ML22178A025
| ML22178A025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Erwin |
| Issue date: | 06/16/2022 |
| From: | Knowles T BWXT Nuclear Fuel Services |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| References | |
| 21G-22-0075, ACF-22-0144, GOV-01-55-04 | |
| Download: ML22178A025 (6) | |
Text
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
CERTIFIED MAIL 21 G-22-0075 RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED GOV-01-55-04 ACF-22-0144 June 16, 2022 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
30-Day Speaker Event (NRC Event No. 55902)
Reference:
Docket No. 70-143: SNM License 124
Dear Sir:
On May 19, 2022, at approximately 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br /> (ET), Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) made a telephone notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Operations Center of an event for which 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) requires a notification. This letter provides the 30-day written event notification.
If you or your staff have any questions, require additional information, or wish to discuss this matter further, please contact me at (423) 743-1705, or Tom Holly, Licensing Manager, at (423) 743-2595. Please reference our unique document identification number (21 G-22-0075) in any correspondence concerning this letter.
Sincerely, NUCLEAR FUE~ SERVICES, INC.
Tim Knowles, Director Safety and Safeguards
- TCH/las
Attachment:
30-Day Notification of Reportable Event
_::c*E72
- vfv/5 S/J I
- JtvJ5S 1205 Banner Hill Rd, Erwin, TN 37650 People Strong t
- +1.423.743.9141 f: +1.423.743.0140 www.nuclearfuelservices.com INNDVATIDN DRIVEN >
T. Knowles to U.S. NRC 21G-22-0075 GOV-01-55-04 ACF-22-0144 Copy:
Regional Administrator .
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II 245 Peachtree* Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Dr. Robert E. Williams, Jr.
Chief, Projects Branch I Division of Fuel Facility Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Mr. James Downs, Senior Project Manager Fuel Manufacturing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Two White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. Larry Harris Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. T. Knowles to U.S. NRC 21G-22-0075 GOV-01-55-04 ACF-22-0144 Attachment 30-Day Notification of Reportable Event (3 pages to follow)
. T. Knowles to U.S. NRC 21 G-22-0075 GOV-01-55-04 ACF-22-0144 30-Day Notification of Reportable Event
- 1. The date, time, and exact location of the event The event in question occurred on May 18, 2022, at approximately 1450 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.51725e-4 months <br /> (ET). Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) made the telephone report for this event on May 19, 2022, at approximately 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br /> (ET). The event location is the NFS facility, located in the Town of Erwin, Unicoi County, Tennessee.
- 2. Radiological or chemical hazards involved, including isotopes, quantities, and chemical and physical form of any material released There were no radiological or chemical hazards associated with this incident.
- 3. Actual or potential health and safety consequences to the workers, the public, and the environment, including relevant chemical and radiation data for actual personnel exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials (e.g., level of radiation exposure, concentration of chemicals, and duration of exposure)
An operable Criticality Accident Alarm Station (CAAS) is required per 10 CFR 70.24. There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences to the public, workers, or the environment. The potential consequences were that, in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel outside the main processing area where redundant speakers have not been installed.
- 4. The sequence of occurrences leading to the event, including degradation or failure of structures, systems, equipment, components, and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences On May 18, 2022 at approximately 1450 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.51725e-4 months <br /> (ET), an electrical switch for the (CAAS) legacy speakers was noted to be out of its normal position. A functional redundant speaker system is installed in the main processing plant and laboratory. As a consequence of the switch being out of position, in the highly unlikely event that the CAAS had actuated, the alarm would not have been annunciated in areas outside of the main processing area and laboratory where there are no redundant speakers. Compliance was restored at approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> (ET) when the switch was placed back in its normal position. The system was subsequently tested and confirmed to be operational. The most recent audibility test of the speaker system had been 1
- T. Knowles to U.S. NRC 21 G-22-0075 GOV-01-55-04 ACF-22-0144 performed on May 13, 2022 at approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> {ET). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector .on May 18, 2022 at approximately 1625 hours0.0188 days <br />0.451 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.183125e-4 months <br /> {ET). There were no actual nuclear safety consequences. Subsequent investigation revealed that the switch was likely placed out of position on May 13, 2022 at approximately 2022 hours0.0234 days <br />0.562 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.69371e-4 months <br /> (ET).
- 5. The probable cause of the event, including all factors that contributed to the event and the manufacturer and model number (if applicable) of any equipment that failed or malfunctioned The probable cause of the event is that the procedure and form used to direct and document the switch alignment needed improvement. The form documented a series of actions necessary to perform a special alignment.
However, the form did not specifically check that adjacent switches that were not intended to be operated were not inadvertently manipulated.
Other contributing causes included confusing displays and switch position and alignment issues that contributed to the initiating action of a worker placing the switch in an incorrect position. Additionally, use of some error prevention tools needed strengthening.
- 6. Corrective actions taken or planned to prevent occurrence of similar or identical events in the future and the results of any evaluations or assessments The procedure and form used to complete this special alignment has been revised to document the condition of adjacent switches and indicators. The procedure was also revised to address use of human performance tools to prevent errors in operating the system. A training toolbox was generated to institute the changes to the procedure and form, as well as reinforce the importance of switch alignment.
Longer term actions scheduled to be completed include modifying the switch position indicators and displays, as well as improving the arrangements of components. Additionally, lesson plans will be modified to incorporate the lessons learned specific to this event.
- 7. If the event involved an area or equipment with an approved Integrated Safety Analysis, whether the event was identified and evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis Not applicable 2
T. Knowles to U.S. NRC 21G-22-0075 GOV-01-55-04 ACF-22-0144
- 8. The extent of exposure of individuals to radiation or radioactive materials There were no exposures of individuals to radiation or radioactive materials as a result of this event.
- 3