ML22140A344
| ML22140A344 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/08/2022 |
| From: | Kim A, Kim Lawson-Jenkins Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML22140A344 (11) | |
Text
A Zero Trust Paradigm for Cyber Security in New Reactors Anya Kim, NRC Kim Lawson-Jenkins, NRC
Outline
- Why Zero Trust?
- What is Zero Trust, really?
- How do we plan to apply Zero Trust concepts to the nuclear industry?
Cyber security defensive architecture - current Continuous Threats, New Technologies, Shifting Paradigms Malware Artificial IoT Remote Drones Physical Regulatory intelligence Wireless operations and security compliance monitoring Need a new way of thinking about security
What is Zero Trust?
- Heres what it is not - not a product or solution, not one-size-fits-all
- It is a strategy - with set of guiding principles/assertions/tenets
- Assume network is always hostile
- Trust is explicit
- Least privilege access (e.g., risk-based adaptive policies)
- Every device, user, data flow should be authenticated and authorized
Core Components of a Zero Trust Architecture From NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture
Zero Trust Applied to the Nuclear Industry
- Can a Zero Trust paradigm be applied as one way to protect new and advanced reactors?
- Replace current defensive architecture
- Satisfy safety requirements
- Applicability of Zero Trust assertions and concepts in Industrial Control Systems
- How to provide guidance for licensees considering applying a Zero Trust architecture?
Our Approach
- Survey the Zero Trust landscape
- Develop Zero Trust Framework suitable for nuclear security
- Scope and define Zero Trust principle(s) suitable for use in nuclear industry
- Identify the technical challenges
- Examine the interface between cyber security and safety for a Zero Trust architecture
- Develop Implementation strategies
- Develop guidance on adoption of Zero Trust strategies for new and advanced reactors
- Develop performance criteria for the trust algorithm/policy engine
Zero Trust Architecture Revisited Trust Algorithm From NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture
Expected Results and Benefits
- Provide the basis for future regulatory guidance documents
- Zero Trust architectures may provide alternatives to current defensive architectures when applied to new reactors
- Educate applicants, licensees, vendors, and inspectors regarding not only the Zero Trust paradigm, but the potential usefulness of various (Zero Trust) implementation strategies
Thank you!
Anya Kim Kim Lawson-Jenkins Anya.Kim@nrc.gov Kim.Lawson-Jenkins@nrc.gov Computer Scientist Cyber Security Specialist Instrumentation, Controls, and Electrical Eng. Branch Cyber Security Branch Division of Engineering Division of Physical and Cybersecurity Policy Office of Research Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response