ML21035A257
| ML21035A257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/02/2021 |
| From: | NRC/OCIO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21035A252 | List: |
| References | |
| NRC-2021-000029 | |
| Download: ML21035A257 (128) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Docket Number:
Location:
Date:
Work Order No.:
Predecisional Enforcement Conference RE Tennessee Valley Authority EA-19-092 teleconference Friday, July 24, 2020 NRC-0998 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island A venue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 Pages 1-127
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE RE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA)
(DOCKET NO. EA-19-092)
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FRIDAY JULY 24, 2020
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1 The conference was convened at 8:00 a.m.,
Kenneth O'Brien,
Region III I Deputy Regional Administrator, presiding.
NRC STAFF PRESENT:
KENNETH O' BRIEN, Region III, Deputy Regional Administrator ALEX ECHAVARRIA, Region II, Office of Investigations I AN GI FFORD, Office of Enforcement JOE GILLESPIE, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel NICK HILTON, Senior Enforcement Advisor, (202) 234-4433 Office of Enforcement, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CRAIG KONTZ, Region II,
Office of I nvestigations MARK MI LLER, Region II, Director, Division of Reactor Projects MARCIA SI MON, Senior Attorney, Office of the General Counsel ANDY SHUTTLEWORTH, Director, Office of I nvestigations SCOTT SPARKS, Region II,
Senior Enforcemen t Speci a l ist ALSO PRESENT :
J IM BARSTOW, TVA, Vice President,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs TIM RAUSCH, TVA, Chief Nucl ear Officer TRICIA ROELOFS, TVA, Director,
Data Governance & Analytics RANDY STAGGS, TVA, Director, Plant Support,
Wat ts Bar Nuc l ear Plant TONY WILLIAMS, TVA, Site Vice President, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant BRENDAN HENNESSEY,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman MONICA HERNANDEZ,
Pillsbury Wi nthrop Shaw Pi ttman NEAL R. GROSS 2
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TOM HILL, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman MICHAEL LEPRE, Pills bury Winthrop Shaw Pittman DAVID LEWIS, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman DREW NAVIKAS, Pillsbury Wi nthrop Shaw Pittman HOWARD FELDMAN, Blank Rome BARRY LEVINE, Blank Rome (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CONTENTS Opening Remarks Director, Office of Enforcement Enforcement Policy Overview.......
Apparent Violation Office of Enforcement Staff External Presentation Questions...
Closing Remarks Adjourn NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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P R O C E E D I N G S 8:01 a.Ill.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Good morning.
I have it as being 8:00 Eastern, 7:00 Central.
This is Ken O'Brien.
Why don't we begin?
Today we will finish the third day of a three-day predecisional enforcement conference with the Tennessee Valley Authority relative to activities at Watts Bar in 2015 and 2016.
Before we begin, let me do some checks here.
Court reporter, can you hear me?
Mr. Barstow?
COURT REPORTER :
Yes, Mr. Chair.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you.
Marcia?
MS. SIMON :
I'm here.
MR. O'BRI EN:
Nick?
MR. HILTON:
Here.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Scott?
MR. SPARKS:
Yes, Ken.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you.
Mr. Rausch and MR. BARSTOW:
Yes, we are here with one exception.
Chris Rice is up at Watts Bar helping to operate the station today, so everyone else is here.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you very much, and just a few opening comments and then I 'll turn i t back (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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over to you.
Again, this i s a predecisional enforc-ement conference to discuss the apparent violations that were identified during an Office of Investigations review completed in May of 20 19 regarding activities at the Tennessee Valley Authority ' s Watts Bar Nuclear Plan t.
Today, I understand that you're planning to discu ss your perspectives on four of the 12 apparent violations, having completed the other e i ght previously.
The apparent violations to be discussed today would be 8, 10, 11, and 12.
I n
- summary, these apparent violations involved providing to the NRC information that was not complete and accurate during a meeting with the NRC on January 6, 2016, maintaining in 2016, January 2016, as a
part of a Level II Corrective Action Program evaluation, information acquired by the Commission,
regulations to be compl ete and accurate that was not complete and accurate in all material respects,
providing to the NRC information that was not complete and accurate during a meeting with the NRC on February 2, 2016, and providing information to the NRC that was not complete and accurate during two telephone calls with the NRC, and in a TVA speci a l report, revi ew team (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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report submitted to the NRC in March of 2016.
At thi s point, I ' ll turn the meeting over to you for your presentations.
Thank you.
MR.
BARSTOW:
Thank you, Mr. O'Bri en.
Good morning, this is Jim Barstow at the hearing today.
Before we begin today ' s discussion, I would like to reiterate our key concerns regarding Apparent Violations 8, 10, 11, and 12.
As I've stated before,
TVA is deeply concerned about the implications of these v i olations.
While the accusations on their face are very troubling,
after an investigation int o
- them, it becomes even more troubling that such significant accusations have been leveled given the lack of evidence to s upport them.
TVA undertook a significant effort to examine these issues fol lowing NRC ' s l ett er of March 9, 2020 providing TVA with the apparent violations.
Wit h the exception of a shift manager that we've already discussed, TVA has found no evidence that the individuals named in the apparent violations provided i ncomp l ete or i naccurate information.
TVA has also been able to substantiate that these individuals did anything that would consti t ute deli berate misconduct.
There is s i mpl y no (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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evidence available to TVA that supports the NRC' s conclusions that intent i onal v i o l ati ons occur red.
As you have heard during the first two days of this PEC, a number of organizational failures contributed to the RHR event,
and whi 1 e the environment in 2015 may have contributed to poor decision making, our employees did not intentionally violate NRC requirements.
It is TVA ' s desire to move forward from the events of 20 15 and to continue the progress we have made since that time.
We have completed significant corrective actions relative to safety culture issues in particular.
Let me be clear.
TVA is committed to timely, accurate, and complete communicati on with the NRC, but I believe that everyone can understand that i nformation about events or t he company's understanding of that information may change over time.
We suspect that the NRC understands this
- reality, especially since the Commission has histori cal ly moni tored licensees whil e issues and their causes are still being investigated.
We expect the NRC to assess the ultimate results of our work, a nd view them from the context of (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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the actual evidence as well as their safety significance consistent with the established regulatory framework.
With that, I will turn the presentation over to our counsel for discussion of the Apparent Violations 8, 10, 11, and 12.
MR.
HILL:
Thank you, Jim.
As I will
- discuss, TVA denies Apparent Violation 8.
I will first discuss how Apparent Violation 8 is predicated on a backup slide having been presented at the January 6 meeting and characterized as providing the cause of the November 11, 2 015 pressurizer level excursion, but that predicate on which AV 8 entirely depends appears to be incorrect.
Next, I will explain why the participants in that meeting had no reason to discuss operator concerns having been raised to the OCC managers because they had no apparent awareness of any concerns having been communicated to the OCC and no reason to discuss OCC involvement in the decision to move forward with the heatup on November 11, 2015 since they were aware of no OCC impropriety causing the November 11 events.
- Finally, I
will discuss the appropriateness of facing a llegations of deliberate (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 misconduct on alleged omissions during an NRC management site v isit similar to a drop-in meeting.
Let me turn to the first point, that Apparent Violation 8 rests entirely on the allegation that TVA presented a backup sli de at the January 6 meeting with the bullets allegedly characterized during the meeting as the cause of the November 11,
2015 pressurizer level excursion.
We have not found any basis for that all egation, and the evidence that we have reviewed indicates that it is wrong, and if, as the evidence available to TVA i ndicates,
the slide was not presented or described as the cause of the event, the basis for any alleged omissions vanishes.
In short, Violation 8 appears to be based on two false predicates.
First, the quoted language from Apparent Violation 8 comes from a TVA slide entitled residual heat removal evolution.
This slide is part of a series of backup slides which were not part of t he slides that were printed for presentation to the NRC and which, as shown on the slide on your screen, were clearly labeled backup slides.
As can be seen on the next slide, Mr.
(b )(?)(C) requested copi es of the presentation to be (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 printed for the January 6 meeting.
He also requested that the copies omit the backup slides consistent with his ordinary practice.
A copy of the slides that were printed and presented to the NRC have been provided to you as Exhibit 60 of TVA 1 s written responses to the apparent violations and they do not include the backup slides.
- Second, as Misters l(b)(?)(C)
I, l(b
)(?)(C) l(b)(?)(C)
~ and (b)(?)(C) stated in their PECs, none of them recall the residual heat removal evolution backup slide being presented to the NRC at the January 6
- meeting, and they do not believe that it was presented.
So, how did the NRC get this backup slide and then include it in its allegation? Of course, it is not marked backup slide on its face, so the NRC would have had no way of knowing that i t was a backup slide if it was just subsequently given to the NRC, perhaps by the TVA OIG.
You' l l see what attendees say about whether the backup slide was presented. What do their notes say?
Obviously there are many questions to be asked and answered, questions that one hopes were addressed before making an allegation of deliberate misconduct against four individuals and TVA.
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- Third, TVA' s notes from the January 6 meeting provide no indication that the backup slide or the bullet points on it were discussed at the meeting.
These notes have been provided to you as Exhibit 59 of TVA's written response to the apparent violations.
Further, as can be seen on the next s l ide, on its face, the backup slide that is alleged to have been presented at the January 6 meeting described the bullet points quoted in the apparent violations as, quote, insights, not causes as alleged by the NRC.
Therefore, even if a copy of the backup slide has been presented or was somehow obtained by the NRC, it is hard to understand how or why the NRC would switch TVA's chosen word insights with cause, especially in the context of alleging deliberate misconduct by TVA officials for providing inaccurate or incomplete information.
The fact that Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I is the on-e now alleged by the NRC to have presented the backup slide is no surprise given that his name on the bottom left of the backup slide is presented in small print, but he told you that neither he nor anyone else presented it, and TVA's notes do not reflect Mr. l(b)(?)(C) speaking at all.
(202) 234-4433 Mr. l (b)(7)(C)
And indeed, was clear during NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 13 his PEC that not only does he not recall the slide being presented or discussed, but that he certainly would not have characterized bullets specifically labeled as insights as the cause of the event, particularly as TVA had not yet investigated the causes of the RHR event.
Further, the NRC 's allegation that TVA was representing that it had determined the cause of the event is inconsistent with the tenor of that meeting as recalled by participants and as reflected in TVA's notes that TVA still needed to evaluate the cause of the event.
If, as the evidence available to TVA indicates, the backup slide was not presented or did not characterize the cause of the event, the NRC's allegations that participants should have included discussion of operator concerns a nd OCC involvement become baseless.
If the cause of the event was not being presented, there obviously would have been no reason for any of the participants to be offering additional views, but let me t urn to the second main point.
Even if the backup slide has been presented, which does not seem to be case, and even if it had been characterized as the cause of the event, (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 14 which appears equally unlikel y, the participants would no t have recognized any reason t o interject some discussion of operator concerns or OCC involvement.
They would not have done so because t hey had no apparent awareness on January 6, 2016 that MCR operators had raised concerns with the OCC managers on November 11, 2015, a nd they would not have done so because they were aware of absolutely no OCC impropriety causing the November 11 events.
Before I
continue discussing this allegation, it is important to keep in context the role of the OCC during an outage.
The OCC exists to maintain the outage schedule and to coordinate plant activities to support the operators in safely bringing the p l ant back online.
To that end, the OCC includes a dedicated oper ati ons representat i ve, Mr. Spri nkle on November 11, who was the single point of contact between the OCC and t he control room.
Having a single point of contact reduces distractions on the shift manager and promotes effective communication between the control room and the OCC.
In addition to the OCC operations representative,
the shift manager also receives s upport dur i ng an outage from the operati ons (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 department leadership.
15 During the November 2015 outage, Mr. 1(b)(?)(C) I and Mr l(b)(7)(C) lwere alternative days and nights respectively to ensure a senior operations department leader was onsite at all times.
Given this structure, there would be nothing unusual, indeed normal and necessary, in the OCC operations representative or operations department leadership communicating with the shift manager about the plant's status and schedule adherence, nor would there be anything unusual about the shift manager communicating to the OCC operations representative questions that he or other control room operators had regarding plant operations and upcoming evolutions in the schedule.
Given that background, I will now turn back to the allegations in Apparent Violation 8.
The NRC alleges that Misters l(b)(?)(C)
I, l(b)(7)(C) and l(b)(?)(C) I had a
legal obligation that they deliberately chose to breach to inform the NRC at the January 6 meeting that on November 11, 2015, the MCR operators raised concerns to the OCC managers as to their ability to control pressurizer water level during heatup with normal letdown out of service.
While Mr. 1(b)(?)(C) I was aware that MCR operators had questions on November 11,
- 2015, he (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16 understood those questions had been answered, and there is no evidence showing that any of the other atoos (phonetic) were aware on November 11 or by January 6, 2016 that operators had raised concerns with OCC managers as is alleged.
Mr ~(b)(7)(C) I was th~.....
(b_)(?_)(_C) _____
__.I on November 11, 2015, but he was not a member of the OCC.
Based on his PEC testimony, Mr. l(b)(7)(C) I recalls discussions with Mr. Johnson and other MCR operators on November 11.
- However, he recalls these discussions bei ng normal, heal thy questioning and does not r -ecall anyone ultimately feeling uncomfortable with or objecting to proceeding with the heatup.
Mr.
l(b)(7)(C) recollection appears consistent with the information that the TVA OIG interview summaries indicate he conveyed in 2016 and 2017, as well as the notes of an interview by TVA's root cause analysis t eam on February 16, 2016.
I won't quote those interview summaries now, but relevant sections have been quoted in TVA's written response to Apparent Violation 8.
turn to the allegations against Mr. l(b)(?)(C)
I'll now 1-Mr.1(b)(7)(C) lwas on the night shift during the forced outage on November 11, 2015.
Based on his (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 PEC statement, he has no recollection of operators chall enging the heatup sequence on November 11,
although he did recall some healthy discussion at some point.
Mr
- l(b)(7)(C) I l eft the plant around 10 : 00 a.m.
RHR was not removed from service until after 1 : 00 p.m.
Further, he does not believe that any operator-indicated concerns had been raised when Mr.
~fb_)_(7_)(_C_)_~l returned for his night shift on the evening of November 11.
Mr* l(b)(7)(C)
! statements in his PEC are consistent with the NRC ' s interview of him on Dec-ember 18, 2015.
We have provided Mr. ~l(_b)_(7_)_(c_) __ __,l interview statements to you in TVA's written response to Apparent Viol ation 8.
Furthermore, while Mr. 1(b)(?)(C) looked into the November 11 events after the senior resident inspector began asking questions in mid-December 2015,
we have not found any evidence that Mr. 1(b)(?)(C) learned that operators had raised concerns to the OCC as to their ability to control pressurizer water level during normal heatup without normal l etdown in service, or for that matter, that the OCC overrode any s uch concerns.
There are a couple of communicati ons where (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 operators indicated that they had been uneasy proceeding with the heatup, but none indicating that the operators raised concerns to OCC managers.
I 'm not going to again go through the emails and discussions that may be pertinent to this regard, but they are identified and discussed in TVA's written response to Apparent Violation 8, and I discussed them yesterday with you in connection to Apparent Violation 9.
I'll now turn to the allegations against Mr.l(b)(?)(C)
I-Based on his PEC statements, Mr.1(b)(?)(C) does not recall being aware on January the 6th, 2016 of operators having raised concerns to the OCC prior to the RHR event.
His recollection is consistent with his testimony during his December 18, 2015 interview by the NRC where Mr,l(b)(7)(C) I stated that no one came to him with concerns and that he does not know, quote,
what they did in the OCC in terms of challenges, end quote.
Additional quotes from Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) interviews have been provided to you in TVA's written response to Apparent Violation 8.
Further, TVA has not found that Mr, l(b)(?)(C) I was aware on January 6, 2016 that operators had raised questions or concerns (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 19 with OCC managers.
First, none of the NRC transcripts or TVA OI G interview summaries provided to TVA show that Mr.
l(b
)(7)(C) I was aware on November 11,
2015 of MCR operators having raised concerns.
Second, TVA is not aware of Mrl(b)(?)(C) subsequently learning on or before January 6,
2016 that operators had raised any concerns to the OCC prior to the RHR event.
While Mr !(b)(?)(C) lis described in TVA OI G interview summaries as having recalled briefing Mr.
~l(b_)_(7_)(_c_) _~l on November 11 about the plan to proceed with a
slow, controlled heat up,
- which, by the way, is consistent with Mr l(b)(?)(C)
I testimony in his Dec-ember 18, 2015 NRC interview, there is no suggestion in these interview summaries that Mr.l(b)(?)(C) I relayed MCR operators' questions or concerns to Mr.,(b)(?)(C)
Mr.
Sprinkle,
the occ operations representative, is also described in TVA OIG interview s ummaries as having recalled a briefing on November 11 attended by Mr, l(b)(?)(C)
~ but the report expr-essly states t hat Mr.
Sprinkle d i d not,
and I
quote,
specifically tell the OCC staff that he was uncomfortable with heating up using the excess l etdown, nor did he tell them that Johnson was (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 20 uncomfortable.
Again, whil e Mr. l(b)(7)(C) may have been briefed on November 11, 2015 of the plan to proceed with a slow, controlled heatup, the evidence available does not suggest that Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I was aware on November 11 or on January 6, 2016 that operators had raised a n y concerns to the OCC prior to the RHR event.
As for the allegations made against Mr.
(b)(?)(C)
TVA has not found that Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I was aware on January 6, 20 16 that operators had raised concerns on November 11, 2015.
Based on his PEC testimony, Mr.l(b)(?)(C) lctoes not recall being aware on January 6, 2016 that operators had raised concerns to the OCC prior to the RHR event.
As further discussed in TVA' s written response to Apparent Violation 8, none of the NRC transcripts or TVA OIG interview summaries provided to TVA support the allegation that operator concerns were commun icated to Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I o n November 11, 2015, or that he subsequently learned on or before January 5,
2016 that operators had raised any concerns to the OCC prior to or during the RHR event.
To summarize t hese points,
the NRC's a llegations of deliberate misconduct presume and infer (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 that the accused individuals were aware of information and knew it to be material to the NRC's investigation, but that is not a reasonable assumption because the individuals were, as of January 6, 2016, apparently unaware either of any concerns having been raised with OCC managers or any reason why that might be material, and allegations of deliberate misconduct requiring by the NRC itself a nearly criminal standard should never be based on presumption and inference.
I will now move onto whether the participants in the January 6 meeting should have recognized some need to disclose any awareness of improper OCC involvement in the decision to move forward with the heatup.
The participants of the J anuary 6 meeting were not aware of any OCC impropriety causing the RHR event, and therefore would have not recognized a need to discuss OCC involvement even if the backup slide had been presented.
Thus, the OCC was involved in planning, scheduling, and supporting the heat up is obvious and expected.
As I explained earlier, the purpose of the OCC is to support the plant in moving safely and efficiently through the outage.
wrong with that.
There is nothing (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22 Any theory that participants should have interjected and identified OCC involvement as the cause of the event necessarily requires that the accused individuals knew that something about how the OCC' s involvement in decision making had been improper and contributed to the RHR event, otherwise, there could be nothing to tell the NRC.
But the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support such an implication.
- Rather, the evidence shows that the accused individuals did not perceive on January 6, 2016 that anyone in the OCC had overstepped their bounds, directed Mr. Johnson to proceed, or overrode any communicated concerns.
I ndeed, as I have just discussed, other than Mr. l(b)(7)(C) awareness of questions that he perceived as normal and having been addressed, the participants in the January 6 meeting had no apparent awareness that operators had even raised concerns in the control room.
To the extent the allegation against Misters l(b)(?)(C)
I, l(b )(7)(C) I, l(b ){7)(C) I, an~ (b )(7)(C) I is that they failed to explain to the NRC how mistakes by OCC personnel on November 11, 2015 had contributed to the RHR event, that connection was not yet understood on (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 23 January 6, 2016.
In the absence of an appar ent cause analysis or root cause analysis on January 6, TVA did not have the benefit of the investigation or analysis that was required to appreciate the role the OCC played in the RHR event.
I' 11 again discuss each accused indi victual separately with regard to this allegation.
With respect to Mr. l(b)(7)(C) I and as previously discussed in connection wi th TVA ' s response to Apparent Violati on 9,
TVA does not believe that Mr. l{b)(?)(C)
I learned through emails or in-person discussions with operators that the decision to move forward might have come from the OCC as is alleged in the factual summary.
When Mr.l(b)(?)(C)
!returned to the site for the night shift on the evening of November 11, 2015, he recalls that none of the operators indicated to him that they had been directed to proceed with the heatup on excess letdown over their objections.
Specific quotes from Mr.
~l(b_)_(7_)(_C_) __
~
interview with the NRC on December 18, 2015 which touch on this s ubject have been provided to you in TVA ' s written response to Apparent Violation 8.
As Mr. l(b)(7)(C) I explained in his PEC statement, he would have been a l armed if he had (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 learned that MCR operators did not want to proceed with a n evolution, but were made to do it.
To the extent the NRC is alleging that Mr.
~l(b_)_(7_)(_C_) _~l 1earned that the occ, not the shift manager,
made the dec i sion to move forward, TVA has not found evidence to support that allegation.
Mr_,(b)(7)(C)
I will now go through the materials that I may have seen prior to January 6, 2016 because they are laid ou t and discussed in TVA' s written response to Apparent Vi o l at i on 8.
Suffice it to say that none of the emails or in-person discussions indicated to Mr. l(b)(7)(C) that the shift manager had been inappropriately displaced as the ultimate decision maker.
The OCC personnel were making p l anning and scheduling decisions with input from various managers, i nclud i ng Mr. Sprinkl e' s discussions wi th Mr. Johnson.
That is an OCC function.
Mr. Johnson, as shift manager, had the responsibility in the control room to make the actual decision whether the startup sequences could and should proceed.
As Mr. l(b)(7)(C) explained in his PEC statement, he knew both Mr. Sprinkle and Mr. Johnson were senior reactor operators,
and he would have (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 expected them to faithfully discharge 25 their obligations as l icensees.
He had no reason to believe that the OCC had infringed on the shift manager's prerogative to control operation of the plant.
Moreover, he would have expected both Mr. Sprinkle and Mr. Johnson to come to him directly with any concerns if the responsibility and authority of the licensed operators had been compromised.
Absent a dir ect statement from either senior reactor operator that something so troubling had occurred, he had no reason to assume that anything improper had occurred.
I' 11 turn now to the allegations made against Mr. l(b)(?)(C) 1-Mr. l(b)(?)(C) was aware of OCC involvement in planning and scheduling on November 11, 2015, but insofar as TVA can determine, he also did not perceive the OCC' s involvement as overstepping its bounds or as directing the MCR to proceed.
As reflected in TVA OIG interview summaries,
Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I believed that the OCC was p ush ing to move forward, but, as I quote, did not feel that there was any abnormal pushing to heatup in order to remain on schedule.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 reflect Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) consistent view that the decisi on to proceed was Mr. Johns on 's dec i sion as the shift manager.
For example, the summary of the TVA OIG's June 2016 interview says, and I quote again, it was clear to l(b)(?)(C) I that day that the decision was made by Johnson, who was the shift manager.
Additional quotes from Mr. 1_(b_)_(7_)_(c_) ___ I OI G interviews have been provided to you in TVA ' s writ ten response to Apparent Vi olation 8.
The factual summary for this apparent violation also alleges that Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I was dir-ectly involved in a discussion with Mr. Johnson on November 11 in which Mr. l(b)(7)(C) I wanted Mr. Johnson to increase the heatup rate, but that Mr.
Johnson expressed concerns and indicated that he did not want to proceed.
As TVA explained in response to its earlier discussion of Apparent Violation 4, TVA has not substantiated the NRC ' s unsourced allegation which presumably relates to information obtained by the root cause anal ys i s team from an a uxiliary operator.
Because this allegation was already discussed in detail,
I will not repeat that discussion, but it is addressed in TVA ' s written (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 27 response to Apparent Violation 8.
As we discussed yesterday, it seems inconceivable that if the heatup had occurred because Mr.l(b)(?)(C) I
.... ___ ___, directed or coerced Mr. Johnson into doi ng so, that Mr. Johnson woul d not have said so in his 2016 interviews when he was laying his actions off on the OCC and Watts Bar senior management, and even today in a statement that he submitted to the NRC, Mr.
Johnson makes no mention of Mr. l(b)(?)(C)
~
Based on Mr fb)(?)(C) recollection, his interaction with Mr. Johnson was certainly within appropriate bounds for members of the operations department to discuss whether and how to proceed with an evolution.
Mr.l(b)(?)(C) I has acknowl edged i n i ntervi ews that he had some healthy challenges with Mr. Johnson, but he has stated both i n his TVA OI G i nterviews and in his PEC testimony that he did not direct or coerce Mr.
Johnson,
and that he understood from his discussions that Mr. Johnson was prepared to move forward.
Rel evant quotes f r om Mr. l(b)(?)(C)
OI G interviews have been provided to you in TVA's written response t o Apparent Violation 8.
(202) 234*4433 Further, Mr.1(b)(?)(C) l was not a member of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 the OCC, and in the numerous interviews conducted by TVA OIG and in his statement responding to Apparent Violation 9,
Mr.
Johnson never identified any discussion with Mr. r bXn~)
~ but confirmed that any such conversations were not coercive.
I' 11 turn now to the allegations made against Mr....
l(b_)_(7_)(_c)_..... I and Mr. (b)(?)(C).
As senior plant managers, Mr, l(b)(?)(C) I and Mr. (b)(?)(C) would have been aware of the OCC's functions.
The evidence does not, however, show that either was aware of any OCC impropriety causing the events of November 11, or that either Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I or Mr. (b)(?)(C) directed the decision to proceed with the heatup.
I t seems that Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I d M l(b)(?)
~ an
- r. ~cc~).___,
were likely briefed on the plan to heatup, but there is no indication of which we are aware that they directed it or had told anybody else to direct it, and there is no indication that either Mr. 1(b)(?)(C) I or Mr.
(b)(?)(C) recognized that the continued heatup might result in an undesirable rise in the pressurizer level.
The evidence I have laid out today does not show that Mistersl(b)(?)(C)
I, l(b)(?)(C) I, l(b)(?)(C)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 29 omissions during the NRC management meeting on January 6, 2016.
I n any event, the alleged omissions really are all predi cated on the, quote, insight s, listed on a backup sli de allegedly having been mischaracterized by the NRC as the, quote, cause, of the events of November 11,
2015, that operator concerns and OCC involvement should have been disclosed to make a discussion of cause complet e.
Whil e TVA sees no evidence t hat the s lide was presented, or even if presented, that TVA s,enior management characterized the bullet points on i ns ights as reflecting the causes of the event, neither of which is s upported by the evidence available to TVA, basing this apparent violati on entirel y on such an alleged mischaracterization at an NRC management meeting is inappropriat e and wrong.
The NRC has alleged not only that TVA's statements at the January 6 meetings were incomplete, but that t hey were deliberately incomplete.
As previously discussed, the NRC set a high bar for allegations of deliberate misconduct, and correctly so.
Accusing l icensee's employees of del iberate omissions at an informal oral presentation (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 30 would only serve to chill communications with the NRC.
I n this
- regard, a s d i s cussed in detail in TVA ' s written response to Apparent Violation 8, the January 6 meeting was an NRC management visit to a licensee faci l ity similar to a n informal drop-in meeting.
As the NRC ' s Management Directive 3. 5 Handbook explains,
and I quote,
NRC ' s staff and management from regional and headquarter's offices visit a facility for various purposes, including, but not limited to tours to enhance familiarity with the facility or operational events discussion of plant issues,
and informal assessment of lic-ensee performance and monitoring, or assessing the performance of NRC's subordinates.
Further,
in expl aining why drop-in meetings or similar management meetings with senior managers at the region in which their facility is located need not be open to the public, the handbook states, and again I quote, these visits should be limited to a general exchange of information not directly related to any regulatory action or decision.
I ssua nce of a meeti ng notice or summary may limit the frank exchange of information and dissuade future communications.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 31 that the January 6 meeting was an informal meeting to further a frank exchange of information and was not and should not be construed as one intended to influence any regulatory action or decision.
According to the accused individuals, none was prepared to or intended to speak to the causation of the November 11, 2015 events, an issue that TVA had not yet investigated, but had initiated an apparent cause analysis just the day before on January 5.
I t is thus unfair to accuse them of intentionally, knowingly omitting to mention facts that were only later understood to be significant in light of formal causal analyses.
Additionally, in the context of 10 CFR 50.9, the NRC has recognized that it is prudent to apply a different standard to oral communications than to written communications.
Indeed, the NRC stated that, and I quote,
the Commission recognizes that oral information may in some situations be inherently less reliable than written submittals because of the absence of an opportunity for reflection and management review.
Accordingly, even if the backup slide was presented to the NRC, contrary to all of the evidence,
and even if the insights on the slide were somehow (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 32 characterized during the discussion as the cause of the event, also contrary to all of the evidence and which seems extremely
- dubious, charging four individuals with deliberate misconduct all predicated on a bullet on that slide being mischaracterized is inconsistent with the deliberate misconduct rule.
The slide itself,
if it was indeed presented, was clearly labeled as providing insights, not causes.
There appears to have been universal recognition at the meeting that TVA had not yet identified the causes of the RHR event, and there is no evidence of which TVA is aware that would lead TVA to conclude that any of its employees deliberately withheld information from the NRC on January 6, 2016.
This concludes TVA' s presentation relating to Apparen t Violation 8, and I will now turn it over to my colleague, Monica Hernandez, to discuss Apparent Violations 10 and 11,
which do share some commonalities with Apparent Violation 8.
Thank you.
MS. HERNANDEZ:
Thank you, Tom.
Apparent Violations 10 and 11 are premised on information in TVA ' s Level II Corrective Action Program evaluation, also referred to as the apparent cause analysis or ACA for short, being allegedly incomplete and inaccurate.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 33 I will first discuss Apparent Violation 10 which TVA denies.
I will explai n TVA ' s pos ition that the ACA report was complete and accurate in all material respects when submitted, and that it accurately reported the conclusions that the ACA team had reached based on the information TVA had collected as of the time the report was completed.
Next, I will explain that as a result of this investigation, the ACA team learned that there appeared to be a causal production over safety issue and thus recommended a full root cause analysis or RCA for short.
As such, it is not reasonable to view the ACA report as incomplete or inaccurate simply because there were issues that it did not reach which were issues the RCA was expected to examine.
Lastly, I will discuss why the evidence does not support an allegation that the two TVA employees accused of deliberate misconduct, Mr ~(b)(?)(C) I and Mr.l(b)(?)(C) I, intentionally submitted information that was incomplete or inaccurate.
Let me tur n to the fi r st point, that the ACA report was complete and accurate in all material respects when submitted.
First, the ACA report was not i ncomplete or i naccurate as the NRC alleges in (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 34 failing to state that the MCR operators raised concerns with the OCC staff regarding removing RHR from service and continuing the heatup using only excess letdown.
The ACA report explicitly states, and I quote, interviews with OCC personnel indicated that the s hift's concerns with securing RHR and commencing the heatup on excess letdown were not communicated effectively beyond the OCC ops representative, end quote.
That statement in the report discloses that t here were shift concerns and t hat they were communicated to the OCC operations representative.
This statement not only accurately reflects the information that was gathered by the ACA team, but also appears supported by the weight of the evidence.
In this r egard, the shift manager, Mr.
Johnson, prepared a written statement on January 15,
2016 which states,
- quote, I didn't have concrete evidence or OE that excess letdown would not be able to maintain pressurizer level,
so I didn ' t feel comfortable pushing back on the senior managers i n the OCC, and refusing to raise RCS temp any more until normal letdown was back.
I did have several conversations with Bill Sprinkle, ops rep in the OCC,
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 35 and voiced my concern, end quote.
This statement did not refer to any concerns raised either than by Mr. Johnson to Mr.
Sprinkle, and it indicates that Mr. Johnson was not comfortable pushing back due to a lack of concrete evidence or operating expense that excess letdown would not be able to maintain pressurizer level.
Most of the interviews with Mr. Johnson by the ACA team do not appear to make any further mention of operators raising concerns or having any specific communications with the OCC or management regarding the heatup.
A copy of the ACA team's interview notes have been provided to you as Exhibit 3 2 on TVA' s written response to the apparent violations.
Statements from the unit supervisor, Mr.
l(b )(7)(C) and operator at the
- controls, Mr.
Blankenship, indicate that concerns were communicated to Mr. Johnson, but also indicate that they were unaware of what Mr. Johnson actually said to the OCC.
These statements have also been provided to you as Exhibits 33 and 32 respectively.
In addition, the ACA team's notes of its interview with Mr. Sprinkle do not reflect his having communicated Mr. Johnson's concerns or other members (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 36 of the OCC, excuse me, do not reflect his having communicated Mr. Johnson's concerns to other members of the OCC or senior management.
Rather, those notes state that the decision to continue with the heatup was, quote, a decision of ops, end quote.
The ACA team's understanding that Mr.
Sprinkle did not communicate Mr. Johnson 's concerns to other members of the OCC is consistent with a statement that Mr. Sprinkle provided to the TVA OIG shortly after the ACA report was finalized.
The TVA OIG interview summary of Mr.
Sprinkle states on the morning of November 11, 2015, Mr. Sprinkle met with the OCC staff, but then at that meeting, quote, Mr. Sprinkle did not specifically tell the OCC staff that he was uncomfortable with heating up using the excess letdown, nor did he tell them that Johnson was uncomfortable, end quote.
The summary also states that, quote, in hindsight, Sprinkle wishes he had done a better job expressing his and Johnson ' s concerns, end quote.
Additionally, the ACA team interviewed the
~l(b_)(_?)_(c_J ____________ ___,I' who had been on duty during the day shift on November 11. The team's notes of that interview do not reflect that Mr.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 37 concerns.
Again, these notes have been provided to you as Exhibit 32.
Reflecting what the ACA team had learned from Mr. Sprinkle and Mr.
(b)(7)(C) the ACA r -eport accurately stated that interviews with OCC personnel indicated that the shift ' s concerns with continuing with the heatup on only excess letdown were not communicated effectively beyond the OCC office representative, Mr. Sprinkle.
Again, this stat-ement acknowledges that shift concerns were communicated to the OCC operations representative.
Further, as Mr. Hill discussed in response to Apparent Violation 8, TVA has not identified evidence leading to the conclusion that MCR operators raised concerns with other members of the OCC staff.
Summaries of interviews by TVA OIG of the l(b )(7)(C)
I, Mr. l(b)(7)(C) I, do show that Mr.
l(b )(7)(C)
I, who was not a member of the occ, had discussions with Mr. Johnson and MCR operators on November 11, 2015, but those interview summaries do not indicate that Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) communicated any operator concerns to the OCC.
As Mr. Hill also discussed, TVA has not identified evidence leading to the conclusion that operator concerns were communi cated to the l(b)(?)(C) I (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 38 l(b)(?)(C)
~ Mrl(b)(?)(C)
I, or.....
l(b-)(7-)(_c) _______ I, Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) I on Novembe r 11, 2015.
On balance, information collected through the ACA team's investigation and interviews s upport the ACA report ' s findings that there was ineffective communication of any concerns to the OCC beyond Mr.
Sprinkle, and thus, that the OCC, other than Mr.
Sprinkle, was unaware of MCR operator concerns.
Accordingly, the ACA report did not state that operators raised concerns with the OCC staff beyond Mr. Sprinkle because that went against the team ' s findings.
To state otherwise would have made the ACA report inaccurate.
Second, the ACA report was not incomplete or inaccurate as the NRC a l leges in failing to state that the OCC was involved in discussions and decision making on November 11, and influenced the MCR staff to proceed with the heatup.
The ACA team was presented with no evidence that led them to conclude that OCC personnel directed the MCR staff to proceed with the heatup on onl y excess l e t down or that the l evel of OCC involvement in scheduling or operations discussion was abnormal or inappropriate.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 39 with TVA ' s understanding.
That is of January 21,
2016, the date t he ACA report was finalized, TVA management had no apparent appreciation that OCC involvement caused or contributed to the decision making of the MCR staff on November 11.
As Mr. Hill discussed in response to Apparent Violation 8, while there was awareness that the plan to proceed with a slow, controlled heat up had been discussed and briefed in the OCC and was reported, there does not appear to have been any recognition that the OCC ' s involvement was unusual, or that the OCC had directed Mr. Johnson to proceed, or overridden any communicated concerns.
Indeed, as I explained, the OCC, other than Mr. Sprinkle, appears to have had no apparent awareness that operators had raised concerns.
The notes of t he ACA team ' s interviews do not reflect Mr. Johnson identifying anyone directing him to proceed.
- Instead, the notes reflect Mr.
Johnson explaining that he acted out of fear of retaliation, which the ACA team included in the repor t, and which prompted in part the recommendati on to perform a full root cause evaluation.
Further, Mr. Johnson's January 15, 2016 written statement onl y i dentifi ed discussions with Mr.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 40 Sprinkle,
and included no statement that he was directed by Mr.
Sprinkle or anyone else.
Mr.
Johnson ' s written statement has been provided to you as Exhibit 68.
The ACA team ' s notes from the interview of Mr. Sprinkle also do not indicate that he gave any direction to Mr. Johnson.
Instead, as I previously stated, the notes say, quote, this was a decision by ops, end quote.
The statements Mr. Sprinkle gave during his December 18, 2015 interview with the NRC also reflect mutual agreement to proceed with the heatup and not direction by the OCC.
Relevant quotes from Mr. Sprinkle ' s interview have been provided to you in TVA's written response to Apparent Violation 10.
As I stated earlier, the ACA team also interviewed Mr. Hough, the OCC manager, but notes of that interview also do not reflect any directions from the OCC.
Indeed, shortly after the ACA was issued, Mr. Johnson corroborated having received no direction from the OCC.
Notes of an interview by the RCA team of Mr. Johnson on February 11, 2016 state that, quote, the interviewee indicated that there were discussions with the OCC ops rep.
The interviewee also indicated (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 41 that there was no discussion with any OCC management dir e c t l y either in t he OCC or in the MCR, end quote.
Further, when asked whether he had talked to any senior management before the decis i on was made to proceed, Mr. J ohnson said no.
Moreover,
as explained in response to Apparent Violations 4 and 8, TVA has not found any evidence to substantiate the allegation that the OCC or senior management directed Mr. Johnson to proceed, recognized that there had been any objections, or understood that the action was non-conservative.
TVA has not found any evidence suggesting that the OCC overstepped its bounds or directed the MCR to proceed.
I n
- sum, i n the absence of any determination of a degraded work environment which had not yet been i nvestigated, the ACA team viewed the decision to proceed with the heatup on only excess let down as properl y residing wit h Mr. Johnson and attri buted to h im the responsibility for not having objected to it.
Neither the ACA team no r Mistersl(b)(?)(C) I, l
(b )(?)(C) I (b )(?)(C)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 42 reserved to the licensed operators to move the plan.
The ACA team's view was als o t hat while it is the OCC ' s job to encourage operators to adhere to the schedule,
the responsibility to validate assumptions and informati on lies with the MCR.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the ACA report ' s conclusions fault s the OCC ' s staff for not recognizing or challenging the non-conservative decision to continue heatup on excess l etdown.
The ACA report also states that risks were not properly evaluated and managed by the MCR or the occ.
Accordingly, although the ACA report did not come to the ultimate conclusion that the RCA did after further i nvestigati on and review, the ACA report certainly did not exonerate the OCC.
Moving onto my second poi nt, it appears that Apparent Violation 10 faults the ACA for not reflecting determinations made by the RCA,
determinations that had not been made when the ACA was finalized.
The NRC should not fault the ACA report for not looking deeply into the safety culture aspects that may have impacted the events of November 11, 2015 because that was not the ACA ' s i ntent and because the (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 43 ACA team responsibly and correctly recognized that a f ull root cause analysis was needed.
Early in the ACA investigation, the team learned that Mr. Johnson feared retaliation, which may have influenced his decision to p r oceed with the heatup on only excess letdown.
Specifically, as documented in the ACA report, the team found that, quote, shift manager felt uncomfortable not proceeding based on concerns with reprisal.
While instances were referenced in the interview with t he SM related to punitive measures taken against personnel within the operations organization related to job performance deficiencies,
intervi ews with other shift managers did not indicate similar fear of reprisal for stopping activities due to concerns for nuclear safety, end quote.
The ACA team also received feedback on the report by the l(b)(7)(C) l (b)(7)(C)
I
.... ________________________ __,' which recommends that there was a production over safety i ssue.
Mr. ~l(b-)(-7)-(C_) __ _,l letter has been provided to you as Exhibit 70.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 44 ACA recommended a full root cause analysis.
In fact, the RCA report states, quote, the team that performed the Level II evaluation provided the recommendation that a root cause analysis should be performed to determine the root causes of the event and to develop corrective actions to preclude repetition, end quote.
The RCA also
- states, quote, the recommendation from that effort was that a root cause evaluation should be performed to fully understand the breakdowns that occurred at Watts Bar that preceded the shift manager's decision to remove RHR from service with a plan in an abnormal alignment, end quote.
Again, the ACA was intended to focu s on the immediate cause of the November 11, 2015 events and to gather information quickly, not to dig deeply into the root cause.
Accordingly, the ACA report was complete and accurate in reporting its findings and conclusions and covered the subject matters it was intended to examine.
It is not reasonable to view the ACA report as incomplete or inaccurate simply because there were issues that it did not reach, especially when i t expressly recommended that these i ssues need (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 45 to be addressed further.
Rather, the ACA must be viewed as a r -esult of the review with the level of effort appropriate with that expected or an apparent cause evaluat i on,
and identifies apparen t and contributing causes, not root causes of events.
The ACA must also be viewed as a result of the review that identified what was apparent to the team at the time, and specif ically recommended f u rther inquiry as was communicated to the NRC.
Furthermore,
in promulgating 10 CFR Section 50. 9, the Commission emphasized that being forthright in communications is essential if the NRC is to fulfill its responsibilities.
However, appl ying Secti on 50. 9 to apparent cause analysis, you will have the chilling effect of disincentivizing licensee personnel involved in such analysis from expressing their perceptions or of apparent and contributing causes out of fear of being accused of providing allegedl y incomplete or inaccurate information if a later, more thorough analysis comes to a different conclusion or if an NRC reviewer has different opinions.
As for my l ast point,
the evidence provi ded shows that the two TVA empl oyees involved, (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 mm'n7 d
(b)(7)(C)
Mr.~
an Mr. ____,
46 did not intentionally submit information to TVA t hat was incomplete or inaccurate.
After initiating the ACA review on January 12, 2016, the ACA team spent the weekend looking into the events of November 11.
In l(b)(?)(C)
I, Mf b)(7)(C) r ma i led Mrl(b)(7)(C) and Mr j(b)(7)(C) stating, quote, I I a copy of the draft ACA r -eport (b)(?)(C) end quote.
This email was not sent for an improper means, but rather because the ACA team had been working all weekend on the evaluation which was still a work in progress, and Mr!(b)(7)(C)~anted to ensure that the team was getting to the bottom of the November 11 events.
As Mr ~(b)(?)(C) I explained during his PEC testimony, he also wanted to get Mr l(b)(7)(C) I and Mr.
l (b )(7)(C)
I
~-_____ i nput on the draft report as they were very experienced senior managers and he was interested in their views whether the ACA was adequately responding to the NRC staff's concerns.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 47 Moreover, at that time, Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I was
~ thus it would have been reasonable for Mr!~~~(?) Ito believe that Mr l(b )(7)(C) lwould have to ultimately approve the ACA report.
As such, it seems appropriate that Mr!~~)57) I would seek input from senior leadership, especially from the chair of the approving committee.
The following day, on Monday, January 18, 2016, Mrj(b)(?)(C)~ent another email to Mr l(b)(7)(C) land Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) I attaching an updated draft of the ACA report and stating, review culture aspects.
In response, Mrl(b)(7)(C) !quoted a section of the draft report which referenced discussion X.11 of the culture aspect ' s section of the ACA report.
This secti on of the report was changed between the draft and the final.
The next slide of today's presentation shows Mr l(b)(?)(C) proposed language and the language of discussion X. 11 resulting after Mr.1(b)(?)(C) proposal.
As you can see,
Mrl(b)(7)(C) proposed l anguage was not adopted in the final draft, and the red lines showing changes between the drafts has also been provided to you in TVA' s written response to Apparent Violation 10.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Based on TVA ' s investigation,
48 TVA understands t hat this change was proposed i n order t o make discussion X.11 consistent with the discussion of safety conscious work environment which states t hat the shift ' s concerns were not communicated effectively beyond the OCC ops representative.
Specifically, TVA understands t he decision had been made to remove reference to the OCC as making decisions related to plant operations because it was the ACA team ' s correct under standing that operational decisions are reserved for the MCR, not the OCC.
Since the MCR operat ors were the only ones with the authority to make decisions related to controlling the plant, M~(b)(7)(C) ~elieved the ACA should reflect t hat reality. Accordingly, Mr (b)(?)(C) esponded to M~(b)(?)(C) email by telling him that he had a l ready made the change.
As
- such, Mr ~(b)(7)(C)
! response actually reflects that Mrl{b)(?)(C) lhad effectuated no changes in the final ACA report.
A copy of Mr l(b)(?)(C) lemail was provided to you as Exhibit 74.
Moreover, as you can see on this sli de,
the changes made to discussion X.11 did not limit that discussion to the control room.
Rat her, the discussion was changed to state that underlying (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 49 assumptions were not chall enged without attributing this failure to either the MCR or the OCC.
I mportantly, what the draft version and the final version of discussion X.11 refer the reader to H.11, which remained unchanged between versions and clearly places responsibilit ies on both the MCR and the OCC.
MS. HERNANDEZ:
H.11 states quote, when associated with performing 1-SI-0905 with the plant access s l ide down in Mode 4, were not properl y validated and managed by the main control room or OCC, end quote.
That statement was also included in the body of the ACA report.
The ACA team made other changes in the report to align with the team's understanding.
But, the OCC does not have decision making capabilities when it comes to operating the plant.
That t he NCR operators are the individuals required to validate their assumpt i ons a nd information.
That validation of assumptions and information occurs in the MCR and not in the OCC.
And to accurately assure that the OCC was extricated with fault.
Those changes are discussed in detail in TVA's response to Apparent Violation 10.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 50 Thus, while the ACA report actuated the decision making to the MCR because that was the responsibility of the licensed operators, it fell to the OCC staff for not only failing to recognize and challenge the lack of assertive decision making, but also for not properly evaluating and managing the risk associated with performing 1-SI-0905 with plant access slide down in Mode 4.
To summarize this point, Mrl(b)(?)(C) land Mr.
(b )(?)(C) provided comments to the draft ACA report, because they believed as drafted, an original statement conflicted with another statement in the stakeholder aspect of the report.
Their comments were also meant to align the ACA with the team's conclusions.
As such, it was the intent of both Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) I and M (b)(?)(C) to make the ACA report as complete and accurate as possible, not the opposite.
And their comments certainly did not absolve the OCC of responsibility.
I n any event, any alleged incomplete or inaccurate statement made in the ACA r -eport attributable to M~(b)(?)(C) pr Mr l(b)(?)(C)
!would have been an honest mistake, based on their understanding at the time the ACA report was written.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 51 a high bar for allegations of deliberate misconduct.
TVA has not seen a ny evidence that M (b)(?)(C) or Mr.
(b)(?)(C) were aware that during the events of November 11 MCR operator concerns regarding continuing to heat up with only access s lide down were effectively communicated to the OCC beyond Mr. Sprinkle as the ACA report d isclosed.
Or that the OCC directed the MCR operators to proceed with the heat up.
Additionally, TVA has not seen any evidence that M~(b)(?)(C) lor Mrl(b)(?)(C)
!bel ieved that the OCC can make operational decisions.
Or that the OCC could override a shift manager ' s decision making responsibility.
As such, TVA sees no basis to conclude that Mr {b)(?)(C) r Mr,l(b)(?)(C) I deliberately submitted incomplete or inaccurate information to TVA.
I will now move onto Apparent Viol at i on 11.
In Apparent Violation 11, the NRC alleges that during a February 2,
2016 non-public drop-in meeti ng with NRC managers, TVA management presented a slide addressing the ACA for the November 11, 2015 events.
This slide contains statements that the NRC acknowledges are consistent with statements in the fina l ACA report.
In other words, the apparent --
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 52 Apparent Violation 11 is redundant to Apparent Vi olati on 10.
I t asserts that the slide regarding the results of the apparent cause of the November 11 events was incomplete and i naccurate for the exact same reasons that the NRC alleges with respect to Apparent Violation 10.
The NRC does not allege any difference in the state of TVA's knowledge bet ween the issuance of the ACA r eport on January 21, 2016 and the February 2,
2016 meeting.
TVA respectfully submits in citing TVA for a second allegedly willful violation because of presentation slide, repeated conclusions in the ACA report is unwarranted.
Because Apparen t Violati on 11 is redundant with Apparent Violation 10, I will not repeat my statements from Apparent Violation 10.
But I will summarize some points.
First,
for the reasons I
discuss in response with Apparent Violation 10, the ACA report was not incomplete or inaccurate. The report not only accuratel y reflects the information that was gathered by the ACA team, but it was supported by the weight of the evidence.
Accordi ngly, the parti c i pants at a J anuary (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2016 drop - in meeting,
including Mr.1~~;7) I, Mr.
l(b
)(7)(C) I and Mr (b)(?)(C)
, had no basis to state that MCR operators raised concerns with the OCC staff either at the meeting or thereafter.
Second, for the reasons I discussed in response to Apparent Violat ion 10, the ACA report reflected the ACA team's ultimate findings regarding what they believed at the time the report was made, were the apparent and contributing causes for the November 11, 2015 events.
Thus, the changes that were made to the ACA report during its drafting, were made to align the report with the ACA teams '
understanding of the events.
Accordingly, the presenters at the February 2 meeting had no reason to discuss changes that had been made in drafting.
Additionally, it bears repeating that the ACA did not absolve the OCC from responsibility.
In discussing the safety filter aspects, it specifically stated that quote, risk associated with performing l-SI-0905 with the plant access slide down in Mode 4,
were not properly evaluated and managed by the main control room or OCC, end quote.
Third, as I previously discussed, the ACA team recognized that there were further issues to (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 54 examine, including the shift manager's disclosure that he had acted out of fear of retaliation, and therefore recommended a full group cross evaluation.
As can be seen on the next slide, which is a slide at issue in Apparent Violation 11, during the February 2, 2016 drop - in meeting,
TVA personnel explicitly informed the NRC that TVA was conducting an RCA to further understand the event of November 11, 2015.
This slide states quote, apparent cost analysis complete.
Root cost in progress, end quote.
In fact,
the following slide of the February 2 presentation, which is also the second slide of today's presentation, states other actions taken or in progress quote, initiated root cost analysis to validate other factors associated with decision making and critical thinking, including extent of cost and condition, end quote.
As such, the NRC knew at the February 2,
2016 meeting that TVA had not yet reached final determinations as to the causes of the November 11, 2015 events.
For these reasons it is unreasonable for the NRC to view the February 2,
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 issues that the ACA did not reach, issues that would be f urther analyzed in a forthcoming RCA.
It is particularl y unreasonable to do so based on a drop-in meeting that was presented, that was presenting only a high level summary of the ACA.
I would also like to point out that the February 2, 2016 non-public drop-in meeting was an informal meeting with NRC management.
And as the NRC's management directive3.5 pamphlet explains senior executives of a licensee may request the opportunity to have a drop-in visit or similar management meetings with the EDO or with other senior managers at agency headquarters.
- Further, in explaining why drop-in meetings for senior managers at the agency headquarters may not be open to the public, the Handbook states quote, these visits should be limited to a general exchange of information not directly related to any regulatory action or decision.
I ssuance of a meeting notice or summary, be limited to a frank exchange of information and dissuade future communications, end quote.
Accordingly the NRC recognized, should recognize that the February 2 non-public drop-in meeting was an informal meeting to further a frank (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 56 exchange of information.
And was not, and should not be construed as one intended to advise any irregularity action or decision.
Applying 10 CFR Section 50.9 to informal discussions regarding apparent cost evaluations such as the February 2 drop-in meeting with the ACA for the events of November 11 was discussed, would have the chilling effect of incentivizing licensees from sharing views of the apparent cause of an event.
Out of concern that any mention or bullet point might not be considered sufficiently elaborate at the NRC, or out of fear that discussing the results of an apparent cause evaluation would be characterized as separate violations for the complete inaccuracy rule i n which the meeting participants are complacent if the NRC staff later disagrees with the results of the evaluation.
This can also have the chilling effect of incentivizing licensees from having future drop-in meetings and communications with the NRC, which TVA understands it is not the intent of the NRC.
That being said, I will now briefly discuss the del iberate allegations brought against Messrs J(b)(?)(C) I (b )(?)(C) and l~~r) ~
TVA does not believe that the evidence (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 57 shows that any allegedly inaccurate statement or omission by these individuals occurred during the February 2 meeting.
Specifically, TVA has not in any evidence that as of February 2, 2016 these men were aware that the events of November 11, 2015 or their subsequent communications about it involved NCR operators raising concerns to the OCC beyond Mr. Sprinkle as the ACA report disclosed about the decision to proceed with the plant heat up the only access slide down, or that the OCC directed the NCR operators to proceed with the heat up.
Thus, neither Messrs. l(b)(?)(C) I, (b)(?)(C), or
~~r) ad any evidence that led them to believe that the l evel of OCC involvement in planning, scheduling, or operations discussion was abnormal or improper.
And thus something that should have been discussed during the informal drop-in meeting on February 2.
TVA also has not seen any evidence that these men believe the OCC could have -- could make operational decisions, or that the OCC could override the shift manager's decision making responsibility.
Furthermore, it is not -- it does not seem reasonable to assume that the prior draft of the ACA report was more accurate than the final version, which (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 58 went through a formal process before being finalized.
As such, it would not have been reasonable for the accused individuals to have informed the NRC during the February 2 meeting of previous draft statements in the ACA report, which were ultimately determined to be inaccurate by the ACA team.
While a later and more thorough analysis, the RCA came to a different conclusion then the ACA, basing this Apparent Violation entirely on later findings, findings that were not yet available as of February 2, 2016 is wrong.
The NRC has alleged not only that TVA statements that the February 2, 2016 drop-in meeting were incomplete,
but that they were deliberately incomplete.
And was previously -- as was previously discussed, the NRC has set a high bar for allegations of deliberate misconduct.
Accusing licensee employees of deliberately omitting at an informal oral presentation would only serve to chill communications to the NRC.
As I've previously explained, the NRC should recognize that the February 2 non-public drop-in meeting was an informal meeting to further a frank exchange of information, and was not and should not be construed as one intended to influence any regulatory action or (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 59 decision.
According to the TVA summary notes of the February 2 meeting, which has been provided to you as Exhibit 75, the discussion regarding the ACA was only quote, a high leve l summary of the results, end quote, not a deep dive into the ACA or the RCA.
Furthermore, as we previously saw, the cite discussing the ACA explicitly stated that an RCA had been initiated quote, to evaluate other factors associated with decision making and critical thinking, including extent of cause and condition, end quote.
It is thus unfair to accuse TVA personnel of intentionally, knowingly, or knowingly omitting facts that were only later understood to be significant in light of an RCA.
The standard for deliberate omissions from informal oral presentations to the NRC -- excuse me.
If the standard for deliberate omissions from informal oral presentations to the NRC is slow enough to capture what happened at the February 2, 2016 drop-in meeting between TVA and NRC Region II management, then it is a barrier to a free and frank exchange of information between licensees and the agency.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 60 fear that in retrospect it will appear that additional information might have been understood to be relevant.
That concludes TVA ' s presentation leading to Apparent Violations 10 and 11.
I will now turn it over to Jim Barstow.
MR.
BARSTOW :
Thank you, Ms. Hernandez.
As you have heard from Mr. Hill and Ms. Hernandez, there is simply no evidence, at least that was available to TVA, indicating that TVA employees provided the NRC with inaccurate or incomplete information as alleged in Apparent Violations 8, 10, and 11, much less did they do so intentionally.
A common element among all of these apparent violations is that TVA was working earnestly to provide the NRC with up to date information on an ongoing basis as the information evolved while TVA employees conducted their reviews and obtained information over time.
They did not have all the information right away.
And in some instances, the information they had was understandably supplemented or a new perception was developed as the review progressed.
But they made sure that the NRC knew what they knew at the time they were providing information to the NRC.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 61 within a relatively short period of time while TVA was trying to understand what exactly had happened on November 11, 2015, and perhaps more importantly, how it happened.
Obviously, t he NRC wants to encourage a free flow of information on an ongoing basis.
Licensees should not be concerned that they need to withhold information from t he NRC until they have reached final and conclusive determination, out of fear that the NRC may pursue a violation for providing information that in retrospect once the investigation is complete, could potentially be construed as inaccurate or incomplete.
Further, it should be, and is indeed a high standard that must be met to show that an individual deliberately provided the NRC with incomplete or inaccurate information. This is a very serious allegation.
And in these cases, there is simply no evidence apparent to TVA that supports such allegations.
That concludes our comments on Apparent Violations 8, 10 and 11.
And I believe the agenda calls for a break now, Mr. O'Brien, if you wanted to take that agenda break.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 62 my mind exactly.
What I would like to do is take a break from now until 32 minutes after the hour if that's okay with everybody.
And we'll return then and discuss AV 12.
I s that good with you, Mr. Barstow?
MR. BARSTOW:
Yes.
It is, Mr. O'Brien.
Thank you.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Thank you.
We're off the record and will be back at 32 minutes after the hour.
(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 9: 18 a. m.
and resumed at 9:33 a.m. )
MR. 0' BRIEN: Thank you, we' re back on the record then.
Mr. Barstow, if you'd like to continue with AV l2?
MR.
BARSTOW:
Yes.
Thank you, Mr.
O'Brien.
I'd now ask Mr. Lewis to discuss Adverse Violation 12.
MR. LEWIS:
Thank you, Jim.
We will now present this. TVA denies Apparent Violation 12, which relates to information that TVA's _l(b_)_(7_)_(c_) ______
l (b )(7)(C)
I
.... ________________ _. provided through the creation of talking points and through the submission of the report of the Special Review Team, SRT for short.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 63 As I will discuss, it is evident that the talking points and questions were not incompl ete or inaccurate in any material respect.
Likewise, the evidence shows that the SRT report was not incomplete or inaccurate i n any material respect.
First, I will show that Mr 1(b)(7)(C)
!talking points stated that the NRC had come to the same critical conclusion, conclusion singular, as the NRC, that there was a degraded work environment in the operations department at Watts Bar.
That was accurate contrary to being Apparent Violation, the talking point did not refer to conclusions plural.
What is inaccurate here is the NRC' s quotation, not Mr l(b)(?)(C) I bullet point.
And the NRC's inaccurate quotat i on changes the meaning.
Second, I will explain that the report of the Employee Concerns Program, ECP for short, and the SRT report, were reasonably described as independent.
- Third, I will explain that Mr ~(b)(7)(C) informal talking points were intended to communicate that the ECP and SRT teams had completed their investi gations and had reached the same conclusion as the NRC, nothing, nothing more. This message too, was accurate.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 64 formed for the primary purpose of evaluating safety culture issues at Watts Bar and supporting s -enior leadership in addressing any safety culture issues that were identified.
I will also explain that forming the SRT reflected TVA's desire to show the NRC that i t was fully understanding and responding to those challenges, which is no different from virtually any other regulatory interaction with the NRC, and not something that would need to be or would be expected to be stated.
Lastly, I will discuss that the Apparent Violation does not raise material issues.
And that TVA has not identified any intent by Mr.l(b)(7)(C) I to deliberately provide to the NRC, deliberately provide the NRC with incomplete or inaccurate information through h is talking points or through the SRT report.
As you can see on the screen, these are the bullet points in question.
The f undamental point that Mr jCb)(?)(C) !was making in these talking points is that TVA had reached the same conclusion as the NRC, that there was a degraded work environment in the operations department at Watts Bar.
And both the ECP team and the SRT team had reached this conclusion.
I f you look at A, the NRC (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 65 conclusion there is about degraded work environment.
This message was accurate.
The SRT report, link to my - -
so, let me turn to my first point.
l (b )(7)(C)
Mr..
informal talking points communicated that TVA had come to the same conclusion as the NRC.
That there was a
degraded work environment in the operations department at Watts Bar.
Apparent Violation 2 misquotes Mr,l(b)(?)(C) point.
I talking It alleges that the....
l(b_)(?_)(_c) _______
indicated to the NRC that quote, the two reports had reached the same conclusions, plural, as those of the NRC.
When in fact, as of March 12, 2016, there were significant differences between the conclusions in the SRT report and the ECP report.
And between the SRT report and the NRC conclusions that had been conveyed to TVA on March 11, 2016, end quote.
The talking point did not refer to conclusions, plural.
I t ' s surprising that the NRC would allege that the talking points were inaccurate, and then base that allegation on an inaccurate quote.
Contrary to the Apparent Violation, Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) I talking points did not state or communicate that the ECP report and the SRT report had come to all (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 66 of the same conclusions in every regard as the NRC, or that there were no differences between the wording of the two reports.
The talking point referred only to one overarching conclusion that was the same as the NRC's, that there was a degraded work environment in the operations department at Watts Bar.
It is therefore clear from the talking points that Mr.!(b)(?)(C) I only intended to convey that TVA through the work of its ECP and SRT teams had both reached the conclusion that there was a degraded work environment consistent with the NRC, not that the reports had all reached the same conclusions in every regard as the NRC.
The ECP report and the SRT report were also reasonably described as independent.
The NRC's dispute with this characterization ascribes a meeting of independent that was neither stated nor implied.
First, as Mr!(b)(?)(C) I explained in his PEC, the ECP and SRT teams were independent. And that they were largely comprised of indi victuals external to Watts Bar Unit 1. The ECP investigation was conducted by outside consultants.
In fact, the ECP report states quote, to ensure independence the investigation was conducted by a team of two individuals external to TVA, l_(b_J(_7l_(C_J ___ _,
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I, end quote.
On its face it's described as independent.
Similarly, the members of the SRT were, with the exception of the site licensing director, external to Unit 1, with corporate personnel, a
manager from another plant and an outside consultant.
As Mrl(b)(?)(C) I stated in his PEC, from its formulation, the SRT review team was crafted as an independent effort by TVA senior leadership.
The SRT was designed to have organizational independence from site leadership, operational senior leadership, and the state employee concerns program.
The staffing of the SRT reflected this independence.
I n fact, in describing its composition, the SRT report specifically states quote,
an independent, i nterdisciplinary team was formed to evaluate the overarching question, end quote.
So, it too on its face is described as independent.
Second, while the SRT team considered the ECP report as one of its input, there was no overlap in the membership of the two teams.
Third, as Mrl(b)(?)(C) I explained during his PEC, the SRT did not in any way direct or influence the ECP report ' s findings.
There was no collusion (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 68 between the investigations.
This aspect of the Apparent Violation appears to be based on a misinterpretation that independent meant that the two reports were developed in complete isolation from each other.
- However, this was never the intended meaning of._l(b_)_(?-)(_c_) __
___.I talking points, nor would it have made sense for Mr. (b)(?)(C) to have made such an assertion given that the SRT report would describe its use of the ECP investigation report.
This brings me to my third point, that there was no material inaccuracy in stating the two reports had been completed.
The Apparent Violation seizes on the wording, the two reports had been completed in reaching the conclusion that a degraded work environment in the operations department existed.
l(b )(7)(C) I As he has explained, Mr. _____ use of the word completed in his informal talking points was intended to convey that TVA had completed the ECP investigation and the SRT investigation.
And that both teams had come to their conclusion regarding the degraded work environment.
He did not intend to convey that the reports themselves had been finalized and signed. Mr.
l(b)(?)(C) I understanding of the status of these reports, (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 69 was supported by contemporaneous correspondence.
With respect to the ECP report, the main investigation report had in fact been completed.
I t was dated March 1, 2016 and is marked as revised on March 8, 2016.
As can be seen on the screen, an email from the l (b_)(?_)(_Cl ___________________ _,
to Mr. I~~{?) Ion March 8 stated quote, attached is the final investigation report drafted by the investigation team, end quote.
As can be seen here, Mr. (b)(?)(C) also received an email message from the l~(b_)(-7)-(C_) ______ _,,
on l(b)(?)(C) I, stating attached is the final executive summary.
While there were some s ubsequent changes to mm'7n the ECP execut1 ve summary, Mr li£L_J understood when he prepared his talking points that it was complet-e.
As could be seen now on your screen, on the Of l (b)(?)(C)
I l(b)(?)(C) I evening
..... ---~ ' Mr sent an email to TVA' s....
l(b-)(7_l(_c) _______ __,I and others....
l(b-)(?_)(_c) ____ _,I l(b)(?)(C) that is described as quote, i (b)(?)(C)
~
l(b_)(?_)(_C) _________ _.I' end quote.
It is true that in that message he stated quote, in light of today ' s information from Region II regarding issuance of a chilling effect letter next week, the report will need to be revised to reflect (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 70 emphasis on some of the problem areas.
The team is reflecting on this over t he weekend, end quote.
As Mr ~
explained in his PEC while at this point he recognized some editorial changes to the report were likel y still
- needed, under no circumstances did he expect any of the subsequent editorial changes to modify the f undamental completions of that effort.
In summary, when Mr. (b)(?)(C) drafted the tal k ing points, he understood that the ECP and SRT investigations had been needed, and that they had reached their conclusions even though some editorial work on the SRT report remained, such as emphasizing important points.
I mportantly, Mr l(b)(?)(C) pnderstood that the two reports had reached the conclusion which did not change that there was a degraded work e nv i ronment in the operations department, which was the issue that he understood the NRC was interested in.
Before turning to the allegation and the purpose of the SRT report was not disclosed, let me briefl y address the allegation t hat an attempt to subsequently make the SRT report consistent with the conclusions of the ECP report and NRC changes were made to the March 11 version of the SRT report.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mrl(b )(7)(C) 71
!bullet point never said that there were no order differences between the two TVA reports. But only said that they had both reached the same conclusion as the NRC that a degraded work environmen t i n the operations department existed.
Nothing more.
So the attempt to identify differ-ences between the two reports is irrelevant to the accuracy of the bullet point.
Moreover, none of the changes alter the fundamental conclusion already reached by the SRT team that a degraded work environment in the operations department existed.
As can be seen here on this slide now, the March 1.1 version of the SRT report explicitly concluded in Sections 1 and Sections 5, and I 'm just showing Section 5 here, but the same statement is in Section 1, that there was a chilling effect of the operations department and a degraded work environment, which was consistent with the ECP report.
As discussed in detail in TVA's written response to Apparent Violation 12, those additions that the NRC points to were innocuous.
And appear to have been intended to improve the report's accuracy and clarity.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 72 NRC's allegations that the SRT report failed to acknowledge that the SRT was formed to influence the NRC not to take additional regulatory action. The NRC basis this allegation on M~ (b)(7)(C)
! proposed agenda for a
strategy session by senior leadership on February 26, 2016 before the SRT was formed.
Mrl(b)(7)(C) I however, did not form the SRT.
As he explained in his PEC, TVA's senior leadership recognized the need to have an independent r *eview which determined that employees across t h e site at Watts Bar were reluctant t o raise nuclear safety concerns, and if so, to determine the extent of the condition.
The team was also expected to develop a set of recommendations for TVA l eadership to successfully address the violation.
But even if Mr.
l(b )(7)(C) I
.... ___... agenda is attributed to the SRT, without regard to any of the intent ions of senior leadership, it would not support the alleged incompleteness of the report.
The primary objective that Mr.1(b)(7)(C) proposed was to address TVA identified challenges at Watts Bar.
That M~(b)(?)(C) ~ a,.... (b-)(-7)-(C_) _______
l(b)(?)(C)
I a lso proposed communicating those actions to the NRC in a manner that would convince the (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 73 NRC that no further regulatory action is needed, is unremarkable.
What licensee would not do this? It would always be the case as part of addressing safety culture concerns at TVA or any other licensee will seek to demonstrate to the NRC that they understand such safety culture concerns.
And that they are taking actions to address them.
Where generally it's understood that licensee efforts to address regulatory concerns should and will naturally have the effect of influencing the NRC.
It ' s implicit that when a licensee takes action to address issues, that the licensee is in part seeking to show the NRC that it ' s capable of handling the issues itself.
And it does not need further regulatory actions imposed by the NRC.
In fact, the NRC' s allegations' manual states that the NRC staff should counter balance the perceived need for the issuance of doing a reg letter for a determination as to whether the licensee is taking timely and effective remedial actions that the NRC anticipates will enhance a safety conscious work environment in a timely manner.
As a result, it was reasonable for Mr.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 74 (b)(?)(C) to expect that he did not need to explain to the NRC that TVA was seeking to avoid and have regulatory action by doing its own investigation, coming to its own conclusions,
and taking its own effective corrective action.
If the SRT report is determined to be materially incomplete by not indicating that TVA was taking actions to address identified challenges in a manner that it hoped would obviate further NRC regulatory response, then virtually every submission by a licensee to the NRC, or even any int,ernal response to a condition adverse to quality, would be materially incomplete unless it proclaims the NRC's desired response.
For example, every response to a notice of violation would be incomplete unless the response included some banner stating this response is submitted with the objective of influencing the NRC's enforcement decision.
A finding by the NRC that a submission of information to the NRC without a direct statement that it's intended to influence the NRC would set a new and ill-advised precedent.
Turning to my last point.
There is not one writ of evidence thatl(b)(?)(C) I intended to make or (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 75 cause any incomplete or inaccurate statement.
The Apparent Violati on assert s that Mr.
(b)(?)(C) was aware that the information in the talking points was incomplete and i naccurate.
But t hat assertion merely assumes that Mtj(b)(?)(C) lintended the talking points to be understood as the apparent violation now seeks to construe them.
As already discussed, the NRC's interpretation of those talking points is not reasonable.
And i ndeed in one instance is based on inaccurately quoting the talking point.
And the assumption that Mr l(b)(?)(C) li n t -ended to communicate more than the talking points indicate, is entirely unsupport ed.
Certai n l y, there i s no evidence that Mr.
(b)(?)(C) deliberately at tempted to conceal from the NRC the desire when the SRT was formed to convince the NRC that TVA was addressing the identified concerns such that f urther regulatory action would be unnecessary.
As a
nucl ear executive whose career include~-(b_)_(7_)(_c ) ______
he expected that the NRC wou ld understand this.
Moreover,
the alleged inaccuracies or omissions, even if they are viewed as s uch, are truly immaterial.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 76 after the NRC issued its chilling effect letter.
So,
any objective to convince the NRC not to do so, no longer existed.
Further,
the desire of every lic-ensee facing a degraded work environment and NRC scrutiny to address those issues in a matter to satisfy the NRC is so self-evident that admitting this, to state this could not possibly affect the NRC decision making.
Similarly, crippling over whether the talking points should have said the investigations were complete instead of the reports being complete, had no impact on the communicated message t hat TVA had determined that there was a degraded work environment in the operations department.
That the two reports were formally issued about a week later, made no difference to the message or NRC decision.
Why would they NRC have cared that the two reports were dated about a week later where both investigations had concluded that a degraded environment existed in the operations department?
Did the date on which the reports were issued make a material difference?
Obviously not.
And why would it matter if Mr. (b)(?)(C) had stated, by the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 77 As TVA has previously explained, it is appropriately -- it's an appropriately high bar that the NRC must meet to show that Mr l(b)(?)(C) r eliberately provided inaccurate information.
In applying the deliberate misconduct standards,
the NRC has not shown that Mr l(b)(?)(C) I intentionally acted i n a wrongful manner, because he did not do so.
That concludes our presentation relating to Apparent Violation 12.
I will now t urn it back over to Jim Barstow.
MR. BARSTOW :
Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
As Mr.
Lewis explained, Mr.1(b)(?)(C) violate NRC requirements.
actions did not Mr J(b)(?)(C) !provided the then....
l(b-)(7-)(C_l ___
l (b)(7)(C)
I
..... ____ with informal talking points that he thought the (b)(l)(C) could use during a call with the NRC' s Executive Director of Operations.
In drafting these talking points, Mr l(b)(?)(C) was focused on accomplishing t h e goal inherent in any set of talking points, to convey the main points of interest.
In this case, there was really one main point that Mr ~(b)(?)(C) r as trying to convey, that recent investigations determined there was a degraded work environment in operations at Watts Bar.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mr *l(b)(7)(C) 78
!talking points were complete and accurat e.
This much i s particularly clear when you consider Mr j(b)(?)(C)
~ntent on drafting.
Both the Employee Concerns Program i nvestigation and the Special Review Team investigations had been completed, which allowed TVA to come to the conclusion that there was a degraded work environment. This conclusion was consistent with the NRC ' s assessment.
The fact that there were some non-substantive, nonmaterial changes to the language of the Special Review Team report before it was submitted to the NRC, is frankly beside the point.
TVA has provided a more detailed explanation of why the changes were innocuous i n our written response.
Additionally, Mr. l(b)(?)(C) I rightfully characterized the two i nvestigations as independent.
TVA had obtained outside consultants to conduct the ECP investigation in order to ensure independence.
And the personnel on the Special Review Team were largely independent to Watts Bar with one exception.
Perhaps most concerning i s the f i nding, is that finding a violation here would set a troubling precedent that each time a licensee communicates with the NRC wi th the hope that t h e NRC wil l be i nfluenced (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 79 by the communication, they must expressly state they intend to try to influence the NRC.
It' s hard to see why such a disclaimer would be required nearly as in - -
in nearly -every communication.
To determine when the NRC and the licensees communicate with each other one of the purposes is almost always to influence one another, even where there ' s an exchange of information.
TVA's review has produced no indication that Mr (b)(?)(C) cted with any intent to provide the NRC with inaccurate or incomplete information. With that, and as we close with this group of Apparent Violations, I want to summarize and highlight some big picture concerns that TVA has with Apparent Violations 8, 10, ll and 12.
TVA ' s investigation into these Apparent Violations found no evidence that its employees provided the NRC with incomplete or inaccurate information.
For us, this concludes and raises the question of how the NRC arrives at its conclusions.
TVA has found that the information communicated by our employees was complete and accurate based on what they knew at the time.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 80 premise that there was a coordinated and concerted effort within the company to mislead the NRC.
Again, TVA vehemently denies that there were ever any such efforts.
And after our extensive investigation over the past four months, we have found no actual evidence of such an effort.
TVA is also concerned, because of the Apparent Violations rely on information that the NRC presumes TVA managers knew, even though the more thorough analysis designed to obtain that knowledge had not yet been completed.
Presumed knowledge is not a reasonable basis for issuing violation.
And it certainly not a basis for concluding that individuals intentionally provided incomplete or inaccurate information.
We hope that the NRC will consider the information that has been presented today as well as in our written submission in reaching a reasonable decision regarding the disposition of these apparent violations.
Absent such a disposition by the staff,
TVA strongly believes that when presented with the evidence, a neutral arbiter would come to the same conclusions as TVA.
That completes our comments on Apparent (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 81 Violation 12.
MR. O'BRIEN :
Thank you, Mr. Barstow.
I think that completes the presentations that you'd planned today, and I correct?
MR. BARSTOW:
Yes.
That is correct.
MR. O' BRIEN :
So, we ' re at the top of the hour according to my time here.
I propose that we take an hour long caucus and add on the back of that an hour long lunch and resume at 11 o'clock you -- oh, it ' s nine o'clock, 12 o'clock your time.
Is that fair?
MR. BARSTOW :
Thank you.
MR. O'BRIEN:
I'm sorry, you - -
MS. ROELOFS:
We said yes.
I'm sorry.
We were on there.
MR. BARSTOW:
Yes.
That's fine.
MR. O'BRIEN :
Okay.
So, we will then go off the record until 12 o ' clock Eastern time, 11 o'clock Central, at which point we' 11 resume with questions and answers relative to 8, 10, 11 and 12.
(202) 234-4433 We are off the record.
Thank you.
(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 9:59 a.m. and resumed at 12:01 p.m.)
MR. O'BRI EN:
Good afternoon everybody.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 82 It's the top of the hour, so why don ' t we begin.
I'm going to do a couple of administrative things first.
Court Reporter, are you with us?
COURT REPORTER:
Yes, sir.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you.
Marcia?
MS. SIMON:
Yes.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Nick?
MR. HILTON:
Yes.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you, sir.
Scott?
MR. SPARKS:
Yes, Ken.
MR. 0' BRIEN: Thank you. Mr. Barstow, are you ready to begin?
MR. BARSTOW:
Yes sir, Mr. O'Brien.
MR.
O'BRIEN:
Sounds good.
So, we' re ready to begin with our questions and answers after our caucus and our lunch break.
And I'll start off with identifying that we have no questions relative to AV 8.
But we do have some questions relative to AV 9, and I'd ask Marcia to begin.
MS. SIMON:
It ' s actually AV 10.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Excuse me, AV 10.
I did that earlier.
Thank you, Marcia.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
I don't want anyone to be confused.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 83 related to AV 10.
So, it was stated several times, Ms.
Hernande.z stated several times this morning during the discussion of AV 10 that responsibility for validating assumptions belongs to the MCR staff.
And we've been told in several PECs that one of the OCC's roles is to provide guidance and support, including technical input to the main control room. And Mr. Blankenship f or one, indicated that his concerns on November 11, 2015 were addressed when he heard conversations that led him to believe the OCC had engineers looking at the issue.
So, my question is, are you saying, when you say responsibility for validating assumptions belongs to the MCO staff, are you saying it was not appropriate for the operators to rely on information provided by the OCC in deciding whether their concerns about moving forward had been addressed?
MS. ROELOFS :
I'm sorry.
I was on -- this is Ms.
Roelofs.
Mr.
Williams will answer your question.
He was having a l ittle trouble with his camera, but I think he has it on now.
we do MR. WILLIAMS:
Thank you. Yes, Ms. Simon,
we do expect our operators to challenge assumptions.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 84 And also we do expect them to understand the basis of the answers to those assumptions that are put into the calculations.
So, when we talk about the main control room and their responsibility to understand the controls, understand the mechanisms, understand the f undamental aspects of the evolutions that they're going to be put in place, and the controls on how they're going to operate the plant, that's how we're correlating that the -- those responses.
We also expect the OCC to be a supportive f unction for the control room.
And get whatever the control room needs so they can understand how the evolution is going to occur, what to expect and the controls in play.
So, we do have a, we do see that the OCC did not get the information that was needed for the control room.
But we also see that the control room should have been challenging where those answers are,
and how are we going to be doing this evolution.
And that ' s how we're correlating the two entities, the OCC and the main control room.
MS. SIMON:
Yeah.
I want to follow up on that a little bit.
And I might ask Mr. O'Brien to jump in, or he might jump in anyway.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 85 MR. O' BRIEN:
I just jumped in Marcia.
MS.
SIMON:
I think Mr. l(b)(7)(C) I talked about, and I think - -
Mr.1(b)(?)(C)
!talked about how engineering was consulted in the occ during discussions that day.
And I believe Mr. Blankenship talked about overhearing Mr. Sprinkle in the control room talking about some input from engineering.
And so, I guess
- again, my question is, to what extent can the operators r ely on that input?
I mean, if for instance Mr. Blankenship said he had to remain at the controls, he couldn ' t do the work to ensure the evolution would be successful.
He had to rely on others to do the calculation and the research.
Was he, was that appropriate for him to do?
(No response)
MS. SIMON:
I can't hear you.
MS.
ROELOFS:
We were conferring, Ms.
Simon.
MR. WILLIAMS:
Yes, Ms. Simon. So, it was correct for him to say that he cannot divorce himself from the active control 's position while he's monitoring and controlling the plant.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 86 However, he can also get a relief.
They can step back, the team can step back, have a pre-job brief.
And he could ask the questions, where did you get the heat up rates?
Where did you get the pressuri.zer level based upon temperature issues? And what to expect?
Is that a t humb rule?
Is that something we ' re just, how we correlate those numbers?
And it occurs all the time when you have complex evolutions where t he control room steps back, pull the individuals that are going to be performing those tasks, and having a pre-job brief.
- Now, we don't believe any of these individuals had any deliberate misconduct in their evolution. They just did not question or challenge or understand the evolution good enough.
I mean, they missed the -- they relied on the thumb rule.
They should have understood that it was things that didn't have a technical basis behind it.
And they should have asked for the technical basis behind it before moving forward.
MS.
SIMON:
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 87 ultimately responsible for validating that.
And they coul d not rely on the engineers in the OCC saying that they had calculated, they had done calculations based on this rule of thumb, and it was going to be okay?
MS.
ROELOFS :
Ms.
Simon,
we need one moment to confer.
MS. SIMON :
Okay.
(Off mic comments)
MR. WILLIAMS:
Yes, Ms. Si mon.
And I think I might be confusing you with the way I'm answering this.
When an operator asks a question and he's challenging an assumption, the individuals that go and support that operator, whether it maybe engineering in this case, they do go in and perform and calculate and do those act i v i ties to provi de answers for those operators to -- so they understand how to control the plant.
And it's the responsibility of the operator to understand those answers that they' re getting from engineering that they ' re going to utilize to operate the plant.
And it's not an outage thing.
It ' s not a -- because we also have the same issues with online.
If there ' s a condition (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 88 report that they need engineering's help and ass istance with when they have parameters o r evolutions online as well, they ask for the right resource, which maybe engineeri ng, to provide some technical background or help and assistance with it.
The engineers are proficient in these methods t o get that profes sional, the technical help.
But then it ' s embedded, I mean, it ' s incumbent on the operators to understand what ' s the basis, where the i nformation is coming from before t hey make determinations to move forward.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Ken, do you have any follow up on that?
MR. O' BRIEN:
Oh, just a couple.
And I'm not sure who will answer thi s.
So, I want to make sure I clearly understand the points you're trying to make.
Because to be frank with you, I 'm at a compl ete loss.
As I understand the testimony, individuals in the control room raised questions regarding an evolution they were being asked to do.
Or it was on the s chedule to do, however you choose to put it.
To conduct activity that had never been performed before.
Had no procedural guidance to do.
Had no criteria to be accomplished.
Was never tested (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 89 under an IPTE process.
Had never been run in the simulator.
And yet at the same time you expect the NRC to understand that you believe it's their job, after having raised all of those questions, to then second guess the information that they get back from the Ops control center as it relates to the acceptability of doing things that they just identified that they'd never done before, had never been tested before, had never been trained on before, had no guidance to do, and had no procedures to do.
Is that the position you want me to understand?
MS.
ROELOFS :
Mr. O'Brien, we're just conferring briefly for a moment.
MR. O'BRIEN:
I thought you might --
I thought you might have to.
MS. ROELOFS:
Yes. Okay. Thank you, sir.
Be right back.
(Off mic comment)
MS. ROELOFS : Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Williams is prepared to answer your question.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you very much.
MR. WILLIAMS:
Mr. O'Brien.
Mr. O'Brien, you' ve kind of -- you're making -- you ' re pulling some (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 90 statements out that, but not all the statements that we ' re making here.
We also agree that there are better formality and the technical rigger from the OCC should have been better.
We also believe that when there's uncertainty, that individuals pursue getting understanding of those uncertainties.
You know, they should use the simulator.
They should have done just in time training, IPTEs.
We talked about that the other day that, and how they handled this evolution.
So, I'm not just talking about the operators.
I am talking about the OCC staff as well.
If an operator has a question and he doesn't think that his question was answered to his understanding, then he should ask and say that.
And say, I don't understand how you're corning to those conclusions.
But we ' re not, also I expect that when he gets, when he asks a question that we present that information to him, to give him the knowledge he needs to be able to perform his task.
And it's not just Mr. Blankenship as was mentioned in the original base line for this question.
But also Billy Johnson as the assistant manager as well.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 91 And then also the other reactor operators as a team, both the OCC and the contr ol room, they should have all the understandings that they are comfortabl e to perform the evolution. And perform the tasks and the preparations to make them ready to be able to perform this evolution in a controlled, deliberate manner.
- Now, as it pertains to this Apparent Violation, I would like t o turn it over to counsel and see i f they have anything.
MR. O'BRIEN:
No, it ' s --
I don ' t hear anybody.
Is somebody else going t o speak?
MR. LEWIS:
I ' m just trying to start my video.
Excuse me.
MR. O'BRI EN :
Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
MR.
LEWIS:
There we go.
In the root cause analysis the -- and apparent cause analysi s,
there was a
clear identification that operator f undamentals were an issue.
The opinion was, and I think our opinion is that the OCC did not do a good enough job in analyzi ng the issue a nd managing the risk and assessing the risk.
But it ' s also clear that the control room did not act conservatively enough.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 92 validate the assumptions that were their duty as the licensed operators.
I don't think it falls on Mr. Blankenship that he was at the controls.
I think he appropriately raised it with Billy Johnson.
And I
think once those concerns were communicated to Mr. Johnson, it was his obligation to validate the assumptions, to ask for a simulator run.
To put the procedure in place, and to do those things that an operator, that you would expect an operator to do before performing, as you said, this first of a kind evolution.
So, the fact that there was some information corning from the OCC, did not excuse or absolve the reactor operators from trying to validate assumptions.
Again, I 'm distinguishing Mr. Blankenship who was at the
- controls, and who relayed the information to Billy Johnson.
And therefore, was assuming that Mr. Johnson was doing the communications with Mr. Johnson himself.
MR. O 'BRIEN:
Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
If I might add a follow up to this?
I want to make sure I clearly understand also, and it's probably going to be directed to Mr. Williams, not you, Mr. Lewis.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 93 Is that in the context of the description you agree that the control room and the OCC may have been able -- or, should have done a better job.
I want to ask again to make sure I clearly understand your expectation that the control room should have taken actions, especially when the shift, excuse me, the_l(b_)_(?_)_(C_) ________
~ who was also aware of this issue, also knew it was not a -- it was a first of a kind evolution, also had to have been aware that there were no procedures?
Also was aware there was no training?
Also aware that the shift had changed? That it ' s not also his responsibility to completely stop the evolution as th~-(b_)_(7_)(_c _) ___
since he recognized it I t violates a l l the individual s ' licenses along with the facilities '
license, of conducting activities without procedures and without having previous training, and without conducting testing?
I want to make s ure I understand, that's your position?
MS. ROELOFS:
Mr. O'Brien, we need just a moment here.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Well, before you go, I want to add on top of that, recognizing, recognizing that this was a change in the process, and each of these (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 94 individuals that we ' ve talked about,
have responsibili t ies.
I s it not a responsibility of the facility as a whole to ensure safety in this regard? And isn't everybody that I j ust articulated, responsible for that activity?
Thank you.
(Off mic comment)
MS. ROELOFS : Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Williams is prepared to answer this question.
MR. O'BRIEN :
Thank you, Ms. Roelofs.
MR. WILLIAMS:
Thank you, Mr. O'Brien.
A long question.
A lot of different s t atements made.
I believe your question pertained to Mr* l(b)(?)(C) 1-We believe that the environment fundamentals had gaps in performance.
And that includes Mr -l(b)(?)(C)
I-But we do not believe t hat those gaps in performance were deliberate.
MR. O' BRIEN :
Mr. Lewis -- Mr. Williams, if I may ask onto that.
So, you would ask the NRC to take as fact that one senior re -- one licensed senior reactor operator chose not to follow his license and the requirements.
Another senior reactor operator,
Mr.
Sprinkl e, chose not to fol low hi s l icense and the (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 95 requirements.
And the 1 (b-)(-7)(_c_) ________
__, for the facility as a
whole,
chose not to follow the facilities' license in conducting activities that were not in accordance with plans, procedures, protocols that had the potential to challenge the integrity of the RCS.
And that that all happened just by happenstance?
MS. ROELOFS:
Mr. O'Brien, we'll turn that question over to our counsel, please.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you.
MR.
LEWIS :
I ' m just thinking for a second.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Not a problem.
Take your time, Mr. Lewis.
MR. LEWIS:
We've not seen any indication
-- well, first let me get back.
It's recognized and TVA has agreed that the performance of the operators and the OCC were not sufficiently conservative.
That they did not meet their standards.
That is different from saying that they recognized that they were violating their license.
Poor performance happens.
And when it does, it needs to be corrected.
But, you cannot simply assume that a performance was poor.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 96 therefore, everybody recognized that they were violating their licenses.
That is the disconnect.
So, we look at this and we see efforts to evaluate this evolution.
And they were cl-early insufficient.
We don ' t see the evolution being completely ignored.
We see poor performance.
We see people not meeting operator fundamentals. And that is the difference.
I n your questions you' re assuming that Mr.
l(b)(?)(C)
I, for example, knew that this was a violation of the licenses.
I've never seen any basis for that assertion.
You're assuming that he knew that there weren't procedures in place.
I don ' t know if that is true.
I don't know if everything in the record that indicates whether he was aware whether Billy Johnson had put some procedure in place or not.
But there were a lot of assertions built into your question.
- Again, we ' re not condoning anybody ' s performance as adequate.
They cl-early failed to meet TVA's standards.
- But, we ' re
- also, have come to the conclusion that it was mistakes and poor performance, and really poor operator fundamentals. But, extending (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 97 to, you know, poor performance in the OCC for not adequately evaluating and managing risk as the root cause analysis to that.
So, there's plenty of blame to share aro
-- to spread around.
What we don't see is someone, you know, recognizing that this was a violation of the NRC r ules, and proceeding despite that recognition.
MR.
O' BRIEN:
Thank you, Mr.
Lewis.
Marcia?
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you, Ken.
And I am going to get back to the apparent cause anal ysis report now.
And the reason I 'm trying too under - - I 'm trying to understand the, I guess, the relative role or roles of the OCC and the main control room, because I'm looking at the language that was changed between the draft report and the final report, and I think I can just, if it ' s okay with you, I ' ll just read the phrases that were changed.
I think it ' s, rather then put the document up.
If we need to, we can do that.
But, I don't think it's necessary.
So, for example, the draft report said, during the discussions related to plant heat up with the concurrent removal of the residual heat removal (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 98 flow path in support of performing 1-SI - 0905, the OCC and the MCR made an erroneous assumption related to the capacity of the excess let down system.
In the final report, it was essentially the same, except the reference to the OCC was removed.
And it simply said the MCR made an erroneous assumption related to the capacity of the excess let down system.
And I'm trying to understand why that would be removed if the OCC -- it seems from the information we've heard over the past couple of days, especially related to Mr. l(b)(?)(C)
~ and saying that, you know, they used a rule of thumb and it was incorrect.
But, there were discussions in the OCC related to that.
Why it was appropriate to r *emove that language?
MS.
ROELOFS :
Ms.
Simon, this is Ms.
Roelofs.
We will turn that question over to our counsel to respond to, please.
MS.
HERNANDEZ:
Hello, this is Monica Hernandez.
I attended Mr. (b)(?)(C)
PEC.
And there he said that he had two very strong opinions.
The first one was that the OCC cannot make operational decisions.
Only the MCR can.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 99 second is that the MCR is responsible for validating assumptions.
And those two very strong opinions went into the revision and finalizing of the report.
So again, t h e changes were made to align t he report with the ACA team's understanding at the time that the report was finalized.
MS. SIMON:
That sounds like Mr. l(b)(?)(C) opinion was put into the report.
But was the rest, do you know whether the rest of the ACA team was i nvol ved in discussing that at all?
MS. HERNANDEZ : Well, M~ (b)(?)(C)~id say that he identified issues and provided suggestions for those changes to the authors of the report, which were Ii~?) I and...
l(b-)(7-)(-Cl _____
____.l and 1 (b-)(?-)(C_l ___ l*
And that they were either accepted or rejected those changes, as well as changes that other team members had provided.
And then after they made those changes,
another draft of the report was provided to the whole review committee.
And that ' s when they discussed the report and f ina l ized i t.
MS. SIMON:
Do you know if that -- never mind.
I'll forget that one.
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MS. SIMON:
Okay.
And then so your view is it's based on the opinions M~ (b)(7)(C) I stated in his PEC?
MS. HERNANDEZ:
Correct.
MS. SIMON:
Those statements related to the OCC cannot direct the operators to proceed, and sorry.
I know the second one.
Okay.
So, I 'm trying to understand.
Can the OCC decide that they believe something is safe or feasible to proceed with?
Is it --
I mean, is that a decision the OCC can make? Not deciding to direct the operators to do it, but just deciding whether it's safe to proceed or feasible to proceed.
And that may be an appropriate question for TVA then you, Ms. Hernandez.
whoever you think is appropriate.
I don ' t
- know, MS.
ROELOFS:
- Yes, Ms.
Simon.
We're conferring in the room really quickly here.
And then we will respond to the question.
(Simultaneous speaking)
MS. ROELOFS :
Ms. Simon, Mr. Williams is prepared to answer your question.
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procedures.
101 MR. WILLIAMS:
Yes, Ms. Simon.
Sorry for I was just looking up something in our The OCC, of course they can do a review or look into assumptions and plant configurations and analyses of the plant operations and make in their mind, make conclusions whether they feel it's safe to perform these activities or not.
But, if you look at the span of authority of the OCC, the shift manager and the l i censed SRO of record are the ultimate decision maker authorities for plan t operations.
The shift manager has the f ul l responsibility and authority for nuclear safety. His authority may not be usurped to transferred at any time.
So, while the OCC can understand the situation or understand the evolution, they can't --
their span of authority does not allow them to make decisions for plant operations.
MS. SIMON:
So, is it is it fair to say that the OCC has to make decisions like that because they 're trying to schedule acti vities?
So, in other words, if they ' re trying to schedule activities they might look into it to decide whether it ' s safe to proceed for that reason?
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I'm trying to understand.
(No response)
MS. SIMON:
I can ' t hear you.
102 MR. O'BRIEN:
I think they're waiting to decide which one is going to answer.
MS. ROELOFS:
Yes, one morn this is Ms.
Roelofs.
One moment please, Ms. Simon.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Thank you, Ms. Roelofs.
MS. ROELOFS:
Ms. Simon could you please rephrase your question?
Or repeat?
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Yeah.
I guess I'm --
we ' ve been told that the
- OCC, one of their responsibilities is scheduling activities and, you know, monitoring a critical path and things like that.
And so, I ' m just, I guess, inferring from that that as part of doing that, the OCC has to make decisions about whether an activity is feasible at a given time.
I guess that's kind of what I'm getting at.
I s that true?
MS. ROELOFS:
Mr. Williams is prepared to answer that.
MR.
WILLIAMS:
- Yes, Ms.
Simon.
I do believe the OCC does, and should, look at different evolutions and understand where they're going to lay (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 103 out and potentially put them into the schedule and sequ ence them ou t.
We have, that ' s one of the reasons why we have Ops representation in the OCC.
Laying out the schedule does not mean t hat they have the authority to make decisions on plant operations though.
They can p u t it in the schedule and then talk to the shift.
And if the shift has issues with that, the main control room has issues with that, then they have to resol ve those issues.
But, the ultimate authority and the final decision maker is the main control room.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you.
I think I'm
-- that makes it clear for me.
Thank you.
MR. O'BRI EN :
Marcia, before you go on, I have one follow up question if you wouldn ' t mind.
MS. SIMON :
Sure.
MR. O'BRIEN:
So, my follow up question,
and I'm not sure who will answer this.
I want to make s ure I understand, the ACA effort, the apparent cause effort and the Level II report that was done was i ntended to assess t h e conditions and the events that happened on November 11.
Is that a correct statement?
MS.
ROELOFS :
Mr. O' Brien, We have Mr.
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MR. O'BRIEN:
I'm sorry.
I didn't catch the name?
MS. ROELOFS:
Mr. Staggs, Randy Staggs.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you.
MR. STAGGS:
Yes, sir.
And I'm waiting for my video to come on.
MR. O' BRIEN:
I appreciate that.
Thank you, sir.
MR. STAGGS:
Yes, sir.
And in reference to your question of the purpose of root cause, I'm just going to read what the problem statement was.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Excuse me, sir.
I didn't say -- excuse me, sir.
I didn't say the root cause.
I said the apparent cause.
MR. STAGGS:
Yes, sir.
I agree.
That's what I thought I had said, was the apparent cause. If I said root cause, I apologize.
Yes, sir.
So, I want to say then from the apparent cause, the object was pressurizer level. The defect that was being analyzed, and experienced an unexpected rate of pressurizer level rise, with the consequence requiring compensatory operator action to regain control of pressurizer level.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 105 with the understanding of the apparent cause ass ocia t ed wi th that acti vity.
And I beli eve du r i ng the course of that investigation, it didn't stand out to strip to a root cause to identify other learnings.
MR.
O' BRI EN :
Wel l,
I appreciate that.
So, I have a follow up question to that.
And I want to make s ure it ' s, I understand clearly, because this is a question we ' ve asked around a number of different ways.
So, given that its intenti on was to discuss and understand the issues associated with the November 11 event, I ' m struggling to understand how the report would be changed or otherwise modified to identify a perceived or proceduralized responsibility of the OCC that may, or may have not, have been in fact in play on November 11.
That i s, that t h e OCC cannot and does not make decisions when that maybe factually what the procedure says, but may not be what act ually occu rred.
And I 'm trying to make sure if I
understand this, is TVA by their descriptions today, and information they provided in response to the Apparent Violations,
articulating that they have evidence that indeed the OCC did not, in any way, shape, or form, vary from i ts requ irements in the (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 106 procedures, and did not in any way, shape, or form, direct or otherwise provide unsubstantiated guidance to the main control room?
As opposed too theoretically not allowed to do?
MS. ROELOFS:
Mr. 0' Brien, we ' 11 turn that over to our counsel to respond based on their investigation.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Thank you very much.
MR.
LEWIS:
We don't have any evidence that the OCC directed the control room. It is clear that the OCC looked at the evolution and provided their views.
We don't have evidence that that overstepped the bounds as the root cause analysis determined.
And as a fact as indicated in the apparent cause analysis.
The apparent cause analysis indicated that the OCC did not do an adequate job in looking at and managing risk.
I believe that's the words.
But, that ' s as stated in H.11 of the ACA.
And the r oot cause subsequently went further and said that, you know, they did not -- that they engaged in their non-conservative decision making.
That's different from the decision making that occurred in the control room.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 107 decision about, should we recommend this evolution?
Do we think it ' s safe?
The information that was passed onto the control room.
That does not mean that they us u rped the a uthor ity of the control room or directed them.
The control room still as the license holder and the shift manager and senior SRO should have questioned that if they were uncertain.
They should have put a procedure in place.
They should have run it on the simul ator.
They should have done a lot of things they didn't do.
So, yes,
the OCC's performance had problems.
But we don ' t have any indication that the OCC directed the evolution or usurped the operator,
the control room operator ' s dec i sion making authori ty.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
What I'm really trying to get at is, I'm trying to get at the apparent change to the apparent cause assessment analysis that removed the previous dialog regarding the OCC ' s responsibility.
And my understand that it was remov,ed at the direction of individuals based upon a theoretical response role and responsibility for the OCC,
versus any specific facts that demonstrated that that was exactl y the case.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 108 And it sounds like you have no direct evidence to prove the answer one way or the other.
Which to me would appear to indicate that changing what was in there originally, mi ght be incorrect.
Bu t, I' m not sure of that.
I have to finish reviewing all of the information. That's what I'm trying to get at.
Thank you for your answer, Mr. Lewis.
Marc i a?
MS.
SIMON :
Okay.
Ms.
Hernandez, I
actually want to ask you something, because you said something in -- when you were speaking this morning.
And I, my notes that I wrote down have part of it.
But, I want to make sure that I understood i t correctly.
I think you said something to the effect of that during the apparent cause analysis, the team found no evidence reflecting t hat t he OCC caused or contributed to the main control room ' s decision.
Is that, am I remembering correctly?
Or MS. HERNANDEZ:
Ms. Simon, I would have to go back a nd see what I said to confi rm.
Bu t, what I said was that whatever is fine.
Whatever you find in the ACA report is what the team found to be true and correct at the time (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 109 that the report was finalized.
MS.
SIMON :
Okay.
And the reason I 'm asking is that I' m pretty sure you said something about cau se, or whether the OCC caused or contributed to.
And I wanted to ask some questions about that.
So, if you' d like to -- if it 's relatively easy for you to check and see.
I don't want to mischaracterize what you said.
So, I just want to make sure.
MS. HERNANDEZ:
Okay.
I 'll look.
I will look for that.
Thank you.
(Off mic comment)
MS. HERNANDEZ:
Ms. Simon?
MS. SIMON:
Yes?
MS.
HERNANDEZ:
I found the --
what I said.
And I
said the ACA team's findings are consistent with TVA ' s understanding that as of January 21, 2016, t he date the ACA report was finalized, TVA management had no apparent appreciation that OCC involvement caused or contributed to decision making of the MCR staff on November 11.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you.
So, I got part of i t.
I appreciate that.
So, (202) 234-4433 Mr.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 110 representative in the OCC that day.
And so, if Mr.
Sprinkle as the OCC Ops representative provided input or analysis to the main control room that turned out to be i ncorrect, and the main control room operators proceeded based at l east in part on that input, isn 't Mr. Sprinkle ' s action wouldn ' t that be an OCC contribution to t he decision t hat was made by the main control room?
MS. ROELOFS:
One moment, Ms. Simon, we' re con ferring to determine who will answer.
(Off mic comment)
MS. ROELOFS :
Ms. Simon, Mr. Staggs is prepared to answer your question.
MR. SCAGGS :
Yes, ma'am.
And before I answer, could you, could you just repeat the question so I can do the best I can to answer it complet-ely?
MS. SIMON :
Okay.
I will try my best to repeat it.
So, Mr. Sprinkle was the OCC operations representative that day.
And so the question is, if Mr. Sprinkle, as the OCC Ops representative provided inp u t or analysis to t he main control room t hat turned out to be incorrect, and the main control room proceeded, at l east based in part on that inpu t,
wou ldn' t that be an OCC contri bution to the decision (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 111 made by the main control room to proceed?
MR.
SCAGGS:
Okay.
Thank you, ma ' am.
Relative to the OCC contribution, well, first I'll go back and talk about the, I 'm going to call it the life of the apparent cause, which transitioned into a root cause.
So, when the apparent cause was being completed with the transition to the root cause, it's my understanding that the evidence wasn't there to support that specific input from the OCC.
Subsequent to that, when the root cause was initiated to look at the organizational and programmatic issues associated with that day in the OCC, that is when it was determined that the OCC and the main control room were both contributors to that event.
Does that answer your question, ma'am?
MS. SIMON :
I think so.
So, although Mr.
Sprinkle was interviewed as part of the apparent cause, nothing came from that interview, to your knowledge, that would have led the team to bel ieve that there was a contribution on his part as the OCC Ops representative?
MS. ROELOFS:
Ms. Simon, we'll turn that over to our counsel.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 112 MS.
HERNANDEZ:
Ms.
Simon,
when Mr.
Sprinkle was interviewed, he said that the decision was made by Ops.
And he also said that he never directed anyone to proceed.
He in fact described his discussions with Mr. Johnson as collaborative.
MS. SIMON : Is this based on the interview notes?
MS.
HERNANDEZ :
I 'm sorry.
The NRC interviews.
MS. SIMON:
The NR oh, okay.
Thank you.
But, and there was nothing in the ACA interview notes to expound on that, that you're aware of?
Because the ACA team would not have had the NRC interview notes.
MS.
HERNANDEZ:
Right.
The ACA t -eam' s notes do state that Mr.
Sprinkle stated that a decision was by Ops.
And I quote, decision by Ops.
Is what the notes say.
MS. SIMON:
And those notes are pretty, pretty brief and not very extensive, right?
Those interview notes?
I mean, I've seen them.
There I s r you know, there's not a lot of detail there to quote Mr.
Hill from the day, from yesterday and the day before.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 113 You know, there ' s certainly not transcripts, right?
MS. HERNANDEZ: Right. But, assuming that he would have been asked the same questions that the NRC asked, he would have provided the same answer that he did to the NRC.
And we can take the NRC transcripts as what he would have told the ACA team had they asked.
MS. SIMON:
Do you know the questions that the ACA team asked him?
MS. HERNANDEZ:
I do not.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
That ' s fine.
I also Mr l (b)(7)(C) want to ask kind of the same question on that I just asked about Mr. Sprinkle.
In his OIG, one of his OIG interviews
- anyway, Mr* l(b)(7)(C)
I indicated that there were extensive discussions in the OCC that morning about whether excess let down would work.
And he indicated that engineering was consulted and had told him and others that excess let down could handl e it.
And in his PEC, Mr -l(b)(7)(C) lalso referred to the discussions.
And he said that there were several hours of discussions.
And he also acknowledged the input from engineering.
And so, again, you know, my question is, if some OCC personnel spent several hours discussing (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 114 whether it was feasible and advisable to heat up an excess let down, and engineers provided input, isn't that indicative of OCC involvement, or a contribution to the MCR's decision to proceed?
MS. ROELOFS:
Ms. Simon, we will turn that question over to our legal counsel.
MS. SIMON :
Okay.
MR. LEWIS:
Yes.
This is Mr. Lewis.
I don 't believe, at least I'm not aware that the ACA team intervi ewed Mr ~(b)(?)(C)
I-Clearly the RCA team did, and has an interview summary.
Which suggests to me that a difference between the two reports and a recognition of greater involvement by the OCC was the result of that d i scussi on with Mr.1(b)(?)(C) 1-Can you repeat your question too, just --
oh, I know what I was going to say.
I don ' t think Mr ~(b)(?)(C)
!indicated there was two hours of continuous discussion.
I think he was indicating discussions occurred at different times over a two hour period.
I don't think i t's fair to assume that they were deliberating over this, you know.
He describes a break out session and some discussions and then periodi c questi ons.
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I had never gotten the sense from the statements I've seen from Mr. 1(b)(?)(C) hour dialog.
I that it was a continuous two MS. SIMON:
Thank you, Dave.
Yeah.
I don't know if it was a continuous dialog.
But he did say in his PEC, I did ask him how long the -- how many hours they were discussing.
And he -- he actually said it was three or four hours.
And you may be right, he -- maybe he was referring to the ultimate time that it took for them to make their decision to go forward.
MR. LEWIS:
One of the things that's very hard to reconstruct is, you know, what discussions were occurring when.
Particularly five years later.
It appeared to us when we were r *eally trying to figure out who said what when, that there were discussions early in the morning at turn over.
And prior to moving into Mode 4.
And there were probably discussions later in the day.
So, that was actually over quite a wide period of time.
And I think in that sense, what Mr.
l(b )(7)(C) l said is correct.
I cannot tell you, and we don ' t have a precise enough record to say that when it (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 116 actually came to time to perform the surveillance and move RHR from service, that that was a two hour discussion.
I think that it was probably a range of discussions over the day from the morning until the RHR evolution.
And I wish we could pin it down better.
We really tried hard.
MS. SIMON:
That's fine.
That's fine.
MR. LEWIS :
Yeah.
MS. SI MON:
Your answer also actually got to the next question I was going to ask, which you partially answered, which was whether Mr.l(b)(?)(C) interviewed on this.
l was Because my understanding is, he was on the apparent cause analysis team.
And I guess I -- it seems to me given that he was on the team and in the main control room and the OCC, and in the OCC that day, even if he wasn ' t an official member, that they might have interviewed him.
But, it sounds like they didn't as far as you can tell?
MR. LEWIS:
I' ve seen no interview notes or other indication he was interviewed.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you.
questions have to do with Mr. l...
(b_)(_?)(_C_) __
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 117 letter, I guess, from I think it was ~l(b_)(7_)(C_ l __ ~I*
And I was just wondering, so he said in that that he believed the problem statement should also address the poor assessment of risk by work control operations and the outage control center on an emergent work activity that ultimately placed the plant in an unexpected operating condition requiring compensatory operator action to regain control of pressurizer level.
And I just wanted to make sure that it was clear, were any changes made to the report as a r *esult of this, of his review and his comments?
MS. ROELOFS:
Ms. Simon, Mr. Barstow will address your question.
MS. SIMON:
Thank you.
MR. BARSTOW:
Hello, Ms. Simon.
I guess what I would say is no.
My answer is no, I don't think there were changes to the apparent cause.
But, I also believe and may ask counsel to weigh in, but my understanding was that Mr. ~l(b_l(_7l_(C_l __ _,
insights in his letter were put into the root cause's theater for that investi gation.
I'm sure that it was comprehensive.
- But, I'll ask counsel if they have anything to add.
Go ahead.
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LEWIS:
This is Mr. Lewis.
No, we don't have anything to add.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you.
And that, Mr.....
l(b_)(?_)(_c) __
_.l letter was sent to Mr. (b)(?)(C)
Do you have -- did you have any indication whether that was distributed to the other members of the ACA team?
MS. ROELOFS:
Ms. Simon, we'll ask our counsel to respond to that question.
They have the answer based on their investigation.
MR. LEWI S:
I don't recall who, we would have to look at the transmittal.
But, I do not know whether that letter was distributed to other members of the team.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you.
MR. LEWI S:
I do believe that the comments were recognized as good.
And reinforced the decision to do the root cause analysis.
And were essentially, you know, viewed as being items that would be dis addressed by the root cause analysis.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
that would be MR. LEWIS:
As opposed to going back and working on the apparent cause analysis. At that point it was pretty clear that what should be happening is a full root cause analysis.
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MS. SIMON :
Okay.
But as far as you know, there were no changes made to the report to reflect that there was input suggesting, you know, further work?
Or a broadening of the investigation, being done?
MR. LEWI S :
I am not aware --
MS. SIMON :
I can't hear you.
MR. LEWI S : I' m not aware of changes being made.
I think Mr. Barstow is correct.
But, I've never really looked at drafts to see if there were any changes after the date of ~l(b_)(_? )_(C_l __ ~I letter.
But, I think Mr. Barstow is.
MS. SIMON:
Okay.
Thank you.
I think,
Ken, I think that's a l l the questions I have.
MR. O' BRIEN :
Thank you, Marc i a.
Mr.
Barstow, at this point in time we don ' t have any f urther questions on the remaining AV's.
I' d like us to move to closing commen ts if you're prepared.
MR.
BARSTOW:
Thank you, Mr.
0 ' Brien.
Yes, we ' re prepared to go to closing comments.
MS. ROELOFS :
Could Mr. O' Brien j us t give us one minute to recollect our paperwork over here.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 120 And we'll be back on the record in 30 seconds.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Thank you, Ms. Roelofs.
MS. ROELOFS:
You ' re welcome.
(Pause)
MS. ROELOFS:
Mr. 0' Brien, I apologize for the brief wait.
We ' re ready to move into closing remarks, starting with our counsel.
Pillsbury.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Thank you.
MR. LEPRE:
Yes.
This is Mike Lepre with We'd like to thank the NRC for the opportunity to participate in this PEC.
We've heard a lot of i nformation.
Sorry, my camera.
Let me put my camera on.
Can you hear me?
MR. O'BRI EN:
Yes.
MR. LEPRE:
Okay.
Can you hear me?
MR. O'BRIEN :
Yes.
I can see you and hear you, sir.
MR. LEPRE:
Great.
Thank you.
This is Mike Lepre with Pillsbury. We'd like to thank the NRC for the opportunity to participate in this PEC.
You've heard a lot of information over the past few days.
So, our final comments will be brief.
This matter has played itself out over the past five years or so.
TVA believes that the NRC has, (202) 234*4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 121 and continues to pursue a theory that the events of November 11, 2015 were continually covered up as part of an intentional concerted effort among the numerous TVA employees.
We certainly believe and hope that the evidence presented during this PEC, along with TVA's written responses and the PEC ' s in written statements for the ten individuals that proceeded it, has disabused the NRC of this notion.
The NRC has provi ded no direct evidence of deliberate misconduct.
Rather, the NRC appears to merely assume, speculate, a nd con jecture that TVA, that ten TVA employees knowingly intended to violate NRC requirements. That assumptions, speculations and con jectures woul d not hol d up in liti gation.
As we pointed out in detail during this PEC,
and in our written s ubmittals,
many of the apparent violations and allegations are based on inaccurate characterizations of t he facts.
Others take prior statements and testimony entirely out of context and misinterpret the speakers' words.
Still other s rely on documents that TVA believed it didn ' t even provide to the NRC.
Given all this, the staff should find, as with any adjudicatory body, that if these matters were (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 122 to proceed to the next level,
that the apparent violations do not satisfy the Commission 's well established legal standard for demonstrating deliberate misconduct.
Yes, mistakes were made on November 11.
They have been studied and corrected.
And a new and improved TVA has emerged.
As TVA has explained, it doesn't dispute certain of the violations.
But with one limited exception, there was no deliberate misconduct by TVA or its employees.
And certainly there was never any concerted or individual effort to provide any inaccurate or incomplete information to the NRC.
I'll now turn it over to Mr. Rausch.
MR. RAUSCH:
I too would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss these Apparent Violations.
And even though that we do not agree with everything in the Apparent Violations, we take ownership over the RHR event.
We understand what caused it, and have taken actions to make sure it doesn't happen again.
We also take ownership over the chilled work environment at Watts Bar.
And we ' ve made (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 123 significant progress to improve behaviors at -every level of the organization.
At Watts Bar in 2015, our procedural use and adherence,
operator fundamentals,
and work environmen t were not up to standard.
We have implemented a number of corrective actions to create and sustain a culture that we as nuclear professionals can be proud of.
I want to mention four t h ings t hat show me our actions have been effecti ve.
We completed our root cause evaluation of the November 11, 2015,event effectiveness review on J une 6, 2018.
And that effectiveness review validated that all corrective actions to prevent recurr,ence,
con t inue to be effective.
The NRC completed a follow up inspection of the NRC confirmatory order and the chilling effect letter on October 24, 2019.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
The NRC inspection team also determined that Watts Bar continues to make progress in improving their safety conscious work environment.
On J uly 27, 2017, a confirmatory order established an independent monitor for three years.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 124 A recent June 2020 semiannual independent auditor report,
which was the l a s t of t he three year requirements, identified that the ERBs or Employee Review Boards, are being effectively implemented in accordance with the procedure, and that all confirmatory order and chilling effects letter requirements are being met.
We made changes to our Employee Concerns Program in October 2019.
And those changes have gone through a f i rst s i x month's effectiveness review.
The NRC allegation data shows that allegations have gone from 21 in 2019 to three in 2020.
Meaning only that four allegations have been received during this new Employees Concerns Program model. In many cases, concerns are now being resol ved in less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
We recognize that the improvements that we 've made don ' t negate our responsibility for our past deficiencies.
We also recognize that we still have work to do.
But TVA and its employees are ready to c l ose this chapter so that it becomes a part of our history.
And we can remember and learn from it.
I want the TVA fleet to understand what happened.
And for TVA nuclear employees to agree, we (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 125 do not want to go back to how we were in 2015.
As we've communicated throughout this hearing, we are prepared to fully accept Violations that are fair, based on facts, and are consistent with the NRC ' s own regulations.
TVA has a responsibility even greater than that of other utilities to operate its plant in a safe and reliable manner.
To earn and maintain the trust of the people of the Tennessee Valley.
And that the responsibility includes owning up to TVA's mistakes and correcting them once and for all.
TVA also has a responsibility to its employees.
Even when they haven't performed at their very best, to ensure that they are treated in a manner that is consistent with law and applicabl e regulations.
I am hopeful that the NRC' s findings following this conference will meet these criteria so that we can move forward.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak.
MR. O' BRIEN:
Thank you, Mr. Rausch.
I have just a few comments to provide here as we wrap up our three days of dialog.
As you have likely heard me say the other days, and I 'm going to repeat it today, because it's (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 126 important. In closing this pre-decisional enforcement con ference, ther e are two points that I want to make sure everybody is aware of, and after three days of comments and perspect ives on both sides, I think i t's very impor tan t.
The Apparent Violations discussed during this conference are subject to further review and maybe subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.
Second,
the statements or views,
expressions or opinions by me, any NRC employees at this conference, or the lack thereof, are not i nt-ended to represent final agency determinations or beliefs.
We intend to take the information you've provi ded us, the information from our other PECs, and look at all the information to make sure that our fina l actions, as we propose, will be fully supported and fully appropriate to the circumstances.
I want to than k all of you for your patience, your words of wisdom, your words of advice,
and your words of information to help the agency do the best that they can i n the job that they're charged with.
Unless there are any other comments, and I want to make sure before I go one step further, and (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 127 ask the Court Reporter if there ' s anything they need?
COURT REPORTER:
Yes, Mr. Chair.
B-efore we go off the record, or after we go off the record, I have a few spelling questions.
MR.
O'BRIEN:
So, after we go off the record, I ' d ask if TVA can help you with those.
With that
- then, I
will c l ose this conference, and it is completed. Thank you very, very much.
And we are off the record.
(Whereupon, the a bove-entitled matter went off the record at 1:12 p.m.)
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