ML21258A321
| ML21258A321 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/15/2021 |
| From: | Dennis Andrukat NRC/NMSS/DREFS/RRPB |
| To: | |
| Andrukat, Dennis | |
| References | |
| NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19 | |
| Download: ML21258A321 (3) | |
Text
1 Alternative Physical Security for Advanced Reactors - Proposed Rule Proposed Eligibility Criteria Breakdown Handout for September 16, 2021 Public Meeting Criterion A: Reliance on inherent characteristics (i.e., loss of cooling equipment and containment structures; no security considerations)
Criterion B: Reliance on installed design features, limited security features, and MCR/CAS/SAS actions Criterion C: Reliance on recovery/mitigation strategies, offsite resources, security features, personnel actions Conditions and Assumptions Criterion A Criterion B Criterion C
1 Design basis threat (DBT)-initiated events 2
DBT damage to fuel, the facility, and structures, systems, and components (SSCs); the effect on accident progression; and the release of radiological material are analyzed, and anything allowed in analysis must survive the DBT adversary attack.
3 Recovery/mitigation strategy/equipment/personnel implementation timeline starts after the reasonable assurance of protection time (RAPT)
N/A N/A 4
Human actions / interactions N//A Limited (onsite autonomous engineered safety and security systems, only applicable to credible target sets) 5 Recovery/mitigation (safety and security) can be included in the analysis.
N/A Limited (autonomous engineered safety and security systems) 6 Offsite dose analysis timeline starts when target set is compromised.
2 7
Recovery/mitigation strategy/equipment/personnel implementation can be considered.
N/A Limited (autonomous engineered safety and security systems)
What is Allowed in the Analysis Criterion A Criterion B Criterion C Inherent characteristics Passive engineered safety features/SSCs N/A Active engineered safety features/SSCs N/A Limited (systems or features that are passive and autonomous after activation or deployed by human actions initiated onsite)
Action that can be taken in the Main Control Room (MCR),
Central Alarm Station (CAS), Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), or other secured areas N/A Limited (autonomous engineered safety and security systems)
Physical security detection & assessment capabilities N/A Limited (autonomous engineered systems onsite)
Physical security delay capabilities N/A Limited (autonomous engineered systems onsite)
Onsite physical security interdiction & neutralization capabilities N/A Limited (autonomous engineered systems)
Onsite security personnel N/A N/A Onsite armed responders N/A N/A Passive engineered security features/equipment N/A Active engineered security features/equipment N/A Limited (systems or features that are passive and autonomous after activation or deployed by human actions initiated onsite)
Security features/equipment initiated by MCR/CAS/SAS N/A Limited (autonomous engineered systems onsite)
3 Remotely operated weapons system (ROWS) (assuming an operator panel is inside MCR/CAS/SAS)
N/A Limited (autonomous engineered systems onsite)
Offsite security response (e.g., law enforcement, licensee personnel, hired contractor personnel)
N/A Limited (puts a timeframe on DBT capabilities, outside of target set space)
Physical security interdiction & neutralization capabilities that are controlled from offsite (e.g., ROWS)
N/A Limited (autonomous engineered systems onsite)
Offsite safety or security equipment N/A N/A Offsite assistance/capabilities (safety, emergency preparedness, etc.)?
N/A Time limit on analyzing DBT events (e.g., RAPT)
?
(RAPT1)
(RAPT) 1 RAPT may need to be set at a different timeline than is used for currently operating reactors.