ML22230A096
| ML22230A096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/09/1979 |
| From: | NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Tran-M790809 | |
| Download: ML22230A096 (76) | |
Text
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I RETURN TO SECRETARIAT RECORD~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MMI SSlO N IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING MEETING WITH FEDEPAL, STATE & LOCAL OFFICIALS ON NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES
?! o ce -
Washington, D. C.
D o te -
Thursday, 9 August 1979
?oges l -
73 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, I::--rC.
Official Reporters
-!44 North Capitol Srief=lr Wc:,ht r.gton, D.C.1000 1 NATlONWIDi: COVH'-6..GE, CAH.Y ieieohone:
(202 ) 347-3700
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DISCLAH1ER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory.Commission held on Thursday, 9 August 1979 in the Cornmissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argu..~ent contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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9 10 UNITED STATES OF A~~RICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PUBLIC MEETING MEETING WITH FEDERAL, STATE & LOCAL OFFICIALS ON NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES Room 1130 1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Thursday, 9 August 1979 11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m.
12 BEFORE:
13 DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman 14 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 15 RICHARDT. KENNEDY, Commissioner 16 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 17 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 18 ALSO PRESENT:
2 19 Messrs. Bickwit, Gossick, Jaske, Tucker, *and Cunningham.
20 FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCALS OFFICIALS PRESENT:
21 Lupe Aguirre; Hon. Polly Baca-Barragan; Gino Carlucci; 22 Wilma Espinoza; Anette Kearney; Mario G. Obledo; Eduardo Pena; 23 and Jim Seely*.
24 Ace era I Reporters, Inc.
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P R O C E E D I N G S CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Come to brder.
The Commission meets this morning with a group of federal, state and local officials to talk about nuclear power i5sues.
This meeting follows from correspondence we have had with representatives of the group.
Mr. Obl edo of California is,the spokesman for the group.
Why don/t I ask you to, for the record, introduce the people in your party, Mr. Oble.do, and go ahead I
and frame the discussion for us, if you please?
MR. OBLEDO:
Certainly.
Good morning.
To my left is Lupe Aguirre, who is the state chairperson for the League of United Latin American Citizens; Wil'ma Espinoza who is the national president of the Mexican American.Women National Association.
To my right is Senator Polly Baca-Barragan from the State of Colorado.
Ms. Anette Carney, representing the National Council of Negro Women.
We have Mr. Seely representative of Tom Bradley of Los Angeles.
Mr. Carlucci representing the Mayor of New Orleans, Ernest Morial and finally? Mr. Pena, immediate past president of the League of United Latin American Citizens.
I first off wish to express my appreciation of the accommodation by the Commission to meet with us.
I am the Secretary of Health and Welfare for the State of California, with jurisdiction over health and safety matters of the citizens of that state.
I am also a past president and
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general counsel of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, which is a national group representing the Spanish people and others similarly.situated in matters of legal and constitutional rights.
The issue of nuclear power is one that touches the lives of the citizens of this country and we felt that it touched the lives of the people in our major cities.
The major cities of this country are becoming minority dominated and wiJl be in the next few years.
Virtually every major city in this country will be dominated by the brown and the black communities.
Quite a few already are in that posture.
Nuclear energy touches on the cities of these citizens, the poor, the disadvantaged, the minorities.
And as representatives of the minority community, we felt it important, since it appeared to some of us that during the discussions involving this issue, few if any minority faces were ever seen.
It was important to us as community representatives to learn about this issue, to focus on, and perhaps to make some determinations about this source of energy, its feasibility, its safety, whatever, and alternate sources of energy, if that be the case.
That is our purpose here today.
We don't want to indict anyone.
We are not here to put blame of anything on anyone.
We are not here to use this as a forum for any kind of rhetoric.
We are here to be
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informed.
And just to gather that kind of information.
I don't believe that any one here representin9 the community is an expert in this field.
We are all new to this very complex and sophisticated issue.
There has bEen a wealth of information, if you will, published in the last three or four months.
I have done quite a bit of reading, not only of reports but of new articles, as I am sure that other members of our group have done.
We get all kinds of opinions on safety, on the feasibility, on the economics of this issue.
Books have even been written now on the whole situation.
There doesn*'t seem to be any definitive answers to some of these problems or questions that have been raised.
And what we would like to have this morning is, if at all possible~ an informal informative discussion about these particular issues.
Now, I touched base with 20 leading members of the minority community that were on the correspondence that was
~irst sent to you.
I expressed my own concern about some of these matters to the various mayors of Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Oakland, Detroit, the State of New York, and from coast to coast, from north to south, all areas of this country.
All were deeply concerned about it*
All said they wanted to learn of our discussion here today and to get a report from us as to what information we have gathered, et cetera.
We will be getting back to them on this matter.
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All of us are very, very busy people.
I have jurisdiction over 53,000 employees and I manage a budget of
$15 billion.
All of the person here have extremely vital responsibilities, as you have.
So I think that we ought to utilize our time.
I know we were set for an hour and a half.
Perhaps we need not take that long, and we can proceed.
Initially I had written a letter to the chairman questioning a meeting calling attention to the fact that this nuclear issue impacted on minorities and poor of America that reside in our cities, and the following questions were raised.
How safe are nuclear power plants?
To what extent are the nation's cities dependent on nuclear power?
In the event that nuclear power industry fails to mEet its safety obligation to the public and is forced to shut down, what is being done to assure alternative energy sources for the urban populations?
Then we wondered about the impact, economic or otherwise, that any deficiency in alternative sources would have on the people of our major cities.
The urban risk.
Now, since my correspondence in May to the Commission, quite a few articles have been written about the risk factors, about the economic impact of nuclear power, about all these Lssues.
But perhaps it is a good thing that we meet with the body that regulates this and get, firsthand, the
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answers to some of the questions that have been raised.
I received a response from the executive director of the Office of State Programs, indicating that perhaps the Cammi ssion was not in the pc:isi tion to answer the question on economics or the question of the developmen~ of alternative sources of energy, but perhaps you could address the risk factors, the safety factors to the extent the nation depends on nuclear energy.
I am going to defer at this time to any member of our group to have them articulate any parti~ular concerns or overviews they might have on the issue.
Why don't we start here?
Do you have anything?
MS. ESPINOZA:
I still don't understand what role you have defined for yourselves as a Commission.
MR. OBLEDO:
Why don't we defer to that question?
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could you expand a little bit and say what role?
MS. ESPINOZA:
I was concerned because of the response we received that you could only deal with three of the questions and that three of the others you were not prepared to respond to.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
I might commeht that I represent an area in Colorado, north of Denver, that has within its boundaries, Rocky Flats.
And also just farther north, about say 20 miles north, is Fort St. Vrain power
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plant.
Of course~ one of the pro bl ems we have, I am sure you are well aware of the -- not -- accident, but at Fort St. Vrain about a year ago there was some leakage in the air, the atmosphere.
That presented quite a problem to the citizens of our state and, of course, the state legislature.
One of the things we are constantly dealing with is safety versus jobs, you know, and h6w do you balance the two.
I have got constituents that work. at Rocky Flats that I am concerned about in terms of their employment.
And recognizing that the closing of that facility would'be of great economic consequences *to my particular consti tuents 7 at the same time I have got other constituents who have been demonstrating for quite some time about Rocky Flats, because of their concern that it is not safe.
There are health hazards.
There is real concern in the area with regard to health hazards to the citizens that live in the area.
The water situation at Broomfield, not far from Rocky flats, has often been a point of concern, that it might have been contaminated.
So I think as an elected official we have responsibilities that are somewhat similar to yours in the sense that we need to deal with how you protect citizens as
. well as provide for the development of this' type of energy, if necessary.
I guess I just have a lot of.questions along
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1v1S. KEARNEY: Yes, I represent --
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If you will pull the microphone up close, we can hear fine, but for the people in the back, i f you w o u l d pu 11 i t u p cl o s e
- COMMISSIONER KENNEDY g It would be best if you could attach it somewhow.
-Ms._ KEARNEY: Let me hold it.
Mr. Chairman, and Commissioners, I represent Dorothy Height, national president, National Council of Negro Women.
We are a major women's organization? representing a linkage to four million black women in this country, minority women, also.
We are very much concerned about the issue of nuclear energy.
We have to respond to our constituents out there in the cities and suburbs and rural -~~eas, and we get an increasing amount of questions today requesting some answers.
We just don't seem to have the answers and I don't know if you do either.
But we have to respond to them intelligently.
Now, coming November ll? that entire week we will convention here in Washington, D.C.
Approximately 4000 to 5000 women will come in for that event. One of the issues on the calendar will be nuclear energy.
We need to respond to them intelligently with your assistance.
They seem to be asking us how safe is nuclear energy, as the Senator has stated to
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 9a you in the telegram.
Also, we are very much concerned about waste disposal because many of our women not only live in cities but in the rural areas, also in the suburbs.
We must never forget that, even though we are concerned a*bout people in the cities.
Surrounding those cities we have the suburbs and the outlying areas --
we have the rural areas.
So that we are all connected together.
We are not removed in terms of land space and area.
Those are our concerns at this point.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 MR. SEELY~
Speaking on behalf of Mayor Bradley of Los Angeles, a city of approximately 3 million people, which also, incidentally, owns the largest municipal power company in the United States 9 his concern is that the uncertainty surrounding nuclear energy has created problems for him as an administrator, both of the city and somebody who oversees the municipal power company which has responsibility of either participating in nuclear power plants or coal-fired power plants.
The controversy has in the past caused the kind of projections by the power company of not being able to supply the kind of energy that will be nEeded by the city.
So, we are really caught betwEen a rock and a hard place in terms of how you project future demand, project future supply, and how we reach those goals.
To reiterate, the uncertainties that exist here make it difficult for him personally to resolve and be responsible to the constituents as consumers and as human beings who want the answers before they embark on either large expenditures or health risks.
MR. CARLUCCig The city of New Orleans has thr.ee concerns concerning power plants.
First of all, I would like to become more familiar with the regulations concerning the exclusion area around the plant.
The plant that is being constructed near the city
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. l l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 of New Orleans has an exclusion zone that includes the Mississippi River.
If you were to close o£f the river for any length of time, it could be devastating to our port, the third largest port in the world and our major source of employment.
A second concern is the present regulations that require an evaluation plan, I believe that is true, for a JO-mile radius around the plant and control of food chain for 50 miles, a 50-mile radius.
A 50-mile radius of the
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As you probably know, Louisiana consists mostly of wetlands in the southern part of the state.
The food chain th~t begins in the wetlands ends out in the gulf.
So, it would be extre~ely difficult not only to control that fDod chain, but if it were controlled, it would damage severely our seafood industry and fishing industry.
The third area I would just like to comment on, Brookhaven, a Brookhaven study from 1957 and a Union of Concerned Scientists; report more recently in the J70s indicates a possible danger area in the event of a meltdown greater than the JO-mile radius that present regulations call for an evacuation plan for.
I would just like your comment as to the validity of these earlier studies.
And what impact they might have on changing the regulations.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 12 MR. OBLEDOi Mr. Carlucci informed me last night that New Orlenas is at least 50 percent black.
It never had --- I never thought of New Orleans as a minority dominated city.
That is one of the cities represented on our list.
If you scan the list, you will see cities with great, great brown and black populations, Hispanic populations.
Ed.
MR. PENA:
I don~t guess any of you knew at the time you were appointed how fast your agency would become a focus of great interest on the part of all Americans in this country.
Energy, all of a sudden 9 has become a major concern for all of us.
The shortage of energy affects all of us.
But particularly us, the poor people who live in large cities.
The price of gasoline has gone way out of proportion to what it used to be, and it hurts the poor people more than anybody.
The price of heat and the great inflation that the shortage of energy has caused has raised prices to a point that the poor are the most adversely affected.
I think it all comes back down to the problem of the shortage of energy.
But most important, the shortage of
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 i6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 13 energy in the future, I think, will limit our growth in jobs.
That is what it means to us.
Jobs for our community.
The Hispanic community is the youngest community in this country, and it is growing fast.
And we will need the jobs that need to be created every year in order to maintain an employment ratio that is reasonable.
And so the shortage -- what I want to say is, we want to believe that there is an answer to the shortage of energy in this country and that there is an answer that can be utilized quickly, not until all the technology is developed.
So we need some quick interim kinds of remedies for our present problem of shortage of energy.
I guess what my real concern is is truth.
We really nBed some truthful answers to the questions being raised by the people who are concerned about the environment.
We are concerned about energy and jobs and lowering the inflation ratio, but we are also concerned about creating a wasteland in this country through the possible injudicious use of nuclear energy.
And so our real concern has bBen that when people talk about the problems of energy, they talk in great extremes.
It is either the worse thing that could happen to this country, or people on the other side say it is the best thing that could happen to this country.
There is very
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- 14 little in between.
Maybe that is the way the issue is.
I don't knowo My great concern when we talk to people and read articles, they always point out where people testifying either on behalf of nuclear energy or against nuclear energy always leave something out of their statements.
And there is always some areas where they find that we haven't been entirely truthful.
You people_have been appointed by the President and ratified by the Senate to be the experts in this field.
I think you have to be way out front te.lling us the real true story of how energy affects us and how it will affect us.
How nuclear energy will affect us.
And how we are going to live with it or if we are not.
I think we need answers fast.
We can't wait until solar energy is built.
MR. OBLEDCH So, from this overview, you gather our concern.
And I think that as representatives, as citizens of the country, but particularly as representatives of two of the major minority groups in this country that are going to be severely impacted by any decisions made by this Commission, we have a responsibility to report to our respective communities about this issue.
Now, the Chair or members of the Cammi ssion may wish to ask myself or any member of our group specific
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i5 questions before we get into the general format, or you may wish to make some statement on your own.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEg Why don't I start out by trying to touch some of the questions that you have raised in your telegram and that others have suggested here.
And I would think my colleagues would want to make comments of their own, sort of subject by subject as we go down the line.
Let me start out with a sort of preliminary comment raised by a question from that end along the lines of what is the Commission-'s role.
It may be helpful to you to understand to some extent the scope of responsibility that this Commission has under the Atomic Energy Act and other acts that we are responsive to.
Our principal mandate he re is to regulate commercial nuclear technology, not just the power, nuclear power technology, but all commercial nuclear activities, including 9 for instance, the medical uses of radiosotopes =
in health diagnosis, industrial uses, radiographers that take X-rays of welds in oil pipelines and all kinds of things like that.
The basis of our regulation under the Atomic Energy Act is primarily a health and safety basis as contrasted to an economic one.
We do not regulate on the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16 basis of economics.
We do not set rates, we don't directly influence the cost, although clearly as we require safety provisions, that raises the cost of a nuclear power plant, there is a cost element that way.
But we don't do rate regulations.
We do regulate on a health and safety basis.
There are some other aspects in the Atomic Energy Act.
Our licensing of commercial nuclear activities has to be judged by us not to be adverse to the national defense and security.
We have to give weight to environmental values on decisions we make in licensing.
This is a requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act.
And, finally, there are some antitrust provisions in the Atomic Energy Act that are sort of a specialized area and have to do with the proposition that since nuclear technology was developed by the public funds, in effect for a.11 of us in society, that the sponsors and writers of the Atomic Energy Act didn't want the technology used in a way that would con tribute to mono pol i sti c practices, and so on.
So there is an antitrust question.
But the central thrust of our regulation is health and safety, and just of commercial nuclear technology.
I don't believe there is a comparable regulatory body for any other energy form.
In fact, there are not really very comparable regulatory structures for much else except the co.mmercial aviation~ the civilian
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 aviation industry in this country, where the Federal Aeronautics. Administration has a very similar sort of health and safety and licensing for heal th and safety purposes mandate.
But in the energy field, while there are economic regulators, both to the federal and state level, I think nuclear is the only pl ace where, -*~c_er*t;i~iy, in the federal
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sphere, you have a* group who*are supposed to be expert in the technology and to be watching it from a health and safety standpoint.
How safe are nuclear power plants and related questions.
And can I tell you the truth~
MR. PENA:
It is hard to answer one without the othero CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
I certainly will, but I think "can I 11 is an even more interesting question.
What I.have to say about that is the following.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY g What is truth?
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.I 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What I can tell you is what I believe to be the case on the basis of my own experience and background in the area.
You will hear from other people, as yau have read in numerous articles, of very widespread abuse.
All the way from the proposition that this technology is the most diabolical evil ever visted on the face of the earth to the proposition th.at it will do everything, including cure the common cold 9 that needs to be done for mankind.
I suggest to you that neither of the extremes of opinion that you encounter have very much to do with reality.
It is neither a panacea for Bll of man~s problems 9 nor is it a particularly malevolent technology.
I point out to you that the concerns that people have about nuclear technology are related to exposure to radiation.
I point out to you that every life form on the planet evolved, was created 9 evolved 9 has existed 9 lives in a radiation field which is fairly substantial compared to levels that are emitted in normal operation from nuclear technology.
The hazard that we are concerned with in this field, radiation 9 at least has t~e familiar property that radiation has always been a part of the environment of living things.
What we are talking about is a little more or a little less in normal operation of nuclear facilities, or indeed, in accident situations, locally, lots more.
But at least it is something that has been around.
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10 11 12 13 14 1 5 16 17 ls 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 19 Radiation has been around since the beginning of time, as far as life on_this planet is concerned.
And that is not something that.I can say about an assortment of chemical products which have been introduced by man by virtue of our technologi~al advances within the last generation or two.
And whose effects, then, we are able to observe only through quite recent times.
So radiation may indeed be mysterious and awful to some people who have just heard about it in a way that doesn~t allow them to think about it very much.
It may seem very
.mysterious and terrible.
But of the assorted industrial materials, products of our civilization, radiation, of all,
\\ is the oldest form, if I may put it that way.
Now, how safe are nuclear power plants?
It is my view that 9 considering the sources from which we can get substantial amounts of electricity, that nuclear power does not present a larger risk than the other sources.
You will note that I have not said no risk.
Because in all of these methods of producing electricity, and the nuclear technology just produces electricity -- it doesnJt produce gasoline to go in your car~ or nuclear engines to run eVen a railroad train have not evolved, and in my view are UnlikelY to.*
w_e"., do have some nuclear boilers in ships, notably the Navy ships, but even for commercial vessels, nuclear plants haven~t -- there have been a couple of
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-22 23 24 25 20 trials, and ships have run all right, but it hasn1 t seemed really, on balance, to work out and be worth the complications of worrying about nuclear safety sspects and so on.
So we are really talking about nuclear technology in the engineering sense as an electricity producer.
We have to recognize<tlic::t~~-electr!city is, I don.,.t know, something of
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the order of maybe 20 percent of our gross energy --- 20, 25 percent of our grass energy need.
So this is just a piece of the whole energy p_ool.
The other bulk sources of electricity are generation in i
fossil fueded -- that is, coal, oil, natural gas -- fired plants, and generation from hydroelectric sources.
The fo_ssil sources all have the interesting property that they create carbon dioxide.
The carbon dioxide level of the atmosphere has been rising steadily.
We have been mapping it with some precision since I think, I don 1 t know, the mid-'20s.
It has gone up substantially.
I can-'t tell you wher,e it is go-1ng and wh.at it all means, except to point out that my friends the climatologists say that there is st least a possibility in that increase of CO2 that by about the end of the century we will have precipitated a temperature change for the earth which cycle will last some decades, more likely hundreds of years, with µnknowable effects in terms of changes in crop product ion --wor-1awide_.
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And whether the net balance in terms of a world food supply might be of benefit to us or an ULter catastrophe is very much, I think, in the balance.
- All I can say on._this subject ~s that there are some very unpleasant possibilities out along that line +/-ram the production of carbon dioxide.
And if we want to talk about very remote --- that is, of the order of one chance in 10,000, sorts of accidents at nuclear power plants -
I think it is fair to talk about one chance in 10,0D0 events in th.e other technologies.
And I would not put the possibility of difficulty of a substantial amount from carbon dioxide at,11-early as*--.
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low a numb.er as that.
MR. OBLEDO~
I was going to make ---
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. OBLEDO~
I follow what you are saying.
But I think we had wanted to focus on nuclear eng.ineering as such, and the risk of the op.eration of nuclear power plants.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Of course.
MR. OBLEDOg No question about the comment you make on radiation.
I be1 ie ve Dr. TeJl er in the Wa 1.1 Street Journal ad pointed out that specific area.
But if we get back to the risk, I take it that the risk *-- there is.a risk; am I correct
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE1 Absolutely.
MR. OBLEDO~
All right.
Now, what is the risk of a nuclear meltdown, for instance 9 of one o.f the. almost LOO plants in op.eration, or that are -- I say operationo You will have to forgive me, because I don1 t know how many are really operating.
Some may be shut down.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
About 68 at the moment.
MR. OBLEDO-~
Whate.ver.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. OBLEOo:
And, in case of a meltdown,.what would be the consequences to the surrounding population in terms either of death, destruction of property, property damage, knowing the capac.ity,. fo.r instance, of a nuclear plant?
And we could even get specific.
Any one nuclear plant, knowing the capacity 9 then a m.eltdown --- knowing the pop.ulation of the area, what might be the consequences?
The risk is there.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes o But you cannot answer the question how safe is nuclear power without also answering, compared to what?
MR. OBLEDO-:
We w.i 11 just --- I will get back to the specifics, Mr. Chairman.
You have a nuclear power plant, and I don"t know the terminology that.is used in the production of energy, and you have a meltdown, and you know that the nuclear power plant is close to Chicago, and you know the
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And it would seem to me, as a lay per son, that some projections could be made.
I saw some statistics that had been projected by some scientists or whatever.
But couldnJt a projection be made on the number of -- probable number of deaths, probable numbei of people that would be impacted by radiation 9 the economic/.~j:.he property lass?
Is that possible?
I am asking.
I am not even sur.e what I may b.e asking, if you will pardon me',-:-:*
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
I wanted to go on and turn to these aspects that you have raised.* But I want to point out that You can*'t *-- you do have to ask -- ask yourself and eventually answer the question, compared to what, when you consider a risk question. _ This is true whether it is for nuclear or anything else.
We do not live, are not able to live in a risk-free situation.
MR. OBLEDO:
I understand.
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S) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 S) 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let me turn to this that you have talked about with regard to accidents in plants.
There have been various estimates of both probabilities and consequences for large and small accidents.
The most extensive of these is work called the Reactor Safety Study which was completed in 1975.
We have reexamined this study again recently and concluded on the basis of the-. review made for us that, while it does represent a substantial gathering together of what is known, that our ability to calculate with precision in this area is not that g.ood.
And, ind.eed, that the probability estimates in that work and in comparable estimates simply have large error bands on them.
That is, they are not very precise.
By not very precise, I mean factors of 10.
That is, a given estimate may be factors of 10 or more higher, 10 or more lower 9 or even a factor of a hundred, perhaps, in some caseso The general thrust of those risk estimates studies, probability and consequence, comes out that major accidents that would lead to a melt~down might occur of the order of once in 20 9 000 plant years, something like that.
And there is a substantial error on that, as we have said.
In fact, what we have said is that representing that the imprecision in those estimates is so great, we don"t use those estimates for policy decision purposes.
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It's estimated that about one in a hundred of those cases would result in a near term fatality in the general public.
It seems to me that is about the ---
MS. ESPINOZAs Is that about one in a hundred?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEi Yes.
About one in a hundred melt-downs would lead to an off-site fatality in the near term.
That is, a radiation exposure large enough to cause someone to die within the first several wseks.
Anybody remember whether I have got the right order to that?
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
This is oJf-site?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. OBLEDOg The statistics I looked at last evening --- I think it was part of that report, and, Mr. Carlucci has that, two or three pages -
were quite alarming insofar as deaths from radiation, the economic loss, things of that sort.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKYg This is from the 1957 B r_oo k haven Re port ?
MR. CARLUCCii Union of Concerned Scientists Report.
MR. OBLEDOg That is where I was getting that kind --- Whe_ther. it's true 9 has any validity, I don-'t know.
6348 04 03
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Well, as one move_s to accidents 2
which are estimated at least to have lower and lower 3
probability levels, that is, the less and less likely 4
events, then you can come to -- then in principle, at least, 5
you can get the bulk of the fusion products out of the 6
reactor, and t.hais can lead to some substantial loss of life.
7 MRo OBLEDOg Yes.
See, what we have here is this 8
risk, even though it may be a minimal risk, and the fact 9
that such an occurrence could take place. You take your 10 statistics of one in 20,000.
What if that one were to occur 11 this month or next month?
And the loss of life that might 12 come about.
And so when I was speaking to some people, a 13 minority group, the observation was made, well, what good is 14 it to get nuclear energy, perhaps, at a more economic -- at 15 lower scales than other forms of energy to where poor people 16 might be able to afford the rates -- even though there is 17 some question about whether it's more expensive or less 18 expensive if it were to wipe out 9 you know, hundreds of 19 thousands of people, only one accident.
You~re saving money 20 but you're facing a loss of life.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE8 My own view is that the 22 hundreds of thousands numbers are simply n~l --
23 24 MR. OBLEDO~
Realistic?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
Well, not only not realistic 25 but simply couldn't be reached.
But there are others who
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A.11 I can tell you is what I think.
MR. OBLEDO~
From the fallout in later years?
People with thyroid cancers, et cetera?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MS. ESPINOZA:
But 20,000 is bound to happen within the century for sure.
We have 71 plants operational now.
There are 29 under construction and 30 on the drawing boards.
That sounds to me like the chances for an accident to happen are very, very great.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I can't tell you whether the one in 20,000 is really the number we should focus on.
All I can tell you is that that was, as I recall it, the
.result from the safety study.
But, there are about 200, as you say, either operating or in the pipeline,
.although whether all of those 9 in fact, will be finished being built is an open question.
But suppose for purposes of discussion there are 200.
Okay.
Then if the statistic is right, one would expect that, if we make no further safety improvements over the plants for which the study was done,which were a pair of plants that were recently started operation, in about 1972 or '3, that on the average, every hundred years there would be a melt-down accident, and, on the average, every hundred of those times, or every 10,000 years, if my recollection is correct, the melt-down would result in serious, more or less serious
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That is, radiation levels that would cause immediate fa tali ties.
Now, everyone will have to decide for himself whether or not? if these numbers are? in fact, reasonable and to be credited, whether or not that is an acceptable risk.
MS. ESPINOZA:
I want to ask you, is it true that this count:i:y is accepting waste from other countries.to be buried here?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Not I think in the sense in which you mean 9 at least thus far.
Because I think --
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why don,.t you go through, though, the research reactor and -- Because there is waste coming into this country.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEg I think what you have got in mind are the power reactors making electricity someplace else, and we're getting the waste from it.
For that the answer is clearly no.
However 9 there are a number of research reactors which were given to other countries by the United States over the years at various universities and research institutions abroad.
Those use a special enriched fuel which typically we export to them, and we take back, in many cases, the spent fuel from those in order to reprocess and recover the unburned enriched uranium.
So that there has been and there is, that is, it's an ongoing situation, spent fuel elements from some of those research reactors.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 29 I guess maybe most of them, because I think the arrangements typically included a reprocessing provision as best I can remember.
COMMISSIONEf~ AHEARNE:
But it is waste, it is coming to the country and after proces~ing that waste is being stored.
That is correct.
You have to recognize, though, that when the Chairman talks about an enriched fuel, another way of talking about that material is also usable for bombs.
That is one of the reasons for getting it back.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY&
Ind.eed, that is why the Non-proliferation Act suggested the option this country might_wish to pursue to cover fuel in order that, to discourage the reprocessing of this.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 l 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 30 MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
How is it being stored?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
At government installations, probably Savannah River, but possible, probably*some also in Idaho and the State of Washington, at major government --
COMMISSIONER AHEARNEg It would be a very small part of very similar waste from U.S. Government activities also being stored there.
The foreign part is a small portion.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let me kick( /off on some of the
',.I other questions.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDYi One point, a minor point perhaps, that ought to be cleared up.
Very early on, Senator, you commented on Rocky Flats.
It should be understood that this agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, does not have regulatory authority over Rocky Flats.
We do not have any responsibility or authority for that.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN2 I understand that.
You do have, you do regulate Fort St. Vrain.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes, indeed.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We license Fort St. Vrain.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~
And inspect it regularly.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You were asking some specific questions about exclusion areas and so on.
Let me see if I can give short answers to those and so on.
It is not uncommon for the exclusion area around a plant to include
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 31 something like a waterway, in the case you are referring to, the Mississippi, or --- if the plant is, say, on the shore of one of the Great Lakes 9 then the exclusion area will include an arc out into the lake.
The intent of the exclusion area is simply to have an area close in right around the nuclear unit itself in which the licensee can control access when that is necessary.
It does not mean that people have to be kept out of that area all the time.
And in fact, at numbers of plants there are recreational areas, public recreational areas within the exclusion area.
What does have to be true is that if anything happens, the licensee has to be able to get people out there in a hurry and has to be able to control the access then, which you can do on a waterway.
That is, there is no interference with the traffic up and down the Mississippi.
On the other hand 9 if there were an emergency, the licensee on one of these water site locations has to have facilities to signal, you know, both, fishermen or whatever, who may be right off-shore at the plant to please move on and get half a mile away or whatever the distance is.
So it is not, I would think, not a problem for traffic on the Mi ssi ssi ppi, recreational or commercial.
MS._ KEARNEY:
My concern was if there were an accident, how long would it be necessary to restrict traffic
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I can Dnly say in a general way.
My guess would be, at most, for a day or something like that.
That is, I guess it could be longer, but the c hara,cteri sti c of the characteristics of the large accidents that we have been concerned about, at least in the past, is that the leakage of radioactive material, the major part of it would probably occur over a relatively short time span.
Either a period of hours or a day or two or something like that.
That is, it wouldn't be months.
COMMI.SS I ONER GI LINSKY i As you say, you can't really be sure.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You can~t.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKYg We would do whatever is necessary to protect the public in that area.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And in the process 9 it would be under a continuing monitoring, so that as the situation changed, we would be aware of it and actions would be taken as appropriate, either to extend, retain the exclusion or relax it, depending upon the results of the actual monitoring.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD; In a major accident today that might be pretty optimistic.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, the sorts of cases that have tended to attract the attention are those in which
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 33 the e.ffects on people are the greatest, and the effec.ts on people are the greatest if it all happens very fast, before very many people have a chance to ~ove away, to get out of the area.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And the containment is breached to permit a major release.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
So that the stuff gets out, yes.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
The concern we had in our area, of course a little over a year ago, was when radioactive dust, a cloud of radioactivity, whatever it was, at the Fort St. Vrain escapedo I don't know quite the correct terminology, but it did escape.
We were very concerned about the wind, where it was going to blow that cloud and the effects it would have_ on people should it, you know, hit a populated area.
Denver, of course, is just 30 miles to the south 9 30 to 40 mile£ to the south of Fort St. Vrain.
I think that is an area that I would like some comment on.
Are you doing research, do you know how to deal with that kind of problem?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
In terms of*- we have a substantial research program on reactor safety which would have as a fundamental aim in a general way, you know, not letting the stuff get out.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 34 MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
It came as a great shock to us that it did get out.
That is the concern, if it does get out 9 what happens.
It got out of Fort St. Vrain before it was at full operating capacity.
I understand yesterday was the first day it went into full operating capacity.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEi I didn't know it was.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
A gentleman on the way.with me told me that on the way out here.
It hit full operating capacity yesterday.
The question, of course, that will go back down because of the continual checking, monitoring of the power plant.
But my question is that if a year and a half ago the cloud was able to escape, and the concern in Colorado, on the part of the Governor and the others, was how would that effect the rest of the population?
Of course 9 this dissipated eventuaJly.
That could conceivably happen again.
I guess what I am concerned about is how do you -- is there any? what is the effort being made to be able to dissipate that cloud or deal with it when it gets out?
CHAIRMAN HENDFHEg Once -- the form in which radioactive material might get out in the event of an accident, or in the case of a small accident, small accidental release of the kind you had at Fort St. Vrain, the stuff that is of interest, that you worry about, is a gas.
Is is simply atoms of radioactive atoms of xenon
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So those atoms just. move with the atmosphere*.just like they were molecules of oxygen or
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nitrogen and they go in the direction the wind is blowing.
So that is the direction of one's concern.
We can~t do much about it once they get out.
If there is a high enough concentration so that the radiation fields are a concern from a health.standpoint, then*you try to move people away from the path of the cloud, if you have time and it is practical to do so.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There is also some possible advanced precautions that can be taken, depending upon what the material is.
For example MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
Pardon me?
COMMISSION ER AHEARNE:
De pending upon what is released.
If it is radioactive iodine being released, there is a blocking agent, potassium iodine I believe it is, that the FDA and we are looking at the possibility of recommending it being stored in certain areas.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
Would that help dissipate the cloud?
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It does not help dissipate the cloud, but what it does is help prevent some of the bad effects if you happen to breathe the stuff.
MS. BACA-BARRAGANg So it would be mixed in?
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36 COMMISSIONER KENNEDYg Just take a pill or MR. PENAg After you burn, you get a pill.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No, you don't burn.
You are inhaling the gas.
MR. PENA~
What happens to You when you inhale?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It conceivably could result in latent cancer development.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If you inhale enough.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Thyroid cancer, and if in fact, the substance functions as it is presumed to, the blocking agent, presumably that would substantially, if not totally, eliminate the likelihood bf development of cancer resulting from that inhalation.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNEg But you have to inhale a lot of it.
COMMISS !ONER KENNEDY:
That is right.
It is not as though you took one quick breath and were immediately doomed to develop thyroid cancer.
That just would not be the case.
It would be a rather substantial amount that would have to be inhaled.
MR. PENA~
How about storing gas masks instead of pills?
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, the best thing if you are threatened with exposure to radioactive cloud like
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 37 that is to get people out of the way.
That is the purpose of emergency plans and preparations which we are now taking a far greater interest in than we did before the Three Mile Island accident.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
Is there no effort being made in terms of research to possibly find a neutralizing agent or some means of dealing with a cloud to neutralize it or dissipate it or do something?
anyway.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It dissipates anyway.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEg No, because it dissipates MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
With time.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~
And distance.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And air turbulence as it moves downwind.
MR. OBLEDO:i Talking about the plans, the GAO report which I also scanned through last night, but haven.'t
- rea.lly read, seemed to be quite critical of the Commission, particularly in the area of the response from the Cammi ssion back to GAOi there was an admission of some failures.
There were also some statements that the Commission felt the GAO report was quite misleading in several areas.
And that if I recall incorrectly, Mr. Carlucci has a copy of the report, that the Commission +/-elt in most circumstances, in most circumstances, there were adequate plans.
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 38 I focused on the word "adequate" because I didn,,t know exactly what was meant by that.
Adequate is a minimal requirement being met?
COMMISSIONER AHEARNEg I think the quick answer would be that there are many people including us who are doing a lot of rethinking after Three Mile Island.
MR. OBLEDO g The Governor of California informed me of a review group that I believe is still ongoing that formulated some plans for emergency situations.
One of them I know includes one of the departments in the health and weliaire agency, department of health services, would be charged with distributing the pills, potassium iodide, in the case of emergency of some kind.
I would think the Commission probably has a copy of the Governor,,s COMMISSIONER AHEARNEg We do.
MR. OBLEDOg You do.
All right.
I am sorry.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don,,t think that letter represents the view of the Commissi6n.
MR. OB LEDO:
I knew it was signed by staff members which was surprising.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY~
That often is the case with GAO reports, given the timing.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
The staff always comments on the draft report.
Then the staff comments are included in the final issue of the GAO report.
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The Commissioners reply to the GAO report separately MR. OBLEDO~
my jurisdiction, one of the 500 programs, I al so responded as the Secretary.
Not a sta_ff person.
Because I want to make sure that --
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEg Mr. Obledo, the Commission has responded.
MR. OB LEDO:
Yes, sir.
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The re,sponse of the CommLssion is not in the GAO report.
The response of the Commission was some wee.ks close to two and a half months after the GAO re po.rt.
I would b.e glad to supply you with a copy of that.
It is rather different.
MR. OBLEOCH Okay.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The point the Chairman is making, the.way the GAO cycle works is that the Commission*'s response is after the report is issued *-- normal federal agency response.
I would like to re.iterate though,.my earlier point th*at the GAO report came out prior to Three Mile Island and many people are ret~inking --
MR. OBLEoo.:
This is not the form to address the proce..ss COMMISSI.ONER GILINSKY:
It should have reviewed it.
L think you are right.
MR. OBLEOO:
My response goes. in the report when that report is issued, because. that is the report that gets out to the public.
I was not aware of the subsequent reponse o f the Co mm i ss i o n
- CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You know, I can~t be responsible for the traditional practice of the General Accounting Clffice 9 you know.
There is a certain pattern of response.
The agency formal reponse comes 60 days afterwards.
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You might, even though you are a minor official in this whole bureaucracy, have an impact on how government works.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEi Let me assure you that my ability to influence the pattern of publication of GAO reports is nil.
Let me tall< about emergency planning, however, because we have been dealing with some procedural -- in effect --- some procedural matters on who spoke f.irst in the GAO report and What and.. when the Commission responded.
The essence of the matter.is that the Commission went forward pretty aggressively with very considerably enhanced emergency planning activities.
We are working with all the states including California on state-level plans.
We will be publishing sets of guidelines for improved state plans.
We want tn? are going to be working and are working with local authorities to improve the local civil defense planning around plants.
So the substance~ or whatever comment I have to make about emergency planning is we think it ought to be be+/-ter and we are moving pretty hard to try to make it better.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Let me add-there that of course, responsibility for emergency planning may rest with
. this agency, but responsibility. t:or emergency plans, that is, their execution, must inevitably rest with the state and local authorities.
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I was wondering if the Commission may have responded to its subsequent report by some Congressional committee, also I believe on the planning process.
I forget the name of the Congressperson who signed off on that report
- COMMISSIONER KENNEDY g Mr. Moffett.
MR. OBLEDCJg That is right.
If there was an official response to that we would be glad to have it as well.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
I don~t think we have received the official transmission.
In some fashion it has been publishsd in the newspapers 9 but we havenJt been allowed to have a copy.
one?
MR. OBLEDO:
V1e have*-- I think we might have ---
(Laughter.)
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEg Do you think you could slip us COMMISSIONER AHEARNE~
We are serious.
We have not received it.
published.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~
~fo have not received one.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I am not surs it is formally COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I have asked for iL I have not received it.
I have asked for it.
CO MM I S S I ONE R GI L I NSK Y :
I have s e en a draft copy
- CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I believe what~s happened is that various drafts of the Moffett subcommittee report have been
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So I read newspape_r stories about it.
But I don~t get either the drafts themselves, and certainly th.e final report so far as I know has-. not been approved by the Committee and published.
So I am sort of helpless.
If you hav.e got it, if you have got a copy I would be fascinated to see it.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY~
Let me say that some -- that from some of the newspaper accounts 9 I think the report deserves and will get, as soon as we get a copy, careful attention.
- CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
Senator, let me try to pick up or at least introduce a couple of the other questions on your telegram and some of the others that have been mentioned at the tablee What is +/-he urban risk?
My own view is that your urban risk.is fairly small.
For the most part the plants tend to be sited away from urban areas by deliberate policy *. And particularly for the most recsnt plants, there has been a stronger regulatory policy to keep them in less-populated areas.
I think the_re is a plant 9 what 9 maybe 20 miles --
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Zion.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
outside~ north of New York.
Zion, I am not quite sure how far it is from Chicago.
MR. OBLEDO:
People who li:ve -- you have detai.led
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDYg Yes, detailed information on the plant, out to a distance of over 50 miles.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The third-question? to what extent are the n~tj_Q11_'s:.cities dependent on nuclear power_?
In a general way, yet sort o+/- taking it on a national basis, you could sa y 9 we 11, the cities are dependent to the same extent that everybody else is.
On a national basis that is about, I guess in 1978 it was about 13 percent of the electrical energy supplied was nuclear generated
- Obviously, the sit.uation in any part.icular city will be specific to the generating patterns in that area.
For Chicago 9 I suspect that the nuclear gensration is quite high.
MR. OBLEDO:
50 percent is the figure I have read.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:. It may be.
Yes, 50 I would. think easilY.
Probably high in New York.
Elsewhere 9 perhaps lower than the national average.
MR. OBLEDO-~
I think it decreases as you move westward generally.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
I think that is true.
MR. OBLEDO:
IA/ithout really knowing, perhaps some plants were.first constructed in the East.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
East coast and California.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
There is probably some
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1 O JI 1 2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 45 relationship with other fuel sources, availability of other fuel sources in those areas, and relative cost comparisons that were made early on.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
There were some questions over here about tha -- that relate, I suspect 9 to the Commission.'.§ emergency planning zone documents and proposals.
The thrust of a joint NRC-EPA study on emergency planning ma~ters out a little further from the plant than we normally
. wo.rk, suggested that al though the chance of meltdown ace idents which would breach the containment and be a serious problem outside is not large 9 neverthelass 9.it is prudent to have some thought in mind as to what one would do 9 and recommended a JO-mile radius emergency action zone, and out beyond that 9 a 50-mile radius action zone for interruption of the food chain if that became necessary.
You were concerned about the food chain in the Gulf and so on.
What is of interest in the food chain 9 the main thing one has in mind is concentration of radio-iodine up the ve9etation-cow-milk can:~\\.o Iiumah~being ch~-~-
And if there were
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a lot of radio-iodine released in an accident, you might want to interrupt. the milk supply for a while until that iodine peak had passed and the levels were back down.
We checked the.iodine levels at Three Mile Island, for instance, pretty cBrefully to see that they were low, which they were.
634.8.06.07 46 MR. CARLUCCI:
But my question was relating to the 2
wetlands surrounding the plant in Louisiana and if the 3
radio-iodines that were to enter the food chain, that the 4
.e.cology of the wetlands is.j,._:Qj:_e;ii-eTat~dc:' with the Gulf.
5 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yes, but on time cycles, 6
., which are L think generally _longer than --
7 8
9 JO MR. CARLUCCii Right.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE~
Long enough so that *--
MR. CARLUCCig That is my question.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE g The iodine in particular **--
Jl that is obviously not the only thing that I would be concerned 12 about, but it.is one that one looks at? because there is a lot 13 of radiation in the core.
The iodine has about an 8 1/3-day 14 half-life or something like that.
On the time cycle for the 15 food chains that you are talking about to get out in the 16 Gulf why,. it just washes out, disappears*-- that is 1 it 17
.decays.
18 MR. PENA:
Isn.,,t there one element that sort of 19 builds up 9 one radioactive element that builds:*up, accumulates,
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20 say if the fish --
21 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There are several.
MR. PENA:
So if a fish with so much of that element 23 eats another with so much of that element, it winds up twice 24 the amount and just sort of ac£umulates in the body?
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
That is what I mean when I talk
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MR. PENAg What kind of effect would that have, say~
_in the New Orleans area, if you were to have a discharg.e of that e 1 ement?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That is what we just talked about.
MR. PENA:
You said iodine is a problem, but you didnJt say about anything else.
CHAIRMAN HENDRJEg I think iodine wouldnJt be a*
problem in the food chain out to the Gulf.
Iodine could be a problem if a bBtch of it got out, could be a problem in the milk chain.
You would want to check the milk.
MR. PENAi What would be a problem.in the food chain of the fish and oysters and stuff like that?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
One would want to check levels like cesium and strontium.
There are a number of elements that are of interest in these food chain questions.
MR. PENA:
Wouldn't those elements cause a severe problem in the ecology of the area?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I doubt it very much.
You have to have a whale of a lot of it out to make a problem.
Unlike the iOdine, strontium and cesium are not gases at ambient temperatures.
So although they can be carried along with a cloud in the form of atoms of that material on a dust particle, it is stLll a stage removed as a transport mechanism
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.I 1 12 1 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2-4 25 48 from having it be directly a gas itself.
And it would just go off down COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But your question is, if they get out, are they a problem?
The answer is c_ertain'ly*;
yes.
MR. PENA:
Are they less likely to get out than iodine?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. PENA1 Much lass likely?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDYi Yes.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
WeJl 9_ the iodine is a gas
- Along w_ith the xenon, it would come out first.
More easily.
Primarily the xenon came out in the Three Mile Island accident.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And finally you were asking is a 10-mile zone enough?
I guess some would say it was too much.
Others would say it wasn't enough.
What you are l_ooking at here are a set or pre.tty unlikely ace ident s 9 the core _melt accidents.
And there are a spectrum of these; that is, they can occur in various ways and have various consequences.
And attempts have been made to estimate, weil, what
_is the probability distribution?
How likely is.it that it could occur this way?
How likely is it that it would occur that way?
And a l ~mile zone is taken to accommodate a very
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.13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 49 large fraction of all those accidents.
That is, there is a residual tail which you might want to work out to 12 miles or 15 or whatever.
But those are such a small fraction of all core melt accidents that you would say for practical planning purpos.es --- it amounts to saying the following.
For practical planning purposes, it is neither necessary nor reasonable to plan against the worst'. possible thing that could occur in the whole world.
In that case, I
.think it is cons~stent with the kind of guidelines that one uses in making public decisions.
MR. CARLU_CCI:
My question related to the Union of Concerned S~ientists report that estimates the radi.ation can be fatal as far as 65 miles from the plant.
That -is what led to my question 9 since New Orleans is 25 to 30 miles from Waterford 3.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE~
Yes.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY&
We_ll 9 the 10-mile limit doesn't take into account the very worst cases.
MR. SEELYi What would be the mileage for the very
_worst case?
COMMISSIONER GILINSKYg I think it is hard to put an upper limit here.
But the idea is that 9 in fact, in the
.worst cases, the radioactivity is moving rather slowly, because it is in fairly stable conditions that you can get an amount of radioactivity moving out -- stable weather
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If the wind is, the more vigorous winds 9 the radioactivity gets out further faster, but it gets dispersed 9 also.
There is a lot of mixing.
The notion is that if you should have to move people beyond the I 0-mil e radius, you have some time to arrange for that.
V*Jhat you have to decide is where are you going* to draw th.e line between making fairly substantial preparations and regions where you wi.11 in a sense improvise.
That is where the group drew the line.
COMMISSIONER AHEARJ\\!Eg But I think you ought to rBalize that we are trying to rethink what *are the appropriate actions, what are the appropriate regulations.
We have asked for public comment on a proposed change in our rules and regulations on emergency planning and what those ought to be.
I would CBrtainly encourage all of you to provide comments on that.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Do you have the document soliciting public comment?
MR. OBLEDo.:
No, I do not.
But it would be a good
- - thing to distribut.e 9 that we could distribute.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, that would be very useful.
COMMLSSIONER AHEARNE:
Some of the quest ions that you are raising are the ones that we are trying to rethink.
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,l l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 51 MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
This is a result of Three Mile Island?
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE8 Yes.
COMMLSS I ONER GI LINSKY::
Of course these recommendations came before that.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, a lot of it, though, is seriously as a result of Three Mile.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
I had understood in the manner in which you were rethinking your position as a result of Three Mile Island COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
March 28.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We all remember.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
We remember it well.
MR. OBLEDO:
Three days later, the GAO report issued March 30 --
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
They worked very rapidly.
MR. OBLEDO:
Oh, is that right?
Well, that is --
the fastest any government agency ever worked.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I'm joking.
MR. OBLEDCH Sometimes problems come up and we react to them.
And, of course, things surface that some of us never really think about until the problem is presented, until there is an occurrence of this sort.
It's fortunate that no one was killed in a major accident and that we have the opportunity to really focus and make our plans to meet
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]6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 52 any kind of emergency, should nuclear power continue and nuclear plants continue to be built.
I don~t know if someone else from the group, or whether the Chairman wishes ---
MR. PENA:
I would like to hear from the other Commissioners as well.
MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:
I think we should finish analyzing the nuclear --- ~foll, your response?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We want to be sure before you leave that you do get a copy of the notice that has gone out.
MR. OBLEDCH Oh, yes.
I would like to get that and then the response to the GAO as well.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. OBLEDO:
Those two at least.
MS. KEARNEYg Senators,_as the Commissioners respond, I wish they would say a word about disposable nuclear waste.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I intend to.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Start at one end or the other.
Go a head, Peter.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me just touch on a few of the points that you have raised, in no particular order.
As to the question of how safe nuclear power is, as already indicated, there is no definite numerical answer to that
__ _J
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 53 question.
I find myself sometimes thinking about it sort of as though one lived 500 years ago and asked how big the solar system was.
It would be similar.
It's clearly big.
By most societal standards, nuclear power in terms of its accident rate is pretty safe.
But, as far as measuring relative to other things, we just don't,-have yet the data base and ability to come down with a numerical answer that means very much.
I would caution you not to take the one in 20,000 number or other numbers involving probabilities away from here as a basis for your own thinking.
We explicitly don't do that because the uncertainties associated with those numbers are just too big for policymaking purpose.
A reiterated question to that is the question of what is acceptable.
We regulate in large part on a acceptable risk standard.
And not only is it not possible to state the risk itself with precision, it's also not possible to state what society considers to be an acceptable risk with any great precision.
In reports, of course, people use standards like beyond a reasonable doubt for some types of verdicts. One could develop, I suppose, comparative standards as to other risks people accept in their daily lives.
But, the definition of acceptable risk is really an ongoing one and is part of a political process that involves the state5, localities, the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 54 Congress and us.
And I donJt know that -- I'm quite confident that if you went around the table, you would get a number of different.definitions of what is acceptable.
And to the extent that you can articulate it for yourselves in your communities through the Congress, that is a project well worth doing because it's an area in which, as to nuclear power, there is, I don't think, a working
.definition.
We talked a little bit about areas in which reassessing, I think, the emergency response planning, also site selection, waste management all come to mind.
I find myself looking at the Three Mile Island accident not as a single event that has forced a reassessment but as far and away the most dramatic moving force in the reassessment process that, in fact, has been going on for three or four or five years on a large scale.
Proliferation.risks are being reassessed in the international fuel cycle evaluation.
Low level radiation risks have been under debate for some time, and the federal government is now reorganizing the way in which it intends to deal with them.
Costs are being reassessed before public utility commissions left and right in many different guises around the country and have been since before Three Mile Island.
The waste question as well has gone through the
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9 10 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 interagency review group exercise and are now at the beginning of setting up a regulation and licensing process for high level waste.
A lot of the Old World assumptions are at least under question.
The Kennedy Commission and Three Mile Island suituation are the most dramatic example of the reassessment, but they aren't unique.
One issue I know I have some differences with my colleague on.
As state and local representatives, at least some of you 7 I have felt, as a former state o.fficial myself, that the section of the Atomic Energy Act which says that state and local authorities should have no voice in the setting up of radiological health and safety standards in their own communities, that is 9 you can't regulate what a nuclear power plant will emit, is a mistake on a couple of levels.
One, we don't deal with other po.llutants from stationary sources that way.
As to air and water pollution and most other sources, the state is allowed to go beyond the federally set minimum standards if it feels that that is necessary.
I think that that regulatory regime ought to apply to radiological emissions as well, and I am urging you to think about it.
The second adverse consequence of that is that it means that states and localities having been excluded from many of
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- a_ I_!§llda tory_ rs>le _in those decisions, setting the standards are only really.
brought into the action when something goes seriously wrong.
They may be less prepared.
I know, in main, even as a public utilities commissioner, I paid much less attention than I would have to _*'the status of Maine's emergency response plan simply because all the steps leading up to it were not in the s:'tate's hands.
La st point.
One of you mentioned Edward Teller-' s advertisement in the Wall Street Journal.
On a quick reading of that, I notice several things that seem to me to be significant overstatements.
There is no real reason to touch on them, but I wouldn't take the ad as a policymaking guide. i would, 'to--lielp:put:..it:J..{i
- perspective, note for you that the company that sponsored it, Dressler Industries, is sponsoring the claim that Edward Teller was the only casualty of the Three Mile Island accident neglected to mention that they manufactured the relief val;ve that malfunctioned du.ring the Three Mile Island accident.
MR. OBLEDO:
I might mention that I had a meeting with Dr. Edward Teller when he was in the hospital, Cedar Sinai in Los Angeles.
He related to me then that he had been the only casualty.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I wish him a speedy
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 57 recovery, but I think we will be in very serious trouble if we ever come up with the conclusion that he was the only casualty&
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't really have much to :~.1.dd fo what's been said.
It might be worth saying a word about the different nature of the safety problem we're up against here as compared to something like automobile safety where we know that whatever it is, 40,000 or 50,000 people get killed every year.
We wouldn't expect that number to change dramatically from one year to another.
We have pretty good statistics, and people can decide whether or not they're comfortable with that.
Here we're concerned about small chances of rather large happenings.
We don't have the data.
Our best estimates on the chances of these occurrences are just our own experience up to now.
But it really 'isn't sufficient to give you a firm handle on an estimate.
So you're thrown to your own intell,ectual _resources in trying to calculate the answer.
Various people attempt to cal cu late this in di.ff erent ways.
And you try to do it the best you can.
But it s a necessarily imprecise process.
We have discovered that calculations that many person have relied on now look to be a good dea1 1jess reliable than
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were thought.
The Commission concluded that they were considered too unreliable for use as a guide to
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9 JO l l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 58 decisionmaking.
So in this situation, it's very important that since we're dealing with pretty complex, technical questions, that there been a body of experts as there are here, and that they act independently.
That is why it's so important that this agency be independent of those agencies that are concerned with producing_power, so these calculations and judgments aren't affected by other concerns.
And, it's also important that the process be open, accessible, so that others can check the answers to see what we're doing and comment on that.
NiR. OBLEDO:
That is precisely why we're here.
With all conflicting reports about all of these things.
COMMISSION ER GI LINSKY:
Right.
MR. OBLEDO:
We thought we would meet with the persons the regulate.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Right, so you get an idea of how it's done and also so you can have your other experts take a lnok at what professionals in this agency are up to.
And if they have comments to make on the process or find arrors or better ways to do things, certainly, that is certainly help we can use.
Ultimately, you have to make some judgment on how much safety you're going to _require because there really isn't any limit to how much safety you can pile on.
Ultimately, there is a judgment on what is
6348 07 09 4l1p 2
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 59 reasonable, how much is enough.
There are a lot of factors that enter into that judgment.
There isn't any rule.
There is nothing laid down in the law except that the law requires that there be adequate protection for the public health and safety.
Historically, a certain standard has developed on the basis of that language. Put into -- a little more specific in our regulations.
But ultimately, it is a kind of historical process, a cumulation of requirements that this agency has imposed over the years.
And a~situation or accident at Three Mile Island causes one to rethink and go back to the drawing board and say where did things go wrong, we have to recalculate.
We may have to come to some new conclusions.
I think it-'s a lcind of iterative process.
There probably is no other way to approach it if one is to get into it at all, but it is terribly important that it be approached in a highly professional and independent and sober way.
MR. SEELYs Somebody made the point this is part of a political process.
I would say it isn't just a scientific process.
We went through the LNG siting problem in California, whether or not in terms of jobs we would like it right at Long Beach, Los Angeles Harbor in terms of health and safety, which was uncertain.
You had a big event with a minimal risk which we had to deal with.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 60 An unfortunate coalition in the Harbor brought everybody's attention to the potential of that happening with minimal risk.
So we appreciate the process that you go through.
I n t ha t ca s e, our pol i ti c i an s were, our l ea de r s we re quick to comprehend the political proce.ss and the decision.'
was made.
We are concerned the commissioners who are outside the political process are also responsive to what politicians have -- and I think you are.
The fact you get out your statements, respond, you have listened to this group, all is reassuring.
We have b.een through that with
,ea~t!lqiia,R~~-~ *.. LNG siting 9 skyscrapers, and we know it.
We have structured a process in Los Angeles that responds.
MR. PENA~
I don't know why anybody wants.to live in California.
They have all the problems.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 61 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me add one more point.
Because you are going on the basis of calculations and one doesn't have enough experience to really get a firm estimate of what the risks are, it is terribly important that we make use of whatever data we have available.
And that we watch the process very closely, watch the operation of these plants Yery closely and make use of what we learn form the various occurrences there.
One of the things we have disco,*yered after the Three Mile Island accident is that we didn't watch carefully enough.
I n f a c t, there was at l e as t on e s i mi la r a cc i den t or incident at another plant 9 had one taken sufficient note of 9 would probably have avoided the Three Mile Island accident.
I think there is a great deal more awareness of the need for this clos~attention now.
And we are in fact starting up a new office to specifically pay attention to the safety data that comes from operating reactors.
MR. OBLEDCH One of the major points that Dr. Teller has made is the fact that the personnel operating the plants ought to be more highly trained.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That is one of a whole list of improvements that are being looked at and will in fact be effected.
MR. PENA:
But you raised a question that has been in my mind, too.
That is while you are learning from
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9 10 1 l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 62 problems that develop in these existing p1-ants, should there be a continuation of building of plants, you know, should you continue to build plants that you are going to be learning from down the line as well?
I don't know.
Should all the learning take place with the existing plants that exist, or should we be building more plants.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, at the moment, as you probably know, there is a pause in the granting of permits for constructing plants, and the granting of licensing fqr operating plants.
That certainly is one of the issues that -- we have got a variety of groups that are trying to review what are the major lessons learned from the Th~ee Mile Island accident and pulling together a lot of the suggestions and thoughts that have been around.
Some of those re.ports have al ready b_een pres anted and some wi 11 be presented in coming months.
One of the questions is the one you ju st asked.
MR. PENA~
You know, we came to get reassured.
I guess this is sort of a unique group.
I don't think you have ever had a group here that you have talked to that isn't committed to either being for or against nuclear energy.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY g It is refreshing.
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9 10 I l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 63 MR. PENA:
To a large extent, we are here to get information so that we can make up our own minds about it.
Maybe that is why the meeting so far has b"een rather low key.
We haven;t had any shouting or gesturing as I understand at other meetings.
But I still feel unfulfilled.
I don't know what the hell to tell people when I get out of this m.eeting, whether it is good or bad or what?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That ultimately is as it properly should be.
Something for you to think about and conclude.
Not for us to try to tell you or lead you to.
I hope it would be that we have not.
Let me just, if I might, add only a few comments to those that have been already made.
There is much talk about the question of acceptable risk in various contentions.
I would only urge that as you think about it, and indeed that you do so, but as you do, manifestly it is a very, very complex question.
And to go back to something that Dr. Hendrie said earlier, it is essentially as compared with what, because one can~t go about, I think, making a series of independent judgments of acceptability of risk.
If he did, it is conceivable he would come out with a zero risk society which does not exist.
Thus, something would have to give.
And there was a lot of talk many times as each of
6348 08 04 64 you was advancing concerns, about jobs and economics.
Those 2
are some of the factors that have to be thought about when 3
one is talking about what is an acceptable risk.
4 If nothing else is at stake, I guess you would 5
certainly say zero.
I don't want any.
But life isn~t that 6
way.
So, it is a very. very complex question.
7 I would think that in the process of looking at 8
the question, then, one would have to take into account what 9
the options, what the alternatives would be to determine 10 11 what level of what level is really acceptable.
As to the question of waste, I will just simply 12 make an assertion.
I would be glad to spend lots of time 13 and talk about it.
I don't think we have that time.
My 14 assertion is simply that I believe the waste problem to be 15 solvable and to be solvable now.
There are acceptable ways 16 to resolve it.
17 The only question in my judgment now is, which is 18 better, which is the best?
Not whether there are acceptable 1 9 ways.
There are, in my view.
I have gone out and l coked at 20 a number of them, and I am satisfied.
21 Based on the judgments of the technical experts 22 dealing with them, even more satisfied, having gone and 23 looked at the ways to doing this that those solutions 24 exist.
It is only a question of deciding.
25 Since there is time to make that decision, it is
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 65 worth taking that time to see which is the preferable course among acceptable ones.
As to the state and local authorities question, it is true that state and local authorities have been, I think the word is *"preempted 11 in the law.
Personally, I think that unfortunate.
On the other hand, I submit to you, as yo LI are thinking about that question and what rule states and localities ought to play in radiation protection questions and so on, one also has to think again, coming back to that business about economy, jobs and all the rest, one has to realize, remember, that jobs and the economy, which you know better than I, don't rest who.lly on local circumstances, but rather are. reflection in the long run of the totality of the economy and social structure.
And if all decisions can be made, each individual of all others, it is, I think, possible at least, at least worth thinking about, that you might wind up with a situation in which the sum of a series of correct decisions at individual levels becomes a very bad decision on a larger 9 _more national level.
So, those questions have to be thought about, it seems to me, as one approaches the question of how much au to*nomy, how much ~to@::
0authorfff ~Cc:¥.1-1ci,er :-ancf"iower~-:::iicia.Ilef-'
and smaller units be given in such questions.
6348 08 06 66 I would urge that if you have not done so? that 2
you meet with officials of the Department of Energy, because 3
inherent in this whole question is the one that you did 4
raise:
How does one see this technology as part of the 5
total energy picture?
6 It has bEen said, it seems to me rightly so, that 7
the energy problem in this country cannot be solved, 8
certainly in this generation, without the use of all the 9
forms that we now have, because possible substitutes are IO somewhere down the road.
One can argue about how far, but 11 there is no quest ion that it is some way down the road.
12 And we are talking about 13 or 15 percent of the 13 electrical generation now being produced by this technology 14 leading, reaching to perhaps something over 20 percent in 15 the relatively near future.
The question is what supplants 16 it if it isn't there?
17 I would also urge that if you -- that you not 18 consider this opportunity, this talk, which I found 19 particularly helpful and beneficial to me, the end of your 20 discussions with our agency.
I would suggest that it ought 21 to be considered only the beginning.
22 I think if you want to talk safety, you ought to 23 talk with the experts in safety in this agency, who are the 24 staff members who are working on it day by day doing the 25 calculations to which reference has been made.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 67 I think you ought to do that for two reasons.
First, you can pursue the issue as far in depth as you want With them.
Secondly, you can in the process get an appreciation of what you think about who they are and what you think of them, because, after all, in the last analysis, a lot of this just depends upon trust.
Do you trust the people who are doing the work?
If you do, then the answer to the safety question means one thing.
But if you don/t trust the people who are doing the work, the answer to the safety question means something else.
So, I would urge, and I know that the staff would be more than happy to sit down and arrange further discussions at any time on any subject.
I would urge that you do this.
And if we can help arrange that, we are here to do so.
Let me just say thank you very, very much for the opportunity to meet with you and to hear your thoughts.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If you could bear with a few more minutes.
MR. OB LEDO:
We want to hear from the swing vote on the Cammi ssion.
COMM! SSIONE!~ AHEARNE:
I see.
Then perhaps I shouldn/t say anything.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORDg Just keep swinging.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 68 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As you undoubtedly knew before you came and as you can see, we are a Commission?
which means many times we have five di+/-ferent view~.
Perhaps a committee MR. PENA:
Usually ten.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Perhaps a committee on which many of you people have served off and on, I am sure, or various committees, you know the difficulty of getting a uniform position.
So, I sympathize with you trying to come*
away with a crystal clear or a clear picture.
Let me just go through some of the -- my comments on some of the questions.
Many are just a reiteration of other points.
Insofar as how safe pl an ts are, in the.past, many people have either taken one of two parts of that.
One group has said, well, let us lnok at how likely an accident is.
And that group has tended to say, we.11, accidents are very unlikely to happen, and we will concentrate on that.
Another group has said, well, if an accident occurs, let's consider how bad it can be, the results can be.
They have tended to concentrate on how serious the results would be.
I think, actually? you have to look at both of them together.
Unfortunately, that ends up being very much a balancing judgment, as you mentioned, that you have gone
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I think as most people involved in the governmental process end up making balancing judgments, and it is not completely clear.
Again, that is one of the areas we are spending more time reviewing, looking at the two of, those in combination.
It is certainly true that cities end up having, just because of the large density of population and difficulty of moving that population rapidly, probably the highest risk if there is a major accident close to them.
As was mentioned, that was one of the reasons gradually the
_emphasis was to move plants farther out.
And I wouldn't be surprised over the next few months that we would be focusing in one of those reviews on tighter siting criteria and perhaps other additional actions to be at least addrassed to some of the plants that are close to these major urban centers.
You had mentioned early on, why couldn/t we answer some of the questions.
I think the point has been made several times that one of those was because of the role that we have versus the role of the Energy Department.
I wi 11' mention that that touches somewhat on a debate we began to have earlier this Y(ear here.
You may recall that the Commission took some action to shut down five plants because of earthquake
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 70 problems.
One of the questions we began to get into at that time is to what extent do we try to balance some of the economic impacts with respect to action taken solely in health and safety.
As the Chairman had pointed out, the law seems to be very clear, health and safety.
In my mind, I don/t go that far.
I think there are some other balancing points.
But certainly not to the extent I think was embedded in your question, the consideration of alternative energy forms, if you close down a nuclear plant? what alternative energy form is there available.
We haven/t gone anywhere near that far.
The emphasis upon alternative energy forms and what kind are available and how can they be utilized to meet urban needs is much more appropriate to John Deutch or people at the Energy Department.
The question of waste, I probably am not as optimistic as my colleague on the left.
I think that there are a number of problems that have to be solved.
I think the Federal Government in the last couple of years has gotten a lot of its effort together, much more than it has in the past.
I tend to believe that the so-called institutional problems are the largest ones.
Those are the ones that people in the states and localities are going to
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 71 have to have fundamental say-so, because just as there are a lot of debates on relative risks and how safe is a nuclear plant, there will be similarly many debates on the relative risks of various types of waste disposal and how safe is a disposal site.
A disposal site has an additional major problem the nuclear power plant doesn't have.
The nuclear power plant obviously is generating a lot of electricity that ties into clear benefits in the locale.
The waste disposal site doesn't at least have that strong advantage.
Finally, you mentioned you need some truthful answers.
I think, as far as I can tell across xhe spectrum, people who are very pro, people very anti, people in the middle, the Commission, by and large 9 people are trying to give truthful answers.
They are certainly sincere in their answers.
One of the difficulties is most people are using different sets of assumptions.
They start out with a large range of assumptions 9 and that leads them to positions which can be quite dLfferent than someone else who started out with a different set of assumptions.
On the surf ace, it may appear one person can't be telling the truth because the answers are so different.
It might be useful to try harder to make sure that in probing into those areas that you understand clearly what are the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 72 assumptions people are starting with.
In many cases, the answer is found in the assumptions.
Like I think all my colleagues, I am also very glad to have been able to meet with you.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE g Mr. Obledo, I don't have anything else to add.
If the re are other questions, we have run a little longer than we expected, but I think it has b.een a very useful exchange.
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MR. OBLEDO:
It has.
I didn't have anything else on our agenda.
I feel much like other persons, probably, around the table, that there is no definitive answer.
It depends on what assumptions you start with.
I think it is-Just a matter of trying to work together on these i.ssues for the benefit of the public generally.
For our country.
,..:..:f' That is -- maybe I -will get this:;,fnJ9.r~ai_i<?ii--~rid will stay in communication.
Your executive assistant has been very, very helpful with my office in arranging the meeting and communicating with us.
I am appreciative of that.
Beyond that, perhaps we can arrange a m.eeting with the Department of Energy in the next few weeks to get into thato CHAIRMAN HENDRIEg Very good.
Thank you all very much for coming.
It has been
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v\\fhy don-'t we tal<:e five minutes.
<Whereupon~ at JJg4J a.m., the m.eeting adjourned.)
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