ML22230A049
| ML22230A049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/24/1978 |
| From: | NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Tran-M780124 | |
| Download: ML22230A049 (28) | |
Text
TO SECRETARIAT RECORDS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
COMMISSION MEETING DISCUSSION OF INCIDENT AT FORT ST. VRAIN FACILITY Place -
Washington, D. C.
Date -
Tuesday, 24 January 1978 ACE
- FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Official Reporters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATlONWIDE COVERAGE *DAILY Pages 1 -
25 Telephone:
(202) 347-3700
DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a ~eeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on January 24, 1978 in the C0i::~ission 1s offices at 1717 H Street, N. \\*!., \\*/ashington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been revie1*1ed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcfipt is intended solely for general informational purpose~.
{1,:--, provided by 10 CFR 9. 103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect fi na 1 determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or arg:1ment contained herein, except as the Commi~sion may authorize.
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25 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DISCUSSION OF INCIDENT AT FORT ST. VR.AIN FACILITY Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
1 Tuesday, January 24, 1978 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 4:25 p.m.
BEFORE:
DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner RICHARDT. KENNEDY, Commissioner
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P R O C E E D.~I N G S CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The Commission will come to order.
The Commission is meeting this afternoon -- on ra.ther short notice, I am sorry to say --
for a briefing from the Staff on Ft. St. Vrain, and events there in the past day or so.
Ernie, I guess you have the lead.
MR. GOSSICK:
Go right ahead.
MR. VOLGENAU:
Yesterday morning at 9:30 there was.~initiated a release of radioactive gases from the Fort St. Vrain facility about 35 miles from Denver.
The release took place over a period of about two hours, and subsequently has proved to be not a very significant release at all in terms of radioactivity.
However, in terms of the response of various organizations or licensees, the State of Colorado and NRC, and for that matter, the news media and the Commissioners, it was in fact a significant event, although not one that I would classify as an incident, even though we activated our incident-response center yesterday.
Beginning around noon time, we had most of the staff assembled in the incident-response center on the 5th floor of East-West Towers, including Mr. Gossick, myself, and Mr. Case, and other members of the Staff. __
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I have with me today --
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
How often have you activated these responses?
MR. VOLGENAU:
This is the first time we have activated the incident-response center since we have had the procedures for doing so.
We've had a number of drills, however.
MR. GOSSICK:
The last time there was a comparable event, there was the Browns Ferry fire, and we ad hoced it, frankly, in effect.
It was not greatly different from what happened yesterday, but at least yesterday, we had a checklist, and at least we had some semblance of order as to what was going on.
That's the only other time that we got together in that kind of.a mode.
It was a much smaller group and had to do with a threat, an extortion threat.
It turned out to be a hoax, but anyway, we_ got everybody together there.
MR. VOLGENAU:
Looking down the outline, I'd like to go over the chronology of events, and then get to the other two items, which have to do with the nature of the event-itself, which have to do with --.--what happened and what the release was, and then finally talk about our investigation.
I have with me today to assist in this presentation Carl Seyfrit, who was an assistant director in our -- he's a health physicist in our headquarters
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And last but not least, Dick Denise from NRR.
So moving right into the presentation, Jim, may I have the next slide, please.
(Slide.)
Here's some of the particulars of the facility.
I'll give you a moment to glance at the slide.
I don't propose to read it. I'll just highlight a few things.
As you know, this is a unique reactor.
It's cooled by helium.
It's moderated with graphite.
Its fuel consists of high enriched ur_anium and thorium.
In terms of some of our newer, larger commercial reactors, it's not very big, 343 megawatts electric, and as a matter of fact, has not yet been allowed to operate over 70 percent of that power.
Next slide, please.
(Slide.)
The reactor is located, as I said, 35 miles northeast of Denver, and you can see it on that slide.
May I have the next one please, Jay?
(Slide.)
Here you can see a blowup of the site.
And the nearest large towns are Greeley, at about 28,000 people and 15 miles distance to the northeast; Loveland, to the northwest, perhaps 15-to 20,000 people; and Longmont to the southwest, also at about a distance o~-about 15 miles.
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5 May we have the next slide, please?
(Slide.)
Here's a view of the reactor.
The core is on the left, and in that little rectangle, which is about 15-feet 5
high to 20-feet across, below the core are the *steam generators 6 -and. the helium is circulated through the core by four 7
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 helium seep circulators.
There are 12 steam generators.
You can get a better view of that in the next slide.
(.Slide.)
And perhaps even the handout is a little bit clearer.
The diagrams are slightly different.
It's essentially what I said.
In your diagrams, the hot helium fromthe core, which is indicated by the black arrows, comes down through the steam_ generators, is pumped down by means of these circulators.
And the circulators in turn having passed t helium through the steam generators, and heated the water in the steam generators, which in turn is used, of course, to drive the turbine, then the cooled helium goes back up through the top of the core and then down through the core itself, which-of course is graphite containing the helium and thorium.
And there's cooling channels which have been drilled into the graphite to support that circulation.
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25 Let's go to the next slide, _please?
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(Slide.)
This is a brief outline of activities in mountain standard time that took place yesterday.
As I say, the licensee first.discovered that something was wrong about 9:30 yesterday, and this was signalled really by two events: two stack monitors alarmed, and at the same time, or shortly thereafter, the reactor was scrammed due to high moisture, due to helium.
We received word from the licensee. at 10:30, and immediately activated our incident-response center, and you can see that really the next major event was 11:30, when they determined where the helium was leaking.
Now, it turns out the helium was leaking out through a bearing in one of those circulators into the reactor building.
And from the reactor building, to the stack.
Now the licensee in reading his instruments, was concerned that there might be iodine 131 in fairly large quantities leaking out, and for this reason, he went to condition 2 in his emergency response plan, which is not as bad as condition 3, bu-t more significant than condition 1
.m terms of how they react.
They evacuated about 280 nonessential people who were on site for various activities, construction and otherwise The site continued to opera~e.
It didn't -- they did not
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25 evacuate the people that were necessary to operate the site.
Well, about 1:00 o'clock, accompanied by the 7
State of Colorado inspectors, went out and made some surveys about 3 miles downwind from the site, and the wind in this case was blowing from east to west.
And they went out about 3 miles and they took several surveys, and they found nothing.
As they began to look into the event, then about 2:00 o'clock, they determined that the event was not as significant as they had initially thought.
They had reacted in a conservative. way, based primarily on the stack monitors.
And we in turn had dispatched three inspectors on a chartered aircraft from our Dallas office, and they arrived on site about 6:00 o'clock mountain time.
And our incident-response center remained in existence until 9:30 mountain time last night; which is 11:30 local time, or 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> earlier than we are.
Okay, I guess at that point I'd like to ask Carl Seyfrit to talk a little bit about the radiological consequences: and the nature of the event.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
May I ask a couple of questions about the chronology first?
Is 10:50 the point in time at which the NRC was notified?
MR. VOLGENAU:
No, we were notified about an hour
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after the event was initiated.
And they called our Dallas office, as they were supposed to do, about 10:30, 10:35, as a matter of fact.
The Dallas office got the information and called the headquarters.
John Davis received the call, and he called me, and I decided to activate*the center.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Why would they wait even an hour before calling Dallas?
MR. VOLGENAU:
I think that's one of the things we want to find out from out investigation.
Without attempting to apologize for them or prejudge them, I could imagine that there were a number of activities that they had to get under way, that a lot of people they had to notify; they established an alternate center, which their plan calls for.
And what we need to do in the investigation is to track through that sequence of events and see if they did all the things they were supposed to do in an appropriate time frame.
But I could imagine where they would be so busy that it would take an hour to get the.most important things done.
And of course, if there's danger of people being overexposed, why, we would want them, you know, to take the actions to stop that overexposure, and £or that matter, stop th release.
That would be more important than getting to us.
But we're looking at it.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And it did take them two
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hours to locate and stop the leak?
MR. VOLGENAU:
Yes.
COMMISSIONER BRADFOR~:
Does that seem a long time?
MR. VOLGENAU:
Once again, we'll have to go back over the events to find out what it is.
Now, keep in mind, the release*was not a very significant release.
But any release in which people are overexposed above the limits,--in fact, incidentally, it's not clear at this point that the release is over their technical specifications.
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But during this period of time they thought it was.
I guess I wanted to see how they respond to something MR. VOLGENAU:
Exactly right.
That's one of the things we would want to evaluate, even though the release appar nt ly is not significant.
How well did their response plan operate?
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's see: we now think that it was roughly 4 curies of noble gases.
What would they be?
MR. VOLGENAU:
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay, that's where the actual radiography comes in.
MR.. VOLGENAU:
Yes.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's our judgment, or
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10 that's the public service of Colorado's?
MR. VOLGENAU:
I think it's a collective judgment at this point?
COMMIE.STONER KENNEDY:
Including Colorado?
MR. VOLGENAU:
Yes.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The instrumentation there on the stack is such that when there is excess radioactivity going out,.:then.they can't tell where it comes from?
9 MR. VOLGENAU:
Yes, and Carl will talk a little 10 bit more about that, as to why they thought it might be 11 iodine 131.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Carl, why don't you go 13 ahead?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MR. SEYFRIT:
Well, as Dr. Volgenau indicated, both the licensee and the state of Colorado made surveys outsides the confines of the plant.
(Slide.)
They did this with portable instrumentation, taking some air samples, and some direct radiation measurements.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
At what point was this l
done?.~-
MR. SEYFRIT:
Point in time?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What, 2:00 o'clock in the Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
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3 11 MR. SEYFRIT:
I don't believe that I have.a specific time as to when they started.
But this was fairly immediate after they got the release stopped in the 4
plant, and they began to look beyond the plant.
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You mean the field surveys?
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were done at 1:00 o'clock.
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It covered a period of time, because you recognize they're covering a 3-mile stretch away from the plant, and they take measurements at various places along that route.
At any rate, they found nothing but background readings, both in the air samples, and in the direct measurements that they made.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Where does the figure of 5.6 rem that was given to us first come from?
MR. SEYFRIT:
That depends on the way one interprets what was seen on the iodine monitors of the stack. I'll try to get into this a little bit.
On the stack monitors, there really are two monitors.
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25 12 One is to measure the activity in gaseous material.
The other is to trap in a charcoal filter radioactive iodine and measure that value.
Now, when you have particula:t.e
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iodine being trapped, obviously, the level on that filter will increase as you deposit more and more material.
If all the material that's deposited there is iodine, then you have a calculation as to what rate of release of iodine is involved.
As. it turned.out, when the release occurred, this particulate monitor also, of course, saw a lot of noble gaseous activity which also passed ;*.through there.
The noble gases themselves are not deposited on the filter, but some of their daughter products are.
And you get a short-term high-level reading which, unless you have the opportunity to make a decay measurement, one can assume is all iodine, and indeed it appears that's what the licensing did.
He made a very conservative assumption that everything he was seeing there was._iodine.
And if you make the calculation as if it were all iodine, it would lead to those kinds of numbers.
COMMI-SSIONEB,:; B.RADFORD:, _ That was never mea-sured?
That was the figu~e calculated?
MR. SEYERIT:.ca.1cu1a+/-:ed_on*the basis of the readings from these stack monitors.
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25 13 Now, later in the cycle the iodine filter cartridge was removed and analyzed in the normal fashion, and when this was done it showed that there was less than one microcurie of iodine deposited on the filter, which says that your release could not have contained significant amounts of iodine.and, therefore, the conc~usion that the
- release was all noble gas.
':'his is also borne out by the fact that we
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found no evidence of activity away from the site.
Again, if the noble gases would behave in that fashion~ It woul4 be distributed.
They don't -- play out, drop out, and the half lives would deteriorate quite rapidly.
Okay.
In addition to these measurements that they took, they have taken soil and vegetation samples from the area,.,and air and milk sampling has been initiated as a precautionary measure.
This was done by the ERDA folks.
We have no results on those yet, but based on the other measurements we would expect these not to show anything of significance.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Why would the Department of Energy be involved in that?
MR. SEYFRIT:
I believe that some grain is to spme extent under their jurisdiction, is it not?
I really don't know.
CHAIRT\\1AN HENDRIE:
Was the:i::e a Rocky Flats team?
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25 14 MR. VOLGENAU:
Now, the Rocky Flats.team really didn't go there.
They sent one representative who went as an observer.
MR~ SEYFRIT:
I think this was the Idaho office.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE*:
The radiation emergency teams
Radiation.assistance teams. --
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
--:.are :.-made :_*:µp of experts at laboratories and federal installations.
You know, they just get called to go.
MR. SEYFRIT:
The licensee did contact the Idaho office, and I suspect that they initiated this on the basis of that call when it appeared from the initial information that there was indeed a very high release.
MR. VOLGENAU:
Furthermore, we have an interagency agreement with those folks, and one of the things we did after we activated the Incident Response Center was to notify them and alert them and alert them to stand by.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would it not make sense for us to have a representative on those teams?
MR. VOLGENAU:
We feel no need to have a representative on those teams because our inspectors can always accompany them if they choose.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The primary -- typically, the RAT teams are a group of people out of federal.installations.
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25 lS There's ate.am like that based out at Brookhaven, based out at the heal th physics group at Brookhaven..
They get a signal to go, and they just go.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Imd they have other jobs at those installations doing other things.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You know,.the game is to get out and get on the site and find out what's going on.
MR. VOLGENAU:
And DOE is not the only organization that has :those.
We have similar arrangements with Defense, for their type of teams.
CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That's why I asked about the Rocky Flats.
HR. SEYFRIT:
They were notified, but they did not respond.
We work with the state people.
That pretty much takes care of the off-site consequences.
I'd like to talk about the on-site consequences.
(Slide.)
The personnel exposures, there were approximately 15 pepple who had moderate levels of contamination to their clothing and skin which was readily removed.
The*maximum estimated dose to a single individual was 10 millirem, based on his dosimeter which he was wearing and one of the men who was in the reactor building at the time of the release.
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25 16 The overall exposures, of course, are still being evaluated..
'. To. c:::*et. solid numbers we will need to get evaluations from other measures, such as whole body counting and reading of TLDs and this sort of thing.
As £ar as the level of radiation within the site, the maximum level that we found were.10 MR per hour inside the reactor building.
'11his is based on the area radiation monitor readout.
And when they reentered the reactor building some hours after the event, there was-.smearable contamination on the surfaces of 3-to 4000 counts per minute.
That 1 s per hundred centimeters2
. standard smear area.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What did that come from?
MR. SEYFRIT:
That's from the daughter products of the noble gases, basically, that fall out and are retained within the reactor building.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The same thing that was on the iodine monitor?
MR. SEYFRIT:
To a degree, yes.
I'n sure that was the same thing that was there.
We don't have at this point in time a specific isotopic breakdown of all of these things*.
That would have to come a little later. It I s, I think
- proper to assume that that's,*1here it came from.
And I believe, Dr. Volgenau, that the total release was confirmed to be about 4 curies of the noble gases.
I'd like to get into a descr.iptionof..the event
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25 17 itself.
(Slide.)
And I would like to make this description as nontechnical as I am able to get away with, because this is an extremely complicated system, and if we were to describe it in full, we'd be here for some time, I'm afraid.
The event was initiated by the tripping -- well, the first evidence of the event was the tripping of the 1-D circulator, followed closely by the tripping of a second circulator.
And the reactor then scrammed because of high moisture which is monitored coming back into the core.
And as Dr. Volgenau explained, this was because the helium circulating had become moisture-laden and because of leakage in the buffer seals and so forth.
About 12 minutes after the initial event, it received the high activity alarm from the stack monitors, and at that time sounded their emergency alarm and began to move people out of the reactor building and into other areas.
They initiated,.. a:s.we ___ have:..said..,before, their emergency procedures, w.liich.* involved evacuating some 280 people on the site, and they set up their control center about six or seven miles north/northwest of the plant in Johnstown, Colorado.
At about 10:10 the release was terminated, and
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25 18 from that point on it ~as a matter of beginning to assess and do the measuring that we talked about earlier.
That's a very brief summary of what happened.
We.do have a slide that is a very simplified slide -- Jay --
(Slide.)
of the service system which gives some idea of what we're talking,about.
If you look in the lower right-hand corner of that figure where you see the letters LC inside of a small circle, that's level control, and attached to that off on the right".""hand side you see a valve.
There actually are two valves associated with that.
It's a split control system.
One controls inlet~ one controls outlet.
Th_e failure in this case was the. inlet valve which failed wide open, and at the time the outlet valve was closed.
This caused the level of water in the surge tank to increase, and as you can see, if-it..increases, you~create a back pressure on this main drain line going over toward the circulator shaft.
And this causes water to creep up along the shaft, and eventually it will come out through the helium water drain line that you see up toward. t*h e top of the drawing.
This comes through the high pressure separator, and it's now moisture-laden, so the separator can't knock it all out.*
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25 19 You move on over to the dryer.
You've got water there, and it begins to flash, creating pressures.
And just off to the right of the dryer there is a release valve, and that was one of two release valves which opened as a result of the event.
The second one is not shown on this sketch, unfortunately.
It is associated with the low pressure sepgrator.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Where is this release valve?
MR. SEYFRIT:
It isn't shown on the drawing.
It's just at the outlet of the dryer in the upper right-hand corner.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Aha,....:.:the culprit.
MR. SEYFRIT:
And when that opened, of course, that opens directly_to the reactor building atmosphere, and that's the path of release to the reactor building.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That's one of two.
MR. SEYFRIT:
The other one was on the low pressure ?eparator, which is not shown on this drawing.
But it's similar to the high-pressure separator-that you see there, and there was a release valve associated with it, ~lso.
~he release valve on the dryer, I believe, is set to release at something like 865 pounds, and the one on the low pressure separator at 50 pounds.
That's further downstream.
But both of the-se opened and divided that from
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25 the reactor-coolant system to the reactor building atmosphere.
COM!.'-1ISSIONER BRADFORD:
Excuse my technical ignorance, but were these things supposed to open?
20 MR. SEYFRIT:
On an overpressure, yes, they are supposed to open to protect the rest of the system.
And there was an overpressure created because the water had backed up in the system, and we got water in an area where it didn't belong.
This dryer operates a:t a very hi*gh temperature, and when the water hit that, it flashed to steam, which increased the pressure quite rapidly.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So that by functioning as they were supposed to, these things discharged the radioactivity.
MR. SEYFRIT:
Into the reactor building, that's correct.
But now the path from the reactor building to the outside still involves filters, and the elevated release, and so for this kind of an event we would not expect to see significant
~off-site releases, and indeed we did not, as a result of this event.
CIIAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The valve that popped, I suppose under steam pressure might have gotten to it, but you could have blown the dryer shaft, *in which case you
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25 21 would have gotten a good deal more release to the atmosphere.
This way, at least, it -Popped,
.and you eventually get a grip on the water system by pushing down that load.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The only actual malfunction~is the valve down in the lower right?
MR. SEYFRIT:
That's the only one of which we are aware as of this moment.
And everything else that occurred subsequently can certainly be explained with that malfunction.
So while there may be something else that shows up later on, we don't really anticipate it.
MR. "\\iiOLGENAU:
May I have the next slide, please.
(Slide.)
I'd like to conclude by saying.that even:.though the event itself is not significant in terms of release of radioactivity, we are conducting a complete, thorough investigation.
We have three inspectors on-site now.
They will be there for the next few days, for as long as it takes them.
If necessary, we'll augment that team.
What we were trying to do both during the establishment of the Incident Response Center and also when our inspectors got there was to make sure that these three high priority items were covered.
And you can see them on the slide.
We want to be sure the fac~lity is safe, to
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25 22 begin with.
Last slide, please, Jay.
(Slide.)
rn*sumrnary, these are the points that we intend to cover in our investigation.
We want to be thorough, makin*g sure that we find out why this event occurred, how the licensee responded to it, how we can avoid such things in the future.
And, also, I might add, we want to evaluate our own response.
That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank_ you very much.
I think you're right on the mark at 30 minutes, and it was a very thorough presentation, although since you have been living with us, so far as I know, without sleep since sometime yesterday early.
When you've had a lot of time to think about it, even though it I s a short time, these are not things that we*'-re happy.
to hear about, and this oni started out and got progressively better after the initial notification.
The !elease apparently remained a small one.
We'd be very interested in the results of the investigation.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:* *Just a couple of other ques-tions about what actually happened.
At one point we were told, I guess, the roads were closed.
Did that actually happen?
MR. VOLGENAU:
Yes.. The state police blocked off the roads going into the site in the downwind direction.
Those 18 were the only roads that were blocked as far as we know.
19 COM..TvlISSIONER KENNEDY:
.. -This was part of the state 20 response?
21 22 23 MR. VOLGENAU:
Yes.
They didn't want people approach ing the site.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
They activated the emergency 24 plan?
ce-Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. VOLGENAU:
Yes.
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25 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I trust that you'll be covering I
this part of the investigation.
- Yo.u.know, here is an experiment with an emergency plan, not a planned experiment.
But let's take advantage 0£ all observational opportunities, and you'll have a chance to look and see how did the communication go, how did the responses go.
It could.be useful* from that standpoint.
MR. VOLGENAU:
Precisely.
For example, Barbara Ryan and I talked about evaluating the state response from a totally constructive viewpoint, because, as you know, we -participate in their training.
MR. GOSSICK:
We'll also get some insights into things we need to do in our response.. center, things we can use to work with perhaps more.effectively in the course of one of these things.
It became evident to Ernie and I and the others yesterday, so it's useful in that ~egard, too.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
When will we know the results of the investigation?
MR. SEYFRIT:
We should have some results within the next couple of days.
I don't have*"a specific schedule.
Jay is behind the screen over there, and he may have.better*information than.
I do.
MR. VOLGENAU:
Come on out, Jay.
(Laughter.)
MR. VOLGENAU:
We **11 be happy to get with you
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25 25 afterward, if you like.
Jay, when do you expect that we'll have some more of *.the results?
They' re looking -- they've already examined, for example, the filter in the.:stack and the iodine detector.
When will some of the other results be coming in?
MR. SEYFRIT:
Like snow on vegetation?
VOICE.:.* Snow on the vegetation was taken by the State of Colorado officials.
It would be several days.
The network that ERDA activated was actually the EPA network, the air sampling and the other sampling that works, and they will have several samples.
But again those will require several days for laboratory analyses.
MR. VOLGENAU:
That's another agency I neglected to tell you we have an interagency agreement with, is EPA.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
Thank you very much.*
(Whereupon, at 5: 0.0 p. m., the meeting was adjourned. )