follows: § 73.20 General performance objective and requirements. 19

(b) (2) Is designed with sufficient redundancy and diversity to ensure maintenance of the capabilities described in §§ 73.25 and 73.45; (3) Includes a safeguards contingency capability that can meet the criteria in Appendix C to this part "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans;" and (c) Each licensee subject to the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall establish, maintain, and follow NRC-approved safeguards physical protection and safeguards contingency plans that describe how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

11.

In § 73.26, paragraph (h)(6) is revised to read as follows: § 73.26 Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures. (h) Test and Maintenance Programs.*** (6) The transportation security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include an audit of transportation security procedures and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the transportation physical protection system, an audit of the transportation physical protection system testing and mainten&nce program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. 20

The results and recommendations of the review, management's findings on whether the transportation security program is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior reviews, must be documented in a report to the responsible organization management and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection for*a period of 3 years. § 73.40 [Amended].

12.

In § 73.40, paragraphs (b), including footnote 1, (c), and (d) are removed.

13.

In § 73.46, paragraphs (g)(6) and (h)(l) are revised to read as follows: § 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures. (g) Test and Maintenance Programs. -H* (6) The security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The security program review must include an audit of security procedures and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance 21

program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorit~es. The results and recommendations of the security program review, and any actions taken, must be documented in a report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operations. These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection for a period of 3 years. (h) Continqencv and response plans and procedures. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the strategic special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans." Contingency plans must include, but not limited to, the response requirements listed in paragraphs (h)(2) through (h)(5) of this section. The licensee shall retain the current safeguards contingency plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of change.

14.

In § 73.50, paragraphs (g)(l) and (h) are revised to read as follows: § 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities. 22

(g) Response regujrement. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, nlicensee Safeguards Contingency Plans." The licensee shall retain the current safeguards contingency plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of the change. (h) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of this section.

15.

In § 73.55, paragraphs (b)(4)(ii), (g)(4), and (h)(l) are revised to read ~s follows: § 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. 23

(b)*** (4)*** (ii) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of this paragraph. The licensee shall maintain the current training and qualifications plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which the plan was developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of the change. The training and qualifications plan must include a schedule to show how all security personnel will be qualified 2 years after the submitted plan is approved. The training and q~alifications plan must be followed by the licensee 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC. (g) (4) The security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The security program review must include an audit of security procedures and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and *an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results and recommendations of the security program review, management's findings on whether the security program is 24

currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior program reviews must be documented in a report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection, for a period of 3 years. (h) Response requirement. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans."

16. In § 73.60, the introductory paragraph and paragraph (e) are revised to read as follows:

§ 73.60 Additional requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material at nonpower reactors. Each nonpower reactor licensee who, pursuant to the requirements of Part 70, possesses at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium, alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams= (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium), shall protect the special nuclear material from theft or diversion pursuant to the requirements of paragraphs 73.67(a), (b), (c), and (d), in addition to this section, except 25

that a licensee is exempt from the requirements of paragraphs {a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section to the extent that it possesses or uses special nuclear material that is not readily separable from other radioactive material and that has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding. (e} Response requirement. Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan 'for responding to threats,* thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans."

17.

In § 73.67, the introductory text of paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) and paragraph {c){2) are revised to read as follows: e § 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance. (c} Each licensee who possesses, uses, transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic sig-nificance, or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall: 26

(2) Within 30 days after the plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(l) of this section is approved, or when specified by the NRC in writing, implement the approved security plan. (d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except as allowed by paragraph (b)(2) of this section and except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50, shall: (f) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses special nuclear material of low strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50, shall:

18. In § 73.70, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:

§ 73.70 Records. (c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not employed by the licensee pursuant to §§ 73.46(d)(l3), 73.55(d)(6), or 73.60. The licensee shall retain this register as a record, available for inspection, for 3 years after the last entry is made in the register. 27

19.

In Appendix B to Part 73, the Introduction is revised to read as follows: APPENDIX B TO PART 73 - GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL Introduction Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear material on site or in transit and for the protection of the facility or*shipment vehicle against radiological sabotage should, like other elements of the physical security system, be required to meet minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security-related job duties. In order to ensure that those individuals responsible for security are properly equipped and qualified to execute the job duties prescribed for them, the NRC has developed general criteria that specify security personnel qualification requirements. These general criteria establish requirements for the selection, training, equipping, testing, and qualification of individuals who will be responsible for protecting special nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, and nuclear shipments. When required to have security personnel that have been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform assigned security job duties in accordance with the criteria in this appendix, the licensee must establish, maintain, and follow a plan that shows how the criteria will be met. The plan must be submitted to the NRC for approval and must be implemented within 30 days after approval by the NRC unless otherwise specified by the NRC in writing. 28

20. In Appendix C to Part 73, the Introduction is revised and a new section on Audit and Review is added to read as follows:

APPENDIX C TO PART 73 - LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS Introduction A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or radiological sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. An acceptab1e safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to efficiently implement the decisions, and (3) a stipulation of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action. The goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for responding to e threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage are: (1) to organize the response effort at the licensee level, (2) to provide predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies, (3) to ensure the integration of the licensee response with the responses by other entities, and (4) to achieve a measurable performance in response capability. Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organizing the licensee's resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated. The responses should be timely. 29

It is important to note that a licensee's safeguards contingency plan is intended to be complementary to any emergency plans developed pursuant to Appendix E to Part 50 or to § 70.22(i) of this chapter. Contents of the Plan Audit and Review At intervals not to exceed 12 months, the licensee shall provide for a review of the safeguards contingency plan by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include an audit of safeguards contingency procedures and practices, and an audit of conunitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The licensee shall document the results and the recommendations of the safeguards contingency plan review, management findings on whether the safeguards contingency plan is currently effective, and any actions taken as a - result of recommendations from prior reviews in a report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. The report must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection for a period of 3 years. 30

PART 75 -- SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL - IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT

21.

The authority citation for Part 75 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134, 2152, 2201; sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242 as amended, (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161}. For purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273), the provisions of this part are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)}.

22.

In § 75.4, paragraph (f)(l) is revised to read as follows: § 75.4 Definitions. (f) "Effective Ki]ogramft means a unit used in sa~eguarding nuclear material. The quantity is: 31

(1) For special nuclear material: The amount specified in § 70.4 of this chapter. Dated at Rockville, ~ Maryland this t_1' day of ~ For the Nuclear Regulatory~m~;on. , 1992. 32

e Commonwealth Edison 72 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 - 0767 DOCKET NUMBER PR yd,2:, 13 7~ PROPOSED RULE ~---- ) J ( ~Lj (f 3 3 5?0 Sammuel J. Chilk, Secretary, October 3, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regunttory Commission Atteoti61f: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

• ag OCT -6 P 3 :19

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Rule Regarding Amendments

Dear Mr. Chilk:

to Physical Protection Requirements (Federal Register Vol. 54, No. 156, August 15, 1989) This provWes Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECo's) comments on the subject ~roposed* ~le. CECo would specifically like to provide comments on the re.fflstatement *of limitations on vital area access. The NRC proposes to add to its vital area access rule, 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(7), the following sentence: "Access to vital areas for purposes of general familiarization and other non-work-related activities shall not be authorized except for good cause shown by the licensee." The supplemental information provided in the proposed rulemaking stated that this sentence was inadvertently dropped when the regulations were amended in 1986, and that reinstating this requirement does not change any Commission policy in this regard. The Commission believes that since up until the inadvertent ommission in 1986 most licensees' security plans met this requirement, therefore this will have minimal impact on most licensees. CECo's current security plans include the criteria for requiring "good cause" for vital area access, therefore the proposed rule will not significantly impact CECo. However, CECo offers the comment that it would be beneficial if a definition of "good cause" was provided by the Commission in the rule. This would provide licensee's with a clearer understanding of what the NRC considers "good cause" rather than leaving interpretation open to licensees. NOV,,.. 6 1989

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1 CECo also believes that it woul d be beneficial if additional guidance were provided in the rule as to what consti tutes "non-work-related-activities".

For the same reasons provi ded for defining "good cause". CECo appreciates this opportunity to provide comments to the NRC. /lb:9003k50 Re spectfully, ~

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Les lie E. Holden Regu latory Assurance Engineer

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','p* 231 W. Michigan. P.O. Box 2046, Milwaukee. WI 532~1 VPNPD 514 NRC-89-116 September 27, 1989 Secretary of the Commission U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing & Service Branch Gentlemen: COMMENTS ON PROPOSED MINOR AMENDMENTS TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS (10 CFR PARTS 70, 72, 73, AND 75) "89 OCT -2 p 4 :22114J 221-2345 ," Fr tou In the August 15, 1989, Federal Register notice at 33570 ff., NRC proposes to insert at 10 CFR 73.55d(7)i a "provision that addresses access to vital areas at power reactors... to insure no erroneous views are held by licensees that the deletion of the sentence was a 'signal' that vi t al areas could be opened up to 'pub l ic sightseeing tours' or 'open house visits' without close licensee oversight." We have no objection to maintaining "close licensee oversight" during plant tours. However, the proposed insertion is aimed more toward discouraging plant tours than toward the assurance of close licensee oversight. Furthermore, the proposed language is fraught with ambiguity. Plant tours have potentially substantial educational value for elected representatives, regulatory agency personnel, families of plant employees and other groups. The conduct of plant tours for these groups is consistent with the spirit and intent of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and can, in many if not most cases, be regarded as responsive to the public right to know. Decisions regarding the appropriateness of plant tours properly should be left to the Licensee. The thrust of the regulations in this area should address and be restricted to the provision of proper security measures during such tours. The proposed insertion reads: "Access to vital areas for the purpose of general familiarization and other nonwork-related activities shall not be authorized except for good cause shown to the licensee." This change would limit access to nuclear plant vital areas even when under escort. We understand that such tours or visits might be allowed for "good cause." However, the term "good cause" presently is not carefully defined and would undoubtedly result in varying interpretations between licensees 'I i I I, 1989 A su/Jsitfialy of Msconsin £nel[{Y ColJ)Omtioa

Secretary of the Commission September 27, 1989 Page 2 and between NRC inspectors. A narrow interpretation could exclude not only members of the public, but also spouses and relatives of plant employees, the media, state public service commissioners, and others. we believe all licensees recognize the importance of ensuring against industrial sabotage or other events which could jeopardize safe operations of facilities. However, if the nuclear option is to become viable again in the United States, the public must become convinced that the plants can be operated safely and reliably. It has been the experience of Wisconsin Electric--and we believe most utilities--that plant tours have been most bene-ficial in reducing the apprehension and fear regarding the poten-tial danger posed by nuclear plants. We view these activities not so much as promotional but rather as fulfilling our educational responsibility as society moves toward crucial energy choices for the future. In the past, we have had tours of media and public service commission personnel, families of plant employees, local law enforcement personnel, local fire department personnel, and state and federal elected officials, as well as other groups. In all cases, the individuals were highly complimentary and appreciative after touring the facility. To the extent that we are required by regulation to say, in effect, that something is too dangerous or too sensitive to allow them to see it, even when under escort, our efforts to educate the public will be adversely impacted. While we consider it inappropriate to restrict a Licensee's prerogative to conduct plant tours, we wholly support the provision of appropriate security measures during such tours. We would not object to the specification of security and safety requirements for tours, perhaps even including NRC Region review of security arrangements in advance of large tours, such as those involving more than 50 people. In summary, it is highly desirable that tours be allowed to include vital areas by appropriate members of the public, inclu-ding local, state, or federal politic i ans; regulators; and support organizations such as local fire departments or law enforcement agencies. It is, therefore, recommended that the restrictions proposed be withdrawn in favor of more definitive guidelines which will continue to allow tours with the provision of appropriate security measures to ensure plant safety. Very truly yours, ~J~ C. W. F'jo/ Vice President Nuclear Power

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~ .:>C. Joe F. Colvin Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Services Branch Re: Minor Amendments to the Physical Protection Requirements - 54 FR 33570 Request for Comments

Dear Mr. Chilk:

September i2,9, 1989 OUV These comments are submitted on behalf of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc. ("NUMARC") in response to the request of the U.S. Nuclear Renulatory Commission ("NRC") for comments on "Minor Amendments to the Physical Protection Requirements" - 54 FR 33570 (August 15, 1989). NUMARC is the organization of the nuclear power industry that is responsible for coordinating the combined efforts of all utilities licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nuclear power plants and of other nuclear industry organizations in all matters involving generic regulatory policy issues and on the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical i~sues affecting the nuclear power industry. Every utility responsible for constructing or operating a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States is a member of NUMARC. In addition, NUMARC's members include major architect-engineering firms and all of the major nuclear steam supply system vendors. With one exception, we support the proposed amendments. The proposed modification to Section 73.55 (d)(7)(i) that would add the sentence "Access to vital areas for the purpose of general familiarization and other nonwork-related activities shall not be authorized except for good cause shown to the licensee" needs clarification. (J) Many licensees have strong public relations programs that involve elected officials, the press, local law enforcement agencies, the community, employee families, etc. The added sentence could be interpreted to mean that licensees can no longer provide public information tours as they might deem appropriate. If this is NRC's intention, it may create an increased negative image of nuclear power that could be very costly in the future. Removing this oppor-tunity for selected members of the public to see the inside of a nuclear power plant may create or support the perception that there are problems in the industry that are being hidden from the public. If organized tours for

..). NUCI.E"-~ "*GI! ATO Y COMMIS I DOCi'El'i 'G r.., SE I CE SEC'TIOl'll f) c* ' :* (,;: *, ;-:~ ~E('.flETARY, c-, " co",,.:ss:oN Po~tm* r~ D 'J _ _t}_:_)) ______ _ C i:,i,s *,,,. * /_ Add'I *:* *~.. . ~-: ** d Special O 511,1:,.... i,;n f JJ{l---'~-/-JJS ___ _ J-.>ul1rj Dw ~)-+'( J

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 29, 1989 Page 2 groups of individuals as listed above are considered to be implicit in the "good cause" requirement, then this aspect should be acknowledged in the final rule. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments and would be pleased to discuss these comments further with appropriate NRC personnel. Sincerely, JFC/RE:amw r(}e11 t-tu'-- "'Je F. Colvin

Copy to Sec,- DOCKET NUMBER PR 9°"'-J-d 13 15 PROPOSED RULE Al !r Originat sent to the ' Office of the Fedefll 'U 1 for pubtlcatlon ( 5l/ f 1-J35?0) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PARTS 70, 72, 73, and 75 RIN: 3150-AD03 [7590-01) DOCKn-o U3 ii'C Minor Amendments to the Physical Protection Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regul ations.that cover the physical protection of special nuclear material. These amendments will : (1) add definitions for common terms not currently defi ned but frequently used, (2) make the defi nitions sections easier to use by arranging the terms in alphabetical order, (3) delete action dates that no longer apply, (4) correct outdated terms and cross references, (5) clarify wording that is susceptible to differing interpretations, (6) correct typographical errors, and (7) make other minor changes. The proposed amendments are necessary to reflect the results of a systematic review of NRC ' s safeguards regulations. DATE: Comments must be received on or before (45 days after publication). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but only those comments received on or bef ore this date can be assured of consideration. ADDRESSES: Comments or suggestions regardi ng the proposed amendment s should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and p 1J /.sl c Y. i r. 1A <- (cJ u-./ {<c~ ~ rkr v,. 8' -IS - ~9

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[7590-01] Service Branch. Copies of comments received will be available in the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW.* Washington, DC 20555. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Stanley L. Dolins, Division of Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 492-3745 and Priscilla Dwyer, Domestic Safeguards and Regional Oversight Branch, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Mate~ial Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 492-0478. SUPPLEMENTARY I°NFORMATION: The Safeguards Interoffice Review Group at the NRC has been conduc-ting a systematic review of the agency's safeguards regulations and guidance documents. This review has identified areas in the regulations that are out of date, inconsistent within the regulation or between related regulations, susceptible to differing interpretations, and in need of other changes. In addition, the staff nas identified other areas in the regulations where minor changes are warranted. In response to these efforts, the NRC is proposing specific amendments to the regula-tions in the way of minor corrections and changes. The proposed changes are summarized here with a brief discussion. (1) Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 10 CFR 73.40 substantively are being moved to Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73 and combined with the plan specifications already there. A requirement for having a safeguards contingency plan is also included in the specific security requirements section for each class of affected licensees. (2) The commonly used terms Category I, Category II, and Category III, as qualified, are added for reference purposes to existing definitions in the definitions sections of 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73. Category I quantity of material, if unirradiated, is equivalent to a formula quantity; Category II quantity of mat~rial, if unirradiated, is equivalent to special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance; and Category III quantity of material, if unirradiated, is 2

t [7590-0lJ equivalent to special nuclear material of low strategic significance. In the current regulations, the terms are included in the regulations without category designations. HO\'fever, the category designations are freque~tly used, particularly in international safeguards, and appear in some NRC documents because they save time and space. To avoid possible confusion, references to these shorter terms are being added to the definitions. (3) The definitions in 10 CFR Part 70 are alphabetized without paragraph designation. Locating a specific term will be easier with alphabetized definiw tions. When new terms are added, they will be placed 1n the prope*r alphabetical order. Because the paragraph designations are removed, other parts of the regulations are modified to eliminate any reference to a specific numbered paragraph in the definitions section. (4) The general requirements for auditing the safeguards contin-gency plans and the physical security programs of Category I transporta-tion and fuel cycle licensees are made compatible. The record retention period for results of the acdits is made con-sistent at three years in both cases. The content and resulting action on audited findings is also made consistent. At this same time, the general requirements for auditing the safeguards contingency plans {10 CFR 73.~0(b), (c) and (d)) are being moved to Appendix C to 10 rFR Part 73 and combined with the plan specifications already there. A requirement for having a safeguards contingency plan is also included in the specific security requirements section for each class of affected licensees. (5) An inadvertently omitted provision that addresses access to vital areas at power reactors is being reinserted into the regulation. The restoration of the requirement in 1r CFR 73.55(d)(7) is bein~ proposed to insure no erroneous views are held by licensees that the deletion of the sentence was a 11signal 11 that vital areas could be "openec up" to "public sightseeing tours 11 or 11open house visitsn without close licensee oversight. This lanruage is already reflected in most licensees security plans and it was intact in 10 CFR Part 73 in 198( (and for a number of years preceding 1986). Correcting this inadvertent 3

f7590-0l] omission does not signal any change in Cotm11ssion policy on past rractices in this regard. Licensees are assigned the responsibility for making final vital area access decisions in accord t,ith the past practices and provisions under the app,roved security plans.

6) The remainder of the proposed changes are of a very minor nature.

A definition for the term "contiguous sites" is added to 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73. Action dates that have passed are eliminated. Use of the outdated tenn "industrial sabotage" is changed to the current tenn "radiological sabotage." References to parts of the regulations that have been moved or deleted are corrected. Several areas in the regula-tions are clarified where the wording was susceptible to differing inter-pretations. The notification requirement for changes to the safeguards contingency plan that do not decrease the plan's effectiveness is being revised to require that the oripinal be sent to the NRC headquarters office with a copy to the regional office instead of vice versa. Finally, typographical errors are corrected. Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The HRC has detennined that this proposed resu1ation is the type of action described in catesorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(2). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed regulation. Papen1ork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Papen1ork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved under the Office of Management and Budget approval number 3150-00P9 for Part 70, approval number 3150-0132 for Part 72, approval number 3150-0002 for Part 73, and approval number 3150-0055 for Part 75.

[7590-01] Regulatory Analysis With the eAception of the proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7), these minor amendments impose no new restrictions or requirements, and ~ therefore, have no significant impact. Accordingly, a regulatory analysis is not considered necessary. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 ( 5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 4lt entities. The amendments being proposed are very minor in nature and care has been taken to ensure that the impact on any licensee is minimal. In the matter of reporting certain changes to the security program, the amendments merely reverse who receives the original and who receives the copy. The other changes are of an administrative nature and therefore do not alter the current implementation of the regulations by a licensee. Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rufe, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this proposed rule with the possible exception of the amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7). Here we are addressing the material and relevant parts of 10 CFR 50.109 to ensure that there are no particular questions raised by the reinsertion of the inadvertently omitted language. A backfit analysis is not required for these minor amendments because they do not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l). The following analysis is in support of the amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7).

1.

Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed backfit is designed to achieve. The proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) would restore a sentence that had been inadvertently dropped when the regulations were amended August 4, 1986 (51 FR 27817). The restored provision would 5

[7590-01] require licensees to limit visitor access to vital areas of nuclear power plants for the purpose of general familiarization and other nonwork-related activities except for good cause.

2.

3.

4.

~ General description of the activity that would be required by the licensee or applicant in order to complete the backfit. The proposed requirement was codified in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) until September 3, 1986. Therefore most nuclear power plant licensees' current approved security plans and implementing procedures already meet the requirements. However, reinstatement of the requirement could, in concept, affect licensees whose security plans were or will be approved after September 3, 1986, and licensees who subsequently changed their approved security plans and implementing procedures to relax controls on access to vital areas. Affected licensees potentially may be required to reinstate procedural controls that limit nonwork-related access to vital areas. Potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental off-site release of radioactive material. Vital areas of nuclear power plants contain equipment, systems, devices or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Therefore, by limiting nonwork-related access to vital areas, licensees reduce the potential risk to the public from the accidental off-site release of radioactive material. Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees. By limiting nonwork-related access to vital areas of nuclear power plants, licensees also reduce the potential risk to facility employees from accidental radiological exposure. 6

5.

6.

[7590-01] Installation and continuing costs associated with the backfit, including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction delay. ~ The proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) would reinstate a procedural requirement that licensees limit nonwork-related access to vital areas of nuclear power plants. There are no installation or continuing costs associated with this requirement. The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational complexity including the the relationship to proposed and existing regulatory requirements. The proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) does not alter the plant or operational complexity. It does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety since neither plant design nor reactor operating procedures are changed. In addition, it does not alter any safety related design basis of the facility. Therefore, the proposed amendment neither creates the possibility of a new or different kind of accident nor does it involve an increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

7.

The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the proposed backfit and the availability of such resources. The proposed amendment has no significant resource implications for the NRC. ~- The potential impact of differences in facility type, design or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed backfit. The proposed amendment is uniformly relevant and applicable to all licensed nuclear power plants without regard to'type, design or age.

9.

Whether the proposed backfit is interim or final and. if interim, the justification for imposing the proposed backfit on an interim basis. The proposed backfit is final. 7

[7590-01] List of Subjects in 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73 and 75: Part 70 - Hazardous materials - transportation, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures, Special nuclear material. Part 72 - Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel. Part 73 - Hazardous materials - transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. Part 75 -Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act 4t of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 72, 73, and 75. PART 70 -- DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

1.

The authority citation for Part 70 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2201, 2232, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 204, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1245, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5845, 5846). Sections 70.1 (c) and 70.20a (b) also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 70.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 70.21(g) also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 8

[7590-01] U.S.C. 2152). Section 70.31 also issued under sec. 57d, Pub. L. 93-377, 88 Stat. 475 (42 U.S.C. 2077). Sections 70.36 and 70.44 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 70.61 also issued under secs. 186, 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236, 2237). Section~70.62 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as a~ended (42 U. S. C. 2138). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273); §§ 70.3, 70.19(c), 70.21(c), 70.22(a), (b), (d)-(k), 70.24 (a) and (b), 70.32(a)(3),(5),(6),(d), and (i), 70.36, 70.39 (b) and (c), 70.4l(a), 70.42 (a) and (c), 70.56, 70.57 (b), (c), and (d), 70.58 (a)-(g)(3), and (h)-(j) are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); §§ 70.7, 70.20a (a) and (d), 70.20b (c) and (e), 70.21(c), 70.24(b), 70.32 (a)(6), (c), (d), (e), and (g), 70.36, 70.51 (c)-(g), 70.56, 70.57 (b) and (d), and 70.58 (a)-(g)(3) a~d (h)-(j) are issued under sec. 16li, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and§§ 70.5, 70.9, 70.20b (d) and (e), 70.38, 70.51 (b) and (i), 70.52, 70.53, 70.54, 70.55, 70.58 (g)(4), (k) and (1), 70.59, and 70.60 (b) and (c) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

2.

Section 70.4 is amended by removing afl alphabetical designators and arranging all definitions into alphabetical sequence, adding a definition for 11Contiguous sites" in proper alphabetical sequence, and revising the definition of 11formula quantity, 11 paragraph (2) of the definition 11plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant, 11 the introductory text of the definition 11special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance,' 1 and the introductory text and paragraph (1) of the definition 11 special nuclear material of low strategic significance 11 to read as follows: § 70.4 Definitions. 11Contiguous sites 11 means locations, in close proximity to each other, for the possession, use, or storage of special nuclear material where the same licensee or contractor security measures and/or organizational elements, including the alarm station and response 9

[7590-01] personnel, are used to provide the capabilities necessary to satisfy the applicable security requirements. 11Formula quantity 11 (in unirradiated form this class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category I quantity of material) means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams= (grams contained U-23 5 ) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). "Plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant 11*** (2) research and development activities involving any of the opera-tions described in paragraph (1) of this definition except for research and development activities utilizing unsubstantial amounts of plutonium. 11Special nuclear material of low strategic significance" (in unirradiated form this class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity of material) means: (1) Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, as defined in this section, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enricned to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the equation, grams= (grams contained U-235) + (grams plutonium)+ (grams U-233), or 11Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance 11 (in unirradiated form this class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category II quantity of material) means:

3.

In §70.19, paragraph (a)(2) is revised to read as follows: §70.19 General license for calibration or reference sources. (a)*** (2) Any Government agency, as defined in §70.4, which holds a specific license issued by the Commission or the Atomic Energy Commission 10

[7590-01] which authorizes it to receive, possess, use and transfer byproduct material, sourc~ material, or special nuclear material; and

4.

In §70.22, paragraphs (h)(l), and (k) are revised to ~ read as follows: § 70.22 Contents of applications. (h)(l) Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material as defined under §70.4, other than a license for possession or use of this material in the operation of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, must include a physical security plan, consisting of two parts. Part I must address vital equipment, vital areas, and isolation zones, and must demonstrate how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of§§ 73.20, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.70, and 73.71 of this chapter in the conduct of the activity to be licensed, including the identification and description of jobs as required by§ 11.ll(a) of this chapter. Part II must list tests, inspections, and other means to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. (k) Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee special nuclear mate-rial of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance as defined under§ 70.4 other than a license for possession or use of this material in the operation of a nuclear power reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, must include a physical security plan that demonstrates how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of§ 73.67(d), (e), (f), and {g), as appropriate, of Part 73 of this chapter. The licensee shall retain a copy of this physical security plan as a record,for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material requiring this record under each license and each change to the plan for three years after the change. 11

[7590-01]

5.

In§ 70.32, paragraph (c)(3) is removed and paragraph (g) is revised to read as follows: §,70.32 Conditions of licenses. (g) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures in accordance with Appendix C to Part 73 of this chapter for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of its safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall retain a copy of the safeguards contingency plan procedures as a record for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material requiring this record under each license for which the procedures were developed and each change to the plan for three years from the effective date of the change. The licensee may not make a change that would decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the first four categories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix) contained in any licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared pursuant to§§ 70.22(g), 70.22(j), 72.184, 73.20(c), 73.26(e)(l), 73.46(h)(l), or 73.SO(g)(l) of this chapter without the prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for an amendment to its license pursuant to§ 70.34. The licensee may make changes to the licensee safeguards contingency plan without prior Commission approval if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. The licensee shall maintain each change to the plan made without prior approval as a record during the period for which possession of a formula quantity of special nuclear material is authorized under a license and retain the superseded material for three years from the effective date of the change and shall furnish a report containing a description of each change within 60 days after the change is made to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office as specified in Appendix A to Part 73 of this chapter. 12

[7590-01] PART 72 -- LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

6.

The authority citation for Part 72 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 u.s.c. 10151, 10152, 10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168). Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b), 10168(c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68, Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(9)). Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2244, (42 U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a), 10161(h)). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273); §§ 72.6, 72.22, 72.24, 72.26, 72.28(d), 72.30, 72.32, 72.44(a), (b)(l), (4), (5), (c), (d)(l), (2), (e), (f), 72.48(a), 72.50(a), 72.52(b), 72.72(b), (c), 72.74(a), (b), 72.76, 72.78, 72.104, 72.106, 72.120, 72.122, 72.124, 72.126, 72.128, 72.130, 72.140(b), (c), 72.148, 72.154, 72.156, 72.160, 72.166, 72.168, 72.170, 72.172, 72.176, 72.180, 72.184, 72.186, are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. '94a, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l{b)); §§ 72.lO(a), (e), 72.22, 72.24, 72.26, 72.28, 72.30, 72.32, 72.44,(a),(b}(l), (4), (5}, (c), (d)(l),(2),(e), (f}, 72.48(a), 13

[7590-01] 72.50(a), 72.52(b), 72.90(a)-(d), (f), 72.92, 72.94, 72.98, 72.100, 72.102(c), (d), (f), 72.104, 72.106, 72.120, 72.122, 72.124, 72.126, 72.128, 72.130, 72.140(b), (c), 72.142, 72.144, 72.146, 72.148, 72,150, 72.152, 72.154, 72.156, 72.158, 72.160, 72.162, 72.164, 72.166, 72.168, ~ 72.170, 72.172, 72.176, 72.180, 72.182, 72.184, 72.186, 72.190, 72.192, 72.194 are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 220l(i)); and§§ 72.lO(e), 72.11, 72.16, 72.22, 72.24, 72.26, 72.28, 72.30, 72.32, 72.44(b)(3), (c)(5), (d)(3), (e), (f), 72.48(b), (c), 72.SO(b), 72.54(a), (b), (c), 72.56, 72.70, 72.72, 72.74(a), {b), 72.76(a), 72.78(a), 72.80, 72.82, 72.92(b), 72.94(b), 72.140 (b), (c), (d), 72.144(a), 72.146, 72.148, 72.150, 72.152, 72.154 (a), (b), 72.156, 72.160, 72.162, 72.168, 72.170, 72.172, 72.174, 72.176, 72.180, 72.184, 72.186, 72.192 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 u.s.c. 2201(0)).

7.

In§ 72.184, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows: § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan. (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in Appendix C to Part 73 of this chapter. This plan must include Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities licensed under Part 50 of this chapter. (The fifth category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.) PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

8. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); secs. 201 as amended 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844). Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241, {42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued 14

[7590-01] under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 u.s.c. 2169). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273); '\§ 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); §§ 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 16li, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and§§ 73.20(c)(l), 73.24(b){l), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(G), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), ,e (3)(iii)(B), and (h), 73.55(h)(2) and (4)(iii)(B), 73.57, 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

9. Section 73.2 is amended by revising the definition of 11 Formula quantity/1 the introductory text of the definition "Special nuclear material of low strategic significance," and the introductory text of the definition 11Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance/'

and adding a definition for "Contiguous sites" in proper alphabetical sequence to read as follows: § 73.2 Definitions. 11Contiguous sites 11 means locations, in close proximity to each other, for the possession, use, or storage of special nuclear material where the same licensee or contractor security measures and/or organizational elements, including the alarm station and response personnel, are used to provide the capabilities necessary to satisfy the appliGable security requirements. 11 Formula quantity" (in unirradiated form this class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category I quantity of material) means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams= (grams contained U-235 ) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). 15

[7590-01] 11Special nuclear material of low strategic significance 11 (in unirradiated form this class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity of material) means: 11Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance 11 (in unirradiated form this class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category II quantity of material) means:

10. In§ 73.20 paragraph (b)(3) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(4), a new paragraph (b)(3) is added and paragraphs (b)(2) and (c) are revised to read as follows:

§ 73.20 General performance objective and requirements. (b) (2) Is designed with sufficient redundancy and diversity to assure maintenance of the capabilities described in§§ 73.25 and 73.45; (3) Includes a safeguards contingency capability that can meet the criteria in Appendix C, 11 Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans 11 to this part; and (c) Each licensee subject to the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall establish, maintain and follow NRC-approved safeguards physical protection and safeguards contingency plans that describe how the licensee will comply with the requirements of para-graphs (a) and (b) of this section.

11.

In§ 73.26, paragraph (h)(6) is revised to read as follows: § 73.26 Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures. (h) Test and Maintenance Programs (6) The transportation security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months and prior to each use by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct r~sponsibility 16

[7590-01] for implementation of the security program. The review must include a review and aud.t of security procedures and practices, evaluation of the effectiveness vf the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of ~ commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review and the audit along with recommendations for improvements and corrections must be documented, reported to the responsible organization management, and kept available for inspection for a period of three years. §73.40 [Amended]

12. In§ 73.40, paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) are removed.

13. In§ 73.46, paragraphs (g)(6) and (h){l) are revised to read as follows;

§ 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures. (g) Test and Maintenance Programs (6) The security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include a review and audit of security procedures and practices, evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review, audit, and evaluation along with recommendations for improvements and corrections if any, must be documented and reported to the licensee's plant management and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operations. The reports must be kept available at the plant for inspection for a period of three years. 17

[7590-01] (h) Contingency and response plans and procedures. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological ~ 4 sabotage related to the strategic special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans" to this part. Contingency plans must include, but not be limited to, the response requirements in para-graphs (h)(2) through (h)(5) of this section. The licensee shall retain 4t a copy of the current safeguards contingency plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

14. In§ 73.50, paragraphs (g)(l) and (h) are revised to read as fol lows:

§ 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities. (g) Response requirement. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans;' to this part. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current safeguards contingency plan and each change to the plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change. (h) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and 18

[7590-01] qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of this section.

15. In§ 73.55, paragraphs (b)(4)(ii), (d)(7)(i) introductory text, (g)(4), and (h)(l) are revised to read as follows:

~ § 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. (b)*** (4)*** (ii) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of this paragraph. The licensee shall maintain a current copy of the training and qualifications plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which the plan was developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the material that is superseded for three years after each change. The training and qualifications plan must include a schedule to show how all security personnel will be qualified two years after the submitted plan is approved. The training and qualifications plan must be followed by the licensee 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC. (d) (7) (i) Establish an access authorization system to limit unescorted access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties. Access to vital areas for the purpose of general familiarization and other nonwork-related activities shall not be authorized except for good cause shown to the licensee. To achieve this the licensee must: (g) 19

[7590-01] (4) The security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the secu-rity program. The review must include a review and audit of security ~ procedures and practices, evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review audit and evaluation along with recommendations for improvements and corrections, if any, must be documented and reported to the licensee 1 s plant management and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. The reports must be kept available at the plant for inspection for a period of three years. (h) Response requirement. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this sect ion. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C, 11 Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, 11 to this part.

16. In§ 73.60, the introductory paragraph and paragraph (e) are revised to read as fol lows:

§ 73.60 Additional requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material at nonpower reactors. Each nonpower reactor licensee who, pursuant to the requirements of Part 50 possesses at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or_ more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams= (grams contained in U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium) shall protect the special nuclear material from theft or diversion pursuant to the requirements of§ 73.67(a), (b), (c), and (ct) and as follows, except that a licensee is exempt from the requirements of 20

[7590-01] paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section to the extent that it possesses or uses special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of three feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding. (e) Response requirement. Each licensee shall establish, maintain and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C, 11 Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, 11 to this part.

17. In§ 73.67, the introductory text of paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) and paragraph (c) (2) are revised to read as follows:

§ 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance. (c) Each licensee who possesses, uses, transports or who delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall: (2) Within 30 days after the plan(s) submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(l) of this section is approved or when specified by the NRC in writing, implement the approved security plan. (d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a site or contiguous sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50 or except as allowed by paragraph (b)(2) of this section shall: 21

I 1, [7590-01] (f) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses special nuclear material of low strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50, shall:

18. In§ 73. 70, paragraph (c) is revised as follows:

§ 73.70 Records. (c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not employed by the licensee pursuant to§§ 73.46(d)(13), 73.55(d)(6), or§ 73.60. The licensee shall retain this register as a record for three years after the last entry is made in the register.

19.

In Appendix B to Part 73, the 11 Introduction 11 is revised as follows: APPENDIX B - GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL Introduction Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear material on site and in transit and for the protection of the facility or shipment vehicle against radiological sabotage should, like other elements of the physical security system, be required to meet minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security-related job duties. In order to ensure that those individuals responsible for security are properly equipped and qualified to execute the job duties prescribed for them, the NRC has developed general criteria that specify security personnel qualification requirements. These general criteria establish requirements for the selection, training, equipping, testing, and qualification of individuals who will be responsible for protecting special nuclear materials, nuclear facil-ities, and nuclear shipments. 22

l [7590-01] When required to have security personnel that have been trained, equipped, and iualified to perform assigned security job duties in accordance wit.1 the criteria in this appendix, the licensee must establish, maintain, and follow a plan that shows how the criteria will ~ be met. The plan must be submitted to the NRC for approval. The plan must be implemented within 30 days after approval by the Commission unless otherwise specified by the Commission in writing.

20. In Appendix C to Part 73, the Introduction is revised and a new section on Audit and Review is added as follows:

APPENDIX C -- LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS Introduction A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or radiological sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action. The goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage are (1) to organize the response effort at the licensee level, (2) to provide predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies, (3) to ensure the integration of the licensee response with the responses by other entities, and (4) to achieve a measurable performance in response capability. Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organizing the licensee's resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated. The responses should be timely and internally consistent among themselves. 23

[7590-01] It is important to note that a licensee's safeguards contingency plan is intended to be complementary to any emergency plans developed pursuant to Appendix E to Part 50 of this chapter or to§ 70.22(i) of Part 70 of this chapter. When so required in this chapter, each licensee shall establish, maintain and follow a safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in this appendix. The safeguards contingency plan must include plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage, as applicable. The first four categories of information con-tained in the safeguards contingency plan must be submitted to the NRC for approval. (The first four categories of information, as set forth in this appendix, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Plan-ning Base, and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.) The plan becomes effective 30 days after approval by the Commission unless otherwise specified by the Commission in writing. When the plan becomes effective, the licensee shall have: (1) all safeguards capabilities specified in its safeguards contingency plan available and functional, (2) detailed procedures developed according to this appendix available at the licensee's site, and (3) all appropriate personnel trained to respond to safeguards incidents as outlined in the plan and specified in the detailed procedures. Audit and Review The licensee shall provide for the implementation, revision, and maintenance of its safeguards contingency plan. To this end, at intervals not to exceed 12 months, the licensee shall provide for a review of the safeguards contingency plan by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include a review and audit of safeguards contingency procedures and practices and a test of the safeguards system along with commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The licensee shall document and report the results of the review and audit, along with recommendations for improvements and corrections, if 24

e [7590-01] any, to the licensee's corporate and plant management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the plant. The report must be kept available at the plant for inspection for a l)eriod of three years. PART 75 -- SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL - IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT

21. The authority citation for Part 75 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134, 2152, 2201; sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242 as amended, (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). For purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273), the provisions of this part issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

22. In§ 75.4, paragraph (f)(l) is revised to read as follows:

§ 75.4 Definitions. (f) material. 11Effective kilogram 11 means a unit used in safeguarding nuclear The quantity is: (1) For special nuclear material: The amount specified in§ 70.4 of this chapter. Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 31st day of July 1989. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ja s M. Taylor 25 ting Executive Director for Operations}}