ML21158A223

Meeting Summary for Ticap Workshop 3

ML21158A223
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf, Arkansas Nuclear, River Bend, Waterford
Issue date:	06/08/2021
From:	Eric Oesterle NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP
To:	John Segala NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP
Oesterle E
References
Download: ML21158A223 (29)

Text

CONTACT: Oesterle Eric UARP/DANU (301) 415-1014 June 8, 2021 MEMORANDUM TO:

John P. Segala, Chief Advanced Reactor Policy Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:

Eric R. Oesterle, Senior Project Manager Advanced Reactor Policy Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUMMARY

OF MAY 26, 2021, PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS TECHNOLOGY INCLUSIVE CONTENT OF APPLICATION PROJECT On May 26, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff held a public meeting with stakeholders, to discuss the technology inclusive content of application project (TICAP).

The meeting notice is available in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession No. ML21144A002, and the presentation slides are available at ADAMS Accession No. ML21146A088. The Enclosure 1 to this summary provides the attendees for the meeting as captured by Microsoft Teams.

Meeting Highlights The meeting was in the form of a workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss industrys draft TICAP guidance document found at ADAMS Accession No. ML21106A013. Prior to the workshop the NRC staff identified a list of 23 items that were identified as topics to be discussed during this workshop and remaining TICAP workshop scheduled for May 26, 2021. The list of issues can be found at ADAMS Accession No. ML21120A057. Thirteen of the 23 items were discussed during the May 11, 2021 workshop (see meeting summary at ADAMS Accession No. ML21132A295) and seven of the 23 items were discussed during the May 19, 2021 workshop (see meeting summary at ADAMS Accession No. ML21154A290). A path forward for several of the issues discussed during workshop was identified. Enclosure 2 documents the results of the workshop in the disposition column.

Eric R. Oesterle Digitally signed by Eric R.

Oesterle Date: 2021.06.09 11:14:09 -04'00'

J.Segala Two topical areas were identified during this workshop for further focused discussion towards resolution of the content of the TICAP guidance discussions needed for these topics:

Topic 9, reliability and capability targets, from the list found in Enclosure 2. This issue was originally identified as an outcome of the TICAP tabletop exercises that were held in the February through March 2021 time frame. The observations from these TICAP tabletop exercises can be found at ADAMS Accession No. ML21125A139.

The NRC staff noted that industrys draft TICAP guidance document does not appear to be consistent with NEI 18-04, Rev 1, Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactors, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19241A336) in that the reliability and capability targets are not proposed to be captured in the safety analysis report (SAR). From the staffs perspective the SAR should describe reliability targets and performance requirements used as input to the probabilistic risk assessment and for structures, systems and components that were used to develop the selection of special treatment requirements (i.e., programmatic actions used to maintain performance within the design reliability targets). The staff noted this information is important to capture in the SAR and in some cases could also be captured as part of technical specification requirements. From the industrys perspective, there is a concern that placing such information in the SAR is unnecessary and would potentially create a burden from a change control process standpoint. The staff and industry agreed to discuss this issue further in a future focused meeting.

Topic 6 from the list found in Enclosure 2 associated with the development of principal design criteria (PDC).

The staff believes the TICAP approach to establishing the RFDC as the PDC is too narrow.

The staff believes the following statement is not correct For plants that use the NEI 18-04 methodology, the PDC that flows from the LMP methodology and are needed to support the LMP-based safety case are based on the RSFs and the Required Functional Design Criteria (RFDC). RFDCs are used to supplement or modify ARDCs in developing PDCs. RG 1.232 should be referenced since there are other PDCs that are not tied to RFDCs (e.g., ARDCs 1 through 4). NEI 18-04 4.1 Task 7 states: RFDCs are defined to capture design-specific criteria that may be used to supplement or modify the applicable General Design Criteria or Advanced Reactor Design Criteria in the formulation of Principal Design Criteria.

Industry does not believe the intent of NEI 18-04 was to impose deterministic PDC on a risk-informed, performance-based process. The TICAP methodologies are trying to adapt the PDC concept to the affirmative safety case approach and equate the PDC to those associated with RSFs. In that approach, considering non-reactor sources could have associated RSFs and PDCs if high-consequence events might be associated with such inventories. Other issues associated with the LWR GDC or ARDC may be addressed by other parts of an application.

The issue will be considered further by the staff and industry and discussed again at Workshop #3. Aspects for consideration include cross-cutting GDC/ARDC; areas outside the TICAP scope such as releases during normal operation (GDC 60); and implications of GDC imposing requirements beyond those that might be established by LMP (e.g., GDC 17 and single failure).

J.Segala At the end of the workshop the staff noted the dates for the remaining workshop and the target date of early June 2021 for the NRC staff to provide a complete set of comments on the industrys draft TICAP guidance document and industrys target of late July for providing a revision to the document. The staff noted that the list provided in Enclosure 2 are the high-level issues associated with industrys draft guidance document. The staff informed industry that it was also developing comments embedded within the draft document that did not rise to a level to be discussed during the workshops. The staff and industry also discussed the need for a future meeting focused on resolution of Topics 6 and 9, as discussed above, and agreed to coordinate on scheduling of this during the June 2021 timeframe.

Enclosure:

1. Attendance List

2. List of Topics of Discussion for TICAP Workshops

ML21158A223 NRC-001 OFFICE NRR/DANU/UARP/PM NRR/DANU/UARP/BC NRR/DANU/UARP/PM NAME EOesterle JSegala EOesterle DATE 6/7/2021 6/8/2021 6/8/2021 May 26, 2021, Public Meeting to Discuss Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project Attendance List*

NAME AFFILIATION NAME AFFILIATION Nathan Sanfilippo NRC/NRR/DANU Amir Afzali Southern Company Martin Stutzke NRC/NRR/DANU Jason Redd Southern Nuclear William Reckley NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Brandon Chisholm Southern Company John Segala NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Mike Tschiltz NEI Prosanta Chowdhury NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Cyril Draffin US Nuclear Industry Council Maryam Khan NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP George Flanagan Oak Ridge National Lab Eric Oesterle NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Ed Wallace GNBC Associates Arlon Costa NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Steven Nesbit LMNT Consulting Juan Uribe NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Frank Akstulewicz A to Z Reactor Consulting Services Amy Cubbage NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Steve Vaughn X-energy Joe Sebrosky NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Travis Chapman X-Energy Nan Valliere NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Jim Kinsey Idaho National Laboratory (INL)

Jordan Hoellman NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Tom King INL Stephen Philpott NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Christopher Chwasz INL Alex Chereskin NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Tom Hicks INL Margaret OBanion NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP Ricardo Davis-Zapata GE Power Jan Mazza NRC/NRR/DANU/UARL Dennis Henneke GE Power Mallecia Sutton NRC/NRR/DANU/UARL George Wadkins GE Power Hanh Phan NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Archana Manoharan Not Available (NA)

Alexandra Siwy NRC/NRR/DANU/UARL Farshid Shahrokhi NA Michelle Hayes NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Lance Sterling NA Michelle Hart NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Bill Fowler NA Timothy Lupold NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Michael Mayfield NA Ian Jung NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Alan Levin NA Chris Van Wert NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Tom Braudt NA Boyce Travis NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Karl Fleming NA Tim Drzewiecki NRC/NRR/DANU/UART Jana Bergman NA Carolyn Lauron NRC/NRR/DNRL/NLRB Rob Burg NA Eric Bowman NRC/COMM/CS Barton Landon Pate NA Yuan Cheng NRR/NRC/DEX/EXHB Amanda Spalding NA Julie Ezell NRC/OGC Narasimha Kadambi NA Marcia Carpentier NRC/OGC Stephen Burns NA David Heeszel NRC/NRR/DEX/EXHB Parthasarathy Chandran NA Barbara Hayes NRC/NRR/DEX/EXHB Steven Pope NA Baindur Satyen NA Alan Jelalian NA Kamal Manoly NRC/NRR/DEX Jason Andrus NA Andrew Zach EPW Anthony Schoedel NA

2 NAME AFFILIATION NAME AFFILIATION Caroline Cochran Oklo Rachel Turney NA Chantal Morin NA

• Attendance list based on Microsoft Teams Participant list. List does not include 5 unidentified individuals that connected via phone.

List of Topics of Discussion for Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project Workshops Workshop1 Cellcolordenotes workshopinwhichissue wasfirstdiscussed Redfontindicates Workshop#3updateson topicsdiscussedinprior workshops Workshop2 Workshop3 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 1

Theconstructionpermit(CP)guidance containedinthetwostepLicensing sectionisnotsufficientlydetailedto ensureconsistentimplementation.

Hi ForSections1.2,1.3,1.4,2.4thereisnoCPguidance.For Section2.3,simplifiedand/orqualitativeanalysesshouldbe availabletosupportreasonableassurancefindings (examplesareprovidedinAppendixCofNRCsConstruction PermitWhitePaperfoundatADAMSAccessionNo.

ML21043A339)

Chapter3-Useoftermpreliminaryassessments.What doesthatmean?Shouldreferenceboundingassumptions andconservativemodelingtoaccountfortheuncertaintyin finaldesigndetails.Shouldreferencediscussionofthe majorSSCsofthefacilitythatareintendedtomitigatethe radiologicalconsequencesofadesignbasisaccident(DBA).

ForChapter4,thestaffwouldliketounderstandbetterthe useoftermpreliminarydescriptionoftheintegratedplant performance.

ForChapter6,guidanceforfirstofakind(FOAK)structures, systemsandcomponents(SSCs)doesnotappeartobe sufficientlydetailedtoensureconsistentimplementation.

TheCPguidanceshouldconsiderincludingadescriptionof theresearchanddevelopment(R&D)planssupportingthe design.

TheminimumlevelofdetailtosupportaCPapplication shouldbeconsideredfordiscussion.TheCPwhitepaper providesthoughtsregardingminimumlevelofdetail.

Thenonlightwaterreactorprobabilisticriskassessment (NLWRPRA)standard(ASME/ANSRAS142021)contains Workshop#2

Comment4:TICAPreiterateditsintentionto takeanotherlookathow/ifTICAPguidance needstoaddress50.43(e)(seeIssue7from Workshop1).

Comment5:TICAPwillexpandguidanceon R&Dplans.CurrentlythisisinSection2.3,butit couldbeexpandedtoSSCsystemdescriptions inChapters6and7.

Comment7:TICAPwillreviseSection2.1.1to clarifythatthePRAassumptionsshouldbe availableforNRCauditbutarenotrequiredto beprovidedinthePSAR.

TICAPwillconsideraddingCPguidancefor Section2.4aswell,recognizingthatitwill necessarilybegeneral.

TICAPwillconsiderNRCexpectationsinthe draftTICAPGuidanceDocumentRegGuidefor incorporationintotheGuidanceDocument.

ThisincludesPRAdocumentationattheCP stage.

TICAPwilllookatearlysitepermit(ESP) guidanceinRegGuide1.206forpotential applicationtoCPguidance,butnotedthatthe inherentdifferencesbetweenESPsandCPsmay

2 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition numeroussupportingrequirementstodocumentthe assumptionsmadeinlieuofdetaileddesigninformation.

Willtheseassumptionsbeidentifiedinthepreliminary safetyanalysisreport(PSAR)orwilltheybeprovidedinthe detailedPRAinformation(whichisonlyavailabletothe staffviaanonsiteaudit)?ThiscommentisrelatedtoIssue

1. 8below.

ThestaffexpectsthattheTICAPguidancedocumentwillbe usedtosupportneartermnonLWRCPapplications.

DiscussionsofhowtheTICAPguidancedocumentmightbe usedalongwithpreapplicationdiscussionstoaidthenear termreviewscouldbeatopicofaworkshop.Suchan approachcouldpotentiallybeusedtodevelopnearterm guidancewithrevisedupdatedguidancebeingissuedata laterdate.Therevisedguidancecouldbebasedonlessons learnedfromtheinitialconstructionpermitreviews.

limitapplicability.NRCalsonotedtheClinch RiverESPasapossibleresource.

2 Sourcetermguidancemightneedtobe expanded.

Med Thesourcetermdiscussionshouldrequiretheattenuation mechanismsbedescribed.Thesearejustasimportantin limitingradionuclidereleaseasisfuelperformance.

Sourcetermsshouldbedetailedforeachlicensingbasis event(LBE),butnoconfirmatoryanalysesisdonetoensure inclusionofallsourceterms.

Workshop#1

TICAPtoclarifyinguidancethatattenuation mechanismsaretobedescribed.

3 Theguidanceinseveralareasistoo generaltoensureconsistentand adequateimplementation,suchasthe useoftermslikerelevant phenomena,initialoperating conditions,andidentifytreatments.

Additionalexamplesinthisareaare providedinitems3athrough3dbelow.

Workshop#1

TICAPacknowledgesthatsomeguidancecanbe mademorespecificbuttherearelimitationson howspecificfortechnologyinclusiveguidance.

NRCtoprovideadditionalexamplesaspartof writtencomments.

3 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3a Theguidanceshouldbemorespecific inspecifyinginitialplantparameters, settingsofprotectionsystemfunctions, meteorologicalassumptions, uncertaintyassumptions,and characteristicsoffissionproduct releasesassumedintheLBEanalysis.

Formodularnuclearpowerreactordesign;describeand analyzethepossibleoperatingconfigurationsofthereactor moduleswithcommonsystems,interfacerequirements, andsysteminteractions.

TICAPbelievesmultiplemodulesareaddressed inLBEdescriptions(Chapter3)andinterface requirementsandsysteminteractionsare addressedinsystemdescriptions(Chapters6 and7).However,TICAPwillreviewthecurrent wordingtoseeifenhancementsarewarranted.

3b Theguidanceregardingthedefensein depth(DID)contentshouldbe expandedtoaddresstheareas discussedinthestaffsApril2020 annotatedoutlineinChapter7(see:

ADAMSAccessionNo.ML20107J565) whichwerederivedfromNEI1804

Section4.2(DID)statesthatthescopeandcontentofthe finalsafetyanalysisreport(FSAR)arefocusedonpresenting results,notdetailsoftheprocess.Itgoesontosaythatthe topicstobeaddressedintheevaluationofDIDarefor backgroundandthereisnorequirementtoaddresseach topicintheFSAR.Whyisntdiscussionoftheevaluation topicsimportantenoughtobeplacedintheFSAR?This providesthetechnicalbasisfortheDIDadequacy determination.Othersections(4.2.1,5.4)makesimilar statementswithnobasis.

NEI1804(Section5.9.3)statesthattheadequacyofDIDis confirmedwhentheactionsanddecisions(listedin5.9.3) arecompletedbytheIntegratedDecisionMakingProcess (IDP).ThereishardlyanymentionoftheIDPintheTICAP guidance,yetNEI1804emphasizesit.

Section5.4(SafetyRelatedSSCs)statesintheintroduction thatinidentifyingsafetyrelatedSSCs,theSSCsnotselected assafetyrelatedconstituteoneelementofPlantCapability DID.However,theintroductiongoesontosaythatthese DIDSSCsarenotdesignbasisinformation.Whyaren'tDID SSCsinthedesignbasis?Whatisthebasisforexcludingthe informationusedtoselectthesafetyrelatedSSCsfromthe SAR?"

TICAPdiscusseddesiretofocusSARcontenton resultsratherthanprocess.

NRCtoprovidespecificrecommendations whereadditionalDIDcontentisdesiredinthe SAR,alongwiththerationale.

NRCprovidedadditionalcommentsonDIDon May17,2021.Responsetothoseseveral commentsfollow;notethattheseissueswere crosscuttingforTopics3b,10,12.

4 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

TICAPguidancedocumentSection4.2addressesdefensein depth(DID).Itisunclearfromtheguidancethatan adequatelevelofdetailwouldbeincludedintheSAR regardingtheevaluationofDID.

GeneralCommentResponse:

Multiplecommentshaveoverlappingthemes andcontent.TICAPreconciliationofthebasic commentsrequiredtoextractindividual pointsforinclusioninTICAPguidance updates.

TICAPplanstoupdatetheDIDguidancewith thefollowingcommonunderstanding:

o TICAPDIDcontentwillfocusonthefinal resultsoftheIntegratedReviewProcess.

o Supportingrecordswillcontainadditional detailsoftheIDPdeliberations.

o DIDbaselinecontent,i.e.thatnecessary tosettheframeworkforfutureDID changeevaluationsshouldbeprovidedin theSAR.

o DIDtopicdiscussionoutlinedinNEI1804 willbeparsedamongmultipleTICAP chapters,i.e,3,4,5,6,7and8as appropriatetosupportthespecifictopic discussionsinthosechapters.

TherevisedDIDguidancewillalsoreflectthe dispositionsassociatedwithComments17 below.

5 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment1 AddthefollowingtoSection4.2:BaselineEvaluationof DefenseinDepth

Thissectionshoulddescribethebaselinelevelofdefense indepthprovidedbytheproposedfacility.Thisbaselineis establishedwhentherecurringevaluationofplant capabilityandprogrammaticcapabilityassociatedwith designandPRAupdatecyclesnolongeridentifiesrisk significantvulnerabilitieswherepotentialcompensatory actionscanmakeapractical,significantimprovementtothe LBEriskprofilesorrisksignificantreductionsinthelevelof uncertaintyincharacterizingtheLBEfrequenciesand consequences.ThisbaselineDIDevaluationanditsoutcome aretobedocumentedinsufficientdetailtoassurethat futurechangestophysical,functional,operational,or programmaticfeaturesofthefacilitycanbeeffectively evaluatedfortheirpotentialforreductionofDIDbefore proceeding.

SeeGeneralCommentResponseabove

6 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment2 Section4.2.1describesSARcontentguidanceforplant capabilityDIDevaluations.Suggestthefollowingchangesto Section4.2.1:

Thepurposeofthissectionistoprovideadescriptionof theSSCsandthelayersofdefensetheyrepresentinthe overallachievementofanacceptablelevelofDID.The applicationshoulddescribehowthedesignmeetsthe guidelinesforplantcapabilityattributesprovidedinNEI18 04Table52[GuidelinesforEstablishingtheAdequacyof OverallPlantCapabilityDefenseinDepth].Separate discussionsofplantcapabilitiesthatarereliedupontomeet theseplantcapabilityattributesshouldbeprovidedinthis section.Forexample,describehowthedesignminimizes thefrequencyofchallengestosafetyrelatedSSCsincluding controllingabnormaloperation,detectingfailuresand preventingdesignbasisaccidents.

Response2.1SeeGeneralCommentResponse above.

Response2.2-reminimization Thepartiesagreedthatminimizationwasnot theobjective.

TICAPagreedtoreviewthechainofevidence requiredacrossthechapterstomakesurethe DIDAttributesinNEI1804arecapturedinthe variousguidancesections.

7 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment3 ModifyTICAPtextinSection4.2.1.2asfollows:

Thissectionshoulddescribehowthedesignaddresses eachqualitativeguidelineinNEI1804Table52foreach LBEanddescribeanydeparturesfromthestatedcriteria.

Theapplicantshouldprovideasummaryidentificationof thelayersofdefenseforeachrisksignificantLBEand describetheextentofindependencebetweendifferentLBE layersofdefense.Theapplicantshoulddescribeforeach risksignificantLBEhowthedesigndoesnothaveanover relianceonasingledesignfeature,barrier,oroperational featurereliedupontomeetquantitativeobjectives.The criteriausedtodecidewhetherornotanoverreliance existsshouldbeprovided.Theapplicationshoulddescribe howtheprocessidentifiesthepotentialforcommoncause failuresandhowthosevulnerabilitieswereeliminated.

Describehowthedesignprovidesanappropriatebalance betweeneventpreventionandmitigationinthelayersof defenseforrisksignificantLBEs.Thecriteriausedtodecide whetherornotthereisanappropriatebalancebetween preventionandmitigationshouldbeprovided.

Response3.1SeeGeneralCommentResponse above.

Response3.2-TICAPclarifiedthatsingle featureevaluationwouldbesummarizedin Chapter4.TICAPalsoemphasizedthattheSAR contentforDIDadequacyfocusedonresults andshouldnothavetodocumentnegative findingsofthereviewthathadnoimpacton thedesignoroperationalprograms.Such negativefindingsshouldbeavailablein supportingrecordsoftheIDP.

Response3.3-TICAPclarifieditspositionon thetermoverrelianceasusedintheTICAP guidanceandNEI1804andtheadequacyof NEI1804todealwiththisqualitativeobjective.

Response3.4-TICAPidentifiedthePRA standardandresultingrecordsasthesourceof informationforcommoncauseevaluations.

ThenecessarycontentispartofthePlant CapabilityevaluationofLBEs.

Response3.5-TICAPclarifiedthatitsapproach topreventionmitigationbalanceiscontainedin theexaminationoflayersofdefense.Theneed foradditionalguidanceonlayersofdefensein Chapter3and4willbereviewed.

8 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment4 Addnewtexttosection4.2.1.2asfollows:

ForSSCsthatperformpreventionandmitigationfunctions forrisksignificantLBEs,describethesetofrequirements relatedtotheperformance,reliability,andavailabilityof theSSCfunctionsthatarereliedupontoensurethe accomplishmentoftheirtasks,asdefinedbythePRAor deterministicanalysis.Thissectionshouldalsodescribethe capabilityofthoseSSCsrelieduponforDID.Thisshould includehowthatcapabilityisensuredthroughtesting, maintenance,inspectionandperformancemonitoring.If thisinformationisprovidedinothersectionsitneednotbe repeatedhere.

Response4.1seerelateddiscussionin Response3.5.

Response4.2Performancetargetsarebeing addressedunderTopic9.

Response4.3-TICAPclarifiedthatspecial treatmentsarediscussedinChapters5,6and7.

9 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment5 Section4.2.2describesSARcontentguidancefor programmaticDIDevaluations.Suggestmodifyingthetext inSection4.2.2asfollows:

ProgrammaticDIDshouldbeusedtoaddressuncertainties whenevaluatingplantcapabilityDIDaswellasuncertainties inprogrammaticmeasures.Itshouldprovidethebasisfor definingspecialtreatmentrequirementstoensurethereis reasonableassurancethatthepredictedperformanceof SSCsandprogrammaticmeasurescanbeachieved throughoutthelifeoftheplant.Theapplicationshould describehowthedesignincorporatestheprogrammatic capabilityattributesprovidedinNEI1804Table56to provideadequateassurancethattherisk,reliability,and performancetargetswillbemetandmaintained throughoutthelifeoftheplantwithadequate considerationofsourcesofsignificantuncertainties.This descriptionshouldsupportthediscussionofspecial treatmentprogramsselectedforsafetysignificantSSCs describedinChapters6and7.Specialtreatmentsdescribed inNEI1804Table57shouldbeconsidered,althoughthe applicationdoesnotneedtoaddressitemsthatarenot applicable.Theapplicationshoulddescribehowuncertainty inprogrammaticDIDisaddressedandhowadditional measuresareinplacetoaddressunknowns.

Response5.1SeeGeneralCommentResponse above.

Response5.2TICAPclarifiedthatthe discussiononuncertaintiesrelatedto evaluatingplantcapabilityuncertainties,not programmaticuncertainties.TheTICAP guidanceinChapter4isbeingrevisedandwill containadditionalguidanceonthetopicof uncertainties.

Response5.3NRCclarifiedthatthecomment onunknownswasreferringtotheDID attributesinNEI1804Table56.

10 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment6 Addarequirementtosummarizetheintegrateddecision makingprocess(IDP)whichNEI1804emphasizes(in Section5.6)asresponsibleformakingthedeliberate, affirmativedecisionthatDIDadequacyhasbeenachieved.

SuggestthefollowingbeaddedtotheTICAPguidance document:

TheapplicationshouldsummarizehowtheIDPprocess wasappliedinevaluatingtheoveralladequacyofDID.The descriptionshouldaddresshoweachofthedecision guidelineslistedinNEI1804,Section5.9.3,wasevaluated andthebasisforanaffirmativeresponse.Thecriteriaused inmakingthedecisions(e.g.,riskmarginsaresufficient, prevention/mitigationbalanceissufficient,etc.)shouldbe provided.Ifquantitativemeasureswereusedaspartofthe criteria,theyshouldbeprovided.Adescriptionofhowthe resultsoftheIDPprocessaredocumentedandavailablefor futureDIDdecisionmakingandoperationssupportshould alsobeprovided.

Response6.1TICAPnotedthatChapter4will focusontheintegratedDIDresultsnot containedinotherchapters.

Response6.2reaffirmedthattheDIDSAR contentisfocusedonresultsfortheDID baselineandthattheresultswillbedistributed acrossmultiplechapters.

3.b AdditionalNRCDIDCommentsdated May17,2021

Comment7 Addthefollowingtotheendofsection4.2:

EvaluationandIncorporationofChangestoDefensein Depth

Thechangecontrolprocessshouldbedescribedaddressing howthebaselineDIDevaluationwillbereevaluated,based onproposedchanges,todeterminewhichprogrammaticor plantcapabilityattributeshavebeenaffectedforeachlayer ofdefense.Changesthatimpactthedefinitionand evaluationofLBEs,safetyclassificationofSSCs,orrisk significanceofLBEsorSSCsmustbeassessed.Thissection shouldalsodescribehowanychangestothebaselineDID evaluationwillbedocumentedandimplemented.

Response7.1TICAPobservedthatthegeneral topicofSARchangecontrolwascommonto otherportionsofthelicensing.TICAP confirmedthatthediscussionofbaselineDID informationinNEI1804wasinrecognitionof thisneed.

Thepartiesagreedthatthechangecontrol topicisbroaderthanTICAP.

Furtherdiscussionofchangecontroloutsideof TICAPareanticipated.

11 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 3c Inaddressingthespecialtreatments theguidanceshouldspecifythatthe applicationaddressthespecial treatmentrequirementsfromNEI18 04,Table41,onacasebycasebasis andinthecontextoftheSSCfunctions inthepreventionandmitigationof applicableLBEs.

Describesafetyrelated(SR)SSCreliabilitytargetsand performancerequirementsusedasinputtothePRAfor SSCsthatwereusedtodeveloptheselectionofspecial treatmentrequirements(i.e.,programmaticactionsusedto maintainperformancewithinthedesignreliabilitytargets).

GuidanceshouldpointtoNEI1804Table41andhavethe applicantaddresstheitemsinthatlist:

(fromNEI1804,Table41,asapplicable)

i. Equipmentqualification ii. Seismicqualification iii.Materialsqualification iv.Preserviceandriskinformedinserviceinspections

v. Preopandstartuptestingrequirements vi.Surveillancetestingrequirements TICAPwillenhancethelinkagesbetweenspecial treatmentsinChapters6and7andthe programsinChapter8.

TICAPstatedthattheSARcontentfortheLMP basedaffirmativesafetycaseshouldfocusof thespecialtreatmentsthatwereselected throughtheLMPprocess,vs.documentingwhy specialtreatmentswerenotselected.

3d Similarly,guidancediscussionof "optional"programsshouldinstead makeaclearertiebetweenidentified specialtreatmentsandtheprograms thatimplementthosetreatments

Theprogrammaticactionsusedtomaintainperformance withinthedesignreliabilitytargetsshouldincludea descriptionofhowactualSSCreliabilityisdeterminedand comparedagainstthedesignreliabilitytarget(e.g.,aspart oftheMaintenanceRuleprogram).

TICAPwillrevisitthelinkagesbetweenspecial treatmentsandprograms(see3c).

NRCclarifiedthatoptionalreferstowhetheror notthespecialtreatmentinvokingtheprogram wasselected.

4 Theguidancereferencesthemodular hightemperaturegascooledreactor preliminarysafetyinformation document(PSID)asguidancebutdoes notreferencethestaffssafety evaluationreportonthatPSIDwhich identifiedgapsinnecessarycontent.

Discusswhetheractualguidancethatis referencedshouldbeplacedinthe TICAPguidancedocumentinsteadof referencingthedocument Hi Anexamplediscussionfromthestaffssafetyevaluation foundatADAMSAccessionNo.ML052780497isasfollows:

Someeventswerenotdefinedexplicitlyenoughto quantifyproperly.Commonmodeandcommoncause eventswerenotpresentexplicitlyinthemodels.Human failureeventsweretoovaguelydescribedtodetermine whethertheywereassumedtooccurbeforetheevent initiationorafterMostrestrictiveintracingtheresultsof thePRAwasthefactthatthereisnolistofbasiceventsthat includestheoccurrenceprobabilityassociatedwitheach event.

Workshop#1

ThePSIDreferenceswereforthepurposesof guidancedocumentationonly;thesafety evaluationisthereforenotrelevanttothe guidance.

TICAPwillrevisitthePSIDexamplestoupdate themor,ifnecessary,replacethemwithTICAP examples.

TICAPwillendeavortoincludetheexamples directlyintheguidanceratherthanreferencing them.

12 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 5

Thedocumentdescribesamoveaway fromcompliancebasedapplicationsto amoreperformancebasedapproach.

It'snotclearfromthesestatements whetherapplicantswillbeexpectedto describehowtheycomplywiththe regulationsthatareassociatedwiththe performancebasedscopeand outcomesoftheaffirmativesafetycase approach.regulationsisanexpectation forapplicationcontent.

Hi TheTICAPguidancedoesnotrequiretheNRCregulations applicabletothedesignbeidentifiedordiscussed.Isntthe purposeoftheFSARtodemonstratecompliancewiththe applicableregulations?

LMPprimarilyaddressesthe50.34requirementstoidentify events,plantresponsetothoseevents,andassociated safetymargins.ThisprovidesanalternativetotheLWR basedregulationsthatdirectlyconnecttothispartof50.34 (50.46requirementsforECCS,forexample).Isthisthe basicpopulationofregulationsindustryisreferringtoinits proposedchangefromcompliancebased?

DoesthecontentofthisTICAPguidancealignwiththe NRCsregulatoryapplicabilityassessmentsinNRCStaff DraftWhitePaperAnalysisofApplicabilityofNRC RegulationsforNonLightWaterReactors,asdiscussedin recentnonLWRstakeholdermeetings?

Potentiallyanotherwaytoconsidertheaffirmativesafety caseapproachisstatedinRG1.233assafetyevaluations maydemonstratecompliancewithorjustifyexemptions fromspecificNRCregulationsandidentifywheredesign specificregulatorycontrolsarewarranted.Anapplication willneedtoaddresstheresultsfromthesafetycasein termsofwherecurrentregulationsdonotcontributeto safety(exemptions)orwherecurrentregulationsare lacking(additionalrequirements).Whereasthesafetycase shouldfocusonsatisfyingsubjectfunctions,itwouldbe usefultoagreeonaformatforcompliance/exemption discussions,betheyembedded,inatable,orotherformat.

Workshop#2

TICAPwillrevisitwordingofcompliance basedintheGuidanceDocument(p.4under Scope)toensurethereisnounintended implicationthataTICAPapplicationisnot requiredtocomplywithregulations.

13 6

Theguidanceforinclusionofprincipal designcriteria(PDC)maybe incomplete,sinceonly"LMPoutcomes" areaddressed,andothertopicsfrom Part50App.A(likeMonitoringFuel&

WasteStorage)arenotclearlyincluded forconsideration Hi ThisstatementisnotcorrectForplantsthatusetheNEI 1804methodology,thePDCthatflowsfromtheLMP methodologyandareneededtosupporttheLMPbased safetycasearebasedontheRSFsandtheRequired FunctionalDesignCriteria(RFDC).RFDCsareusedto supplementormodifyARDCsindevelopingPDCs.RG 1.232shouldbereferencedsincethereareotherPDCsthat arenottiedtoRFDCs(e.g.,ARDCs1through4).

Section5.3seemstoimplythatPDCsareonlyforDBEsand DBAs.WhatdesigncriteriaareappliedtoaddressBDBEs?

Section5.3:ForplantsthatusetheNEI1804 methodology,thePDCthatflowsfromtheLMP methodologyandareneededtosupporttheLMPbased safetycasearebasedontheRSFsandtheRequired FunctionalDesignCriteria(RFDC)

Section5.6:Thus,thePSARcontentforChapter5should includefunctionaldecompositionofFSFstoRSFs,a preliminarysetofRFDC/PDCwithperformancebased criteria

FromNEI18044.1Task7:RFDCsaredefinedtocapture designspecificcriteriathatmaybeusedtosupplementor modifytheapplicableGeneralDesignCriteriaorAdvanced ReactorDesignCriteriaintheformulationofPrincipal DesignCriteria.

TheTICAPmethodologiesaretryingtoadaptthePDC concepttotheaffirmativesafetycaseapproachandequate thePDCtothoseassociatedwithRSFs.Inthatapproach, consideringnonreactorsourcescouldhaveassociatedRSFs andPDCsifhighconsequenceeventsmightbeassociated withsuchinventories.Otherissuesassociatedwiththe LWRGDCorARDCmaybeaddressedbyotherpartsofan application.

Workshop#2

NRCbelievestheTICAPapproachto establishingtheRFDCasthePDCistoonarrow.

TICAPdoesnotbelievetheintentofNEI1804 wastoimposedeterministicPDConarisk informed,performancebasedprocess.

TheissuewillbeconsideredfurtherbyTICAP andNRCanddiscussedagainatWorkshop#3.

Aspectsforconsiderationincludecrosscutting GDC/ARDC;areasoutsideTICAPscopesuchas releasesduringnormaloperation(GDC60);and implicationsofGDCimposingrequirements beyondthosethatmightbeestablishedbyLMP (e.g.,GDC17andsinglefailure).

Afutureconversationwillbeheldbetween TICAPandNRC/INLstaffregardingthe definitionofPrincipalDesignCriteria(PDC)in AppendixAof10CFRPart50andthemost efficientwayforTICAPPDCtocomplywith existingregulationswhilenotlosingthe advantagesprovidedbyanRIPBapproach.One specificaspecttodiscussistheamountof specificity(i.e.,howdetailedaPDCmustbe) thatisappropriateand/orrequiredfortheset ofPDC(e.g.,arederivedrequirements necessarytobeidentifiedasPDC?).

14 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 7

Theguidanceincludesarequirementto includetesting/qualificationplansfor firstofakind(FOAK)safetyrelated SSCsforCPapplications.This requirementisreflectedin50.43(e),

andalsoappliestotheothertypesof applicationscoveredintheguidance (COL,DC,OL)butisnotdiscussedinthe guidanceforthoseotherapplication types.

Hi 50.34(e)(1)(i):Theperformanceofeachsafetyfeatureof thedesignhasbeendemonstratedthrougheitheranalysis, appropriatetestprograms,experience,oracombination thereof

50.43(e)requiresapplicantstoprovidethecollectionof analyses,tests,OE,etc.necessarytoassuretheexpected performanceofsafetyfeatures.Doesthissafety featurerequirementapplytobothSRandNSRSTSSCs?

Chapters6&7oftheSARinanapplicationwouldreflect therequiredcapabilitiesofSRandNSRSTSSCs.Where wouldtheproofofthosecapabilitiesbeprovidedtoaddress 50.43(e)?(ItsnotedthatthistopiciscalledoutforFOAKSR SSCsreflectedintwostepCPapplications,butthe documentseemstobesilentontheissueforDC,COL,ML).

Workshop#1

NRCbelievesthat50.43(e)testingisinherently fundamentaltothesafetycaseandshould thereforebeincludedunderTICAPguidance.

TICAPbelievesthattheNEI1804methodology doesnotencompassthe50.43(e)regulation, butthatresultsof50.43(e)testingwouldlikely appearinthetechnicaljustificationssupporting thesafetycase(e.g.,benchmarkdatafor computercodesusedtoanalyzeDBAs).

Thisisanexampleofdisagreementonthe scopeoftheTICAPguidance.Additionalclarity withrespecttoscopeandNRCexpectationswill beneeded.

Nevertheless,TICAPwilltakeanotherlookat whetherand,ifso,howthe50.43(e)testing couldbeaddressedbyTICAP.

TICAPwillmodifyitsguidancetoreflectthatit isnotjustCPsbutDCsandCOLsthatmay invokeFOAKtestingasspecialtreatments.

Dispositionisasdiscussedontheslidesfor workshop#3modificationofguidancefor Chapters2,6,and7asindicated.IftheNRC desiresaspecificsectionintheSARcoveringa 50.43(e)testprogram,NRCwilldevelop guidanceforthatsection.TICAPbelievesthe appropriatelocationforsuchasectionwould beSARChapter2.

15 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 8

ThelevelofdetailintheSAR, supportinginformationplacedonthe docket,andinformationthatis availableforauditwereidentifiedas potentialitemsforfurtherdiscussion duringtheTICAPtabletopexercises.

DuringtheTICAPtabletopexercisesit wasalsonotedthatthereisa distinctionbetweenitemsincorporated byreference(IBR)intotheSARand referencestotheSAR.IBRditemis consideredtobepartofthelicensing basisfortheplant.

Hi Discussthatifthestaffreliesonsomethingtheyreviewas partofanaudittomaketheirsafetyfinding,thatthe specificsofthatitemthenneedtobeelevatedintothe FSARoranIBRdocument?

MakeclearthatreportsthatareIBRdarepartofthe licensingbasisandchangecontrolprocess.

Section1.2statesthatthesiteattributesrelevanttothe safetycaseareinChapter2.Thereisnositeinformationin Chapter2.

Thereisnomentionoffuelqualification.

RG1.233providedclarificationsincertainareas.Doesthe TICAPguidancedocumentintendtoincludethese?

Workshop#1

TICAPunderstandsthatNRCcitinganiteminan auditreportdoesnotputthatinthelicensing basis.

TICAPconfirmedthatIBRintheSARmakesthe informationintheIBRreferencepartofthe licensingbasisandsubjecttotheNRCchange controlprocesses.

TICAPexplainedthatthereferencetosite informationinChapter2isbasedonthe understandingthatARCAPwilladdresssite informationthere.

Thetreatmentoffuelqualificationwillbe discussedinARCAP/TICAPdiscussionsin Workshop#3.

16 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 9

Duringthediscussionofnonsafety relatedwithspecialtreatment(NSRST) structures,systems,andcomponents (SSC)SARcontent,theNRCstaffraised aquestionregardingwherethe reliabilityinformationfortheseSSCs wouldbelocated(e.g.,PRAorSAR)and whatthisinformationmightentail.The NRCstaffbelievesfurtherdiscussionon thistopicwouldbebeneficial.

TICAPstatedthattheapplicantis responsibleforensuringitisaddressing RegGuide1.233includingclarifications andlimitationstherein.TICAPdoesnot seemuchdaylightbetweenNEI1804 andRegGuide1.233.

Hi SARshoulddescribereliabilitytargetsandperformance requirementsusedasinputtothePRAforSSCsthatwere usedtodeveloptheselectionofspecialtreatment requirements(i.e.,programmaticactionsusedtomaintain performancewithinthedesignreliabilitytargets).

Section6.2statesthattheSSCreliabilityandavailability informationwillnotbeintheFSAR.Thisisdesignbasis informationthatisneededfordeterminingthe effectivenessofthemaintenanceprogram,thereliability assuranceprogramandtheISI/ISTprograms.Whatisthe basisforexcludingitfromtheFSAR?

Section7.1definesNSRSTspecialtreatmentrequirements, notietoperformancetargets

Section8plantprogramshasspecialtreatmentsforSR SSCsandNSRSTSSCsmayinvolveprogramsrelieduponto providereasonableassurance

TheintroductiontoChapter6saysThisfurtherdetail

[Chapter6]includesSRDC,reliabilityandcapability performancebasedtargets,andspecialtreatment requirementstoprovidesufficientconfidencethatthe performancebasedtargetsintendedinthedesignwillbe achievedintheconstructionoftheplantandmaintained throughoutthelicensedplantlife.Thisstatementappears tosupportthatthesetargetsshouldbeinSAR.

Itmaybeacceptabletopointtowheretheinformation resides(e.g.,reliabilityassuranceprogram)versusputting actualreliabilityassumptionsintheSAR.

Workshop#1

NRCbelievesthereliabilitytargetsshouldbe providedintheSAR.NRCnotesthatNEI1804 statedthereliabilityandcapabilitytargets forSRandNSRSTSSCs,andspecialtreatment requirementsforSRandNSRSTSSCsdefine safetysignificantaspectsofthedescriptionsof SSCsthatshouldbeincludedinsafetyanalysis reports.NRCfurtherbelievestheinformation shouldbeintheSAR.

TICAPbelievesthetargetsshouldbeowner controlledinformation,notmaintainedinthe SAR.TICAPacknowledgestheNEI1804 statementbutbelievesTICAPguidance specificallyfortheSARcansupersedeNEI1804 statementsonSARcontent.TICAP acknowledgesthatoneinthedraftguidance (introductiontoChapter6)isnotalignedwith theTICAPposition,butthatstatementwas mistakenlyincludedintheApril15,2021draft guidance.

TICAPandNRCwillconsidertheissuefurther andrevisititatWorkshop3.

TICAPacknowledgestheneedtobeconsistent withtheguidanceinNEI1804.TheNRCand theTICAPTeamplantohaveafocusedfollow upmeetingonthetopic,probablyinthemid Junetimeframe.

17 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 10 TheSARcontentshouldfocuson presentingtheresultsofimplementing theLMPprocess.Fordiscussion purposes,itmaybebeneficialto discusswhattypeofdocumentation mayexistfromimplementingtheLMP processbytheapplicant,including narrativeontheiterationsinthe process,andthedeliberationsand decisionsoftheintegrated decisionmakingprocess(IDP)and whetherthisdocumentationmaybe somethingthatisauditedbytheNRC staff.

Hi Thedescriptionshouldaddresseachofthedecision guidelinesdescribedinSection5.9.3ofNEI1804,including thebasisforconcludingtheguidelinehasbeenmet.For thoseguidelineswhereaquantitativemeasurecanbe provided,thosemeasuresusedinthedecisionmaking shouldbeprovided.

Numerousplacesin1804detaildocumentationneedsfor basesordecisions.TheTICAPreportshouldhighlightwhat isdocumentedinaTR,andwhatisintheSAR Relatedtoitem8 Workshop#1

SeedispositionofadditionalNRCDID commentsunderIssue3b.

18 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 11 NEI1804(Section3.2.2-Task6)states that,wherepossible,externalevents aretobeanalyzedinthePRAbut,in somecases,maybeselectedand treateddeterministically.Thereisno discussionintheTICAPguidance documentabouthowtoselectand treatexternaleventsselectedusinga deterministicapproach.Accordingly, theVTRreportdidnotaddressthis topic.

Hi ThereisNoteonPage51thatreadsNote:The developmentoftheDBEHLsisaddressedbyARCAPand summarizedinSARChapter2.

Section6.1.1statesthatthedesignonlyneedstoprotect againstexternalhazardswithafrequencygreaterthan1E 4/yr.DoesthisexcludeBDBEexternalhazardsfrom consideration?

Section2.2includesexternaleventsinthePRA.Howare deterministicallyselectedexternaleventsaddressedinthe PRA?

Additionally,incorporationofexternalhazardsintotheLBE determinationprocesslacksbasisanddetailin1804and theTICAPdocument.

Proposed10CFR53.510(a)setsthedesignbasisexternal hazardlevels(DBHELs)at1E5/plantyear.RG1.208 (seismic)establishesthesitespecificgroundmotion responsespectrum(GMRS)suchthatthefrequencyof significantinelasticdeformation(FOSID)is1E5/y.RG1.76 (tornados)andRG1.221(hurricanes)setDBHELsat1E7/y.

Workshop#2

TICAPwillconsideradditionalguidancein Section6.1.1toclarifythedeterministic selectionofDBEHLs.

TICAPwillconsideradditionalguidancein Chapter3aboutincorporationofexternal hazardsintotheLBEdeterminationprocess.

TICAPwillconsidertypicalinformationin Chapter3ofLWRSARsanddetermineifthe levelofdetailinSection6.1.1shouldbe enhanced.

12 ThediscussionofDIDinSection4.2ofa SARdevelopedusingtheTICAP guidanceisagoodcandidatefor discussionaspartoftheupcoming workshopswiththeNRC/INLstaff.

Hi Section4.2itstatesNotethattheaboveinformation

[topicslistedinNEI1804Table51]isprovidedfor background,andthereisnorequirementtoaddresseach topicintheSARmaterial.Howdoesanapplicantaddress this?

Relatedtooneofthesubbulletsinitem3-Workshop#1

SeedispositionofadditionalNRCDID commentsunderIssue3b.

13 Basedoninternaldiscussionwiththe staff-believeadiscussionofprincipal designcriteriaguidanceembeddedin draftindustrydocumentisappropriate inaccordancewitheVinciTICAP tabletopexercisecomments HI NotethattheguidancemoreaccuratelyreflectstheNEI18 04PDCdevelopmentthanwasperformedbyeVinci.

Workshop#2

Noitemsidentifiedfordispositionspecificto thisissue.PDCissuesarebeingcoveredunder Issue6.

19 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 14 CurrentlythescopeoftheTICAP guidancedocumentcoversonlyCOLs.

ThescopeoftheTICAPguidance documentshouldbeexpandedto includeapplicabilityforOLapplicants underPart50andthesupplemental guidanceforthetwosteplicensing processshouldbelimitedtojustCP applicants.

Hi TheguidancedocumentneedstoalsoaddressscopeofESP, DCandMLapplications.RegardingESPs,thestaffbelieves anapplicantusingtheTICAPguidancemightleverage informationfromanESPindevelopingtheirapplication (e.g.,informingtheDBEHLdetermination).

ThelevelofdetailanddesignmaturityforanOLapplication isexpectedtobethesameasforaCOLapplicant.By incorporatingthiscommenttheguidanceforCPapplicants canbemademoreclearandspecific-currentlytheentries undertheTwoPartLicensingProcessareconfusing, inaccurateinsomeplaces,andlackspecificityinothers.

On4/2/2021,NEIsubmittedcomments(ML21092A115)on thedraftCPISG.OnecommentstatedthattheNRC shouldnotberequiringthatthedesignandanalysisfora CPAbeatthesamelevelofcompletionasforaCOLA.This differsfromtheTICAPstatement.

Workshop#1

TICAPtoconsiderchangestoclarifythat alternativelicensingpathstwosteplicensing guidanceisapplicabletotheCP,nottotheOL, andthatthebaselineTICAPguidanceis applicabletotheOL.

NRCtoprovidedetailsofexamplesofTICAP guidancedepartingfromNEIpositionsasstated inNEIcommentsonthedraftconstruction permitInterimStaffGuidance.

15 ForsupplementalguidanceforDesign Certificationstherearenoentriesfor severalsections.Needtoclarifyintent forthesenoentries(I.e.,guidance providedforCOLsapplies)orif additionaldiscussionisintended Med Similarto#14,alllicensesshouldbecovered Workshop#1

TICAPclarifiedthatnoentryforDCmeansno adjustmentstothebaselineguidanceforDCs.

16 ForsupplementalguidanceforDesign Certifications,itappearsthatperhaps onlylimitedDIDadequacyassessments mightbeabletobeperformeddueto thefactthattheexpectationson operationalprogramdescriptionsfor DCapplicantsisnotequivalenttoCOL applicants.Mayalsohavesomeimpact onidentificationofspecialtreatments.

DCsshouldaddressDIDaspartofthedesignincluding identificationofneededspecialtreatments.Theonly differencefromaCOListhedevelopmentofthe operationalprogramdescriptionwhichwouldnotbe expectedinaDC.

Workshop#1

TICAPwillreviseguidanceasneededtoreflect DCadjustmentsduetothefactthatDCdoes notaddressoperatingplantspecifictopics.

17 TheTICAPguidancedocumentrefersto licensingbasis,however,thereisa Med ThestaffnotesthatthisissuecouldbeconsideredasPart 53languageisdevelopedforSubpartHandI.

Workshop#3

20 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition definitionofcurrentlicensingbasis containedin10CFR54.3whichwas necessitatedbylicenserenewal.

Shouldareferencetothatdefinitionbe includedintheguidanceorshouldthat definitionberevisitedandredefined forthepurposesofuseoftheLMP approachorforinclusioninPart53for thatmatter.Questionfordiscussionis whetherornotthedefinitionneedsto bemodifiedforthepurposesofthis guidancedocumentorotheradvanced reactorguidancedocuments?

TICAPdidnottakeissuewiththebasic definitionofcurrentlicensingbasisin 10CFR54.3.TICAPdoesnotplantoincludea licensingbasisdefinitionorreferenceinthe TICAPGuidance.

[Note:TICAPindicatedthatitwouldtakea furtherlookattheuseofthatdefinitionmore broadlyanditsbasiswouldhaveany unintendedconsequencesifthedefinitionwas usedoutsidethescopeofPart54.Thisreview wastargetedforcompletionbymidJune.]

18 Thereshouldbealignmentonthe proposaltonotincludelicensingbasis informationinChapter1.Thepurpose, Ithink,istoalsoexcludeChapter1for thechangeprocessandreducefuture regulatoryburden.However,our currentconceptofthechangeprocess is10CFR50.59anditisnotclearasto whatthechangeprocessunderPart53 mightbe.

NeedtoalignontheproposalthatChapter1isnotlicensing basisinformationw/ohavingacleardefinitionoflicensing basisforLMPbasedSARsorevenwhatthechangeprocess wouldentail.

Workshop#3

TICAPtoreviewchapter1andtheuseof licensingBasisterminologytoseehowitcan clarifythatChapter1isnotsomehowexcluded fromthe50.59changeprocesssinceitisapart oftheFSAR.Thisshouldbedoneinthecontext ofourreviewofIssue17whichisalsofocused onlicensingbasisandthedefinitionin 10CFR54.3.

19 Severalsectionsrefertotablesinthe LMPTabletopExerciseReportorto usefulguidanceintheMHTGRPSID document.(ERO)

Hi Itwouldbemoreusefultoincludethetablesanduseful guidancereferredtowithintheTICAPguidancedocument.

Workshop#1

SeeDispositionofIssue#4

21 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 20 AroundWorkshop#3,thestaffis consideringdiscussionofadraftTICAP RGandanARCAProadmapISGtostart thediscussiononhowindustrys guidanceisenvisionedtofitwithin TICAPandthestaffsinitialthinkingon whereindustrysTICAPguidanceis envisionedtobesupplemented(e.g.,

fuelqualification,ASMESectionIII Division5,designreviewguideforI&C)

Med

Workshop#3 TheNRCwillconsidertheTICAPcommentsas providedontheWorkshop#3TICAPslidesasit continuestodevelopitsARCAPISGandTICAP RegGuide.

21 Thetermsafetycaseisnotcurrently usedinNRClicensingprocesses.

Hi TICAPpage4statesThetermsafetycaseisacollectionof statementsthat,ifconfirmedtobetruebysupporting technicalinformation,establishesreasonableassuranceof adequateprotectionforoperationofthenuclearpower plantdescribedintheapplication.TICAPFigure1onpage 6showstherelationbetweenTICAPandanadvanced reactorlicenseapplication;specifically,theaffirmative safetycaseaddressedbyTICAPisnecessary,butnot sufficient,toestablishreasonableassuranceofadequate protection.Needalignmentonwhatasafetyisand,equally important,whatitisnot.

Noitemsidentifiedfordispositionspecificto thisissue.

22 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 22 Thestaffhasprovidedindustrywitha listofNRCobservationsfromtheTICAP tabletopexercises.Todate,industrys feedbackontheseobservationshas beenlimitedtothefirsttwoTICAP tabletopexerciseobservations.The NRCstaffwouldbeinterestedin industrysfeedbackontheNRC observationsforthelasttwoTICAP tabletopexercises(i.e.,theeVinci microreactor,andthemoltenchloride reactorexperiment(MCRE)).In particular,theNRCstaffwouldbe interestedinwhetherindustry identifiespotentialworkshopitems fromeVinciandMCRETICAPtabletop exercisesthatarenotcapturedinthe itemsidentifiedabove.

Hi

Workshop#3

TICAPhasnotidentifiedadditionalitemsfor discussionwhichhavenotalreadybeencovered byotherIssues.

23 Issue Topic Priority Comments Disposition 23 TheNRCstafffindsthatadditional informationandclarityonPRAis neededintheTICAPguidance.

Hi InSection2.1.1,theoverviewofPRAneedsadditional clarityregardingpeerreview,theuseoftechnically adequatePRA,thelevelofdetails,andsoon.Inaddition, PRAforconstructionpermitapplicationsneedsdiscussion withtheNRCstaffsincethereisongoingdiscussionsonthe subjectaspartoftheNRCstaffsongoingdevelopmentof guidanceonconstructionpermit.

InSection2.1.2,thesummaryofkeyPRAresultsshould includeotherinformationsuchaskeyassumptions,the resultsandinsightsfromimportance,sensitivity,and uncertaintyanalyses,andsoon.

AlthoughotherChapters(i.e.,Chapter3and4)include someofthePRAresultsorinsights(suchasrisksignificant SSCs,humanactions,etc.),itmaybeusefultohavethese keyresultsunderSection2.1.2tohavethecomprehensive PRAresultsinoneplace.Alternatively,asetofpointers (notattheChapterlevel)attheindividualtopicareasmay beincludedinSection2.1.2.

Noitemsidentifiedfordispositionspecificto thisissue.

TheNRCmayprovidespecificwritten commentsrelatedtothisissue.

ItisnotedthattheNRCrecentlyupdatedCP guidanceregardingnonLWRdesignsandPRAs; theCPangleisaddressedunderIssue#1.