ML22158A263
| ML22158A263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/06/2022 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Brown, C, ACRS | |
| References | |
| NRC-1953 | |
| Download: ML22158A263 (350) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: teleconference Date: Friday, May 6, 2022 Work Order No.: NRC-1953 Pages 1-208 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1716 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 NON-POWER PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 8 SUBCOMMITTEE 9 + + + + +
10 FRIDAY, MAY 6, 2022 11 + + + + +
12 The Subcommittee met via Video-13 Teleconference, at 8:30 a.m. EDT, Ronald G.
14 Ballinger, Chairman, presiding.
15 SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Chairman 17 VICKI M. BIER, Member 18 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 19 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 20 GREGORY H. HALNON, Member 21 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 22 JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member 23 DAVID A. PETTI, Member 24 JOY L. REMPE, Chairman 25 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
2 1 ACRS CONSULTANTS:
2 DENNIS BLEY 3 KEN CZERWINSKI 4 STEPHEN SCHULTZ 5
6 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
3 1 C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 2
3 Opening Remarks and Objectives 4 Ronald Ballinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 Staff Opening Remarks 6 Josh Borromeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7 Chapter 3 Presentations 8 SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC 9 Marc Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10 NRC Staff 11 Andrew Prinaris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 12 Chapter 8 Presentations 13 SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC . . . . . . . . 62 14 NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 15 Chapter 11 Presentations 16 SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC . . . . . . . 118 17 NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 18 Chapter 9 Presentations 19 SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC . . . . . . . 142 20 NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 21 Public Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 22 Adjourn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
4 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 8:30 a.m.
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: The meeting will now 4 come to order. This is a meeting of the SHINE 5 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor 6 Safeguards. I'm Ron Ballinger, chairman of today's 7 Subcommittee meeting.
8 ACRS members in attendance are Charlie 9 Brown, Greg Halnon, Vicki Bier, Walt Kirchner, myself, 10 Joy Rempe, Chairman Rempe, Matthew Sunseri, Jose 11 March-Leuba, Dave Petti, and I believe Vesna 12 Dimitrijevic is on the line and present. We may have 13 Dennis Bley and/or Steve Schultz present. I don't 14 know. I can't see them --
15 DR. BLEY: Dennis Bley is here.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: Bingo. Thank you very 17 much.
18 DR. SCHULTZ: Dave Schultz is here.
19 CHAIR BALLINGER: Derek Widmayer of the 20 ACRS Staff is the Designated Federal Official for this 21 morning. I might add additionally that we now have 22 our a consultant Ken Czerwinski onboard to help us 23 with chemistry and the like. He may or may not be --
24 we went him an invitation, but it's very early in Las 25 Vegas.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
5 1 During today's meeting the Subcommittee 2 will receive a briefing from the NRC Staff on SHINE 3 medical isotopes. The Subcommittee will hear 4 presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC 5 Staff, SHINE representatives and other interested 6 persons regarding Chapters 3, 8, 9, and 11. Note that 7 Section 3.1 will not be presented today; it will be 8 presented in July.
9 As part of the presentation by the 10 Applicant and the NRC Staff presentations by the 11 Applicant and NRC Staff may be closed in order to 12 discuss information that is proprietary. Right now we 13 have some issues on Chapters 9 and 11 which may be 14 proprietary. Attendance at the meeting that deals 15 with such information will be limited to the NRC Staff 16 and its consultants, SHINE and those individuals and 17 organizations who have entered into an appropriate 18 confidentiality agreement with them. Consequently we 19 need to confirm that we have only eligible observers 20 and participants when we do the closed part of the 21 meeting.
22 The rules for participation in all ACRS 23 meetings including today's were announced in the 24 Federal Register on June the 13th, 2019. The ACRS 25 section of the U.S. NRC public website provides our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
6 1 charter, bylaws, agendas, letter reports, and full 2 transcripts of all Full and Subcommittee meetings 3 including slides presented there.
4 The meeting notice and the agenda for this 5 meeting were posted there.
6 We have received no written statements or 7 requests to make an oral statement from the public.
8 The Subcommittee will gather information, 9 analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate 10 proposed positions and actions as appropriate for the 11 deliberation by the Full Committee. The rules for 12 participation in today's meeting have been announced 13 as part of the notice of this meeting previously 14 published in the Federal Register.
15 Today's meeting is being held in person 16 and also over Microsoft Teams. A telephone bridge 17 line allowing participation of the public over their 18 computer using Teams or by phone was made available.
19 Additionally, we have made an MS Teams link available 20 on the published agenda. A transcript of today's 21 meeting is being kept, therefore we request that 22 meeting participants on Teams and on the Teams call-in 23 line identify themselves when they speak and to speak 24 with sufficient clarity and volume so that they may be 25 readily heard.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
7 1 Likewise, we request that meeting 2 participants keep their computer and/or telephone 3 lines on mute when not speaking to minimize 4 disruptions. We'll get a lot of feedback if we don't 5 adhere to this. The chat feature on the Teams should 6 not be used for any technical exchanges.
7 At this time I ask Teams attendees to make sure 8 that they are muted so we can commence the meeting.
9 We'll now proceed. And I guess I'm going 10 to call Josh Borromeo, Branch Chief, NRR, for opening 11 remarks. Is that correct?
12 MR. BORROMEO: That's correct.
13 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you. Go ahead.
14 MR. BORROMEO: Yes, so good morning. My 15 name is Josh Borromeo. I'm Chief of the Non-Power 16 Production and Utilization Facility, or NPUF Licensing 17 Branch in NRR. As Member Ballinger mentioned, this is 18 a Subcommittee meeting for the SHINE operating 19 license, one in a series of Subcommittee meetings.
20 And first I want to express the Staff's 21 appreciation for ACRS using the process of using --
22 issuing interim letters after each one of these 23 Subcommittee meetings. We feel that is an efficient 24 way to both identify and address issues as we work our 25 way through the review and we look forward to using NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
8 1 this process as we continue to work our way through 2 the remainder of the chapters.
3 So, as mentioned, the Staff and SHINE will 4 be presenting information on Chapter 3, Design of 5 Structure Systems and Components; Chapter 8, 6 Electrical Power Systems; Chapter 9, Auxiliary 7 Systems; and Chapter 11, Radiation Protection.
8 I want to thank both the Staff and SHINE 9 for their efforts in the development and the 10 preparation for the material ACRS will hear today and 11 I also want to thank ACRS for the time and continued 12 support of the SHINE Operating License Review and we 13 look forward to the conversation today.
14 And with that, if there are no questions, 15 I'll turn it over to SHINE.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes, before we start I 17 need to make a clarification. With respect to memos 18 and letters we have agreement that unless there's an 19 issue that needs additional resolution, our procedure 20 will be to write individual memos on chapters unless 21 we have an issue, at which point we might write what 22 you were calling an interim letter. There's a big 23 difference between the two, so let's be clear about 24 that.
25 MR. BORROMEO: Yes, sorry for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
9 1 confusion, but the process that we're using is good 2 and I want to continue to do it.
3 (Laughter.)
4 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay.
5 MR. BORROMEO: Thanks.
6 CHAIR BALLINGER: All right. Are the 7 SHINE folks on?
8 MR. BARTELME: Yes, SHINE is here, and 9 Marc Anderson for Chapter 3 is here as well.
10 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay. So let's proceed.
11 MR. BARTELME: Thanks. Go ahead, Marc.
12 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Good morning, 13 everyone. My name is Marc Anderson. I'm the 14 Structural Engineering Manager at Sargent & Lundy.
15 I've been deeply involved with the design of the main 16 production facility structure since the beginning of 17 the detailed design phase in 2018. Very much 18 appreciate the opportunity to discuss the design 19 approach and answer any questions that you might have, 20 so please feel free to stop me at any point if 21 something is unclear.
22 I'll give a brief outline. So this 23 morning's presentation is going to focus on the main 24 production facility primarily. At the end we'll talk 25 about the nitrogen purge system structure, but for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
10 1 main production facility structure we're going to 2 discuss meteorological damage, water damage, seismic 3 damage, and also damage from external hazards. And 4 I'll talk about the ways we've addressed the potential 5 damage.
6 Just briefly I'd first like to give an 7 overview of the main production facility structure.
8 What you see here is a screenshot of the 3D model of 9 the facility. Really it's comprised of two separate 10 buildings. One is a safety-related building and one 11 that is entirely non-safety-related. And I'll get 12 into that in a little bit more detail here in the next 13 few slides.
14 As we talk about the different aspects of 15 the facility structure, it's convenient I guess to 16 establish a plant coordinate system. So just for 17 everyone's benefit the way that we're looking at the 18 building here is from the southwest corner looking 19 northeast. So this SHINE logo that you see is kind of 20 is in the southwest corner of the building. So as I 21 describe various aspects of the facility -- and that's 22 the plant coordinate system just for clarification.
23 So as I describe various aspects of the facility, 24 that's kind of a good way to establish which direction 25 you're looking, I guess.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
11 1 Okay. Next slide, please, Jeff?
2 Okay. So as I mentioned, there's really 3 two separate buildings, all part of the same main 4 production facility structure. The first building is 5 highlighted here in red, and I'll attempt to clarify 6 what you're looking at. The red building is the 7 safety-related Seismic Category 1 structure. There's 8 an RCA building, which is the taller building here, 9 and then there's the non-RCA structure, which is the 10 shorter building to the sort of upper left, or west, 11 northwest. As you can see from the slide they share 12 a common MAT foundation which extends also under a 13 portion of the non-safety-related building sort of at 14 the southwest corner of the safety-related structure.
15 It's predominantly robust reinforced 16 concrete construction, 6,000 psi compressive strength 17 concrete. There are some structural steel elements.
18 The mat slab is three foot and it's thickened around 19 the perimeter underneath the main sheer walls. As 20 you're looking at the building here you can imagine 21 this is sort of a giant box or -- for the RCA and then 22 another giant box for the non-RCA. And there's a big 23 sheer wall that runs underneath where you see the roof 24 kind of comes to a peak. So it's like three parallel 25 bays, three rectangles that are just -- it's a big NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
12 1 open box. And underneath each of those main sheer 2 walls the mat slab is thickened to four-and-a-half 3 feet thick.
4 Just to give a sense of dimensions, it's 5 approximately 212 feet long in the north-south 6 direction and 158 feet long in the east-west 7 direction. This is the RCA. The roof is at its high 8 point 56 feet tall and at its low point 45 feet tall.
9 The main sheer walls of the RCA are two feet thick.
10 The roof is a one foot thick slab that's supported by 11 steel trusses which span the short dimension of these 12 -- of the rectangles essentially. So the trusses span 13 in the east-west direction.
14 There is an eight inch thick concrete slab on 15 metal deck mezzanine and the southeast corner of the 16 RCA, and that's at elevation 22. It covers 17 approximately one-sixth of the floor area of the RCA.
18 The non-RCA Seismic Category 1 building 19 has a one foot, eight inch thick roof slab and its 20 walls are two foot, four inches thick reinforced 21 concrete.
22 I wanted to highlight here that there's a 23 red line drawn at the interface between the Seismic 24 Category 1 building and the non-Seismic Category 1 25 building to the south and to the west. And that will NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
13 1 be a little bit more clear on the next slide, but this 2 red line is meant to represent the seismic gap. As 3 you're looking at the 3D model it looks like this is 4 one integrated building. In reality these are two 5 separate buildings with an engineered seismic gap 6 between them that's sized and designed to accommodate 7 the anticipated seismic movements of the two 8 buildings.
9 DR. BLEY: Marc?
10 MR. ANDERSON: Yes?
11 DR. BLEY: This is Dennis Bley. You've 12 talked several times about the seismic gap and I was 13 thinking back to a nuclear power plant quite a few 14 years ago that was designed with such a gap. There 15 had always been a concern in the seismic area that 16 maybe you fall off a cliff once you get past the 17 design-basis and all of a sudden everything starts to 18 fail. The only place I ever saw that happen; we were 19 doing risk assessments at the time, was a plant that 20 had a gap that was I guess you could say just set to 21 the design-basis. If the earthquake went a little 22 above the design-basis, the buildings interacted and 23 you had substantial problems developing.
24 I don't think you're doing a seismic risk 25 assessment, but if you look a little beyond the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
14 1 design-basis, do you have any idea about whether those 2 gaps begin to close?
3 MR. ANDERSON: It's not a situation that 4 we've analyzed. The way we sized the gap is we've 5 checked the maximum displacements of the safety-6 related structure and we added that --
7 DR. BLEY: For the design-basis 8 earthquake, I assume?
9 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct. And the 10 maximum displacements of the non-safety-related 11 structure for the -- for its design-basis earthquake, 12 which is simply the ASCE 7/IBC sort of commercial 13 design earthquake. And we've added those two 14 displacements together and included some margin on top 15 of that to make sure that they're --
16 (Simultaneous speaking.)
17 DR. BLEY: Can you say anything about the 18 margin?
19 MR. ANDERSON: So the seismic gap is 20 approximately one inch wide and the margin is about 25 21 percent.
22 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
23 If we get into anything that looks like it's going to 24 be proprietary, we need to be careful that we know 25 that so that we can take this back up in a closed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
15 1 session if need be. So I'm assuming that your numbers 2 are not proprietary.
3 MR. BARTELME: Right, these numbers are 4 not proprietary. If we feel we're getting kind of 5 close there, we'll kind of just wave a flag and save 6 that for a closed session discussion.
7 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you.
8 DR. BLEY: Thanks.
9 MR. ANDERSON: Are there any additional 10 questions related to that?
11 DR. BLEY: Not yet.
12 MR. ANDERSON: Okay.
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: No, I have -- this is 14 Walt Kirchner. I have a question.
15 So you mentioned earlier the mat 16 thicknesses underneath. I'm just trying to -- so when 17 you said for the design-basis earthquake, I'm 18 presuming for the safety-related structure you used 19 the safe shutdown earthquake equivalent?
20 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Right. And then how 22 much different in terms of expected displacement do 23 you get for the safety-related building versus the 24 non-safety-related building using a different 25 earthquake design-basis? Is it substantial or is it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
16 1 -- you've already worked the numbers and your one inch 2 provides plenty of margin?
3 MR. ANDERSON: We have not analyzed the 4 displacement of the non-safety building for the SSC 5 earthquake.
6 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. Thank you.
7 MR. ANDERSON: Are there any other 8 questions?
9 (No response.)
10 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. I did want to 11 highlight as we're speaking about the seismic gap 12 there is a small portion of the non-safety-related 13 building that sits on top of the safety-related mat 14 foundation in the -- if you're -- again as you're 15 looking at this figure, it's the south of the non-RCA 16 Seismic Category 1 building.
17 This building is included in the seismic 18 model of the Seismic Category 1 facility and so the 19 effects of the earthquake that this building might 20 have on the foundation are analyzed and the seismic 21 gap around this little portion of the building has 22 been designed so that it doesn't interface with the 23 adjacent Seismic Category 1 buildings. So it's really 24 isolated from the rest of the non-safety-related 25 building as well as the safety-related buildings next NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
17 1 to it with the exception of the foundation that it 2 sits on.
3 Okay. If you'd mind going to the next 4 slide? Okay. So this is the non-safety-related 5 building. As you can see its predominantly on the 6 south end of the safety-related building and it sort 7 of wraps a little bit around the west side of the 8 building. This is a two-story structural steel 9 building that's founded on reinforced concrete spread 10 footings.
11 The second story at the interior of the 12 building is a five inch thick slab on metal deck.
13 It's approximately 77 feet long in the north-south 14 direction and 150 feet in the east-west direction.
15 The lower roof elevation is at 22 feet. It matches 16 the roof elevation of the -- I'm sorry, is there a 17 question?
18 (No audible response.)
19 MR. ANDERSON: It matches the roof 20 elevation of the non-RCA Seismic Category 1 building 21 and the higher roof elevation is 40 feet tall.
22 MEMBER BROWN: I had a question.
23 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, please.
24 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie Brown. I 25 was looking going between 4 and 5 and it looked like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
18 1 the part where those little caret signs are on the 2 bottom floor, that part is shown in the safety-related 3 on the previous slide and here it's non-safety. I 4 believe based on the figures that they just --
5 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, let me clarify that.
6 So I'm not sure it's depicted very clearly in my 7 sketch here, but --
8 MEMBER BROWN: Well, they were labs.
9 That's why I asked the question.
10 MR. ANDERSON: Sure. If you can imagine 11 there's a continuous three foot thick -- as I 12 mentioned earlier there were some exceptions -- mat 13 slab that's -- it's a big rectangle, so it's from --
14 and I don't think I have a -- I can't show with my 15 cursor on the screen, but if you look at on the 16 southwest corner of the -- what looks like the red 17 highlighted -- there you go. Thank you, Jeff.
18 There is this little rectangular 19 structure. I wanted to highlight that because it's 20 actually -- there's a non-safety-related building 21 there that sits on a safety-related -- on a continuous 22 safety-related mat slab. So the mat slab --
23 MEMBER BROWN: Is that the lower right-24 hand corner? Is that the lower right-hand corner 25 you're talking about where the little conference room NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
19 1 looks like it is?
2 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Yes, sort of at the 3 near corner of the picture here.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Where the hand was?
5 MR. ANDERSON: Yes.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I was on the other 7 end.
8 MR. ANDERSON: Okay.
9 MEMBER BROWN: Well, go ahead.
10 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, so the mat slab is 11 continuous underneath. It's a large rectangular mat 12 slab. We did not -- it was beneficial to the design 13 of the structure to keep it as a rectangle. And so we 14 have a small portion of this non-safety-related 15 building that sits on a portion of the safety-related 16 mat slab. And it's isolated -- a portion of the non-17 safety-related building is isolated both from the 18 safety-related building and the non-safety-related 19 building.
20 Okay. All right. So now I'll just go 21 through the meteorological damage and the various 22 design aspects that were considered for the safety-23 related portions of the building. If you have 24 questions about the non-safety-related portions 25 building, please feel free to stop me and I'm happy to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
20 1 answer them, but I'm largely going to address the 2 safety-related portions.
3 So the wind loading is determined using 4 ASCE 7-05. We utilized analytical procedure instead 5 of simplified procedure or the wind tunnel testing 6 method. And the way that we've accounted for the sort 7 of importance of the building is by utilizing the 8 Code's importance factor of 1.15 and adjusting the 9 wind speed so that rather than designing for the 50-10 year mean recurrence interval that the Code defaults 11 to, we've modified it with a factor so that we're 12 designing for the 100-year mean recurrence interval 13 wind speed.
14 We used the same procedure for tornado 15 loading. We use Reg Guide 1.76, Region I design 16 requirements and we use the same procedure, the ASCE 17 7-05 analytical procedure equations: 230 mile per hour 18 winds and importance factor of 1.15. We do account 19 for the differential pressure and tornado missile 20 spectrum in conjunction with the design wind pressure.
21 Are there any questions about that?
22 (No response.)
23 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Next slide, please.
24 We also account for snow, ice, and rain loading as 25 necessary. There are some flat roofs and some sloped NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
21 1 roofs and ASCE 7 requires different considerations 2 depending on the type of roof you have. For snow 3 loads we've again modified the standard default ASCE 4 7 loading from the 50-year mean recurrence interval to 5 the 100-year mean recurrence interval by increasing 6 the loads by 22 percent.
7 We've also considered unbalanced snow 8 loads and any drift loading that the Code requires us 9 to consider. Are there any questions about that?
10 (No response.)
11 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Jeff, next slide, 12 please. Okay. In terms of water damage the design-13 basis flood level; and this is described in Section --
14 in Chapter 2, from the local probable maximum flood 15 event, creates a water level approximately 50 feet 16 below grade. And there is a precipitation event again 17 defined in Chapter 2, the design-basis rainfall and 18 that creates a water level of approximately grade 19 elevation. So in order to address these water levels 20 the lowest portion of the structure is essentially 21 above the design-basis flood level and the top of the 22 mat slab is at least four inches above grade in all 23 locations. So we've essentially attempted to address 24 these water levels by raising the structure above 25 them.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
22 1 There are some internal floods considered 2 as a result of various incidents. There are a series 3 of berms and ramps that are designed at the top of the 4 mat slab that are intended to contain and capture any 5 internal flood water and any water-sensitive safety-6 related equipment is raised off the floor above the 7 prescribed internal flood levels.
8 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg Halnon. Just 9 a quick question on the flood. You mention on that 10 first bullet lowest portion of the structure. I 11 assume that's external of the structure, not internal?
12 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct.
13 MEMBER HALNON: Is there any below that 14 grade of any conduit penetrations and/or piping 15 penetrations that have an opportunity to leak if 16 there's a flood level?
17 MR. ANDERSON: There's not. So all of the 18 penetrations are above -- well, I should -- all of the 19 penetrations come through the mat slab, which is at 20 least four inches above grade.
21 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. Thank you.
22 MEMBER BIER: Another quick question.
23 This is Vicki Bier. What was the historic basis of 24 the external flooding level and is there any reason to 25 believe that that might be changing due to climate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
23 1 change? I know Wisconsin has experienced unusual 2 flooding recently.
3 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, those -- the 4 probabilistic maximum flood event is based on another 5 chapter of the FSAR and I'm not an expert on that.
6 Jeff, I don't know if you have any 7 feedback we can offer there.
8 MR. BARTELME: No, we've got that detail 9 in (audio interference) go back and pull that.
10 MEMBER BIER: That's fine. We can 11 certainly defer that.
12 MEMBER REMPE: I'm sorry, but the person 13 who responded back, a few of us at least couldn't 14 quite interpret what was said because of an echo.
15 Could you say what your last response was again, 16 please, about the flooding?
17 MR. BARTELME: This is Jeff Bartelme.
18 Just to clarify that the maximum precipitation basis 19 is in Chapter 2. We have to go back and pull that.
20 It's just not --
21 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you. Thank you.
22 That was much clearer. I wasn't sure what was lost in 23 that echo.
24 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, this is Greg. If my 25 memory serves us right, I think you did not apply NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
24 1 climate change just because of the uncertainty, that 2 you have just stayed strictly with the Code 3 requirements. I think we asked that during the 4 Chapter 2 visit.
5 MEMBER REMPE: And actually I think that 6 was -- wasn't that a decision made as part of the 7 construction permit versus the operating license, too?
8 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, that was back in the 9 very first --
10 MEMBER REMPE: So water under the bridge, 11 so to speak.
12 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Are there any other 13 questions?
14 (No response.)
15 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Jeff, would you go 16 to the next slide, please? Thank you.
17 Now I'll discuss seismic damage. The 18 maximum ground acceleration, or I should say the 19 design response spectra is taken from Reg Guide 1.60 20 with a maximum ground acceleration of 0.2 Gs. We 21 created synthetic acceleration time histories. We 22 generated those in an attempt to envelope the design 23 response spectra from Reg Guide 1.60 and we used 24 Approach 2, Option 1 of NUREG-800, Section 371 to do 25 that. And we designed the -- we ran the response NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
25 1 spectra for all the critical damping values described 2 in 1-1 of Reg Guide 161.
3 We then performed a soil/structure 4 interaction analysis using a program called SASSI2010.
5 We used an equivalent linear elastic basis for three 6 different soil conditions: the best estimate, the 7 upper-bound, and the lower-bound soil properties which 8 were derived specifically for the site based on the 9 geotechnical investigations at the site and the free 10 field site response analysis.
11 We performed a separate structural seismic 12 qualification analysis of the facility. Once we had 13 performed the in-structure response spectra we used 14 the accelerations from that analysis and performed 15 separate seismic qualification of the facility using 16 a program called SAP2000, a comprehensive 3D model.
17 And then we combined the earthquake components using 18 Section 2.1 of Reg Guide 192 and also performed a 19 stability evaluation according to ASCE 43-05 and 20 NUREG-800, Section 385.
21 Are there any questions about that?
22 (No response.)
23 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. And just to 24 emphasize the seismic analysis of the facility was --
25 used load combinations and designed the facility in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
26 1 accordance with ACI 349-13 and the steel elements were 2 designed according to AISC N690-12. So those are the 3 codes of record for the structural design of the 4 safety-related aspects of the facility.
5 I briefly just want to talk about the 6 various seismic qualifications and classifications in 7 the facility. So there's as we've discussed Seismic 8 Category 1 structures which we've defined as 9 structures that must perform their safety functions 10 after an SSE. There's also non-seismic structures 11 which are not required to perform any safety 12 functions. And then there are Category 2 SSEs which 13 we've defined as being collocated with Seismic 14 Category 1 SSCs and must maintain their integrity in 15 the event of an SSE to prevent unacceptable 16 interactions between Seismic Category 1 SSEs and non-17 seismic SSEs. And these Category 2 SSCs are not 18 required to remain functional after the SSE.
19 Any questions about that?
20 (No response.)
21 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. I'll briefly touch 22 on the aircraft impact analysis that was performed.
23 So a critical aircraft was selected utilizing the 24 nearby airport records. And then we used some 25 industry documents to determine governing horizontal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
27 1 and vertical velocities at impact for those critical 2 aircrafts that were selected, and we analyzed the 3 building utilizing the standard DOE Standard 3014-4 2006. And so we've accounted for both local and 5 global impact responses in the event that an aircraft 6 accidentally impacts the facility.
7 For a global response we've considered the 8 ductility limits of ACI 349 and AISC N690 and we've 9 essentially evaluated every available surface of the 10 structure for perpendicular impacts both at the center 11 of those surfaces and at critical locations near edges 12 and corners that we thought might pose a risk. And we 13 tracked that these -- that no aspects of the aircrafts 14 can penetrate or perforate the building envelope and 15 potentially cause damage to safety-related SSCs.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
17 The two aircraft that you selected, neither one of 18 them is manufactured anymore. Are we sure that going 19 forward there aren't any other aircraft that would 20 frequent the airport that are outside the envelope of 21 those two aircraft?
22 MR. ANDERSON: Since the initial design 23 was performed we have not gone back and reevaluated 24 the records from the airport. I can't say for certain 25 if there are other aircraft available today that would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
28 1 be described as critical, but the aircraft that we had 2 chosen at the time were from among a large array or a 3 large number of various types of aircraft and they 4 were critical just because of their size and weight.
5 Essentially those are the sort of critical aspects of 6 them that we needed to consider.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, this is Greg. I 8 believe in the construction portion it was a class of 9 aircraft and they chose that as representative of that 10 class that was most representative.
11 I had a question about -- looks like the 12 impact of an aircraft relative to the structures is 13 well covered. This is a question I asked earlier in 14 the other Chapter 2 also. The ensuing fire or the 15 ensuing consequences of an aircraft -- notwithstanding 16 that we were told that no analysis has been done, but 17 do you -- are you concerned at all with the potential 18 degradation of the concrete and degradation of 19 structures based on potential high heat from a fire or 20 whatever the case may be for an extended period of 21 time?
22 MR. ANDERSON: It is not a scenario that 23 we've evaluated, so --
24 MEMBER HALNON: Okay.
25 MEMBER HALNON: The other question, just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
29 1 to put it on the record, was that -- the other 2 question is that if a large area fire did ensue from 3 an aircraft impact, what impact on the ventilation 4 systems, the environmental systems inside the plant 5 would there be? So that would be the next logical 6 question beyond what I just asked as well.
7 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, so the ventilation 8 systems are -- I guess they have not been addressed.
9 We are planning to -- we are going to design missile 10 barriers around the outside of the facility that will 11 harden the penetrations through the building envelope 12 to ensure that they will remain functional as 13 necessary under various external events.
14 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. Thanks.
15 MR. ANDERSON: Are there any other 16 questions?
17 (No response.)
18 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. I'll briefly talk 19 about the nitrogen purge system structure then. This 20 is a small safety-related Seismic Category 1 building.
21 And that's on the east side of the facility near the 22 entries into the facility.
23 Next slide, please, Jeff. This little 24 facility is essentially designed -- same criteria as 25 the main production facility structure. I guess I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
30 1 just wanted to highlight the exception associated with 2 meteorological damage. Rather than doing sort of a 3 comprehensive snow loading analysis conservatively a 4 60 psf snow loading has been applied, and that's been 5 shown to bound the 100-year mean recurrence interval 6 snow load.
7 I also wanted to highlight that the 8 aircraft impact has been addressed qualitatively on 9 this structure because its location relative to the 10 main facility and to any off-site power structures --
11 essentially it could not be struck at the same time as 12 the main facility or the off-site power structures 13 that need to provide backup systems to the facility 14 under an aircraft impact scenario.
15 Are there any questions about that?
16 (No response.)
17 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. That concludes my 18 presentation. Are there any general questions or 19 specific questions on any of the slides we've seen now 20 that you've had a chance to see them all?
21 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay. If there aren't 22 any questions, I think we're -- thank you very much.
23 We now need to transition to the Staff. Who's the 24 presenter on the Staff?
25 MR. PRINARIS: It's Andrew Prinaris.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
31 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: Ah, okay. Andrew.
2 Okay. You've got the slides coming up.
3 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, thank you. Good 4 morning, Chairman and members of the ACRS. My name is 5 Andrew Prinaris. I'm a staff engineer from the Office 6 of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or NRR.
7 We're here today to discuss the Staff's 8 safety review of the SHINE Medical Technologies' 9 operating license application as documented in the 10 safety evaluation report. Joining me today are other 11 members of the technical staff, project management, 12 and management including Joe Colaccino, Chief of 13 Structural Civil Geotechnical Engineering Branch, 14 Division of Engineering and External Hazards, Office 15 of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
16 Next slide, please. We will begin today's 17 presentation with an overview of selected Chapter 3 18 technical areas that we believe are of interest to the 19 ACRS before sharing the findings of Staff's safety 20 review. In this review particular attention was paid 21 to the effects of potential aircraft impact on the 22 facility and to the effects of radiation on safety-23 significant SSCs.
24 For the aircraft impact, the Staff also 25 examined the effects of impact on certain safety SSCs NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
32 1 such as those of crane systems.
2 Next slide, please. The Staff, in its 3 review, verified the sufficiency of the SHINE facility 4 design that there is a reasonable assurance it is 5 adequate for the facility to remain safe during 6 operation and capable of safe shutdown as defined in 7 10 CFR 50.2 during environmental events and accident 8 conditions. The Staff paid special attention to 9 facility SSC designs and operating characteristics 10 that have unusual or novel design features to ensure 11 that they remain safe and functional so that they 12 fulfill their intended function during facility 13 operation.
14 The applicable regulatory requirements for 15 the evaluation of SHINE OLA, or operating license 16 application, its facility and its SSCs designs are as 17 follows: 10 CFR 50.34, Contents of Applications 18 Technical Information, Paragraph B, Final Safety 19 Analysis Report; 10 CFR 50.40, Common Standards; 10 20 CFR 50.57, Issuance of Operating License.
21 Applicable regulatory body (audio 22 interference), but I'm not so sure. Can you hear me 23 well?
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: You broke up a bit ago, 25 so --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
33 1 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, applicable -- can you 2 hear me now?
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes.
4 MR. PRINARIS: Okay. Great. There is 5 some echo in the background and I'm not so sure is 6 affecting the transmission. I probably -- yes, I'd 7 appreciate --
8 (Simultaneous speaking.)
9 MR. PRINARIS: Yes. Applicable regulatory 10 body that was followed in Applicant's design and 11 Staff's review included mandatory and voluntary 12 guidance and standards. For example, for mandatory 13 guidance the Applicant and Staff focused on NUREG-14 1537, Part 1, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing 15 Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors 16 Format and Content, and NUREG-1537, Part 2, Guidelines 17 for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the 18 Licensing of Non-Power Reactor Standard Review Plan 19 and Acceptance Criteria, their ISGs final Interim 20 Staff Guidance augmenting NUREG-1537, Part 1 and Part 21 2.
22 Other NRC Regulatory Guidance included 23 several Regulatory Guide standards and codes such as 24 Regulatory Guide 1.142, Safety-Related Concrete 25 Structures for Nuclear Power Plants Other than Nuclear NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
34 1 Reactor Vessels and Containments; NUREG-CR-7171, A 2 Review of the Effects of Radiation on Micro Structures 3 and Properties of Concrete Used in Nuclear Power 4 Plants; National Codes and Standards; ASC 7-05, 5 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other 6 Structures; CMA 70, which is Crane Manufacturer 7 Association of America Specifications for Top Running 8 Bridge and Gantry Type Multiple Girder Electric 9 Overhead Traveling Cranes; that's a mouthful; ASME, or 10 American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nog-1, Rules 11 for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes, Top 12 Running Bridge and Multiple Girder; and U.S.
13 Department of Energy, DOE Standard 3014, Accident 14 Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities; 15 and local building codes as applicable.
16 Next slide, please. The NRC Staff 17 evaluated the sufficiency of the facility design 18 features for systems and components as described in 19 SHINE FSAR Section 3.5. For environmental and 20 abnormal loading effects on facility potential damage, 21 Staff's review used the guidance and acceptance 22 criteria from Section 3.5, Systems and Components of 23 NUREG-1537, Part 2, and the ISG augmenting NUREG-1537, 24 Part 2. In addition, the Staff also used the guidance 25 of other Chapter 3 sections as presented in follow-up NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
35 1 slides to ensure facility safety and protection of the 2 public.
3 Next slide, please. The NRC Staff 4 reviewed the FSAR layout and its safety-related SSCs 5 in the irradiation facility, radioisotope production 6 facility, the non-radiologically-controlled seismic 7 area, and a non-safety-related area. Staff's review 8 included safety-related and non-safety-related SSCs.
9 The review of STR's structural SSCs, or elements, 10 structural elements that is, included the foundation 11 mat, mezzanine floor, roof slab, and sheer walls.
12 Some review details included the review of 13 the steel roof truss and the concrete roof slab of the 14 irradiation facility and radioisotope production 15 facility, the mezzanine floor, which is made of 16 reinforced concrete on metal deck, and a large section 17 of the basement in the RPF, which is recessed below 18 grade to accommodate a series of tanks, valves, pits, 19 and other mechanical systems.
20 Additionally, reviews included facility SSCs and 21 equipment such as an exhaust stack, supercells, below-22 grade reinforced concrete vaults, tanks, and some SSCs 23 found in other FSAR chapters.
24 The N2PS, which is a stage-2 structure, is 25 built on the FSTR basement. It contains a portion of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
36 1 the N2PS system, which is a high-pressure nitrogen gas 2 system. The N2PS structure seismic design is based on 3 an equivalent static load method with an amplification 4 factor of 1.5. This design methodology provides a 5 conservative seismic response that accounts for 6 possible cell structure interaction effects between 7 FSTR and the N2PS structure. In general it has an 8 ability to conservatively resist lateral loads.
9 DR. BLEY: Could I ask you a question 10 here, Andrew?
11 MR. PRINARIS: Absolutely.
12 DR. BLEY: This is Dennis Bley. And it's 13 the same question I raised with SHINE, and it's based 14 on a couple of things historically that I remember, 15 the idea of some good design practice having 16 unintended effects.
17 At one nuclear plant quite a few years ago 18 it was found that the gap between two of the buildings 19 was such that if the earthquake was not a whole lot 20 above the design-basis earthquake you could get 21 interactions with -- between the buildings and 22 actually collapse of those buildings, or at least the 23 first walls of them.
24 Also back in 2011 the Mineral, Virginia 25 earthquake affected the North Anna Power Plant and I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
37 1 remember a -- you can get this from the theory as 2 well, but I remember a public meeting between the 3 Commission and the North Anna people, Dominion people 4 and EPRI. And they discussed that given the standard 5 methodology and the assumed uncertainty distributions 6 of -- that approach leaves about a 16 percent 7 probability of an earthquake acceleration beyond the 8 design-basis earthquake so that the high acceleration 9 that was noticed at Mineral wasn't -- shouldn't have 10 been a great surprise.
11 I'm not sure at all -- I'm pretty sure 12 that their -- SHINE's calculated one inch gap to allow 13 for displacement in the two buildings is probably a 14 very good estimate. I don't have a very good idea at 15 all about how much their margin gets us away from this 16 idea of a seismic cliff, that something just beyond 17 the design-basis could lead these buildings to 18 interact and cause a problem.
19 Did you folks look at that? And if you 20 did not, I'm curious as to why not.
21 MR. PRINARIS: We engaged with SHINE, and 22 in particular with Sargent & Lundy on this particular 23 question regarding the seismic isolation and I believe 24 Marc Anderson in the previous presentation addressed 25 the seismic gap. And it was the same examination that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
38 1 you are asking and we were asking. And as far as the 2 North Anna earthquake, or the Mineral -- I don't 3 recall the exact name --
4 DR. BLEY: Mineral, Virginia. Yes.
5 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, the Mineral, Virginia 6 earthquake. The geologic structure of the two areas 7 are different. I'm not a geologist to address this in 8 detail.
9 DR. BLEY: Well, that part is not the 10 issue I'm raising. It's the issue there was -- and we 11 have the same design approach; you can tell us where, 12 is that it isn't trying to assure you never have an 13 earthquake with accelerations above the design-basis.
14 It's to ensure you have a really good chance of that.
15 And as they pointed out, that methodology leaves about 16 a 16 percent chance you go above it.
17 So the question was really if you have an 18 earthquake that goes above it --
19 MR. PRINARIS: I did look -- the USGS --
20 DR. BLEY: -- do you get a split --
21 (Simultaneous speaking.)
22 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, I did look at USGS 23 material on this.
24 DR. BLEY: Yes.
25 MR. PRINARIS: And I think there are newer NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
39 1 maps of available. In our review, the Staff's review 2 -- it's not only me -- we looked at those maps and we 3 couldn't see the acceleration beyond what we already 4 -- I mean, the Applicant already designed for. And 5 that's what we -- in our evaluation, in our review, in 6 our verification that's what we focused on. There was 7 not on record something that we could take us beyond 8 that.
9 DR. BLEY: Okay. But there is uncertainty 10 in that. This idea that there might be a cliff there 11 just beyond the design-basis is one that's troubled 12 people for a long time. Most places where you look 13 you can assure yourself that's not a problem. Here 14 I'm not sure because I don't -- Marc told us that they 15 had about a 25 percent margin, which might be plenty 16 to cover that uncertainty, but he didn't tell us how 17 they picked it or why that was enough. And you're not 18 quite telling us that either. So I'm just not sure 19 about it.
20 MR. PRINARIS: And again we're looking for 21 reasonable assurance in our safety determination.
22 (Simultaneous speaking.)
23 DR. BLEY: Go ahead.
24 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, I'm a little bit --
25 where were we? Did I finish the slides, the scope of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
40 1 review?
2 DR. BLEY: No, you were about half way 3 through, somewhere in there.
4 MR. PRINARIS: I think I did cover the 5 N2PS. Okay. The following -- let's go to the next 6 slide. Then you're going to get pretty much what we 7 did in our reviews for safety determination. And 8 again we're looking for reasonable assurance.
9 Thank you for the next slide. Consistent 10 with the review procedures of NUREG-1537, Part 2, 11 Section 3.2, Other Applicable Regulatory Guidance, the 12 Staff considered the site meteorology to ensure that 13 all SSCs that could suffer meteorological damage as 14 presented in SHINE FSAR Section 3.2 and 3.6 and other 15 relevant chapters of the FSAR were addressed.
16 Next slide, please. By the way I want to 17 mention one thing. I don't mind if you want to stop 18 me some place to ask a question, just like the 19 previous ACRS member did.
20 So let me go on for the time being. I 21 think there will be adequate time at the time also to 22 ask questions. Similarly, consistent with the review 23 procedures of NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 3.3, the 24 Staff considered flooding to ensure that all SSCs that 25 could suffer water damage are considered as presented NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
41 1 in SHINE FSAR Section 3.3 and 3.6 and in other 2 relevant chapters of the FSAR.
3 Next slide, please. Consistent with the 4 review procedures of NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 3.4, 5 the Staff considered seismic effects to ensure that 6 all facility SSCs that could suffer seismic damage as 7 presented in SHINE FSAR Section 3.4 and 3.6 and other 8 relevant chapters of the FSAR are considered. Staff 9 verified the design response spectra discussed in FSAR 10 Section 3.41 provides information for the peak ground 11 acceleration for the safe shutdown earthquake SSC, its 12 design response spectra, synthetic time histories for 13 SSI, or soil structure interaction analysis, and 14 critical damping values for structural components.
15 The Staff verified that this approach follows Section 16 3.71 of NUREG-0800 and other regulatory guidance as 17 applicable.
18 Next slide, please.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Andrew, this is Walt 20 Kirchner. Just a quick question on this El Centro 21 earthquake as a reference. It's a little bit 22 different than we've been seeing from your reviews of 23 other facilities, typically where they'll use a 24 spectrum. Is the El Centro one tied to the Wisconsin 25 siting, or is that tied to the 1537?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
42 1 MR. PRINARIS: I'm going to request --
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: NUREG-1537.
3 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, a colleague of mine 4 addressed this specific point and I'd like to turn it 5 over to him.
6 Amit, are you available to discuss that?
7 MR. GHOSH: Good morning. My name is Amit 8 Ghosh and I can't answer this questions right now, so 9 we'll take it back and respond to it.
10 MR. KWON: This Sean Kwon from Sargent &
11 Lundy. So, this El Centro earthquake was used as a 12 seed time history to generate the response spectrum 13 consistent time history, so I don't think we need this 14 one in the slide.
15 This is just a seed time history; we did 16 not have anything so you can use El Centro earthquake 17 time history, or let's say, Taft earthquake or 18 Northridge earthquake, you can use any time history as 19 seed and then you just modify the time history to make 20 the synthetic time history consistent with our 21 response spectrum. So this is not necessary to 22 address on the slide.
23 DR. BLEY: I missed a few words in your 24 answer, I think what you said is, it's essentially an 25 arbitrarily picked time history that you used as a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
43 1 starting point and then you vary it according to what 2 you know about the actual site conditions. Is that 3 what you were saying?
4 MR. KWON: Not related to site condition.
5 So, yeah, you pick real time history, I cannot make, 6 like, a synthetic time history from nowhere, so you 7 pick existing, actual time history data and then you 8 modify that time history to make it consistent with 9 our response spectrum, the .2g anchored NRC Reg Guide 10 1.60 response spectrum.
11 So you can pick, let's say, other time 12 history, you have Northridge earthquake time history, 13 or Virginia time history, or Taft earthquake time 14 history, but we did, like, many tries and then El 15 Centro earthquake time history -- synthetic time 16 history based on El Centro time history showed better 17 match than others.
18 DR. BLEY: Okay --
19 PARTICIPANT: Why not (inaudible) a bunch 20 of them and then you pick the one that you can adjust 21 to best fit.
22 MR. KWON: Right, that's correct. That's 23 the correct statement. So it's misleading, so I don't 24 think we need that one on the slide.
25 MEMBER BIER: One other follow up question NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
44 1 to make sure I'm understanding -- this is Vicki Bier 2 again -- when you start with the El Centro and then 3 modify it, does that lead to a single new synthetic 4 time history or does that lead to a bunch of 5 different, randomly generated time histories that are 6 used in some kind of, like, Monte Carlo simulation or 7 whatever?
8 MR. KWON: No, this is, NRC NUREG 3.7.2 9 allow to use of one set of time history instead of, 10 like, 30 or 60 sets of time history. So we, based on 11 the real time history, we generated one set of time 12 history, so north, south direction, east, west 13 direction, and north, south direction, and then those 14 generated time history meet all the requirement 15 described in SRP 3.7.2.
16 MEMBER BIER: Okay --
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 MR. KWON: So the generated response 19 spectrum should meet that response spectrum shape and 20 also, like, there are many other requirements. The 21 strong motion duration should be longer than six or 22 seven seconds, and then power spectrum density should 23 be, like, distributed well, instead of, like, random 24 picky here and there. And then there are some other 25 requirement, so we met all the SRP requirement.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
45 1 DR. BLEY: I forgot your initial 2 introduction of yourself, you're with the Staff?
3 MR. KWON: I'm at Sargent & Lundy.
4 DR. BLEY: Sargent & Lundy, okay. And the 5 Staff then does agree with this, Andrew?
6 MR. PRINARIS: Sir, the information that 7 came to us that the seed was the El Centro, and I 8 believe I've heard this in the discussion, that was 9 the best fit in generating the synthetics. This is 10 where we are.
11 What exactly are the exact methodology 12 that Sargent & Lundy followed, I believe they just 13 outlined, and if there are other questions we'll be 14 happy to take them back and come back and respond to 15 you.
16 MR. COLACCINO: Andrew, if I may. This is 17 Joe Colaccino, I'm the chief of the structural, civil, 18 and geotechnical engineering branch, ACRS members have 19 asked a reasonable question here about how the Staff 20 utilized this in their review, and as Amit said, I 21 think this is a question, because it's clear here 22 since we don't have a good answer for you, how we 23 utilized this in our review right now.
24 So that's on us, we'll take that back and 25 we'll work with the Staff and get you the right NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
46 1 answer. Thank you --
2 MR. GHOSH: Joe, I can answer this part of 3 the question because development of the synthetic time 4 history was done in chapter two, reviewed by a 5 seismologist. I reviewed that, and as the previous 6 speaker from Sargent & Lundry said, in section 3.7.2 7 gives several criteria to seed the generated time 8 history, and the spectrum, sir, have all those 9 characteristics, we checked that. Six seconds strong 10 motion, ground motion, independent between X, Y, and 11 Z, and all those things we checked.
12 So we verified everything and we fully 13 agree with what Sargent & Lundry said, there's a 14 procedure given in 3.7.2 and we've verified that in 15 our review.
16 MR. COLACCINO: Amit, this is Joe 17 Colaccino again, thank you very much. Does that 18 satisfy the member's question?
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I think I started this 20 off, so yes, thank you. Walt Kirchner speaking.
21 MR. GHOSH: Thank you.
22 MR. PRINARIS: Is there any other question 23 regarding this slide?
24 (No response.)
25 MR. PRINARIS: Thank you. May we go to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
47 1 the next slide, please? Staff verified methodologies 2 for modeling and analysis performed for the FSDR, for 3 example, with SASSI2010, SAP2000, finite element 4 analysis codes. Applied loads to the structure, for 5 example, dead, live, including those from a 6 meteorological crane, fluid, soil, pressure, and 7 seismic.
8 The structural response to multi-9 directional seismic input, structural seismic 10 stability, etcetera, are consistent with regulatory 11 guidance, national codes and standards, and industry 12 accepted practices.
13 The finite element analysis code selected 14 for analysis are commercially available and have been 15 used excessively in the nuclear power industry. Next 16 slide, please.
17 Staff verified that strain-dependent soil 18 properties were determined from geotechnical 19 investigations and pre-filled site response and 20 analysis using Shake 2000 program. The pre-filled 21 site response analysis is performed using the min-BET, 22 or best estimate, the upper bound and the lower bound 23 soil properties to represent potential variations of 24 the in situ soil conditions.
25 Staff finds the methodology used to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
48 1 determine the bounding in-structure response spectra 2 acceptable. Staff also finds, the analysis followed 3 the NRC guidance documents and satisfies NUREG-0800 4 3.7.2 section. Next slide, please.
5 Staff's review included effects of 6 radiation, structural support system and components, 7 for example, beams, for the Neutron Driver Assembly 8 System, or NDAS, and those in the sub-critical 9 assembly, SASS.
10 Staff verified that safety-related 11 austenitic stainless steel substructural component in 12 the irradiation unit cells have adequate ductility and 13 strength to resist anticipated transients and abnormal 14 loads with stainless steel tested for radiation and 15 corrosion at the Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
16 Staff's review also included the 17 structural performance of irradiated concrete and 18 structural steel affected by radiation exposure. In 19 its review, the Staff considered the threshold limits 20 of NUREG/CR-7171 and ACI 349.3, which is Report on 21 Evaluation and Repair of Existing Nuclear Safety-22 Related Concrete Structures.
23 Staff verified that crane structural 24 components and loadings were evaluated in accordance 25 with ASME NOG-1, ASME B30.2, and CMAA 70. Staff also NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
49 1 verified that the crane purchased specifications 2 included environmental additions for design of 3 structural components to account for seismic loads, 4 fracture toughness, and radiation hardening as 5 applicable per ASME NOG-1.
6 Staff verified that, for crane loading, 7 there was conservatism in the building design 8 consistent overall with ASC-705 or IBC-1607 Building 9 Codes and Requirements.
10 Staff verified that the irradiation unit 11 structure and its light water pool submerged, or semi-12 submerged, safety-related SSCs or equipment are 13 designed for hydrodynamic loads, consistent with 14 applicable national standard, for example, ASC-498, 15 ACI-350.3, and AISC N690-12. Next slide, please.
16 Staff verified that SHINE used this FY 17 screening approach, detailing US DOE standard 3014 18 Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous 19 Facilities to programmatically reduce the risk for 20 facility damage and to eliminate the need to further 21 examine consequences of elevated temperatures due to 22 aircraft impact generated fires of the safety-related 23 FSDR structural steel SSCs.
24 Staff verified that the consequences of 25 elevated temperatures to FSDR structural steel from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
50 1 postulated aircraft crash external to the facility and 2 those fires of that type would be minimal, if any, and 3 that the facility would continue to maintain its 4 defense-in-depth.
5 Staff also verified that the SHINE, 6 through several aircraft impact scenarios on the FSDR 7 external envelope, ensured the design adequacy of the 8 FSDR and its safety-related SSCs to aircraft impacts.
9 In summary, Staff verified that seismic 10 design robustness is equally applicable to the design 11 for external hazards, and in this case, external 12 hazard meaning, the aircraft impact and we'll be 13 following up with another external hazard slides.
14 Next slide, please.
15 MEMBER HALNON: Before you go on on the 16 impact -- and this Greg Halnon -- the DOE standard 17 that you cite talks a lot about secondary effects, and 18 analysis looking taking credit or non-credit for 19 certain systems, not taking credit for active fire 20 protection systems or even suppression systems of 21 other types.
22 I still don't see any analysis and/or 23 verbiage in the, either, SAR or the FSAR, that tells 24 me that this was looked at in any kind of detail 25 according to that standard.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
51 1 There's a whole section, Section 7, that 2 talks about it, there's Section 5.5 that talks about 3 it, where is that analysis that shows that last bullet 4 is true?
5 MR. PRINARIS: Well when SHINE did the 6 approach of strengthening the walls by increasing the 7 size of the walls, that eliminated the risk of an 8 aircraft or its power plants penetrating the facility 9 envelope.
10 As such, the fires would be external and 11 I believe, in the SCR, or the draft SCR, as it may be, 12 addresses that in part and in fact discusses fire 13 protection and mitigation standards, and fire 14 brigades, and so on and so forth, I don't recall the 15 exact place in the -- where we discussed this thing 16 but I do recall that we referenced other chapters of 17 the FSAR, or other reviews that the Staff performed 18 regarding fires.
19 One thing that concerned me was, if the 20 envelope was to be penetrated then what would be the 21 effects on the structural steel, and we did have an 22 interaction with SHINE, or Sargent & Lundy, to this 23 effect and then the reduction in risk for penetration 24 was accomplished by increasing the size of the walls, 25 so there wouldn't be any effect for penetration as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
52 1 such.
2 We also looked at the labyrinth, and I 3 believe SHINE discussed potential impacts at the 4 corners of the facility. We discussed that with the 5 Applicant extensively, we were concerned potential 6 missiles may get into the labyrinth, but the way the 7 labyrinth are constructed is to minimize those.
8 Our aim in the review was to make sure 9 that safety-related system structures and components 10 would not be affected by an aircraft impact. And I'll 11 take you one step further, a concern was on the cranes 12 which are non-safety-related systems, whether an 13 impact to the walls would be dethrone, so to speak, 14 the cranes.
15 SHINE shared with us the design and how it 16 was constructed to minimize, if any -- the way they 17 built it, it seemed like it was highly unlikely for 18 the rails or the systems of the cranes to come 19 detached and cause problems to safety-related 20 component.
21 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. I think I already 22 gave you the credit for good impact analysis, I'm 23 really looking for some more words on the secondary 24 analysis, not just what the standard requires but just 25 the practicality of it.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
53 1 I just haven't seen where that last bullet 2 is substantiated by any verbiage in the SCR or the 3 FSAR, so if you find where that -- I can issue --
4 (Simultaneous speaking.)
5 MR. PRINARIS: Sure.
6 MR. COLACCINO: So, Andrew, if I could --
7 this is Joe Colaccino again, I think that's a takeaway 8 for us that we could do that --
9 (Simultaneous speaking.)
10 MR. PRINARIS: Well, let me respond, Joe 11 --
12 MR. COLACCINO: If we could, Andrew, 13 please --
14 MR. PRINARIS: Yes, sir.
15 MR. COLACCINO: We could do a takeaway on 16 that so that we can keep everything morning forward.
17 MR. PRINARIS: Well, I was about to 18 respond -- I was about to respond to ACRS, if you 19 permit me.
20 I'm looking at, and help me out here, 21 Michael Balazik, if you have -- I'm reading here from 22 our draft, to ensure that the consequences of elevated 23 temperatures to FSDR structural steel would be 24 minimal, if any, from postulated aircraft crash fires.
25 And B, the facility would continue to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
54 1 maintain its defense-in-depth and exceed the DOE 2 standard limits to active fire and/or suppression 3 system, following such events has been considered, the 4 NRC Staff reviewed FSAR Section 982.3 and we 5 requested, through an RAI 9.5, regarding these fires 6 and I can --
7 MR. BALAZIK: Yeah, this is -- go ahead, 8 Andrew.
9 MR. PRINARIS: Yeah, I can go into the RAI 10 9.5 that clarifies the basis for the fire barrier 11 ratings --
12 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg, again, 13 that's not necessary, just citing it would be good.
14 We haven't done Chapter 9 yet, so I'll go look at that 15 and if I have continuing questions I'll bring it back 16 up.
17 MR. PRINARIS: Absolutely. And also, sir, 18 if you do go to our writing, and Michael can perhaps 19 help to this effect on what page, I think we're 20 looking at page 17 of --
21 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, the 22 NRC project manager for SHINE. So we have a dedicated 23 subcommittee meeting related to fire protection, which 24 we plan to present to the members in the July time 25 frame.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
55 1 So, yes, fire protection is part of SCE 2 Chapter 9, but again, we're having a focused 3 discussion down the road.
4 MEMBER HALNON: Yeah, and this is Greg, I 5 can we wait for that and I'll do a little bit of 6 research to make sure that I have a, you know, 7 succinct question, if there's still one.
8 MR. BALAZIK: Yes, sir. Thank you.
9 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger, 10 in the meantime can we get RAI 9.5 and transmit it?
11 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, 12 project manager for SHINE, yes, I will transmit you 13 the RAI.
14 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you.
15 MR. PRINARIS: Again, this question is to 16 the SCRS, do you wish us at this point to respond, or 17 you'll be waiting for the engagement you'll have, July 18 time frame?
19 MEMBER HALNON: I can wait. Again, I have 20 a little research to do myself, to be fair, so I --
21 maybe go look at that stuff.
22 MR. PRINARIS: But we did address your 23 concern, and this was one of the concerns that we 24 looked at the impact on the skidding on the roof, and 25 we also looked at additional material that you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
56 1 probably are aware of the background of Chris Kimura 2 (phonetic) that looked at risks of decelerating 3 aircraft, as well as accelerating, decelerating to 4 landing, that means they're not accelerating, and 5 thankfully the document, this particular document, has 6 the challenger aircraft in there and describes all 7 kinds of velocity approaches, and so on and so forth.
8 I'm going to leave it there, so I'm going 9 to go on and I would like to take to the next slide, 10 if I may.
11 Staff verified that SHINE followed the 12 methodology described in Reg Guide 1.91, Revision 2, 13 Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur at 14 Nearby Facilities and on Transportation Routes Near 15 Nuclear Power Plants, to determine that potential 16 explosions would not have adverse effects on facility 17 operations or prevent a safe shutdown of the facility.
18 Staff also verified that potential 19 explosive materials are located at a safe distance 20 from the FSDR and that those that are located closer 21 have a minimal explosion incident rate of 10 to the -6 22 per year.
23 Staff further verified that externally 24 located liquid nitrogen tanks are designed in 25 accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
57 1 Section 8, Division 1, to prevent their accidental 2 explosion and fragmentation.
3 The Staff finds that these approaches, 4 based on the guidance of Reg Guide 1.91, Revision 2, 5 and national codes and standards are consistent with 6 NUREG 1537 and therefore acceptable.
7 The next slide brings us to our findings, 8 are there any questions of any of the previous slides, 9 before I take you to the findings?
10 (No response.)
11 MR. PRINARIS: If you could go to the next 12 slide, please. Our findings, this means the Staff 13 findings. Staff verified the FSDR N2PS designs are 14 adequately protect SSCs against potential 15 mineralogical, water, and seismic or external hazard 16 damages and the release of radioactive materials, 17 provide reasonable assurance that SSCs would continue 18 to perform the required safety functions and that 19 incurred damages, if any, would not cause unsafe 20 facility operation and would not prevent safe shutdown 21 of the facility, and provide adequate levels for 22 defense-in-depth against uncontrolled release of 23 radioactive material to the environment.
24 This concludes our discussion of Chapter 25 3, and I'd like to open again the floor for further NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
58 1 questions and discussions.
2 CHAIR BALLINGER: Questions from the 3 members? I have one. Dennis, before we finish this, 4 has your concern or your comment been adequately 5 articulated?
6 DR. BLEY: Not for me. I don't think 7 either Andrew or Mark explained to us the basis for 8 the 25 percent margin, and if there's a way to know 9 that kind of ensures we don't have a cliff edge on the 10 buildings coming together in an earthquake with 11 accelerations above the design basis earthquake.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thanks --
13 (Simultaneous speaking.)
14 DR. BLEY: They kind of said, that's not 15 their business; as long as they've done it by the 16 rules, everything's perfect.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: So I guess my next 18 question is, should we pursue this a little further 19 and get feedback from the Staff and/or SHINE on this?
20 DR. BLEY: Well, the Committee might want 21 to talk about it. I guess the idea that there's a 22 cliff edge and we're safe up to a point, not much 23 beyond it, is an uncomfortable one. It's been shown 24 not to exist for most kinds of equipment, but this 25 kind of seismic gap thing is a place where, at least NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
59 1 once in the past, it was clear that it wasn't enough.
2 And I just think some convincing argument 3 about why the margin they've left is enough to cover 4 for earthquakes a bit beyond the design basis makes 5 sense, because, yeah, there's reasonable assurance but 6 you really don't want the world to fall apart just a 7 little beyond where you looked.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Dennis, this is Walt, 9 you know, this TRIAL Reg Guide 1.252 on Seismic 10 Isolation technologies actually deals with this, I 11 can't by memory recite how they tell you to address 12 this margin.
13 But, for that Reg Guide, they were worried 14 about the same thing, about if you had an isolated 15 mat, there's a gap between the mat, and, I'll call it 16 a moat, around it -- there is a section in there, that 17 might be worth looking at it, on this, a way to give 18 yourself confidence that you have enough margin. But 19 I can't reconstruct the methodology from memory here 20 in real time.
21 DR. BLEY: Yeah, I got that sitting in the 22 corner but I'm in the same boat you are, and I don't 23 think either, the Applicant or the Staff, cited that 24 document.
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
60 1 again, what I would like to be sure of is that we 2 don't have a situation where there's been an 3 inadequate analysis that runs counter to the rules, 4 versus the importance of having a discussion that 5 would be useful beyond the finding of adequate 6 protection.
7 DR. BLEY: Well, yeah, I know what you'd 8 like, Ron, but the idea -- I mean the Staff has 9 decided this provides adequate protection, I don't 10 know that they've looked at the issue in particular 11 and that they've addressed it with confidence.
12 And, for me, if there's a cliff edge it 13 doesn't smell adequate. Of course, that's a 14 Commission decision in the end, but -- so I can't go 15 further than that, I think Walt's point gives the 16 Staff a place of their own to work from but, you know, 17 it's a weird kind of case. But it's always been a 18 worry. It's been shown not to be a problem in most 19 cases; this is a particular case where that's not as 20 clear.
21 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, thanks. I guess 22 I'm still a little confused, so to speak. Okay.
23 Thank you.
24 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, NRC 25 project manager for the SHINE facility, one thing I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
61 1 would like to add, back in the March 17 subcommittee 2 meeting, a member asked on applicability of 5054hh1 3 which requires a licensee to develop and implement and 4 maintain procedures if they're notified of a potential 5 aircraft threat.
6 I did go back and look at the statements 7 of consideration for that regulation and upon my 8 review, you know, I've come to the conclusion that 9 this applies only to nuclear power reactors and not 10 the SHINE facility.
11 I also asked our general counsel to take 12 an independent look at it and they come up with the 13 same conclusion that that regulation does not apply to 14 the SHINE facility, so I just wanted to add that, I 15 don't know if there's any questions on it.
16 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg Halnon, I 17 asked the question. Thanks. If you have any 18 documentation of that I would appreciate it because I 19 don't see that, but I didn't look at the statements of 20 considerations and I'll go back and look at that.
21 Thank you.
22 MR. BALAZIK: Yep, appreciate it.
23 CHAIR BALLINGER: Other questions from the 24 members?
25 (No response.)
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
62 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, we are at -- well, 2 we're a little bit behind schedule. But not that 3 much, 15 minutes. We scheduled for a break from 9:45 4 to 10:00 o'clock, but we're already beyond that, so 5 let's take a break until -- what times is it -- until 6 10:15. Thank you.
7 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 8 off the record at 10:00 a.m. and resumed at 10:15 9 a.m.)
10 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, we're back online.
11 Just to make a clarification, the chapter order today 12 will be 8, 9, and 11. So, I was not playing with a 13 full deck, and I've got the revised schedule.
14 So, Chapter 8 is next up, and is SHINE 15 ready to go?
16 MR. BARTELME: Yes. Just to clarify, 17 after Chapter 8 we're going to be doing the public 18 session of Chapter 11, correct?
19 CHAIR BALLINGER: No, we're doing Chapter 20 9. Public, Chapter 8, public, Chapter 9, Chapter 11.
21 MR. BALAZIK: Yes, this is Mike Balazik, 22 Project Manager, NRC Project Manager. Yes, so 23 according to the agenda that's on the ACRS website, 24 it's Chapter 8, then Chapter 11, then Chapter 9.
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: That's what I was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
63 1 dealing with this morning, but then there's a revised 2 schedule so I don't particularly care, it's just as 3 long as we know what we're doing.
4 MEMBER REMPE: Larry, can you weigh in 5 that it's okay since this is a subcommittee meeting, 6 to do what works fine with you, or with the 7 subcommittee chairman?
8 MR. BURKHART: I'm sorry, repeat the 9 question again?
10 MEMBER REMPE: Okay, so this is a 11 subcommittee, not a full committee. So even though 12 something's been published on the website, with the 13 Federal Register notices where they're pointing people 14 to on the ACRS external website, is it okay, I believe 15 it is okay for the subcommittee chairman to make 16 changes, as long as the Applicant and the Staff can 17 accommodate it.
18 Is that true?
19 MR. BURKHART: That is true. Yes, that is 20 true.
21 I also just wanted to make a comment to 22 you all that our consultant had joined the meeting 23 during the break, Ron, okay?
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: Oh, very good. Thank 25 you very much. Hello, Ken, how are you?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
64 1 DR. CZERWINSKI: Very well, Ron, good to 2 hear from you.
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: Good, I don't want to 4 see your picture. I don't want to be surprised. I 5 look just as old as you.
6 (Laughter.)
7 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, so we have a 8 meeting scheduled early next week anyway, so we'll be, 9 we'll bring you up to speed then.
10 DR. CZERWINSKI: Very good, so I'm 11 obviously not going to be on the entire meeting, but 12 I'm going to get as much information as I can.
13 CHAIR BALLINGER: Sure enough, thanks a 14 lot. Okay, we'll we're okay with Chapter 8 now, so 15 let's do Chapter 8. And then -- well, let's do 16 Chapter 8 and then Chapter 9. Because one of our 17 members has a bit of a conflict that we need to 18 address. Is that okay with everybody?
19 MR. BARTELME: SHINE has the Chapter 11 20 resources lined up.
21 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay.
22 MR. BARTELME: After Chapter 8, we have 23 the flexibility to shift resources but I'm not sure we 24 can accommodate that but we'll.
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, if you can do it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
65 1 that would be fine. If not, we'll just stick with the 2 original schedule.
3 MEMBER REMPE: But just to be clear, no 4 matter how you do these open sessions, the closed 5 sessions will be at the end.
6 So, you know, right, everybody?
7 CHAIR BALLINGER: That's always been the 8 case.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
10 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, so let's proceed.
11 And we have a hard stop at 11:30, so we need to be 12 careful. Okay, let's go.
13 MR. BARTELME: All right, can everyone 14 see the Chapter 8 slides?
15 CHAIR BALLINGER: We can see them fine.
16 MR. BARTELME: Okay, great. I'm Jeff 17 Bartelme, I'm SHINE's Director of Licensing. I'm 18 going to be presenting on Chapter 8 of the FSAR 19 electrical power systems, and the presentation will be 20 supported by Roger Thomas, SHINE's Lead Electrical 21 Engineer.
22 Today's presentation, SHINE will provide 23 an overview on the electrical power systems, including 24 a description of the normal electrical power supply 25 system, or NPSS, and describe the emergency electrical NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
66 1 power systems, which includes the safety-related, 2 uninterruptible electrical power supply system, or 3 UPSS, and the non-safety-related standby generator 4 system, or SGS.
5 Here's where the overview, SHINE has 6 provided a simplified one-line diagram of the 7 electrical power systems, at the SHINE facility.
8 The diagram includes the normal electrical 9 power system through the top half of the figure you 10 see there.
11 The safety-related uninterruptible 12 electrical power supply system, the bottom half you 13 see there under the dashed line, as well as the 14 standby generator here in the center.
15 A single overall electrical power system 16 serves the main production facility, as well as the 17 outbuildings and the site electrical loads.
18 The SHINE facility is connected to a few 19 power circuits from the local utility, Alliant Energy.
20 The two power circuits stage 5 local outdoor 21 transformers, you see there towards the top of the 22 figure.
23 The 12 KB Feeders originate from the 24 Alliant Energy trip road substation, about 2.8 circuit 25 miles from the SHINE site. And the Alliant Energy NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
67 1 Venture substation, about 2.3 circuit miles from the 2 SHINE facility.
3 Each division of the -- one of the inter-4 related uninterruptible electrical power supply 5 systems that are normally powered by a 480-volt 6 transfer buss, and the normal electrical power supply 7 system via division specific memory charger, you can 8 see those interconnections here, for division alpha; 9 here for division bravo.
10 These 480-volt transfer busses can also be 11 powered via the standby generator system, providing an 12 alternate source of power to the uninterruptible 13 electrical power supply system.
14 (Audio interference.)
15 MR. BARTELME: Is there any portion -- is 16 this any better? I got a little closer to the 17 microphone.
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: It's like you're getting 19 feedback from behind you somewhere, that's, that was 20 the point. That's what I'm hearing.
21 MR. BARTELME: Okay. Looking at the 22 Normal Electrical Power Supply System, the NPSS 23 consists of the normal power service entrances from 24 the local utility, as well as the distribution 25 equipment providing the three identifying utilization NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
68 1 voltages.
2 The power facility load --
3 MEMBER BROWN: Can we go back? This is 4 Charlie Brown. I had a -- we popped up and we were 5 muted. So, I had some questions on the figures.
6 MR. BARTELME: Sure.
7 MEMBER BROWN: If you don't mind. I'm 8 looking down at the UPSS part of this, and the feeds 9 from the transfer or whatever it's called, the 10 transfer buss switch gears.
11 And I guess I'm noticing that the busses, 12 the 125-volt busses A, B, and C, are all tied together 13 totally. In other words, they're operating in 14 conjunction with each other.
15 And the batteries, the battery chargers, 16 are feeding down from the independent transfer busses, 17 but then they go into these, the UPSS A, B, and C, and 18 then feed the batteries.
19 So, those two battery chargers are 20 operating in parallel, continuously. And that's 21 normally not a real good idea unless there's some way 22 to balance, and not put all the load on one of those 23 just based on voltage differences when you're doing 24 battery charging.
25 MR. THOMAS: Yes, this is Roger Thomas, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
69 1 the Lead Electrical Engineer for SHINE.
2 This is simplified. Those are not a solid 3 connection between those 125-volt busses.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
5 MR. THOMAS: What you're seeing there is 6 actually just a diode, you know, the auctioneered 7 power supply on the DC side. So, there's diodes that 8 would prevent any buss connection, and it's a pretty 9 limited --
10 MEMBER BROWN: Well, the diodes out of the 11 chargers, I would expect. It's the connections below 12 between A, B, and C. You say those, those are just 13 figuratively speaking, there's actually, they're not, 14 how are they connected?
15 Just, you see it has to be connected to 16 something otherwise it can't supply DC loads. But a 17 connection between, you know, A, B, and C all solid 18 doesn't make sense. The other --
19 MR. THOMAS: Correct. So, let me start 20 with the AC connection, that's easiest to explain.
21 That is the transfer switch. The power is either from 22 A or from B.
23 MEMBER BROWN: Where are you on the 24 diagram?
25 MR. THOMAS: I'm at the very bottom where NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
70 1 it says AC UPSS C.
2 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I got that.
3 DR. BLEY: Charlie, they're straight 4 lines, but apparently there are breakers in there.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I guess.
6 MR. THOMAS: It's a transfer switch.
7 DR. BLEY: Okay, I just.
8 MR. THOMAS: Yes, there's no -- in the 9 transfer switch, there's no way to connect the two 10 incoming sides of the transfer switch. It chooses 11 either between one side or the other. And then --
12 MEMBER BROWN: Hold on a minute. We've 13 got an omission down here. I can't see part of the 14 diagram.
15 DR. BLEY: Charlie, it's showing up on 16 mine. I see the whole bottom and --
17 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, but I've got a 18 microphone and hands and the phone. There it goes.
19 All right, now please start over again.
20 I see the AC, the three AC busses, they're all 21 connected.
22 MR. THOMAS: Right, and so --
23 MEMBER BROWN: And parallel it looks like.
24 MR. THOMAS: What that AC UPSS C actually 25 is, is a transfer switch. So, power is either from A NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
71 1 or from B.
2 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, all right, I got 3 that.
4 MR. THOMAS: And, yes, and you can't 5 interconnect A or B at that point.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I agree. You can't 7 operate those in parallel, that would be a disaster.
8 DR. BLEY: So either A or B is supplying 9 all three of those loads down there?
10 MEMBER BROWN: No, it's just A or the 11 power is coming either to A and C, or B and C. C is 12 transferred between either the right hand B buss, or 13 the A buss.
14 Is that correct, SHINE?
15 MR. THOMAS: That is correct.
16 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
17 MR. THOMAS: And then let me go up to the 18 DC buss there.
19 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
20 MR. THOMAS: It's what's commonly called 21 an auctioneered power. So, this would be very similar 22 to a dual-corded power supply on a server. You would 23 have the ability to either share power, or well, one 24 with the other but it's all blocked by diodes from 25 interconnecting them, the A and C, A and B.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
72 1 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, let me work on that 2 one again.
3 MR. THOMAS: Okay.
4 MEMBER BROWN: I'm not looking at the 5 charger, right now, okay?
6 MR. THOMAS: Right, correct.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Right now the charger 8 independently feeds if I'm listening to you correctly, 9 charger A feeds buss A?
10 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
11 MEMBER BROWN: And the battery associated 12 with that. And it is isolated from the USS, UPSS buss 13 B and it's charger. They are, that battery B is being 14 charged independently?
15 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
16 MEMBER BROWN: And the loads on C are then 17 auctioneered between A or B. Is that correct, or is 18 that a transfer switch also?
19 MR. THOMAS: No, it's auctioneered between 20 the two.
21 MEMBER BROWN: So, there's effectively a 22 diode feeding out of A and B, to C, and they, those DC 23 loads are then auctioneered from C?
24 MR. THOMAS: Correct. Yes.
25 MEMBER BROWN: All right, I got that.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
73 1 MR. THOMAS: So, yes. So, it's power 2 coming from A would have a diode blocking it from ever 3 getting to the B buss. And the same the other way.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. One last question on 5 this. Let me get my brain unwired here for a minute.
6 I didn't look totally at chapter 7 yet.
7 I mean is started that, but normally the safety loads 8 would be split between either the A DC buss and the B 9 DC buss, and whatever you'd want to put.
10 But if you want them set, powered from 11 separate sources to maintain if you lost something, 12 you'd still maintain part of the safety-related 13 system.
14 And I presume that's similar for, it 15 doesn't show up here, but that's something we would 16 see when we looked at chapter 7 distribution, and what 17 their sources are?
18 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
19 MEMBER BROWN: No -- okay, I got it.
20 Okay, you answered my question.
21 The one last question on this is up on the 22 DT breaker 1 and 2. Those are, obviously you do not 23 want those closed at the same time.
24 Are they interlocked? There was no 25 interlock called out in this section, that's why I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
74 1 asked the question.
2 MR. THOMAS: I'm sorry, so DT 1 and DT 2 3 can be closed at the same time, but they cannot be 4 closed with the UP breaker 2, or UP breaker 1.
5 So, there's an interlock that says you can 6 only close three --
7 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, that's what the 8 dashed line shows you?
9 MR. THOMAS: Correct, yes, that's --
10 (Simultaneous speaking.)
11 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, all right.
12 MR. THOMAS: You can fill all the two 13 utility transformers.
14 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, I got that then. All 15 right, thank you.
16 You can go on. Yes, my next questions 17 come later.
18 MR. THOMAS: So, the normal electrical 19 power supply system, the NPSS consists of the normal 20 power surge to the roving utility, as well as 21 distribution equipment providing the three identified 22 utilization voltages, to power facility loads.
23 SHINE provides physical separation between 24 safety-related and non-safety-related circuits, in 25 accordance with applicable protection of IEEE 384.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
75 1 Application of these applicable sections of IEEE 384, 2 supports satisfying the SHINE design Criterion 27 3 requirement for independence.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, I'll ask my question 5 now, is that okay?
6 MR. THOMAS: Sure.
7 MEMBER BROWN: I just realized -- I 8 apologize. You listed three or four different voltage 9 levels. The 480-277, which is pretty standard. The 10 400-230, and the 208-120. Those are all fairly 11 standard supply. But on the diagram, I only saw the 12 480-277. Is there -- unless I didn't read the diagram 13 correctly?
14 MR. THOMAS: No, you read it correctly.
15 That was a simplified diagram. The 480 is European 16 voltage. The 400-230 is just for some specific pieces 17 of equipment --
18 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, yes, that --
19 (Simultaneous speaking.)
20 MEMBER BROWN: I got the European 21 connection.
22 MR. THOMAS: Great.
23 MEMBER BROWN: All right, so those are I 24 was correct, you don't really break down the voltage 25 levels on where those applied lower down in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
76 1 electrical power system?
2 MR. THOMAS: Correct, correct.
3 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, thank you.
4 MR. THOMAS: Well, that was Mr. Thomas, 5 this is me, Roger Thomas. I apologize.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Then that was me, Charlie 7 Brown, talking. I apologize I didn't give you my 8 name. Okay.
9 MR. BARTELME: This is Jeff Bartelme, 10 picking the presentation back up.
11 Surge protection provided at each 12 electrical service entrance, to limit voltage spikes 13 and electrical noise. When the electrical service 14 exceeds prescribed limits, it's ability is 15 disconnected from the building to prevent damage.
16 NPSS branch is automatically physically 17 disconnect from the local utility on the loss of 18 phase. It is reversal or sustained over voltage or 19 under voltage, as detected by protection relays on 20 each utility transformer.
21 The NPSS contains redundant safety-related 22 breakers that provide power to certain plan equipment, 23 that does not perform an active safety function. The 24 safety function of these breakers is to disconnect 25 power, to prevent actions that could initiate or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
77 1 increase the consequences of an accident. Redundant 2 breakers are provided to ensure that safety function 3 can still be performed, in the event of a single act 4 of failure.
5 These safety-related breakers in the NPSS 6 include two safety-related breakers for each instance 7 of the NDAS, or the Neutron Driver Assembly System.
8 They provide the redundant ability to disconnect power 9 from the accelerator. And two safety-related breakers 10 per vacuum pump provide the redundant ability to 11 disconnect power from each vacuum pump in the VTS, or 12 the vacuum transfer system.
13 Two safety-related breakers per extraction 14 feed pump, provide the redundant ability to disconnect 15 power from each of the three extraction feed pumps in 16 the MEPS, the Minimum Extraction Purification System.
17 And two safety-related breakers provide 18 the redundant ability to disconnect power from the 19 radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust fans, 20 radiological ventilation zone 2 exhaust fans, and the 21 radiological ventilation zone 2 supply air handling 22 units.
23 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie Brown 24 again.
25 Are you finished with this slide or did I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
78 1 interrupt you too soon?
2 MR. BARTELME: That's the end of this 3 slide.
4 MEMBER BROWN: I forgot to ask one other 5 question, but you don't have to go back to the other 6 slide yet. The diagram slide.
7 Your power comes from Alliant, and you 8 show two different feeds coming out of a little box.
9 So, effectively if you lose Alliant, you lose all AC 10 power.
11 You don't have, there are not two sources, 12 independent grid sources, or do these come from 13 different substations? Or have you all figured that 14 out yet?
15 MR. THOMAS: Yes, this is Roger Thomas 16 from SHINE. If you would, that riser diagram says 17 that it would come actually from two different 18 substations. One is the Trip substation, and what's 19 the other?
20 MR. BARTELME: Venture.
21 MR. THOMAS: The Venture substation, yes.
22 So yes, the circuits originate from two 23 different substations but your, here's the major grid 24 failure within all the other substations, you will not 25 have power from Alliant.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
79 1 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, okay. Obviously, the 2 feed has to come singly somewhere, but you try to back 3 it up as best you can, so you did.
4 There will be an ancillary question 5 relative to that. If you do have a total loss of all 6 AC like that for a period of time, your SGS starts.
7 But if it fails, your UPS system is based on reading 8 the other times?
9 I couldn't figure out how long your UPS 10 systems would maintain yourself, the critical systems 11 in monitoring, while some additional power was brought 12 in somehow. Or they recovered the grid.
13 MR. THOMAS: Actually, if we have that 14 total loss of power and go into plant shutdown and the 15 UPSS applies, you acquire them for safe shut down of 16 the plant.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Say that again? Because 18 you garbled, that's why I ask you to.
19 MR. THOMAS: I'm sorry. If we have, you 20 know, a major power outage that shuts down both of 21 those substations.
22 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
23 MR. THOMAS: We go into plant shutdown.
24 We don't try to keep operating. So, the UPS system 25 provides enough power to safely shut down the plant.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
80 1 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, and by meaning to 2 shut down just to clarify, that means you turn 3 everything off, the building goes dark, all the 4 systems that are doing anything shut down, and you've 5 got times, you had a table of times to do that, in 6 Chapter 8.
7 At that point, the whole facility is dark 8 but you're safe. Is that correct?
9 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
10 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, so you don't need 11 power to all the systems, even if you were in the 12 middle of a process?
13 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
14 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, the shutdown times 15 cover that closing out those processes?
16 MR. THOMAS: Correct, yes.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. All right.
18 I also didn't notice on the SGS, you did 19 not, I presume you have onsite gas, or is it, are you 20 depending on a site feed as opposed to a site storage?
21 MR. THOMAS: We'll get to that in a later 22 slide but --
23 (Simultaneous speaking.)
24 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, all right, that's 25 fine.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
81 1 MR. THOMAS: -- yes, the quick answer 2 would be just rely on utility gas. We do not have an 3 onsite gas piece.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
5 MR. THOMAS: But it's a non-safety system 6 so again, it's not required for safe plant shut down.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I understand that now.
8 Okay, it's not, no onsite source. Strictly used 9 utility. That's fine.
10 Thank you.
11 MR. BARTELME: Moving on discussion of the 12 UPSS, uninterruptible electrical power supply system.
13 UPSS provides a reliable source of safety-14 related power, to the redundant divisions of AC and DC 15 components on the safety-related power busses.
16 UPSS provides the safety-related power to 17 equipment required to ensure and maintain the safe 18 facility shutdown, and to prevent or mitigate the 19 consequences of design basis events.
20 Each UPSS consists of a 125-volt DC 21 battery substation, inverters, battery chargers, IPASS 22 transformers, distribution panels, and other 23 distribution equipment necessary to feed safety-24 related AC and DC loads, and select non-safety-related 25 AC and DC loads.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
82 1 Redundant divisions of the UPSS batteries, 2 their size per the guidance of applicable sections of 3 IEEE 485, and the sizing, the UPSS battery sizing 4 considers margin to account for variations in procured 5 equipment, and capacity margin for future needs.
6 Additional SHINE specific consideration 7 for battery sizing, including run time are discussed 8 on the next slide.
9 DR. BLEY: All right, this is Dennis Bley.
10 I was just curious. Do the ventilation 11 and lighting circuits keep power longer than, after 12 you've shut down all the processes? How long can you 13 keep those going for?
14 MR. THOMAS: Well, so there's if the 15 generator, I'm sorry, let me start things. Roger 16 Thomas again, from SHINE.
17 If the generator starts, as long as we 18 have utility, gas, you can keep things powered with 19 emergency lighting, and things like that.
20 DR. BLEY: Okay.
21 MR. THOMAS: But in general, the lighting 22 is, you know, if you have battery backup for 90 23 minutes, provides lighting.
24 There's a lot of other battery backup 25 systems, like the fire alarm is going to have battery NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
83 1 backup for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and stuff.
2 I'm not sure I can list all of them 3 adequately, but hopefully that answered your question.
4 DR. BLEY: He's got some prioritized list 5 of things that need power that we, you would like to 6 have power to the longest.
7 So, that's kind of what I was asking 8 about.
9 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
10 DR. BLEY: Thanks.
11 MEMBER BROWN: There was a table in there 12 that showed 3 minutes, 5 minutes, et cetera, et 13 cetera, and I, so the time to put those in a safe 14 condition is not real long.
15 MR. BARTELME: Correct.
16 MEMBER BROWN: Is that correct? Yes, 17 okay, thank you.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Hi, this is Vesna 19 Dimitrijevic.
20 I'm sorry I had a total failure with the 21 internet my house. So, I try to listen on the phone 22 to repair the internet, so I only heard couple of 23 Charlie's questions.
24 But I had the questions on the, I have 25 some questions on this, you know, and location NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
84 1 separation ventilation. But also, I had this same 2 question that your internal slide on the page 3?
3 You know, there was a lot of question 4 which I, you know, how you treat the, the loss of 5 power actually before the, you dump the solution in 6 PCM dump tank.
7 There is a three-minute delay on the loss 8 of the cooling from PCLS, right? You are aware that 9 the loss of power that is, of the loss of PCL it could 10 be PCLS flow will be lost, because it's not supplied 11 from the standby generator. There is a three-minute 12 delay before you say that their creation will be 13 resulting in PSC dump valve to open, right?
14 MR. BARTELME: Yes.
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, so what my 16 question is, say if the three-minute, if the PCS, PCLS 17 flowing is restore, this will not happen, right? And 18 my question for you is how do you restore if you have 19 outside power? What is the minimum time you can 20 restore offsite power to those, you know, the MDAS 21 loads?
22 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy Radel, with 23 SHINE. So, the cooling, primary cooling, closest 24 cooling system pumps, are not on the generator, the 25 backup generator. We don't intend to, you know, run NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
85 1 the facility on the generators.
2 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I understand that.
3 My question was because you can get 4 offsite power back in one minute, right? But your 5 circuit breakers are tripping. How long it will take 6 to connect the loads back to the offsite power, if you 7 get power back in the show time? How do you recover 8 offsite power if the power is back in show time?
9 MR. THOMAS: So, this is Roger Thomas with 10 SHINE. Maybe a little clarification?
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay.
12 MR. THOMAS: Are you asking if we lose 13 power --
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes.
15 MR. THOMAS: So until the utility power 16 comes back on --
17 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes. Very short.
18 MR. THOMAS: -- how long could --
19 (Simultaneous speaking.)
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes.
21 MR. THOMAS: All right, are you asking is 22 there a limit for the solution because --
23 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: No. Okay, my 24 question is you must have some procedure for this 25 restoration to upload the switch gap busses back, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
86 1 right, close those breakers, load them back? I was 2 just wondering how long it takes. I mean, do you have 3 any feeling, can you actually restore utility power 4 back within 3 minutes?
5 MR. THOMAS: So, these breakers can be 6 remote. The main breakers on the switch board, can be 7 remotely operated from the control room. So, if the 8 operators can assess what's going on, they would have 9 the ability to pretty quickly reconnect the breakers 10 upon return of power.
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay. Do you have 12 some prioritization of which routes would be loaded?
13 I was always curious, you know, even in the nuclear 14 powers, how fast these procedure of restoring power, 15 especially here because you have a limit before you 16 dump, you know, solutions, so.
17 I was wondering did you consider this fast 18 restoration of utility power? I mean when you set 19 this 3-minute delay on the dumping the solution, so.
20 MR. THOMAS: Okay.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Can I amplify that a little 22 bit, Vesna? I guess my question, based on what you 23 said, is there once you shut down and all the power is 24 gone, and now you get power back, is there a sequence 25 that you have to follow in order to ensure you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
87 1 maintain safe shut down capability and margin? Or can 2 you just have power pop back on everywhere 3 simultaneously?
4 MR. THOMAS: This is again Roger Thomas, 5 from SHINE. I'm going to break that up into two 6 answers.
7 If we have a fairly momentary interruption 8 of power, I'm going to say like 30 seconds, our intent 9 will be to pick up production before that 3 minutes is 10 up or anything.
11 But we have some timing relays in our UPS, 12 we have some. If we have gone for like 3 minutes on 13 the UPS, the UPS suffers some discharge and so the 14 timing relays don't advance the.
15 If we were to start back up after 30 16 seconds, for instance a 5 minute timing relays will 17 now be at 4 minutes and 30 seconds to shut off power 18 to equipment, to make sure that we do not challenge 19 the UPS batteries from an unstable grid that's on and 20 off, on and off, on and off.
21 It can only be manually reset by the 22 operators, after they feel comfortable that the grid 23 is stable.
24 Beyond that sort of that 3-minute window 25 is the solution gets dumped. Then there's a whole, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
88 1 and it's not really electrical but there's a whole 2 procedure about how they would restart a process.
3 There's this, and I would have to defer to 4 those entities about the whole thing, but it's my 5 understanding it's about a 12-hour process to bring up 6 the first ones back online.
7 MS. RADEL: Yes, this is --
8 (Simultaneous speaking.)
9 MEMBER BROWN: That answers my question, 10 now I don't know whether that covers Vesna's questions 11 or not. I'm sorry, Vesna, go ahead.
12 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: No, it pretty much 13 covers my question.
14 My second question was about this UPS 15 separation. So you have two dimensions and you stated 16 they're located in different fire areas, right? And 17 that they're also cable routings are separated for at 18 least okay it's a nice to look on the picture because 19 my question is what's located in this fire areas?
20 Are your battery chargers? So, the UPS 21 passes the battery chargers, inverters. What is 22 located in each of those fire areas? What would be 23 located?
24 Is it the battery chargers there? Are the 25 inverters there? Is that also AC UPS loads there?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
89 1 MR. THOMAS: The separate fire areas, for 2 instance the battery, I'm sorry, this is Roger Thomas.
3 The batteries are in a separate fire area.
4 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: All right.
5 MR. THOMAS: The charger, I'm just going 6 to describe Division A.
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay.
8 MR. THOMAS: Division A battery is in a 9 separate fire area. Division A charger, inverter, 10 bypass transformer, is going to be, and part of the 11 distribution is the main 125-volt DC buss.
12 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay.
13 MR. THOMAS: Is in a separate fire area.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: All right.
15 MR. THOMAS: And, then --
16 (Simultaneous speaking.)
17 MR. THOMAS: Yes, and then the 18 distribution panels are, and it's generally in 19 separate fire areas. There is some more control 20 centers that are in separate spatially, within one 21 fire area.
22 Not sure, I hope that answers that 23 question, but there is the UPS C division that you see 24 there, those transfer pieces of equipment?
25 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Right.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
90 1 MR. THOMAS: Those are in a different fire 2 area. They happen to be in the facility control room.
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, you have a A, C, 4 and B are in different fire areas?
5 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
6 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, so my concern 7 here why I ask this question is because if this, you 8 know, in my practice I saw that this areas where the 9 battery charger inverters are, they usually heat up 10 very fast during the operation, you know.
11 So, and, you know, and I know that you 12 elementarily qualify all your safety agreement, right?
13 So, did you ever like the heat up of those 14 areas after you lose ventilation? Because there is a 15 subbase on your battery, you know, base of your table.
16 So if the battery loads, I saw the, I mean 17 you have sometimes need to, you know, to operate the 18 monitors and things like, that for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
19 Did you analyze how fast those areas heat 20 up, or loss of ventilation?
21 MS. RADEL: So, let me repeat your 22 question and making sure I understood it.
23 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: All right.
24 MR. THOMAS: You're asking if there is a 25 heat up calculation for the batteries, and for the UPS NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
91 1 rooms on the upper ventilation?
2 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes.
3 MR. THOMAS: Yes, there is.
4 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, and you don't 5 reach that qualification temperatures in that, in the 6 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />?
7 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
8 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, all right.
9 MR. BARTELME: Jeff Bartelme, picking up 10 the presentation.
11 Let's just touch on there. SHINE's 12 located redundant trains in the UPSS separate fire 13 areas, within the safety-related seismic portion of 14 the main production facility.
15 And again, we cut SHINE powers both 16 safety-related and non-safety-related loads from the 17 UPSS. Non-safety-related loads are isolated from the 18 safety-related loads by breakers or isolating fuses, 19 meeting the required and applicable sections by IEEE 20 for ensuring a failure of the non-safety-related 21 loads, does not impact safety-related loads.
22 Similarly, the distribution of wiring in 23 each division of the UPSS, is isolated and separated 24 from the other division, for the applicable --
25 MEMBER BROWN: Hello? We were muted and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
92 1 I didn't get to ask my question. This is Charlie 2 Brown again. I apologize.
3 On the batteries, have you -- you did not 4 identify the type of batteries you all were 5 contemplating using. Are they lead acid? Or they're 6 going to be lithium? Are the --, have you gotten into 7 that?
8 MR. THOMAS: Yes, this is Roger Thomas 9 again. Yes, they are lead acid batteries.
10 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
11 MR. THOMAS: So, standard within the 12 industry.
13 MEMBER BROWN: So you're going to have the 14 hydrogen protection systems in place, for the charging 15 process for those as well then?
16 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
17 MEMBER BROWN: I didn't -- okay, I didn't 18 see. I might have missed that when I read the 19 chapter. I'm sorry if I did. Okay, you answered my 20 question. Thank you.
21 MR. BARTELME: Picking back up, the UPSS 22 is designed and sized for run time requirements, the 23 required loads. There are really three things that 24 run time requirements.
25 First, equipment required to prevent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
93 1 hydrogen deflagration. Adequate flow of the nitrogen 2 power system, and equipment relied on to minimize 3 transient effects on the facility due to short 4 duration power loss, or power for five minutes.
5 Equipment to provide alerts to facility 6 personnel, and monitor the status of the facility 7 during immediate recovery efforts. That's powered 8 for two hours. And equipment to monitor and reduce 9 the tritium source term. And the tritium confinement 10 is powered for six hours. Here we --
11 MR. MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. Can you 12 go back to the previous slide?
13 MR. BARTELME: Sure.
14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Hydrogen production 15 doesn't stop after you shut down. Even on the down 16 time, you continue to have the heat, right? Within 17 the five minutes?
18 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy Radel with 19 SHINE. So, following the run time of those TOGS 20 floors on the UPSS batteries, the nitrogen purge 21 system is sufficient to mitigate the hydrogen being 22 generated --
23 MR. MARCH-LEUBA: So, are you -- you kind 24 of have an echo or something, can you speak slower?
25 I'm sorry. It's just hard to hear you.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
94 1 MS. RADEL: Okay, I'll repeat that. So, 2 following the run time of the TOGS blowers on the UPSS 3 batteries, the nitrogen purge system is sufficient to 4 mitigate the hydrogen generated by the decay heat in 5 the solution.
6 MR. MARCH-LEUBA: But if you're in the 7 dump tank, you don't have access to the TOGS anymore, 8 to the overhouse system. So, the hydrogen will 9 accumulate on the top of the dump tank. Or are you 10 saying --
11 MS. RADEL: The TSV dump tank is 12 ventilated by the TSV off-gas system.
13 MR. MARCH-LEUBA: Okay, maybe we'll ask 14 that question during chapter 13 when we talk about 15 deflagration, and all those things. Thank you.
16 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg Halnon, just 17 a quick question on this slide.
18 The UPSS, the tech specs allow one train 19 to be out for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Are we talking that the run 20 time requirements are able to be met with just one 21 train in the UPSS?
22 MR. THOMAS: Yes, this is Roger Thomas.
23 Yes.
24 MEMBER HALNON: Okay, so they're totally 25 redundant, 100 percent redundant to each other for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
95 1 safe operation, is that correct?
2 MR. THOMAS: Correct.
3 MEMBER HALNON: Okay, thank you.
4 MR. BARTELME: All right, so, here is 5 trying to provide a list below that's powered by the 6 UPSS, including safety-related INT systems, CTRPS, and 7 SFAS there. The TSV reactivity protection system, and 8 the engineering safety features actuation system. As 9 well as various process radiation monitors.
10 The UPSS provides safety-related power to 11 the identified loads, to ensure to maintain safe 12 facility shut down, prevent or mitigate the 13 consequences of design basis events.
14 In addition to the identified safety-15 related loads, non-safety-related loads, important to 16 providing alerts to facility personnel, monitoring the 17 status of the facility, and reducing the tritium 18 source term in the facility, which is the defense in 19 depth function are connected to the safety-related 20 busses and the UPSS, and are isolated from the safety-21 related portion of the busses by isolation over 22 current devices.
23 And lastly, a slide on the standby 24 generator system. Standby generator system consists 25 of a natural gas driven generator, 4A switch gear, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
96 1 transfer switches.
2 The natural gas fired generator 3 automatically starts, provides power to the 4A volt 4 transfer busses, and the normal electrical power 5 supply system.
6 The standby generator system provides a 7 temporary source of non-safety-related alternate power 8 to the UPSS, and selected loads for operational 9 convenience and defense in depth, including emergency 10 lighting and detectors in the radiation area 11 monitoring system. And a RAMS and a continuous air 12 monitoring system, CAMS.
13 And then as stated on the slide, operation 14 of the standby generator system is not required for 15 any safety function at the SHINE facility.
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I'd like to in the 17 Jose, support of the Jose question, the standby 18 generator can supply TOGS, right?
19 MR. THOMAS: Yes. So if the facility 20 loses power and the standby generator starts, it 21 provides power to the UPS, which then can continue 22 providing power to the TOGS systems.
23 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay, thanks.
24 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Can I ask you a 25 question? This is Walt Kirchner.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
97 1 Is the nitrogen purge system then passive, 2 or does it have its own power supply?
3 MR. THOMAS: It is passive.
4 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay.
5 MR. THOMAS: It's, I don't know, what is 6 it six or eight tanks. But it's under pressure and at 7 the lowest I think it's supposed to go for like five 8 days, and like four days.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
10 MR. THOMAS: A thoroughly passive system.
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, you need the 12 power to open the valve, right?
13 MR. THOMAS: Correct, just controlling the 14 valves for instance, needs power.
15 MR. BARTELME: Any other questions on 16 Chapter 8? Okay, questions from the members? If not, 17 we can transition to the Staff, please.
18 And, just there was a bit of confusion on 19 the schedule. Again, we do have a hard stop at 11:30, 20 and so we'll modify the schedule, I guess. We'll do 21 the NRC, the Staff's Chapter 8, and then we'll I'm 22 sure it will be 11:30 and that's probably where we'll 23 break for lunch.
24 So, is the Staff ready to go?
25 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: Good morning, yes, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
98 1 this is Jorge Cintron, and I'm ready.
2 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you.
3 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: Good morning, my name 4 is Jorge Cintron, I'm an electrical engineer from the 5 long term operations and organization branch in the 6 NRR. And today we'll be discussing the Staff 7 evaluation for Chapter 8 electrical power systems.
8 Next slide, please. Joining me today for 9 this presentation is Mike Balazik, he's the Project 10 Manager for SHINE; Steve Wyman, the Acting Branch 11 Chief for the long term operations and organization 12 branch; myself, and Sheila Ray, she's my peer 13 reviewer, and technical reviewer from the electrical 14 engineering branch in the NRR.
15 Next slide. The regulatory basis and 16 acceptance criteria. Regulatory basis for SHINE, the 17 Staff used AT-34 content of the application technical 18 information from paragraph B.
19 Final safety analysis report, which 20 requires in part that the Applicant should include 21 information that describe the facility, present the 22 design basis on limited information, safety and 23 analysis of the structure, systems and components of 24 the facility as a whole.
25 For the acceptance criteria, the Staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
99 1 used Chapter 8 of NUREG 1537 part 1 and 2.
2 Next slide, please. NUREG 1537 part 2, 3 Chapter 8, electrical power system, is divided in two.
4 Section 8.1 provides normal power electrical power 5 systems, which provides the acceptance criteria for 6 the design, safe preparation and shut down of non-7 power reactors, and to provide the reactors use.
8 The specific areas of review are that the 9 design should be functional, they should be 10 commensurate with the design basis. They should have 11 a dedicated substation to provide safety reactor shut 12 down, and provide isolation of electrical systems to, 13 including the technical specifications.
14 Section 8.2 the emergency electrical power 15 systems, provide the acceptance criteria for emergency 16 electrical power systems. Upon the acceptance 17 criteria is that the electrical power is required to 18 maintain safety shut down, for operation of recurring 19 safety features, and to protect the public from 20 release of radioactive materials.
21 Next slide, please. SHINE's normal 22 electrical power system as described in the 23 representation is describing 8a2.1 of the FSAR, normal 24 electrical power systems.
25 The FSAR provides a description with a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
100 1 normal electrical power systems of both the 2 irradiation facility, and the irradiation production 3 facility. And the normal power supply system operates 4 at five separate branches, usually receiving utility 5 power of 480-277 volts. The branch is automatically 6 physical disconnect from the utility by opening the 7 associated utility power breaker, supply breaker, upon 8 loss of face, face sustained over voltage or under 9 voltage, as detected by protection relays where each 10 utility as former.
11 The design of the NPSS is based on 12 Criterion 37, electrical power systems, and Criterion 13 28, inspection and testing of electrical power system 14 of the SHINE designs criteria. Design SHINE criteria 15 is described in section 3.1.
16 Next slide. SHINE follows the National 17 Protection Association's 70, 2017. This is the 18 national electrical code, as well as other portions of 19 IEEE standards applicable for the facility of the 20 design of the normal power systems.
21 The normal power supply system provide 22 power to the following situated equipment. Two 23 redundant safety breakers for the NDAS to provide the 24 ability to disconnect power. Two redundant safety 25 breakers for the VTS, as well for the MEPS and the RBS NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
101 1 1 and 2.
2 Next slide, please. The Staff reviewed, 3 the Staff evaluated the technical information 4 presented in Chapter 8, of the SHINE FSAR as 5 supplemented by responses of two RAIs to assess the 6 sufficient and the preliminary design and performance 7 of SHINE normal electrical power systems in super 8 operations of the operating license.
9 The Staff considered design criteria, 10 design basis, and the normal power descriptions, and 11 design and operating categories to provide reasonable 12 assurance that the final design will conform to the 13 design basis.
14 The areas of review of this section 15 included the functional cross-studies conducted on the 16 normal power supply systems should be commensurate 17 with the design basis, evaluation of the normal power 18 supply system substations, the capacity and capability 19 of providing a safe shut down, and the isolation of 20 electrical systems, and the technical specifications.
21 Next slide, please. SHINE emergency power 22 supply system, section 8a2.2 provides SHINE's 23 emergency electrical power system description. The 24 FSAR provides a description for emergency power for 25 both irradiation facility and the RPF as well.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
102 1 The emergency electrical power system of 2 the SHINE facility consists of the UPSS, the non-3 safety-related standby safety system, standby 4 generator system, and the normal related local power 5 supplies and unique batteries.
6 The UPSS is the only power source of the 7 emergency electrical power system, that is classified 8 as safety-related.
9 Next slide, please. The purpose of the 10 UPSS is to provide safety-related source of power to 11 equipment, to require to ensure and maintain safety 12 shut down, and prevent or mitigate the consequences of 13 the design basis.
14 The UPSS is designed based on Criterion 27 15 and 28 the SHINE design criteria. It consists of 125 16 volts of recurrent batteries, subsystems, inverters, 17 bypass conformers, distribution panels, and other 18 distribution equipment necessary to fix safety-related 19 AC and DC loads, on selected non-safety-related AC and 20 DC loads.
21 Next slide, please. The UPSS provide 22 power at sufficient capacity and capability to all 23 safety-related structures, systems and components, to 24 perform their safety function. It is designed, 25 fabricated, erected, to maintain quality standards NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
103 1 commensurate with importance safety-related.
2 It should be able to -- it is designed to 3 withstand the effects of the design basis natural 4 phenomena, without loss of capability to perform the 5 safety function.
6 It is located to minimize consistent and 7 other safety requirements, the probability and effects 8 of fires and explosions. It has sufficient 9 independence, redundancy and testability to perform 10 the safety functions submitting to a single failure, 11 incorporates provision to minimize the probability of 12 a failure as a result, or consistent with the loss of 13 power and transmission network. And it permits for a 14 probability inspection and testing, to assess the 15 continuity of the system, and condition of components.
16 Next slide, please. The UPSS is designed 17 using the applicable codes and standards. Applicable 18 portions of the following codes and standards were 19 used for the design or installation and maintenance of 20 the UPSS.
21 As you can see, some of them authorize 22 seismic qualification, separation and insolation, 23 maintenance and testing, design, battery sizing, 24 environmental qualification, design of DC systems, and 25 circuit breakers.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
104 1 Specific portions of these standards are 2 used for the design of the UPSS, are described in the 3 FSAR. Use of these codes and standards provide 4 assurance that meeting Criterion 27 and 28 of SHINE's 5 design criteria.
6 Next slide, please. The Staff evaluation 7 for the SHINE's UPSS. The NRC Staff evaluated the 8 design of the UPSS, as described using SHINE and FSAR 9 section 8a2.21.
10 The Staff reviewed the SHINE, the Staff 11 reviewed the FSAR to verify that the functional 12 characteristics of the emergency power system, are 13 commensurate with the design basis.
14 The Staff evaluation was performed based 15 on the following SHINE's plan specific design 16 criteria. Criterion 4, environmental and dynamics 17 effects; Criterion 27, electrical power system; and 18 Criterion 28, inspection and testing of electrical 19 power systems.
20 Next slide, please.
21 (Pause.)
22 CHAIR BALLINGER: Did we lose anybody?
23 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: All right, here we 24 are. The Staff evaluation for meeting compliance with 25 SHINE design Criterion 27. The Staff evaluated the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
105 1 safety-related UPSS to verify the design of the UPSS, 2 provide sufficient capacity, and capability to perform 3 its intended safety function.
4 SHINE classifies the UPSS as safety-5 related, however, it is not classified as Class 1E 6 electrical for SHINE, for the SHINE facility.
7 The Staff issue area as to SHINE to verify 8 the design of the UPSS. In specific, the Staff 9 requested the codes and standards used for the design 10 of the UPSS, supporting equipment, and the 11 classification of the UPSS.
12 While SHINE does not classify the UPSS as 13 Class 1E systems, and apply the full scope of all 14 Class 1E standards of the UPSS, portions of Class 1E 15 standards are applied for the design of the UPSS, in 16 order to satisfy applicable SHINE design criteria.
17 The Staff finds that the use of --
18 DR. BLEY: This is Dennis Bley. The 19 reason they don't have to be Class 1E, even though its 20 safety-related, is because some of the parts of Class 21 1E don't apply to their design criteria. Is that the 22 basis?
23 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: That's correct. We 24 issued RAIs to verify that information, and since the 25 SHINE design is not as the same as a normal nuclear NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
106 1 power plant, they don't need to provide the full scope 2 of the actual policy standards to qualify their 3 equipment.
4 They only use the, those that are 5 applicable for meet their design basis.
6 DR. BLEY: Okay, thank you.
7 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie Brown 8 again. I wanted to amplify to make sure. I had a 9 slightly different thought process, in that SHINE 10 effectively stated that you got a walk away capability 11 relative to power.
12 If everything goes dark, you can walk out 13 and go home and have a beer, okay? Come back a day 14 later and everything's still okay.
15 I'm obviously exaggerating slightly, but 16 that's a fairly important design capability, when you 17 really do not have anything that's going to become 18 critical when it's not paid attention to for a 19 significant period of time.
20 So, it's just a different way of I thought 21 of it, the way I read the chapter. So, I don't know 22 whether that conflicts with what Dennis said, but a 23 Class 1E, portions of it seem to make sense to me.
24 So, that's all. I just wanted to get that 25 on the record. Go ahead.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
107 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: No, this is Ron 2 Ballinger. Here we are talking about design Criterion 3 27 and others. That's in section 3.1, chapter 3, and 4 we haven't gone through that, and that's not going to 5 happen until July.
6 So, just to put that on the record. I 7 couldn't quite figure out why we didn't do section 3.1 8 when we talked about chapter 3. But here we are 9 talking about design criteria, that we haven't talked 10 about.
11 DR. BLEY: Yes, I agree, and we need to 12 double check that when we get to that point. But they 13 are closely interrelated.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Just to add to what 15 Charlie said, you know when we say VNA, we don't need, 16 we don't need the power for operation, but we need 17 them for all of those demands created by the loss of 18 power.
19 When we have to, you know, open breakers, 20 or vacuum pump, or the feed, the extraction feed pump, 21 or to close the, you know, the exhaust fan.
22 So, there is a lot of things which we have 23 to do in the first middle chapter, loss of the power, 24 and then we are fine, so.
25 I mean that's a part which is safer to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
108 1 delay, that he has to make sure there is no, you know, 2 radiation leaks, and has to make sure that, you know, 3 solution has been dumped into the passive cooling, and 4 things like that, so.
5 MEMBER BROWN: All right, can I ask SHINE 6 a question while you're on?
7 MR. BARTELME: Sure.
8 MEMBER BROWN: I forgot to ask this during 9 your presentation. You're orientation and you talked 10 about auctioneering, UPS, 125-volt UPSS buss seat.
11 So, you had power, auctioneered power 12 coming from A and B, that feeds C, to a bunch of DC 13 loads.
14 And the way I looked at it that is A and 15 B busses, have certain loads on them but C had loads 16 that you really wanted to make sure had DC power, even 17 if you lost A or B. Is that a correct? I would 18 expect the loads on that buss to be more critical 19 loads than on A or B.
20 MR. BARTELME: This is --
21 (Simultaneous speaking.)
22 MEMBER BROWN: This is where you have the 23 auctioneering, but not the others.
24 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy Radel from 25 SHINE. Actually, that oxygen power is supporting NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
109 1 Division C instrumentation, and that's a much smaller 2 load that is in the safety-related control system.
3 There are certain functions where we have 4 three instruments coming in rather than two and that 5 third instrument is on Division C and that's for 6 operability reasons that we want three instruments 7 measuring certain parameters.
8 So, it's not more important loads, it's 9 just limited number of Division C instruments.
10 MEMBER BROWN: I understand. Go ahead.
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I have also a 12 question which I missed in the previous one. Do you 13 have to strip any loads from the 125 basis on the loss 14 of offset power?
15 MR. THOMAS: I'm sorry, I didn't pick that 16 question up, could you repeat it?
17 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: If you lost offset 18 power for you not to extend the battery life, do you 19 have to strip any loads from those UPS buses?
20 MR. THOMAS: Yes, those are where we group 21 those loads in the five-minute, two-hour, and six-hour 22 categories. We need to limit the amount of the five-23 minute loads because those are the biggest loads. You 24 pull those off to be able to hit the criteria for 25 those long tie-offs.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
110 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, basically, I 2 know UGS and things like that doesn't have loads, but 3 so after 5 minutes, after 20 minutes you strip certain 4 things, right? Is that how it goes? In the beginning 5 you don't have to strip anything automatically.
6 MR. THOMAS: Correct. All the loads are 7 supported after five minutes, when you drop off those 8 five-minute loads, and then two hours is another group 9 that gets dropped off.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: That's done by 11 operators?
12 MR. THOMAS: No, those are automatic, they 13 are part of the UPS system itself part of the 14 safety-related system.
15 MEMBER BROWN: They are stripping loads, 16 three and five-minute load stripping and then they've 17 got two hours for the smaller loads. I think I 18 phrased that correctly, didn't I?
19 MR. THOMAS: Close enough.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Thank you, that's all I 21 need. Go ahead, Jorge, I'm sorry to interrupt.
22 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: No worries. The 23 Staff finds that the use of specific persons IEEE 24 codes since it provides reasonable assurance that the 25 UPSS provides sufficient capacity and capabilities to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
111 1 inform its intended safety function.
2 Next slide, please. Compliance with 3 Criteria 28 is Staff evaluated the safety-related UPSS 4 to verify the system is designed to permit appropriate 5 inspections and testing as safety-related equipment.
6 Trying to follow specific portions of 7 standards, testing, and installation, and maintenance 8 offsite technical equipment. The Staff finds the 9 proposed approach that SHINE used of the use of IEEE 10 standards is acceptable for inspection and testing of 11 the UPSS.
12 Compliance with SHINE Design Criterion 4, 13 the Staff evaluated the safety-related UPSS to ensure 14 the design to perform its intended safety-related 15 functions with the environmental conditions associated 16 with normal operations, testing, or postulated 17 accidents.
18 SHINE's design of the UPSS will be in 19 accordance with applicable portions of IEEE 44 for 20 seismic and 32003 for environmental qualification.
21 The Staff finds the use of these IEEE standards will 22 provide reasonable assurance that the UPSS will meet 23 Design Criterion 4.
24 Next slide, please. Staff evaluation of 25 the SGS, the NRC Staff evaluated that non-safety-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
112 1 related SGS as defense in-depth for SHINE's emergency 2 electrical systems.
3 The SGS consists of a 480 to 77 volts 60 4 Hertz natural-gas-driven generator and a 480 switch 5 gear and a switch to all figure out the SGS switch 6 gears to be connected to either or both emergency 480 7 volts of the normal power system process.
8 The purpose of the SGS is to provide a 9 temporary source of non-safety-related alternative 10 power to the UPSS and select additional loads for 11 operational convenience and defense in-depth.
12 The SGS is designed in accordance with of 13 Article 700 of NFPA 70 2017. In response to NRC 14 Staff's RAI, SHINE describes the specific portions 15 that are the goal of NFPA 700 2017 for use for design 16 of the SGS.
17 Next slide, please. Upon loss of onsite 18 power, the SGS will automatically start both non-light 19 breakers and the Breaker 1 and Breaker 2. They will 20 automatically open and transfer switches operated to 21 provide power to the associated 480 volts normal power 22 system transfer loss.
23 The SGS provide power upon loss of offsite 24 power, the SGS is not required to support 25 safety-related functions of the SHINE facility.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
113 1 Next slide, please. Staff evaluations of 2 technical specifications, the Staff evaluated the 3 sufficiency of the Applicant's proposed technical 4 specifications for the SHINE electrical power systems 5 of describing FSAR Chapter 8.
6 The proposed tech specification 3.3 7 emergency power limited conditions for operations, 8 3.6.1., and surveillance requirements, 3.6.1 LCL 3.6.1 9 requires, in part, that two divisions of the OPSS 10 should be operable. The LCL provides the criteria to 11 determine if the division of the UPSS is considered 12 operable.
13 SCR 3.6.1. provides surveillance 14 requirements for the UPSS, Table 2.6.1 UPS actions 15 provide the actions to be taken upon completion times 16 to restore operation of the UPSS if one or two 17 divisions of the UPSS are not operable.
18 Next slide, please. The NRC Staff reviews 19 SHINE's electrical power systems of applicable 20 guidance of Chapter 8 of NUREG 1537 Part 2. The Staff 21 have determined that the phone rate of the PSS and the 22 emergency power system are commensurate with SHINE's 23 plant-specific design criteria 427 and 28.
24 The normal power supply systems provide 25 reasonable assurance that the event of loss of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
114 1 electrical power, the facility can be safely shut 2 down. In the event of loss of normal power systems, 3 the UPSS provide reasonable assurance that SHINE's 4 facility can be maintained in a safe shutdown 5 condition.
6 The Staff finds the licensees use specific 7 codes and standards provides reasonable assurance that 8 the normal power system and the emergency electrical 9 system meet the SHINE's plant-specific design criteria 10 in 427 and 28.
11 Next slide. Based on the information 12 provided, the NRC Staff finds that the description and 13 discussion of SHINE's electrical power system are 14 sufficient to meet the applicable regulatory 15 requirements and guidance and acceptance criteria for 16 the issuance of an operating license.
17 That concludes my presentation.
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: Questions from the 19 members?
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I am confused about 21 the tech specs. If one of the train of the UPS is 22 found unoperable, what are the tech specs require them 23 to do?
24 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: Yes, let me rephrase 25 your question. Are you're saying both of the redundant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
115 1 trades are unoperable the text provides through how to 2 handle what to do, the actions to be completed?
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes, if the last 4 train of UPS is found but two divisions and one 5 division of UPS is found unoperable.
6 MR. CINTRON-RIVERA: If both additions of 7 the UPSS are inoperable, there is actions associated 8 with completion times as well and they will provide 9 what actions to be taken in the facility upon loads of 10 both of them.
11 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg, I got it up 12 in front of me.
13 One division inoperable, you just store 72 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />. If both divisions are inoperable, you have 1 15 hour1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> to place the units into Mode 3 open vacuum 16 breaker, open vacuum breaker valves and place tritium 17 and all 3 TPS process equipments in storage.
18 So, those are 1-hour and 12-hour 19 requirements.
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I understand that 21 one. My question is it's like you need the UPS to 22 place this in safe shutdown. So, I'm curious how 23 would that be done without UPS?
24 MEMBER HALNON: I think it's assumed 25 normal power is available.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
116 1 MEMBER BROWN: Are you done, Greg?
2 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I'm just reading off 3 the tech spec.
4 MEMBER BROWN: I had one other question.
5 I hope it's the only other one.
6 Can you operate this facility or is the 7 SGS going to be sized so that even if you lost the 8 line that you could continue to operate normally on 9 the SGS with all your process controls until, say, the 10 power went out for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and you could operate on 11 the SGS as long as you had utility gaps?
12 MR. THOMAS: This is Roger Thomas from 13 SHINE. No, the CMI generator is just more for 14 shutdown.
15 MEMBER BROWN: I thought that was the case 16 but I wasn't absolutely clear. Thank you.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: Other questions from the 18 members? I know we've got a few minutes now. I still 19 want to bring it up again. Here we have been talking 20 about design criteria.
21 We won't be looking at the design criteria 22 until July and you can be sure that one or more of us 23 will ask a question when we see the design criteria in 24 final form, whether or not any changes in those design 25 criteria have impacted the previous chapters.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
117 1 So, this has got its tentacles into a lot 2 of chapters I think.
3 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, NRC 4 SHINE Project Manager. Professor, Section 3.1 does 5 list the design criteria and it spells out what 6 specific system that SHINE has applied that criteria 7 for.
8 In the individual chapters, for example 9 Chapter 8 has applied certain design criteria and as 10 part of our technical review, we consider those design 11 criteria. I just wanted to point that out.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: I'm assuming that's true 13 but we just want to be sure we get a match between, if 14 you will, the design criteria of record and the 15 chapters.
16 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, yes, 17 I understand.
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: Other questions from the 19 members? By the schedule which I'm now working on, we 20 will recess until 1:00 p.m.
21 MR. BALAZIK: And precisely, are we going 22 to Chapter 11 or Chapter 9 upon returning to from 23 lunch?
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: Chapter 11.
25 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
118 1 off the record at 11:29 a.m. and resumed at 1:01 p.m.)
2 CHAIR BALLINGER: It's 1:00 p.m. --
3 actually 1:01 p.m., so we're back in session and we're 4 at a point where we're ready for SHINE's presentation 5 on Chapter 11. Are we in good shape?
6 PARTICIPANT: I think we are.
7 CHAIR BALLINGER: You sound like your 8 covered? You're in a conference room? That's better.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Before we get into it, are 10 you hearing us okay? Some folks have complained that 11 it's hard to hear because of an echo when we're 12 talking. How does it sound right now?
13 PARTICIPANT: We have not had any issue 14 hearing the members today.
15 MEMBER REMPE: That sounds good. We don't 16 hear that in our room too.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: Let's move on.
18 MR. MCSWEENY: My name is Riley McSweeny, 19 I'm the waste processing lead at SHINE. Today is open 20 session, I'll be presenting on Chapter 11, radiation 21 protection program and waste management.
22 This presentation will cover the following 23 topics, radioactive liquid waste storage, radioactive 24 liquid waste mobilization, solid radioactive waste 25 packaging and waste resources.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
119 1 The radioactive liquid waste storage 2 system is a system comprised primarily of storage 3 tanks located in a below-grade shield of tank vaults 4 in the radioisotope production facility.
5 The system collects and stores liquid 6 waste from various processes in the radioisotope 7 production facility prior to transfer to the 8 radioactive waste mobilization system.
9 They are sent to radioactive liquid waste 10 storage system that includes washes from strength 11 isotope separation systems, time and state from 12 process vessel event system condensers, liquid waste 13 from non-routine operations such as decontamination 14 flushes.
15 The good-wave streams are combined out for 16 radioactive decay, sampled and adjusted as needed.
17 Are there any questions on this portion of the 18 radioactive liquid waste system before I move on?
19 The safety-related functions of the 20 radioactive liquid storage system include the use of 21 favorable geometry tanks in accordance with the 22 nuclear criticality safety evaluation.
23 Favorable geometry designs are used for a 24 set of two tanks, referred to as the uranium liquid 25 waste tanks.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
120 1 These two tanks are designed to maintain 2 liquid and annual geometry meets the same general 3 design as the annual tanks use throughout the 4 radioisotope production facility.
5 Additionally, uranium concentrations of 6 liquid waste within the uranium liquid waste tanks are 7 verified to be within the safe point prior to transfer 8 to non-favorable geometry storage tanks.
9 Other notable features of the radioactive 10 liquid waste storage system include the use of 11 shielded below-grade areas to provide radiation 12 shielding versus some components and use of the vacuum 13 transfer system to prepare tank-to-tank transfers.
14 Any questions on this?
15 This is a flow diagram of our uranium 16 liquid waste tanks. Liquid waste streams are received 17 from the various process systems into the first 18 uranium liquid waste tank. These liquid waste sources 19 are represented by the PBBS ISP not to BTS flow 20 arrows.
21 Prior to transfer to the second uranium 22 liquid waste tank, the uranium concentration is 23 verified to be within safe limits.
24 After transfer to the second uranium 25 liquid waste tank, the contents are again sampled and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
121 1 verified to be within a safe uranium concentration 2 limit prior to transfer to downstream favorable 3 geometry tanks.
4 Transfer from the first to the second 5 uranium liquid waste tank are made into the vacuum 6 tank located in the upgrade hot cell. The lift tank 7 is also where samples are taken from.
8 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg, I've got a 9 question, maybe it's a tech-spec question. One is 10 actions of the return solutions to the liquid waste 11 blending tank to the favorable geometry location.
12 It's a little bit ambiguous where that is.
13 Is that a complicated move to implement this tech 14 spec, where it's a stop transfer of solution, return 15 the solution to the geometry or dilute it? Is that a 16 complicated operational action or is that relatively 17 straightforward?
18 MR. MCSWEENY: Can you clarify the tech 19 spec?
20 MEMBER HALNON: I'm looking at the waste 21 tank uranium concentration actions, Table 3.8.4 and I 22 realize that what I don't have a feel for is just how 23 much operator action is required to do this. Because 24 it's a stop transfer immediately and then you have six 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> to do something else.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
122 1 I'm curious, you've got one operator on 2 Staff out in the field, I just was curious how much 3 operator action is required to implement that.
4 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. Didn't 5 you say a moment ago that you mentioned the 6 concentration of uranium before you started transfer?
7 It's not an online measurement, correct?
8 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy Radel, it's a 9 sample that's taken to the measurement.
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's not an online 11 measurement but before you do the transfer you verify 12 that?
13 MEMBER HALNON: We wouldn't even do the 14 transfer.
15 MS. RADEL: Correct.
16 MR. MCSWEENY: These are both geometry 17 tanks that never get to the non-favorable for this 18 one.
19 MEMBER HALNON: We need to have a second 20 one before this would even -- that's fine, I wanted to 21 make sure it wasn't just something that --
22 (Simultaneous Speaking.)
23 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Do you have it 24 defined how you're going to measure the concentration, 25 is this one mass spec, overlaying with a sample?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
123 1 MR. MCSWEENY: We plan to analyze the 2 sample in our labs using ICP-MS mass spectroscopy.
3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Changing the subject, 4 or the same subject, when does the ING solution become 5 waste? I thought we were recycling most of it? Are 6 these small spills or things that get contaminated?
7 Is it going to be a large volume?
8 MS. RADEL: As far as timing or cadence of 9 recycle and reuse, that would be proprietary so we'd 10 have to cover that in closed session. The normal 11 waste streams going into here are coming from the 12 washes during the extraction and purification 13 processes. And the normal uranium concentration in 14 those washes is below the safe limit concentration 15 limit.
16 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Is the waste stream 17 from the , for example? This is 18 going to be a small percentage of the total uranium in 19 the plant?
20 MS. RADEL: Correct.
21 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Thank you.
22 MR. MCSWEENY: So, the exhaust left 23 connection to the process vessel event system and 24 nitrogen systems to ensure proper ventilation, 25 overflow lines leading to a direct drain system and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
124 1 hydrogen lines for mixing prior sampling.
2 If there's no other questions we can move 3 on. This is a flow diagram of the liquid waste 4 blending tanks which are large and non-favorable 5 geometry tanks downstream of the uranium liquid waste 6 tanks.
7 These tanks have process connection to 8 samplers located in the hot cells and additional lines 9 so that liquid waste could be adjusted and sampled as 10 needed.
11 These tanks also have process connections 12 to the radioactive liquid waste on mobilization feed 13 tank following waste storage and connections to the 14 process vessel event system.
15 The third lens ensures proper ventilation.
16 If there are any questions on the blending tanks?
17 Radioactive liquid waste and mobilization system is 18 located downstream in the process from the radioactive 19 liquid waste storage system.
20 It's physically located above graded level 21 in radioisotope production facility. The functions of 22 the system include separation of classification 23 driving radioisotopes and the solidification of the 24 liquid waste.
25 Prior to the transfer to the liquid waste, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
125 1 waste is sampled to verify the chemical properties of 2 the waste are appropriate to processing indoor 3 radioactive liquid waste and mobilization system.
4 After the solidification process is 5 complete, the solid waste is transferred to a material 6 staging building where it's starred for additional 7 radioactive decay in prior shipment.
8 Any questions on this portion of the 9 radioactive waste mobilization? This is a flow 10 diagram for the radioactive liquid waste and mobilize 11 mobilization system.
12 The waste is transferred to the 13 mobilization feed tank from the radioactive liquid 14 waste storage system by vacuum transfer.
15 The feed to the mobilization feed tank is 16 shown in the lower left corner. If the liquid waste 17 stream requires cleanup prior to liquefication, it's 18 pump-through waste cleanup valves in return to the 19 column effluent tank prior to feed into the waste 20 solidification drums.
21 Waste can also be pumped directly from the 22 mobilization tank to the waste solidification drums.
23 The waste solidification drums are filled with 24 solidification agents outside of the AWI system.
25 Once filled with liquid waste, the waste NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
126 1 location drums are filled within the system. Any 2 questions on this?
3 MEMBER PETTI: This is Dave Petti, just 4 one clarification. All of these tanks/drums are not 5 in a critically safe configuration. Is that just 6 because of the uranium concentration is so low it's 7 not --
8 MR. MCSWEENY: Yes, upstream controls on 9 the uranium concentration that control -- there's no 10 need for criticality-safe tanks in this system.
11 MEMBER PETTI: Thank you.
12 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Going back to the 13 criticality safety question, are those wastes going to 14 be stored for a significant amount of time so that 15 liquid or water can evaporate and increase the 16 connection by operation?
17 The geometry is so safe that it doesn't 18 really matter? And I will suppose that we have area 19 radiation monitors to even indication of an 20 criticality and somebody comes into the room.
21 MS. RADEL: There are storage for extended 22 periods of time and we do see it holding periodically 23 through storage.
24 They are also covered by the criticality 25 external lens system, there's coverage through that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
127 1 whole area of this upgrade vault.
2 MR. MCSWEENY: We're talking about the 3 thanks, not the solidified waste, right?
4 MS. RADEL: The tanks.
5 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay, thanks.
6 MR. MCSWEENY: The solid radioactive waste 7 packaging system consists of equipment needed to 8 collect, segregate, and package solid radioactive 9 waste.
10 This is handled and shipped offsite in 11 accordance with the radioactive waste management 12 program, sideways handled by radioactive waste 13 packaging system that includes dry active waste and 14 ion exchange resin and spent filters.
15 Any questions on the solid radioactive 16 waste packaging system?
17 Radioactive waste stream sources and their 18 waste classifications are shown below. The streams 19 include spent accelerated components, process filters, 20 glass used in the liquid purification and trash, which 21 includes contaminated radiation protection equipment.
22 Target solution casts vessels skid 23 components are replaced as needed. Waste streams also 24 include isotope extraction columns used in our 25 molybdenum and iodine extraction systems.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
128 1 Waste separation columns, water deionizer 2 units, contaminated oil from accelerated pumps and 3 solidified liquid waste. Any questions on this table?
4 MEMBER PETTI: This is Dave Petti again.
5 This Class C, is it just because you're not convinced 6 at this point that those waste streams can always read 7 Class B?
8 MS. RADEL: There is some uncertainty in 9 your extraction definition, the extraction media. So, 10 we have data that we've set on the chart are nominal 11 and based our analysis on but those aren't certain and 12 so are evaluated as those three are produced.
13 MEMBER PETTI: Once you get real data you 14 can make the most informed decision in operation?
15 MS. RADEL: Yes.
16 MEMBER PETTI: Thanks.
17 MR. MCSWEENY: Are there any questions?
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: Questions from members?
19 Thanks, we switch over to the Staff.
20 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: While the Staff is 21 coming can I ask a question? Is there any chemical 22 hazards on the waste? I'm thinking mixed waste 23 possibilities.
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: Good question, we're 25 going to find out.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
129 1 MEMBER HALNON: We have them on the list, 2 radioactive oil is mixed waste.
3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Those are much harder 4 to change.
5 MR. BARTELME: Could you clarify the 6 question?
7 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Do you have plans to 8 handle what is known as mixed waste where you have a 9 chemical and radiation together? You have to do 10 special plans for that and it was mentioned, the 11 example of having contaminated oil.
12 MR. BARTELME: The contaminated oil would 13 be misplaced and would need to be handled separately.
14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You don't have any 15 significant chemical hazards, do you?
16 MR. BARTELME: No, nothing besides the 17 contaminated oil, which is produced in small volumes.
18 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, NRC 19 Project Manager. Do you have the Chapter 11 slides?
20 MR. GRAN: Am I good to start? Hello, 21 everyone, my name is Zachary Grand and I am a health 22 physicist at NRR. I am the leader for Chapter 11, 23 radiation protection program and waste management for 24 the SHINE review.
25 I will be presenting the Staff's review of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
130 1 Chapter 11. The Staff's review was based on the 2 guidance provided in NUREG 1537. It is broken down 3 into radiation protection, radioactive waste 4 management, and respiratory protection topic areas.
5 Next slide, please. In radiation sources, 6 the Staff reviewed the information provided by the 7 Applicant for two source term scenarios nominal and 8 safety basis values.
9 The Staff evaluated the information 10 provided in the SAR for the gaseous liquid and solids 11 source terms.
12 This review included a review of several 13 calculations made available during an audit with 14 SHINE. The Staff review ensured that an appropriate 15 level of detail is contained in the SAR to confirm 16 their confirmatory calculations.
17 The results of the Staff review determined 18 that the Applicant provided enough details to allow 19 Staff to verify F1 releases, direct doses into that 20 calculation. Next slide, please.
21 For the radiation protection program, the 22 Applicant provides information to establish their RP 23 program and provide commitments to training and annual 24 auditing of their RP program. The Applicant provides 25 commitments to Reg Guide 8.2 and ANC ANS 15.11.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
131 1 Applicant's commitment to this guidance is 2 consistent with NUREG 1537 and is an acceptable method 3 for describing RP program that is consistent with the 4 requirements in 10 CFR 20101 for our radiation 5 protection program.
6 Next slide, please. The Applicant 7 describes a ALARA program that conforms with the 8 guidance in Reg Guides 8.2, 8.8, 8.10, 8.13, and 8.29.
9 The Applicant also provides information that the 10 radiation protection they enter conforms annual 11 evaluation of their ALARA program.
12 The Applicant uses design features such as 13 building ventilation hot cells and shielding that is 14 made available for personnel to maintain doses of 15 ALARA and to do minimize the spread of contamination.
16 Based on the information provided in the 17 SAR, the Staff determined that the Applicant has 18 described an ALARA program that is acceptable and 19 consistent with NUREG 1537 and is again compliant with 20 the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 2011-01 for the ALARA 21 program.
22 Next slide, please.
23 Slide 5. In radiation monitoring and 24 surveying, the Applicant provides information on 25 gaseous F1 monitoring, continuous air monitoring, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
132 1 radiation monitoring.
2 The Applicant provides stacked monitoring 3 to ensure that gaseous to releases are below the dose 4 limits contained in 10 C.F.R. 20.1301.
5 The Applicant also provides tech specs to 6 ensure radiation monitoring is operable and below the 7 regulatory release limits.
8 Based on the information presented in the 9 SAR, Staff determined that the Applicant has 10 appropriately described radiation monitoring that will 11 control and monitor the radiologist conditions of 12 their facility.
13 Next slide, please. In radiation exposure 14 control dosimetry, the Applicant provides information 15 on the use of signage and postings. The Applicant 16 provided information on the radiation areas as well as 17 the use of interlocks and visual warnings.
18 In addition, all workers will wear 19 personnel monitoring while working in restricted areas 20 of the facility.
21 Based on the information provided in the 22 source term section, the Staff use that information to 23 perform several confirmatory calculations to verify 24 the established radiation zones specified in the 25 facility.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
133 1 The Staff also reviewed several 2 calculations provided during audits to verify the dose 3 rates in the facility. The results of the Staff's 4 review determined that the Applicant has described the 5 satisfactory program for the radiation exposure 6 control dosimetry.
7 And the Staff has verified through 8 calculations and reviewed all the calculations that 9 the Applicant has correctly determined the radiation 10 zones established in their facility.
11 Next slide, please.
12 Contamination control at the facility is 13 summarized by the use of shielded compartments and hot 14 cells that are incorporated as part of the facility 15 design. Like what was described previously with the 16 ALARA design features, ventilation considerations are 17 made to control airflow patterns to reduce the spread 18 of contamination.
19 In addition, the Applicant describes the 20 use of continuous air monitors located at various 21 locations in the facility to monitor airborne 22 contamination.
23 The Staff's review determined that the 24 Applicant adequately provides information on design 25 features and accurately provides information on the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
134 1 monitors to the spread of contamination in the 2 facility.
3 Next slide, please. In environmental 4 monitoring, the Applicant describes the use of 5 Regulatory Guide 4.1 and NUREG 1301 for developing the 6 REMP and ODCM. The Applicant describes and 7 environmental monitoring program that provides offsite 8 monitoring around their facility and has provided that 9 they'll use direct radiation monitoring and air 10 sampling at these offsite locations.
11 Given that they'll have no radioactive 12 liquid influence, the Applicant does not expect to 13 need surface water and bio-monitoring. The Staff 14 finds this acceptable given the RENP will be evaluated 15 annually to ensure if new pathways will need to be 16 monitored.
17 Based on this information, the Staff plans 18 the Applicant has described an acceptable 19 environmental monitoring program.
20 MEMBER PETTI: Just a question here. The 21 tritium release that they'll have goes up their stack 22 but eventually that gets into biota. That doesn't 23 count in terms of this idea of not having to monitor 24 because it might happen outside the site boundary?
25 MR. GRAN: I think it's more like the F1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
135 1 monitoring stack that will still have the in-person 2 sampling for tritium, I think determining how much 3 tritium they have offsite maybe annually, they'll 4 figure out if they need to unmonitor anything.
5 But I think I could be correct in that I 6 think the biota in the area didn't seem like there was 7 anything they needed to but I could be corrected on 8 the current biota around the area.
9 MEMBER PETTI: I would be interested to 10 know what, for instance, can-dos do. It's probably a 11 lot more tritium than here.
12 MR. GRAN: Slide 9, environment. In the 13 radioactive waste management program, the Applicant 14 describes the structure for their program. This 15 includes the description that their staff will be 16 trained and have procedures to ensure appropriate 17 waste handling.
18 In addition, the Applicant will be 19 required to maintain records of their waste disposals.
20 Based on the descriptions provided in the Applicant's 21 program, the Staff finds the Applicant has acceptably 22 described their radioactive waste management program.
23 Next slide. In radioactive waste 24 controls, the Applicant provides information on the 25 estimated annual waste treatings at their facility in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
136 1 January.
2 The Applicant provides information on the 3 practices used to minimize the generation of 4 radioactive waste through the training, goals, 5 segregation of waste amongst other practices as 6 described in their SAR.
7 The Applicant describes the use of the 8 material staging building for the interim storage of 9 waste for decay prior to transport. The Applicant 10 also provides the sources, types and volumes of waste 11 generated at their facility.
12 Based on the information provided in the 13 descriptions of their waste sources, the Staff 14 determined that the Applicant had acceptably described 15 their radioactive waste controls. Next slide, please.
16 Slide 11. In release of radioactive 17 waste, the Applicant describes the gaseous effluent 18 releases and the anticipated solid waste generation 19 rates. No liquid waste releases are anticipated 20 because all liquid sources are solidified prior to 21 disposal.
22 Gaseous release are from the facility 23 stack and are monitored to ensure compliance with the 24 release limits. Staff confirmatory calculations 25 determines that the gaseous effluent releases are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
137 1 below the 10 C.F.R. 20-1101D 10 millirem limit for 2 airborne effluents.
3 Based on the information provided in the 4 release of radioactive waste, the Staff determined 5 that the Applicant has acceptably described the 6 release of radioactive waste. Next slide, please.
7 The final slide, the respiratory 8 protection program from SHINE will follow the guidance 9 contained in Reg Guide 8.15., which is an acceptable 10 method for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR Part 11 20 Subpart H.
12 This commitment is acceptable and ensures 13 protection of personnel from airborne concentrations 14 exceeding the DAC limits in 10 C.F.R. Part 20 Appendix 15 B. This concludes my slide presentation.
16 MEMBER PETTI: This is Dave again, I have 17 another question but it may be more appropriate for 18 SHINE. What technology are you going to use in 19 measuring the tritium? Does it go in a stack?
20 MR. GRAN: I don't know what specific 21 monitoring they would be using.
22 MS. RADEL: We have a bungler system for 23 measuring the tritium in that step.
24 MEMBER BIER: This is Vicki Bier, I have 25 a few questions, some of which may be more appropriate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
138 1 for different days of presentation so let me know.
2 First, the document mentions that there is capacity to 3 hold waste for up to five years for the radioactivity 4 to decay before shipment.
5 Is the anticipation that always will be 6 held for five years or that it's going to be shipped 7 out on a regular basis?
8 MR. GRAN: From the Staff's review, the 9 third descriptions say that waste will be held for no 10 longer than five years and then be shipped. I'm not 11 sure if I recall anything about the shipping prior to 12 that.
13 MR. MCSWEENY: This is Riley McSweeny from 14 SHINE. We don't anticipate holding ways for the full 15 five years, it's more of an upward limit.
16 MEMBER BIER: Is there a sense of do you 17 plan to ship once a month, once a year, how 18 frequently, and how much volume of storage would build 19 up by then approximately?
20 MR. MCSWEENY: We haven't fully planned 21 out how the shipments will be staged.
22 MEMBER BIER: Have there been 23 conversations with local authorities about what the 24 volume of stored material might be and they're okay 25 with that? Or again, is that at a later stage?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
139 1 MR. BARTELME: This is Jeff from SHINE.
2 Actually, as part of the agreement of obtaining the 3 land from the city, the city of Janesville reviewed 4 SHINE's waste management plans as a condition of that 5 land transfer. And they're aware of the volumes and 6 storage times.
7 MEMBER BIER: Second topic with regards to 8 aerosol releases, what is the prevailing wind 9 direction? I assume roughly west to east and what's 10 the nearest significant population, how far would that 11 be?
12 MS. RADEL: We had covered that in Chapter 13 2.
14 (Simultaneous speaking.)
15 MS. RADEL: -- look back at those notes 16 and get back to you on that one.
17 MEMBER BIER: I can go look that up.
18 Thanks for the reference.
19 The last question, which I'm guessing is 20 probably best deferred until the human performance 21 presentations, but it strikes me that everybody 22 dealing with hazardous radioactive material has two 23 somewhat schizophrenic jobs.
24 One is persuading everybody that you have 25 it all under control and RC, local county, reporters, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
140 1 et cetera, and the second job is making sure the Staff 2 does not get complacent. And those two really work at 3 odds with each other in a sense.
4 The same day you're telling somebody don't 5 worry, we know what we're doing, you have to be 6 telling the Staff, hey, something could have happened 7 at any moment, don't take this for granted.
8 So, what thoughts have been developed for 9 dealing with complacency as a possible issue? And 10 it's totally fine if you tell me, hey, we'll just 11 discuss that under human performance.
12 But I wanted to raise it now.
13 MR. BARTELME: That's something we can 14 discuss in July in the conduct of ops discussion. We 15 can see if we can put some information in there about 16 dealing with complacency, like you mentioned.
17 MEMBER BIER: Super, thank you.
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: Other questions from 19 members or consultants? Steve Schultz?
20 DR. SCHULTZ: Hi, Ron, this is just a 21 question perhaps for the NRC for Zachary. You 22 described the programs associated with the ALARA 23 program, employee radiation protection programs and so 24 forth.
25 The documentation has presented the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
141 1 programs in concert with the regulations associated 2 with the timeframes, one-year reviews of the ALARA 3 programs and so forth.
4 Is the Staff anticipating and discuss with 5 the Applicant any special programs associated with 6 startup, more frequent reviews of these programs in 7 the first year of operation as an example?
8 MR. GRAN: I didn't know if that was a 9 question you wanted handle, Mike?
10 MR. BALAZIK: Yes, this is Mike Balazik, 11 NRC Project Manager. At this point, no, we haven't 12 had those discussions with the Applicant on changing 13 it any frequencies for the startup program.
14 But we will be presenting the startup 15 program later this summer. I'll look forward to that, 16 thank you.
17 MEMBER BIER: I realized I have one 18 additional question. Sorry about that.
19 In the discussion of potential failure 20 modes for FVZ4, I believe there's a discussion that 21 there is not a risk because of pressure differences in 22 the system that you're not going to get flow in the 23 direction you do not want.
24 And is that pressure maintained actively 25 by electric power or something or is it an inherent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
142 1 feature of the system design?
2 MS. RADEL: For clarification as far as 3 the pressure difference, are you talking about from 4 inside process piping and tanks and systems to the 5 outside? Or between parts of the process systems?
6 MEMBER BIER: Yes, releases to outside 7 environment I believe.
8 And it says pressure gradients, the 9 response to information request says, create flow 10 patterns that direct air towards areas of increase and 11 contamination potential and not to places with easy 12 access to the used.
13 And I think that is Page 4 of the ML 2109 14 something or other. I can follow up later if need be.
15 MS. RADEL: I believe that's referring to 16 our HVAC system, which will be covered as part of 17 today.
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: Additional questions?
19 Hearing no more questions, thank you very much, we're 20 all set there. Now we need to switch to Chapter 9 and 21 SHINE is up first.
22 Are we ready to go?
23 MR. BARTELME: I just need a minute to 24 turn the room over until folks in the room check out.
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: Should we take a small NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
143 1 break?
2 MR. BARTELME: It'll be 30 seconds, we're 3 getting everything set up. We should be all set to go 4 here on the SHINE side.
5 For Chapter 9, auxiliary systems, we've 6 got Tony Palumbo our systems engineer presenting on 7 ventilation systems, Cody Fagan, our tritium engineer 8 presenting on our tritium purification system, and 9 Eric Edwards our chemical process systems manager 10 presenting on during the solution lifecycle, the 11 vacuum transfer system, and our gas management system.
12 So, with that, I'll turn it over to Tony 13 to get started on the ventilation discussions.
14 MR. PALUMBO: Hi, everyone, I think 15 everybody got that my name is Tony Palumbo. I'm the 16 ventilation engineer. Starting with the first slide 17 here, let's look at the production facility 18 ventilation system.
19 As you can see, the system is breaking 20 down to the subsystem screen, ventilation zone 1 is 21 broken down into a recirculation and exhaust 22 subsystem. Ventilation zone 2 is broken down into a 23 supply and exhaust and a recirculation subsystem.
24 And then we have radiological ventilation 25 Zone 3 there at the bottom and that consists of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
144 1 transfer ducts that we'll get into in a little bit.
2 Underneath that, you'll see the non-radiological area 3 for ventilation system and its subsystems.
4 We call that one an FVZ4, a facility 5 ventilation zone 4, that consists of a supply exhaust 6 and recirculation substance. The next slide, you'll 7 see this is a breakdown of our zones and areas served 8 from RVZ1, 2, and 3.
9 Those are our radiological ventilation 10 zones. You can take a look but you'll notice that 11 we've got this set up in a way that we're going from 12 areas from the least amount of potential to the areas 13 on the right, all the way to the left, which is the 14 RBZ1.
15 So, you can see just the highlight areas 16 here, we've got the IU cells, the tog cells, the left 17 is what we call a super cell. The TPS process 18 equipment, TPS disillusion tanks, prep tanks, glove 19 boxes and primary closing cooling system and expansion 20 tank.
21 Zone 2 there, areas are general zones, 22 those are normally occupied areas in the RCA. And 23 again, Zone 3 you'll see those transfer areas that 24 should be received the emergency access to the 25 labyrinth.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
145 1 From a high level, this gives you a 2 pictoral view of how the radiological ventilation zone 3 is served. You'll see I have some boundaries on there 4 and when you start over on the right-hand side of your 5 screen, that's the non-RCA Zone 4, that is FVZ4.
6 That transfer is cascading air into the 7 RCA through RBZ3 that you see there in blue through 8 one of those transfer paths. I have it laid out as 9 the RBZ transfer path and that's cascading into Zone 10 2, which is our generally occupied area.
11 There was a circulation unit inside Zone 12 2, we have couple of those and then the air once again 13 travels from that zone into the RBZ1, that's only one 14 space. You see that over there in red.
15 Do we have any questions on that?
16 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg, tell me if 17 this is better handled in July when we talked about 18 fire protection.
19 If you have a fire in the non-RCA zone in 20 Zone 4 or in Zone 3 or even in Zone 2 for that matter, 21 you had fire dampers and the system shuts down on a 22 fire alarm, and the second question would be how would 23 you inject the smoke? Or maybe you don't.
24 Using ventilation, how would you inject 25 the smoke?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
146 1 MR. PALUMBO: It's a little hard to get 2 there but, yes, we do have fire dampers at all of our 3 different fire boundaries.
4 MEMBER HALNON: The second question is, is 5 the system designed with the smoke ejection mode or is 6 that going to be manually done by fire brigade?
7 MR. PALUMBO: No, sir, there is no active 8 smoke handling.
9 MEMBER HALNON: I didn't see it so I 10 thought that was the case.
11 MR. PALUMBO: These are radiological 12 ventilation system functions. We've listed the non-13 safety-related functions of the RV system and that's 14 just to provide that ventilation and air conditioning 15 to the RC environment to the workers.
16 We've moved down into the safety-related 17 functions for the ventilation system.
18 You'll notice that the Zone 1 exhaust, 19 Zone 2 exhaust, Zone 2 recirculating and supply right 20 there, they have safety-related functions that the 1 21 and 2 exhaust provide locations for that in-duct fan 22 monitoring 2 provide air flow.
23 That's air flow leaving the RCA portions 24 of that one exhaust, two exhaust, two recirculating 25 and two supplied, they provide redundant isolation in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
147 1 the form of volatile dampers and they make up a 2 portion of the confinement boundary.
3 And those dampers under the exhaust supply 4 air flows, they will isolate when signaled by the 5 safety activation systems.
6 Below that you can see radiological 7 ventilation zones recirculating, that's a closed 8 system in the RCA and extends to the confinement 9 boundary of the IU in the toggle cell.
10 Below that you see the RVZ3 portions of 11 the ventilation zone 3 provide that same redundant 12 isolation. You have volatile dampers and they make up 13 a portion of the RCA boundaries. That system also 14 isolates the signal of the safety actuation system.
15 If we go to our next slide here, this 16 slide gives you a couple of images. This is a 17 radiological ventilation safety-related flow path so 18 you're looking at those safety flow paths.
19 On the left, we highlight our point out 20 the IU cells and the TPS exhaust. At the bottom of 21 that image on the left would be our irradiation unit 22 cells. You'll see two valves in there.
23 In the cooling room those are isolated, 24 those are redundant safety-related valves for that 25 train, then you'll also see that as all connected at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
148 1 a point to the ventilation zone 1 exhaust supplied 2 from there.
3 In the center you'll see the RSC is 4 supplying the exhaust at the boundary. This is the 5 RCA boundary.
6 So, here I'll note for you once again 7 there could be tornado dampers and fire dampers at the 8 boundary and what I've highlighted in red here, those 9 are the bubble side dampers and those are the 10 safety-related patchworks that form that isolation at 11 that boundary of the RCA.
12 On the right, we have super salt supply 13 and exhaust, that's being supplied up on the top of 14 that image by a ventilation Zone 2 recirculating.
15 We're reconditioning some of the air inside of the RCA 16 and we are using that, it's going through the super 17 cell.
18 You'll note the two dampers on the inlet 19 side and the two dampers on the outlet side of the 20 supercell, those are safety-related. And then you 21 have the radiation detection on that as well and 22 that's ventilated to RBZ1E, or the Zone 1 exhaust.
23 It comes in from the recirculating and 24 goes out to one exhaust. Then we have the non-25 radiological area support systems that just highlight NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
149 1 some of these for you real quick.
2 This would have been that green zone 3 outside. We have FBZ4 which is that ventilation 4 system zone 4 that provides ventilation air 5 conditioning exhaust, return amber circulation and 6 that's in the non-RCA portion of the building.
7 That just conditions that space for the 8 workers.
9 The FBZ4 and RBZ2S, so the supply units 10 for both the radiological side and the facility 11 ventilation, they're provided their cooling water by 12 the facility's chilled water system and then we also 13 have each of those units that's served by the facility 14 heating water system.
15 That heating water system does extend to 16 someplace outside of the RCA for other coils because 17 different areas of space may need it. Those are our 18 non-safety-related functions right there.
19 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: This is Vesna. I 20 have a question which I asked a little or was 21 connected to electrical system. Most of your 22 sensitive answers are just to provide this relation, 23 right?
24 Do you have in the loss of information, 25 like for example cooling of electrical area, did you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
150 1 ever consider that could initiate some loss of 2 electrical systems for the operation of the break?
3 Actually, would anything happen in the 4 plant if you lost ventilation?
5 MR. PALUMBO: The system is designed, 6 FZV4, for loss of power to keep airflow in our battery 7 rooms in our EPS room. Other than that, our facility 8 is safe by design. If we have an issue, we isolate 9 and let the radiological area of elevation secure.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Your normal 480 11 volts switch gas, ABCD, where are they located? In 12 the switch gear rooms? Do those areas of the UPS need 13 cooling?
14 MS. RADEL: As Roger stated earlier, there 15 is a calculation that was out ventilation, after 16 ventilation, in those battery rooms that the heat-up 17 would not exceed the design temperature of those 18 units.
19 Does that answer the question?
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Even during normal 21 operation when you have all the loads and things like 22 that, there is no -- basically, if you lost 23 information, the plant will come to you operating 24 normally, that's my question.
25 MS. RADEL: As far as the operation of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
151 1 batteries, that air is normally conditioned. If we 2 lost all flow in our ventilation systems, we would be 3 monitoring temperature and if anything was unsafe, 4 take action.
5 I don't know if Catherine is on and wants 6 to speak to any procedures that have been drafted to 7 that effect.
8 MS. KOLB: Yes, this is Katherine Kolb 9 from SHINE. We don't have -- or I would have to go 10 check and see what procedures we have for responding 11 to a loss of facility ventilation.
12 But we have no tech specs related to 13 required temperatures because of the heat-up 14 calculations that Tracy has mentioned and Roger 15 mentioned earlier, that it's not required for safety.
16 If we did lose ventilation and didn't also 17 lose offsite power, it was a loss of complete offsite 18 facility ventilation without the loss of offsite 19 power, things would heat up. I'd have to check what 20 our draft procedures say in that event.
21 There's no requirement or tech spec limits 22 around those.
23 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Thanks.
24 MEMBER BIER: If I can have a quick 25 follow-up on Vesna's question? This is Vicki. One of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
152 1 the main purposes of the ventilation is to keep the 2 batteries cool is the anticipation that heat-up would 3 cause an immediate battery failure. Or is it just 4 going to lose battery life in the long-term?
5 MS. RADEL: The heat-up path shows that 6 without ventilation it doesn't exceed the design 7 temperature so I guess we didn't evaluate beyond that.
8 I just want to note that we do have redundant --
9 MR. PALUMBO: Those are redundant air 10 handling units, because E4 are the radiological 11 ventilations. So, each one of our supply units are 12 100 percent redundant.
13 DR. BLEY: Okay, Vicki?
14 MEMBER BIER: I'm good for now, thanks.
15 DR. BLEY: This is Dennis Bley. I have to 16 admit a knowledge gap on my part. I think I heard you 17 talk about tornado dampers, if that's what you said, 18 I'm guessing they're there to prevent a low-pressure 19 outside the building from damaging or overpowering 20 your ducts or ventilation system.
21 Is that correct?
22 MR. PALUMBO: That's 100 percent 23 correction.
24 DR. BLEY: I don't think I've seen those 25 before but thanks.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
153 1 MR. PALUMBO: Anymore questions on 2 ventilation before we move on to the tritium 3 purification system? Go ahead, Cody.
4 MR. FAGAN: Thanks for the opportunity to 5 talk. Like I was introduced before, my name is Cody.
6 I'm one of the trading engineers here at SHINE 7 technologies so I just wanted to start off with what 8 the tritium is and does.
9 It's a very simplified block diagram here 10 shown on the right, essentially, the purification can 11 be broken into three sub-units, the tritium handling 12 system that is designed to deliver or cover and store 13 purified isotopes that are moved around the facility.
14 The secondary enclosure cleanup system, 15 which is a support system for the TPS glove box which 16 houses the THS subsystem that maintains that 17 environment inside the glove box to reduce tritium 18 contamination from building up.
19 And the very subunit would be vacuum and 20 impurity treatment system, also known as ITS, that is 21 an additional support system for both the THS and the 22 newfound vacuum assembly for decontamination and 23 material supply as well.
24 We'll walk through and break down each of 25 these slides.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
154 1 MEMBER PETTI: Just a quick question.
2 Remind me, your little box, IU of N, that means it's 3 one system for all eight, right?
4 MR. FAGAN: No, we have three systems with 5 the first one moving two IU cells and the remaining 6 two systems each serving three. So, that's just 7 representative of NEI cell where the cell is serviced 8 for that particular train.
9 MEMBER PETTI: Physically, how big is the 10 glove box?
11 MR. FAGAN: It is I believe eight feet 12 long by standing on top of a spring, about six feet 13 high.
14 To talk a little bit more in-depth about 15 the tritium handling system, the THS was designed to 16 store, deliver, recover, again purify isotopes. We 17 store tritium and deuterium that it's mixed with in 18 double wall tritium uranium meds as a solid metal 19 tritide.
20 So, that before was UT3, that is 21 considered a solid form due to the process of 22 hydrating.
23 The tritium is delivered to the end that's 24 targeted by the group to maintain the desired target 25 concentration to support fission neutron products NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
155 1 being mixed tritium with deuterium is the cover from 2 the NDAS.
3 You can use non-mechanical cryogenic 4 pumps. We started through a few other additional 5 filters such as a permeator for moisture and dryer 6 bed. And then we isotopically purified that gas using 7 a process called TDOT or thermal absorption process 8 and recycled that back to the target loop.
9 So, essentially, it's a feed volume and 10 then a return volume in purification to maintain the 11 desired target concentration. The TDOT process 12 equipment is housed inside a credited secondary 13 barrier, that's the THS glove box that we just talked 14 about.
15 That does make up part of the credited 16 treatment.
17 MEMBER PETTI: Just another question. I 18 know DU has been used for a long time in the tritium 19 community for storage tritium. But did you guys look 20 at all at the Japanese technology? It's been a while 21 since I've done this stuff, Zircobalt, I think?
22 MR. FAGAN: This is historic media. UT3 23 does have the highest density of storage. There are 24 other advantages as well. You cannot generate 25 significant pressures if you don't leave for this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
156 1 system.
2 Other things such as titanium, what the 3 Canadians used, and palladium also exists as storage 4 media, I think they have their advantages and 5 disadvantages but we did pick the tried and true UT3 6 that gets us high density for storage, relatively 7 moderate solution temperatures in high density.
8 MEMBER PETTI: Thanks.
9 MR. FAGAN: The subsystem that helps serve 10 as the tritium glovebox is the secondary enclosure 11 cleanup system.
12 Its entire job is to maintain the dirt 13 environment inside of that glovebox, which helps to 14 reduce the impacts of product or acute omission by 15 releasing that gas over a series of tritium capture 16 beds.
17 So, in that series, the first bed removes 18 any reactive permit D.C., water and oxygen for the 19 glovebox of these D.C.s are actually to migrate 20 through the material in the membrane.
21 That can stimulate the out-gassing of 22 tritium from surfaces that are inside of the pump box.
23 That's a phenomena known as humidity release. By 24 cleaning out those DCs, we keep that well over 25 acceptable limits.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
157 1 Tritium is removed from the inert gas bad 2 so after we removed out the water and oxygen using 3 iron beds, that's a different type of hydrating 4 material, using a stream opener for the gas to return 5 back to the glovebox.
6 And we can actually assess the reduction 7 factors by taking the difference between an inlet 8 monitor and an outlet tritium monitor and capable of 9 changing the loop to circulate to gain even greater 10 initiation factors.
11 As part of that, the SAC is forming part 12 of the tritium confinement boundary along with the 13 glove box itself.
14 The last fact I'll talk about for the TPS 15 system is the vacuum impurity treatment system. The 16 first side of it, the vacuum side, allows us to treat 17 the vacuum so the process gas rejection from the 18 tritium handling system.
19 It allows us to pull 10 to the minus 9 TOR 20 so we can maintain very high levels of accuracy inside 21 those THS process lines. We again use the hydrate 22 bed, that's the same as the SCC, to reduce tritium.
23 Having large factors, that was replaced through the 24 loop.
25 The second part of it is the KTS side if NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
158 1 you will. One gets split into two, so effluent, that 2 is mixed, can be sent to either the exhaust waste 3 stack, which Tony alluded to a little bit earlier, or 4 we can send that to the ITS tritium reduction. What 5 that does is it allows us to treat it in the vacuum 6 system.
7 If it still maintains a high level we can 8 recirculate and if we really want to get it clean, we 9 can send it to the ITS for further reduction. The ITS 10 also submits our cases with the NDAS by receiving 11 mixed air effluent.
12 So, the vacuum side is meant for inert 13 effluent and vacuum effluent, the mixed air side of 14 things will go to the IGS, which decontaminates by 15 flushing and oxidizing any elemental hydrogen that may 16 come has mixed air and capturing, which is HTO on the 17 left.
18 The ITS is also designed to support the 19 material in rapid cleanup and vacuum element of the 20 same manner where you have quantities of tritium and 21 you can treat it for that as well.
22 So, just to talk about some of the 23 safety-related equipment within the TPS scope. We've 24 mentioned the glove boxes of low-beacon boundary for 25 confinement of tritium inventory.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
159 1 We also have isolation valves. Any of the 2 penetrations that are not in that boundary, so 3 quantity of actuation can isolate these highest risk 4 inventory to that confinement. So, it's time 5 spreading around the facility.
6 We have glovebox tritium monitors that sit 7 on top and communicate directly with that environment 8 that monitor for release activity from inside of the 9 glovebox. There are target chamber supply and exhaust 10 pressure monitors on the lines that go to the high 11 cell.
12 They're redundant as well and all of our 13 safety equipment is redundant, except the glove box in 14 this case.
15 The pressure valves they're looking for a 16 breach of vacuum and the TPS exhaust is still stacked 17 monitors which are kind of shown there on the two-18 facility stack line monitoring floor excess tritium 19 release from the ITS.
20 And then that would cause an isolation 21 event as well.
22 DR. BLEY: This is Dennis again. It's a 23 small thing but since I didn't know about tornado 24 dampers, since you have them, I assume they sense a 25 low outside pressure is when they shut.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
160 1 Do they have some kind of throttle 2 function so you can maintain your ventilation zones 3 inside or do they just shut you up completely?
4 MR. FAGAN: The tornado dampers are a 5 passive device obviously.
6 They're, of course, closed by that 7 differential that you're talking about but it's a high 8 enough differential where we're not looking at those 9 closing during operation, I guess is what I would say.
10 DR. BLEY: If they closed, you waited too 11 long but you're going to shut down right away.
12 MR. FAGAN: Yes, you would get an upset 13 condition in the ventilation system if those were to 14 close and then we would follow our standard safety 15 procedures from there.
16 I think I get it. At some point, when you 17 talk about how you're going to operate this system, is 18 it likely you'll talk about that at all? Maybe the 19 members are familiar with this but I'm not.
20 MR. BARTELME: This is Jeff, I don't 21 expect that would come up in future topics. I 22 wouldn't expect so, no.
23 DR. BLEY: Let me just ask one last 24 question about it then.
25 I think from what you're saying if weather NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
161 1 forecasts show you're likely to have a tornado in your 2 area, you would shut down so that these things 3 wouldn't lead you to a shut down while you operate.
4 Is that a fair guess?
5 MS. KOLB: This Catherine again. We do 6 have draft procedures for responding to events for 7 offsite issues like that. We would have to check and 8 see what specific provisions we put into them.
9 But we do intend to have instructions for 10 the operators on what to do in the event of tornado 11 watch, tornado warning.
12 DR. BLEY: My guess is still that you 13 wouldn't wait for the dampers to slam shut, you'd try 14 to get ahead of it? If at some point, that was more 15 about that, I'd appreciate it but it's not a key 16 issue.
17 MR. FAGAN: The last slide on the tritium 18 purification system. Any additional questions on the 19 TPS before we move on to trend solution lifecycle and 20 the tritium transfer system?
21 With that, I'll turn it over to Eric.
22 MR. EDWARDS: This is Eric Edwards, the 23 chemical process systems manager at SHINE. We start 24 talking about the target solution lifecycle in the 25 back of the transfer system. The target solution, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
162 1 there's a low-enriched uranyl sulfate solution.
2 SHINE receives uranium and stores it in 3 the uranium receipt and storage system or USS in racks 4 that are designed for criticality safety.
5 If the uranium is metal and the URSS is to 6 convert the metal to uranium oxide, uranium oxide is 7 then dissolved in the target solution preparation 8 system or TSPS.
9 After dissolution of uranium is stored in 10 the target solution preparation tank until it's ready 11 to be staged for radiation or used for makeup. When 12 writing for either of these purposes it may be 13 transferred to the whole tank and the target solution 14 stage consists of TSSS.
15 Once the target solution leaves the 16 preparation tank, there's no means for it to return to 17 the TSPS. All the solution prepared in the 18 preparation system insists on fresh uranium.
19 After staging the whole tank, the target 20 solution is transferred into a target solution vessel 21 for radiation. Following radiation, the solution is 22 dumped into a target solution vessel dump tank and 23 then transferred into the hot cell for isotope 24 separation.
25 While separation occurs, the solution is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
163 1 typically returned to a whole tank and the target 2 solution staging system for subsequent radiation may 3 also be set to the target solution storage tank for 4 the first two radioactive liquid waste and the 5 radioactive liquid waste storage system that we 6 discussed just previous to this.
7 Next slide. At the end of solution life, 8 it is processed through the radioactive liquid waste 9 storage system where it's blended down where its other 10 waste streams, and then solidified in the radioactive 11 liquid waste mobilization system.
12 Solidified waste is then served in the 13 material access building prior to equipment offsite.
14 We just talked about that a short time ago. Next 15 slide.
16 Now shifting a little bit back to the 17 vacuum transfer system, the vacuum transfer system or 18 VTS consists of vacuum pumps to create vacuum and a 19 backup pump that also serves as a vacuum reservoir, 20 vacuum lift tanks that move solution around the 21 facility and the associated piping components and 22 instrumentation.
23 There are two different patterns that 24 connect to the backup pot, which again is a source of 25 vacuum, one with components that contain target NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
164 1 solution and one with components that do not contain 2 target solution.
3 A vacuum transfer system transfers 4 solution multiple ways. The first system transfers 5 solution to oil tanks and gravity feeds its next 6 location. It may perform this in a single lift or 7 staged lift.
8 The second method is to open a path 9 directly between the source of the destination tank 10 and put the vacuum on the destination tank. In 11 addition to transfers, the vacuum transfer system 12 provides vacuum services to other RPM systems and 13 provides an interface for sample solutions.
14 A vacuum transfer system is designed with 15 favorable geometry components analyzed for 16 criticality, safety, and liquid detection is also used 17 to prevent inadvertent criticality.
18 This includes automatic shut-off balance 19 that prevent liquid from reaching the backup pot.
20 Vacuum transfer system equipment that is required to 21 survive a seismic event has been analyzed for that 22 design basis event.
23 Our engineer safety feature for actuation, 24 the vacuum transfer system opens the atmosphere, 25 preventing further transfers of radioactive liquids.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
165 1 The vacuum transfer system is designed to 2 prevent liquid from flashing a vapor by monitoring the 3 temperature of the liquid transfer. The location of 4 the equipment is hot cell and below grade.
5 This is the last slide of the target 6 solution lifecycle and vacuum transfer system. So, 7 are there any questions before we move into the 8 pressure vessel event system and maybe the other 9 gaseous systems?
10 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
11 I have what might be a dumb question but 12 is vacuum transfer of solutions, all of these 13 solutions have a vapor pressure of some kind and is 14 there a chance that this could encourage collection of 15 stuff within the lines themselves, which amounts to a 16 hold up the train?
17 MR. EDWARDS: We're not anticipating any 18 hold-up from the vacuum lines themselves.
19 CHAIR BALLINGER: I've tried that in my 20 lab before and it didn't work.
21 MS. RADEL: We have done some prototype 22 testing of the system. The system has also been a 23 layout design to gravity during back to certain takes 24 depending on the location you're looking at.
25 MR. EDWARDS: That's another feature of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
166 1 the knock-up, once you get that part of that, purpose 2 of the backup pump is to down most other things to 3 prevent and train with the droplets in particular to 4 reaching the vacuum pumps themselves.
5 And then that liquid can be transferred 6 back into the system from that point too.
7 CHAIR BALLINGER: I don't think I'd be 8 concerned too much about droplets as much as I would 9 be concerned about precipitation or stuff on the 10 pipes. It's always water?
11 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's a water solution 12 of uranium nitride.
13 CHAIR BALLINGER: It's a water solution of 14 uranium.
15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's mostly water.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: It's mostly peaceful.
17 Thanks.
18 MR. FAGAN: Any other questions? Next I'm 19 going to talk about the pressure vessel led system and 20 then nitrogen perch system, process vessel event 21 system.
22 The process vessel event system collects 23 and treats gases from the processes and this morning 24 productions facility before releasing to the FAC.
25 These processes include venting from the radioisotope NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
167 1 production facility tanks.
2 Gases discharge from the vacuum transfer 3 system, gases discharge from the TSB off gas system, 4 exhaust gases from the BTS vacuum pumps, sleep gas, 5 nitrogen perches, and pressure relief.
6 While there is upstream of the Staff pull 7 flow through ventilator tanks in order to remove 8 hydrogen and create radiolysis to maintain a slight 9 negative pressure in the tanks.
10 The process vessel event system was 11 designed to condition these gases in order to improve 12 the reliability of the down-tier equipment which I'll 13 talk about shortly, filter particulates from the 14 effluents, capture radium iodine, and a lot of the 15 radioactives in krypton isotopes to be indicated 16 before release.
17 Here we have a flow diagram and I'm just 18 going to discuss it and then go into similar 19 information. Here you see the tank at the bottom so 20 we click on condensers and I'm going to walk basically 21 from left to right here.
22 On the left there is a condenser and the 23 re-heater, then there's the HEPA filter and the garden 24 beds. On the bottom there's also a pump to return 25 that condensate to our process.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
168 1 The gases collected by the process vessel 2 first enter the filtration system and this works to 3 condition the gases for particular radio iodine. And 4 that's the dark on the right.
5 The first section of the system consists 6 of condensers to condense the water out of the gases, 7 re-heaters to heat the gases back up because they're 8 condensed by chilling them, a condensate tank to 9 collect liquids, and a pump to change the condensate.
10 The next section has an acid absorber to 11 remove acidic gases and another filter to remove 12 particulates from the stream.
13 After exiting the HEPA filters, the gas 14 goes through the garden beds, which move the 15 radioiodine prior to entering the delay beds, which 16 we'll talk about next.
17 This filtration tank is located in the hot 18 cell with the exception of the garden beds, which are 19 located in a separated vault.
20 After leaving the filtration skip, the gas 21 travels into delay beds that delay radioactive xenon 22 and krypton from being released until they are 23 sufficiently decayed to acceptable limits for 10 24 C.F.R. Part 20.
25 There's a final HEPA filter to remove any NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
169 1 particulates early. Because the delay beds are filled 2 with carbon trailers, they are distinctly different 3 from the delay bed in the case where fire is detected.
4 The delay beds are located on a separate 5 valve and subsequent equipment, including the HEPA 6 filters and blowers are located in the facility 7 mezzanine.
8 And then we have a safety-related backup 9 system for the venting, that's called the nitrogen 10 purge system, which is there to provide sweep gas to 11 each system to control hydrogen concentration in the 12 case of a failure that would affect the process vessel 13 event system or the TSV off-gas system.
14 The nitrogen purge system, or NPS, is 15 actuated by the engineered safety features actuation 16 system on loss of normal power or loss of sweep gas 17 flow.
18 The system stores sufficient nitrogen to 19 provide sweep gas for three days. The nitrogen purge 20 system consists of an above-grade reinforced concrete 21 structure that houses high-pressure supplied to be 22 extended for the nitrogen gas.
23 These tubes are folded together so they'll 24 activate a simultaneous supply of nitrogen. The 25 system also includes isolation valves, regulators, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
170 1 relief valves, pressure instrumentation, and the 2 piping and tubing for transfer of the nitrogen gas.
3 The structure is designed to withstand the 4 impact of tornado missiles and the design basis 5 earthquake. It's located in an area where non-safety-6 related components, for example, a facility could not 7 impact the housing or operation.
8 Nitrogen purge system uses the pressure 9 vessel system piping and components for portions of 10 the flow. A safety-related exhaust point is opened 11 for N2PS actuation in the case that the N2PS flow is 12 stopped due to an issue with the normal exhaust point.
13 That's the end of I believe the entire 14 Chapter 9 presentation. Are there any other questions 15 on this section?
16 MEMBER SUNSERI: Yes, this is Matt 17 Sunseri. I have more of an observation than a 18 question and it follows this nitrogen purge system.
19 So, there is a proposed tech spec that 20 identifies that if fewer than 11 storage tubes of 21 pressurized greater than 2100 PSIG or if the purge 22 system is not available to deliver 1600 standard cubic 23 feet of the sweep gas, then you have to place all your 24 radiation units in Mode 3 with equal routers and then 25 restore the system to operable in each tube.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
171 1 To me, it sounds like you're expecting 92 2 percent or greater availability of this system and 3 what this risk is all of the operation of all the 4 irradiation units.
5 So, if you can't maintain that, your 6 second bullet that on the previous page really -- oh, 7 no, the second bullet on this page identifies the 8 challenge. There's a lot of components there that 9 have to be potentially flawless to maintain this 10 reliability of the system.
11 My comment is I think you have a little 12 bit of a vulnerability there because maintaining a 13 nitrogen system to that high reliability might be 14 challenging for you.
15 So, the so-what would be it's not a safety 16 issue, we just shut the units down. But the nexus to 17 safety could be if it really turns out to be not a 18 very reliable system, then you could be unnecessarily 19 cycling these units, which then could introduce a 20 human performance challenge.
21 So, that's my observation. My comment 22 would be it might be prudent to look at this tech spec 23 and see if you can gain any additional margin. If 24 there's only 10 tubes available, do you have to shut 25 down all of the units or do you have to shut down a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
172 1 fraction of them?
2 I don't know, the system works in tandem, 3 maybe you can't do that. I would just offer that 4 might be an area to look at to see if you could get 5 some more margin in your facility.
6 That's all I have.
7 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you, we wrote that 8 down.
9 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg, I've got a 10 question. Back on the air treatment systems you have 11 with the HEPAs and the charcoal and whatnot, do you 12 know what standard you'll be testing those to, or 13 manufacturing and testing those to?
14 Do you know what standard you're going to 15 using? It used to be ANSI 510 or N510 but I think 16 that's been superseded over the years.
17 MR. EDWARDS: I don't know offhand, I 18 don't know if anyone in the room knows offhand but 19 it's something we could get back on.
20 MEMBER HALNON: I'm just curious. It goes 21 to you have a lot of filtration and whatnot, and a lot 22 of testing needs to be done according to the current 23 standard.
24 I'm interested in how you're going to 25 manufacture the appropriate testing points and how NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
173 1 those systems can be tested while online, offline, 2 those types of questions.
3 MR. EDWARDS: Is there a question 4 specifically about the HEPA filters or the entire 5 skid?
6 MEMBER HALNON: It's specifically 7 probably, based on my experience, the charcoal and the 8 HEPA filters.
9 MR. EDWARDS: AG1.
10 MEMBER HALNON: Is it AG1? That's the 11 most recent one, is that what you guys are testing to?
12 MR. EDWARDS: Yes.
13 MEMBER HALNON: And then I assume there 14 would be appropriate testing points put in there so 15 that you could do that either online or in the outage, 16 depending on where the system is, I guess, is that 17 correct?
18 MR. EDWARDS: It won't be a regularly 19 scheduled activity but it will be possible.
20 MEMBER HALNON: Remote instrumentation, 21 did you determine whether or not the DP on the HEPA 22 filters need to be replaced or is there a roughing 23 filter in front of that to help?
24 MR. EDWARDS: There is differential 25 pressure measurement on it.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
174 1 MEMBER HALNON: That's in the weeds in the 2 stuff I know but it's interesting to be able to see 3 how you're going to test these things and whether or 4 not it's going to take an outage to replace certain 5 portions of it based on the DP falls out.
6 So, if you're using AG1 I'm satisfied.
7 Just out of curiosity, this is Walt Kirchner, how 8 frequently will you have to -- I think those are 9 underneath one of your shield plugs.
10 How frequently will you have to change out 11 the HEPA filters?
12 MR. EDWARDS: They're in the supercell so 13 they'll be replaceable by manipulator.
14 MEMBER REMPE: I believe Member Kirchner 15 asked how frequently you're replacing them and you 16 responded back how you're replacing them. Do you 17 understand still need a frequency, Walt?
18 MEMBER KIRCHNER: It's more curiosity.
19 The expectation is for --
20 (Simultaneous speaking.)
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I didn't have my mic on.
22 I was saying, what's the expectation for changing out 23 the HEPA filters in terms of a duty cycle?
24 MR. EDWARDS: This is Steve from SHINE.
25 The current estimate is once a year because we know NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
175 1 that will be replacing the assets in medium once a 2 year.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
4 MEMBER BIER: This is Vicki, I wanted to 5 come back to my earlier question about the HVAC and 6 whether the pressure that is supposed to prevent 7 significant air releases is created actually and 8 requires a lot of power or if it's inherent in the 9 system?
10 I don't know whether the people who are 11 presenting now if they were here for the earlier 12 question?
13 MR. EDWARDS: I wasn't here for the 14 earlier question. Can you frame it one more time for 15 me? I wasn't here for the earlier question.
16 MEMBER BIER: There was a request for 17 additional information that dealt with -- I don't have 18 it pulled up right now but a Z something. If somebody 19 has it?
20 MR. EDWARDS: FZV4, facility ventilation 21 4?
22 MEMBER BIER: Correct. And there was an 23 explanation that we don't need to worry about leases 24 through that path because of pressure differentials 25 that go the other way.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
176 1 And I'm just trying to check do the 2 pressure differentials require you to actively 3 maintain them with electric power?
4 MR. EDWARDS: The pressure differential 5 between FVZ4 and RVZ1, I spoke to earlier how we 6 cascade that area into the facility, all of that is 7 maintained by those exhaust fans for ventilation zone 8 1 and 2.
9 It is not a safety-related function of the 10 system though.
11 MEMBER BIER: Does that mean those fans 12 would not be provided emergency power on the 13 uninterrupted power supply?
14 MR. EDWARDS: That's correct, that's how 15 the system stands, yes.
16 MEMBER BIER: Thank you.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: Other questions from 18 members? We're getting towards the end. It's time 19 for the Staff, is the Staff ready to go?
20 MR. KAIPINENI: Mike, do you have any 21 opening statement about two reviewers here on this 22 section?
23 MR. BALAZIK: No, Rao, this is Mike 24 Balazik. No, Rao, just go ahead and Rao will be 25 presenting most of the presentation but Joe NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
177 1 Staudenmeier is going to talk about the TPS.
2 MR. KAIPINENI: Next slide, please. My 3 name is Rao Karipineni, I'm a reviewer in Safety and 4 Systems Branch in individual safety systems. We're 5 going to be reviewing the HVAC systems and the PBBS 6 and the nitrogen purge system today.
7 Next slide, please.
8 These chapters were covered in Section 9 9A21 of the SAR. The SAR states that the RPF and the 10 radiation facility systems are covered in different 11 sections.
12 In actuality, when you go to the RPF 13 portion of it, it refers you back to the radiation 14 facility, claiming that these are all common systems 15 and therefore, whatever is provided in Section 9A is 16 in Section 9B also.
17 Therefore, we only cover the 9A Section.
18 And then outside of the RCA, the non-RCA portion 19 ventilation systems and the chill water systems, 20 heating water systems also will be in this section.
21 Next slide, please.
22 The facility has four regular articulation 23 zones as we have heard many times today. The zones 24 are determined with the idea that you want to 25 procrastinate from areas of least potential for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
178 1 contamination to areas with the most potential for 2 contamination.
3 So, in this case the three onsite RVZ1, 4 RVZ2, and RVZ3, RVZ3 in some sense is really a 5 transfer system officer outside into RVZ3 and then 6 into RVZ2.
7 The RVZ1 systems is probably the pressure 8 varies the least is what I mean, therefore, these 9 areas that are RVZ 1E, meaning exhaust there, they're 10 not directly supplied with any air into the same 11 areas.
12 You would supply the area in a different 13 portion of the building and in this case it is RVZ2 14 and by turning the RVZE system on, you would be 15 natural pulling the air from RVZ2 into RVZ1 and that 16 is the basis of how to move the air from one zone to 17 the other.
18 There was a question about how these zones 19 are maintained at these pressures from one of the ACRS 20 members.
21 What I remember reading, and I didn't have 22 time when the session was going on to go check back on 23 it, what the SAR says is there are some pressure 24 indicators inside the ducts.
25 That will be sending the signals based on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
179 1 the pressure differentials between the different AS of 2 the buildings, whether to increase the flow from one 3 fan or whether to decrease the flow from another fan.
4 This is all set up into the control 5 systems, from what I understand and I was pretty 6 satisfied with what was described there. RVZ4, that 7 is the non-regular containing systems.
8 It has its own supply systems, exhaust 9 systems, and recirculation systems, just like all the 10 other systems have the recirculation and exhaust 11 systems in RVZ2 and RVZ1.
12 The purpose of RVZ2 is to supply air into 13 the main facility into the open areas basically, and 14 sometimes, directly to RVZ2 and then the left hole air 15 inquiry had that door but the other air quantity would 16 move into the RVZ1A.
17 So, the way this whole system is set up, 18 it is a once-through system. The RCA is a once-19 through system. You don't reuse any of the air. The 20 entire supply to the RCA comes RBZ through supply.
21 All the MRA would be through the RVZ1E 22 exhaust or RVZ2E exhaust or PBBS system. So, this 23 way, maintaining the whole facility at an added 24 pressure and making sure all the air going out of the 25 facility is always going through all these filters is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
180 1 one of the good safety features of the full AC.
2 Next slide, please.
3 The external to the RCA, you have these 4 two other systems, facility chilled water system, and 5 facility heating water systems. The facility chilled 6 water system serves the equipment located external to 7 the RCA back.
8 It not only serves the FVZ4 supply system, 9 it also serves the RVZ2 supply system and they can do 10 it that way because the RVZ2 system is outside of the 11 RCA and the equipment is located in a non-RCA zone.
12 So, both the heating and the air 13 conditioning for RVZ2, meaning the RCA supply, is 14 performed by this unit, the facility chill water and 15 facility heating water systems.
16 Next slide, please.
17 We'll cover some of the isolations, et 18 cetera, as we go and I have a few schematics from the 19 FSAR to show in this session to get a better 20 understanding. As you know, all the isolations are 21 only in the RBZ, 1, 2, and 3 systems.
22 There are no isolations needed for the 23 outside facility systems. Next slide.
24 In addition to the HVAC heating systems, 25 we will be covering a little bit of the covered gas NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
181 1 control and primary cooling system and covered gas 2 control in the RPF, meaning the PBBS and the nitrogen 3 purge systems today.
4 Next slide.
5 We are into tritium here, I'll skip this 6 next slide.
7 MR. STAUDENMEIER: This is Joe 8 Staudenmeier, I'm from the Office of Research. I'm 9 going to be covering the tritium purification system 10 review.
11 The tritium purification system, the main 12 function is to supply pure deuterium and tritium 13 streams to the neutron driver assembly system, and 14 also separate the deuterium tritium gas mixture coming 15 back from the NDAS and into pure deuterium and tritium 16 streams and also remove any impurities in the streams.
17 The TPS equipment is all located inside 18 the TPS room. The TPS room is exhaust to the RVZ2 19 exhaust system. That was that system, processes are 20 performed inside gloveboxes to minimize exposure to 21 workers.
22 The glovebox has its own ventilation 23 system that's part of the RVZ1 ventilation system.
24 Next slide. Another function is to limit the amount 25 of tritium and waste streams exhausted to the facility NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
182 1 ventilation system.
2 And finally, it's designed to minimize the 3 release of tritium to the facility and environment 4 during normal operations and design basis accidents 5 and for normal operations it keeps the releases within 6 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
7 And a bit of information that's not 8 related to this, I was asked before, I think the 9 amount of a tritium that a can-do generates in a year 10 is a bit over 100 grams per year. So, not part of 11 this but some additional information.
12 That covers the tritium system. Next 13 slide.
14 MR. KAIPINENI: These are the regulatory 15 basis on the criteria that we looked at in reviewing 16 these HVAC systems. The guys mentioned the 10 CFRs.
17 We reviewed them for completeness and consistency 18 between each other.
19 We follow any other guidelines we have in 20 1537.
21 The 10 CFR occupational dose limits 22 individual members to the public, those were reviewed 23 to ensure all of the requirements described in the CR 24 are consistent with the assumptions made in the 25 chapter zone controls of the system and Chapter 13, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
183 1 the accident review.
2 The actual results of those reviews will 3 be provided in the Chapter 13 SC. But our intention 4 is to make sure the systems are properly described and 5 functions are clearly described and actuations are 6 clearly described.
7 That's how we did it. Next slide, please.
8 In addition, we also looked at the design criteria, we 9 also looked at the isolation features and as I said 10 before, we looked at the Chapter 7 review of these 11 different accidents or events that are described.
12 And essentially, we made sure all the 13 design features and the equipment that is required to 14 be in the tech specs are actually included in the tech 15 specs. These are some of the processes we followed 16 with the end goal of concluding that they're all 17 right, they're all consistent.
18 We don't have any other versions. Next 19 slide, please. The summary of the application on 20 these isolations and other issues, et cetera, we'll 21 write that in the later slides looking at the 22 schematics I mentioned before.
23 This is the RVZ2 supply system. You can 24 see that the system is located in the non-25 radiological area of this.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
184 1 We have an outside area coming in, going 2 through the filters, the cooling and heating coils and 3 then a ray of fans and then a humidification in case 4 humidity is added.
5 And then it goes to a damper, which is the 6 tornado damper that we discussed a little bit in 7 yesterday's session, followed by the two buffer-type 8 isolation dampers. The two S system is very small 9 letters to see here but the cooling coil is applied by 10 the facility 2R, like I said.
11 The heating system is applied by the 12 facility heating system. The array of fans is 13 something a little bit different than we have 14 traditionally seen in the nuclear industry.
15 They include a bunch of fans, for lack of 16 exactly knowing how many numbers they have I'll just 17 say that. They operate in a little bit differently, 18 fans dropping out, fans coming back on, needed, it 19 helps that maintaining the pressures on everything 20 makes it a little bit easier so you're not fighting 21 with one big fan on that issue.
22 It could potentially have for six fans 23 inside, I have no idea, but how many numbers they have 24 there. They all have very low frequency drive on 25 their walls that makes it a little bit easier to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
185 1 increase the speed and decrease the speed.
2 So, these features would help manipulate 3 those pressures inside the facility a little bit 4 easier. The tornado damper we discussed about the 5 fact that it will close if the tornado were to occur.
6 A good question was brought up about the 7 facility, what happens afterwards? The most safe 8 thing to do is that you close that tornado damper, the 9 tornado damper closes when there is a tornado.
10 After that design, that separated feature 11 and it is there. As far as in the hybrid effects, the 12 plant operations in the sense immediately what you 13 would do, the longer of what you do, that I did not 14 necessarily go into that because I felt that was a 15 safe design.
16 It has been normal for the operating 17 plants nuclear big plants to go into this anticipation 18 of tornado, take some actions and all those things.
19 But in a system like this, if you want to continue 20 operating and make the radioisotopes that you want to 21 do, and if you are on there operating it's pretty hard 22 to stop that.
23 And so you're in a situation where we have 24 to be ready for what would you do after that?
25 If a tornado in fact hits and it did not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
186 1 damage any equipment, if you want to restart the 2 facility because the location of the tornado damper is 3 such, it has to go through in some sense, a lot of 4 pressure has to go through the units there and that 5 potentially could damage that unit.
6 Maybe the filters get pulled off or maybe 7 some of other thing gets pulled off in the equipment.
8 Design-wise, it is needed tornado to have it.
9 Operationally-wise, what you do is the other issue and 10 that's open I guess, it can be out with the arrow 11 here.
12 The regular isolation dampers, they're the 13 RCA isolation dampers, all these systems have those 14 two dampers when you go from RCA to non-RCA, and the 15 signal that comes to it from the FPAS system closes 16 all those dampers in the facility.
17 The most important signal is the track 18 radiation model signal. If those send a signal, that 19 eventually pulls a lot of equipment, not only the RCA, 20 there are so many other pieces of equipment -- I'll 21 list them later here -- they would close too.
22 So, that also in some sense, just like the 23 tornado, what would you do right away? That's a 24 different issue that needs to be probably addressed 25 from the regulations side. If the isolation is there, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
187 1 that is a safe thing to do in the section.
2 These are some of the isolations described 3 before. The top ones are the PCLS isolation from 4 RVC1E system.
5 What that system is doing is there is a 6 way they could -- any radiolysis gases in the PCLS 7 gets pulled through the expansion tank, which is 8 located in the PCRS cooling room, the IC cell cooling 9 room, and it gets pulled to those two dampers, 10 isolation dampers on a cover.
11 And if there is a radiation signal there, 12 this doesn't clearly show where the area is, the 13 dampers would close and you isolate the IEO. The good 14 thing about it is if you can isolate it quickly 15 enough, you have only one by you that you're 16 isolating.
17 But if that is delayed and a signal goes 18 to the stack eventually because you're talking about 19 I already see 1E here, that may require RCA isolation.
20 So, the local isolations in some sense help this plan 21 to not isolate the earlier RCA if these react quick 22 enough so the other radiation monitors in the stack 23 did not react.
24 The bottom portion isolations are all the 25 supercell isolations. They're coming from the RVZ2 S NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
188 1 system, basically, but what the system has is after 2 the air enters from RVZ2S into the generator area, 3 there is another subsystem, cooling system, provided 4 in the dock work, it's called RVZ2R, recirculation.
5 They have it close to I don't remember 6 exact numbers but for five things like that at 7 different points.
8 The reason for that is there may be some 9 additional pulling required after the way it comes 10 from RBZ2S so these would be the porters that could 11 turn on and keep the facility at even a cooler 12 temperature.
13 I don't know the exact technical reason of 14 why a supercell would help by doing but if it is in 15 the process it helps.
16 So, those colors pull the air, supply them 17 into this supercell, and at the outside of this 18 supercell you have a connection to the RBZ1E again and 19 it all goes to the RBZ1A.
20 So, other than this two or three, most of 21 the other exhaust points from the RBZ2 system comes 22 from RVZ2E. I'll show that exhaust system in a 23 second. Next slide, please.
24 It is the RVZ1E and RVZ2E exhaust systems 25 so these are located, I'm trying to see here, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
189 1 total crane is located within the RCA but the trends 2 that are pulling the RA off this RVZ283 and RVZ1A, 3 they're located in the cleaner side, in the non-RCA 4 area.
5 So, it can be easier without any 6 maintenance to be done and things like that, you don't 7 have to worry too much about this. The filter frames 8 have a little bypass there. This bypass can help them 9 not shut down.
10 You have at least some cleaning of the 11 filters or some small problem they have in those 12 filters, et cetera.
13 This was a slight design change that was 14 performed and I'm okay with it because the stacks and 15 everything have one more variation monitors so for a 16 short time they open the door or something and bypass 17 those filters.
18 We thought it's not a big issue unless 19 there's a response, then they'll obviously take some 20 action about it. So, the two fans provide you the 21 redundancy to the only two active components there.
22 So, if one fan goes you have another fan 23 so that should not cause any problem. The filtration 24 system itself is all past-use so it's unlikely that 25 you will really get a problem or anything like that.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
190 1 So, the design chain would help be 2 comfortable and we don't have other issues than that.
3 Next slide, please.
4 Let me just go back to one more slide, go 5 back. Again, you see those two filter trains right at 6 the separation between the two zones, RCA and non-RCA.
7 You have a tornado damper and you have two isolation 8 dampers in the RCA.
9 Again, if a tornado comes right by the 10 side of the area where they have all this exists and 11 the entries are, the tornado dampers, depending on how 12 light the tornado is.
13 Next slide, please.
14 This is the FVZ, the outside RCA portion 15 of the air conditioning system.
16 As you can see, the heating and cooling 17 components of getting the water from the facility 18 chill water and facility heating water systems, they 19 have the facility chill water and the facility heating 20 water systems.
21 The chill water system has two chillers 22 and two pumps, almost 50 percent each, not almost, 23 actually, they're 50 percent each. There are two 24 pumps, basically on pump into this unit and another 25 pump pumping it into RVZ2 supply unit, I just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
191 1 described it before.
2 The facility system is dealing with all 3 the cooling parts of the HVAC systems to both the RCA 4 and non-RCA with the exception of these small 5 recirculation coolers I mentioned that are in the 6 RVZ2ES system.
7 And those recirculation coolers, because 8 they are in the RCA, the design used the RPCS2 water 9 system, which is slightly different. This is a part 10 of facility chillers, and the second part of the 11 escorting chiller system that they have.
12 This system, the RPG system, unlike the 13 main facility, this has a return damper and a return 14 fan, you can see it in the very top.
15 Because this is non-RCA, it is pretty 16 common to use the safety systems that way so you don't 17 have to spend a lot on air conditioning and heating on 18 all those things.
19 So, just a portion that is being imposed 20 by different exhaust fans will be replaced from 21 outside to the bottom line at the left, that's where 22 the A is coming in. Next slide, please.
23 That's basically how the HVAC systems work 24 here. The design is pretty consistent and they 25 provide the features that will maintain the main NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
192 1 facility that enable it to get different negative 2 pressures.
3 And the FVZ part of it, there is a small 4 requirement FVZ that they would maintain the pressure 5 also there because the common portions, they will not 6 want A to be any chance speaking out of the main 7 boundary.
8 So, by maintaining a slight pressure 9 there, you would actually have it going in only.
10 The RBZ 3 part, which I haven't really 11 touched on until now, is sort of that system. You 12 have a small dock port that passes through from RVZ3 13 to RVZ2 and there's air coming in from RVZ4 to RVZ3.
14 Also, they're just more dark. There are 15 dampers in those transfer docks. If something happens 16 that requires isolation of the entire RCA, those 17 dampers also close by any unexpected way that somebody 18 tries to go out.
19 The transfer docks, they have a 20 backtracked damper there, almost like a check round, 21 that would close and would not cause any immediate 22 issue for the facility.
23 The expansion tank is designed to prevent 24 radiolysis gases. I mentioned that a few minutes ago 25 and also we have addressed that same system in Chapter NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
193 1 5 and 4 analysis in the last discussions with the 2 ACRS.
3 The boxes are there freely but are not in 4 my portion, I forgot to take that off. The PBBS 5 process vessel event system and N2PS and the IBZ 6 isolation also, I'll go into that. There's more on 7 the next slide.
8 You see in this sketch for a few minutes 9 ago, the PBBS in the top portion on the left side in 10 the lines come in, the main PBBS line, you have the 11 treatment of the gases due to normal operation to 12 condense them and heat them a little bit more to get 13 to better humidity levels and then go to the carbon, 14 HEPA, carbon again, to have that system and come back 15 into a single line.
16 At which point it enters into the below-17 grade delay beds, we have altogether eight delay beds, 18 three plus three plus two. The system, the PBBS 19 system, when PBBS is operating, it is operating based 20 on those two little fans, the ambulatory fans.
21 They create the negative pressure for flow 22 to travel through the PBBS lanes towards the fan. The 23 PBBS lines come in from different tanks, et cetera, 24 all those things. There is a small supply connection 25 to all of them coming from RBZ2S system inside the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
194 1 facility.
2 A lot of times it is a small line going 3 into the tank. There is a valve there, an operator 4 valve, when the normal operation is going on.
5 If something happens to the PBBS flow, 6 whether it is a stack issue or a fan issue, a loss of 7 power, you would turn the system back to the automatic 8 sign based on loss of flow and based on loss of power.
9 And the N2PS and the PBBS connections, 10 those valves will close then and the PBBS valves 11 close, and the other system valves open.
12 And the nitrogen gets going into all the 13 PBBS lines with the past-due pressure and the push 14 pressure coming into the PS system, just because the 15 fans are not operating at the end here.
16 We are going on assumptions there.
17 So, that pressure pushes the flow to the 18 filter trains. The whole treatment part of the system 19 in those conditions can be bypassed, which is one of 20 the lines that's created on the entire filters and the 21 hitters, et cetera.
22 That can be turned on but you're going to 23 get the loss of power and everything to happen, that's 24 one way they can just bypass that and go straight to 25 the delay beds.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
195 1 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. That 2 sequence you just described, is the timing of all 3 those valves closing and pressurizing in NPN2, is all 4 that really important or is it just simultaneously 5 happening?
6 MR. KAIPINENI: The signal goes to those 7 two valves at the same time, one is closing and the 8 other one is opening. So, time-wise, I don't think 9 that appears to be a big issue.
10 MEMBER HALNON: Thanks. I think it just 11 all happened simultaneously and what happens happens 12 based on signals, yes.
13 MR. KAIPINENI: The delay beds underneath, 14 at the bottom of the skid, you see there are some 15 bypass valves there so it looks like a TBB valve but 16 the operation, they were added mostly because of the 17 fire protection issues that were discussed in Chapter 18 13 I believe, fire personnel accident, that took 19 credit for the ability to isolate any section of those 20 delay beds and operate the remaining ones, which 21 seems to be variable.
22 But there is the reason why they did it 23 that way. The HEPA filter is there at the end, it is 24 always there under both conditions whether you're 25 operating under PBBS or 2PS.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
196 1 Next slide, please.
2 This is a sketch I just want to show of 3 the same thing we saw before. And on the very bottom 4 on the left, the lines, there are two liens of those 5 two. The top line, they show you the N2PS and the 6 PBBS, the PBBS and the nitrogen purge.
7 And also, same way with the other ones 8 here. These are happening and the inlet locations of 9 the N2PS are the RBC2S. Those are the fractions that 10 are one closes and the other one opens.
11 This has this continuous sweep flow going 12 onto the thanks pretty much. Next slide, please.
13 This is the nitrogen system basically that is in the 14 basement structure right adjacent to the facility.
15 And there are two lines going up there, 16 the RPF and et cetera going and making the connections 17 to the PBBS lines basically, the larger manifold and 18 all that stuff, and it fills in the connection at the 19 bottom.
20 MEMBER HALNON: Before you go on, Member 21 Sunseri put a caution out there that 12 tanks, only 1 22 in reserve, the 16 SCFM and the 2100 PSI, did you all 23 have any concern with the system causing maybe 24 excessive shutdowns based on the tech specs or did you 25 feel the margin was adequate?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
197 1 MR. KAIPINENI: The tech specs were very 2 descriptive and a lot of numbers were there. I 3 thought it was a very safety -- the safety caution 4 done.
5 My thinking was if this system of getting 6 these gases out is probably thought to be very 7 important and that's why the client in this case, 8 SHINE, has put himself in a very tight tech spec 9 there.
10 And I thought it was good. The other 11 part, like you said, the operations part, how we could 12 possibly delay or shut down some of the equipment 13 inside if it's up to the licensee to look at?
14 The quantity we are talking about is so 15 small really, there's so many tanks and all these 16 combined.
17 I guess the gas that was created 15 CFR 18 both the mags and the tech specs have in fact places 19 where individuals will in some places will measure and 20 require, in fact, to be 1.5 or 2 CFM.
21 It's very small flows here.
22 MEMBER HALNON: That's the one piece that 23 clearly has margin.
24 I think the concern was potentially what 25 you said, it's a tight tech spec and every time you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
198 1 shut down the plant, you introduce additional operator 2 actions that introduce additional risk relative to 3 potential errors.
4 So, I think we've talked about and I think 5 they'll look at it and maybe make whatever adjustments 6 operationally they need to.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: This is Walt Kirchner.
8 One thing that struck me in a lot of these 9 line diagrams, and maybe they're simplified, I see 10 single point failure for this system. You have lots 11 of redundancy in the storage tubes but you've got at 12 least showing just one line to deliver the function.
13 MR. KAIPINENI: There is one line where 14 all these --
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Come together?
16 MR. KAIPINENI: Yes, come together and go.
17 This is a safety-related system.
18 (Simultaneous speaking.)
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- for both reliability, 20 functionality, separate the trains, just a thought.
21 This works but it's vulnerable to single failure.
22 There's no diversity or redundancy. You break that 23 line somewhere and you shut down.
24 MR. KAIPINENI: Yes, if you break this 25 line --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
199 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Several of the other 2 line diagrams, it may be they're just poorly 3 simplified, I don't know.
4 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
5 Another thought I have when I look at something like 6 this, and it has nothing to do with sinking, is that 7 you've got calibrate all these things all the time and 8 you can't take any of these things off of service 9 without shutting the plant down.
10 So, it wonders from a standpoint of having 11 to have these things calibrated periodically whether 12 that's an impact.
13 MR. KAIPINENI: Calibration-wise, it's 14 because it has so many loops and everything there.
15 They can work on one calibration at one time and 16 isolation valves, et cetera.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: Lot of pressure gauges 18 and sensors.
19 MR. KAIPINENI: Right, more than the 20 calibration, a more valid question might be is a 21 safety failure created as something that needs to be 22 assumed here? If we do break it, I don't recall now 23 what the tech spec says on outage times for all these 24 systems.
25 But we can look at that.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
200 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: If the architecture of 2 these systems is like this, it may not be a safety 3 issue per se because it may force you into a finite 4 period of time to shut down but it sure could be a 5 productivity issue.
6 My observation, maybe I should made this 7 to the SHINE people, I was overall for all these 8 support systems, I was a little bit surprised to see 9 schematics with a similarity to this one where you had 10 single point failure potential.
11 That's an observation.
12 MR. KAIPINENI: If you look at the design 13 criteria to the point where how that applies to the 14 facility here, in 29 it talked about many boundaries 15 and RCA boundaries was one of them.
16 There was called a foot class boundary and 17 the design satisfies it because you're closing these 18 valves, the isolation is maintained and the boundary 19 is maintained.
20 Provisions for testing and inspections, 21 based on what we have seen in the drawings and the 22 schematics and everything, we are satisfied and rolls 23 up areas of radioactive materials as we describe with 24 the isolations, et cetera, and the PBBC and the N2PS.
25 One of the radioactive releases that the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
201 1 points were there in the common stack where any other 2 leaders were supposed to go through. We're okay with 3 that. And the 39 hydrogen part, there were systems 4 provided for the PBBS and into PS to do that, to do 5 the functions needed.
6 Next slide, please. We already talked 7 about the LCOs a little bit. These are the LCOs we 8 all looked at, the supercell confinement dampers in 9 CL3.4.4., 3.4.5, the IU boundary, the RF boundary I 10 should have said.
11 The shield products and the RBZ 1R unit, 12 the RBZ1R is a recirculation unit that keeps pulling 13 the air from the radiation part, radiation cells, et 14 cetera, and puts it back in.
15 And it was described as an extension of 16 the IU boundary and the licensee actually included 17 that into the consideration into the tech specs, et 18 cetera, in that.
19 3.8.9 RCA isolation dampers, they were all 20 used up and they're all there. And we also looked at 21 the PBBS, N2PS 3.5.1 and 3.8.1. The reception of the 22 systems and the actions taken and what they are 23 testing, et cetera, we will find you that.
24 TPS portions have somebody, I guess, 25 providing more on that. That's the end of my NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
202 1 conclusion unless you have any questions.
2 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. There's a 3 lot of ventilation that ultimately ends up in an F 4 float released to the stack and I see that in the 5 annual operating report there will be an accounting of 6 that.
7 Is there an equivalent? I'm used to 8 seeing an offsite dose calculation manual or program 9 required. Is there going to be an equivalent program 10 required to where that is anticipated and calculated 11 before as a programmatic aspect?
12 MR. KAIPINENI: I did not notice any but 13 that doesn't mean something is not there because there 14 was such a large tech specs events in the systems in 15 somewhat administrative procedures, et cetera, but 16 we'll take a look at that and we have to get back to 17 you on that.
18 MEMBER HALNON: The reason being the local 19 health departments typically use that to see where and 20 when they want to do samples to verify the effluent 21 releases.
22 MR. STAUDENMEIER: They have committed 23 that in offsite calculations.
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: I see two more slides, 25 at least I think.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
203 1 MR. KAIPINENI: These are my final 2 conclusions. Like I initially said, the comparisons 3 of these design features and how they're described in 4 other chapters' control systems and accident analysis 5 banks chapters, we have found them to be all 6 consistent.
7 We did not find any anomalies or anything 8 like that. Chapter 9 information tables brings that 9 back which I have shown you. We have concluded they 10 were all in accordance with what was described and 11 what we conclude that to be acceptable.
12 Next slide, please. Based on what we have 13 done, we found that they were described, the systems 14 were described, in detail including the design 15 criteria and the tech specifications based on what we 16 find with the assurance.
17 The deactivating side and operating 18 license can be conducted without endangering the 19 health and safety of the public.
20 CHAIR BALLINGER: Can you go back to the 21 delay bed picture? Let me see. That one.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Just a question of 23 clarification, once again I look at this line diagram 24 and I puzzle. I'm having trouble making sense of it, 25 is this just the schematic?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
204 1 Where's the flow through the delay beds?
2 How does it flow through the delay beds?
3 MR. KAIPINENI: The main line coming from 4 the left side, let's say it was two lines. Valves 5 would open, come inside to these two beds, and go past 6 again into the main line.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: How does it go through 8 the beds when the pipe is connected to the same line?
9 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy with SHINE. The 10 beds are connected in series, this single point 11 diagram does not show all of the valves within the 12 system.
13 So, there's valves arranged such that it 14 will flow through sequentially, bed 1, bed 2, bed 3, 15 bed 4, bed 5, bed 6, bed 7, and bed 8 and go through 16 all beds before exiting the facility.
17 The grouping that you see here is for 18 isolation in case of a fire event as fast in the 19 safety feature actuation systems that would isolate 20 groups in that group bed and actuate the appropriate 21 valves to bypass a group in the case of a fire event.
22 But normal flow is through all eight beds 23 in series.
24 MR. KAIPINENI: Which gives you more delay 25 time also that way in the design time.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
205 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: That's what I expected 2 but this diagram makes to me no sense whatsoever. And 3 it again points to one, if indeed that's what's 4 intended, a break in the upper line that takes you out 5 of business. If you shutdown, you lose production.
6 It's just not what I'm used to seeing for 7 a system like this. That's an observation, not a 8 request to change the design.
9 CHAIR BALLINGER: Questions from members?
10 We are at the end of the open session and so we need 11 to now ask for public comments before we go into a 12 closed session if necessary.
13 So, if there are members of the public 14 that would like to make a comment, please either 15 unmute yourself or hit star 6 and make your comment 16 please. Please identify yourself as well. That's for 17 civilians. 10 seconds.
18 Hearing no comments, now this is the end 19 of the open session. By my reading, we have slides 20 for closed session for Chapter 11 from SHINE and 21 Chapter 9 from the Staff but this is just what I have 22 in front of me.
23 So, I guess my question to the members and 24 to the Staff in China are do we need a closed session?
25 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Chapter 9 is just a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
206 1 picture of --
2 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes, Chapter 9 is just 3 one slide and Chapter 11 is quite a few, a lot of 4 numbers.
5 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, NRC 6 Project Manager for SHINE. No, we just had that 7 backup slide just in case there was further 8 discussions and we thought that we could use that to 9 help promote the discussion. So, we don't 10 specifically need a closed session.
11 CHAIR BALLINGER: Can we ask the same 12 question to our SHINE folks? Five-second rule for 13 SHINE. It doesn't sound to me as if we're going to 14 need a closed session --
15 MR. BARTELME: We do have closed session 16 slides to present on Chapter 11 on the radiation 17 sources.
18 CHAIR BALLINGER: Right, do you wish to 19 present them regardless of whether there are questions 20 from the members or are there questions from the 21 members that would require that?
22 MR. BARTELME: If there's no question from 23 the members and no need to present the slides, we 24 wouldn't need to, no.
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: I'm just trying to be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
207 1 complete. Hearing all negatives, thank you folks, 2 both the Staff and the SHINE folks very much for these 3 presentations. It's been a long day and we're looking 4 forward to another long day for the Subcommittee 5 meeting.
6 I would remind members who have been 7 assigned tasks to write little memorandums for us to 8 start the process of constructing these memos to do 9 the best you can to get them to Chris and I as quickly 10 as you can.
11 But, other than that, are there any 12 comments the members would like to make?
13 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's a question to 14 you, Jim, do you have an updated template for the 15 memos?
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes. On the SharePoint 17 site.
18 MEMBER BIER: Chris, can email you a 19 template?
20 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I can't find it.
21 CHAIR BALLINGER: It's there. Chris is 22 not here, but I'm absolutely 1,000 percent, 100 23 million years penalty positive that it's there.
24 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And it's called 25 template?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
208 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, so if there aren't 2 any other comments or issues that need to be 3 addressed, we are adjourned.
4 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 5 off the record at 3:27 p.m.)
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components MARC ANDERSON, STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING MANAGER, SARGENT & LUNDY
© SHINE
© SHINE Technologies, Technologies, LLC LLC 1
Outline Main Production Facility Structure o Meteorological Damage o Water Damage o Seismic Damage Nitrogen Purge System Structure
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 2
Main Production Facility Structure
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 3
Main Production Facility Structure SAFETY-RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I SAFETY-RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I RCA SEISMIC GAPS BETWEEN STRUCTURES SAFETY-RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I SAFETY-RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I MAT SLAB EXTENDS UNDER NON-SEISMIC BUILDING
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 4
Main Production Facility Structure NONSAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SEISMIC NON-SAFETY NON-SEISMIC ADMINISTRATIVE ANNEX
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 5
Main Production Facility Structure METEOROLOGICAL DAMAGE Wind Loading o Pressure calculated per American Society of Civil Engineers/Structural Engineering Institute (ASCE)
Standard 7-05 Basic wind speed of 90 mph adjusted for 100-year mean recurrence interval (1.07 factor)
Importance Factor of 1.15 Tornado Loading o Tornado characteristics per Regulatory Guide 1.76 for Region I o Pressure calculated per ASCE 7-05 Basic wind speed of 230 mph (per Regulatory Guide 1.76)
Importance Factor of 1.15 o Differential pressure of 1.2 psi o Tornado missile spectrum and speeds per Regulatory Guide 1.76 o Tornado missile impacts transformed to equivalent static loads per NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.3, Subsection II
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 6
Main Production Facility Structure METEOROLOGICAL DAMAGE Snow, Ice, and Rain Loading o Snow loads calculated per ASCE 7-05 Adjusted for 100-year mean recurrence interval (1.22 factor) o Unbalanced snow loads considered o Drift surcharge loads considered
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 7
Main Production Facility Structure WATER DAMAGE Design Basis Water Level o Design basis flood level: 50 feet below grade o Design basis precipitation level: at grade o Maximum ground water level: 50 feet below grade Flood Protection o Lowest portion of the structure is above the design basis flood level o Mat slab is 4 inches above grade o Water stops and waterproofing of exterior surfaces up to 4 inches above grade o Berms and ramps are used to contain and capture internal flood water o Water-sensitive safety-related equipment is raised off the floor above internal flood levels Structural Design for Flooding o No dynamic force due to precipitation or rain because of relative elevation of building and water levels
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 8
Main Production Facility Structure SEISMIC DAMAGE Seismic Input o Maximum ground acceleration of 0.2 g and design response spectra per Regulatory Guide 1.60 o Synthetic acceleration time histories generated to envelop the design response spectra per Approach 2, Option 1 of NUREG-0800, Section 3.7.1 o Critical damping values per Section 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.61 Seismic Analysis o Soil Structure Interaction (SSI) analysis performed using SASSI2010 SSI analyses performed separately on equivalent linear-elastic basis for best estimate, upper bound, lower bound soil properties Strain dependent soil properties form geotechnical investigations and free field site response analysis o Structural seismic qualification analysis performed using SAP2000 o Earthquake components are combined according to Section 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.92 o Stability evaluated per ASCE 43-05 and NUREG-0800, Section 3.8.5
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 9
Main Production Facility Structure SEISMIC DAMAGE Seismic Analysis (cont.)
o Robust reinforced concrete seismic force resisting structure designed to American Concrete Institute (ACI) 349-13 o Structural steel roof trusses and mezzanine support designed to American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) N690-12 Seismic Classification and Qualification o Seismic Category I and II components designed for safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) o Category I: Facility structures, systems, and components (SSCs), including their foundations and supports, that must perform safety function(s) after an SSE o Category II: SSCs that are co-located with a Seismic Category I SSC and must maintain structural integrity in the event of an SSE to prevent unacceptable interactions with a Seismic Category I SSC, but are not required to remain functional o Seismic qualification of SSCs may be performed via analysis, testing, comparison to databases or a combination of these methods
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 10
Main Production Facility Structure DAMAGE FROM EXTERNAL HAZARDS Aircraft Impact Analysis o Critical aircraft selected from Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport (SWRA) records o Horizontal and vertical velocity at impact per Attachment E of UCRL-ID-123577 o Global impact response per DOE-STD-3014-2006 Ductility limits per ACI 349-13 and AISC N690-12 Perpendicular impacts considered at center of wall and roof panels and at critical locations near edges o Local impact response per DOE-STD-3014-2006 Resist scabbing and perforation Punching shear not postulated because sections 20% thicker than required to prevent perforation (ACI 349-13)
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 11
Nitrogen Purge System Structure FSTR BUILDING RCA SAFETY-RELATED SESMIC CATEGORY I N2PS BUILDING FSTR BUILDING ADMIN ANNEX
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 12
Nitrogen Purge System Structure Meteorological Damage o Design methodology matches the main production facility structure (FSTR) with one exception:
Uniform snow load of 60 pounds per square foot (psf) is conservative considering 30 psf ground snow load with 1.2 importance factor for the 100-year mean recurrence interval Water Damage o Design methodology matches the FSTR Seismic Damage o Seismic Category I structure Aircraft impact addressed qualitatively based on location relative to main facility and off-site power structures
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 13
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems JEFF BARTELME, DIRECTOR OF LICENSING ROGER THOMAS, LEAD ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
© SHINE
© SHINE Technologies, Technologies, LLC LLC 1
Outline Electrical Power Systems Overview Normal Electrical Power Supply System Emergency Electrical Power Systems o Uninterruptible Electrical Power Supply System o Standby Generator System
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 2
Electrical Power Systems Overview Alliant 12.47kV Utility Power Alliant 12.47kV CKT 2 Utility Power CKT 1 NORMARLLY DE - ENGERGIZED NORMARLLY DE - ENGERGIZED CONTROLLED BY UTILTITY CONTROLLED BY UTILTITY N.O. N.O.
N.O. N.O.
12.47kV UP UP UP UP UP 480Y/ XFMR 1 XFMR 2 SG XFMR 5 XFMR 3 XFMR 4 277VAC UP BKR 1 UP BKR 2 UP BKR 4 UP BKR 3 UP BKR 5 SG AC 480V SWGR A 480V SWGR B AC ISO 480V SWGR C 480V SWGR D Loads BT BKR 3 BT BKR 4 Loads BT BKR 1 BT BKR 2 BKR Resource Bldg Service SAFETY NV BKR 1 NV BKR 2 SAFETY RELATED From SGS SWGR RELATED SGS SWGR CHILLER Storage CHILLER Material SAFETY TYP (3) Outbuilding TYP (3) Staging SAFETY RELATED Outbuilding RELATED TYP. 4 Transfer Bus A TYP. 4 To Transfer Bus A To Transfer Bus B Transfer Bus B NPSS NDAS SWGR SWGR NDAS EMERG. BKR 1 Nonsafety-EMERG. BKR 2 Related Serves Outbuildings NPSS Equipment NEC 700 NEC 701 NEC 702 UPSS BATT CHGR Bypass BATT CHGR Bypass Safety-XFMR XFMR BKR 1 BKR 1 BKR 2 BKR 2 Related BATT CHGR A BYPASS XFMR A BATT CHGR B BYPASS XFMR B Equipment 125VDC 125VDC UPSS A 125VDC UPSS C 125VDC UPSS B BATT UPS BATT UPS DISC 1 DISC 1 DISC 2 DISC 2 DC Loads Battery DC Loads DC Loads Battery A B 208Y/
120VAC AC UPSS A AC UPSS C AC UPSS B AC AC AC Loads Loads Loads
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 3
Normal Electrical Power Supply System (NPSS)
The normal electrical power supply system (NPSS) for the SHINE facility consists of the normal power service entrances from the electric utility and a distribution system providing three utilization voltages, 480Y/277, 400Y/230, and 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC), 3-phase, 60 hertz.
Physical separation between nonsafety-related circuits and safety-related circuits is achieved through compliance with applicable sections of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 384-2008.
Surge protection is provided at each electrical service entrance.
o Electrical services are monitored for voltage, frequency, and loss of phase.
o When prescribed limits are exceeded, the facility is disconnected from the utility.
The NPSS contains redundant safety-related breakers that provide power to certain plant equipment that does not perform an active safety function.
o The safety function of these breakers is to disconnect power to prevent actions that could initiate or increase the consequences of an accident.
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 4
Uninterruptible Electrical Power Supply System (UPSS)
The UPSS consists of a 125-volt direct current (VDC) battery subsystem, inverters, battery chargers, bypass transformers, distribution panels, and other distribution equipment necessary to feed safety-related alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) loads and select nonsafety-related AC and DC loads.
Redundant, independent UPSS divisions provide a reliable source of power to AC and DC components upon a loss of offsite power.
Redundant divisions of UPSS batteries are sized per the guidance of applicable sections of IEEE 485-2010 to ensure battery capacity and capability are sufficient to support UPSS loads.
Each division of UPSS batteries is located in a separate fire areas in the safety-related, seismic portion of the main production facility.
Nonsafety-related loads are isolated from safety loads by breakers or isolating fuses meeting the requirements of applicable sections of IEEE 384-2008, ensuring that a failure of nonsafety-related loads does not impact safety-related loads.
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 5
Uninterruptible Electrical Power Supply System (UPSS)
Distribution wiring from each division of the UPSS is isolated and separated from the other division per applicable sections of IEEE 384-2008.
The UPSS is designed and sized to support run time requirements of required loads.
The run time requirements are established as follows:
o Equipment required to prevent hydrogen deflagration is powered for five minutes.
o Equipment used to minimize transient effects on the facility due to short duration power loss is powered for five minutes.
o Equipment used to provide alerts for facility personnel and monitor the status of the facility during immediate recovery efforts is powered for two hours.
o Defense-in-depth power for nonsafety-related equipment used to monitor and reduce the tritium source term in the tritium confinement is powered for six hours.
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 6
Uninterruptible Electrical Power Supply System (UPSS)
Facility loads on the UPSS consist of:
o Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system o Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS), vacuum blowers, recombiner heaters, and instruments transfer system (VTS), molybdenum extraction o Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves and purification system (MEPS) pump, and radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fan o TSV dump valves hold circuits o Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) o Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target o TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) solution preparation system (TSPS), and o TRPS radiation monitors radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches o Engineered safety features actuation system o Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS)*
(ESFAS) o Stack release monitoring system (SRMS)*
o ESFAS radiation monitors o TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers*
o Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors
- Nonsafety-related loads important for providing alerts to facility personnel, monitoring the status of the facility, and reducing the tritium source term
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 7
Standby Generator System (SGS)
The SGS consists of a natural gas-driven generator that automatically starts and provides power to a NPSS transfer bus.
Provides a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to the UPSS and selected loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.
Operation of the SGS is not required for any safety function at the SHINE facility.
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 8
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems TONY PALUMBO, AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ENGINEER CODY FAGAN, TRITIUM ENGINEER ERIC EDWARDS, CHEMICAL PROCESS SYSTEMS MANAGER
© SHINE
© SHINE Technologies, Technologies, LLC LLC 1
Outline Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Tritium Purification System o Tritium Handling System o Secondary Enclosure Cleanup System o Vacuum and Impurity Treatment System Target Solution Lifecycle and Vacuum Transfer System Process Vessel Vent System and Nitrogen Purge System
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 2
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 3
Production Facility Ventilation Systems Radiological Ventilation (RV) Systems/Subsystems o Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 (RVZ1)
RVZ1 Recirculating Subsystem (RVZ1r)
RVZ1 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ1e) o Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 (RVZ2)
RVZ2 Supply Subsystem (RVZ2s)
RVZ2 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ2e)
RVZ2 Recirculating Subsystem (RVZ2r) o Radiological Ventilation Zone 3 (RVZ3)
Non-Radiological Area Ventilation System/Subsystems o Facility Ventilation Zone 4 (FVZ4)
FVZ4 Supply and Transfer Air Subsystem (FVZ4s)
FVZ4 Exhaust Subsystem (FVZ4e)
FVZ4 Room Cooling Recirculation Subsystem (FVZ4r)
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 4
Radiological Ventilation Zones and Areas Served RVZ1 areas served: RVZ2 areas served: RVZ3 Areas Served:
o Irradiation Unit (IU) cells o Irradiation facility (IF) general area o Shipping/receiving alcove o Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas o TPS room, fume hoods, and nitrogen o Main RCA entry and exit system (TOGS) cells exhaust o Emergency exits o Supercell o Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) o Labyrinths o Radioactive liquid waste immobilization service cell (RLWI) shielded enclosure o Primary cooling rooms o Tritium purification system (TPS) process o TSPS and URSS rooms equipment o Radioisotope process facility cooling o Target solution preparation system system (RPCS) room (TSPS) glovebox o Supercell o TSPS dissolution tanks o Analytical and quality control (QC) labs o TSPS preparation tanks and fume hoods o Uranium receipt and storage system o RCA exhaust filter room (URSS) glovebox o Access control area o Primary closed loop cooling system o Tool crib, transfer aisle, storage rooms, (PCLS) expansion tank and workspace o Labyrinths and vestibule
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 5
Radiological Ventilation Zones and Areas Served
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 6
Radiological Ventilation System Functions Nonsafety-related functions of the RV subsystems o Provides ventilation air and conditioning to the RCA environment for workers.
Safety-related functions of the RV subsystems o RVZ1e, RVZ2e, RVZ2r, and RVZ2s The RVZ1e and RVZ2e provide locations for in-duct radiation monitors prior to airflow leaving the RCA.
Portions of RVZ1e, RVZ2e, RVZ2r, and RVZ2s provide redundant isolation and make up a portion of confinement boundaries.
These subsystems isolate redundant dampers in the exhaust and supply air flows when signaled by the safety actuation system.
o RVZ1r The RVZ1r is a closed system within the RCA and extends the confinement boundary extension for each IU and TOGS cell.
o RVZ3 Portions of the RVZ3 provide redundant isolation and make up a portion of the RCA boundaries.
This subsystem isolates redundant dampers in the transfer airflow when signaled by the safety actuation system.
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 7
Radiological Ventilation Safety-Related Flow Paths IU Cell and TPS Exhaust RCA Supply and Exhaust Supercell Supply and Exhaust
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 8
Non-Radiological Area Support Systems Nonsafety-related functions of the FVZ4 subsystems:
o The FVZ4 provides ventilation air, conditioning, exhaust, return, and recirculation to the non-RCA environment for workers.
Nonsafety-related functions of the Facility Chilled Water System (FCHS) o The FCHS is a closed-loop cooling system that removes heat from the RVZ2s and FVZ4s subsystem air handling units (AHUs).
Nonsafety-related functions of the Facility Heating Water System (FHWS) o The FHWS is a hydronic hot water heating system that supplies hot water to the RVZ2s and FVZ4s subsystems along with other heating coils outside the RCA.
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 9
Tritium Purification System
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 10
Tritium Purification System Overview Tritium Handling System (THS) IU(n) TPS Glovebox o Gas system that delivers, recovers, stores and purifies hydrogen isotopes THS Secondary Enclosure Cleanup System (SEC) o Maintains inert environment inside the tritium purification system (TPS) glovebox Vacuum and Impurity Treatment System (Vac-ITS)
SEC Vac-ITS o Support system for THS and neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) decontamination Simplified Block Diagram
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 11
Tritium Handling System The THS is designed to store, deliver, recover and purify hydrogen isotopes Double walled depleted uranium beds store inventory as a solid hydride (UT3)
Tritium is delivered to the NDAS target loop to maintain desired target concentration to support fusion neutron production Mixed tritium-deuterium is recovered from the NDAS target loop using non-mechanical pumps (cryopumps) and isotopically purified (Thermal Cycling Adsorption Process [TCAP]) for recycling to the target loop The THS process equipment is housed inside a credited secondary boundary that makes up part of the tritium confinement boundary
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 12
Secondary Enclosure Cleanup System Maintains inert helium environment in the TPS glovebox to reduce impacts of chronic and acute emissions by circulating glovebox gas through a series of getter beds First beds remove reactive permeant species (water and oxygen) that can stimulate outgassing of tritium from surfaces internal to the glovebox Tritium is removed from the inert gas stream using a hydride bed, leaving a stream of inerted gas to return to the glovebox o The reduction factors are assessed as the difference between a tritium monitor on the inlet and the outlet of the glovebox o Recirculation in the cleanup loop is possible to achieve greater de-tritriation factors.
The SEC forms part of the credited tritium confinement boundary
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 13
Vacuum and Impurity Treatment System The vacuum system treats inert vacuum effluent and process gas rejection from the THS A hydride bed is used, and the gas can be recirculated within the loop, to obtain greater de-tritriation factors Effluent can be sent to the TPS exhaust facility stack or to the impurity treatment system (ITS) for further tritium reduction The ITS treats tritium in mixed air-effluent from the NDAS decontamination flushes by oxidizing any elemental hydrogen and capturing tritium as HTO on molecular sieve beds The ITS also supports deuterium raffinate cleanup and vacuum effluent in the same manner
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 14
Safety-Related Equipment within TPS Glovebox: low leakage boundary for confinement P TM of tritium inventory IU(n) TPS Glovebox Isolation valves: provide isolation on process lines P THS to penetrate the credited tritium confinement boundary Glovebox tritium monitor: monitors inert He atmosphere for a release of activity inside the SEC Vac-ITS glovebox Target supply/exhaust pressure monitors: monitor tritium supply/return lines for a line breach TM TPS exhaust facility stack tritium monitor: monitors To facility stack for tritium emissions
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 15
Target Solution Lifecycle and Vacuum Transfer System
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 16
Target Solution Lifecycle RECEIPT AND STORAGE OF UNIRRADIATED SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Target solution is a low-enriched uranyl sulfate solution Low enriched uranium (LEU) is received by the uranium receipt and storage system (URSS)
The URSS system provides for storage of special nuclear material (SNM) and converts the uranium metal to uranium oxide Unirradiated uranyl sulfate solution is created by dissolving uranium oxide using the target solution preparation system (TSPS)
Once prepared, the solution is stored in the target solution preparation tank until it is needed for a new batch or as make-up volume Uranyl sulfate solution may be pumped from the TSPS to any target solution hold tank Once uranyl sulfate solution is pumped out of the TSPS, it cannot return
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 17
Target Solution Lifecycle IRRADIATION AND ISOTOPE SEPARATION The target solution batch is transferred into the target solution vessel (TSV) for an irradiation cycle from the target solution hold tank Following irradiation, solution is transferred from the TSV dump tank to the supercell, where medical isotopes are separated from the target solution After separation processes in hot cells, the solution can be transferred to:
o A target solution hold tank for the next irradiation cycle o A target solution storage tank o The first uranium liquid waste tank in the radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system to start the disposal process
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 18
Target Solution Lifecycle END OF SOLUTION LIFE Solutions are eventually processed through the RLWS at the final stage of the target solution lifecycle Target solution is blended with other waste streams and stored in below grade tank vaults Blended solutions are transferred to the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system to be solidified in drums Drums from RLWI are transported to the material staging building for staging prior to shipment
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 19
Vacuum Transfer System SYSTEM OPERATION The vacuum transfer system (VTS) consists of vacuum pumps, a knockout pot, vacuum lift tanks, and associated piping components and instrumentation Two separate vacuum headers are provided:
o Processes that contain target solution o Process that do not contain fissile material The VTS transports radioactive liquids throughout the radioisotope production facility (RPF) by either:
o Applying vacuum to an intermediary small volume lift tank, moving liquid in small batches, in one or more stages; or o Applying vacuum directly to a destination tank Provides vacuum services to RPF systems Provides an interface for sampling of solutions
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 20
Vacuum Transfer System SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Designed with favorable geometry and liquid detection to prevent inadvertent criticality Designed to withstand design basis seismic events VTS relieves to atmospheric pressure upon actuation of the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) to terminate radioactive liquid transfers Temperature of solution in the source tank is monitored prior to a transfer to ensure that the transfer does not induce the solution to flash Automatic flow shut-off valves and liquid detection prevent solution from entering the knockout pot VTS equipment is located in hot cells, the below-grade tank vaults, and the below-grade valve pits
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 21
Process Vessel Vent System and Nitrogen Purge System
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 22
Process Vessel Vent System SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The process vessel vent system (PVVS) collects and treats off-gases from radioactive processes in the main production facility before releasing to the facility stack o Radioisotope production facility tank vents o Gases discharged from the VTS and the TSV off-gas system (TOGS); includes vacuum pump discharge, sweep gas from analyzer instruments, nitrogen purges, and pressure relief PVVS blowers upstream of the stack induce flow through the ventilated tanks o Mitigates radiolytic hydrogen generation in RPF process tanks o Maintains RPF tanks and vessels at a slightly negative pressure PVVS components are designed to:
o Condition off-gas to improve reliability and performance of equipment o Filter radioactive particulates from the gaseous effluents o Capture radioiodine from the off-gas stream o Delay the release of xenon and krypton isotopes from the process to allow for decay
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 23
Process Vessel Vent System FILTRATION SKID Ventilation for the process tanks exhaust to the PVVS header and flow to the filtration skid in the PVVS hot cell The filtration skid consists of:
o Condensers, reheaters, condensate tank, and condensate pump to reduce humidity and handle condensate o Acid adsorbers to remove any acidic off-gases o HEPA filters to filter particulates Guard beds packed with carbon are located in a subgrade vault to remove iodine from the off-gas
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 24
Process Vessel Vent System DELAY BEDS After the filtration skid, process gases flow through the delay beds, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and blowers and out the facility stack Delay beds adsorb xenon and krypton isotopes to delay their release to the facility stack and ensure 10 CFR Part 20 limits are met Safety-related isolation occurs on detection of fire within the carbon delay beds Delay beds are located in a subgrade vault and HEPA filters and blowers are located on the facility mezzanine
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 25
Nitrogen Purge System SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The nitrogen purge system (N2PS):
o Provides safety-related backup supply of sweep gas to each irradiation unit (IU) and to tanks normally ventilated by the PVVS o Ensures the hydrogen concentration is below the lower flammability limit (LFL) to prevent deflagrations and detonations from potential hydrogen accumulation for safe shutdown N2PS is actuated by ESFAS on:
o Loss of normal power o Loss of sweep gas flow Sized to provide three days of sweep gas flow
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 26
Nitrogen Purge System SYSTEM LOCATIONS N2PS Structure o An above-grade reinforced concrete structure adjacent to the main production facility o Stores high-pressure nitrogen gas tubes, manual isolation valves, high point vents, low point drains, self-regulating pressure reducing valves, relief valves, check valves, pressure instrumentation, and associated tubing and piping.
o Supply tubes are manifolded so they will act in unison o Designed to withstand the impact of tornado missiles and the effects of a seismic event o Located such that the failure of nonsafety-related components (e.g., facility stack) do not affect operation of the N2PS N2PS uses existing PVVS piping and components, and the alternate safety-related exhaust point, to ventilate the RPF tanks
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 27
Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management (Open Session)
RILEY MCSWEENY, WASTE PROCESSING LEAD
© SHINE
© SHINE Technologies, Technologies, LLC LLC 1
Outline Radioactive Liquid Waste Storage Radioactive Liquid Waste Immobilization Solid Radioactive Waste Packaging Waste Stream Sources
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 2
Radioactive Liquid Waste Storage The radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system collects, stores, blends, conditions, and meters liquid wastes for processing by the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system for solidification Nonsafety-related functions of the radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system:
o Collect liquid radioactive wastes from the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS), iodine and xenon purification system (IXP), vacuum transfer system (VTS), process vessel vent system (PVVS),
and non-routine operations such as decontamination flushes o Blend collected liquid radioactive wastes for feed to the RLWI system o Provide holdup time for radioactive decay of isotopes in the liquid waste o Allow remote sampling of the stored liquid waste o Control radioactive liquid waste solution pH
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 3
Radioactive Liquid Waste Storage Safety-related functions of the RLWS:
o Prevent inadvertent criticality through design of equipment in accordance with the criticality safety evaluation Favorable geometry annular tanks are used to collect uranium-bearing process wastes prior to blending Uranium concentrations verified to be less than administrative limit prior to transfer to liquid waste blending tanks The RLWS system tanks, valves, and piping are located in shielded tank vaults, valve pits, and pipe trenches within the radioisotope production facility (RPF)
Tank-to-tank transfers in the RLWS are performed using the VTS
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 4
Radioactive Liquid Waste Storage
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 5
Radioactive Liquid Waste Storage
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 6
Radioactive Liquid Waste Immobilization The RLWI system solidifies blended liquid waste from the RLWS to a form suitable for shipping and disposal and selectively removes dose and classification-driving radioisotopes The RLWI system is designed to limit radiation exposure to workers o The RLWI processing equipment is located in a concrete shielded enclosure o Localized lead shielding is used around system tanks to provide additional shielding Remote sampling for waste characterization is performed in the RLWS prior to solidification activities Radiation measurements are performed on the solidified waste drum in the material staging building prior to shipment to verify it meets shipping dose rate requirements
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 7
Radioactive Liquid Waste Immobilization
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 8
Solid Radioactive Waste Packaging (SRWP)
The solid radioactive waste packaging (SRWP) system consists of equipment designed and specified to collect, segregate, and package solid radioactive waste from systems throughout the irradiation facility (IF) and RPF Solid waste handled by the SRWP may include:
o Dry active waste (DAW) o Spent ion exchange resin o Filters and filtration media Waste is handled and shipped off site in accordance with the radioactive waste management program
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 9
Waste Stream Sources Waste Stream Waste Classification Accelerator Components A Filters A Glassware A Trash A Target Solution Vessel (TSV) Off-Gas System (TOGS) Skids A or B TOGS Zeolite Beds B or C Isotope Extraction Columns B or C RLWI Columns B or C Water Deionizer Units A Contaminated Oil B Liquid Waste Streams A
© SHINE Technologies, LLC 10
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards SHINE Medical Technologies Operating License Application Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components May 6, 2022 Andrew Prinaris (Civil Engineer, Structural)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Presentation Outline
- Sufficiency of the Design
- Scope of the Review
- Meteorological Damage Review
- Water Damage Review
- Seismic Damage Review
- Other Structural Damage Reviews
- External Hazards (EH) Damage Review
- Findings 2
Sufficiency of the Design 1
- Staff verified that SHINE facility structural design followed:
- Regulations, regulatory guidance (NUREGs, ISGs, RGs,)
- ANSI Design/Analysis STDs (e.g., ANS, ASCE, ACI, AISC, ASME)
- Local Codes
- Industry Recognized Practices
- Staff in its review used its judgment to determine applicable acceptance criteria, including regulatory guidance 3
Sufficiency of the Design 2
- Staffs verified facility SSC design sufficiency
- Description
- Performance characteristics
- Evaluations
- Technical bases/justification(s) for safety considerations
- Staff verified sufficiency of the facility design considered
- Environmental and abnormal loadings
- Effects in facility potential damage 4
Scope of the Review
- FSTR, Primary Structure (Stage One)
- A two-story reinforced concrete with basement box
- Seismically Qualified
- Passive safety
- No SSCs (e.g., Stack, Walls, Tanks, Vaults, Plugs, Supercells) shared with other buildings
- FSTR Controlled Area, includes
- Irradiation Facility or IF and its SSCs
- Eight accelerator driven Subcritical Assembly Irradiation Units
- Radioisotope Production Facility or RPF and its SSCs
- Target Solution Preparation
- Target Solution Irradiation
- Isotope (Moly) Extraction
- Waste Handling
- N2PS, Secondary Structure (Stage Two)
- Structures configuration control consistent with 10 CFR 50.59 5
Meteorological Damage Review
- Staff verified FSTR and N2PS meteorological load(s)
(wind, tornado, snow, ice):
- Meet recommendations of NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 3.2, RGs, national standards, and local building codes
- Are derived based on historical DATA and predictions specified in FSAR Chapter 2, Site Characteristics
- Relevant Design Parameters (e.g., wind velocity, frequency) are determined in accordance with ASCE 7-05 and NRC RG 1.76
- Staff verified facility structural design considered
- Tornado generated missile impact design consistent with NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.3
- All safety related SSCs subject to meteorological damage 6
Water Damage Review
- Staff verified that the FSTR and N2PS structural designs against flooding:
- Meet recommendations of NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 3.3, RGs, national standards, and local building codes
- Satisfy site hydrological conditions (e.g., historical DATA and predictions) specified in FSAR Chapter 2, Site Characteristics
- Staff verified that all FSTR, N2PS safety related SSCs are protected from internal and external flooding
- Staff verified water-sensitive SSCs/equipment are:
- Placed above internal flood heights, discharge of the fire protection system (FPS), or other source for internal flood water
- Protected from accidental FPS discharge by system redundancy 7
Seismic Damage Review 1
- Staff verified that the FSTR and N2PS structural designs for seismic events
- Meet recommendations of NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 3.4, RGs, national standards, and local building codes
- Have Design Response Spectra with a maximum acceleration of 0.2g, consistent with NUREG-0800, 3.7.1
- Have synthetic time history accelerations (STHA) based on El Centro earthquake of 1940; consistent with NUREG-0800, Section 3.7.2,
- Have STHAs of sufficiently long duration, are mutually independent in 3 orthogonal directions; consistent with NUREG-0800, Section 3.7.1 8
Seismic Damage Review 2
- Staff verified acceptability of the methodology used for seismic analysis and derivation of in structure response spectra (ISRS), including
- SASSI2010 Code, to develop ISRS synthetic accelerations
- SAP2000 Code, to determine in-plane shear forces, wall overturning moment, and facility stability
- SHAKE2000 Code, to generate best estimate (BE) free field strain-dependent soil properties supplementing those from geotechnical investigations 9
Seismic Damage Review 3
- Staff verified:
- Free field site response analysis included BE derived upper bound and lower bound (UB, LB) strain-dependent soil properties; consistent with NUREG-0800 Section 3.7.2 and ASCE 4-16
- BE soil profile included an analysis with assumed cracked concrete structural components (reduced modulus of elasticity to 50%);
consistent with ASCE 4-16 and with RG 1.61
- At each component node LB, BE, UB, and cracked case responses were combined to develop ISRS bounding response
- Staff verified methodologies used for seismic qualification of equipment/components achieved with analytical methods, testing or a combination thereof acceptable
- Staff verified seismic acceleration measurements at the facility using non-safety-related instrumentation acceptable, as NRCs regulations do not require seismic instrumentation for this facility 10
Other Structural Damage Reviews
- Staff verified that under normal and overloads (e.g., due to seismic events, external hazards) radiation effects would not affect intended function(s) of FSTR structural SCs associated with:
- Neutron Driver Assembly System (NDAS)
- Subcritical Assembly Support Structure (SASS)
- Irradiation Facility (IF) and Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF) Cranes
- Irradiation Unit (IU) structure and its light water pool submerged or semi-submerged safety-related equipment 11
EH - Aircraft Impact Damage Review
- Staff verified; FSTR aircraft impact analysis used:
- An impactor with heavy engines (Challenger 605) for facility global and local damage assessments, based on airport operational DATA
- The DOE-STD-3014-2006 for functional assessments, screening, and evaluating global, local, and vibration damage
- The energy balance method of DOE-STD-3014-2006 for facility global damage assessment while taking into consideration the ACI 349-13, Appendix F and ANSI/AISC N690-12 Codes ductility limits for reinforced concrete and steel truss elements, respectively
- Staff verified that analysis considered several impact scenarios including impact to facility critical areas and aircraft skidding on FSTR rooftop
- Staff verified that no safety related equipment is attached to the facility envelope that can be damaged by aircraft impact
- Staff verified that facility passive fire protection systems, programs, and nearby firefighting capabilities are adequate to control aircraft impact resulting fires 12
EH - Blast Effects Damage Review
- Staff examined the validity of software and uncertainties in the methodologies used for the design of the FSTR with respect to blast effects
- Staff verified the effects for potential explosions were assessed based on RG 1.91, Revision 2
- Staff verified potential explosions are at safe distance from the facility
- Staff verified those that could take place nearby have a low probability of occurrence
- Staff verified that the nitrogen tank in proximity to the FSTR and N2PS was designed against accidental explosion and fragmentation to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Division 1 13
Findings
- Staff verified the FSTR and N2PS designs
- Adequately protect SSCs against potential meteorological, water, and seismic or external hazards damages and the release of radioactive materials
- Provide reasonable assurance that SSCs would continue to perform their required safety functions, and that incurred damages if any would not cause unsafe facility operation and would not prevent safe shutdown of the facility
- Provide adequate levels for defense-in-depth against uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment 14
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards SHINE Medical Technologies Operating License Application Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems May 6, 2022 Jorge A Cintron-Rivera - Technical Reviewer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Introductions
- Michael Balazik - Project Manager, Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Stephen Wyman- Acting Chief, Long Term Operations and Modernization Branch, Division of Engineering and External Hazards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Jorge A Cintron-Rivera - Technical Reviewer, Long Term Operations and Modernization Branch, Division of Engineering and External Hazards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Sheila Ray - Technical Reviewer, Electrical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and External Hazards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2
Regulatory Basis and Acceptance Criteria
- Regulatory Requirements:
10 CFR 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, paragraph (b), Final safety analysis report. requires in part, the applicant shall include information that describes the facility, presents the design bases and the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of the facility as a whole.
- Acceptance Criteria Chapter 8, Electrical Power Systems, of NUREG-1537, Part 1, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors: Format and Content, (ADAMS Accession No. ML042430055)
Chapter 8, Electrical Power Systems, of NUREG-1537, Part 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042430048) 3
Regulatory Basis and Acceptance Criteria (Cont)
NUREG-1537, Part 2, Chapter 8, Electrical Power Systems.
- Section 8.1, Normal Electrical Power Systems, (NPSS) provides the acceptance criteria for the design, safe operation and shutdown for non-power reactors, and to provide for reactor use.
Specific areas for review are; design and functional characteristics should be commensurate with the design bases, have a dedicated substation, provide safe reactor shutdown, provide isolation of electrical circuits, and to provide Technical Specifications.
- Section 8.2, Emergency Electrical Power Systems, provides the acceptance criteria for the emergency electrical power systems.
Emergency electrical power is required to maintain safe reactor shutdown, to support operation of a required engineered safety feature, and to protect the public from release of radioactive effluents.
4
SHINEs Normal Electrical Power System
- Section 8a2.1, Normal Electrical Power Supply System, of SHINEs FSAR provides the description of the normal electrical power system of both, the Irradiation Facility and the Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF).
- NPSS operates as five separate branches, each receiving utility power at 480Y/277 VAC. The branches automatically physically disconnect from the utility by opening the associated utility power (UP) supply breaker on a loss of phase, phase reversal, or sustained overvoltage or undervoltage as detected by protection relays for each utility transformer.
- The design of the NPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in FSAR Section 3.1.
5
SHINEs Normal Electrical Power System (Cont)
- SHINEs follows the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017) as well as portions of IEEE standards applicable to the facility for the design of the NPSS.
- The NPSS provides power to the following safety-related equipment; Two redundant safety-related breakers for the NDAS to provide the ability to disconnect power.
Two redundant safety-related breakers for per vacuum pump in the vacuum transfer system (VTS).
Two redundant safety-related breakers per extraction feed pump in the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS).
Two redundant safety-related breakers for the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust fans and RVZ2.
6
Staff Review of NPSS
- The staff evaluated the technical information presented in Chapter 8 of the SHINE FSAR, as supplemented by responses to RAIs, to assess the sufficiency of the preliminary design and performance of SHINE Normal Electrical Power Systems in support of the issuance of an operating license.
- Staff considered design criteria, design bases, the NPSS descriptions, and design and operating characteristics to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design basis.
- Areas of review for this section included the functional characteristics of the NPSS should be commensurate with the design bases, evaluation of NPSS substation, the capacity and capability of providing safe shutdown, the isolation of the electrical system, and the Technical Specifications.
7
SHINEs Emergency Electrical Power System
- Section 8a2.2, Emergency Electrical Power System, of SHINEs FSAR provides the description of the Emergency electrical power system for both, the Irradiation Facility and the Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF).
- The emergency electrical power systems for the SHINE facility consist of
- Safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS)
- Nonsafety-related standby generator system (SGS),
- Nonsafety-related local power supplies and unit batteries.
- The UPSS is the only power source of the Emergency Electrical Power System that is classified as safety related.
8
SHINEs facility UPSS
- The purpose of the UPSS is to provide a safety-related source of power to equipment required to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events.
- The UPSS is designed based on Criterion 27 and Criterion 28 of the SHINE design criteria.
- The UPSS consists of a 125-volt direct current (VDC) battery subsystem, inverters, bypass transformers, distribution panels, and other distribution equipment necessary to feed safety-related alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) loads and select nonsafety-related AC and DC loads.
9
SHINEs facility UPSS
- The UPSS;
- Provides power at a sufficient capacity and capability to allow safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions;
- Is designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed;
- Is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions;
- Is located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions;
- Has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure;
- Incorporates provisions to minimize the probability of failure as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the transmission network; and
- Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.
10
UPSSs Applicable Codes and Standards
- Applicable portions of following codes and standards are used for the design, installation and maintenance of the UPSS;
- NFPA 70-2017, National Electric Code
- IEEE Standard 344 - 2013 (Seismic Qualification)
- IEEE Standard 384 - 2008 (Separation and Isolation)
- IEEE Standard 450-2010 (Maintenance and Testing of Batteries)
- IEEE Standard 484-2002 (Installation and Design of Batteries)
- IEEE Standard 485 - 2010 (Battery Sizing)
- IEEE Standard 323-2003 (Environmental Qualification)
- IEEE Standard 946-2004 (Design of DC Auxiliary Systems)
- IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015 (Circuit Breakers)
- Specific portions of each of the Standards used for the design of the UPSS are described in the FSAR.
- The use of this Codes and Standards provides assurance of meeting Criterion 27 and Criterion 28 of the SHINE design criteria.
11
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs UPSS
- The NRC staff evaluated the design of the UPSS as described in SHINE FSAR Section 8a2.2.1.
- The staff reviewed the FSAR to verify that the functional characteristics of the emergency power system are commensurate with the design bases. The staff evaluation was performed based on the following SHINEs plant specific Design Criteria:
- Compliance with SHINEs Design Criterion 4 - Environmental and dynamic effects.
- Compliance with SHINEs Design Criterion 27 - Electric power systems.
- Compliance with SHINEs Design Criterion 28 - Inspection and testing of electric power systems.
12
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs UPSS (Cont.)
- Compliance with SHINEs Design Criterion 27
- The staff evaluated the safety-related UPSS to verify if the design of the UPSS provides sufficient capacity and capability to perform its intended safety function.
- SHINE classifies the UPSS as safety related, However, it is not classified as Class 1E electrical for the SHINE facility.
- The staff issued RAIs to SHINE to verify the design of UPSS. In specific, the staff requested the Codes and Standards use for the design of the UPSS supporting equipment, and the Classification of the UPSS.
- While SHINE does not classify the UPSS as a Class 1E system and apply the full-scope of Class 1E standards to the UPSS, portions of Class 1E standards are applied to the design of the UPSS in order to satisfy applicable SHINE design criteria.
- The staff finds the use of specific portions of the IEEE codes and Standard provide assurance the UPSS provides sufficient capacity and capability to perform its intended safety function.
13
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs UPSS (Cont.)
- Compliance with SHINEs Design Criterion 28
- The staff evaluated the safety-related UPSS to verify the system designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of safety related electrical equipment.
- SHINE follows specific portions of the standards testing, installation, and maintenance of safety related electrical equipment.
- The staff finds the proposed approach by SHINE of the use of IEEE Standards acceptable for the inspection and testing of the UPSS is acceptable.
14
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs UPSS (Cont.)
- Compliance with SHINEs Design Criterion 4
- The staff evaluated the safety-related UPSS to ensure that is designed to perform its safety related function with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.
- SHINE design of the UPSS will be in accordance with applicable portions of IEEE Standard 344 - 2013 (Seismic) and IEEE Standard 323-2003 (Environmental Qualification)
- The staff finds that the used of these IEEE standards will provide reasonable assurance that the UPSS will meet the design Criterion 4.
15
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs SGS
- The NRC staff evaluated the nonsafety-related SGS as a defense-in-depth for the SHINE emergency electrical system.
- The SGS consists of a 480Y/277 VAC, 60 Hertz (Hz) natural gas-driven generator, a 480 VAC switchgear, and transfer switches to allow the SGS switchgear to be connected to either or both emergency 480 VAC NPSS buses.
- The purpose of the SGS is to provide a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to the UPSS and selected additional loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.
- The SGS is designed in accordance with the requirements of article 700 of NFPA 70-2017. In response to NRC staff RAI 8-10, SHINE described the specific portions within article 700 of NFPA 70-2017 used for the design of the SGS.
16
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs SGS (Cont.)
- Upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP) the SGS automatically starts, both non-vital breakers (NV BKR 1 and NV BKR 2) automatically open, and the transfer switches operate to provide power to the associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus.
- The SGS provides power upon LOOP.
- The SGS is not required to support safe shutdown of the SHINE facility.
17
Staff Evaluation of SHINEs Technical Specifications
- The staff evaluated the sufficiency of the applicants proposed technical specifications (TSs) for the SHINE electrical power systems as described in SHINE FSAR Chapter 8.
- The proposed TS 3.6, Emergency Power, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.
- LCO 3.6.1 states in part that, Two Divisions of the UPSS shall be Operable. The LCO provides the criteria to determined if the Division of UPSS is considered Operable.
- SR 3.6.1 provides the surveillance requirements for the UPSS. Table 3.6.1, UPSS Actions, provides the actions to be taken and completion times to restore operation of the UPSS if one of two divisions of the UPSS are not operable.
18
Staff Evaluation of Findings
- The NRC staff reviewed SHINEs electrical power systems against the applicable guidance of Chapter 8 of NUREG-1537, Part 2.
- The staff determined that the functional characteristics of the NPSS and the emergency power system are commensurate with SHINEs plant specific Design Criteria 4, 27, and 28.
- The NPSS provides reasonable assurance that in the event of a loss or interruption of electrical power, the facility can be safely shutdown.
- In the event of a loss of the NPSS, the UPSS provides reasonable assurance the SHINE facility can be maintained in a safe shutdown condition.
- The staff finds that the licensees use of specific codes and standards provides reasonable assurance that the NPSS and the emergency electrical system meet SHINEs plant specific Design Criteria 4, 27 and 28 19
Staff Evaluation of Findings (Cont.)
- Based on the above determinations, the NRC staff finds that the descriptions and discussions of SHINEs electrical power systems are sufficient and meet the applicable regulatory requirements and guidance and acceptance criteria for the issuance of an operating license.
20
Questions 21
Background Information
- SHINEs Design Criterion 4 - Environmental and dynamic effects.
Safety-related SSCs are designed to perform their functions with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. These SSCs are appropriately protected against dynamic effects and from external events and conditions outside the facility.
- Applicable portions IEEE Standards SHINEs Design Criterion 4
- Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE Standard 323-2003 (Environmental Qualification)
- Sections 8 and 9.3 of IEEE Standard 344 - 2013 (Seismic Qualification) 22
Background Information
- SHINEs Design Criterion 27 - Electric Power Systems.
An on-site electric power system and an off-site electric power system are provided to permit functioning of safety-related SSCs. The safety functions are to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that:
- 1) target solution design limits and primary system boundary design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated transients, and
- 2) confinement integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
The on-site uninterruptible electric power supply and distribution system has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure. Provisions are included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the uninterruptible power supply as a result of or coincident with, the loss of power from the off-site electric power system.
23
Background Information
- Applicable portions IEEE Standards SHINEs Design Criterion 27
- NFPA 70-2017, National Electric Code
- Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE Standard 384 - 2008 (Isolation)
- Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE Standard 384 - 2008 (Separation)
- Section 5 of IEEE Standard 450-2010 (Maintenance and Testing of Batteries)
- Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE Standard 484-2002 (Installation and Design of Batteries)
- Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE Standard 485 - 2010 (Battery Sizing)
- Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, 7.3, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE Standard 946-2004 (Design of DC Auxiliary Systems)
- IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015 (Circuit Breakers) 24
Background Information
- SHINEs Design Criterion 28 - Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems.
The safety-related electric power systems are designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features, such as wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components. The systems are designed with a capability to test periodically:
- 1) the operability and functional performance of the components of the systems, such as on-site power sources, relays, switches, and buses; and
- 2) the operability of the systems as a whole and, under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operation sequence that brings the systems into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer of power among the on-site and off-site power supplies.
25
Background Information
- Applicable portions IEEE Standards SHINEs Design Criterion 28
- NFPA 70-2017, National Electric Code
- Section 5 of IEEE Standard 450-2010 (Maintenance and Testing of Batteries)
- Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE Standard 484-2002 (Installation and Design of Batteries)
- Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE Standard 485 - 2010 (Battery Sizing)
- Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, 7.3, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE Standard 946-2004 (Design of DC Auxiliary Systems)
- IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015 (Circuit Breakers) 26
Background Information 27
Background Information 28
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards SHINE Medical Technologies Operating License Application Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems May 6, 2022 Nageswara (Rao) Karipineni - Technical Reviewer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Introductions
Michael Balazik - Project Manager, Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nageswara (Rao) Karipineni - Safety and Plant Systems Engineer, Containment and Plant Systems Branch, Division of Safety Systems, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2
Facility Descriptions HVAC Systems
- Section 9a2.1 of the FSAR addresses the design features of the HVAC systems for the IF, RPF, and the supporting external office complex, including the features designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents and events to keep radiological exposures within acceptable limits. Facility chilled water (FCHS) and facility heating water (FHWS) systems are also described in Section 9a2.1 of the FSAR.
3
Facility Descriptions HVAC Systems
- RCA is divided into three radiological ventilation zones (RVZ1, RVZ2 and RVZ3). Non-RCA is Facility Ventilation Zone (FVZ4).
- Systems consist of supply units (RVZ2s), recirculation units (RVZ1r and RVZ2r), and exhaust units (RVZ1e, RVZ2e). FVZ4 has its own supply, recirculation and exhaust units.
4
Facility Descriptions HVAC Systems (Chilled water and Heating water)
- Facility Chilled Water System (FCHS). Serves equipment located external to RCA.
- Facility Heating Water System (FHWS). Serves equipment located external to RCA.
5
Facility Descriptions Areas of Review - HVAC System Isolations
- Supercell Isolations (RVZ1e Isolations)
- IU Isolation (RVZ1e)
- RCA Isolations No isolations are needed for FVZ-4, FCHS, FHWS 6
Facility Descriptions Cover Gas Control in primary cooling system Captures radiolytic gases from primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) cooling water leaving the subcritical assembly (SCAS) and provide a path to exhaust gases to outside, via RVZ1e exhaust filter train.
Cover Gas Control in RPF
- Process Vessel Vent System (PVVS): Provides radiolytic hydrogen mitigation capability by ventilating process tanks and vessels, accepts discharge from VTS and TOGS, treats the affluents and discharges to outside.
- Nitrogen purge System (N2PS): Provides backup to PVVS during loss of power.
7
Facility Descriptions Tritium Purification System (TPS)
- Supplies pure deuterium and tritium streams to the Neutron Driver Assembly System (NDAS)
Separates the deuterium-tritium gas mixture from the NDAS into pure deuterium and tritium streams
- TPS equipment is contained inside the TPS room.
The TPS room ventilation exhausts to RVZ2e
- Processes are performed inside gloveboxes to minimize exposure to workers The TPS glovebox exhausts to RVZ1e 8
Facility Descriptions Tritium Purification System (TPS) - continued
- Limits tritium in waste streams exhausted to the facility ventilation system.
- The TPS is designed to minimize the release of tritium to the facility and the environment during normal operations and design basis accidents and keep the releases within 10 CFR 20 limits.
9
Regulatory Basis and Acceptance Criteria
- Regulatory Requirements
- 10 CFR 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, paragraph (b), Final safety analysis report.
- 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications.
- 10 CFR 50.40, Common Standards.
- 10 CFR 50.57, Issuance of operating license.
- 10 CFR 20.1201, Occupational dose limits for adults.
- 10 CFR 20.1301, Dose limits for individual members of the public.
- Acceptance Criteria
- NUREG-1537 and ISG, Part 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria.
10
Areas of Review
- System description, system components and system performance are adequately described.
- Applicable SHINE design criteria considered in the design
- Isolation features included in the design, as described in the applicable figures and tables included in the FSAR
- Actuation of the isolation features and consistency with I&C portions of isolation descriptions in Chapter 7
- Inclusion of appropriate design features and equipment in the technical specifications 11
Summary of Application IR and RPF HVAC Systems RCA
- RVZ1e and RVZ1r
- RVZ2s and RVZ2e
- RVZ3
- Isolation Features (Supercells, RCA boundaries)
Non-RCA
- FVZ4
- FCHS
- FHWS 12
13 14 15 16 Summary of Application IF and RPF Cover Gas Control
- PCLS and expansion tank design to vent radiolysis gases to RVZ1 system.
- TPS gloveboxes
- PVVS
- N2PS
- RVZ2s isolation valves 17
18 19 20 Summary of Application Principal Design Criteria:
- Criteria 29 - satisfied by identifying RCA boundaries as a fourth class of boundary
- Criteria 32 - included provisions for testing and inspections
- Criteria 35 - control of releases of radioactive materials is satisfied by isolation provisions and the PVVS and N2PS
- Criteria 38 - design includes monitoring of radioactive releases
- Criteria 39 - hydrogen control provided by PVVS and N2PS N2PS 21
Summary of Application Technical Specifications:
- LCO 3.4.5 addresses IU boundary (shield plugs, RVZ1r)
- LCO 3.5.1 addresses PVVS
- LCO 3.8.1 addresses N2PS
- LCO 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 addresses TPS 22
Review Procedures and Technical Evaluation The staff compared the design features of the HVAC, PVVS, N2PS, and TPS in Chapter 9 with the descriptions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and determined they were consistently applied.
The staff performed an evaluation of the technical information presented in Chapter 9 of the SHINE final safety analysis report (FSAR), including the tables and block diagrams, to assess the sufficiency of the final design and the description of the engineered safety features in support of the issuance of an operating license.
23
Evaluation Findings and Conclusions
- Accordingly, SHINE has met the following requirements of 10 CFR 50.57 for issuance of an operating license:
- 1) Irradiation facility and radioisotope production facility HVAC systems, cover gas control systems (PVVS and N2PS) and TPS were described in sufficient detail, including the applicable principal design criteria and technical specifications.
- 2) Reasonable assurance, based on Chapter 9 review, that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public.
24
TPS Backup Slides Backup Slide -Tritium Purification System (TPS) 26
Backup Slide - Tritium Purification System (TPS) 27
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards SHINE Medical Technologies Operating License Application Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management May 6, 2022 Zachary Gran - Technical Reviewer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Section 11.1.1 -
Radiation Sources
- Describes two source term scenarios: Nominal and Safety Basis Values.
- Provides gaseous source term information for use in worker dose and environmental releases.
- Provides liquid and solid source terms information for use in worker dose evaluations.
- Based on staff review of calculations provided, the source terms were determined acceptable for use in dose analysis.
2
Section 11.1.2 -
Radiation Protection (RP) Program
- Provides information to establish an RP program as well as the commitments to training and annual auditing of the RP program.
- RP program is established to meet the guidance contained in RG 8.2 and ANSI/ANS 15.11-2016.
- Commitments to RG 8.2 and ANSI/ANS 15.11 is acceptable and conforms with information stated in NUREG-1537. In addition, SHINE describes the use of procedures, training, maintaining doses ALARA, and establishment of administrative limits in the development of the RP program.
3
Section 11.1.3 -
ALARA Program
- The ALARA program conforms with the guidance in RGs 8.2, 8.8, 8.10, 8.13, and 8.29 and complies with 10 CFR 20.1101.
- Radiation Protection Manager performs annal evaluation of the ALARA program.
- Incorporates design features to minimize radiation exposures and the spread of contamination by incorporating considerations for materials, radioactive material processing, storage and disposal, facility layout, and ALARA practices.
- Staff determined that ALARA program is acceptable and consistent with NUREG-1537.
4
Section 11.1.4 -
Radiation Monitoring and Surveying
- Continuous effluent monitoring of noble gases, particulates, and iodine on the facility stack.
- Stack is monitored to show gaseous releases being maintained below public dose limits contained in 10 CFR 20.1301.
- TS 3.7.2 ensures releases are below regulatory limits.
- Continuous air monitoring and radiation area monitoring is provided at the facility.
- Radiation monitoring is acceptable to adequately control and monitor the radiological conditions in their facility.
5
Section 11.1.5 -
Radiation Exposure Control and Dosimetry
- Details a program that will ensure appropriate use of signs and postings.
- Establishes restricted areas to control radiation exposures by use of interlocks and visual warnings.
- Provides information to detail expected radiation zones in the facility.
- Personnel monitoring is worn by those individuals that enter and working in the restricted areas of the facility.
- Staff performed confirmatory calculations to verify dose rates in various areas of the facility.
- Uses radiation monitoring and dosimetry to maintain doses ALARA.
6
Section 11.1.6 -
Contamination Control Equipment and Facility Layout
- Shielded compartments and hot cells are incorporated in the design of the SHINE facility to minimize the spread of contamination.
- Control airflow patterns to reduce the spread of contamination.
- Continuous air monitors are located within the facility to detect the spread of contamination.
- Design features and monitors are acceptable to limit the spread of contamination in their facility.
7
Section 11.1.7 -
Environmental Monitoring
- Follows the guidance contained in RG 4.1 and NUREG-1301 for developing REMP and ODCM.
- Provides monitoring for radiation exposures, inhalation, and ingestion pathways.
- Environmental monitoring is established around the facility.
- Air sampling and direct radiation monitoring provided at each location.
- Verifies effectiveness of effluent monitoring program.
- Surface water and biota monitoring is not anticipated.
- Acceptable given the REMP is evaluated annually to verify if new pathways need to be monitored.
- Environmental monitoring program is acceptable to monitor and track effluent released from the facility.
8
Section 11.2.1 -
Radioactive Waste Management Program
- Establishes a structure for the radioactive waste management program.
- Training and procedures established to ensure radioactive waste is controlled by the facility.
- Maintains records of waste management program.
- Staff determined that the Radioactive Waste Management Program is acceptable.
9
Section 11.2.2 -
Radioactive Waste Controls
- Provides information on estimated annual waste streams generated.
- Describes practices to minimize the generation of radioactive waste.
- Material Staging Building is used for interim storage of waste for decay and for preparation for transportation.
- Describes the sources, types, and volumes of waste generated at the facility.
10
Section 11.2.3 -
Release of Radioactive Waste
- No radioactive liquid effluent is released. Radioactive liquid waste streams are solidified prior to disposal.
- Annual solid waste generation estimates provided along with anticipated waste classifications.
- Gaseous effluent is released from the facility stack and is continuously monitored for noble gases, particulates, iodine, and tritium to ensure compliance with effluent release limits.
- Staff confirmatory calculations verify doses from gaseous effluents are below the 10 mrem specified in 10 CFR 20.1101(d).
11
Section 11.3 -
Respiratory Protection Program
- SHINE will conform with NRC guidance contained in RG 8.15.
- Commitment to this RG ensures protection of personnel from airborne concentrations exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B, and compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 Subpart H.
12
Acronyms ALARA - As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable ODCM - Offsite Dose Calculation Manual REMP - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program RG - Regulatory Guide RP - Radiation Protection SAR - Safety Analysis Report TS - Technical Specifications 13