ML22067A047
| ML22067A047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07101042 |
| Issue date: | 03/01/2022 |
| From: | Huilung Liu, Migliore R, Sunwoo Park, Tom H Orano USA |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| C JACOBS NRC/NMSS/DFM/STLB 3014156825 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22067A044 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML22067A047 (25) | |
Text
PUBLIC CoC 1042 Amendment 4 Application Meeting Hoi Yee Tom, Si-Hwan Park, Hui Liu, Rick Migliore March 2022 1
Purpose of the Meeting/Agenda Purpose of the meeting To discuss plans for Amendment 4 to CoC 1042 Obtain NRC feedback and facilitate NRC planning Agenda General Overview/Amendment scope Impacts for each technical discipline Licensing approach Submittal schedule Discussion/Questions CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 2
EOS Amendment 4 Scope
- 1) Add damaged and failed fuel storage capability to the EOS-89BTH Existing staggered basket concept from EOS-37PTH Two new basket types
- 2) Introduce a steel-plate composite option for the EOS-HSM (EOS-HSM-SC)
Steel-plate composite components instead of reinforced concrete Steel shells pre-fabricated and shipped to site for concrete placement at the ISFSI
- 3) Demonstrate MAVRIC software capability for use in dose rate analyses Comparison of MCNP runs with MAVRIC software runs to demonstrate similar results CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 3
Add damaged and failed fuel storage capability to the EOS-89BTH Staggered basket similar to EOS-37PTH Approved contents for storage include intact, damaged, and failed fuel Definition of intact, damaged, and failed fuel initially included in CoC 1042 Amendment 1 Store all existing BWR fuel assembly designs Fuel radiological parameters consistent with current CoC 1042 Technical Specifications Affected components EOS-HSM and HSM-MX, EOS-TC125 Maximum Heat Load Configuration (MHLC)
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 4
Basket Types EOS-89BTH Basket Type 1 Intact Fuel Yes Damaged Fuel No Failed Fuel No Basket Geometry Non-Failed fuel Hold staggered(1)
Damaged fuel Hold Down Ring Type 2(2) Yes Yes Yes with Staggered Down Ring modified FFC Damaged fuel Top Type 3 Yes No Yes with no Staggered &
End Cap limitations Short MMC Failed Fuel Can Notes:
- 1. Approved in Amendment 0 to CoC 1042
- 2. Damaged and failed fuel may not be stored in the same DSC Type 2 & 3 Basket-Staggered plates Shortened MMC plate Damaged fuel Bottom End Cap Basket Type 2 Basket Type 3 CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 5
EOS-HSM-SC Steel-Plate Composite Wall (SC) construction Concrete walls reinforced with two steel faceplates Steel headed stud anchors
- Attach concrete
- Composite behavior of faceplates and concrete Steel tie bars
- Connect faceplates
- Provide structural integrity
- Prevent delamination of concrete core
- Shear reinforcement
- Increasing use in nuclear facilities
- GE Hitachi, Toshiba, TEPCO-ABWR reactors
- Westinghouse- AP 1000
- Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (APR+)
EOS-HSM-SC Steel-plate composite (SC) construction
- Steel casing manufactured and transported to site
- Concrete placement in place on site Option for all existing EOS-HSMs and HLZCs EOS-HSMS Segmented design EOS-HSM-FPS: Flat Plate Support rail used as DSC support structure CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 7
EOS-HSM-SC EOS-HSM-SC Structural Design Criteria Same load cases as for reinforced concrete EOS-HSM Same load combinations as for reinforced concrete EOS-HSM (based on ANSI/ANS 57.9)
Design per ANSI/AISC N690-18 code Regulatory Guide 1.243 considered Exceptions to N690-18 based on testing and analytical studies CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 8
EOS Amendment 4 Structural Impacts
- 1) Damaged and failed fuel storage in EOS-89BTH Reconciliation of basket Types 2 and 3 temperature with basket Type 1 Structural evaluation based on same methods used for EOS-37PTH/NUH-61BTH:
Failed Fuel Can (FFC)
Damaged fuel assembly Damaged fuel extension tube Hold Down Ring (HDR) for intact/damaged/failed fuel Structural SAR sections affected: 3.9.2 and 3.9.6
- 2) EOS-HSM-SC A new section in CoC 1042 UFSAR (Appendix 3.9.8): Similar to Appendix 3.9.4 (EOS-HSM structural analysis) and Appendix 3.9.7 (stability analysis)
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 9
Proprietary Information on Pages 10 and 11 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 10
EOS Amendment 4 Thermal Impacts
- 2) Failed fuel storage in EOS-89BTH Up to 2 failed fuels can be stored in both Basket Types 2 and 3 of EOS-89BTH DSC (0.8 kW max)
The maximum heat loads per DSC for failed fuels are reduced to ensure previous thermal evaluations for intact fuels are still bounding:
- 45 kW in EOS-HSM and the lower compartment of HSM-MX
- 39 kW in the upper compartment of HSM-MX Thermal evaluations are based on previously approved methodology in UFSAR for EOS-37PTH Failed Assemblies in Amendment 1 to CoC 1042.
- No change to the specified time limits in the current UFSAR
- Maximum fuel cladding temperatures are bounded by the values in the current UFSAR
- Internal pressure is bounded by the value in the current UFSAR
- Thermal implications are addressed in new Appendix 4.9.9 and Chapter A.4 CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 12
EOS Amendment 4 Thermal Impacts
- 3) MHLC
- MHLC within the Technical Specifications is revised to specify the maximum heat load for each basket type.
D D D D D D D D D F F Notes: (1) 12 damaged or 2 failed FAs are located according to the figure (2) FFC decay heat is limited to 0.8 kW D D D
- Chapter 2 of the UFSAR is updated to clarify the use of MHLC for use with new basket types and damaged/failed fuel assemblies.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 13
EOS Amendment 4 Thermal Impacts
- 4) EOS-HSM-SC All the thermal evaluations for the reinforced concrete EOS-HSM will remain bounding for the steel-plate composite variant EOS-HSM-SC.
In this steel-plate composite variant, the vent sizes along with the HSM cavity remain unchanged, therefore, the heat dissipation from natural convection will remain the same.
The addition of steel composite to the EOS-HSM will enhance the thermal performance since the concrete is replaced with steel.
Eliminates the optional Dose Reduction Hardware. This will increase the air flow through the inlets and outlets, and therefore will enhance the heat removal capability.
Thermal implications of EOS-HSM-SC are addressed in the new Section 4.4.12 CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 14
EOS Amendment 4 Shielding Impacts
- 1) Damaged and failed fuel storage in EOS-89BTH DSC The MHLC is unchanged from Amendment 3. No new source terms.
Due to changes in the hold-down ring (HDR) design for the Type 2 and 3 baskets compared to the Type 1 design, EOS-TC125 dose rates increase near the HDR. This dose rate increase is not significant and has negligible effect on peak EOS-TC125 side dose rates. No effect on storage dose rates. EOS-TC125 dose rates are updated.
The EOS-37PTH DSC has proportionally more damaged and failed fuel relative to intact fuel compared to the EOS-89BTH DSC. Extensive damaged/failed fuel dose rate calculations performed for the EOS-37PTH DSC demonstrate negligible effect on dose rates. Damaged fuel maintains geometry for normal and off-normal conditions. Failed fuel limited to 0.8 kW/FA, much less than the as-modeled 1.7 kW/FA for intact fuel. Therefore, EOS-89BTH DSC dose rates are presented only for intact fuel, and reference is made to the EOS-37PTH DSC analysis to justify damaged/failed fuel has negligible effect on dose rates.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 15
EOS Amendment 4 Shielding Impacts
- 2) EOS-HSM-SC Dose Rates The steel lined EOS-HSM results in a significant reduction in dose rates.
Vent dose rates are gamma-dominated, and replacing concrete with steel significantly reduces dose rates.
A sensitivity MCNP analysis is performed for this design. Front and roof average dose rates decrease by approximately 50% and 75%, respectively.
Therefore, the original EOS-HSM dose rates remain bounding and are not updated.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 16
EOS Amendment 4 Shielding Impacts
- 3) MAVRIC analysis A MAVRIC analysis for the HSM-MX is provided to demonstrate reasonable comparison to MCNP.
Conclusions are applicable to the EOS-HSM, which is similar in design (i.e., vented concrete structure).
Source terms are consistent with the EOS-37PTH DSC with HLZC 10 sources.
The MCNP model is a segment of a larger structure with reflective boundaries on 3 sides (left side, right side, and rear). Because MAVRIC does not allow reflective boundary conditions, the MAVRIC model is a full back-to-back array of modules.
MCNP dose rates are compared with MAVRIC dose rates at the center of the array.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 17
Proprietary Information on Pages 18 and 19 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 18
EOS Amendment 4 Shielding Impacts
- 3) MAVRIC analysis conclusions Agreement is excellent between MCNP and MAVRIC MAVRIC may be used for dose rate licensing actions for the HSM-MX and EOS-HSM, including site-specific site dose analyses CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 20
EOS Amendment 4 Criticality Impacts Damaged and failed fuel storage in the EOS-89BTH DSC
- Planar average enrichment limits are developed for up to 12 damaged and up to 2 failed BWR fuel assemblies per DSC.
- Enrichment limits developed for several short-loading configurations
- Damaged and failed fuel shall not be placed in the same DSC.
- The limiting damaged fuel geometry is pitch expansion with missing fuel rods.
- For poison loading B, enrichment limits are developed both with and without credit for the BWR fuel channel to constrain the damaged fuel rod pitch.
- The failed fuel geometry is based on a limiting combination of pellet diameter and the number of fuel rods (without fuel cladding) to provide a bounding failed fuel representation, similar to the EOS-37PTH DSC analysis.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 21
Damaged and Failed Fuel Locations D= Damaged F= Failed CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 22
Short-Loading Options CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 23
Criticality Limit Table Example (Type B2, damaged fuel)
- Separate enrichment limits for up to 4 and 12 damaged fuel assemblies.
- Values are enrichment limits.
Each DSC may have a different set of enrichment limits.
- As the intact fuel enrichment limit increases, the damaged fuel enrichment limit decreases.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 24
Criticality Limit Table Example (Type A2/A3/B2/B3, failed fuel)
- Intact and failed fuel enrichments are the same for simplicity.
CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 25
Submittal Schedule Application Submittal- 1st Quarter 2022 Requested Approval- December 2023 CoC 1042 Amd 4 Application Meeting 26
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