ML22140A366

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ML22140A366
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/10/2022
From: Scott(Ois) Morris
NRC Region 4
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML22140A366 (12)


Text

Emergency Response During COVID-19 Lessons from Hurricane Ida

Session Goals

  • Discuss noteworthy aspects of the response to Hurricane Ida, including unique features introduced by the COVID-19 public health emergency
  • Share lessons learned from the event that may be valuable to other organizations in the future Session Agenda
  • Panelist Introductions
  • Photos of Impacts at Waterford Steam Electric Station
  • Panel Discussion
  • Audience Q&A Period

Introductions

Chair: Scott Morris, NRC Region IV, Regional Administrator Panelists:

  • Ryan Lantz, NRC Region IV, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
  • Oscar Martinez, FEMA Region 6, Regional Assistance Committee Chair

Ida: Major Storm Impacting Louisiana Coast Potentially Affected Region IV Plants:

Waterford, River Bend, Grand Gulf Intensifying Trend in Forecasts:

  • Wednesday (8/25/21): CAT 1, 80 mph
  • Thursday: CAT 2, 100 mph
  • Friday: CAT 3, 125 mph
  • Saturday: CAT 4, 130 mph
  • Sunday AM: CAT 4, 145 mph
  • Actual Sunday PM Landfall: CAT 4, 150 mph

Waterford (WF3): Timeline of Events (CST) o 8/28 @ 2200 (SAT): 1st Forecast of Hurricane Force Winds at WF3 o 8/29 @ 0800 (SUN): WF3 commences reactor shutdown o 8/29 @ 1031: WF3 is shutdown, main generator offline o 8/29 @ 1155: Ida landfall @ Southeast Tip of LA, CAT 4, 150 mph o 8/29 @ 1812: Ida reaches WF3, Loss of Offsite Power, NOUE*

  • On-site diesels running properly, providing electricity
  • NOUE = Notice of Unusual Event

Waterford (WF3): Timeline of Events (CST) (Cont) o 8/29 @ 1849: WF3 officially notifies NRC of NOUE o 8/29 @ 1912: NRC enters Activation Mode o 8/29 @ 2300: Hurricane force winds subsided o 8/31 @ 2345 (TUES): WF3 exits NOUE after restoring offsite power o 9/1 @ 0937 (WED): NRC exits Activation Mode

  • The nuclear plant itself did not suffer any impacts to safety-related equipment.
  • The impacts were limited primarily to structures that are not essential to plant operations, such as siding and insulation.
  • The photo to the upper right shows damage to the housing of the low-level rad waste building, which contains nonsafety-related equipment outside of the protected area.
  • The photo to the lower right shows damage to the weir wall of the intake structure.
  • Outside of the protected area, there was significant damage to support and services buildings.
  • The photos show damage associated with water intrusion and fallen ceiling tiles in the main support building, where the NRC resident inspectors work.
  • With respect to the plants return to normal operation, the most impactful damage was to electrical power infrastructure.
  • The photo shows downed power lines on a road heading into the plant.

Questions for Panelist Discussion:

(1) Differences: What made this response different from a typical hurricane response?

(2) Surprises: What aspects of the experience most surprised you?

(3) Insights: What insights gained from the response would be useful to other organizations?

Audience Q&A