SECY-23-0011, Enclosure - U.S. NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report
| ML22355A004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/01/2023 |
| From: | John Lubinski Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22355A002 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-23-0011 | |
| Download: ML22355A004 (13) | |
Text
Enclosure S, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report February 01, 2023
2 Introduction The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) created the interagency task force on radiation source protection and security under the lead of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force (Task Force) evaluates and makes recommendations to the President and Congress relating to the security of radiation sources in the United States (U.S.) from potential terrorist threats, including acts of sabotage, theft, or use of a radiation source in a radiological dispersal device or a radiation exposure device.
The Task Force submits its reports to Congress and the President every 4 years in accordance with the EPAct. The Task Force submitted its first report on August 15, 2006, and subsequent reports were issued on August 11, 2010; August 14, 2014; October 17, 2018; and August 5, 2022. Since its inception, the Task Force has proposed 42 recommendations and actions. As of the date of issuance of this 2023 implementation plan, 36 recommendations and actions have been completed and 6 recommendations and actions remain open. Based upon the Task Forces most recent evaluation as documented in the 2022 Task Force report, the Task Force concluded that there are no significant gaps in the area of radioactive source protection and security that are not already being addressed through interagency cooperation and actions.
To facilitate the prioritization and implementation of activities related to open Task Force recommendations, the NRC staff, with input from its interagency Task Force partners, issues updates to the Task Force implementation plan every 2 years. The biennial implementation plan serves to maintain the Task Force focus on actionable strategies to advance radiological security in the United States. In addition, these updates communicate the status of recommendations and associated actions to the Commission and the public on a routine basis.
The implementation plan includes specific tasks and deliverables for implementing each of the open recommendations and actions of the Task Force. Where appropriate, the individual strategies include task breakdowns and a discussion of any known issues that could challenge implementation. The NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS); Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response; Office of International Programs; Office of the General Counsel; and Office of Public Affairs are involved in the implementation of Task Force recommendations and actions. Other agencies involved in implementation include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Federal Emergency Management Agency; Transportation Security Administration; U.S. Department of State (DOS); U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT); U.S. Department of Defense (DOD); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE); the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is a separately organized agency within DOE; U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Food and Drug Administration; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS);
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP); and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
In the sections that follow, implementation strategies are provided for the six recommendations and actions that remain ongoing. References and footnotes may be omitted from the quotations in this document. The remaining open recommendations and actions include:
2006 Actions 9-1 and 10-2; 2010 Recommendations 4, 5, and 9; and 2014 Recommendation 3.
1 Implementation Strategies for Individual Recommendations and Actions 2006 Action 9-1 Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) Waste Ongoing Task: DOE should continue its ongoing efforts to develop GTCC [Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)] disposal capability.
2022 Report Citation and Content: The following is a summary of the status from the Task Force report at Chapter 2-Status of the Recovery and Disposition of Radioactive Sealed Sources (pp. 11-12):
Potential Issues: Legislative and/or regulatory changes may be required for DOE to implement disposal alternatives identified in the Final GTCC LLRW Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Agencies Involved: DOE (lead), NRC.
NRC Program Office Action: On April 5, 2022, the Commission issued SRM-SECY-20-0098, which approved the NRC staffs recommendation to develop a new proposed rule that consolidates and integrates criteria for licensing the disposal of GTCC waste with the ongoing Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 61 rulemaking efforts, and to allow for Agreement State licensing of those GTCC waste streams that meet the regulatory requirements for near-surface disposal and do not present a hazard such that the NRC should retain disposal authority.
NRC Resources: The 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking is a budgeted activity. The NRC will allocate resources needed to complete planned activities, consistent with overall rulemaking priorities and schedules.
2006 Action 9-1 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date DOE Issue Record of Decision Estimated 2024 NRC Deliver proposed rule for 10 CFR Part 61 Rulemaking to Commission for decision November 2023
[A]dvances have been made in the availability of commercial disposal pathways for sealed sources. Nonetheless, challenges remain. Many sealed source users have little incentive to dispose of their disused sources, preferring to store them potentially until facility decommissioning. Some risk-significant sealed sources commonly used in medicine and industry have no commercial disposal pathway. In particular, there are no established disposal options for sources that are classified as GTCC LLRW because of the absence of a geologic repository in the United States; on a case-by-case basis, the NRC can approve the disposal of GTCC waste at a site other than a geologic repository (such approval must be made at the Commission level) in accordance with 10 CFR Part 61The Task Force has determined that 2006 Action 9-1 will remain ongoing while the DOE awaits action by Congress on GTCC LLRW disposal in accordance with the EPAct. After action by Congress occurs, the DOE could issue a Record of Decision on disposal of GTCC LLRW and GTCC-like waste and close 2006 Action 9-1.
2 2006 Action 10-2 Regulatory Impediments to the Return of Disused Sources Ongoing Task: The U.S. Government should encourage suppliers to provide arrangements for the return of disused sources and examine means to reduce regulatory impediments that currently make this option unavailable.
2022 Report Citation and Content: The following is a summary of the status from the Task Force report at Chapter 1-Advances in the Security and Control of Radioactive Sources (pp. 7):
Potential Issues: In the United States, the NRC regulations allow for the return of disused sources to their suppliers without considering the sources to be radioactive waste. However, legal and technical frameworks that govern the repatriation of sources vary internationally and, in some cases, do not support source repatriation. In addition, if the return of disused sources to the initial supplier necessitates export to another country, the country of the shipping licensee must consider the existing regulatory and security infrastructure of the receiving country.
Agencies Involved: DOE/NNSA (co-lead), DOS (co-lead), NRC, and DOT.
NRC Program Office Action: The NRC will continue supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical and consultancy meetings, international conferences on radioactive waste management, and IAEA activities on matters related to the safe and secure use of radioactive sources.
NRC Resources: This activity is not specifically budgeted; license and certificate reviews are part of routine activities.
While the United States has adequate capabilities to manage disused sources, challenges remainTask Force member agencies will continue to assess strategies for end-of-life management for risk-significant radioactive sources. The member agencies will focus on the following areas:
Addressing end-of-life management challenges through various initiatives such as IAEA technical and consultancy meetings, international conferences on radioactive waste management, and regional engagements with suppliers and non-governmental organizations.
Continuing to support the IAEAs process to develop technical documents on the reuse and recycling of disused radioactive sources. These documents address disposition issues that may provide technical obstacles to suppliers accepting returns of disused radioactive sources.
Addressing the lack of a disposition pathway for foreign-origin americium (Am)-241, plutonium (Pu)-238, and Pu-239.
Supporting efforts to develop guidance on return to supplier, and initiatives to identify and document good practices to facilitate these agreements for domestic and international users.
Due to continuing efforts in these areas, the Task Force has determined that 2006 Action 10-2 remains ongoing, and the Task Force will continue to proactively assess strategies for end-of-life management for risk-significant radioactive sources.
3 2006 Action 10-2 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date DOE/NNSA Provide the IAEA with a 435-B container, ancillary equipment, and operating tools to facilitate the repatriation of U.S. origin sources back to U.S.
suppliers.
Complete DOE/NNSA Provide support to the IAEA as needed for training and other requirements through the completion of the first operation utilizing the 435-B container.
December 2024
- DOS, DOE/NNSA, NRC Complete U.S. interagency review of the Guidance on Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, and if appropriate, submit a letter to the IAEA expressing U.S. intent to work toward implementing the Guidance.
Complete Task Force Identify and assess new, innovative actions or strategies appropriate for end-of-life management of risk-significant radioactive sources within the U.S.
2023-2026
- DOS, DOE/NNSA, NRC Documenting national strategy on management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources.
2023-2024
4 2010 Recommendation 4 Evaluation of Disposal Options for Disused Sources Ongoing Task: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, regional compacts, and States continue to evaluate disposal options for disused radioactive sources, including options for handling a potentially large number of disused cesium chloride sources that may be replaced once viable alternatives are available.
2022 Report Citation and Content: The following is a summary of the status from the Task Force report at Chapter 2-Status of the Recovery and Disposition of Radioactive Sealed Sources (pp.10):
Potential Issues: The DOE/NNSA sponsored a study by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum Disused Sources Working Group which found that while the CA BTP has improved the process for classifying sealed sources for disposal, the revised guidance has not resulted in a significant increase in the number of sources being disposed. To further enhance disposal options, the NRC is proceeding with the new proposed rule that consolidates and integrates criteria for licensing the disposal of GTCC waste and the 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking. The rulemaking will consider a site-specific, graded approach for the compliance period and will include transuranic waste in the definition of LLRW. Completion and implementation of this rulemaking has the potential to facilitate disposal of high-activity GTCC sources for which a disposal pathway is not currently available. The rulemaking is proposing to require site-specific analyses for the disposal of all waste streams, including GTCC and depleted uranium, and would address criticality and physical protection requirements for GTCC waste.
Agencies Involved: NRC (lead), Organization of Agreement States (OAS), Conference of Radiation Program Directors (CRCPD).
NRC Program Office Action: The NRC has formed an NRC/Agreement State working group that will develop a proposed rule (Integrated Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Rulemaking) and draft implementation guidance (NUREG-2175, Revision 1 Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61) to submit to the Commission for approval in November 2023. The staff expects to hold a public meeting to solicit stakeholder input in Spring 2023. The Agreement States will also be provided an opportunity for comment prior to submitting the proposed rule package to the Commission.
NRC Resources: The 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking is a budgeted activity. The NRC will allocate resources needed to complete planned activities, consistent with overall rulemaking priorities and schedules.
With the completion of a second pilot disposal using the Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation Branch Technical Position (CA BTP) guidance and the operation of new Type B packaging, the Task Force can document notable progress toward increasing the availability of disposal options for high-activity Class B and C LLRW sealed sources.
Notwithstanding this progress, the Task Force has determined that 2010 Recommendation 4 remains ongoing.
5 2010 Recommendation 4 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date NRC Issue draft regulatory basis for GTCC disposal through means other than deep geologic disposal, including near-surface disposal, and provide this regulatory basis to the Commission for information.
Complete DOE/NNSA, NRC Evaluate impact of the CA BTP to determine if additional actions are needed to promote its usage.
Complete NRC Deliver proposed rule for 10 CFR Part 61 Rulemaking to Commission for decision November 2023
6 2010 Recommendation 5 Disposal Options for Foreign-Origin Americium-241 Sources Ongoing Task: The Task Force recommends that Federal and State Governments investigate options such as providing short-term secured storage of sources recovered from U.S. owners that contain foreign-origin americium-241 [Am-241] radioactive material, so that these sources can be recovered now, and increase efforts to investigate options for disposal of these sources.
2022 Report Citation and Content: The following is a summary of the status from the Task Force report at Chapter 2-Status of the Recovery and Disposition of Radioactive Sealed Sources (pp. 10-11):
Potential Issues: Sealed sources manufactured with foreign-origin Am-241, Pu-238 and Pu-239 present unique disposal challenges. DOE/NNSA has the authority to recover sealed sources under the OSRP; however, the OSRP is not currently recovering foreign-origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 sources without there being an identified path to disposal. Although disposal options under consideration may include disposal in a future GTCC LLRW disposal facility, there currently are no commercial or Federal options for disposal.
Agencies Involved: DOE/NNSA.
NRC Program Office Action: No specific NRC role.
NRC Resources: The NRC continues to monitor and support Federal activities related to disposal options for foreign-origin sources.
The DOE/NNSA, through the Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP), continues to remove risk-significant sources that have the potential to present public health and safety or national security concerns, if uncontrolledThese sources remain secured in storage under the control of licensees until they are transferred to the DOE/NNSA. The security requirements of 10 CFR Part 37 provide reasonable assurance against the theft or loss of disused sources; however, the longer sources remain disused or unwanted, the chances increase that they will become unsecured or abandoned. Additionally, the CRCPD completed the CRCPD Technical White Paper: Disposition of Foreign Origin Radioactive Material, Revision 1, issued in May 2021 (CRCPD White Paper), which outlines the disposal issues and possible solutions for sources containing foreign-origin material. Options include maintaining the sources at licensee sites, returning the sources to the manufacturer, aggregating the sources at the State radiation control program facilities or commercial waste brokers, developing a GTCC disposal facility, and developing a legislative solution allowing for disposal of foreign-origin sources at a Federal disposal facility. Task Force member agencies are currently reviewing the options offered in the CRCPD White Paper. The Task Force has determined that 2010 Recommendation 5 will remain ongoing while these and other options for management of sources containing foreign-origin radioactive material are being investigated and pursued.
7 2010 Recommendation 5 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date DOE/NNSA Investigate options to enable recovery of foreign-origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 sealed sources and increase efforts to investigate options for disposal of these sources.
8 2010 Recommendation 9 Alternative Technologies Research and Development Ongoing Task: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government enhance support of short-term and long-term research and development for alternative technologies.
2022 Report Citation and Content: The following is a summary of the status from the Task Force report at Chapter 3-Progress in the Area of Alternative Technologies (pp.15):
Potential Issues: The feasibility of replacement technologies will depend primarily upon technical, operational, and financial factors. There may also be challenges related to disposal of the radioactive sealed sources replaced by alternatives.
Agencies Involved: DOE/NNSA (co-lead), DHS (co-lead), EPA, and NRC.
NRC Program Office Action: The NRC supports Task Force member agencies continued research into advances in technology and maintains awareness of the various activities, both domestic and international, regarding the conversion to alternative technologies.
NRC Resources: This activity is not specifically budgeted; it is part of routine activities. The NRC will participate as appropriate.
2010 Recommendation 9 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date
- DHS, DOE/NNSA Publication of Non-Isotopic Alternative Technologies White Paper to identify advantages and disadvantages of alternative technologies for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources.
Complete DOE/NNSA Complete existing feasibility studies comparing cesium-137 (Cs-137) and cobalt-60 with X-ray technologies in biological research.
December 2024 DOE/NNSA Perform a study on the impact of different radiation sources on materials that are commonly used in sterilized medical devices.
December 2024 Because efforts are underway to research alternative technologies and address challenges impeding the use of alternative technologies in specific applications, the Task Force determined that 2010 Recommendation 9 will remain ongoing.
9 2010 Recommendation 9 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date DOE/NNSA Complete existing Phase 1 and Phase 2 Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) projects to develop advanced particle accelerators to replace radioactive sources used in well logging and radiotherapy applications.1 Complete DOE/NNSA Complete existing Phase 3 SBIR projects to develop alternative technologies to Cs-137-based applications for biology research, well logging, radiotherapy, and insect sterilization.
May 2024 DOE/NNSA Perform an analysis to identify the technology gaps that prevent the adoption of alternative technologies in well logging or industrial sterilization applications.
Completed DOE/NNSA Develop and execute proposal requests for Alternative Technology Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in fiscal years 2023, 2024, and 2025.
October 2025 DOE/NNSA Assess the potential impact of fiscal years 2023, 2024, and 2025 proposed studies on radioactive source security.
September 2025 DOE/NNSA Complete any research, development, and test and evaluation projects resulting from fiscal years 2023, 2024, and 2025 proposals.
September 2028 1.DOE/NNSA conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation of promising alternative technologies through SBIR, university, and national laboratory grants. The Congressionally mandated SBIR program supports private sector commercialization of technology, and is the program most often utilized by DOE/NNSA for alternative technologies research and development.
10 2014 Recommendation 3 Alternative Technologies Ongoing Task: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, as appropriate, 4 investigate options such as voluntary, prioritized, incentivized, programs for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task Force further recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate, lead by example in the consideration of and transition to alternative technologies that meet technical, operational, and cost requirements.
2022 Report Citation and Content: The following is a summary of the status from the Task Force report at Chapter 3-Progress in the Area of Alternative Technologies (pp. 16):
Potential Issues: No known issues.
Agencies Involved: DOE/NNSA (lead), NRC, HHS, DHS, EPA, DOD, DOS, and OSTP.
NRC Program Office Action: NMSS staff continues to participate in the Interagency Working Group on Alternatives to High-Activity Radioactive Sources, which is co-chaired by DOE/NNSA and HHS/National Institutes of Health (NIH), to further identify and support Federal efforts related to alternative technologies. As an independent regulator the NRC does not advocate for or against alternative technologies; however, the NRC does provide national source data to DOE/NNSA in support of their Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program.
NRC Resources: This activity is not specifically budgeted; it is part of routine activities. The NRC will participate as appropriate.
4.The NRCs statutory mandate precludes it from promoting one technology over another for non-safety or security reasons. The NRC would review, in accordance with its procedures, any new license application for new technologies.
The Task Force agreed that an inclusive partnership among Federal and State agencies, manufacturers, industry, end users, standard-setting bodies, and technical consultants is important for the evaluation, demonstration, regulation, and promotion of innovative alternative technologies. Thus, Task Force member agencies will continue to pursue initiatives to share information related to alternative technologies with private and public partners, within each organizations statutory roles and responsibilities. These efforts may include educational workshops to facilitate common understanding of alternative technologies, along with the development of a publicly available online repository of information on alternative technologies (e.g., capabilities and limitations) across applications. The Task Force has determined that 2014 Recommendation 3 will remain ongoing as the DOE/NNSA continues to proactively close information gaps related to the capabilities and considerations for alternative technologies and incentivize their deployment, with the assistance of other Task Force member agencies.
11 2014 Recommendation 3 Tasked Office Breakdown into Subtasks Due Date DOE/NNSA Continue to implement voluntary program to provide Federal incentives for the replacement of Cs-137 irradiators with alternative, non-radioactive source-based devices. The Fiscal Year 2019, National Defense Authorization Act, supports the voluntary replacement of all U.S. Cs-137 blood irradiators by December 2027.
December 2027 DOE, DHS, DOD, HHS/NIH In the case of Federal agencies procuring Category 1 and 2 sealed sources and devices or non-radioactive alternatives, provide information on their decision-making process between available source-based and alternative technology to other Federal agencies.
Complete
- DOE, DOE/NNSA, HHS, DHS, DOD, DOS In the case of Federal research grants that require procurement of Category 1 and 2 sealed sources and devices or non-radioactive alternatives, provide documentation of their assessment of available source-based and alternative technology to Federal agencies.
Complete