ML22230A191

Tran-M780530: Briefing on Mark 1 BWR Containment Waiver (Open to Public Attendance)

ML22230A191
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Issue date:	05/30/1978
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RETURN TO S~CRETAR!AT RECORDS BRIEFING ON MARK 1 BWR CONTAINMENT WAIVER (Open to Public Attendance)

May 30, 1978 Pages 1 -

72 Prepared by:

C.H. Brown Office of the Secretary

DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of th2 United States*

Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Ma*~ 3Q. 1911 in the Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, N. \\f., \\.!ashington, D. C.

The

• meeting was open to public attendance and observation.

This transcript has not been revie\\*1ed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.

The transcript is intended solely for general infonnationa1 purposes.

As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.

Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.

No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any stater::ent or arg~1ment contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.

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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BRIEFING ON MARK 1 BWR CONTAINMENT WAIVER (Open.to Public Attendance) 1 Commissioners' Conference Room Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington,. D. c.

Tuesday, May 30, 1978 The Commission met p,ursuant to notice, at 3:25 p.m.,

Joseph Hendrie, Chairman, presiding PRESENT:

Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford ALSO PRESENT:

L. Gossick J. Hoyle E. Cas.e J. Kelley L. Sla*ggie D. Eisenhut J. Scinto

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Lain.us L. Shao J. Guiebert

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 P R O C E E D I N G S CHAIRMAN ~ENDRIE:

vve ought, to vote a short notice

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.meeting to celebrate Peter's briefing hei-e, but that',s all right. All' of those in favot' of a short notice meeting on this s~bject, say aye?

(A chorus.. of.

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CHAIRMAN HENDRJ:E:

So ordered.

Peter, you called for the meeting, would you* like to s:omment"and t}:len ask them to brief if they will?

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Yes.

I *had asked for' the briefing just because I had g'athered on the* basis of information accumula,ted last week, *that a subs,tantial waiver to 16 plants had been granted with regards to the time*that they would have to bring themselves into cm~rpliance with what I:.take it was at one time.th.eir techn:Lcal specifications*.

That seemed to me to be an issue, at. least that I wanted to have a better understanding of both the background of why a waiver of that size was necessary and why it should be grant_e~; and, also, what it was about a waiver of that size that wasn't of _enough. importance to bring it to the Commission's attention back in February when it had been granted.

MR. CASE:

Okay*, I won't at this point argue with your adjectives, although we may later on.

. But in response to your memo,.we' 11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

If only the nouns and verbs

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survive then the question is still there.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Which is the offending adjective?

MR. CASE:

Major, large, tnose kind of words.

He

• characterized the exemption **that we did grant to

.*think there.were 20 operating BWRs rather than 16.

and I

. We are going to talk about the background, the technical basis, the safety considerations and the Commission involvement in the staff's deci~ion to grant an exemption to a portion of the containment design requirements given in the regulations for these 20 operating BWRs.

Darrell will give most of the briefing and I will come in on the end to answer iour specific question about decisions concerning Commission involvement in this.

Darrell?

MR. EISENHUT:

• Thanks, Ed.

What I would like to do is go back and summarize through -- actually I will be using material from slides that we used in our presentation back in October of last year, where we sort of summarized where we were at that point in time on the short term program and the long term program.

John, :'.if I could have the first slide there.

(Slide)

This is a cut-away view of a Mark 1 containment which

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I am, sure you are familiar with.

It sh.ows at the bottom, the two little circles on either side is actually a torus, the tap *filled with water.

The light-bulb-shaped arrangement is the BWR dry':Vell.

This containment arrangement;.* in some 20 plants or 25. *plants,;_ some that aren't operating yet, *

• is termed a Mark 1 Containment.*

(Slide)

The next slide shows a cut-away view of that torus arrangement, the small arrangement that you saw in the lower corners of the previous slide.

This shows, again, that the vent pipe coming from the primary containment, coming from the light bulb given a LOCA in the drywell will. ~low down into the suppression chamber.

In blowing down in the suppression chamber it comes to what is te.rmed the down-comers on the slide discharging into the water where the steam will be condensed.

Back as far as early 1975 while there was some testing work going on with a Mark 3 Containment, which is a new pressur~ suppression design that~is some years down the road to:going.fn to operation, new understandings and new dynamic loads were discovered which lead us to go back and look at this containment design and reanalyze it.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Darrell, let me stop you here.

This is testing being done by GE?

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Yes, by GE.

COMMISSIONER _BRADFORD:

And then they reported to you that their testing on the Mark 3 showed some problems with the Mark 'l?

MR. EISENHUT:

Yei, that's right, ind it was to

~eveloping a*new design, actually, is how the information was developed. :This was back in April of 1975.

Maybe it is appropriate, because that is several years ago now, to very, very. qu'ickly go through a __ li ttle bit of the chronology.

Following the April 1975 or actually early '75 learning of this information, we went out to the owners of all the Mark 1 plants--~

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me ask you, Darrell, who concluded that there was a problem with the Mark l?

Was it GE, the utilitie~ or the NRC?

MR. EISENHUT:

GE provided the information to us that there was some new information developed on the Mark 3.

Given that information,- I think it was sort of we, along with GE concluded that in fact ther.-e were some questions that were raised on.Mark ls that had not previously been analyzed.

MR. CASE:

But you see, back in that early date no one had concluded yet there was a problem with Mark ls, merely that the potential for a problem ought to be investigated.

That's back in April of '75, because the same phenomenon could

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So in April of 1975 we had not reached the conclusion __...:

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.COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

When did you reach the conblu~ion there was a problem?

MR. EISENHUT:

I guess it really came up in February of 1976 -- actually January of 1976.

We issued a press release Janu~ry '76 because one pl~nt~ as it turns out it is Vermont Yankee, shut down because there were questions concerning the loads as*they might deyelop in this torus, this ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is at the point the Commission got involved?

Because I remember we had discussions on this subject.

MR. EISENHUT:

I think it probably was.

There was, in fact -- we issued a press release in January '76, there were briefings of then the JCAE and we issued another press release February 27th 1976 wherein we stated that there would need.to be differential pressure requirements.

You would maintain a differential pressure between the drywell and the wetwell which would have the effect of reducing the loads.

In July of 1976 we sent a report to Congress on abnormal occurrances wherein we reported this Mark 1 containment.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

When was **tha t Darrell?

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MR. EISENHUT:

In July of '76..

It was actually the.Ja~tiary to March report -- the first quarter repor~ of 1976 where we identified the generic problem.

In June of 1977 after considerable work which had been developing on the short term program d~rin~ this period of time, we sent another report to Congress identifying this abnormal occurrance and updating the previous information

.which wherein we stated that we would require for the short term program, a factor safety of* 2 would be.required.. To the best of my knowledge, and*r certainly didn't go back through all of the detailed information, that was the earliest place I found wherein we stated that ---

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

This is June of '76?

MR. EISENHUT:

The June 77 --

June 177 we sent the report to Congress.

It was the October through December 1976 report.

I remember back in those days it took us six months to get the quarterly report.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

When did we form this notion of a short term*program and a long term program?

MR. ~ISENHUT: It was pr6bably early 1976 or els~ maybe even as early as late '75.

We h~d the short term program identified --

I have a reference here back in Juli '76, so it was some time prior to that.

At that point we laid it out as a short term program wherein we would require a review to insure ourselves that the

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plant is safe !allowing a large accident, and in fa~t, safe by a factorcof 2.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

• What does this fac1:or of 2 mean?

MR. EISENHUT: It *means that ---

a load*hits the

.containment you* want* to be sure that there.*is enough margin in the containment.such that it co~ld.~ake at least a factor of twice as much -- twice tha1: load. __ and that factor of 2, we insured, to.be there in fact the weakest link iIJ, the ent:i..re chain.

MR. CASE:

A factor 2 in a failure in effect.

'MR. EISEN'HUT: *In effect,. there*is actually some conservatism.in there.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So you are allowing plastic def ormat:i6n:;.

MR. EISENHUT:

That would be to the point of plastic deformation.

Now, that would again be for the weakest piece of the containment system.-

Most of*. the. containment, you rea,lize, would have a factor of maybe 3. or evem?s.omewha:t numbered higher.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And the temporary solution, as I remember, +/-nvolved sort of differential pressurization where you push the water down in the.dowB-comer?*

MR. EISENHUT:

That's right.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Now, what sort of commitments

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were made at that point in terms of the time scales for the short term and the long term *program, the long term program being presumably to suspension the legs and so on.

MR. CASE:

To restore the safety life, yes.

Make physical changes.

COMMISSIONER'GILINSKY:. Yes, make physical changes and tie down the torus.

MR. EISENHUT:

As I recall at that time, we were shooting for the completion of the short term program in either late '76 or some time in '77, completion of the program, and the program was, :'.in::fact completed, the technical work was completed some time ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

You mean the long term program, don't you?

MR. EISENHUT: Short term program --

'76.*

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I thought the short term program put a number of measures into effect immediately?

MR. CASE:

That was a part of the short term program.

As we were proceeding down the short. term program we found some facilities that did not have this factor 2, sci we in certain places.

So we instituted this differential pressure scheme while we continued the evaluation of all of the.,*structural-members to make sure they had this factor of 2 -- safety of 2.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But with that pressurization, did they each have a factor of 2?

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We believed at the time everything was around a factor safety of 2, but what happens\\to verify that was both GE and there was also a Mark 1 owners group formed b~ck in early '76, ~herein they went and they actually ran tests on containments, model pieces of containments, that verified the loads.

As time developed COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

There were on these 112 scale models?

MR. EISENHUT:

112.* scale:;

Along during that same time frame the NRC, you will recall, funded a program at Livermore Lab wherein we build a 1/Sth sc~le, I think, program wherein theY ran some confirmatory tests ahd since that point in time, because the numbers keep getting refined and refined and.because additional minor questions come up with the details 9f the work,now GE and the Mark 1 owners group are in fact building a quarter scale facility at Norco, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

This is at GE or?

California MR. EI.SENHUT:

It is GE along with the Mark* l owners.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: This is a private facility?

MR. EISENHUT: Yes, it is a private facility.

It is not our facility.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Do you mean this is a sector of the torus?

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes, it is a large-scale test.

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,23 24 25 11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

This is a GE facility?

MR. EISENHUT:

It is actually funded by the Mark 1 owners, but it is sort of-"- they are working together very closely.

MR. CASE:

The report to Congress on January 1. gives the completion date for the short term program as August '77.

August.

MR. EISENHUT:

And since that time ---

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That was correct,- it was in MR. CASE;:

It was shortly after *August, I think, that they,-actua_l:ly __ ;got :.it,done.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And what is it they actually got done?

MR. CASE:

A completion of an evaluation of all of the operating plants to assure that there was at least a margin of 2 from failure for any or ail of the structural and mechanica components involving the containment system.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: With this pressurization?

MR. CASE:

Including that on it, yes.

How many plants have that, three or four require the pressurization?

MR. EISENUT':

Well, in fact,

• a lot of the plants required it.

Some had put in other measures to remove it, but it is a combination because most of these plants are unique.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So the analysis was completed, the safety factor was confirmed by the utilities?

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• MR. EISENHUT:. Yes~

MR. CASE:

And submitted to us.

COMMISSIONERGILINSKY:

And submitted to us,',an,d what did we do with that?

MR. CASE:

We evaluated it and prit out a report called NUREG 0408..

MR. EISENHUT:

We put out this.report in Dec.ember '77.

This report was basically the information we briefed you.all wi~h in October of last year where we went through in some detail and explained what we were trying to accomplish.'

in the short term program, our approach of staying with a factor of 2 for the short term, but that by today's interpre-

,:;J tation of the code allowa.bles as it might be applied to containment would infer that we wanted to put something additional on for two reasons:

One is the loads we:were looking at were the most probabl~ loads.

We were estimating those probable loads, however, we believe.~.they may well go down in the long term program by additional large scale tests.

At the time they were our most probable loads.

Secondly, the weakest link of any of the containment system the weakest component had a factor safety of 2.

We would like to see a factor safety of somewhere between 3 and 4.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me ask you:

did the Livermore tests play a role in your conclusions here?

MR. CASE:

Larry, do you recall how much the played

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MR. SHAO:

They d'idn It. put it in the short term programs and.they-~idn't put it in the*lo'ng term programs.*

MR. EI$ENHUT:

Yes,.the scheduling, I think, was the pro];>lem.

In.,:~act,. the final long term report.f_rom Livermore

• is in f~ct dated,October '77 and ~e just goi it back from the ptinters not too:long ago~

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

The date of the Livermore

. report is what?

MR. EISENHUT:

The final report is Ociober 31, 1977.

MR. CASE:

The technical basis for the staff:':s conclusion that the plants could conti~ue to operate pending completion of ~he long term program was given in this NUREG 0408 which was developed and published in December 1977; made avai:l.:.able to the Commission and the Public Document Room.

And the Commi.ssion was briefed iri October, I believe it was, before the report was published as to the staff's conclusio and its technical basis.

• .COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And what was said about the long term program at that point?

MR. CASE:

It was said that the staff's conclusion was that they could continue to operate pending completion of the long term program which was expected to be completed within approximately two years.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

From the end of '77?

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Yes.

COMMI~SIONER GI.LINSKY:

.And that is the physical.

changes in the c'ontairtment --~*

MR. CASE:

More analysis and physical cha,nges,..

MR. EISENHUT:

That Is right~

• .we in fact have been tar'geted

• to have. the long term program rest1;l ts. implemented by December.. 1980.

That has be.en our objective now for some time.

As Ed ~entioned, in the one report to Co~gress and in the Technical Activities Report it is sta*ted the. short term program would be complete by August '77 ---

(Slide)

COMMISSiIONER BRADFORD:

• That. sfarhrnary,-)W0ti.ld be more helpful if it were tu~ne~ ar6urid.

MR.. EISENHUT:

John, could you turn that slid,e ar,ound?

You can read it, but this was just the summary slide we used actually from October.

I apologize, it is a little battered.

MR. CASE:

In other words, this is what we presented to you in October.

MR.. EISENHUT:.. We just simply say the loads have been identified which we :had not* looked at before.

In the short term we were

-- wanted to ijive additional assurance, namely, a factor safety of 2 and we were going to require a long term program.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15 Now, how we went from,the com~letion of the short term program in~,actually December. to how we go in.and complete the long term program was quite a bit academic.

One could argue in fact that no action would have been necessary.

Any other.. ~action that had* been taken over the last couple years; however,*

COMMISSION~R BRADFORD:

Darrell, let me stop you.

You had said that the staff preferred margins of 3 or

4.

Now, isn't* *that preference in facts*?, It is written into something some where?

MR. EISENHUT:

It is not explicitly;written MR. CASE:

It is written in the Standard Review Plan.

It is not in, the regulations.

MR. EISENHUT:

For new plants. It is not in the regulations and it is not explicitly written into the code.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY£ It was preference 3 or 4 on certain components.

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes.

Generally one could argue that with the vital components you would like to have a factor of 3 or to 4.

As it turns out, the ASME code which is the only thing referenced in the regulations, and in the regulations it does not.~ven specifically say that the ~ontainment structure must meet the code.

The regulations address several components in 5055A, the pumps, the valves and you go down a list of some six or seven items.

The only place it specifically lists the

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And I just happen to have that here.

The words it uses, the Criterion 50 of the General Design Cri te:i;-ion and I will *bridge a* li ttie. bit:

"Containment Design Basis:

The reactor containment structure shall be designed such that it can accommodate with sufficient margin the loads resulting from any loss of coolant accident."

So the word~ th~t we are using in determining whether or not an exemption of the regulations is required, is the phrase "with sufficient margins."

In other words, the regulatio s require sufficient margin~~

This is interpr~ted in staff

.practice through,the Standard Review plan to require compliance with the ASME code in this instance.

The ASME code generally requires a factor of.sifety of:3Jor 4 befo~e collapse.. In this evaluation we concluded that there was only a factor of 2.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me understand this factor of safety.

MR. GASE:

therefore, an exemption of the regulations was required.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

This is what, looking at the most probable load, the maximum load that you can conceive of?

MR. SHAO:

The,,most probable load.

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Is.that what the code says?

MR. SHAO:

The code doesn't say that.

The code staties the maximum load,* so that's one devia_tion.

COMMISSION.ER GI LINSKY: *So* you are really making a change thereitoo~

MR~ SHAO:

That's right, two -changes.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So two changes and we are still in the ~ame directibni MR. SHAO:

That's right.

Maybe.I can give.you a basis why we feel that two is acceptable.

My name is Larry Shao and I'm in the NRR staff.

Now, everybody uses section 3 design for nuclear-structures and components.

When you c0iist:tu:9t.2your. tcomponent there are, :.~fort*_)example, two types of loading.

One is caililed normal load, like temperature, pressure and dead weight.

And there

• is another_type of loads called accident-loads, like safe shut down industry and LOCA load.

For all of the components like nuclear vessels, reactor vessels, piping and pumps they treat the Eecs and LOCA load as accident load.

For the accident load you *have only a margin of 1~5.

For a normal load you ~ffect

• a 3. 0, but. for contairimeht the AS_MK\\cb.de makes it very, very conservative, they say, for containment !(,don't want to treat two types of loads.

I want to treat everything as one type of ioad or the accident load can be considered as normal load and a factor.of 3 to 4.

So that is very,. very

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

yJell, you are really saying that the code MR. SHAO:

Is very, very conservative.'.in.this respect.

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Bui you are really saying that the *code should have made a distinction ---

M~-

SHAO:

The code has its reason too.

It has two reasons for treating this safety margin, because first, containment is a 1ot bearing.

Second, containment is the emergency component.

For the. *emergency component you treat

,0 the emergency load as a normal load.and that's the basis.of the code, to treat it like a normal load.

It is conservative.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But still., the code says maximum MR. SHAO:

Oh, there is another reason.

The code was made many years ago and at that time when the containment code was written there was only very simplified analysis, there was no detailed analysis so that's why they go for a very high margin.

But now, we use very sophisticated analysis but the code hasn't changed the margins for the same analysis.

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes,* another way of saying that is the code itself could be said to be mutually inconsistent in one sense, because on one hand it requires -- for containment

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• COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But yet, 'you seem to be saying that*you*think you ought to get back to that factor of

3.

MR. EISENHUT:. For new plants our gene~~1* approach*,

and' *it' lS in th~ 'standa~d Review P-lan, is in.fact to follow this interpretation of the code that Larry just mentioned, wherein we say that in fact, for the containment even though it is not specifically ciear in the code, what.is*meant*and*

how to do the evaluation, et cetera, it is desirable and it is prudent to have a larger safety factor.

For* :the short terin pr9gr~m, we fel.t that in fact a factor of sa.fety seems very reasonable and* acceptable.

MR. CASE:

A minimum of 2.

MR.* EISENHUT:

A minimum of 2, where we recognize that most of the aspects of the containment actually have more than that.

The~ presently hav~ a larger COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me ask you *the difference here between e~pected loa:dc,.aridaaver.c3:ge:1_1oad and maximum load.

Now, how big*a factor -- how much bigger could the maximum load be from the expected load?

MR. SHAO:

.I would like* to make one correction to this, is the combination of safe shut-off factor plus probable load, not only probable load alone.

MR. EISENHUT:

If you follow it, Larry is saying

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Both of those occurrances at the same time.

MR. EISENHUT:

That's right.

So.now when you talk about the most.probable load, I think the way we worked it is that we aimed toward somewhat of a~- we didn't want to use the short term an extremely upper~bound load, you can, of course keep jacking up the load artificially.

We hunted for something we could put our finger on and say that's the most probable load, however, we probably errored on the conservative side.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes, but look, when you run tests _there must*be some spread ~f load, and how big is that spread?

In other words, could that factor of 1 be realli effective to the the one and a quarter?

MR. EISENHU~:

I think the way the data was interprete our most probable load in fact would bound the situation from all realistic ways you could look at it that in fact would actually occur.

In fact, we think the loa~ is going to be lower than our most probable load for a number of reasons, and that is in fact why the Mark 1 owners have invested a considerable amount:of~money, time and effort to develop these larger scale tests.

In fact, to show us that our most probable load in fact is not the most probable load.

The experiments they

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Guss,* do you.want to comment on it?

MR. LAINUS:

Okay, well, as far as the load to terminate-~ this is.Guss Lainus from the staff --

I think, Commissioner, you asked_ with respect to what kind of margins

• we expect *in the load, the determination of the loads, separated fromtthe structural aspects of it, There are really three areas that we are looking at, the first was )~-\\bne of the conclusions that we made qn this and required for the long term program we had to do a *1arger scale etror test.

The reason we;did was there were thr~e things we were concerned about.

First, was scaling.

In other words, as was pointed o~t they did small scale test~_t6 determine some of these loads; So we. felt lhat we ~ouid like to see some larger scale tests, the experiment load.

It was also errored in some uncertainties in the interpretations of the results and one of these verified the long term.program.

The last with respect to error test is the justifi-cation for some of the extrapolation factors ~nd we were taking the test results and trying to take that since each plant had some differences we felt that they should justify these extrapolations.

I must say that when we had our consultants look at the number that they had been using and they feel that they are reasonably conservative, what was mentioned also is the

I.

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22 Livermore test.

The test results have not been published,.

bu~ we have had access to that data.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Ar.e those tests over?

MR. LAINUS:

Yes, they are over.

The facility is shut down, but it is still standing,-there.

.we haven't published tbe results on that, but indications are that they confirm what was used in the analysis 6f the short ter~ program.

Now, the last item is the steam-induced loads.

What.was used in the short term program was a lot of reliance on tests that were foreign tests and as part of the long term program they built and they are in the process of shaking down a full-scale test facility.

Now we haven't gotten all the results back COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Full-scale?

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes.

MR. LAINUS:

-- but we should be getting the results very shortly.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Where is this full-scale test facility?

MR. LAINUS:

The full-scale test is outside of Los Angeles, it is done by Wylie Labs, Norao_

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I thought you said it was one-quarter scale?

MR. EISENHUT:

No, it's a 90 degrees?

MR. LAINUS:

That has, I think, six pairs of down-comes

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.o~ something like that, I think, yes.

MR. EISENHUT:

There'.is in fact a quarter~scale_

test, there is a piece of full-scale test, there is at least a half dozen tests under way.

The Livermore results were just carried in last week. In fact, this October report is the report Guss'is referring to that hasn't been published.

I got this copy handcarried last week.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And is that going to be published soon?

MR. EISENHUT:

It is, indeed it is. It has been published and it is being distributed as of last week.

MR. LAINUS:

Like I said, we don't expect any big surprises.

MR. EISENHUT:

IL;is.:ha:td: to:.. qua:ntify/an 'Unknown,*.

if in fact, all of our worst guesses turned out to be in fact right, you could get down to this factor of 2.

A lot of the owners, GE, Wylie Labs who is the sub-contractor for those folks running the test outside of Los Angeles are running the tests because they are 6onvinced that in fact, there is margins in there that will show up.

In fact, these most probable loads are in fact conservative.

Then, ::_if you lower the loads, the facton,safety goes higher.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

What torus components tend to be the vulnerable ones?

That have the lowest safety factor?

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i 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. SHAO:

It is on the columns.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

The support columns?

24.

MR. SHAO:

The support columns.to the torus. are the most.. critical, the welds joinin,cj the support columns.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

If I remember, there is a problem with them j.umping off the ground and there ar~

also problems in buckling.

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes.

John, maybe we can go back to the*

we have three little slides that sh.ow the principal loads, 1/2here are a lot of s~condary loads.

L_.. -. -. :.

Given the blow-down event, the first thing you see is you see the steam coming down the down-comer causing a bubble of steam starting to come into the -- under the water.*

At~about this point you see the little arrows, this is where you get the downward force.

There is actually a force down-ward on the torus.when the steam is starting to come down the down-comer.

(Slide)

On the next slide you see moments later what happens is the bubble continues to come out, continues to expand and you~:see the actual water level in the torus rise.,

The water level actually impacts on this header region, there are cat-walks, there are several things in the structure and in fact, at that point you get a loading where you could -- if,

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of cburse, you tore up the down~comers or the ring-header inside you violate your conta.1.nment and some fractions of

~

a second 1,ater; on the* next slide (Sl.j._de)

. -- you can *see what happens.

At this point* th_e -

water level has risen-to a point to.. wher~ it is *actualiy*

causing a force upward*, a net upward force on the torus and it would theoretically have a tendency,to.bounce.

So these are the three major ends of it.,* There ar.e

'all th~ reactor loads associated with it, they are. the loads in the columns, of course, going down.

There is ECCS piping attached to it that you have to l_ook at COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, what about if you look at the entire course as opposed to sections, cany you set up waives at this time?

MR. EISENHUT:

That is one of the thirigs being discussed,::;_in the long term program.

You can, in fact, have various phenomena:,ithat are tneoretically this thing is going to blow down --

I think the*re are. 48 sets on some of the plants of down-comers.-.:.. else 24 sets of down-comers..

I think it is 24 sets* of down-come~s.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Have we uncovered any places where some *combination of relieve valve venting turns out to give you* a worse problem iti'.;the.\\tor.us* than a la_rge blow-down?

MR. LAINUS:

Yes, we do.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 MR. EISENHUT:

We have a separate problem

. underway.

.CHAIRMAN. HEND.RI-E:

Let me comment.

If you get a large pipe bre.~k and i::the:::;drywell is fil*led 'with ste*am' which is'* flashed from the saturated coolant,.

• the bru,:te force that is driving the si t:.uation,. you are going

'to pretty well load'those main ducts at that size. 'And there would be great termoil in the.torus, obviously, but I suspect th~re will be.less.at new goal variation than you can get, if for instance, you managed to selectively vent the right set of relief valves which only flow down at one point in the torus and then you start to. propagate a *waive aro'und it and maybe you can have some more relief valve flow down and dump in other places in a fashion to reinforce.

So then maybe you cah get a really splendid waive circling.

MR. EISENH,UT:

Right.

It certainly i.s something you could picture a lot more feasible than the other arrangement.

We have, as a piece of our long-term Mark lprogram, we have a piece of defining what the safety relief valve loading is, and in fact, that will. be factored irtto our long term program.

You wili also recall we have one of our generic category A task is associated with the*:.sRV discharge problem

• also.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

The preceeding three slides

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 describing the blip, is that* what*would be called the static load or is that a dynamic load?

MR. EISENHUT:

Dyna.mi¢ load.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

And the code in.which the factors of 3 or 4 are de~ived speak to static loads?

MR. SHAO:

Okay, the code was w~itten based on static, but as a highly dynamic load, so actually I can mention another 3 or 4 factors of conservatism which I didn't mention.

The areafof~the static against dynamic there is a factor of, 2 there. Every:t;hing is static after this dynamic, 'so there is a factor of 2 right there.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:* You are saying what, dynamic loads are a less serious load than the static load?

MR. SHAO:

Less serious than the static loads.

Just takes less energy.

• time?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What does that mean?

MR. EISENHUT:

They represe:p.t less energy.

.COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

If they persist for a shorter MR. SHAO:

Yes, very short.

MR. EISENHUT:

There is.. a very rough rule that if the structure can take a load of a factor safety of 2 on a static load, you may argue that it can take a factor 6,L* 4 from a dynamic load.

This is a safety factor.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It depends on the time scale?

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. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. EISENHUT:

Yes.

MR. SHAO:

Actually we aske,d.Livermore 'to look.

in to this and they came up with the factor that we *.can have a factor of 2.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Onward.

Wait a minute, Peter, did *you have some more questions?

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

No, go ahead.

I have some other questions,* but they can wait un ti 1 the end.

MR. CASE:

Well, I would $Ummarize on the technical side of th,e*,* thing that the technical problem, the factors involved, the staff.~s* ;method of resolution and the basis for its conclusion that operation could continue while the long term program was being investigated or carried out, received a wide publicity, considerable Commission involvement ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's see, before you get*

to that it is pretty clear you don't think that this solution is acceptable for a long term?

MR. CASE:

That's correct.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But you feel it is acceptable for some period of time?

MR. EISENHUT:

For several years, but not 40 years.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, several years counting from when?

Counting from 1975 or counting.from today or counting from when?

I mean you have made a decision ---

MR. EISENHUT:

A few years counting from December '77.

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• COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I'm not trying to pin,Y:OU down, I am just trying to make a general assessment.

MR. EISENHUT:

Ttat is a very good question MR. CASE:

We can't quantify it any closer than yes to a~l three of those questions.

• COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Can,you quant,ify it to the extent.that whatever the number of years this may* involve it will be less than,* that is the moving through tb,the long term solution, will be less than the life.ti.me you believe saf~ operations can continue for these safety factors?

MR. EISENHUT: *clearly.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

That's an answer that* could cover a multitude of sins.

MR. EISENHUT:

No, to put it more quantitatively, our objective has been and continues to be to get the long term program complete. *and get the results _implemented by December. of 1980.

We are doing everything we can to get there, however, you realize that when you are running large scale tests, for example, if you run in to a test.pro~lem and

~on't get the results, you may run in to a problem.

The second problem you run in to is if in fact the long.term program slips the implementation of getting the results, getting something fixed~phy~ically in the plant, obviously, to a certain extent, slips.

However, I should also point out that our schedule -- we have been working informally

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.19 20 21 22 23 24 25 30 with each of the Mark 1.' licensees and.in fact, there are several.that*have stated they are going to be putting in some long term fixes on. a.much.shorter time fram,e.

We have one,* in fact, that I3see~i~s~ritting iri so~e design changes presently anticipatinq. the fa11* of. '78 whe~e.:Ln.'they would, go in and chan'ge the designs so that they could reduce.* the loads, reduce the loads s~~riificantly so that one'could argue that in fact they

• are probably aL!,' right on the long term and won't have to. '.do inuch else.

There is another plant t.hat said they are going to try to do something in tne -, in a~1* limited amount in the

• fourth'.quarter of '78, but they wofuld anticipaie that in.

something lik~ March of '79 they would have to put in some additional fix*ups.

So everything is not standing still waiting on the last day and come December '78 we are going to run into ---

MR. CASE:

Nor is December of '78 a drop-dead date either.

If things aren't done by that time then we will

.COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But it is important to get these things done on time because this isn't the only area where we make these kinds of allowances.

I mean, just look at fire protection.

We take a while in instituting the measures that we think ought to be there for the long run*in fire protection.

If you let each one of thes~ things slip then your margins of safety do b,egin to erod*e*~~

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 31 MR. EISENHUT:

That's right.

Well, we are trying to get there as fast as is practicable running the experiments and as fast, certainly, as our resources permit us toge~ there.*

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And so it loqks to you by and' large that date will be met?

MR. EISENHUT:

The majority of them,I would bet my best* guess would be the majority of the stuff would be fixed by December 1980.

It. certainly, as Ed said, is not a drop-dead date.

As we have all seen on dozens of other issues, there is always the little dribble and dabs go on.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But do you get the impression that the utilities are taking this pretty seriously and are really moving to* meet that date?

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes.

And we have been putting approp-riate management attention on it to insure that that message does get across very well and we are going to cqntinue to do so in the future.

This is in fact~-

we take it seriously that it is in fact one of _our high priority category.,A tasks and our recent prioritization tasks, in NRR, Ed, I believe was like in the top 5 of all the tasks that we have announced.

MR. CASE:

We have a pecking order within the "a's" too..

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That means some are better than others?

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 32 MR. EI SENHUT:

We 11, you wo:uld in var +/-ao:ty'... run.. :_ into

~oftflicts in schedule.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

As to what the utilities are doing between now and December 1980, how much of it will depend upon the results of_ the tests which ar~. not yet

• completed?

MR.' EISENHUT:

Certain amount of it wiil, howe-yer, they believe that if they go in and make* a certain kind of design.. changes

• they can in fact envelope any problems.

They are just trying to avoid those ch~nges, becauie they are rather costly and time consuming.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Without taking issue with the technical logic at all, I still have to say that from a legal point of view, I '*m a little mystified by how this apparatus works, that is, why would a waiver be necessar~ in February of '78 that wasn't needed in July of '77 or October of '77 when you briefed us.

I guess I can't see what changed

-between that time.

MR. CASE:

Well, let me say some things and perhaps my lawyer here will stop me.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Could you explain the nature of the waiver?

MR. CASE:

Yes.

Let me first go ahead and answer Peter's CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Let him go ahead and build to it,

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 he has got the first part of his presentation, I sense, in place.

33 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Peter wanted to know why a waiver was necessary, I guess I don't understapd what the waiver is.

MR. CASE:

Well, it was an exemption to General Design.Criterion 50, and in particular there is an_:*exemption to that portion of Gen~ral.D~Sigri,Criterion 50 that says the containment shall be designed with sufficient margin to withstan a LOCA.

And it is an interpretation of the te~m "sufficient margin."

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Which you interpret to be a factor of 3 or 4?

MR. CASE:

Yes.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It is only a 3 if you are saying a -.factor of 3 or 4.

MR. CASE:

Which we interpret to mean in accordance with the ASME Code which requires* such a factor.

MR. KELLEY:

Doesn't that flush too, Ed, the Code?

MR. CASE:

Yes.

There are those kind of words too in the Code, but generally the result in the factor of 3 or 4.

COMMISSIONER GI LINSKY:

You are really* exempting them from meeting the ASME codes for some period of time?

MR. CASE:

Well, not legally, but in effect you are, yes.

You are legally exempting* them _from General Design Cri teri n

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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Which is the "sufficient margin" requirem~nt?

. MR. CASE:

Yes.

MR. KELLEY:

But isn't it kind of marginal whether you needed an exemption at all? Isn't that debatable?

MR. CASE:

Well, *1et me answer Peter's questidp.

When we pe_rmitted them to operate, we in effect gave them a waiver, an oral waiver of the requirement.

We were aware *that they did not comply with the Code, they told us that,.

we took no action.

So in effect, we granted them an oral waiver of the regulation.

to?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

This was back in early '76?

MR. CASE:

Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's what you are referring MR. CASE:

Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But aren't you saying for the time being you regard a factor of 2.~as sufficient?

MR. CASE:

Sure, but I am also saying that the regulations require a greater factor than that for a long term operation.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Your interpretation is required.

MR. CASE:

Yes.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Joe, you were try.iryg to get

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MR. SCINTO:

I don't think there was a question of whether. the exemption was appropriate Or not.

This d.ocument when it is finished gives a staff conclusion.

The staff conclusion_is ~ather.unequ{vocal that the. Mar~*1 continuance on_~the basi.s of the most probable informat,ion that we have now to not have the same*structural margins as are called for by the Code.

The document makes.it fairly clear.

The appropriate stanqard for containment structures is General Design Criterion 1 and the first porticin S0SSA(l).

This provides for a11

• of the structure systems a'nd components important to safety, regardless of all the rest, shall conform with app~opriate cbdes and stand~rds.

5055A said one.

MR. CASE:* And Criterion 1 says: "Structure systems and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated erected and tested to quality standards commensurate wit,h their importance to safety."

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

• And where does the ASME Code come in?

MR. SCillNTO:

If you go back through all of th~

descriptions, PSA, SFARs, SERs, all of these plans, the appropriate code for a containment structure has always been either ASME Code 8 before 3.

Eight before 3 was established.

We have always used the appropriate industrial standard for these structures, the ASME Code.

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,Ca.AIRMAN HENDRIE:

Let's see, we have never built the division 2 or the MC, the metal secti9n of the Code dr Division 2 have never been built into the regs, the vessel

• portion* of MR.. CASE:

'.!'hat's :tight, so the ASME Co.de strictly is not part of the regulations'for containment.

CHl~.IRMAN HENDRIE:

Nevertheless,.as is said here, there is not doubt that the staff over time, particularly with t.he perfection of both the* metal a:nd concrete codes over the last f+/-ve_.:.six years has increasin'gly regarded themaas the authoritative standards for containment structures across-the-.

board.for plants.

I.must say, I myself am unclear w~y the exemption needed to be grazed as it was.

What you have decided*is that sufficient margin for this group of plants for a limited.time is acceptably interpretated to be this approximate factor of 2 to failure on the weak link for the load combinations specified and so on.

The staff has been unequivocal and continues to be so, I believe, with regard to the proposition that containments in general, and particular new stuff coming along and across-the-board and for full plant life times ought to be up to the ACI/ASME Code standards.. Please go ahead and talk further about the merits of an exemption of what I wo~ld regard as an interpretation applicable.to this group of plants for this time.

But I must say for myself, I would

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 37 have belabored the interpretation, but please go and ---

MR. SCINTO:

We looked at it and we*felt that what we were d6ing-here was authorizin~ a period of operation in nonconformity with what we would call for a continuous period.

We felt that in fact what this was, wa9 an exemption from the*regulations and my recommendation was to call a spade a spade.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And why, to ask Peter's question again, did that come at the beginning of

'78?

MR. SCINTO:

Rather than '76?

I can discuss that.

In '76 there was some question as to exactly what the information*we;_,had *at that time, but if I remember correctly January '76 was the time Vermopt Yankee went down, all the rest of them came in.

We had -- Mr. Rusche called in all the rest of the utilities.

There was a lot of discussion on a number of meetings in Bethesda that I can recall about instrument error, about what exactly the readings from the instrument on that small ball were.

There were a lot of questions ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What small ball?.

MR. SCINTO:

This test was a fairly small sized test.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Oh, you mean this. little ---

plastic section?

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes.

MR. SCINTO:

I can recall the motion picture that GE

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took at.that period of time, a~d I remember that fairlywell.

There *were a number of question$.

We had a discuss~on as to exactly what the status at t~at ~ime was.*

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes, but the situation*did n6t*look more optimistic then?

MR. CASE:

• No, but Joe**s *argument is that we d.idn't know at that time.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:. I know, but it*lo0ked if anything works, didn't it?

MR. SCINTO:

There were two components..

.We called

• them in and 1t was the first impression of serious.

whether it was a serious sat'ety problem with the plants

• While *that cou"rse of action at that time may have warranted an Order to Show Causer.indeed the utilities came in and by the time we finished with the discussion with them, we were totally'satisfied what they proposed*to do on a short term basis.

The next question was were they not now in non-conformance with the regulations.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Right, but 11:iow was that situation from ~].lawyer's point of view any different or any better than the situation in February of* '*7fi when the waiver was actually granted?

MR. SCINTO:

It wasn't any bett'er. < *. It was different in that there was no -- this is the first staff document wTuich reaches a staff conclusion as to what those loads are and

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• 39

that they do not conform to the Code.

I know of no prior

• . s*taff dpcument which does.*, t,his.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Oh,. but the. facts in there wer known earlier werenLt they?

MR~. SCI~TO_:

• The f ir'st time I saw them was about Sept:ember or October wµ~m they were, being prepared for the *

• Commission.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, let's even say

.. September or Octob'er.

MR. SCINTO:

We could have tiken' a course of action at that time.. The document got out in December and we took the course of actioh. in.*January.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

There must have been a sort of continuing or intermittent staff judgment that, "Y:es, we've got some more loads that have got to be factored in."

If they werenLt in the original calc-y.1ations, why the stress *1evels for max loading conditions were going to go up, that's going to raise some question about the tnarg;Lfl.$,::.,.nev.e:ttheles$ the s.;taff must :tjave been able to assE:!ss the sort of magnitude of these things and make a judgment,,as I say, on a more or less continuous or perh~ps intermittent basis that well, they continued to think that those.Mark 1 containments out there would serve the essential.purpose if called upori,*and that therefore the plants -- it was-reasonable to ailow the plant to continue to operate until next week or until the next time

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20 21 22 23 24 25 40 we iterate ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well,.there was kind qf c.ontinui ty in the technical 'judgment, but there was discontin-uity in the legal judgment.

MR. SCTNTO~ :Thatts*correct.

MR. CASE:

No, that'? the way the process works.

CHAIRMAN. HENDRIE:*

Both you are I are. s er a tching our heads and wondering why it was necessary for the legal judgment to have this sharp discontinuity when it wasn't ne*cessary ---

MR. CASE:

Well, look, I have got a;generic solution and I have ~ot to apply it to 20 operating plants.

I can't somehow I have got to apply this as a licensed,condition because it requires doing something~, following 'the LT, the long term program ahd completing it within approximately two years.

There are._:other conditions in here that must be followed.

I've got to have a vehicle to ma~e. this applicable t.o individual plant licensees.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is this some kind of legal checking the box ---

MR. CASE:

No.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But what has that got to do with.the exemption?

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Yes.

MR. CASE:

All right, there are a number of ways that you can do it.

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• • The most appropriate way in Joe's *judgment and. ~n my.judgment was to grant the exemption,.cond,ition it on completing the** long term program i.n.ap:proximately two years, and follo~ing the conditions given in thi,s,document.

Tµerefore, I translate t,his document into a specific, license putting the*

reqqirements on*':the, licensee.'. It has to be done some way or other.

CHAI'RMAN HENDRIE:

W,ell, we, have done an awful lot of license conditioning in crq.nking up MR. CASE:

• I could have done it *by an *order..

That's another way it could have been done.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:'

-- without cranking. up exemptions

• and *.so on.

MR. CASE:

Ther~. are a number of vehicles available to the staff.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But if you had issued an order r~quiring these* t,hings without having issued the exemption, then where w9uld. you have been?

MR. SCINTO:

We would be in a mode that looked like a sanction and-that's inde~d -- we felt in this case that's not what we are doing.* We were really authorizing continued operation and it should be called what we. were doing.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And what are the conditioris for continued* operations?

MR. SCJiNTO:

There were a couple of conditions.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 42 One, that they use in fact the pressure differential mode controls that they have been using voluntarily, that they had been using since January '76.

it?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Was.that entirely voluntary?

MR. SCINTO:. I;rom Jan*uary '76, sir.?

Yes.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We placed no requirement on MR. SCINTO:

In January of '76 we called them in, they all came in, they all proposed to act and use'the differential pressure. Mr. Rusche sent a letter to all of the licensees dated February '76, I believe it was, that says we appreciate their prompt attention to the matter and we are glad they are using it.

Had they not used it -- had they*decided not to use the differential pressure that they discussed at that time, it would have been incumbent on us to take a compliance action.

They were then not in violation of anything.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What you are saying is there is~no legal requirement f6r them to use those measures to mainta n their margins of safety?

MR. SCINTO:

There was no requirement in a licensed condition.

Had they deviated from it, we would have* probably ordered it and then made a legal requirement out of it.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay, but somehow you feel that it is necessary now to make that a legal requirement.

MR. SCINTO:

In January of '76 the focus

-- their

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\\

focus was on.whether the plants were safe to dperate.

It was ori the technical.question of the safety status bf the plant~

• Ther.e was a ques"tion of,. okay, wp*a t then was the legal.status?*

They were then operatirig in a safe fashion.

We were not certain and the analysis

~their.technical analysis aa of

.. Fe,bruary. '76. is reflected best in. the. safety evaluation for Vermont Yankee which was the only plant that ended up with a load.problem.

And in Mr. Rusche's letter, there was a discussion and the staff.. did not feel that they could technicall reach the judgment that based on the information they then had they could conclude that there was in fact a deviation from anything, the technical information was questipnable.

We were sur~ it was safe.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY':

Even without the pressure differential?

MR~ SCINTO:

With the pressure differential we were sure it was safe.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But you were not sure that it was going to reach a level of 3 or 4.

the ---

MR. SCINTO:

We could have not put out that document.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

And you are pointing now to MR. SCINTO:

NUREG document.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Okay.

MR. SCINTO:

It took that analysis

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 44 COMMISSIONER 'GILINSKY:

so*you are saying had they not met those conditions you would ha~e made it a really legal requirement and I find this a very odd way to.proceed, I must say.

MR. SCINTO:

That's correct.

MR. CASE:

Well, licensees do a lot of things that contribute to safety that we don't necessarily require in their license.

It is a question of time, it is a question of other things to do, it is a question of importance.

Not everything they do that we think is important to safety is included as a license condition.

And the more you put in, Commissioner Gilinsky, the more time you have to take when some later situation develops, if they want to change it a little bit and there is a lot of paperwork.involved in making those changes

.and time and staff effort.

And I appreciate the lawyers not coming around and bugging me saying, "Hey, what's the legal status of this thing?

Get.a.document together?"

Well, I'm worried about the safety and th~y let me do that first and I appreciate it.

Then when we get that squared away, then we will deal with.the legal problems.

MR. SCINTO:

That's right.

COMMISSIONER-BRADFORD:

But in this case, that's two years?

MR. SCINTO:

Unfortunately, that's two years in this case.

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10, 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 45 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yes, but I keep asking myself,

. now, what*~ the practical effect and the answer is norie.

Isn't that right?

(Mr. *case nods in the affirmative.)

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, it would presumc).bly be nill for another year and~ half after that and then another year and a half after that.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's a different question.

MR. CASE:

But the. lawyers say, well, now you have got all of this.document.tog~ther, you have done your year and a half work, let's capture it in the form of an exemption or a license or amendment or.some act lJy the licensing staff.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Okay, but the plus side of

• that is that it means at the point at wl;lich you actually.take that action you can be very clear about what the criteria are and what you are requiring in a way that you *couldn't have been tw,o years before.

The minus side of it is that the sort of policy and legal judgment was* brought to bear in the February action; is not brought to bear during the year and a half of -- what, ad hoc waiver, I think is about the only thing you ca.uld call it In this case it obviously didn't matter.

In another it might.

MR. CASE:

How might it?

With the situation under surveillance the staff knows what is going on and if it is necessary to order them to use the differential pressure thing,

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21 22 23 24 25 46 we will do that.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But you see,,* Joe in.a sense was arguing that our information was imper,fect arid there-fore, thissfiexible approach was appropriate, but in fact,*

• you seem.to feel strongly enough about i.t that had.they. not complied with the detailed requirements, you-would.have -- you said you would have made it a legal re.quireme.nt.

. So you seemed to know*pretty well what it is you wanted.

MR. SCINTO:

We knew the out-of-bound.

As the letter indicates, the staff was *very concerned about continued operation with less than at least the factor of 2 that was

,provid~d by the differential pressure. control.

The staff, under those_ circumstances --. it was*

. my recollection.or my feeling at that time, the staff would have concluded that operation without that margin would have been unsafe, unsafe, not conformance of the code, riot deviation, but unsafe.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Is what you are saying then in answe_r to Commissioner Bradford's question which*. was the policy judgment wasn't made in 1977.

It.waited until January 1978.

Is what you are saying that you couldn't make that policy*judgment.until such.time as you had the analytical work completed represented by that document. Is that right?

MR. CASE:

Yes.

Now,.-Lit is hard to s_ay that before all of.this was written down we realized that there was less

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weren't going to be satisfied with that, but somehow you have got to document it-in _a piece of paper and then take the

~ction.

It grows on*you, you just don't MR. SCINTO:

The Commission is c_oncerned that the policy judgment wasn't-until January.

This was.the period of time, in early '76 when it was very close, we were reporting to the Joint Committee and the Commission ~nvolvement, what policy reflected in that --

there was no policy that was reflected on the exemption and not exemption, but the Commission was very closely associated with what the course of action the staff had embarked upon at that time.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I think what you are saying is that there was a policy judgment being made that this course o:L:actfon was.all right, it just wasn't clear what that specific p9licy that was being endorsed was in terms of a margin of safety.

No one knew during the discussion that it was 2 or more~

No one was sure exactly what, and I guess no on~ was also sure exactiy what action would be required when you got assurance COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

To raise that assurance to the 3 or 4 level?

MR. CASE:

Right.

There was no discussion with the Commission as to what the vehicle we would use to implement this

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.14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 48

• and to require conformance to the long.term prog_ram. There was no discussion whether it would be an exemption, a waiver, a letter or what hav~,you.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

.No discussion. with whom?

MR.. CASE:

With 1the Commission.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What period of time are' you talking about?.

MR. CASE:

L'm talking about the period of time after this was prepared and we were decidiri~~i~~the staff how to implement this.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

On the last year?

MR. CASE:

La.st three or four months.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me just ask Joe again:

what significance do you attach*this exemption?

Is this some little formality or is this an important act?

MR. SCINTO:

At this stage it winds up to be a formal-izing of the status* of those plans.

The_ir. two years of informal continu~d operation with growing knowledge from some place in January of '76 to some place in December '77.

Yes, we knew enough*.' to know, '.,:we were convinced that they did not have the margins of the code.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Ed, if you had to articulate the difference between what would have been, I guess, a total of close to four years of operation with knowledge that the*,-

level was closer to 2 than to the level required by the Code and the lifetime of operation that the level required by the

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Code;

• why i? 4 y-ears at the lower level acceptable, but 30 years.not?

MR.' CASE:

Well~ there is certainly the probability of ne.ed for the I containment to withstand this kind of an accident.

• ~hat's one difference between* 4.and 3 years.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

And what's'the bas.e

. does the staff use' for a prol;:>afuili ty

• j*udgfuent? *

• MR. CASE:

Ver_y low.

what COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I.s this the point at which we rely*on the Rasmussen 'study, and if sO, how?

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

It is not a numerical matter.

. MR. EISENHUT:

No, it _is really-not.

There is o*nly.

,!,~

aboµt two speci,fic places* that I can think* of where we riferred to probabilities explic~tly.

One. is, of course, for years we have said the probability of a reactor pressure vessel rupture* is less than or ~qual to 10 of the minus 7 per rea6tor year ~nd we have said that that's acceptably low, that it need not be proposed.

The only place:it is specifically written into -- that I~can think of, say. i.n our standard review plan for new plants, is in Standard Review Plan -2.2.3 wherein we talk about an external hazard and what is the acceptable low probablity for showing that an external hazard, say a ship running into your plant or an airplane dropping on it would be, and we s~id it should be down in the range of 10 to the minus 6 or 10 to the minus 7

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Those v~lues generally haye been some g~idelines that we have used. in the* past, so iomething 'dbwn the range of 10 to the minus 6 is clearly a~ceptable and.it doesri't

• necessarily say that anything about 10 to the minus 6 is,not.

Usually those are qalculationi of very conservative worst end product to what wpuld happen.

Now, those are something on the order of magnitude or so different than the numbers that are in the Rasmussen Reper for the total probability there of a core melt down.

We generally think those numbers are not inconsistent because we are taking the approach generally of looking at each individ-ual contributor, so to speak, when we are talking 10 to the minus 6, 10 to the minus 7 number.

We believe --:-:' a.. lot of the staff believes th~t unique aspects of the plants considered in WASH-1400 and the binary logic used in that report.

It assumes that if the ECCS doesn't function perfectly with all the pumps running then they just write in and say fine, that's a complete failure of everything.

It is a binary logic.study.* You have got to understand that when you are trying to use the numbers coming out of it, but there is no specific guidance for acceptable probabilities.

MR. CASE:

And then another reason you want margins other than the probability of requiring the containment is to take into account new information -- have a margin to take

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 51 in to account new information just as was found here.

And we have no way of knowing for sure that some new phenomenon won't.

be discovered with the con'_tainment and we would like it to have that original margin bf 3 or 4 against that possibilty.

COMMISSIONER BMDFORD:

But am I wrong in thinking that the_ licens~ng process really does't work that way, that

. is, if you could point to a document which says the licenses we issue are.based on assumption so conservative that they allow for new information tbat will allow~the plants to keep operating even if it looks as though some of the assumptions are working.

That would be fine, that would cover this case, but that document doesn-~t exist ---

MR. CASE:

Sure it does, the General Design Criterion.

Tha't why it has words in there like sufficient margin" for this that or the other thing.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: *well, wait a minute. Is that what "sufficient margin" means?

Sµfficient margin is designed so that we can say that we -- when we license a plant are you saying that the phrase that the use of the words "sufficient margin" means that when we license a plant and subject it to particular criteria we then:.later find. _tha t those criteria aren't being met, that the plant can continue in operation?

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

That may very weli be the case, but is not necessarily the case.

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'J-4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 52 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

It might riot be an insensible way to license, but I guess it wasn't my understanding of the basis on which we issued licenses..

• MR. CASE:

Well, some of them say this specifically, like Criterion 2* when you are talking'. about coming up with a design basis*earthquake.

It says that~hhe values shall d~ter~ine with sufficient margin for.the limited accuracy, quantity and period of time the h~storical. data had been accumulated.

And that's no more than a reflect} o*n of lack of complete information.

That is a specif,ic basis for conservatism given in, ~nother Gener~t.Design Criterion.

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes, *in.fact, you would not want to be in the other mode to where you licensed the plant right on the limit of:

this is acceptable; !)because :-the m1nute you find an error in the calculations or something due to the mode

. that if that is your acceptability line you are on the other side of the acceptability line.

So you always try _the approach of insuring there is a defense indepth approach with sufficiently large safety factors and sufficiently large margins to absorb some of these things.

And in* fact, otherwise, for example, in the operating reactor end every time a new consideration happened, every time a new piece of adverse operating experience came up you are into.the question of:

did you blow -- drop way below the acceptable limit.

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 53 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:* Well, except the one 'would be drawn somewhere. e],se and** it would be up 'to the -operator.

to just himself leav'e* sufficient margin thatihe*::.doesn It :get close to it.

. 'MR. EISENHUT:. That Is right, bU:t the. present margin.

does hc;:i.ve this cus.hiqn in, it' already~-._*

1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes, ex,cept that everybody..

then say*s that means you don't have to meet the specific*

requirements to keep, runnin~.

It is a different philosophy and it you start applying that in too many place~ *simultaneously you get yoursel'f wrapped in your own trouble rapidly.

MR.. EISENHUT: * **Well, but also like' for example -here, that Is another one of the rea'sons why in the *lbng term of th_e Mark 1 program*we want to restore the margin to the'2extent practicable back what was there when we* started.

And we are interpreting that to.mean

_COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Back to what,.:. we thought.

it was when we started?

MR. EISENHUT:

That's right.

MR. CASE:

Well, in~eed Criterion 5 defines that sufficient margin we talked about here to include consideration of, among other things, the limited experience ahd experimental data available for defining accident phenomena and containmeht responses. It hits it right on the m*oney.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Okay, but when the ASME

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What I gather Darrell is telling me now is that when*we license on that criteria we add a ~econd purpose to it whi9h 1s a*1s*o to.

f allow a dip down to 2 in the event that new :j..nformation comes along that tells us that the the load will be greater or.

resistance* oftt:he load less*, and that we can then continue operation for a limited period of time based on that se*cond consideration.

Now, I wonder if the ASME knew that their Code was going to be used to reach a judgment like that, I wonder

• if 3 or 4 is* still the number.that they would arrive.at?

. MR. CASE:

Oh, L: think they would. Our members sit on the ASME Code* Committees and I.:think these kinds of things are. clearly discussed, aren't they Larry-?

MR. SHAO:

Yes.

Actually thec'.~3;:and 4 are 'associated to the* common unforeseen reasons like the vessel is not strong before, maybe there are s.ome errors in*.the calculation and things like that.

But the minute somebody finds out they say drop the iLoad to 3 or 4, they have to correct that.

But this is a little bit different because mainly one is a steady load and one is a highly dymanic load._ So we feel 2 is still quite.safe, but to me you don't need the code because it is a different type of loading.

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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 MR. EISENHUT:

A'nother way qf looking at it is on this problem*, for example, is. the problem was:creal!!:y worked with two pieces.

One group worked on the *actual loads taking.the data~ calculating what,* you would really expect *.. * ;!'he group working.the loads wants.to have their margin, they want to have their little piece of margin so that, boy, if I 111ade a mistake, if a new piece of infor~ation comes up I want to be sure this is.sufficient conservatism there~

Then that load, with what they predict as being the:L,1oad which they can conservatively are happy with because it has got that cushion in_ it, they then turned it over in this case*to Larry and then said, now look at the structures.

Well,*Larry just*takes that load as a given, it is"~~-x".

He then takes that load and_ goes in and wants to see what the containmenbrntructures do then he wants his little conservatism, because just in case he --

something new comes up in his area he wants his sufficient margin also.

• COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But look, you have decided to run.the place in a certain way, and I assume you set it up to arrive.at the result you think is appropriate.

You can't then explain things any other way.

Do you know what I mean?

In other words, if that's not the right way to do. it, let's do it some other way.

MR. EISENHUT:

Well, r;:think that's consistent with

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY~

Well, I'm not sure..

I mean, it seems.that you.are talking.abo{rt the lines that there is

. another way to. license and there :;woulc!r be a line here over

'that line.arid that,'.~* ft.

It is' not cle*ar. where that line is, i

t b~cause *it: seems like every time. there is. a problem and you may be. perfectly right.artd I'm not questioning.your judgment, okay, but it seems that if every time.there is a prC:blem

,people start sharpening *.their penciices and, we s~art,

• discoveri1;1g more and more margin~ of* safety* which may *'or* may** not be there.

and hopefully are.

But you can't appeal to things that you decided you were going :to put aside when you first set up th*e rules on the b.asis of *which you were going to prove the system.

MR. CASE:

Well, you can set them aside.for a short period of time or for a good reason.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.. But you.are saying, well, you know, we reaily kind of over. :Ldid it and ASME, well,*

they over did it too and so.on.

And there is a limit to that kind of language it se:ems to ine.

MR. EISENHUT:

• Well, we are no't* really s.ay.ing we over did it, we are saying we want to in fact go back and restore those margins, and in fact, we like those kinds of numbers~ we think it is prudent to get back to those but we think it is appropriate to take the sufficient time to do all of

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them right.

Of course,. you realize that is in fact the way it is.

If a line is drawn, whatever it is, if it is 10 a l~censee does his work to get down and the minute he drops below 10 by the simplist. calculation he can show-us, if he comes*up 8, he* can stop work.

• He may wel-1 be able

• to go-ahead and spend a few hunderd thousand more and show that it is really 2.

But if he stops at 8 and then finds.out that he made a 50 percent error, he is back up to 12.

So then he goes back and sharpens his pencil and does the refined calculation and shows that it really was 2 in the first place and he takes 50 percent against 3.

MR. SHAO:

Actually, we sharpen our J;)encil only once" with the safety,factor or 2.

After that there can be multiplication or cut*out:the differential *pressure.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But that is still the second pencil sharpening.

The first having come during the licensing.

MR. SHAO:

The first time we meet a code then we sharpen our pencil~

MR. CASE:

The pencil was blunt for the licensing.

Let me bring up something that I can't answer very well, because Commissioner Bradford asked:

he would especially like to know how the decision was made not to explicitly inform the Commission of this matter and this matter being issuing the

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 58 exemptions.

I have be~n thinking about this every since I got it Friday afternoon to, try to think of a good answer and I haven't got one.

I can only tell you that we did not make

.a decision not to inform the Commission.

There was no specific decision: mad~ not to inform the Commi.ssion.

On the other hand, frankly there was just no decision made on the matter and I have to take responsibility for that.

These gentlemen brought these fact to my attention that the exemption was going to be granted.

I should have been more sensitive to the Commission's interest in this and informed you of it, _and I didn't.

And I can assure you it won't happen again, but I have no explanation for the last one.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

How many exemptions like this get~ranted in a year?

MR.. CASE:

I would --

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, let me say how many

_exemptions get granted in a year?

MR. CASE:

I would guess we average two a month, Joe?

Two or three a.month?

MR. SCINTO~

There is usually ~t least 2 ECCS errors in a year, with say MR. CASE: Nakedly,exemptions, I would guess maybe 2 or 3 a month.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

For individual reactors?

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Right.

CO~ISSIONER GILINSKY:

,This one involves 20.

• Let me ask you :somethin'g else, though.

59 MR. CASE:

Let me answer that implicit question.

Let's t~ke the ECCS problems that,we have had errors with BWRs.

They affect just as many operating plants.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Who grants the exemptions?

MR. CASE:

I grant the exemptions, or Mr. Stello or Mr. Boyd.

We.are all three delegated by the Commission to. grant an exemption.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Who granted this one?

MR. CASE:

I think Vic did.

But*they, both Boyd and Stello aie under instructioris from me, don't grant an exemption unless you discuss* it with me.

Director?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So you approve the exemptions?

MR. CASE:

Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Did you inform the Executive MR. CASE:

I don't believe I did.

I just don't know.

I don't think so.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Speaking of staff notes would that have been a matter of some importance?

MR. CASE:

Yes, sir.

And I was almost positive over the weekend that we had informed the Commission by the Staff Notes, and I looked this morning and to my chagrin it was

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COMMISSIONER GI LINSKY:*

Are other.exemptions* ---

, MR. CASE:

Yes~

• I. can grant them -*- as I say", on*

tllei::a:vergge o.f 2 or 3 a month.

'COMMISSIONER GI LINSKY:

Well, but are. they reported to*. the Executive Director; c:1-re

• they reporter to the Commission?*

• MR. CASE:

. No. they are not usually, because I didn't -

.before this discussion consider them a category of things in whifh*my superiors. were that interested, frankly.

run?

CO!-1MISSIONER BRADFORD:

Hbw long do they normally MR. CASE:

For the lifetime of the plant.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Certainly there.are exemptions and there aie exemptions and I remember. when the question came up wfleh w.e.~:were:i_granting an exempti'on. for Indian Point.

That was ce;r:tainly something the Commissi.on discussed.

This was a matter that was discussed at some point with.the Commission, I mean a couple of.years.ago* and:of course, more recently also.

• MR. CASE:

Well, to tell you the truth my view is MR. KELLEY:

The ECCS rule, I believe requires Commission clearance:

MR. CASE:

My view of the situation* of which you may disagree, you are completely informed of the safety problem

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 61 and th~ safety significance and.the course of action the*

s:t;aff is ;roing to. take.

Whethe.r it took.it by a waiver or an exemption*or a letter signed by Mr. S:tello.

I didn't think it was significant enough to call to the Commission's attention.

Th~ particuiar vehicle that we had used to implement the co'nclusions that we had already informed you.

• MR."KELLEY:

You delegation doesn't go to all the the supplements, at least.J_imi ts on ECCS wa,tvers: **.. ::

MR. SCINTO:

No, the delegation goes to everything authorized by law.

On the ECCS the Coi;nrnission reserved unto itself the first exemptions from the first applications of the final acceptance criteria.

MR. KELLEY:

.When they put the rule on?

MR. SCINTO:

The first application they had a rule.

For those, th.e Commission reserved unto its elf.

MR. KEL~EY:

And that's how Big Rock and some of the others MR. SCINTO:

That's how Big Rock came to the Commission in the exemp:tion on the first application.

The second time Big Rock needed an exemption we did not come to the.Commission.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

How do ECCS errors and

• codes become exemptions?

MR. SCINTO:

Initially the Commission reserved unto itself the authority to determine exemptions from the

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 application of the -- the initial appliqation of the final

. acceptance criteria through a set of,extensions, the initial a.pplh=ation of the final. acceptanc*e* criteria occurred sometime in 1975 for most plants~* *;En some plants it oc~urred as late as 1976.

Each plant had to propose operating limitation~

based on their *analysis an~.exemptions from those operating limitations had to go to.the Commission.

For some of the

,plants, they. made errors* in their ECCS evalucttions which affected the operating limitations under *which they.~could be *authorized to operate.

There were two modes for consideration under those.

Some of them. asked for *commission.e~e~ptions.

In othe actions we considered those to be*complianc~ actions, compliance type actions.

Peopl~ were no longer conforming to the rules. -~_-_;", '

They were ordered to conform to the rules.

We had some discussi n with the Commission about whether these were in fact exemptions or whether they were not exemptions"and w~ treated.them as compliance actions.

However, some people did not.ask for.

compliance-type actions and Big Rock specifically came in and they erroneously calculated their performance assumii:rg that their systems would all work, whereas the rule called for them to calculate it assuming single failure.

With a single failure there was virtually no way they could meet the ECCS rule if they had to calculate assuming a single failure.*

The asked specifically for a Commission exemption.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 63 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes, I remember that one..

MR. SCINTO:

It was a Commission exemption; that

.went t9 the Commission.

Subsequently, after that group, Big Rock**.again had an0"ther problem.

This time,.it was how~ver, based on the seco~d application of the final acceptance criterion.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: No, that was not broq.ght to the attention of the Commission.

MR. SCINTO: That was not brought to the Commission of the Commission.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And so there was another exemption granted in which we were not informed.

MR. SCINTO:

Yes.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Could we be informed in the future?

MR. CASE:

Oh, sure.,

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Could the Executive Director be informed?

MR. CASE:

Certainly.

MR. SCINTO:

There are a number of other ECCS exemptions, the first of which was in Peach Bottom's reload in, I think, 1970 -- it was either the fall of 76 or the spring of 77"-- in which there was a facility which. was now down.

They had modified their core.

They were requesting authorization to return to operation.

They had done their

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,21 22 23 24 25 64 analys~s for their modified core us.ing an erroneous ECCS.

Peach Bottom is a. boiler -- GE model.* we had concluded that*

'it: was erroneous.*

In order to get an amendment authorizing the plant to.operafe the regulations called for a determination that-it conforms :to-the regulat'ions.

~t'did n6t,conform to

• the regulations., They.ask for an exemption from the specific regulation.

They were granted exemption from the*.specific regulation.

~R. CASE:

But we did it in the problems with a bunch of plants.

MR. SC.INTO:

That was the first grouping.

MR..CASE:

And I have g:):'anted exemptions.to MR. SLAGGIE:

Joe, 1n the_ c_ase. of B_ig Rock Point, isn't it true *th'at the second. exemption request they came up with had to.do with a deficiency _that existed at the tirrie of the first exemption request? It was just not discovered then.

MR. SCINTO:

No,that deficien~y had existed then, it existed a year before and it existed for some time.

MR. SLAGGIE:

And it just had not been brought to the Commission~s attention at the time 6£ the first exemption request.

MR. SCINTO:

It hadn't been discovered and therefore was not MR. SLAGGIE:

If it had been discovered it would have been subject to the first exemption.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 65 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Wait a minute.

Is there

a. standard that you *.use in granting exemptions that is, is there a particular_ finding that you are required to make?

MR. CASE:

Yes. It is in conformance with law arid

• won't endanger public health and safety.

Is that it?*

MR. SCINTb:

It is 5012.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

No, seriously.

We get staff notes up here,every day from the Executive Director, ever_y time a microcurie is missing from some-hospital *arid these, matters, it seems to me, are more import.ant.

• MR. GOSSICK:

We will make it standard practice to

.report all *of these in the daily report, and depending on the nature of it ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

There aren't all that many of them.

MR. GOSSICK:

No, that's right.

MR. CASE:

You have. to find that they are authorize_d.

by _law, will not endanger life or property or the c.ommon defense and security and are otherwise in the public inter~st.

MR; GOSSICK:

Okay, Ed, all.exemptions will be in the morning report, those that just need to be reported.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

One other question and it doesrr:!~t deal *with exemptions at all, but what is it about our licensing process that permits a containment to get into place

.with a problem +/-ike this without it ever having been tested or

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. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 66 investigated at the time the construction and op~rating license is issued?

MR. CASE: It was.

MR'~,:EISENHUT:' It was thoroughly teste¢, there

, were tests run _two different places.

It ias dbnstructed, tested,after it was put in place.

These,were.a*new,

• phenomenon that was* observed in connection with the Maik 3 testing program, on developmental of a new program.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But it wasn't a new phenomenon in the* sense that the right test wouldn't have shown it *~-:,-:*'

MR. EISENHUT:

Clearly, the right test would have showed it 20 years agq.

MR. CASE:

There was an extensive test program for the first GE.,wet bulb ¢ontainment for HUrnbold-t :Bay..

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But have we.ever. asked the question of GE' what is it that was different about the test you did for the Mark 3 that showed this problem and why.

didn't you do *that for the Mark l?

MR. EISENHUT:

I don't think we really, specifically asked them that question.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

There is a certain amount of agitation behind you.

. MR. EISENHUT:

This is John Guiebert.

MR. GUEIBERT:

Yes, the answer.really was that the sophistication of the data acquisition systems.

These loads

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.10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 67' we are talking about occur in 3 to 5 seconds and the Bode~a B.ay and Humboldt -Bay which,:.are the tes_ting p~ograms for -*

the ort~inal Mark l,container design ~fi+/-bh~run iri'the time frame from '_58 to say*-'62 were really looking at the viability of the pressure suppression*c::oncept, that.is, when you channel the steam ends what would be the resulting pressure and-temperature and can the containment withstand that~

What happened was they were looking not at the same type of time steps through the process so these short duration loads were missed.

Now, you certainly don't know that 10 years from now we are going to find anothe_r glich and that's why you aiways watit -- it is just prudent to have *a factor MR~ CASE:

But it is generally true that these short term loads are not as significant to the structural integrity as the longer term loads.

So you are going towar~s a point of diminishing returns as you get_ shorter and shorter time steps. -

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Yes, I think 'notifying the Commission _of waivers in the future is obviously:,::,a::~useful step to come out of this.

I want to chew on and digest what I have learned, a little more as to this particular briefing.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Very good or maybe you can have occasion to talk to Ed and

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 68 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

There is one -- the proposition that is troublesome is this one '.is the same that you came acrosp in the connectors

• and in. fire protection which is the question of continued operation at the point at which the license conditions, whatever the. r'elevance of it were are not being met, and it does seem to me worth thinking about whether Commission can't articulate a usef1+l set of guidelines or standards to be used as to the circumstances under which such operations make sense, because we certainly are making these codes do double duty.

On the,one:. hand we say that they applied largely to conservatism in the event of an ac6ident, and on the other hand we also said that they apply to basis for coniinu~d operation because in the event of mis6alculation is shown.

And I'm not sure that in all cases they conserve both purposes.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would think that some more explicit guidance in the general way on the part of the Commission, but more detailed on the part of the senior staff and it would be very helpful to the working staff.

I mean, I would think that they find these situation troubling, because it leaves things very much up in the air.

It is not clear what the standards are.

MR. CASE:

Well if you.are looking for a process where you don't apply judgment, that's what they are here for COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: No, no.

We don't have to jump

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69 to the other extreme and say that you have to have absolutely quantative standards ~t every step of the way, but I think

.it is useful to formalize these standards to the extent we can.

That's is the point of the design criterii, that's the

• • s,

• point of rules, that's.the point of safety guid~s and so*on.

6 And perhaps doing. it'*by*example or indicating instances ---

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

It needs_ to be something that you can bring to bear at that early point in time wh~n the staff making the technical judgment the operations can.safely continue so that you don't bave to wait, ~n this case, 18 months or whatever until you have reached a technical posture that consistent with the legal judgment that you*.have to meet the issue:'of* a waiver.

There should be some basis for saying when the'problem is first discovered that and operation can continue, because in a real way to meet it, the difficulty here i~ not with the waiver that you issued in February, because of the fact there was no judgment made or no basis for issuing a waiver like that back at the point when you first realized there was a problem.

MR. CASE:

There was no documented basis.

MR. KELLEY:

Because it wasn*t*explicitly blear that they had violated a rule.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I don't think that's right.

COMMISSIONER BRAIDFORD:

Who are you going to allocate the uhcettainty to, Jim, is the problem. If the

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io 11 12 13 14 15 16, 17 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 24 25 70 burden suddenly becomes some. way on>.the staff or on the.

public to show tha-t:,,once the basis for licemd,ng is* shown

~o ~e inadequ~te eyery:thing j.s.**still safe a~d I thi.nk that

. wiil.be the policy that we want to think. very carefully *about.

• yes, it.is* true tha,t it wasn '\\.* absolutely clear that a safety threat existed,..on the oth.e:r- ~ap.d,.i.t,was*

also 'at least uncert.ain. as to whether the.. license criteria was still being done.

MR. CASE:* You have got to. hc!,ve more.than that.

I have to satipfy more of a burdenthat that to shut a plant down, :t think.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But.you ought to.have to,

.I think, certify something to permit it to continue0operation.

It is that grey area between shutdown and relaxation that we ari talking a~out.

If it were clear that you ought to shut it down, then you would do that.

MR. KELLEY:

It is a conserva.tive step from a regulatory standpoint it is debatabi.e whether this requires: _,an exemption or not.

The conservative way is. to conclude, okay, we will grant an exemption and that puts the*pressure on to redue something by a time certain.

And they didn't get to a conservative position until after they got this additional information as I read it.

So I can understand the sequence under which when it first comes you scratch your head and you make a safety judgment arid you think:::iabout an order to show

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 71 cause, _but you don't.go around talking about exemptions.

And then later on when you.know more, you* say yes,.it really

• does violate the. regulation*s. and we sho"uld treat it as an exemption even though it is debatable and that elevates the

. seriousn.ess* of: the whole th,ing.

And I thought thati'.:s, basically what you were saying.

COMMIS,SIONER BRADFORD:

But that gets you through a week and a h~lf or a month and a h~lf, I'm ~ot sure it will

• get you thr~mgh a year and a ha.lf.

a hal.f.

MR. KELLEY:

Some of these studies take a year and MR. CASE: Yes, it does.

MR. KELLEY*:*

I don't know. I raised the ;p~int.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

.The 'reason why T say. _.I.

don' ti.think that.' s right is that had the reactors not met the requirements* or what were the conditions asked of them at the time they would have become requirements.

In.other words, the technical staff felt sufficientiy strongly about, these matters and that if they.didn't get Voluntary coope_rat-ion they would have required it, that the reactors operate in a certain way.

Now,*once you get tq that point it seems to me you have to act on your judgment.

MR. KELLEY:

Well, I don't disagree with that at all.

I still think, though,that there may be a difference in the amount of knowledge you have got that would lead you to

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• 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 72 not cause an exemption and take another r.ound which leads tci'the same results.

If they weren't satisfied, then the thing was safe when this first came up.two years ago.

They might have gon~ for a license condition if.the licensee didn't say, voluntar:i.:ly, Okay, I'll do it, which is what happ~ned here.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Further discussion?

I think we may possible have run down, we certainly hit 5:00 o'clock.

Tha,.!"1;]{ you all.very m\\;.ch for coming.

(Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 5:00 p.m.)

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