Text

1014-SR-00001, Rev. 0, Safety Analyses Report Type B(U)F Transport Package Castor geo69
	ML21033A354
Person / Time
Site:	07109383
Issue date:	01/14/2021
From:	; GNS Gesellschaft fur Nuklear-Service mbH
To:	; Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Shared Package
ML21033A352	List: ML21033A353; ML21033A354;
References
	T1213-CO-00005 1014-SR-00001, Rev. 0
	Download: ML21033A354 (512)
	v • d • e

(@)GNS Safety Analyses Report Type B(U)F Transport Package CASTOR geo69 Docket No.: 71-9383 Non-Proprietary Version Dokumententyp SR Document Type Doku=~~~- 1014-SR-00001 Revision Revision 0 Name.t Funktlon Datum Unterschrfft Name, 1-lllCbon Date Signature Ersteller Prepared Fachprilfer Re\118W8d Frelgabe Approved

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 0 GENERAL AND ORGANISATION 0.1 Document Organisation Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed This design document is organised In a series of chapters. Each chapter is identified by the chap-ter number.

A section within a chapter is identified by a sequential numeric after the chapter number; thus Sec-tion 2 in Chapter 1 is denoted by 1.2. Subsections to a section are identified by the numeric after the section number, e.g. 1.2.3 for Subsection 3 of Section 2 In Chapter 1. Figures and tables are numbered sequentially in each section e.g. Figure 1.2-4 for Figure 4 in section 1.2. Revisions to this document will be controlled at the section level, as indicated in the bottom of each page. Both, document revision and independent revision of a section are separately indicated by the respective revision status in section 0.2 and 0.3. In the head of each page of the document the document ID is indicated and the respective revision status, whereas the bottom line shows the section and the revision and page number of the section, respectively.

References are identified at the section level in square brackets. References are numbered for each chapter or section individually.

0.1 Document Organisation Section 0.1, Rev. 0 Page 0.1-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 0.2 Revision Status of this Document Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 0.2 Revision Status of this Document Section 0.2,Rev. 0 Page 0.2-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Revision Date Author Revised section 0 22.12.2020 - First issue Changes in later revisions will be marked with a vertical bar on the left side 0.2 Revision Status of this Document Section 0.2,Rev. 0 Page 0.2-2

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 0.3 Revision Status _of Sections Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 0.3 Revision Status of Sections Section 0.3,Rev. 0 Page 0.3-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Section Rev. Date Summary description of change 0

0.1 0 18.12.2020 First issue 0.2 0 22.12.2020 First issue 0.3 0 22.12.2020 First issue 0.4 0 22.12.2020 First issue 0.5 0 22.12.2020 First issue 1

1.0 0 18.12.2020 First issue 1.1 0 18.12.2020 First issue 1.2 0 18.12.2020 First Issue 1.3 0 18.12.2020 First issue 2

2.0 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.1 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.2 0 18.12.2020 First issue 2.3 0 18.12.2020 First issue 2.4 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.5 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.6 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.7 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.8 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.9 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.10 0 21.12.2020 First Issue 2.11 0 21.12.2020 First issue 2.12 0 21.12.2020 First issue 3

3.0 0 17.12.2020 First issue 3.1 0 17.12.2020 First issue 3.2 0 17.12.2020 First issue 0.3 Revision Status of Sections Section 0.3,Rev. 0 Page 0.3-2

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2 390 3.3 0 17.12.2020 First issue 3.4 0 17.12.2020 First issue 3.5 0 17.12.2020 First issue 4

4.0 0 11.12.2020 First issue 4.1 0 11.12.2020 First issue 4.2 0 11.12.2020 First issue 4.3 0 11.12.2020 First issue 4.4 0 11.12.2020 First issue 4.5 0 11.12.2020 First issue 5

5.0 0 10.12.2020 First issue 5.1 0 10.12.2020 First issue 5.2 0 10.12.2020 First issue 5.3 0 10.12.2020 First issue 5.4 0 10.12.2020 First issue 5.5 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6

6.0 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.1 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.2 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.3 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.4 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.5 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.6 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.7 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.8 0 10.12.2020 First issue 6.9 0 10.12.2020 First issue 7

7.0 0 18.12.2020 First issue 0.3 Revision Status of Sections Section 0.3,Rev. 0 Page 0.3-3

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7.1 0 18.12.2020 First issue 7.2 0 18.12.2020 First issue 7.3 0 18.12.2020 First issue 7.4 0 18.12.2020 First issue 7.5 0 18.12.2020 First issue 8

8.1 0 18.12.2020 First issue 8.2 0 18.12.2020 First issue 8.3 0 18.12.2020 First issue 0.3 Revision Status of Sections Section 0.3,Rev. 0 Page 0.3-4

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 0.4 Table of Contents Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed CASTO~ is a registered trade mark.

0.4 Table of Contents Section 0.4,Rev. 0 Page 0.4-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 0 GENERAL AND ORGANISATION 0.1 Document Organisation 0.2 Revision Status of this Document 0.3 Revision Status of Sections 0.4 Table of Contents 0.5 Glossary 1 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.0 Overview 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Package Description 1.3 Appendix 2 Structural Evaluatlon 2.0 Overview 2.1 Description of the Structural Design 2.2 Materials 2.3 Fabrication and Examination 2.4 General Requirements for all Packages 2.5 Lifting and Tie Standards for all Packages 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport

2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions 2.8 Accident Conditions for Air Transport of Plutonium 2.9 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport 2.10 Special Form 2.11 Fuel Rods 2.12 Appendix 3 Thermal Evaluatlon 3.0 Overview 3.1 Description of Thermal Design 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions 3.5 Appendix OA Table of Contents Section 0.4,Rev. 0 Page 0.4-2

1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 4 Containment 4.0 Overview 4.1 Description of the Containment System 4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport 4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions 4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages 4.5 Appendix 6 Shielding Evaluation 5.0 Overview 5.1 Description of Shielding Design 5.2 Source Specification 5.3 Shielding Model 5.4 Shielding Evaluation 5.5 Appendix 6 Criticality Evaluation 6.0 Overview 6.1 Desctiption of Crlticallty Design 6.2 Fissile Material Content 6.3 General Considerations 6.4 Single Package Evaluation 6.5 Evaluation of Package Arrays und Normal Conditions of Transport 6.6 Package Arrays und Hypothetical Accident Conditions

6. 7 Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation 6.9 Appendix 7 Package Operations 7 .0 Overview 7.1 Package Loading 7.2 Package Unloading 7.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport 7.4 Other Operations 7.5 Appendix 8 Accepta~ce Tests and Maintenance Program 8.0 Overview 0.4 Table of Contents Section 0.4,Rev. 0 ,Page 0.4-3

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8.1 Acceptance Tests 8.2 Maintenance Program 8.3 Appendix 0.4 Table of Contents Section 0.4,Rev. 0 Page 0.4-4

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 0.5 Glossary Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 0.5 Glossary Section 0.6,Rev. 0 Page 0.5-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71: Packaging and transportation 10CFR71 of radioactive material ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BPVC 2017 Edition of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code BWR Bolling Water Reactor Cask CASTOR geo69 Registered trade mark for a dual purpose cask providing sufficient neutron and gamma shielding, heat dissipation, activity retention, criticality safety and CASTOR mechanical integrity for transport and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radio-active waste CASTOR~ geo69 Manufacturer's designation for the specified package design DCI Ductile Cast Iron CLU Cask Loading Unit Assembly of fissile material and packaging components Intended to preserve Confinement criticality safety Assembly of components of the packaging intended to retain the radioactive Containment material during transport Design Drawing Engineering drawing as required by the NRC Regulatory Guide 7.9 Supporting design document containing further infom,ation as e.g. references Design Parts List on materials, codes and standards or applicable design drawings Applicable division of the BPVC Section Ill for containment systems for trans-Division 3 portation and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive material DPC Dual Purpose Cask FA Fuel Assembly FEA, FEM Finite Element Analysis, Finite Element Method GNS GNS Gesellschaft fOr Nuklear-Service mbH

- Headquarters: Frohnhauser Stral!e 67, D-45127 Essen

- Shop: Kranbahnallee 3, D-45473 M0lheim / Ruhr GUR Product name of UHMW PE HAC Hypothetical Accident Conditions HC Handling Conditions Parts, components or subcomponents of the overall package system, espe-Item cially when used in context with the parts list LAP Load Attachment Point LT Leak Testing Manual Document defining the applicable undertying quality assurance system MNOP Maximum Nom,al Operating Pressure 0.6 Glossary Section 0.6,Rev. 0 Page 0.5-2

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 MT Magnetic Particle Testing NCT Normal Conditions of Transport, i.e. minor mishaps NOE Non-Destructive Examination or Evaluation, respectively NPP Nuclear Power Plant NRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OM Operation & Maintenance The packaging together with its radioactive contents as presented for Package transport The assembly of components necessary to ensure compliance with the pack-Packaging aging requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 PE Polyethylene

PT PU QA Penetrant Testing Polyurethane Quality Assurance RG U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide RT Radiographic Testing SAR Safety Analysis Report Applicable Section of the BPVC containing rules for construction of nuclear Section 111 facility components SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel UHMWPE Ultra-High Molecular Weight PE UT Ultrasonic Testing VT Visual Testing 0.5 Glossary Section 0.5,Rev. 0 Page O 5-3

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 1.0 Overview Section 1.0,Rev. 0 Page 1.0-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This Safety Analyses Report (SAR) of GNS transport package CASTOR geo69 provides all rele-vant information of the design analyses and confirmation of the respective safety objectives to con-form to the requirements according to 10 CFR 71 §§71.33 and 71.35 for a Type B(U)-F package.

The content and structure of this SAR follows the guidance according to Regulatory Guide 7.9 [1].

1.0.1 Summary of Compliance with 10 CFR71 Requirements The safety evaluation provided In this SAR complies with subpart E and F of 10 CFR71 and shows, that the CASTO~ geo69 package fulfils all requirements for a Type B(U)-F package acc. to 10 CFR71.

The CASTOR geo69 package complies with all requirements of §71.43. In particular the contain-ment boundaries do not include any valves or other devices which failure would lead to the loss of radioactive active content or allow continuous venting during transport as requested in §71.43 (e) and (h). The materials and constructive arrangement considered in package design do not lead to significant chemical, galvanic or other reactions between the package components or the compo-nents and the content as demonstrated in section 2.2.

As presented in chapter 3 the temperature of the accessible surfaces of the package during transport do not exceed 85 °C as requested in §71.43 (g) for the use of the package in an exclu-sive shipment. The evaluation through chapters 2 to 6 shows that under the tests specified in

$71. 71 (Normal Conditions of Transport) and §71. 73 (Hypothetical Accident Conditions) the pack-age fulfils the requirements of §71.51 and §71.55.

The trunnions of the CASTOR geo69 package fulfil the requirements for lifting attachments speci-fied In §71.45(a) as demonstrated In chapter 2. Furthermore the package design as described In section 1.2 does not include any tie-down devices which are structural part of the package and would have to meet the requirements of §71.45 (b).

As presented in chapter 5 the package meets the radiation level limits for exclusive use shipments specified in §71.47 as the transport index exceeds 10. The criticality safety index of the CASTOR~

geo69 package is 0.0, as an unlimited number of packages remain subcritical under the provisions of §71.59(a) as presented in chapter 6.

The admissible content of the CASTOR~ geo69 package contains more than 105A2. Therefore package fulfils the requirement of §71.61 which is demonstrated in chapter 2.

1.0 Overview Section 1.0,Rev. 0 Page 1.0-2

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The evaluation through chapters 2 to 6 demonstrate that the package design is adequate to meet all structural, thermal, containing, shielding and criticality requirements of 10 CFR71. The operation and acceptance test and maintenance program provided in Chapter 7 and 8 ensure the compli-ance of the package condition with requirements of 10 CFR71 at any time of the package opera-tion.

List of References

[1] Regulatory Guide 7.9, Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2005 1.0 Overview Section 1.0,Rev. 0 Page 1.0-3

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.1 Introduction Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 1.1 Introduction Section 1.1,Rev. 0 Page 1.1-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 The CASTOR,z, geo69 is a dual-purpose cask intended for the transport as type B(U)-F package and long-term dry interim storage of up to 69 BWR fuel assemblies (FA). The regular storage peri-od amounts to 60 years. The packaging consists of the main components cask, internals and im-pact limiters. The internals comprise the canister, the basket and the shielding elements. The cask itself mainly consists of a monolithic cask body made of ductile cast iron (DCI) that is sealed by the bolted cask lid. The cask body and the cask lid form the outer containment of the radioactive con-tent. Neutron shielding is ensured by two circumferential rows of moderator columns Inside the cask body wall and by moderator discs on the cask bottom and lid end. Trunnions at the top and tilting studs at the bottom enable safe handling under operating conditions.

The canister, which contains the fuel basket and the FAs, forms the inner containment. The canis-ter consists of a welded stainless steel shell (canister body), which is sealed by the stainless steel canister lid. Therefor the CASTQRfJ geo69 design includes a double containment system, which qualifies the packaging for the transportation of high bumup fuel.

The fuel basket consists of a structural skeleton that maintains the subcrttlcal arrangement of the fissile material and holds additional components required for heat dissipation and shielding. During transportation on public roads, the cask is protected by a lid-end and a bottom-end impact limiter that cover the trunnions and tilting studs. The impact limiters basically consist of a steel casing filled with polyurethane foam.

The selected materials and protection measures of the packaging are suitable for corrosion protec-tion and decontamination under operating and transport conditions.

1.1 Introduction Section 1.1,Rev. 0 Page 1.1-2

1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2 Package Description Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Reviewed 1.2.2 only 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-1

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The packaging and its components are specified by the parts lists and drawings listed in Table 1.2-1, which are also included in section 1.3.

Table 1.2-1 Documents for packaging specification Docu_ment type Content Component Document no.

Cask 1014-DPL-30934 Information about the single parts of the components: Canister 1014-DPL-36855 e.g. item no., quantity, des-Design Parts 11st Fuel Basket 1014-DPL-30984 ignation, material, material specifications required cer- Shielding elements 1014-DPL-33604 tificate, safety classification Impact limiters 1014-DPL-38772 Cask 1014-DD-30934 Canister 1014-0D-36855 Design and dimensions of Design Drawing the packaging and its com- Fuel Basket 1014-0D-30984 ponents Shielding elements 1014-0D-33604 Impact llmiters 1014-DD-38772 The design and dimensions of the packaging are defined by the set of parts llsts and drawings.

These documents provide all design related information required for the safety assessment of the package. Furthermore, the design drawings contain the dimensions of the interfaces needed for cask assembly and operation.

1.2.1 Packaging The packaging consists of the cask with the cask body and the cask lid enclosing the canister and

- the fuel basket (Figure 1.2-1) intended for the accommodation of up to 69 FA. Furthermore, the packaging includes two Impact limiters fastened to the face ends of the cask in order to protect the cask and its content especially under hypothetical accident conditions.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-2

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390)

Figure 1.2-1 Main components of the packaging (exploded view)

Hereinafter the main components of the packaging are described In detail. The item numbers used in the following chapters of this SAR correspond to the ones in the parts list of the respective com-ponent acc. to Table 1.2-1.

1.2.1.1 Cask body The basic structure of the cask body (Item 2) made of DCI is a hollow cylinder with a closed bottom end, cast in one piece. Subsequently to the casting process, every surface of the cask body is ma-chined. This process includes machining of the radial cooling fins into the outer cask surface and the axial drilling of two circumferential rows of each deep-holes from the bottom side Into the cask wall. Each borehole houses a column of moderator rods (Item 4, 54, 141) completed by steel bars (Item 8, 53), which are kept in place by compression springs (Item 6, 31) and the stainless

- steel closure plate (Item 7) bolted to the cask bottom. At the two angular positions of the trunnions, each three outer boreholes and the six moderator rods (Item 54) are slightly shortened. A bottom moderator plate (Item 5) made .of polyethylene is placed in a recess at the bottom end and screwed to the bottom of the cask body via three cap screws (Item 52) and bushes (Item 57).

The closure plate covers the bottom moderator plate (Item 5), closes the deep-boreholes and serves as a seating for the compression springs (Item 6, 31). An elastomer sealing ring (Item 47) is inserted into a groove in the closure plate and each of the 28 hexagon head screw (Item 9) is equipped with a bonded seal (Item 49). Eight circular openings close to the edge of the closure plate give access to threaded blind holes in the cask body for fastening the bottom impact limiter. The openings are sealed by 0-rings (Item 66). When the bottom impact limiter is not as-sembled e.g. during loading, the threaded blind holes are closed by seal plugs (Item 93) equipped with an 0-ring (Item 94). For leak-testing of the complete closure plate a test port is added. Chan-1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-3

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 nels in the closure plate connect all seals with the test port. During underwater loading, the test port is closed leak-tight by a sealing screw (Item 26) and an 0-ring (Item 74). After loading, the sealing screw is replaced by a sealing screw with valve (Item 155) (with a factory-fitted seaQ which limits the gas overpressure in the volume enclosed by the closure plate to a maximum of

. Accordingly, the channel system of the closure plate also interconnects the deep bore-holes for the moderator rods and the recess for the bottom moderator disc.

For fastening the lid impact limiter, threaded blind holes on an outer diameter of the lid-end face of the cask body are used. The unused blind holes are closed during operation and transport.

For handling, the cask is equipped with one pair of lid side trunnions (Item 12) and one pair of tilt-ing studs at the bottom end. The stainless steel trunnions are form-fitted in recesses that are ma-chined into the cask body and are each fastened by 16 stainless steel cap screws (Item 13). The cap screws may be applied in a way . The trunnions are intended as load attachment points and allow vertical handling as well as tilting of the cask.

The tilting studs to support the cask during tilting operations but are not intended for the attachment of load lifting devices. They are covered against wear and corro-sion by corresponding wear protection (Item 183) made of stainless steel, which are sealed with an 0-ring (Item 184). The wear protections are shrink fitted on the tilting studs and additionally se-cured against twisting by 2 hexagon screws (Item 185) with bonded seals (Item 49) each.

The package is marked with a type plate (Item 105), which is mounted on the cooling fin area of the cask body (see Figure 1.2-1). The type plate is mounted via grooved pins with round head (Item 107), distance bolts (Item 108) and discs (Item 87).

- 1.2.1.2 Cask lld system The cask lid (Item 55) closes the cask body (Item 2) and thus the outer containment. The cask lid has two service orifices that are separately covered by the blind flange (Item 89) and the protection cap (Item 113) which are each sealed via metal gaskets (Item 44, 71). The two service orifices are used for vacuum drying of the cask interior, if necessary and helium filling. Their centres are locat-ed above the circumferential gap between moderator plate (Item 56) and retention ring (Item 21).

I One service orifice is equipped with a quick-connect (Item 60) and a bonded seal (Item 77), which provides pressure-resistant access to the free gas volume In the cask cavity. Both service orifice lids are fastened via cap screws (Item 37). The cask lid is fastened by 72 hexagon head screws (Item 62, 63) and sealed via a metal gasket (Item 69) that is fixed within its groove via VMQ clips (Item 30). The three hexagon head screws for sealing (Item 63) enable attaching of a protec-tion seal to be attached by the corresponding authority against unauthorised opening.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-4

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390

. The main components of the cask lid system are shown in Figure 1.2-2.

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-2 Lid system of the CASTOR geo69 cask On the bottom side of the cask lid, a moderator plate (Item 56) is mounted via six cap screws (Item 52) and bushes (Item 57). Below the cask lid, the retention ring (Item 21) to enable adjustment of the gap at the top of the canister e.g. for thermal expansion and to protect the cask lid with the moderator plate from contact with the canister.

1.2.1.3 Canister The canister consists of the canister body and the canister lid system according to the design parts list 1014-DPL-36855. The welded canister body (Item 2) consist of bottom (Item 2-2), liner (Item 2-3, 2-4) and head ring (Item 2-5). Canister body and canister lid (Item 3) made of stainless steel form the inner containment.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-5

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[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-3 Closure system of the CASTOR geo69 canister The canister lid has two service orifices. One is connected to the interspace between the metal gasket (Item 16) and the sealing ring (Item 17) to test the leak-tightness of the metal gasket and is closed with a sealing screw (Item 26) and an 0-ring (Item 74). The second service orifice (see Fig-ure 1.2-4) is used for dewatering, vacuum drying and helium filling of the canister cavity.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-6

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[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-4 Service orifice and corresponding parts for dewatering, drying and hellum fill-ing of the canister A blind plug (Item 9) with an O-ring (Item 15) is mounted in the service orifice. The quick connect (Item 12) is screwed into the thread in the blind plug with a bonded seal (Item 77). After the canis-ter cavity is dried and filled with Helium, the space above the quick-connect is closed with the tightening plug (Item 10) and sealed with the metal gasket (Item 13). The supporting O-ring (Item 14) limits the test space for leak-tightness testing of the sealing via an orifice in the tightening plug, which Is closed by the sealing screw (Item 26) with 0-ring (Item 74). The pressure nut (Item 11) is mounted in the canister lid to fasten the tightening plug.

1.2.1.4 Fuel Basket

- The fuel basket is designed to ensure criticality safety by accommodation of up to 69 BWR-FA in a secure arrangement inside the canister cavity, as well as the removal of the decay heat released by the fuel. The parts of the fuel basket along with their respective item numbers in parts list 10 14-DPL-30984 are described down below.

The fuel basket mainly consists of a grid of stacked sheets, building the separation of the FA re-ceptacles as shown in Figure 1.2-5. Single structural sheets of boronated aluminium (Item 10 - 27) are stacked, serving both for criticality safety and heat dissipation. The stacks are kept together over the total height by the outer sheets (Item 30, 31) made of stainless steel. Round segments (Item 50) for heat transmission, mechanical support and shielding fill the gap between the outer sheets and the canister wall. FA shoes (Item 2) at the bottom of each FA receptacle serve for posi-tioning of the FAs.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-7

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2 .390

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2 .390]

Figure 1.2-5 Fuel basket of the CASTOR geo69 with structural sheets (topmost layer dyed green), outer sheets (pink) and round segments 1.2.1.5 Shielding elements The circumferential gaps between the four round segments in the corners of the structural skeleton of the basket are filled with four shielding elements (Item 3, 4) according to the design parts list 1014-DPL-33604. The shielding elements are made of solid aluminium profiles, which may consist of several parts. They provide additional shielding , mechanical support and improve the heat con-duction. In order to facilitate the draining of the canister cavity after underwater loading , the ge-ometry of one corresponding element (Item 4) provides space for the permanent or temporary de-

- watering lance. The shielding elements are shown in Figure 1.2-6.

Shielding element 2 (Item 3)

Shielding element 1 (Item 2)

Figure 1.2-6 Shielding elements for the gaps in the corners of the fuel basket 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-8

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.1.6 Impact llmiters To protect the cask and the content both under NCT and HAC, the package comprises a pair of impact limiters (see Figure 1.2-7) according to the respective parts list 1014-DPL-38772.The lid impact limiter (Item 90) and the bottom impact limiter (Item 95) consist of an aluminium housing with a PU-foam filling to dissipate the impact energy. A penetration protection (Item 91) is arranged between the lid impact limiter and the cask lid system. The penetration protection consists of a load distribution plate (item 91-3), a penetration protection plate (item 91-2) and a spacer (item 91-4).

[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-7 Lid-end (left) and bottom-end Impact llmlter (right)

The lid impact limiter is connected through load distribution plate and spacer to the cask body by cap screws (Item 100). The bottom impact limiter is connected through spacer to the cask body by cap screws (Item 101 ). The screws are mounted through the closure

plate of the cask body .

1.2.1. 7 Dimensions, Masses and Volumes The most important properties of the CASTOR~ geo69 components, including dimensions, masses and volumes are summarized in Table 1.2-2 through Table 1.2-4.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-9

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-2 Dimensions of the CASTOR geo69 components

[Propnetary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-10

1014-SR Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Dimensions of the CASTOR geo69 components (continued}

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1.2 Packa e Description Section 1. ,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-11

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-3 Masses of the CASTOR geo69 components

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Table 1.2-4 Volumes in the CASTOR geo69

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-12

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.1.8 Components of the Containment System The containment system consists of all the packaging components that prevent the release of radi-oactive material. The CASTOR geo69 features a double-containment system with the outer con-tainment formed by the DCI cask and the inner containment formed by the canister containing the SNF. The item no. refer to the respective parts list acc. to Table 1.2-1.

1.2.1.8.1 Inner Containment The function of the inner containment is maintained under all conditions of transport.

Table 1.2-6 Components of the Inner containment system of the CASTOR geo69 Component Quantity Item Material Canister body 1 2 Stainless steel Canister lid 1 3 Stainless steel Tightening plug 1 10 Stainless steel

- Pressure nut 1 11 Alloy steel

- Metal gasket 1 16 Ni-alloy, stainless steel, Ag 1.2 Package Description Secilon 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-13

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.1.8.2 Outer Containment The function of the outer containment is maintained under all conditions of transport.

Table 1.2-6 Components of the outer containment system of the CASTOR geo69 Component Quantity Item Material Cask body 1 2 DCI Cask lid 1 55 Stainless steel

- Hexagonal screws 69 62 Alloy steel

- Hexagon head screws for sealing 3 63 Alloy steel

- Metal gasket 1 69 Ni-alloy, stainless steel, Ag Protection cap 1 113 Stainless steel

- Pressure nut 6 37 Stainless steel

- Metal gasket 1 44 Ni-alloy, stainless steel, Ag Blind flange 1 89 Stainless steel

- Pressure nut 12 37 Stainless steel

- Metal gasket 1 71 Ni-alloy, stainless steel, Ag 1.2.1.8.3 Metal Gaskets and Seals The metal gaskets used In the CASTOR geo69 consist of a helical spring surrounded by an inner jacket of stainless steel and an outer jacket of silver.

The selected materi-als ensure long-term stability and its high leak-tightness over a broad operating temperature range.

This metal gasket design has proven itself for more than 30 years of cask operation in more than 1200 loaded and stored CASTOR casks worldwide.

The various O-rings and sealing rings used in the CASTOR geo69 are not part of the containment system. They are made of elastomers due to their excellent elastic properties. The elastomer seals serve as test seals and are non-safety related.

The relevant O-Rings in the cask lid system are made of FKM (fluorocarbon rubber). The quick-connect in the cask lid is equipped with a bonded seal plug made of stainless steel and FKM. The hexagon head screw of the closure plate is also equipped with a bonded seal made of stainless steel and FKM and the closure plate exhibits O-Rings made of FKM as well. This FKM material is composed of vinylindene fluoride and fluor alkene and exhibits a high thermal and chemical stabil-ity.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1 2-14

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The relevant O-Rings in the canister lid system are made of VMQ (vinyl-methyl-silicon rubber). The VMQ elastomeric seals in the canister are auxiliary seals to create a cavity which is necessary for the measurement of the metal seals leakage rate after installation. The cask lid is equipped with a clip made of VMQ. The O-ring of the sealing screw of the closure plate is also made of VMQ. This elastomer material is known to exhibit high resistance against water and weak acids, thermal influ-ences (up to 210 °C) and oxidation.

1.2.1.9 Components Required for Shleldlng The major components contributing to shielding are presented as follows, the item no. refer to the respective parts list acc. to Table 1.2-1. Not explicitly mentioned components does only have a minor contribution to shielding and are discussed in the shielding analysis. Dimensions refer to the 9 most relevant shielding contribution and are conservative, if a larger range is pem,itted.

Table 1.2-7 Cask components required for shielding Component Material Gamma Neutron Cask body (Item 2) Contribution due to Major contribution DCI carbon content (radial/wall, axial/bottom)

(minimum 3%)

Cask lid (Item 55)

Stainless steel Major contribution (axiaQ Minor contribution Trunnions (Item 12)

Stainless steel Major contnbutIon (locaQ Minor contribution Closure plate (Item 7)

Stainless steel Major contribution (axiaQ Minor contribution Steel bar (Item 53, 8) Major contribution (radiaQ,

- Carbon steel only bottom end (for acti- Minor contribution

- vated FA foot piece)

Moderator rod (Item 141, 4, 54)

Major contribution

- UHMW-PE Minor contribution (radial)

Moderator plate (Item 56, 5)

Major contribution

- UHMW-PE Minor contribution (axial) 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-15

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-8 Canister components required for shielding Compo_nent, Material Gamma Neutron Canister body (Item 2)

Major contribution (radi-

- Stainless steel aVwall, axiaVbottom)

Minor contribution Canister lid (Item 3)

Stainless steel Major contribution (axial) Minor contribution Table 1.2-9 Components of fuel basket and shielding elements required for shielding Component Material Gamma Neutron Structure sheets (Item 10 ~ 27) Major contribution due Major contribution B4C-AJ-MMC to boron-carbide con-

- (radial and diagonaQ tent ( )

Outer sheets (Item 30, 31) Major contribution Stainless steel Minor contribution

- (radiaQ Round segments (Item 50) Major contribution Al Minor contribution

- (radial)

FA shoe (Item 2) Major contribution Stainless steel Minor contribution

- (axial)

Shielding elements (Item 2, 3) Major contribution Al Minor contribution

- (radiaQ Besides the basket components and the shielding elements, the content itself has a major contri-

bution on the gamma shielding .

1.2.1.9.1 Shielding Material The moderator rods and plates Installed In the CASTOR,g, geo69 are made of UHMW-PE This treatment leads to isotropic properties until this temperature is reached. The design temperatures of the moderator rods and plates are equal or below this temperature.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-16

1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Informatlon with held @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.1.9.2 Shielding Material 1.2.1.1 0 Components of the Confinement System The components of the confinement system are Intended to preserve criticality safety of the fissile material apart from the confinement function of the fuel assembly itself. This does not only include neutron absorbing materials but also any part of the package that is responsible for maintaining the sub-critical arrangement of the fuel assemblies, as well as components that enclose the fissile ma-terial and prevent in-leakage of water under conditions of transport.

1.2.1.10.1 Canister The canister fonns the boundary of the Inner confinement system that encloses the fuel basket with the fissile material. Consequently, all components of the containment system (as described in

section 1.2.1.8.1) are also confinement components. Under all conditions of transport, the canister fonns an independent confinement that prevents in-leakage of water.

1.2.1.10.2 Fuel Basket Sub-criticality is maintained by the arrangement of the fissile material (spent fuel assemblies) with-in the fuel basket As a consequence, all components of the fuel basket that preserve its structural integrity and thus keep the FAs and the neutron absorbing materials in the intended configuration are part of the confinement system. The structural skeleton of the fuel basket (see also section 1.2.1.4) comprises 69 FA shoes (Item 2) as a base for the loaded FAs. The centre, bottom and top sheets (Item 10-27) made of Al-~C-MMC are all part of the confinement system, as the boron carbide is required as neutron absorbing material for criticality control. The outer steel sheets (Item 30 and Item 31) and the round segments (item 50) preserve its structural integrity of the structural skeleton of the fuel basket.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-17

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.1.11 Components for Thermal Protection The CASTOR geo69 does not feature any components specifically aimed as active thermal pro-tection. In case of the thermal test however, the lid and bottom impact limiters (Item 90, 95) protect the lid system and the cask bottom from the direct impact of the fire. The cask body (Item 2) acts as a thermal protection for the inner components due to its high thermal capacity.

1.2.1.12 Components for Heat Dissipation The maximum acceptable heat load of the CASTOR geo69 package is 18.5 kW, which is com-pletely passively dissipated. In the following the components are summarised, that are specifically designed for the heat transfer from the FA within the fuel basket to the atmosphere.

1.2.1.12.1 Fuel Basket The components of fuel basket play a central role in the heat transfer. The decay heat generated in the spent FA is first transferred to the centre, bottom and top sheets (Item 1O to 27) made of Al-

~C-MMC and the outer steel sheets (Item 30, 31). This heat transfer takes place mainly by radia-tion and partly by conduction through the helium atmosphere in the canister. Inside the structural skeleton of the fuel basket, the heat is distributed radially and axially by conduction. The heat is radially transferred to the round aluminium segments (Item 50) and the shielding elements (see section 1.2.1.5), which transfer the heat further to the canister body.

1.2.1.12.2 Canister The canister body consists of a welded stainless steel construction, which allows heat conduction without any gap to its surface, where it is transferred to the cask body by radiation and conduction through the helium atmosphere in the cask cavity. The canister surface is coated to increase the

emissivity. The canister lid system only plays a minor role in the heat transfer due to the gap be-tween fuel basket and canister lid and the subsequent gap between canister and cask lid.

1.2.1.12.3 Cask Without any gap, the heat is conducted around the moderator bore holes through the monolithic DCI cask body to its surface, where it is dissipated to the atmosphere by convection and radiation.

Cooling fins machined into the base material significantly Increase the effective surface of the outer cask wall and improve the convective heat transfer.

1.2.1.13 Corrosion Protection All components of the CASTORfJ geo69 packaging that may have contact with the environment during transport or that have contact to water during loading are made of corrosion resistant mate-rials or they are corrosion protected by additional measures such as coating.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-18

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.1.13.1 Fuel Basket After underwater loading, the canister cavity with the fuel basket and the SNF is drained, vacuum-dried and helium-backfilled which ensures a dry and inert canister atmosphere. All components of the fuel basket are made of either stainless steel (FA shoes, outer sheets) or self-passivating alu-minium alloys, so that no additional measures for corrosion protection are necessary.

1.2.1.13.2 Canister Most metallic components of the canister are made of stainless steel, which do not require addi-tional measures for corrosion protection. The thread bolts (Item 6) are an exemption, as they are made of alloy steel bolting material SA-540M, grade 822. They are protected against corrosion by a zinc coating. The metal gaskets are made of highly corrosion resistant material (silver, stainless steel, nickel).

1.2.1.13.3 Cask Apart from the tilting studs and the recesses for the trunnions, a multi-layer organic painting pro-tects the outer surfaces and the top face of the cask. A nickel coating protects the bearing surface of the cask lid. The cask cavity surface is protected by a coating, which at the same time increases the emissivity for optimising the heat transfer.

The bottom of the cask body is covered by a sealed and leak-tested cover plate (Item 7) made of stainless steel. The cover plate is bolted with galvanised cap screws (Item 9). In addition to the sealing ring (Item 47) which seals the gap between cover plate and cask body, a silicone sealing is applied to the circumferential contact cap between both components.

The tilting studs are corrosion-protected by a stainless steel wear protection (Item 183), which is

mounted via stainless steel hexagon screws (Item 185). An 0-ring (Item 184) seals the gap be-tween tilting studs and wear protection.

Most components of the cask lid system are made of stainless steel. Only the bolting of the cask lid system, which includes the cap screws (Item 37) and the hexagonal screws (Item 62, Item 63) are made of ferritic steel. The corrosion protection of these screws is ensured by zinc coating.

1.2.1.14 Contam Ination Protection The structure of the packaging surface and preservation measures avoid the formation of gathering points for contaminated media. The monolithic cask body provides a closed and gap-free lateral surface of the cask body. In order to ease the removal of possibly adhering contaminations, the outer cask body surface of the CASTOR~ geo69 is painted with a multi-layer coating of epoxy resin 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-19

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 that is easy to decontaminate. Other components e.g. lids and the closure pla!9 are made of stain-less steel and gaps are filled with sealant which allow for an easy decontamination.

1.2.1.15 Transport Concept During transport on public roads, the package is mounted via a transport frame in horizontal orien-tation on the transport vehicle.

Two circumferential support areas, one at the top and another one at the bottom of the cask body, serve as interfaces to the transport frame. The package is resting with these support areas on bearing surfaces of the transport frame. To prevent the package from shifting horizontally during transport, a locking mechanism of the transport frame engages into the circumferential groove in the support area at the bottom end. The cask is also fastened by lashing belts that prevent the cask from moving vertically. The trunnions as well as the tilting studs are covered by the impact limiters, which make it impossible to use these points for load attachment during transport .

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. O Page 1.2-20

1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.2.2 Contents The characteristic values of the cask contents per loading of the CASTOR geo69 are specified in Table 1.2-10. The cask contents consist exclusively of fuel assemblies (FA) which contain spent nuclear fuel in solid form with the density stated in Table 1.2-11. The characteristics of the fuel as-semblies (FA) to be transported in the CASTO~geo69 which are essential for the safety analyses are denoted in Table 1.2-11. If not explicitly specified otherwise, the values are related to the nom-inal conditions before irradiation. Maximum heavy metal masses correspond to maximum active fuel rod lengths. Thus, heavy metal (HM) masses decrease for shorter fuel rod lengths. FA which have been deformed or damaged during reactor operation or which are otherwise defective in their structural integrity are not to be loaded into the cask. It is _only allowed to load undamaged FA with 9 completely filled grids into the cask. Thus, the FA do not contain any moisture after the cask drying procedure. However, it is allowed to load FA with completely filled grids containing replacement fuel rods and/or replacement rods manufactured from solid material (dummy rods). The FA do not contain any moderating constituents. The cask contents do not contain any coolants.

Table 1.2-1 O Characteristic values of the radioactive content per loading of the CASTO~ geo69 package Maximum number of fuel assemblies 69 Maximum decay heat, kW 18.5 Maximum total activity, PBq 500 Maximum Fa averaged burn-up, GWd/MgHM 58 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure (MNOP), kPa Maximum metallic heavy metal mass, kg Maximum inventory mass, kg 22000 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-21

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-11 Characteristics of the fuel assemblies g ~ FA No 1 2 3 4 5 6 0

1 i .

~0 Fuel Type Fissile Material GE 8x8-1 uo, GE 8x8-2 uo, SPC 8x8-2 uo, GE9B 8x8 uo, GE12 LUA uo, ATRIUM-10A uo, 1 1 max. FA mass kg 2 max. metallic HM mass kg 3 2 max. fuel density g/cm3 4 outer size of the assembty (fuel channel, centre) mm 5 outer size of the assembty (comer) mm 6 thickness of the fuel channel in centre (comer) mm 7 total height of FA (bottom to the top of handle) mm 8 fuel rod pttch mm 9 number of fuel rods 63 62 62 60 92 91 10 number of part length fuel rods 0 0 0 0 14 8 11 3 number of water rods 1 2 2 1 (2x2) 2 (2x2) 1 (3x3) 12 fuel rod length mm 13 fuel pellet stack length (adlve fuel length) mm 14 part length pellet stack length mm 15 nominal pellet diameter mm 1 16 tolerance of the pellet diameter mm 17 max. dishing+chamfering, pellet volume fraction vol-%

18 4 max. 1l\J initial enrichment wt-%

19 5 min. 1l\J inttial enrichment wt-%

20 max. FA*averaged discharge bum-up GWd/Mg.._,

21 min. cooling time d 22 23 cladding material Zlrcaloy Zircaloy Zircaloy Zlrcaloy Zircaloy Zircaloy 24 cladding outer diameter mm 25 tolerance of cladding diameter mm 26 cladding thickness mm 27 6 tolerance of cladding thickness mm 28 water rod/channel material Zircaloy Zircaloy Zlrcaloy Zircaloy Zircaloy Zircaloy 29 min. water rod/channel outer dimension mm 30 min. thickness of the water rod/channel mm 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 All values are given for the cold , non-Irradiated state, If not stated otherwise . Toierances are applied positively and negatively.

1 the weight of the fuel channet Is Included 2

for criticality assessment 3

FA No 4 to 6 shO'N larger water rods with grid dimensions of 2 by 2 water regular rods or a larger water channel with grid dimenslons of 3 by 3 water regular rods

averaged over the cross section of the assembly in the region with highest enrichment Including productk>n tolerance 1

averaged over the cross section of the assembly in the region with lowest enrichment excludlng production tolerance 8

deduced from the tolerances of the Inner and outer diameter Figure 1.2-8 shows the general loading schematic of the cask viewed from the top, including bas-ket position numbers 1 to 69 and position groups (PG) A to F. Position groups are defined by posi-tions which are treated equivalently in terms of shielding and decay heat limit.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-22

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390

[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2 390]

Figure 1.2-8 Loading scheme of the CASTOR geo69 package with position numbers and position groups (PG), top view

- 1.2.2.1 Thermal Payload The BWR FA of the six fuel types listed in Table 1.2-11 are to be loaded into one of three different loading patterns which are defined by overall thermal requirements. At the time of loading into the cask, the decay heat of every FA has to comply with one of the three thermal requirements (TR1-3) presented in Figure 1.2-9. Only one single thermal requirement is admissible for single given load-ing. The thermal requirements comprise decay heat maxima (in Watts) indicated position wise.

Thermal requirements are legit for all FA regardless of their type. In addition to the lndMdual boundaries for decay heat, the overall decay heat of a single loading must not exceed 18.5 kW, as stated in Table 1.2-10. It is possible to combine FA of different types within one single loading re-specting the chosen thermal requirement and the overall characteristics of a loading in Table 1.2-1 O. The bounding thermal parameters are discussed and specified in detail in chapter 3.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. O Page 1.2-23

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

- Figure 1.2-9 Thermal Requirements (TR1-3) with maximum decay heat per FA position In W, top view 1.2.2.2 Source Specification The decay heat values, gamma and neutron source terms, nuclide activities, and fissile gas mass-es are determined with the help of bum-up and depletion calculations. This section briefly de-scribes the approach used for the calculations. Results and details are presented in corresponding chapters of the SAR. The aforementioned physical quantities were calculated using the TRITON

[1] and ORIGAMI [2] modules of the SCALE 6.2 system [3].

To enable subsequent ORIGAMI calculations, TRITON is utilized to generate cross-section librar-ies for all FA types from Table 1.2-11. In Figure 1.2-1 O the two-dimensional TRITON models creat-ing the cross-section libraries are shown for the six types FA. Dark blue circles stand for fuel pins, 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-24

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 yellow circles for fuel pins with Gd2O3 content. Pin cladding is shown in light blue. Red areas de-note the position of the water rods/channels and surrounding moderator. Structural materials of the water rods/channels and the outer fuel assembly are pictured in purple (see Figure 1.2-10) .

luol pin pin clodd;og lueC pin With Gd1O, contenl

., modef ato, slfuctur*

material GE 8x8-1 GE 8x8-2 SPC 8x8-2 GE9B 8x8 GE12 LUA ARTRIUM-10A Figure 1.2-10 TRITON models of fuel assemblies The libraries have been generated using the following parameters:

- ENDF/B-VII 252-group library

- enrichment wt-% 235 U in steps of wt-% 235 U for FA types excluding

- enrichment wt-% 235 U in steps of wt-% 235 U for FA type

- moderator density g/cm 3 in steps of

- burn-up up to GWd/tHM in steps of GWd/tHM-To take axial variations in source term generation into account, axially varying burn-up profiles and moderator densities are employed in the ORIGAMI calculations .

. Every 20 ORIGAMI model is divided into 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-25

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 equidistant axial nodes in the active zone, which leads to a virtual third dimension. In the pro-files shown in Figure 1.2-11 and Figure 1.2-12 and summarized in Table 1.2-12, node 1 is at the bottom end of the active region and node is at the top end.

. Sample input files for TRITON and ORIGAMI are provided in Appendix 1-1 and Appendix 1-2.

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-11 Moderator density used In the ORIGAMI calculations 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-26

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-12 Burn-up profiles used In the ORIGAMI calculations 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-27

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-12 Moderator density und bum-up profile Inputs for ORIGAMI calculatlons

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Table 1.2-13 shows the input parameters which are used to generate the ORIGAMI calculation input files resulting in bounding values for decay heat and source terms. Radiation source terms and decay heat increase monotonically with increasing bum-up. Thus, maximum bum-up is a first bounding parameter. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that for decreasing initial fuel enrichments source terms and decay heat are increasing. As a result, minimum Initial fuel enrichment is a sec-ond bounding parameter.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-28

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-13 Input parameters for the ORIGAMI calculatlons of decay heat and source terms

[Proprietray Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Table 1.2-14 shows the input parameters which are used to generate the ORIGAMI calculation input files resulting in bounding values for nuclide activities and fissile gas masses. As the produc-tion of fissile products and actinides differs for varying initial fuel enrichments, a range of this input parameter was taken into account for each fuel assembly type separately. Thus, bounding parame-ters are determined separately for each nuclide and element, respectively.

Table 1.2-14 Input parameters for the ORIGAMI calculatlons of nucllde activities and fissile gas masses

[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per *10 CFR2.390]

Table 1.2-15 contains the calculated values for these quantities. Calculations are perfonned with respect to 1 MgHM and for a date at the end of the minimum cooling time stated in Table 1.2-11.

1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-29

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 1.2-15 ORIGAMI calculatlon results for decay heat, nuclide and total activities, and fissile gas masses with regard to 1 MgHM at the date of minimum cooling time from Table 1.2-11

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

1.2.3 Special Requirements for Plutonium The content as described in section 1.2.2 to be transported in the CASTOR geo69 package con-tains plutonium in solid form only.

1.2.4 Operational Features The CASTOR geo69 is designed to enable the loading and unloading of spent nuclear fuel under consideration of ALARA principles. The closure systems of both containment boundaries (see Fig-1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-30

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 ure 1.2-13 to Figure 1.2-15) are equipped with connection orifices, which are already described in section 1.2.1, to enable the draining, drying and lnertizing of the package.

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-13 Containment boundary detail at the cask lid with protection cap

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390)

Figure 1.2-14 Containment boundary detail at the cask lid with blind flange 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. O Page 1.2-31

1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390

[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]

Figure 1.2-15 Containment boundary detail at the canister lld with tightening plug List of References 1] M.A. Jessee et al.

TRITON: A Multipurpose Transport, Depletion, and Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis Module in: SCALE Code System ORNUTM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017

[2] M. L. Williams et al.

ORIGAMI: A Code for Computing Assembly lsotopics with ORIGEN in: SCALE Code System ORNUTM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017

[3] SCALE Code System ORNUTM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017 1.2 Package Description Section 1.2,Rev. 0 Page 1.2-32

1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Infonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 1.3 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Appendix 1-1: Sample Input file of a TRITON calculation for a FA of type ATRIUM-10A Appendix 1-2: Sample input file of an ORIGAMI calculation for a FA of type ATRIUM-10A Appendix 1-3: 1014-DD-44719 Rev. 0, Drawing, Design, Transport Configuration, CASTOR geo69 Appendix 1-4: 1014-DD-370231/1 Rev. 0, Drawing, Design, Assembly, CASTOR<<>geo69 Appendix 1-6: 1014-DD-36931 1/1 Rev. 0, Drawing, Design, Internals, CASTOR~ geo69 Appendix 1-6: 1014-DPL-30934 Rev. 0, Parts List, Design, Cask, CASTOR<<i geo69 incl. refer-enced drawings Appendix 1-7: 1014-DPL-36855 Rev. 0, Parts List, Design, Canister, CASTOR geo69 incl. refer-enced drawings Appendix 1-8: 1014-DPL-30984 Rev. 0, Parts List, Design, Basket, CASTOR411 geo69 incl. refer-enced drawings Appendix 1-9: 1014-DPL-33604 Rev. 0, Parts List, Design, Shielding elements, CASTOR<<>geo69 incl. referenced drawings Appendix 1-10: 1014-DPL-38772 Rev. 0, Parts List, Design, Impact Limiters, CASTOR<<>geo69 incl. referenced drawings Appendix 1-11: 1014-TR-00005 Rev. 0, Specification for Design Drawings and Parts Lists, CASTOR geo69 .

1.3 Appendix Section 1.3,Rev. 0 Page 1.3-1

APPENDIX 1-1 to 1014-SR-00001 Sample Input file of a TRITON calculatlon for a FA of type ATRIUM-10A Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 2-1 in total 7 pages Page 1 of 7

APPENDIX 1-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Sample Input file of an ORIGAMI calculation for a FA of type ATRIUM-10A Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 2-2 in total 3 pages Page 1 of 3

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PARTS LIST Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld per 1 O CFR2.39O Date: 14.12.2020 Parts List: Rev. Page:
6 APPENDIX 1-10 to 1014-SR-00001 Prepared by DM-D: 1O14-DPL-38772 0 of: 8 Impact Limiter Date: 16.12.2029 Date: 17. 12. 2e2e Date: 17.12.2020 CASTOR geo69 Reviewed by DM-D: Reviewed by QM-Al:
GNS Approved by DM:
Item Qty. Description Article No. To Legend Material Requirements Dimension / Remarks SC R Applicable Document Item e V
The docu110nt is stamped with electron1c s1gnatures and is valid!
PARTS LIST Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.39O Date: 14.12.2020 Parts List Rev. Page: 7
@ Impact Limiter CASTOR geo69 APPENDIX 1-10 to 1014-SR-00001 Prepared by DM-D:
Date: 16.12.2029 Reviewed by DM-0:
1014-DPL-38TT2 Date: 17.12.2829 Reviewed by QM-Al:
0 of:
Date: 17.12.2929 Approved by DM:
8 GNS Item Qty. Description Article No. To Legend Material Requirements Dimension I Remarks SC R Applicable Document Item e V
The docu~ent is stamped with electronic signatures and is valid!
,LEGEND Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Date: 14.12.2020 Parts List Rev. Page: 8
@ Impact Limiter CASTOR geo69 APPENDIX 1-10 to 1014-SR-00001 Prepared by DM-D:
Date: 16.12.2029 Reviewed by DM-0:
1O14-DPL-38TT2 Date: 17.12.2029 Reviewed by QM-Al:
0 of:
Date: 17.12.2020 Approved by DM:
8 GNS The docueent is stamped with electronic signatures and is valid!
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APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001
@GNS Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Specification for Design Drawings and Part Lists CASTOR geo69 Document No.: 1014-TR-00005 Rev. 0 Name Date Signature Prepared by DM-D 19.08.2020 Reviewed by DM-D 24.09.2020 Approved by DM -1. ok.-tobe.r w w This document shall not be cited, reproduced In whole or in part, or made available to third parties without the prior written consent of GNS Gesellschaft fur Nuklear-Service mbH, Essen. All rights reserved by GNS.
This document contains business and trade secrets of GNS.
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev. 0
@GNS Status of Revision Revision Date Author Reason for change 0 19.08.2020 T. Horster
- First issue CASTOR8 Is a registered trade mark.
Status of Revision Page 2 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev.a Table of Contents Status of Revision 2 Table of Contents 3 Definitions and Abbreviations 4 1 Introduction and Summary 5 2 Requirements 5 2.1 General 5 2.2 Drawing and Part Ust Number 6 2.3 Drawing Format 6 2.4 Projection Method in the Drawing 6 2.5 Principle of lndependency according to ISO 8015 6 2.6 Dimensions and Tolerances 6 2.7 Surface Texture according to*1so 4287 and ISO 1302 7 2.8 Quallty and Testing Requirements for Welded Components 7 2.9 Dimensional Check.Required by Control Plan 8 2.10 Weight Data 8 2.11 Marking of Components. Packaging Marking 8 2.12 Bolt Symbols and qesignation 8 3 Appllcable Codes and Standards 9 List of References 10 Table of Contents Page 3 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR--00001 Rev.a Definitions and Abbreviations ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BPVC Boller & Pressure Vessel Code ISO International Organization for Standardisation DD Design Drawing DPL Design Part List GNS Gesellschaft tor Nuklear-Service mbH, GNS Headquarters: Frohnhauser StraBe 67, D-45127 Essen, Gennany Shop: Betriebsstdtte M0lheim, Kranbahnallee 3, 45473 MOlhelm an der Ruhr, Gennany NDE Non-destructive examination NOR Notice of Revision NRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Engineering drawings 10CFR Part 71 for Package Approvals prepared for NUREG/CR-5502 Spent Fuel Project Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Definitions and Abbreviations Page 4 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev.O @GNS 1 Introduction and Summary This report provides infonnation for preparing design drawings of packagings submitted at the US NRG for package approval application. 10 CFR Part 71 [1] 72 [2]. The primary purpose of draw-ings and part lists is to define the package design. Technical contents appropriate for drawings corresponds to the respective safety analyses.
This report furthennore takes into account applicable guidelines provided in NUREG/CR-5502 [3]
2 Requirements 2.1 General The design of components documented in the drawings has been confinned by GNS to comply with the safety analyses desGribed in the safety analysis report.
Assemblies for transport and storage contains all belonging components for a corresponding con-figuration and infonnation about packaging dimensions and maximum allowable weighs of pack-aging and contents.
The components are due to their function recorded in assemblies. The general arrangement draw-ing Is marked as sheet No. 1 and depict all belonging parts. Single parts or design features should be shown on following sheets. If the BPVC is applied for design or materials, the Code, the sub-part and the edition should be referenced on the respective drawings.
The corresponding part list shall specify at least the Item number, quantity, designation, materials and geometrical infonnation.
The revision level of each indMdual sheet including the cover sheet shall be the same. A revision of *any sheet In the set requires updating of all sheets as well as the parts list to the-applicable revision level. The parts list and the corresponding drawings should always reference each other.
1 Introduction and Summary Page 5 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPEN.DIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev.0
@GNS 2.2 Drawing and Part List Number Drawings and part lists should get following numbering:
Drawing: [Design type no.]-DD-[PDM no.] [Sheet no/total no. of sheets] (if applicable) Rev. [No.]
Parts Ust: [Design type no.]-DPL-[PDM no.] Rev. [no.]
2.3 Drawing Format All design drawings should be prepared in size A 1 or AO and scaled Into A3 for different purposes.
Each drawing should include a tittle block that identifies the name of the company, drawing num-ber, sheet number (if applicable), document title, date and name of the preparing, reviewing and approving person. Revised drawings should identify the revision number (0, 1, 2 and so on), date and NOR no. NOR descripts all changes in corresponding document.
Computer generated article number (keytech PDM System) shall be used for numbering the doc-.
uments and confirms that all appropriate reviews of the drawing or part list are documented in company's network.
2.4 Projection Method In the Drawing The projection method 1 according to ISO 128-30:2001 [4] is a standard.
2.5 Principia of lndependency according to ISO 8015:2011 [5]
Each specified dimensional or geometrical requirement on a drawing shall be met independently.
If it is necessary to invoke the envelope principle (Rule 1) the circle, E Symbol is placed next to the size tolerance.
2.6 Dimensions and Tolerances All dimensions $hall be in mm.
Dimensional tolerances for the componems should be provided to ensure that the design is con-sistent with the supporting analyses. Components should be fabricated In accordance with the manufacturing drawings and may have more restrictive tolerances, to ensure component fit-up.
Worst-case tolerances stack-up from the design drawing shouldn't be used to determine compo-nent fit-up.
2 Requirements Page 6 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev. 0
@GNS Nominal dimensions in brackets are for information only, in order to indicate the general size of the component or part. Nominal dimensions have no specific tolerance, but are met through fab-rication in accordance with other dimensions that are tolerance and inspected.
Design relevant tolerances should be defined together with the respective dimension. Not speci-fied tolerances are recorded in the table on the drawing. Longitudinal dimensions include all ge-ometric tolerances.
Tolerances for thickness of material according to BPVC are specified in BPVC Sec. II.
2.7 Surface Texture according to ISO 4287:1997[6] and ISO 1302:2002 [7]
Following values should be applied.
a = riotmachlried vC = Rz40,R170 .jw" = \ / g Did -~1fr v1y = \I b.iii- c1u-~i)-
' C -- -
~~~ ~ = Rz16,Rt25 /x =v' 80/d Rl20 Rl10 Z Dld (]fij)
- 'v C Further values are allowed and should be defined on the drawing.
2.8 Quality and Testing Requirements for Welded Components Welding specification should include location, type of weld, dimension, process-specification, ex-amination method (PT for penetrant-, RT for radiographic-, UT or ultrasonic-, VT for visual testing) and other applicable information consistent with the package evaluation.
e All welds require visual examination (VT). Additional NDE inspections are noted on the drawing as required. NDE Techniques and acceptance criteria are governed by applicable codes and standards, respectively, as specified in the applicable design requirements.
Fabrication may add welds to stitch welds if needed.
All weld sizes are minimums. Larger welds are permitted. Local areas of undersize welds are acceptable within the limits specified in the applicable code or standard.
Unless otherwise noted, full penetration welds may be made from either side of component.
2 Requirements Page 7 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev.a 2.9 Dimensional Check Required by Control Plan Dimensions determining the design should be considered for manufacturing drawings.
Selected dimensions may be tested using a gauge.
2.10 Weight Data Nominal weight of the component is to declare on the title block.
The maximum allowable weighs of the packaging and contents should be indicated on the general arrangement drawing in the box near the title block. Maximum weigh of the package should in-clude the packaging and the contents. All weights should be consistent with those used in the e evaluation.
2.11 Marking of Components. Packaging Marking The general arrangement drawing should show the location and size of durable marking applied to the packaging after verification that it has been fabricated in accordance with the approved design.
2.12 Bolt Symbols and Designation Metric series should be used.
Tolerances for fasteners according to ISO 4759-1 :2001 [8]
Example for a bolt designation: M48x5-6gx40 e - metric series threads
- nominal bolt diameter 48 mm
- thread pitch 5mm (optional)
- thread class 6g
- overall length 40 mm 2 Requirements Page 8 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev.a 3 Applicable Codes and Standards Referenced codes and standards shall apply in the edition directly cited with the standard or as indicated in the following list of applicable codes and standards. For codes and standards not provided with edition, the latest edition shall apply.
3 Applicable Codes and Standards Page 9 of 10
1014-TR-00005 APPENDIX 1-11 to 1014-SR-00001 Rev. O @GNS List of References 1
[1] Title 10 CFR Part 71 Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[2] Title 10 CFR Part 72 Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-related greater than Class C Waste U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[3] NUREG/CR-5502, May 1998 Engineering Drawings for 10 CFR Part 71 Package Approvals
[4] ISO 128-30:2001 Technical drawings - General principles of presentation -
Part 30: Basic conventions for views
[5] ISO 8015:2011 Geometrical product specifications (GPS)
Fundamentals - Concepts, principles and rules
[6] ISO 4287:1997 Geometrical Product Specifications (GPS) - Surface texture: Profile method -
Terms, definitions and surface texture parameters
[7] ISO 1302:2002 Geometrical product specification (GPS) -
Indication of surface texture in technical product documentation
[8] ISO 4759-1 :2001 Tolerances for fasteners -
Part 1: Bolts, screws, studs and nuts, product grades A, B and C 1 If no revision index is given, the latest version of the quoted documents shall be considered.
List of References Page 10 of 10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2 Structural Evaluation 2.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared I Prepared 2.0 Overview Section 2.0, Rev. 0 Page 2.0-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The following sections of this chapter provides the identification, description, discussion and anal-yses of the principle structural design of the packaging, components and systems important to safety.
The structural safety evaluation considering the mechanical loads and load combination confirms that the load conditions required according to 10 CFR 71 (Division 3, WA-3351.2 i) are met For boundary conditions differing from the requirements, it is shown, that assumed loads are covering for those required and represent a conservative scenario.
The structural safety evaluations include e.g. consideration of loads, materials and other specified relevant infonnation. The description how the package complies with the perfonnance require-ments of 10 CFR 71 is provided in Section 1.0.
2.0 Overview Section 2.0, Rev. 0 Page 2 0-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld . @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Prepared 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In this section the principle structural design of the packaging, components and systems important to safety are Identified, described, discussed and analysed separately for the containment, the basket together with the shielding elements, the load attachment points and the impact limiters according to the description in Section 1.2 and the corresponding parts lists and drawing refer-enced In Section 1.3.
2.1.1 Discussion The structural evaluation presented in the following sections confirms the integrity of the principal structural members of the packaging important to safe operation under normal conditions of transport (NCD and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) by showing that the design criteria
specified in 10CFR71 (§§ 71. 71 and 71. 73) and described in Section 2.1.2 are met. The CASTOR geo69 transport package consists of the major structural components cask body, canister, basket, shielding elements and lid and bottom impact limiters as described in Section 1.2 and shown in Table 2.1-1 according to the corresp<:>nding parts lists cited in Section 1.3.
The evaluation of the integrity of the containment members cask and canister including the corre-sponding seals and fastenings is performed and verified under NCT, HAC and test conditions for a Type B(U) packaging according to 10 CFR 71 §§71.71 and 71.73. The assessment comprises:
- Proof of sufficient strength for the cask body, canister body, cask lid and canister lid accord-Ing to DMsion 3 The evaluation of the basket and the shielding elements comprises the loads for transport condi-tions based on analytical and numerical calculations with the finite element method (FE-method) as the selected numerical algorithm. Requirements, loads and essential verifications are discussed in detail.
All verifications confirm the adequacy of the basket and the shielding elements regarding the ca-pability of bearing the required loads and thus are sufficiently dimensioned.
The evaluation of the load attachment points confirms that the predefined requirements under han-dling conditions are met. The assessment comprises the trunnions including bolts and threads, the tilting studs, the threads in the cask lid and the threads in the canister lid.
The analysis of the impact limiters determines the resulting rigid body decelerations of the package under NCT and HAC and proves that the design of the lid impact limiter components as well as of the bottom impact limiter compo-2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Infonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 nents and their corresponding bolted joints and meet the requirements of NCTand HAC.
Furthermore it is shown that the impact limiters remain at the package for NCT and for assembly conditions it is proven that the length of engagement of the impact limiter bolts is sufficient.
The rigid body decelerations of the cask are given for NCT and HAC and it is shown that the de-formations of the Impact limiter for HAC meet each of the following requirements:
- 9.0-m lid and bottom side flat drop without loads to the lid system and the closure plate
- 9.0-m lid and bottom side edge drop without the cask body touching the ground
- 9.3-m side drop without the trunnions touching the ground 9 Furthermore the components of the lid and bottom Impact limiter are subject to acceptable loads under HAC 9.0 m free drops and 1 m pin drops, respectively.
Table 2.1-1 Principal structural members Important to safe operation No besignstlon Component or Subassembly Safety Aspect 1 Cask body 2 Cask lid Structural resistance against specified 3 Bolting Outer containment, cask load conditions, leak-tightness 4 Sealing 5
6 Canister body Structural resistance against specified 7 Canister lid Inner containment, canister load conditions, leak-tightness 8 Bolting/fastening Structural resistance against specified 9 Structural sheets Fuel basket load conditions, positioning of FAs 10 PU foam Limiting of deceleration loads, protection Impact limiters 11 of lid and cask body from puncture loads Trunnions with fas-12 tenlng 13 TIiting studs LAP Safe handling 14 Cask lid threads 15 Canister lid threads 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.1.2 Design Criteria 2.1.2.1 Containment In general, the assessment criteria are separated Into the following categories:
~~Normal conditions~~
~~Hypothetical accident conditions~~
~~Testing Limits~~
~~Fatigue Assessment The design criteria for the stress assessments of the bolts and the cask and canister parts are de-scribed in the following.~~
2.1.2.1.1 Normal Conditions (NC)
Under normal conditions according to 10 CFR 71, the admissible elastic analysis stress Intensity limits for the cask and canister parts are as defined In Division 3 (WB-3222) except bolts and gas-kets:
General primary membrane stress Intensity: Pm S 1.0
~~Sm Local primary membrane stress intensity: JliS 15* S.,.~~
Primary membrane (general or loca0 plus primary bend- (ltz OT PJ+Pb S 1.5* ~m ing stress intensity:
Primary plus secondary stress) plus peak stress (Pm orPJ+Pb +Q+F SSa The welds at the canister are treated as base material considering the allowable stress values and material properties, which is stated in the ASME BPVC Section Ill Division 1, Subsection NF [1].
The following stress criteria for bolts are considered according to NU REG/ CR-6007 [2].
Average stress (Tension): F 2 u=-S-* S7 A 3 Average stress (Shear): Q T=--S0.4* Sy A
stress Ratio (Tension plus shear): Rt 2 +R* 2 <1 Maximum stress (Stress intensity S): S :d: J(am +ab)2 +4 * (r+-c~2 S 0.9* S7 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The evaluation of shear loaded cross sections that are crltlcal to leak tightness conditions are per-formed by assessments considering the shear forces taken from the simulation results. The evalu-ated shear stress is compared to the pure shear stress criterion (according to Division 3, WB-3227.2 (a)):
I Pure Sheac The admissible stress values are summarized In Table 2.1-2.
Table 2.1-2 Admlsslble stress criteria under normal and hypothetical accident conditions Admlnlble stress [MPa]
0 z
Level A(NC) Level D (AC)
I T rc1 s.,
[MPa]
s.,
[MPa]
P,. P.,~ P,.+Pb P1 Pm+Pb P,. P1 P.,+Pb
+Q+F +Q+F
-29 75.0 300.0 75.0 112.5 112.5 210 0 300.0 300.0 Cask 2 772 1544 SA-874M Cask Dd -29 138.0 517.0 138.0 207.0 207.0 331.2 496.8 496.8 SA-182M 56 - -
Grade F316 Canister Headrtng 2-6 Canister Body 2-2 2-3 2-4 Canister Lid 3
Clamping element -
4 Form piece 6
The yield strength Sy of the bolts is summarized In Table 2.1-3.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.1-3 Admissible yield strength [MPa] of the bolts for the cask lld and the canister thread bolts
[Proprietary Information wrthheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The values for the torsional stress 'Z;as are taken from Table 2.1-4. At assembly state the maximum torsional stress is considered. At other load cases half of the above mentioned values are consid-ered according to [2]. A summary of the values is presented in Table 2.1-5 .
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-6
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.1-4 Calculation of assembly preload; Cask Lid; Items 62 and 63 to 55
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.1-4 Calculation of assembly preload; Cask Lid; Items 62 and 63 to 66 (continued)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 2.1-5 Torslonal stress [MPa] from assembly state Torslonal stress , [MPa] ace to temperature and pretension.
Tom RT T.,..
-29°C 20°c
'tr.o ,.., (Fv 11111) 24 28 28
,,..111&1 (Fv.-)
39 39 43 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Infonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.1.2.1.2 Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC)
Under hypothetical accident conditions, the admissible elastic analysis stress intensity limits for the cask and canister parts are as defined in DMsion 3 (WB-3234) except bolts and gaskets:
General primary membrane stress intensity (for austenitic Pm SMtntmwn(24* Sm;0.7*Su) steel, high-nickel alloy, and copper-nickel alloy materials):
General primary membrane stress Intensity (for ferritic Pm S (0.7
~~S.,J steel materials):~~
~~Local primary membrane stress Intensity (for austenitic P1 S ~tntmwn(3.6* S,ni 1.0~~
~~Su) steel, high-nickel alloy, and copper-nickel alloy materials)~~
~~Local primary membrane stress intensity (for ferritic steel Pz S (1.0~~
~~Su) materials):~~
Primary membrane (general or locaQ plus primary bending (PmorPJ+Pb ~
stress intensity (for austenltic steel, high-nickel alloy, and copper-nickel alloy materials): Mtntmum(3.6
~~Snz; 1.o~~
~~SiJ Primary membrane (general or locaQ plus primary bending (Pm DT Pi) + P1, ~ (1.o~~
~~S11 )~~
stress intensity (for fenitic steel materials):
Primary plus secondary plus peak stress Intensity (P111 or PJ+Pb +Q+FS2* Sa, with (2* Sa)at 10 cycles The Sa criterion for canister head ring, liner and bottom of the material is chosen conservatively for a lower material group (BPVC Section Ill Appendices, Table 1-9.5; Nick~I-Chromium-Molybdenum-lron Alloys).
The welds at the canister are treated as base material considering the allowable stress values and material properties according to BPVC Section Ill Division 1, Subsection NF [1].
The evaluation of shear loaded cross sections that are critical to leak tightness conditions- are per-formed by assessments considering the shear forces taken from the simulation results. The evalu-ated shear stress is compared to the pure shear stress criterion (according to Division 3, WB-3224.1 (d)):
I Pure Shear.
I The admissible stress values are summarized in Table 2.1-2.
For the bolts, the stress criteria of the nonnal conditions (Level A) according to Section 2.1.2.1.1 are applied under HAC.
The values for the torsional stress are .applied as described for the normal conditions above.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-9
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.1.2.1.3 Testing Limits Under test conditions, the admissible elastic analysis stress limits for the cask and canister parts according to Division 3 (WB-3235) except bolts and gaskets are defined as follows:
General primary membrane stress intensity: Pm ~ (0.9
~~s,,.)~~
~~Primary membrane plus bending stress for: P112 s ( 0.67~~
~~s,,)~~
intensity:
(Pm + Pb) S (1.35
~~S,,)~~
for: (0.67* s,,) <Pm~ (0.9* S.,,)
(PnJ + Pb) S (2-15
~~Sy -1.2~~
~~Pm)~~
The admissible stress values are summarized in Table 2.1-6.
Table 2.1-6 Admlsslble stress criteria under testing limlts Admissible stress [MPa]
Teatlng UmltB T Sy rc1 [MPs] P., P...+Pb P,.+Pb (0.678.,) (0.9Sv)
Cask SA-874M RT 200 180 270 214 Cask lld SA-182M RT 207 186 279 221 Grade F316 Carvster Headrlng RT
- Canister Body RT
- Canister l..Jd RT
- Clampmg element RT
~ r m piece RT The following stress criterion according to Division 3 (WB-3235) has to be met for the bolts in the cask lid and the canister thread bolts:
Maximum stress (Stress intensity S):
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. O Page 2.1-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The values for the torsional stress are applied as described above for the nom,al conditions.
2.1.2.1.4 Fatigue Assessment The fatigue assessment of the lid bolting is perfom,ed according to the procedure described in Di-vision 3 (Wa-3232.4).
The assessment is based on determining the admissible design life for a given stress intensity am-plitude. With the calculation of the usage factor as the quotient of design life target cycles and ad-missible design life cycles for different load cases, the total usage factor is detem,ined. The total usage factor is the sum of the usage factors of _each load case:
where n is the given design life target and N is the admissible number of cycles from the equation established in the BPVC Section 111 Appendices.
The admissible number of load cycles is detem,ined with the stress intensity increased-by the fol-lowing factors:
Sa= !
S
KF
~~KB (for pulsating load) andSa 2~~
~~= S~~
Kp
~~K"R (for alternatmg load);~~
Where S = stress Intensity, Fatigue strength reduction factor KF = 4 and correction factor for modu-lus of elasticity Kil=~-
2.1.2.2 Load Attachment Points The dimensions of the components are taken from the design parts list according to Section 1.3 and the corresponding drawings and standards.
The material property values are presented in Table 2.1-7 and Table 2.1-8 and are taken from BPVC Section II (Part D) [3]. Not explicitly given values are highlighted in italics and are interpolat-ed or taken from the next higher temperature if interpolation Is not possible. The coefficients of friction of the components are presented in Table 2.1-9.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.1-7 Material properties Component Tempe- Tensile Yield Thermal Modul of Item Classi- Material 1: Nominal Composition (Dimension) rature Strength Strength Expansion Elasticity fication [Alternative 2: Product Form level material] 3: Spec. No.
4: Type / Grade 5: Alloy Desig. / UNS No.
6: Class/ Cond. / Temper 7: Size I Thickness, mm T s.. Sy a E 8: P-No.
9: Group No. *c MPa MPa 10.. 103 mm/mm/°C MPa
-75 - - - 169.00 1: Ductile cast iron -29 300 200 10.3 165.32 2: Castings 3: SA-874 20 300 200 10.3 161.40 4: - 25 - - - 161 .00 SA-874M 5: -
6: - 40 300 200 - -
7: 300<1<530 8: -
9: -
Cask body 2
-75 - - - 169.00 1: Ductile cast iron -29 300 200 10.3 165.32 2: Castings 3: SA/JIS G5504 20 300 200 10.3 161.40 4: FCD 300 LT 25 - - - 161 .00 IJISG 5504] 5: -
6: - 40 300 200 - -
7: 300<1<530 8: -
9: -
-75 - - - 208.00 1: 13Cr-4Ni -29 793 621 10.6 204.78 2: Bar 20 793 621 10.6 201.35 3: SA-479 SA-479M 4: -
25 - - - 201 .00 13Cr-4Ni 5: S41500 40 793 621 - -
(UNS S41500) 6: -
7: -
8: 6 9: 4 Trunnion 12
-75 - - - 208.00 1: 13Cr-4Ni -29 793 621 10.6 204.78 2: Forgings 20 793 621 10.6 201.35 3: SA-182 4: F6NM 25 - - - 201 .00
[SA-182M Grade F6NM]
5: S41500 40 793 621 - -
6: -
7* -
8: 6 9: 4 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1 , Rev. 0 Page 2.1-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.1-7 Material properties (continued)
Tempe- Tensile Yield Thennal Modul of Component Item Classl- Material 1 : Nominal Composition rature Strength Strength Expansion Elasticity (Dimension) flcatlon [Alternative 2: Product Fonn level material) 3:Spec. No.
4: Type / Grade 5: Alloy Deslg. / UNS No.
6: Class/ Cond. I Temper 7: Size/ Thickness, mm T s. Sy a E 8: P-No. 3 10.a 10 9: Group No. *c MPa MPa mm/mml°C MPa
-75 - - - 208.00 1: 13Cr -29 758 586 10.6 204.78 2: Bolting 20 758 586 10.6 201.35 3: SA-193 4: 86 25 - - - 201 .00 Cap screw SA-193M
(
13 Grade B6 5: $41000 40 758 586 - -
6: -
7: S100 8: -
9: -
Table 2.1-8 Tensile strengths Component Item Ciani- Material Tensile (Dimension) flcatlon [Alternative Strength level material]
s.
MPa Cask body SA-874M 2 300
( (JISG 5504)
Cap screw 13 SA-193M 86 758
_J SA-182M F318
[SA-182 F304, 517 Cask lid SA-240M 316, 55 SA-240M 304)
~
[SA-965M F316, 483 SA-965M F304)
Canister lid 3 689 Load attach-ment point for cask lid
- - - 1000 handling Table 2.1-9 Coefficients of friction Coefficient of friction Component 1 Component2 Area of contact llmu Trunnion bolt Cask body Bolt thread 0.095 Trunnion bolt Trunnion Bolt head bearing area 0.11 2 .1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1 , Rev. 0 Page 2.1-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2. 390 2.1.2.3 Basket 2.1.2.3.1 Verifications for the different conditions of transport The verification is done under the assumption that the decelerations acting on the package are transferred completely to the fuel basket and the content. Since the mechanical loads are modelled as static loads, it Is ensured that dynamic effects are covered in the load mapping. The thermal loads are taken into account as steady-state temperature fields.
When determining the mechanical properties of the materials, maximum design temperature is taken as a basis in order to take into account their temperature dependence conservatively.
The verification of the load-bearing capacity of the load-bearing components Is accomplished in
- form of a linear-elastic stress analysis as described in the corresponding paragraph in Section 2.1.2.3.3 below. If this should not be successful, a nonlinear stress-strain analysis is done accord-ing to the corresponding paragraph on the verification of the load-bearing capacity in Section 2.1.2.3.3 below. The designation of residual deformations is accomplished according to the corre-sponding paragraph in Section 2.1.2.3.3 below. The procedure for the verification of stability is de-scribed in the corresponding paragraph on the stability analyses in Section 2.1.2.3.3 below.
The stresses and strains are calculated using standard analytical and numerical methods. The numerical algorithm selected is the finite element method (FE-method). The calculations are car-ried out using the explicit finite element code LS-DYNA~ [4].
2.1.2.3.2 Classification of the Conditions of Transport as Load Cases Load cases to be considered based on the conditions of transport are classified into load catego-ries according to KTA 3201.2 [5]. For this purpose, the load cases corresponding to NCT are clas-sified as "normal operating conditions" (specified operation). The loadings derived for this category are classified as operating level "Level A".
The load cases which correspond to HAC are classified In load category "accidents" (load case class "incidents') based on KTA 3201.2 [5]. The loadings derived for this category are classified as operational level "Level D". The integrity of the fuel basked is verified under HAC loads, which means that structural failure of the load-bearing components is excluded. Furthermore, it is shown that these loads do not cause any deformations which transmit inadmissible loads to the content. If any residual deformations occur, they are quantified and reported. Additionally, it is also proven in the respective verifications for the package, that leak-tight containment and shielding are properly ensured.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information wrthheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The material-dependent allowable stresses used for verifications with elastic and elastic-plastic material behaviour correspond to the classification of operating levels for different conditions of transport based on KTA 3201.2 [5].
2.1.2.3.3 Load-Bearing Components The verification concept for the load-bearing components with the following analyses is depicted in Figure 2.1-1 in the form of a flow chart
~~linear elastic stress analysis,~~
~~load-bearing capacity analysis (if necessary) with ideally elastic-plastic material behaviour,~~
~~evaluation of the deformations of the fuel basket and~~
~~verification of stability 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-15~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 2.1-1 Verification concept for load-bearing components of the fuel basket 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-16
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 2.1-1 Verification concept for load-bearing components of the fuel basket (cont.}
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-17
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Linear-Elastic Stress Analyses Linear-elastic stress analyses are carried out assuming a linear dependency between stresses and strains using the nominal loads according to Appendix 2-2.
The verification is successful, if the linearized equivalent van-Mises stress crv is smaller than the allowable stress OaJJ.
The allowable stresses 01111 according to KTA 3201.2 [5] for metallic materials are shown in Table 2.1-10.
Table 2.1-10 AJlowable stresses used for II near-elastic stress analyses Allowable stresses oa11 for Stress category NCT HAC Pm Sm 0.7 RmT P1 1.5 Sm RmT Primary stresses Pm+ Pb or 1.5 Sm RmT P1 + Pb Pe Primary plus Pm+ Pb+ p., + Q secondary stresses 3Sm -
or P1 +Pb+ Pe+ Q Pm general pnmary membrane stress due to mechanical loads P1 local pnmary membrane stress due to mechanical loads Pb bending stress due to mechanical loads Pa membrane stress due to constrained thermal expansion Q bending stress due to constrained thermal expansion Rrnr tensile strength at design temperature Rpa 2r yield strength at design temperature Sm stress reference value according to Tal:>le 2 1-13 The higher limit defined for the allowable stresses when considering the additional effect of sec-ondary stresses is explained by the essential characteristic of these stresses, that after exceeding the yield stress, local deformation differences equilibrate and cause plastic strains which are self-limiting.
If the allowable stresses are exceeded in a linear-elastic stress analysis, nonlinear structural anal-yses must be performed according to the corresponding paragraph on the verification of the load-bearing capacity below.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-18
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Infonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In case that after at least one of the further analyses the yield strength at design temperature Rpa 2T is exceeded, a separate deformation analysis must be performed according to the corresponding paragraph on residual deformations below.
Verification of the Load-Bearing Capacity Nonlinear structural analyses are performed based on the von Mises plastic distortion hypothesis.
The vertfication of the load-bearing capacity and the calculation of the residual deformations and plastic strains are accomplished by separate analyses according to the corresponding paragraph on residual deformations below.
For the verification of the load-bearing capacity a safety factor on load side YF is considered ac-9 cording to KTA 3201.2 [5] as shown in Table 2.1-11.
Table 2.1-11 Safety factor on load side used In a nonlinear load-bearing capacity analysis Condition of transport
Safety factor YF NCT 1.50 HAC 1.10 For the load-bearing capacity analysis an ideally elastic-plastic material behaviour is assumed us-ing the fictitious yield stress OF. For the load-bearing components of the fuel basket, the fictitious yield stress values for metallic materials which possess enough ductility over the whole range of operating temperatures according to KTA 3201.2 [5] are shown in Table 2.1-12.
~~Table 2.1-12 Fictitious yield stress of load-bearing components used In a nonlinear load-bearing capacity analysis Condition of transport~~
~~FictltJous yield stress aF-*.~~
NCT 1.5 Sm HAC min {2.30 Sm; 0.7 RmT}
RmT tensile strength at design temperature Sm stress reference value according to Table 2.1-13 The stress reference value is calculated according to KTA 3201.2 [5] as shown in Table 2.1-13.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-19
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.1-13 Stress reference value Sm Ferritic material 8m =mm trf ~1
. """"i]"""°* f?.tT 27 ' 3,0 Austenitic material SIP =nun
- ~ R,oz R.zty
~ *1.1' 27
~~3.0 R.<<r}~~
Rp02RTyield strength at room temperature RpO 2T yield strength at design temperature
-RrnT tensile strength at design temperature RrnRT tensile strength at room temperature The verification is successful if a static equilibrium between external loads and internal forces is achieved, without a structural failure that can lead to the collapse of the frame structure of the fuel basket.
Additionally the limit load can be determined by increasing the mechanical load until a structural collapse occurs. In this way safety margins against structural failure can be identified:
Residual Defonnatlons The calculation of residual deformations is carried out in a deformation analysis using the nominal loads according to Appendix 2-2.
The analyses must be carried out usi~ either an ideally elastic-plastic material behaviour with yield strength at design temperature Oy = Rpo,2T as yield stress or a multi-linear flow curve with the stress-strain relation shown in Table 2.1-14:
Table 2.1-14 stress-strain relation of multi-linear flow curve for deformation analyses
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-20
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The effects of residual deformations resulting from NCT on the behaviour under HAC must be tak-en into account.
The residual deformations from the cumulative loads must be determined for the decisive HAC drop orientations and documented for further safety verifications. Residual deformations which cause loads on the FA are not allowed.
Stability Analyses Under HAC, stability analyses must be performed for all load-bearing components of the fuel bas-ket. This can be done by applying analytical or numerical methods. The code applied as basis for analytical verification is Eurocode 3 [6] for steel and Eurocode 9 [7] for aluminium structures. For numerical analyses stress-free geometrical Imperfections In the structure have to be taken into account for the subsequent nonlinear stability analysis (geometrical and material nonlinearity). The material behaviour Is modelled as described in the corresponding paragraph in Section 2.1.2.3.3.
The safety factor on load side YF is 1.1 (see Table 2.1-11).
2.1.2.3.4 Non-Load-Bearing Components For the non-load-bearing components, those properties relevant for their usability, such as heat conduction, leak-tight containment, etc., must be maintained under the loads at the conditions of transport.
For components which are relevant for shielding the effects of residual deformations resulting fro!Tl NCT on the behaviour under HAC must be taken into account in the calculations. The loads are applied according to Appendix 2-2 (Chapter 2). The material behaviour is adopted from the defor-mation analysis according to the corresponding paragraph on residual deformations in Section
- 2.1.2.3.3 above.
As all components of the fuel basket are classified as load-bearing components, these require-ments do not apply in the framework of this report and are only mentioned in order to complete the description of the verification concept.
2.1.2.3.6 Consideration of the Temperature Influence Within the superposition of mechanical and thermal loads in nonlinear stress-strain analyses ac-cording to 2.1.2.3.3, the temperature loads are applied in the first load step, whereas the mechani-cal loads are introduced in the next load steps.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-21
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.1.3 Weights and Centres of Gravity Weights are given In the corresponding table in Section 1.2, the centres of gravity can be taken from the respective drawings, cited In Section 1.3.
2.1.4 Identification of Codes and Standards for Package Design The design, fabrication, assembly, inspection and examination of the CASTOR~ geo69 package will be performed by the use of generally accepted standards which Includes:
ASME BPVC Section II 2017 Edition, ASME BPVC Section Ill, Division 1, Subsection NF 2017 Edition, ASME BPVC Section Ill, Division 3 2017 Edition, ASME BPVC Section V 2017 Edition, ASME BPVC Section IX 2017 Edition, DIN EN 1993-1-5, 2019/10 Eurocode 3: Design of steel structures Part 1-5: Plated structural ele-
ments, DIN EN 1999-1-1, 2014/03 Eurocode 9: Design of aluminium structures Part 1-1: General structur-al rules, Safety standards of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) 3201.2 Components of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of Light Water Reactors Part 2: Design and Analysis 2017-11 and American National Standards Institute -ANSI N14.6-1993 American National Standard for Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More Special processes will be applied and documented by evaluated and approved procedures.
2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-22
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Sec. 111, Div. 1 Subsection NF 2017 Edition
[2] NUREG / CR-6007 UCRL-I0-110637 Stress Analysis of Closure Bolts for Shipping Casks April1992
[3] 2017 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section 11 - Materials Part D - Properties (Metric)
[4] LS-DYNA~
Version: smp d R7.1.1, Revision 88541 Livermore Software Technology Corporation
[5] Safety Standards of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) 3201.2 Components of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of Light Water Reactors Part 2: Design and Analysis 2017-11
[6] DIN EN 1993-1-5, 2019/10 Eurocode 3: Design of steel structures Part 1-5: Plated structural elements
[7] DIN EN 1999-1-1, 2014/03 Eurocode 9: Design of aluminium structures Part 1-1: General structural rules 2.1 Description of the Structural Design Section 2.1, Rev. 0 Page 2.1-23
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2 Materials Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1 Material Properties and Specifications If not stated otherwise, the applicable material properties according to the respective requirements of ASME PBVC,Section II and Division 3 are taken into account. For applied materials other than specified as described above, the properties are considered as given below.
In the range of validity of the properties (e.g. temperature), the data can be interpolated linearly.
2.2.1.1 Aluminum EN AW-6061 Table 2-1 Physical Properties acc. to [1]
Tempe- Yield Tensile Specific Thennal Heat Elongation Heat rature Strength Strength Expansion Conductivity Capacity TrCJ Rpo.2 [MPa] Rm [MPa] [%] a 1.. Cp
[1o-erci [W/(m K)] [J/(kg K)]
20 60 150 16 - 138 900 100 - - - 23.8 147 960 150 - - - - 151 -
200 - - - 24.8 155 990 Poisson's Ratio v [-] = 0.33 Density p [kg/ dm3] = 2.68 Chemical composition according to [1] as given in Table 2-5 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. O Page2.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.2Alumlnlum EN AW-6083, condition H111 Table 2-2 Physical Properties acc. to [2]
Specific Tempe- Yield Tensile Thennal Heat Elongation Heat rature Strength Strength Expansion Conductivity Capacity
<< A. Cp T rC1 Rp0.2 [MPa] Rm [MPa] [%]
[1~1°C] [W/(m K)] [J/(kg K)]
20 115 270 15 - 116.1 900 50 - - - - 120.6 913 75 - - - - 123.8 924 100 - - - 24.2 126.7 935 125 - - - - 129.5 946 150 - - - - 132.1 957 175 - - - - 134.5 966 200 - - - 25.0 136.7 973 Poisson's Ratio v [-] = 0.33 Density p [kg/ dm3] = 2.66 Chemical composition according to [2] as given in Table 2-5 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-3
1014--SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.3Alumlnum EN AW-5464, condition 0 Table 2-3 Physical Properties acc. to [3]
Yield Tensile Thermal Heat Con- Specific Heat Temperature Elongation Strength Strength Expansion ductlvtty Capacity TrCJ ~[MPa] Rm [MPa] [%] a [1o-8rC] A[W/(m K)] Cp [J/(kg K)]
20 85 215-275 16 23.6 134.0 898 50 137.6 909 75 140.8 923 100 143.6 934 125 145.9 942 150 148.0 951 175 150.0 961 200 151.9 972 Poisson's Ratio v [-] = 0.33 Density p [kg/ dm3] = 2.69 Chemical composition according to [3] as given in Table 2-5 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-4
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Infonnatlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.4Alumlnum EN AW-7076, condition T661 Table 2-4 Physlcal Properties acc. to [3]
Yield Tensile Thennal Heat Con*- Speclflc Heat Temperature Elongation Strength . Strength Expansion ductivity capacity Trc1 Rpo.2 [MPa] Rm [MPa] [%] a [1~!°CJ A. [W/(m K)] Cp [J/(kg K)]
20 360 460 3 23.1 130 796 50 - - - - 134 879 100 - - - - 142 921 200 - - - - 176 1005 400 - - - - 176 1005 Poisson's Ratio v [-] = 0.33 Density p [kg/ dm3] = 2.80 Chemical composition according to [3] as given in Table 2-5 Table 2-5 Chemical composition for Aluminium alloys in wt-%
Alloy SI Fe Cu Mn Mg Cr Zn TI Add. Bal.
ENAW- 0.30 0.45 0.05 0.10 ~ 1.60 ~ 0.30 0.20 0.10 s 0.15 Al 5051 max max max 0.25 2.10 max max max ENAW- 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.40~ 4.00~ 0.05 ~ 0.25 0.15 max s 0.15 Al 5083 max max 1.00 4.90 0.25 max max ENAW- 0.25 0.40 0.10 0.50~ 2.40 ~ 0.05~ 0.25 0.20 5454 max max max 1.00 3.00 0.20 max max
- Al ENAW- 0.35 0.40 0.20 0.05 ~ 1.00 ~ 0.10 ~ 4.00 ~ 0.08~
s 0.15 Al 7075 max max max 0.50 1.40 0.35 5.00 0.25-
~~All content given in wt-%~~
.... Combined content of Zr + Ti 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. O Page 2.2-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.5 Ultra High Molecular Weight Low Pressure Polyethylene
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR 2.390]
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.6 Stainless Spring Steel 1.4310 Table 2-7 Physical Properties acc. to [5]
Tempera- Tensile Thennal Thennal Modulus of Specific Heat Density ture Strength Conductivity Expansion Elasticity TrCJ Rm [MPa] 1 [W/(m*K)] a [1 o-8/"C] E [103 MPa] [J/(kg*K)] p [kg/rw]
1300-20 14.5 16.1 196 472 7920 1500 100 - 16.0 16.7 - 501 -
200 - 17.6 17.2 - 525 -
300 - 19.1 17.7 - 532 -
400 - 20.4 18.1 - 555 -
Emission Coefficient e [-] = 0.40 Table 2-8 Chemical Composition acc. to [5]
Chemical composition [wt-%]
min max C 0.05 0.15 Si - 2.00 Mn - 2.00 p - 0.045 s - 0.015 Cr 16.0 19.0 Ni 6.00 9.50 N - 0.11 Mo - 0.80 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfom,atlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1. 7 Aluminium-Boron Metal Matrix Composite Al-84C-MMC Table 2-9 Physical Properties 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page2.2-8
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR 2.390]
Table 2-10 Chemical Composition acc. to [6]
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR 2.390]
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.8 Polyurethane Hard Foam )
Table 2-11 Physical Properties acc. to [7]
Temperature Compressive Strength Density TrCJ a. [MPa] p [kg/m~
min max min max nominal 20 Thermal Conductivity i [W/(m*K)] =
Specific Heat Capacity Cp [J/(kg*K)] =
Table 2-12 Chemical Composition acc. to [7]
Chemical composition [wt-%]
C H
N 0
p SI 2.2.1.9 Polyurethane Hard Foam (
Table 2-13 Physlcal Properties acc. to [7]
Temperature Compressive Strength Density TrCJ a. [MPa] p [kg/m3]
min max min max nomlnal 20 Thermal Conductivity i [W/(m*K)] =
Specific Heat Capacity Cp [J/(kg*K)] =
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. O Page 2.2-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2-14 Chemical Composition acc. to [7]
Chemical composition [wt-%]
C H
N 0
p Si 2.2.1.10 Polyurethane Hard Foam Table 2-16 Physlcal Properties acc. to [7]
Temperature Compressive Strength Density TrCJ O"s [MPa] P [kg/m3]
min max min max nominal 20 Thermal Conductivity ')., [W/(m*K)] =
Specific Heat Capacity Cp [J/(kg*K)] =
Table 2-16 Chemical Composition acc. to [7]
Chemical composition [wt-%]
C H
N 0
p Si 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. O Page 2.2-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.11 Nlckel alloy Table 2-17 Physical Properties acc. to [8]
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Density p [kg/ dm3] = 8.20 Table 2-18 Chemical Composition acc. to [8]
Chemlcal composition [wt-%]
min max Cr 18.0 21.0 Fe - 2.00 Ti 2.00 3.00 Mn - 1.00 Si - 1.00 C - 0.13 Al 1.00 2.00 Co 15.0 21.0 s - 0.015 Cu - 0.2 B - 0.03 Pb - 0.0025 Zr - 0.15 NI bal.
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-12
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.1.12 Sliver Table 2-19 Physical Properties acc. to [9]
Hardness ThennalConductlv lty Specific Thennal Capacity HV [W/(m k)] [J/(kg*K)]
50 +/-10 429 232 Table 2-20 Chemical Composition acc. to [9]
Chemical composition [wt-%] Density [kg/dm3]
Nominal Ag 99.99 10.49 2.2.1.13 Stainless Steel SA-240 Gr. 304L Table 2-21 Physical Properties acc. to [10]
Temperature Tensile Strength* Yield Strength*
Aaomm Elongation Hardness Brtnelr Hardness Rockwelr Trci Rm [MPa] Rpo.2 [MPa] [%] HBW B 20 520- 700 min. 170 min.45 max. 201 max. 92 Density p [kg/ dm3] = 8.30
~~Values have to be verified during manufacturing test 22 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-13~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2 390 Table 2-22 Chemical Composition acc. to [10]
Chemical composition [wt-%]
min max C - 0.03 Mn - 2.00 p - 0.045 s - 0.030 Si - 0.75 Ni 8.00 12.00 Cr 17.5 19.5 N - 0.10 2.2.1.14 Construction Steel 1.8983 Table 2-23 Physical Properties acc. to [11]
Tempera- Yleld Tenslle Elon- Modulus of Thennal Thennal Specmc ture Strength Strength gatlon Elasticity Conductivity Expansion Heat Ri,o.2 1rc1 [MPa]
Rm [MPa] A rkJ E [10 3 MPa] A [W/(m*K)] a [1~rc1 [J/(kg*K)]
20 890 940 11 212 41.5 - 461 100 828 874 - 207 42.5 12.1 496 200 748 790 - 199 42.5 12.7 533 300 - - - - 41.2 13.2 568 400 - - - - 39.3 13.6 611 Density p [kg/ dm3] = 7.84 Emission Coefficient e [-] = 0.40 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2-24 Chemical Composition acc. to [11]
Chemical composition [wt-%]
min max C - 0.20 Si - 0.80 Mn - 1.70 p - 0.020 s - 0.010 Cr - 1.50 Ni - 4.00 N - 0.015 Mo - 0.70 Cu - 0.50 Nb - 0.06 Ti - 0.05 V - 0.12 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-15
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.2 Chemical, Galvanic, or other Reactions The materials of the CASTOR geo69 have been reviewed and as a result during loading and transport operations no safety related component is significantly influenced by chemical, galvanic or other reactions.
During the loading operations the parts of the basket and the canister are in contact with the pool water. These materials are stainless steels, aluminium alloys and the aluminium boron carbide metal-matrix-composite (MMC) and all are compatible with the pool water.
The interior of the CASTOR~ geo69 is filled with helium after the loading operations. This provides a non-aqueous and inert environment during transportation. Corrosion reactions depend on the presence of water and/or oxygen. The inert helium gas atmosphere in the CASTOR~ geo69 pre-cludes corrosion during transport. Exterior surfaces and materials consists of stainless steels, alu-minium alloys or coated materials. Therefore no chemical, galvanic or other reaction have to be assumed.
The materials of the CASTORiz geo69 are summarized in the attached table. Under the presence of water dissimilar materials can form a galvanic couple. During the loading the aluminium alloys and the aluminium boron carbide (MMC) form a galvanic couple with stainless steel. Both types of aluminium develop a native passive layer that precludes significant corrosion effects. To minimize other galvanic reactions the aluminium components, which are In contact with stainless steels, are additionally anodized. In consequence no galvanic reactions to the aluminium alloys or the stain-less steels occur during the short loading time.
The cask is made of ductile cast iron and the exterior surfaces will be coated to preclude corrosion reactions at the surfaces. The cask cavity is filled with helium and no corrosion has to be assumed.
The lids of the cask are made of stainless steel and are in contact with the zinc-coated alloyed steel bolts. The bolts of the lid are not directly exposed to the ambient weather, because they are covered by the impact limiters. During the time of transport no significant corrosion effects are to be implied for the bolts.
During loading operations of the canister, before drying and refilling with helium, only minor amounts of hydrogen gas will be generated due the minimized galvanic reaction of the aluminium and stainless steel and due to radiolysis of the water. This hydrogen will be evacuated from the canister during the drying process and no concentration of hydrogen can occur.
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-16
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Propnetary Information wrthheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Lubricants are used to coat the screw thread. Only permitted lubricants are used for the coating of the screw thread. Before assembly or loading all cask components will be inspected and freed from any form of contamination or marking. The lubricants have no significant effect on the cask materi-als.
In consequence there are no significant chemical, galvanic or other reaction that could reduce the integrity of the cask during the loading and transport operations.
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-17
en I\) Material / Component Loading Operations / Contact to Fuel Pool a i-->
3::
Transport Environment :::0 ......
I>> 0 0
~~J N~~
l')
a I>>
i s* High alloyed stainless Stainless steels in contact with both borated and
~t
~~0 (I)~~
c:
cir
!Steels: unborated water do not exhibit chemical or galvanic The environmen t for these components will be an inert helium atmosphere. No further chemical, gal- i 0
0 reactions or Interactions with spent fuel. vanic or other reactions are assumed.
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
Basket
-Aluminium boron car- The aluminium boron carbide (MMC) forms a gal- The environmen t for these components will be an bide (MMC) vanic couple with stainless steels. The aluminium inert helium atmosphere. No further chemical, gal-will be anodized to minimise any form of galvanic or vanic or other reactions are assumed.
other corrosion reactions. Due to the short loading
""C D) cc time, in which they are in contact with pool water, (I)
I\) Neutron Absorber the neutron absorber material Is not exposed to i-->
I Basket (X) significant chemical, galvanic or other reactions .
I\.) Material / Component Loading Operations / Contact to Fuel Pool
[ ;.., Transport Environment er
~
~~s::::~~
!!?.
(I)
N j-) irii Aluminium alloys The aluminium alloy forms a galvanic couple with The environment for these components will be an
~~0 (I) stainless steels. These aluminium components will inert helium atmosphere. No further chemical, gal-~~
~
0 be anodized to minimise any form of galvanic or vanic or other reactions are assumed.
other corrosion reactions. Due to the short loading time In which they are in contact with pool water, Heatconducting or the material is not exposed to significant chemical, shielding elements galvanic or other reactions.
!Steels: These components are not In contact with the pool The environment for these components will be an SA-193M 87 water. inert helium atmosphere. No further chemical, gal-
$A-540M 822 vanic or other reactions are assumed.
Canister Puctile cast iron, This component is not in contact with the pool wa- The internal surfaces will be exposed to an inert he-ter. llum atmosphere. Exposed external surfaces will be coated and will be maintained with a fully coated surface. No further chemical, galvanic or other re-Cask actions are assumed.
r:>olyethylene This component is not in contact with the pool wa- The- neutron absorber materfal has no contact to ter. the outer environment No chemical or galvanic re-
~
"'C (D
Neutron absorber Cask actions with ductile cast iron or other steels are as- @
sumed. Other reactions are Insignificant.
I\.)
~~.., . Q I~~
co z
en I\.) Material / Component Loading Operations / Contact to Fuel Pool Transport Environment N
~ s:: f~en ff
J
...., a CD o
!-> fil' High alloyed stainless This component is not in contact with the pool wa- Some parts are exposed to ambient weather Stainless ;p cii" 0
~~a lsteels~~

0 CD ter. steels exhibit a native corrosion protection layer and no 0 0
0 galvanic or other corrosion reactions have to be assumed.
M No chemical or other reactions are assumed.
Constructional steel This component is not in contact with the pool wa- This material has no contact to the outer environ-
$A-675M 60 ter. ment. No significant chemical or galvanic reactions
'1J D) cc with ductile cast iron or other steels are assumed.
CD I\.)
N Cask No other reactions are assumed.
N 0
I\J Material / Component Loading Operations / Contact to Fuel Pool Transport Environment
~~a. i-.J s::~~
~~0 CD 0~~
0 N
a CD
!Steels: This component Is not in contact with the pool wa-0 t
0 1-> 65" Components are exposed to atmosphere. These 6 a'i 0
0 0 ISA-193M 87 ter. components are coated with a zinc layer. During
~ 0 0 SA-540M 822 the transport time, no loss of function has to be as-sumed. Components will be inspected prior to Cask transport.
Metallic gasket All materials of the gasket exhibit a native corrosion All materials of the gasket exhibit a native corrosion Silver, stainless steel protection layer and no galvanic or other corrosion "C, protection layer and no galvanic or other corrosion az "C
land nickel based alloy reactions have to be assumed. No chemical or oth- reactions have to be assumed. No chemical or oth- ::J.g er reactions are assumed. er reactions are assumed.
j j -b
_._ - a 0:::, "C
() o' ::J.
~lumlnium alloys This component is not in contact with the pool wa- Components are exposed to ambient weather. Al- "Tl 3~
~ ~'<
ter. uminium alloys exhibit a native corrosion protection . g"<
W CD layer and no significant galvanic or other corrosion ~~~-
reactions have to be assumed. No chemical or oth- ~
a.
~mpact limiter er reactions are assumed.
PU-Foam This component is not in contact with the pool wa- The foam is fully enclosed in the impact limiter. No ter. chemical, galvanic or other reactions are assumed.
Impact limiter
!Constructional Steel This component is not in contact with the pool wa- Components are exposed to atmosphere. Chemical EN 10025-6 1.8983 "C
Jg CD ter. and galvanic reactions are thus only of minor influ-ence. No other reactions are assumed.
I\J i-.J Q i{,
Impact llmlter z
CII
en N Material I Component Loading Operations I Contact to Fuel Pool Transport Environment N ~~
2:
0 :!l: :< -->.
~~, a (D~~
of'en N -,
!') or High alloyed stainless This component is not in contact with the pool wa- Some components may be exposed to ambient ~
0
'iii 0
~~o (I)~~
!Steels: ter. weather. Stainless steels exhibit a native corrosion 8 0
protection layer and no galvanic or other corrosion reactions have to be assumed. No chemical or oth-I er reactions are assumed.
I I
mpact limiter Organic Coating The coating is not in contact with the pool water. ifhe coating on external surfaces is exposed to ambi-ant weather but exhibits a good long-term durability.
Discoloration is not a concern.
Cask No further chemical, galvanic or other reactions are mpact limiter assumed.
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.2.3 Effects of Radiation on Materials Metals are not impaired by gamma radiation. Significant radiation damages due to neutron expo-sure is not expected for metals at neutron fluences below 10 18 n/cm 2 . The expected neutron flu-ences of the components of CASTOR geo69 will be significantly lower Elastomeric seals are exposed to gamma radiation and thus may undergo degradation. The elas-tomeric seals do not have safety related functions and the degradation products have a similar composition as the original molecule but different crosslinking or chain length. Thus no harmful degradation products are expected.
The neutron shielding material polyethylene may be affected by irradiation analogously to elasto-meric materials. The irradiation of the neutron shielding amounts The impairment through irradiation is insignificant and a loss of the neutron shielding ability does not have to be expected.
There is no significal")t extend of degradation of any important safety related component caused directly by the effect of the reactions. Same applies for the effects of the reactions combined with the effects of exposure of the materials to neutron or gamma radiation.
2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-23
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] EN 573-3, 2019-08, Aluminium and aluminium alloys - Chemical composition and form of wrought products - Part 3: Chemical composition and form of products Material data base WIAM-Metallinfo 2002/2.2 EN 755-2, 2016-03, Aluminium and aluminium alloys - Extruded rod/bar, tube and profiles
- Part 2: Mechanical properties ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II Part D, Properties (metric), Edition 2017 Dubbel, Taschenbuch tor den Maschinenbau, Seite E 102, 20. Auflage, 2001 Aluminium-Tasche nbuch 1995
[2] EN 573-3, 2019-08, Aluminium and aluminium alloys - Chemical composition and form of wrought products - Part 3: Chemical composition and form of products Material data base WIAM-Metallinfo 2002.12.2 EN 755-2, 2016-03, Aluminium and aluminium alloys - Extruded rod/bar, tube and profiles
- Part 2: Mechanical properties ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II Part D, Properties (metric), Edition 2017 Dubbel, Taschenbuch tor den Maschlnenbau, Seite E 102, 20. Auflage, 2001 Aluminium-Tasche nbuch 1995
[3] EN 573-3, 2019-08, Aluminium and aluminium alloys - Chemical composition and form of wrought products - Part 3: Chemical composition and form of products EN 485-2, 2018-10, Aluminium and aluminium alloys - Sheet, strip and plate - Part 2: Me-chanical properties ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II Part D, Properties (metric), Edition 2017 Aluminium-Tasche nbuch, Band 1, Aluminium-Verlag D0sseldorf, 1995 Aluminium Werkstoffdatenblatter, Aluminium-Verlag D0sseldorf, 1998
[4] Material data by manufacturer Ticona GmbH, GUR H. Domininghaus, "Die Kunststoffe und ihre Eigenschaften", Springer, 1998
[5] Stahl-Eisen-Werks toffblatt SEW 310, 08.1992 EN 10270-3, 2011-10, steel wire for mechanical springs - Part 3: Stainless spring steel wire
[6]
[7] Material data by manufacturer General Plastics, USA
[8] HELICOFLEX Federelastische Metalldichtungen, Garlock Sealing Technologies Catalogue July 2017 Datenblatt Nimonic 2.4969 Fa. Metalcor Essen
[9] Physical Properties Silver, G. L. Trigg, E. H. lmmergut, Encyclopedia of Applied Physics, Wiley 1992
[1 OJ ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II Part D, Properties (metric), Edition 2017
[11] EN 10137-2, 1995-09, Plates and wide flats made of high yield strength structural steels in the quenched and tempered or precipitation hardened conditions - Part 2: Delivery condi-tions for quenched and tempered steels Stahl-Eisen-Werks toffblatt SEW 310, 08.1992 Dubbel, Taschenbuch tor den Maschinenbau, Seite E 102, 20. Auflage, 2001 2.2 Materials Section 2.2, Rev. 0 Page 2.2-24
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.3 Fabrication and Examination Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 2.3 Fabrication and Examination Section 2.3, Rev. 0 Page 2.3-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.3.1 Fabrication The CASTOR geo69 package is manufactured by using standard materials and manufacturing processes which include casting, forging, machining, bending, welding and bolting.
All welds of the containment (canister) are performed in accordance with BPVC Section IX.
For all safety related items, the parts lists and drawings referenced in Section 1.3 define all neces-sary codes & standards as well as other applicable specifications which are implemented in the respective manufacturing documents.
Components which are important to safety are fabricated in accordance with approved fabrication and test plans which ensure a sufficient manufacturing sequence and include all applicable manu-facturing specifications.
The components of the CASTOR geo69 package are produced by several suppliers and several sub-assemblies may be assembled individually in advance of the assembly of the whole package.
2.3.2 Examination The manufacturing process of the CASTOR geo69 package follows the requirements of GNS Quality Assurance Program to ensure that each component is produce in accordance with the ap-plicable specifications. This includes the following examinations:
In-Process inspections during the fabrication, 9 - Receiving inspections for overall quality, functionality, dimension compliance and certifica-tion requirements.
The components of the CASTOR geo69 package are examined by several examination methods (e.g. Ultrasonic, Radiographic, Penetrant/Magnetic particle and Visual Testing) to ensure all char-acteristics which are important to safety. All inspection and examination steps are performed by qualified personnel in accordance with the applicable codes & standards and other specifications.
Test and measuring equipment and tools requiring calibration are subject to a monitoring process.
The respective valid calibration certificate shall be available at the time of usage and the identifica-tion number of the test and measuring equipment or tool used are documented.
2.3 Fabrication and Examination Section 2.3, Rev. O Page 2.3-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 During and after assembly acceptance tests are perfom1ed according Chapter 8 on each package prior to shipment 2.3 Fabrication and Examination Section 2.3, Rev. 0 Page 2.3-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.4 General Requirements for all Packages Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 2 4 General Requirements for all Packages Section 2.4, Rev. 0 Page 2.4-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The following subsections provide the relevant information to confirm compliance with the general standards for all packages according to1 0CFR71.43.
2.4.1 Minimum Package Size The CASTOR geo69 package Is defined in the corresponding drawing cited in Section 1.3. The bounding width is given by the impact limiters due to the rotational symmetry with The bounding height between mounted lid and bottom Impact limiters when amounts to 2.4.2 Tamper-Indication Feature The cask lid closes the only opening of the monolithic cask body. After final closure of the CASTO~ geo69, the cask is equipped with an official seal against unauthorized opening. The fastening of the cask lid comprises besides the regular cask lid screws a number of special screws.
The seal typically includes a wire, which connects those special screws via a corresponding hole in the screw head. The cask can only be opened by removing the lid und thus destroying the seal by unscrewing all screws.
2.4.3 Positive Closure The closure system of the CASTOR4P geo69 package is twofold. The inner canister closure system and the outer cask closure system, completely covering the canister closure, thus not being acces-sible at all.
The inner closure system is represented by the canister lid, which is fastened to the canister via corresponding clamping systems.
[Propietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
An orifice in the canister lid for dewatering is closed using a tightening plug, which is compressing a metal gasket via a fastened pressure nut 2.4 General Requirements for all Packages Section 2.4, Rev. 0 Page 2.4-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 The outer closure system is represented by the cask lid with protection cap and blind flange, all being fastened by corresponding screws. The applied tightening torques ensure that the closure system cannot be inadvertently opened during normal transportation.
Quick connections in the canister and the cask lid do not represent any opening because of corre-sponding covers being fastened by bolts or nuts.
2.4 General Requirements for all Packages Section 2.4, Rev. 0 Page 2.4-3
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.1 Lifting Devices The boundary conditions for the analyses of the load attachment points (LAP) are provided in the corresponding Appendix 2-3.
2.6.1.1 General stress verification for trunnion and trunnion bolts The assessment of the general stress verification is carried out according to NUREG-0612 [1] and ANSI N14.6 [2]
The stress calculation is done on the basis of the stress intensity S (Tresca criterion) which is the largest absolute value of the stress differences S12, S23 and S31 according to Division 3 (WB-3215).
~~The stress differences are calculated as follows:~~
S,2 = 0"1 -0"2 S23 = cr2 3 S31 = cr3 -cr1 where 01 ~ 02 ~ O3 are the principal stresses.
For the trunnion subjected to bending and shear loads, the stress intensity is given as follows:
Where: Normal stress resulting from bending load: Ob and Shear stress resulting from shear load: t.
For the trunnion bolts loaded with tension, bending and shear the stress intensity is defined as fol-lows:
Where: Membrane stress:
Bending stress:
Shear stress resulting from shear load: t 1 and Torsional stress:
For shear stress due to shear load the average value over the cross section is taken into account according to ANSI N14.6 [2] (Section 4.2.1.1).
2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The calculation of the bolt stresses is carried out according to VOi 2230-2 [3] (Section 6.3.2.3). The greatest operating bolt force is calculated according to Equation 31 in [3].
According to VOi 2230-1 [4] (Section 5.5.2.1), 50% of torsional stress are taken into account when evaluating stress intensity of the bolts.
The assessment of the trunnion and trunnion bolts is given in Appendix 2-3 (Tab. A 6). The ratio of yield strength and tensile strength of the trunnion and trunnion bolt material is less than 0.8 (Sec-tion 4.2.1.1 in [2D. Hence the following stress design factors are sufficient The assessments for the trunnion and trunnion bolts are carried out for the stress design factors 6.9 and 11.5. For the trunnion the safeties against stress design factors 6.9 and 11.5 are Ste.9.T.m11=2.22 and St.11sT.m111=1.7 for minimum temperature and Stee.T.max=2.12 and St 11 s Tmax= 1. 7 for maximum temperature. The verification of the trunnion is fulfilled with sufficient safety.
For the trunnion bolts the minimum safeties against stress design factor 6.9 and 11.5 are St.e.e FVmax.Tma, = 1.19 and Sf.11.6 FVmax.Tmlll = 1.40 for minimum temperature and Ste 9.FVmaxTmax = 1.09 and St.11 s FVmax.Tmax = 1.42 for maximum temperature. The vertflcation of the trunnion bolts is fulfilled with sufficient safety, too.
2.6.1.2 General stress verification, titting studs The assessment of the general stress verification is carried out according to NUREG-0612 [1] and ANSI N14.6 [2].
- _ The stress calculation is done on the basis of the stress intensity S (Tresca criterion) according to Division 3 (WB-3215) as already described in Section 2.5.1.1.
The assessment of the tllting stud is given in Appendix 2-3 (Tab. A 7). The ratio of yield strength and tensile strength of tilting stud material is less than 0.8 (Section 4.2.1.1 in [2D. Hence the follow-ing stress design factors are sufficient.
The assessment for the tilting stud is carried out for the stress design factors 3.45 and 5.75. For the tilting stud the safeties against stress design factor 3.45 and 5. 75 are St.3 46 Tmm = 1.31 and St s 1s Tmin = 1.18 for minimum temperature and St.3.45.T max = 1.14 and Sr 5.1s.T.max = 1.17 for maximum temperature. The verification of the tilting stud is fulfilled with sufficient safety.
2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. O Page 2.5-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.5.1.3 General stress verification, sufficient resistance to stripping of the blind hole threads In the cask lld and canister lid The verification of sufficient resistance to stripping of the blind hole threads in the cask lid is carried out in Table 2.5-1 and of the blind hole threads in the canister lid is carried out in Table 2.5-2. The minimum required lengths of engagement are The covering length of engagement is for the blind hole threads in both lids.
The load attachment points are not part of the parts list. For the verification, bolts with a tensile strength of 1000 MPa are assumed.
The covering length of engagement of must be guaranteed. Wrth this length of engage-ment, the sufficient resistance to stripping of the threads is verified. The verification is valid for bolts
- with a tensile strength of equal or less than 1000 MPa.
2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.5-1 Verification of sufficient length of engagement for load attachment points and threads in the cask lid Verification of sufficient length of engagement according to KTA 3201.2 Project : CASTOR geo69 - Cask lid Term Symbol I Formula Reference Unit Value Value Bolt designation T= 20°c T-= 20°c Type of bolt input - Hexagonal bolt Hexagonal bolt Bolt dimensions input -
Item number of the component with nut thread according to parts list input -
Parts list input -
Bolt data for metric ISO thread Type of thread - input - Standard thread Standard thread Nominal diameter d input mm Shank diameter for necked-down bolts dr input mm Pilch of the thread p [a] mm Flank angle of the thread a (a) .
Pitch diameter of the bolt th read d2 = d - 0.649519-P [b) mm Minor diameter of the bolt thread d 3 = d - 1.226869-P [b] mm Diameter of stress cross section d s =(d 2 +d 3 )/2 [c), Page 85 mm Diameter at the relevant smallest cross d 0 = min(d; d r; d 5 ) [c], Gl.(138) ff mm section of the bolt 2
Stress cross section of the bolt thread A s = 11 / 4*((d2+d3 ) / 2) = ,r*d s' 14 [c), Gl.(132) mm 2 Appropriate minimum cross-sectional 2 A 0 = ,r*d 0' 14 (c), Page 6 mm area of the bolt Nut thread pitch diameter 0 2 = d2 [b) mm Nut thread minor diameter 0 1 = d- 1.082532-P [b) mm Smallest flank coverage with consideration of the thread tolerances according to (d)
Minimum bolt diameter d min input mm Minimum pitch diameter of the bolt thread d 2,min input mm Maximum nut thread pitch diameter D 2,max input mm Maximum nut thread minor diameter D 1,max input mm Strength values Tensile strength of the bolt R mB input MPa 1000 1000 SA-182M F316 (SA-182M F304, [SA-965M F316, Nut material - input -
SA-1 82M 316, SA-965M F304)
SA-182M 304)
Tensile strength of the nut R mM input MPa 517 483 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.5-1 Verification of sufficient length of engagement for load attachment points and threads in the cask lid (continued)
Verification of sufficient length of engagement according to KTA 3201 .2 Project : CASTOR11> geo69 - Cask lid Tenn Symbol I Fonnula Reference Unit Value Value Coefficients and scope of appllcatlon T=20"C T* 20°c f sGM =,r *d mn I P Factor of nut thread
~~[P/2+(d..,-D 2.max)*tan(a/2)]~~
~~[e], (A2.8-42) mm 2 f sGB = ,r*D, .mu l P Factor of bolt thread [e], (A2 .8-43) mm2~~
~~[P/2+(d 2,mn-D1 ,mo,)*tan(a/2)]~~
Strength ratio R s = (R mM*fSGM) I (R me*f sGs) [e], (A2.8-41) -
Width across flats SW (relevant for TBJ only) input mm 0.00 0.00 Correction factor C , C , (equals 1.0 for blind hole or TTJ) [e], (A2.8-40) - 1.000 1.000 Scope of application check R s s 2.2 [e], (A2.8-46) - Check OK Check OK Correction factor C 2 c, [e], (A2.8-46) -
Scope of application check R s 2: 0.4 [e], (A2.8-47) - Check OK Check OK Correction factor C 3 c, [e], (A2 .8-47) -
Required length of engagement regardless of the adually effective forces From resistance to stripping of the bolt / 1 ;i: A s*PI (0,6*C ,*C2*,r*D 1.mu thread [e] , (A2.8-36) mm
~~[P/2+(d 2.m.,-D,,..,)*tan(a/2)]) + 2*P From resistance to stripping of the nut /22: R ma*As*P I (R mM*0,6* C ,* C 3 *,r*d ,,,.,~~
~~thread [e], (A2.8-37) mm~~
[P/2+(dmn* D 2.mul*tan(a/2)]) + 2*P Minimum length of engagement 1, 2: O.B*d [e], (A2.8-38) mm Relevant criterion Bolt thread, Nut thread or Minimum value - -
Required length of engagement 1,.. = max(/ 1 ; / 2; / 3 ) - mm
[a]-Standards DIN 13: standard threads according to DIN 13-1, fine threads according to DIN 13-2
[b]- Standard DIN 13-19
[c]- Standard VO i 2230 Part 1
[d]- Standard DIN ISO 965-1 lie)- Safety Standard KTA 3201 .2 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.5-2 Verification of sufficient length of engagement for load attachment points and threads in the canister lid Verification of sufficient length of engagement according to KTA 3201.2 Project : CASTOR geo69 - Canister lid Term Symbol I Formula Reference Unit Value Bolt designation T*20°C Type of bolt input - Hexagonal bolt Bolt dimensions inout -
Item number of the component with nut thread according to parts list input -
Parts list input - I Bolt data for metric ISO thread Type of thread - input - Standard thread Nominal diameter d input mm Shank diameter for necked-down bolts dr input mm Pitch of the thread p (a)
Flank angle of the thread a (a) .
mm Pitch diameter of the bolt thread d 2 = d-0.649519-P (b) mm Minor diameter of the bolt thread d 3 = d - 1.226869-P (b) mm Diameter of stress cross section d 8 =(d 2 +d 3 )I 2 (c), Page85 mm Diameter at the relevant smallest cross section of the bolt d 0 = min(d; d r: d s) [c), Gl.(138)ff mm Stress cross section of the bolt thread A s = 1tf 4*((d 2-+<13 ) / 2) 2
=tr *d 8 2 14 [c), Gl.(132) mm 2
Appropriate minimum cross-sectional A o =tr*d 0 /4 2 2 area of the bolt (c), Page 6 mm Nut thread pitch diameter 0 2 =d 2 (b) mm Nut thread minor diameter 0 1 =d-1.082532-P (b) mm Smallest flank coverage with consideration of the thread tolerances according to (d)
Minimum bolt diameter dmin input mm Minimum pitch diameter of the bolt thread d 2.mii input mm Maximum nut thread pitch diameter D 2,max input mm Maximum nut thread minor diameter D 1,max input mm Strength values Tensile strength of the bolt R me input MPa 1000 Nut material - input -
Tensile strength of the nut R mM input MPa 689 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.5-2 Verification of sufficient length of engagement for load attachment points and threads in the canister lid (continued)
Verification of sufficient length of engagement according to KTA 3201.2 Project : CASTOR"' geo69 - Canister lid Term Symbol I Formula Reference Unit Value Coefficients and scope of application T* 20°c f sGM =,r *d ..., I P Factor of nut thread [e], (A2.8-42) 2 mm
~~(P/2+(d ..,-D 2_.,.,) *tan(a/2)]~~
~~f sGe = ,r*D, ,.,., IP Factor of boll thread (e], (A2 .8-43) 2 mm~~
~~[P l2+(d 2,mn-D 1,m.,)*tan(a/2)]~~
Strength ratio R s = (R mM* f sGM) I (R me* f SGe) (e], (A2 .8-41) -
Width across flats SW (relevant for TBJ only) input mm 0.00 Correction factor C , C , (equals 1.0 for blind hole or TTJ) [e], (A2 .8-40) - 1.000 Scope of application check R s :s 2.2 (e], (A2 .8-46) - Check OK Correction factor C 2 c, (e], (A2.8-46) -
Scope of application check R s 2: 0.4 (e], (A2 .8-47) - Check OK Correction factor C 3 C3 (e], (A2 .8-47) -
Required length of engagement regardless of the actually effective forces From resistance to stripping of the bolt / 1 2: A 5 *P/ (0,6*C ,* C 2*,r*D , ....,
thread (e], (A2 .8-36) mm
~~[P /2+( d 2,m;,,-D, .m.,) *tan(a/2)]) + 2*P From resistance to stripping of the nut /22: R me*A s* P/ (R mM*0,6*C ,*C 3*,r*d m;,,~~
~~thread (e], (A2 .8-37) mm~~
[P/2+(d mc, D 2,mo,) *tan(a/2)]) + 2 *P Minimum length of engagement /3 2: O.B*d (e], (A2 .8-38) mm Relevant criterion Bolt thread , Nut thread or Minimum value - -
Required length of engagement t,,. =max(/, ; / 2; /3) - mm (a]- Standards DIN 13: standard threads according to DIN 13-1, fine threads according to DIN 13-2 (b]- Standard DIN 13- 19 (c] - Standard VOi 2230 Part 1 (d] - Standard DIN ISO 965-1 (el - Safety Standard KTA 3201 .2 2.5.1.4 Failure of lifting attachments 10CFR71.45 requires that lifting attachments that are structural parts of the package are designed so that failure under excessive load would not impair the ability of the package to meet other re-quirements of Part 10CFR71. Since the tilting studs are solely designed for tilting operations, i. e.
they must not be used for handling operations, only the trunnions and the corresponding bolts are analysed in this section.
In Table 2.5-3 the sufficient length of engagement for the trunnion bolts in the cask body is verified regardless of the actually effective forces. This means a failure of the nut thread in the cask body is excluded even under excessive load because the free loaded bolt shank fails first. This is shown in addition by the following calculations (symbols and corresponding values according to Table 2.5-3:
Maximum force taken by the bolt in the free loaded cross section :
Fs S Ao
~~Rms =~~
2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Maximum force taken by the bolt in the thread shearing area:
FsGB S AsGB
~~RmB 13 112 =~~
Maximum force taken by the cask body in the thread shearing area :
FsGM S AsGM
~~RmM 13 112 =~~
Therefore the free loaded cross section of the bolt is decisively (FB < FsGM < FsGB) -
2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.5-3 Verification of sufficient length of engagement for trunnion bolts and threads in the cask body Verification of sufficient length of engagement according to KTA 3201.2 Project : CASTOR geo69 - Trunnion Term Symbol I Formula Reference Unit Value Bolt designation T* 20°c Type of bolt input - Cylindrical bolt Bolt dimensions input -
Material or strength grade of the bolt input -
Bolted joint: tapped-thread joint= TTJ, through-bolt joint= TBJ input - TTJ Classification of the bolt according to parts list input -
Item number of the bolt according to parts list input -
Item number of the corresponding lid/flange/component according to parts list input -
Item number of the component with nut thread according to parts list input -
Parts list input -
Bolt data for metric ISO thread Type of thread - input - Standard thread Nominal diameter d input mm 30.00 Shank diameter for necked-down bolts dr input mm 30.00 Pitch of the thread p [a] mm Flank angle of the thread a [a] .
Pitch diameter of the bolt thread d 2 = d - 0.649519-P [b] mm Minor diameter of the bolt thread d , = d - 1.226869-P [b] mm Diameter of stress cross section d s =(d 2+d , )12 [c], Page 85 mm Diameter at the relevant smallest cross d 0 = min(d; d r; d s) [c]. Gl.(138)ff mm section of the bolt 2
Stress cross section of the bolt thread A 5 = xi 4*((d2 +d3 ) / 2) = tr *d s' 14 [c]. Gl.(132) mm2 Appropriate minimum cross-sectional area of the bolt A 0 = ,r*d o' / 4 [c] , Page 6 mm 2 Nut thread pitch diameter D2 = d 2 [bl mm Nut thread minor diameter D, = d- 1.082532-P [b] mm Smallest flank coverage with consideration of the thread tolerances according to (di Minimum bolt diameter d ,,,., input mm Minimum pitch diameter of the bolt thread d 2,min input mm Maximum nut thread pitch diameter D 2,max input mm Maximum nut thread minor diameter D1 ,max input mm Strength values Tensile strength of the bolt R ma input MPa 758 SA-874M Nut material - input
[JIS G 5504]
Tensile strength of the nut R mM input MPa 300 Effective length of engagement Length of the bolt Is (according to parts list) input mm Clamping length of the damped parts I K (according to drawing) input mm Length subtraction (e. g. due to
/JJ (according to drawing) input mm counterbore l Effective length of engagement '*tr.Engagement = I s-1K-&J - mm 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.5-3 Verification of sufficient length of engagement for trunnion bolts and threads in the cask body (continued)
Verification of sufficient length of engagement according to KTA 3201 .2 Project : CASTOR geo69 - Trunnion Term Symbol I Formula Reference Unit Value Thread shearing area for effective length of thread / e11 1
Effective length of thread > I *ff.Thread = / eff,Enga~menc2
~~P - mm A sGM = ' *ff.Thread *,c*d min IP~~
~~2 Shearing area of nut thread [e], (A2 .8-42) mm~~
[P/2+{d.,,.,-O 2.ma,)*tan(a/2)]
A sGB = ' *ff.Thraad ' 'lr"D 1,max / P* 2 Shearing area of bolt thread [e], (A2.8-43) mm
[P /2+{d 2,..,-0 1,ma,)*tan(a/2)]
Coefficients and scope of appllcatlon Strength ratio R s = (R mM*A soMl I (Rme*A soe) [e], (A2.8-41) -
Width across flats SW (relevant for TBJ only) input mm 0.00 Correction factor C 1 C 1 (equals 1.0 for blind hole or TTJ) [e], (A2.8-40) - 1.000 Scope of application check R s s 2.2 (e], (A2 .8-46) - Check OK Correction factor C 2 c, (e], (A2 .8-46) -
Scope of application check R s i!:0.4 [e], (A2.8-47) - Check OK Correction factor C 3 C3 (e], (A2.8-47) -
Required length of engagement regardless of the adually effective forces From resistance to stripping of the bolt / 1 ;i: A s*P/ (0 ,6*C 1*C ,*ir*O 1,ma,
[e], (A2 .8-36) mm thread [P/2+{d 2,m~-O 1.ma,)*tan(a/2)]) + 2 *P From resistance to stripping of the nut / 2 .!: R me*A s*P/ (R mM*0 ,6*C ,* C 3*.- *dm~*
[e], (A2 .8-37) mm
!thread [P/2+{d..,-O 2,ma,)*tan(a/2)]) + 2*P Minimum length of engagement / 3 i!: 0.8*d [e], (A2.8-38) mm Relevant criterion Bolt thread , Nut thread or Minimum value - -
Required length of engagement t,.. =max(/ ,; / 2; / 3) - mm Verification of sufficient length of engagement Verification /rt,q s,.,, - - Verification OK
[a]- Standards DIN 13: standard threads according to DIN 13-1 , fine threads according to DIN 13-2
[b] - Standard DIN 13-19
[c] - Standard VOi 2230 Part 1
[d]- Standard DIN ISO 965-1
[e]-Safety Standard KTA 3201 .2 lr.omments:
~~1) Due to (e], (A2.8-36 or A2.8-37) a length subtraction of 2*P is considered for non-active threads to determine the effective length of thread.~~
2.5.2 Tie-Down Devices There is no system of tie-down devices that is a structural part of the package. Thus, no such anal-ysis is required .
2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Technical Report NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36 January 1980
[2] American National Standards Institute -ANSI N14.6-1993 American National Standard for Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More
[3] VOi 2230:2014-12 Part 2 Systematic calculation of highly stressed bolted joints Multi bolted joints
[4] VOi 2230:2015-11 Part 1 Systematic calculation of highly stressed bolted joints Joints with one cylindrical bolt 2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for all Packages Section 2.5, Rev. 0 Page 2.5-12 a
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6 Nonnal Conditions of Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 2.6 Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. O Page 2.6-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Infonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This section describes the load cases for nonnal conditions of transport, which feature thennal and mechanical loads as provided in 10 CFR 71, §71. 71 aNonnal Conditions of Transport". The Initial conditions that are applied in the following load cases are considered as specified by 10 CFR 71,
§71.71.
The design criteria established for the CASTO~ geo69 for the NCT are described In Sec-tion 2.1.2. These criteria are selected to ensure that the package perfonnance standards specified by 10 CFR 71.43 and 71.51 are satisfied. Detailed structural analyses of various CASTOR geo69 package components subjected to individual loads are provided in Appendix 2-1. The limiting re-sults from these analyses are used in this section to quantify package perfonnance in response to the NCT load combinations, specified in 10 CFR 71.71 and Regulators Guide 7.8 [1]. Appendix 2-1 (boundary conditions cask simulation modeO furthennore provides an overview of the perfonnance evaluations reported in each load combination. The load cases provide the limiting structural anal-ysis results for the affected cask component(s) in comparison to the established design criteria.
This comparison pennits the minimum margin of safety for a given component subjected to a given loading condition to be readily identified. In all cases, the acceptability of the CASTOR geo69 packaging design with respect to established criteria, and consequently with respect to 10 CFR 71 perfonnance standards is demonstrated.
The structural analysis of the cask and canister body is presented In Appendix 2-1 and covers the individual loading conditions. The stress assessments for components other than lid bolts are per-fonned under minimum and maximum temperature considering always maximum bolt preload.
2.6.1 Heat (Load Case N 1)
Stresses in the assessed components for the high temperature environment for NCT, are obtained by a combination of individual loads as summarized in Table 2.6-1 and Table 2.6-2._ Minimum and maximum lid bolt preload effects (according to Table 2.6-3), internal pressure (see Table 2.6-5) and thennal stresses are combined to give the maximum stress intensity in each component for this load combination. The detailed boundary conditions are presented in the Appendix 2-1.
2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Infonnatlon with held @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.6-1 Load Combinations for Hot Environment; Cask Model External load Min. Bolt Preload I Max. Bolt Preload Temperature Hot Environment {Max. Design Tempera-ture)
Pressure Max. Internal Pressure Table 2.6-2 Load Combination for Hot Environment; Canister model External load Min. Bolt Preload Max. Bott Preload Temperature Hot Environment {Max. D~ign Tempera-ture)
Pressure Max. Internal Pressure Table 2.6-3 Summary of the applied preloads [kN]
Min. Room Max.
Design Temperature Temperature Design Temperature Bolting Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max.
preload .preload preload preload preload preload Cask Lid Bolting Closure Plate Impact Limiter Lid Side Impact Limiter Bottom Side Canister Thread Bolts*
2.6 Nonna( Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.1.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures The used design temperatures and applied pressures are given in Table 2.6-4 and Table 2.6-5.
Table 2.6-4 Design temperatures rCJ Cold Envi- Fire Max. Design Min. Design Component Parts ronment Item Temperatures Temperatures name List Accident rC1 rc1 rC1 rC1 Cask body 2 Cask lid 55 "EQ)
~
a, C E 0
Cask lid bolting 0 MI 62,63 '.§ !B
..J :::J ~
Retention Ring
~~a. E a, Cl 21 'in~~
..}- .!:
.E
~
T""
Closure Plate 0 T"" ~ :g :::J
~a.
-29°C -40oc
~
Closure Plate screws 9
~
8-CanlSterbody I
2
-i -~
~~J C~~
.2>
..J
~~a. I.O E ~~~
Q) "C Canister lid q~ 3 I-
~~ ~
0 ~
Canister lid T""
4,5,6,7 bolting 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.6-6 Applied Internal and external pressures for every load case for cask and canis-ter assembly Internal External Load case Component Pressure Pressure
[MPa] [MPa]
Cask Nonnal Conditions of Transport (NCD Canister Cask Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC)
Canister Cask Cavity Cask inner Moderator Drilling Row Fire Accident Cask outer Moderator Drilling Row Canister Deep Water Immersion Cask Cask Pressure Test Canister 2.6.1.2 Differential Thermal Expansion The occurrence of thermal stresses is minimized by sufficiently large gaps in axial and radial direc-tion, which allows for free thermal expansion of the different components without contact and re-straint 2.6.1.3 Stress Calculatlons 2.6.1.3.1 Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.6-6 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.03 for the Pm criterion and occurs at The assessment at this location is performed with the local stress intensity value. The 2.6 Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 details of the stress assessment are presented In Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 93, Fig. A 79, Fig. A 80, Fig. A 81.
Table 2.6-6 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components in Hot Environment; Mini-mum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of Position Stress Location Material safety No. category
[-]
Cask Head 1 SA-874M s.nmmll¥ 1.03 Fillet SA-182M Grade 2 Cask Lid S.n1en111y 2.40 F316 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.6-7 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.09 for the Pm criterion and occurs at the canister lid. The assessment at this location is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 94, Fig. A 82, Fig. A 83, Fig. A 84.
Table 2.6-7 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under Hot Environ-ment; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Stress ' of Safety Factor Position No. Location Material category [-]
Canister Body (Bottom) 1 SiMmllltv 1.36 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid (Pocket) 2 Sintslslty 1.09 ltem3 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.1.3.2 Botting The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 2.6 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.6-8). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 2.1 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.6-4). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1. The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.6-8 N 1 - Cask lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Max. Temp.
N1. Hot Environment Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 3.8 3.3 Shear 33.3 33.3 Tension plus Shear 14.3 11.1 Maximum Stress S 2.9 2.8 Table 2.6-9 N 1 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Max. Temp.
N1. Hot Environment Min. Preloact Max. Preload Tension 3.8 2.2 Shear 28.3 17.8 Tension plus Shear 14.3 4.7 Maximum Stress S 3.5 2.1 2.6.1.4 Comparislon with Allowable Stresses The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
The assessment of the pure shear utilization In this load case Is covered by the load case Fire Ac-cident (see section 2.7).
2.6 Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.2 Cold (Load Case N 2)
The Regulatory Guide 7.8 [1] cold environment load combination results in all cask components In thermal equilibrium at -40°C. Containment vessel thermal stresses do occur in this case due to the differential thermal expansion between the steels. The internal pressure at the cold environment condition is assumed to be O MPa. This results in an external pressure loading for the cask and for the canister. Again, minimum and maximum lid bolt preload effects (according to Table 2.6-3), ex-ternal pressure (see Table 2.6-5) and thermal stresses are considered. The detailed boundary conditions are presented in Appendix 2-1.
2.6.2.1 Verification The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
The assessment of the pure shear utilization in this load case is covered by the load case Fire Ac-cident (see section 2.7).
2.6.2.1.1 Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.6-1 O presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.22 for the Pm criterion and occurs at
. The assessment at this location is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 97, Fig. A 85, Fig. A 86, Fig. A 87.
Table 2.6-10 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components In Cold Environment; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of Position Stress Location Material safety No. category
[-]
cask Head 1
Fillet SA-874M s.~ 1.22 SA-182.M Grade 2 cask Lid s.ntanslty 1.68 F316 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.6-11 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.19 for the Pm criterion and occurs at in the canister body bottom. The assessment at this location is performed with the local stress Intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 98, Fig. A 88, Fig. A 89, Fig. A 90.
Table 2.6-11 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components In Cold Environment; Minimum Fa,ctors of Safety(-]
Stress Factor of Safety Position No. Location Material category [-)
Canister Body (Bottom) 1 Siffl11111511v 1.19 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid Pm 2.10 2
ltem3 Pm+Pb 1.58 2.6.2.1.2 Boltlng The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 2.4 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.6-12). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 2.0 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.6-13). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1. The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.6-12 N 2 - Cask lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety[-]
T= -40"C N2 Cold Environment Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 5.3 4.3 Shear 25.0 20.0 Tension plus Shear 25.0 16.7 MaxJmum Stress S 2.7 2.4 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Infonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.6-13 N 2 - Canister lld bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
T=-4<rC N2 Cold Environment Min. Preload* Max. Preload Tension 3.3 1.9 Shear 44.6 22.3 Tension plus Shear 10.9 3.5 Maximum Stress S 3.5 2.0 2.6.3 Reduced External Pressure (Load Case N 4)
The load case N 4 - minimum external pressure is not considered separately, since it is covered by load case N 5 - Vibration & Shock (see Section 2.6.5) in which the minimum design temperature is combined with the increased external pressure.
2.6.4 Increased External Pressure (Load Case N 3)
The load case N 3 - increased external pressure is not considered separately, since It is covered by load case N 5 - vibration & shock (see Section 2.6.5) in which the minimum design temperature is combined with the Increased external pressure.
2.6.5 Vibration and Shock (Load Case N 5)
The transport shock loadings used to evaluate the CASTOR geo69 are based on NUREG -
766510 [2] and Specific Safety Guide SSG-26 [3]. A combination of the maximum inertia loads for transport via truck and ship is applied in two of the three x-y-z coordinate directions (see Table 2.6-14).
2.6 Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,atlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.6-14 Vibration and Shock Inertia loads [g] for transport via truck and ship Shock Inertia load Direction Source
[g]
Vertical NUREG - 766510 [2] 7g Longitudinal SSG-26 [3] 5g Lateral NUREG - 766510 [2] 2.3 g Resultant transverse load -
(Vertical and lateraQ replac- (2.32 + 7.02) 112 = 7.368 g es vertical in simulation The longitudinal inertia load acts in the lid opening longitudinal direction. Since the simulation model is a 180° symmetrical model, the resultant of vertical and lateral inertia is applied in vertical direction.
The transport shock loads cover the transport vibration loads, so the stress intensities due to the shock loads are used for the fatigue assessment. The vibration loads are not considered for this reason.
The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design tem-peratures. Bolt preload effects (according to Table 2.6-3), internal and external pressure (see Ta-ble 2.6-5) and the shock loads (see Table 2.6-14) are combined. The simulation is performed as described in Appendix 2-1.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied Im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
The assessment of the pure shear utilization in this load case Is covered by the load case 0.3 m side drop (see Section 2.6.7.1).
2.6 Nom,al Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information with held per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.6.1 Vertflcatlon Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.6-15 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.44 for the Pm criterion and occurs at the cask lid under maximum design temperature. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1, Tab A 101 and Fig. A 91 to 96.
Table 2.6-16 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components In Vibration & Shock; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
Location Material No. category Min.design Max.design temperabJre temoerabJre Cask Shell 1 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Section SA-182M Grade 2 Cask Ud F316 s,~ 2.24 1.44 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.6-16 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
°the form pieces (Item - 5) and washers (Item - 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.60 for the Pm+ Pb criterion and occurs at the canister lid. The details of the stress assessment are presented In Appendix 2-1, Tab A 102 and Fig. A 97 to 102.
Table 2.6-16 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components at Vibration & Shock; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]
Factor of Safety Stress [-)
Position No. Location Materlal category Min. design Max.design temperature temperature canister Body (Bottom) 1 PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-2. 2-3, 2-4 Lid P., 1 89 1 96 2
Item 3 1 60 Pm+Pb 1.60 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.6.2 BoltJng Verification The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 2.9 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.6--17). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 1.8 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.6--18). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1. The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.6-17 N 6 - Cask lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
NS Vibration and Shodc Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 7.7 4.8 4.3 3.4 Shear 50.0 50.0 25.0 33.3 Tension plus Shear 50.0 20.0 16.7 125 Maximum Stress S 5.9 4.8 29 2.9 Table 2.6-18 N 6 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[*]
Factor of Safety [- I Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
NS Vibration and Shock Min. Preload. Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 3.3 1.9 3.1 1.8 Shear 39.7 21.0 37.7 18.8 Tension plus Shear 10.9 3.5 9.8 3.2 Maximum Stress S 3.5 2.0 3.3 1.9 2.6.6 Water Spray All exterior surfaces of the CASTOR geo69 cask body are metal and therefore not subject to soaking or structural degradation from water absorption. The water spray condition is therefore of no consequence to the CASTOR geo69.
2.6. 7 Free Drop During transport it is secured, that the CASTOR geo69 package is only able to drop onto the side due to the given transport orientation. The 0.3 m side drop is evaluated under nonnal conditions of transport for that reason.
2.6 Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.7.1 0.3-m side drop (N 6)
One drop orientation is considered credible for the 0.3 m NCT free drop as described in Sec-tion 2.6. 7. The structural response of the cask and canister components are evaluated for a 0.3 m side drop of the package. The assessments of component stresses follow the same logic as estab-lished in Section 2.1.2.1 and Appendix 2-1. The simulations and evaluations are perfonned for both, the maximum and minimum design temperatures. Bolt preload effects (according to Table 2.6-3), internal and external pressure (see Table 2.6-5) and the impact loads (see Appendix 2-1, Tab A. 181) are combined. The simulation ls performed as described in Appendix 2-1.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
The proof against lid slipping for the blind flange and the protection cap is covered by the 9 m side drop load case in Appendix 2-1 (section 4 Assembly state).
2.6.7.1.1 Verification Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluations show. Table 2.6-19 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.43 for the Pm criterion evaluated with local stress and oc-curs at In the cask lid under maximum design temperature. The details of the stress as-sessment are presented in Appendix 2-1, Tab A 105 and Fig. A 103 to 108.
Table 2.6-19 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under 0.3 m Side Drop; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
Location Material No.. category Min.design Max. design temperature tem1>erature Cask Head 1 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 4.91 4.98 Fillet Cask Head 2 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 3.85 >>5.0 Fillet Pm 3.02 3.65 CaskBottom 3 SA-874M Recess Pm+Pb 3.70 4.10 SA-182M Grade 4 Cask Lid Sin1mts1tv 1.70 1.43 F316 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluations show. Table 2.6-20 presents the assessed* minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.51 for the Pm+ Pb criterion and occurs at the canister lid under maximum design temperature. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 106 and Fig. A 109 to 114.
Table 2.6-20 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under 0.3 m Side Drop; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of Safety Stress [-]
Position No. Location Material category Min.design Max. design temperature temperature .
Headrlng (Section) 1 PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-5 Headrlng (Hole) 2 't 1.65 1.56 Item 2-5 Canister Body (Bottom) 3 PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid (center) S1,__ >>5.0 >>5.0 4
ltem3 Pm+Pb - -
Lid (Pocket) Pm 1.81 1.84 5
ltem3 Pm+Pb 1.56 1.51 Clamping Element 6 't 2.94 2.81 ltem4 2.6.7.2 Bolting Verification The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 1. 7 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.6-21). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 1.7 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.6-22). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1. The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
2.6 Nom,al Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. O Page 2.6-15
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.6-21 N 6 - Cask lld bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety [-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
N6 0.3m Side Drop Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 7.7 4.8 3.8 3.2 Shear 33.3 20.0 20.0 16.7 Tension plus Shear 50.0 20.0 14.3 10.0 Maximum Stress S 4.2 27 1.9 1.7 Table 2.6-22 N 6 - Canister lld bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety [-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
N6S/deDrop Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 3.1 1.8 2.9 1.7 Shear 35.7 18.8 26.1 17.0 Tension plus Shear 9.8 3.3 8.6 2.9 Maximum Stress S 3.3 1.9 2.9 1.8 2.6.8 Corner Drop The corner drop is not considered since the CASTOR geo69 package weight is in excess of 100 kg.
2.6.9 Compression The Compression load case does not apply to the CASTOR~ geo69 since the package weight is in excess of 5000 kg.
2.6.10 Penetration The Impact of the hemispherical end of a vertical steel cylinder of 3.2 cm diameter and 6 kg mass, dropped from a height of 1 m is covered by the Puncture load case (see section 2. 7).
2.6 Nonna! Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-16
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.6.11 Summary of verification for normal conditions The summary of all evaluated minimum factors of safety during normal conditions is presented in Table 2.6-23 for the cask parts and in Table 2.6-24 for the canister parts. All requirements are met.
Table 2.6-23 Stress assessment - summary under Normal Conditions of Transport at Cask Min. Factor load Case Location Material of safety
[-]
NlHot SA-182M Grade Cask Lid 2.40 Environment F316 N2Cold Cask Head SA-874M 1.22 Environment Fillet NS Vibration SA-182M Grade Cask Lid 1.44
&Shock F316 N50.3Slde SA-182M Grade Cask Lid 1.43 Drop F316 Table 2.6-24 Stress assessment - summary under Normal Conditions of Transport at Canis-ter Min. Factor of Load case Location Material safety
[-]
N1Hot Lid(
1.09 Environment ltem3 N2Cold Canister Body (Bottom) 1.19 Environment Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 NS Vibration Lid 1.60
&Shock ltem3 NS0.3Slde Lid 1.51 Drop ltem3 The summary of all evaluated minimum factors of safety is presented in Table 2.6-25 for the cask lid bolts and in Table 2.6-26 for the canister lid bolts. Factors of safety higher than 5.0 are depicted as ">>5.0". All requirements are met.
2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-17
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.6-26 Bolt assessment - summary under Nonnal Conditions of Transport; Cask Lid Bolts Minimum Factor of Safety [-]
LDadCase Tension Shear Tension plus Shear Maximum Stress S Nl Hot Environment 3.3 >>5 >>5 2.8 N2 Cold Environment 4.3 >>5 >>5 2.4 NS Vibration and Shock 3.4 >>5 >>5 2.9 N6 0.3m Side Drop 3.2 >>5 >>5 1.7 Table 2.6-26 Bolt assessment - summary under Nonnal Conditions of Transport; Canister Lid Bolts Minimum Factor of Safety[-]
Load Case Tensloh Shear Tension plus Shear Maximum Stress S Nl Hot Environment 2.2 >>5 4.7 2.1 N2 Cold Environment 1.9 >>5 3.5 2.0 NS Vibration and Shock 1.8 >>5 3.2 1.9 N6Slde Drop 1.7 >>5 2.9 1.8 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. O Page 2.6-18
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 7.8 Load Combinations for the structural analysis of shipping casks for radioactive material Revision 1; March 1989
[2] NUREG766510 Shock and Vibration Environments for Large Shipping Containers on Rail Cars and Trucks June 1977
[3] IAEA Safety Standards Specific Safety Guide SSG-26 Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 2012 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport Section 2.6, Rev. 0 Page 2.6-.19
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed~~
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-1~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This section describes the load cases for hypothetical accident conditions (HAG), which feature thermal and mechanical loads as provided in 10 CFR 71, §71.73. The Initial conditions that are applied in the following load cases are provided in Table 1, NRG Regulators Guide 7.8 [1]. The design criteria are described In Section 2.1.2. These criteria are selected to ensure that the pack-aging performance standards specified by 10 CFR 71.51 are satisfied.
The presentation of the HAG analyses and results is accomplished in the same manner as that used above for the NCT. The detailed analyses of the various packaging components under differ-ent loading conditions are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter and 10. The stress results for the cask and canister parts for the specified HAG loadings are obtained from the simulation results reported in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter 11) and summarized here and compared to the design criteria.
In all cases, the acceptability of the CASTOR geo69 packaging design with respect to HAG loads 9 is demonstrated. The stress assessments for components other than lid bolts are performed under minimum and maximum temperature considering always maximum bolt preload since the bolt pre-loads do not impact the stress assessment results.
2. 7.1 Free Drop The response of the CASTO~ geo69 packaging to free drops from a height of 9 m onto an un-yielding surface is evaluated at various orientations. The Inertia loadings applied to the CASTO~
geo69 components are determined in dynamic simulations. A summary of the evaluated Inertia loadings is presented in Appendix 2-1 (Tab. A 181). The stresses in the components are reported for the following drop orientations:
~~A 1 - 9 m Flat Drop onto Lid Side Section 2.7.1.2~~
~~A 2 - 9 m Edge Drop onto Lid Side (cog over comer) Section 2.7.1.5~~
~~A 3 - 9 m Side Drop Section 2.7.1.4~~
~~A 4 - 9 m Flat Drop onto Bottom Side Section 2.7.1.3~~
A 5 - 9 m Edge Drop onto Bottom Side (cog over comer) Section 2.7.1.5.2 2.7.1.1 Dynamic Load Factors To cover dynamic effects In the static analysis, dynamic amplification factors for the loads on cask, canister and respective cask lid and canister lid are evaluated. At first modal analyses are carried out for minimum and maximum design temperature to identify the decisive Eigenfrequencles of the structures.
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The content mass is considered in the analyses. The linear material properties for maximum and minimum design temperature are taken into account.
The excitation functions are taken from the structural evaluation of the impact limiters.
Wrth these different excitation functions and the decisive Eigenfrequencies of the structure the par-ticular system responses are evaluated. Tab. A 182 in Appendix 2-1 lists the results for both tem-peratures.
2.7.1.2 End Drop: 9 m Flat Drop onto Lid Side (A 1)
The dynamic impact analysis of the CASTO~ geo69 package shows that the maximum expected inertia loading from the 9 m flat drop on lid side is (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182). The flat drop onto lid side describes a 9 m free drop onto the flat end of the lid impact limiters. To account for dynamic effects mainly concerning the lid bolting in the static simulation, a dynamic load factor is established in Appendix 2-1 (Tab. A 182) which increases the weight of the cask-, resp. canister lid. To preserve force equilibrium, this additional weight is sub-tracted from the cask, resp. canister body. The details of the performed simulations are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter 9 and 10, Section 9.8.5 and 10.8.5). The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design temperatures (acc. to Table 2.7-28). Bolt preload effects (acc. to Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 178), internal and external pressure (see Appen-dix 2-1, Tab. A 179) and the impact loads (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182) are combined.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
2.7.1.2.1 Verification Bllnd Flange and Protection Cap in the Cask Lid The blind flange and the protection cap and Its respective bolting in the cask lid are assessed by analytical methods. The maximum loading occurs under load case End Drop: 9 m Flat Drop onto Lid Side (A 1). The minimum factor of safety in the Protection Cap amounts to 1.95. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.6, Tab. A 116).
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. O Page 2.7-3~~
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-1 Summary of stress assessment of Bllnd Flange and Protection Cap under 9 m Flat Drop Lid Side; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]
Factor of Position Stress Location Material safety No. category
[-]
Bllnd Flange SA-240M 1 Pm+Pb >>5.0 Item 89 Grade 304 Protection Cap SA-240M 2 Pa,+Pb 1.95 Item 113 Grade 304 The minimum factor of safety in the bolts amounts to 1.04 for tension loading in the Protection Cap bolting. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.6, Tab.
A 73).
Table 2.7-2 A 1 - Bllnd Flange and Protection Cap bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety[-) Factor of Safety [-1 Max. Temp. Max. Temp.
A1 Flat Drop Ud Side A1 Flat Drop Ud Side Max. Preload Max. Preload Blind Flange Bolting Protection Cop Bolting Tension 1.09 I Tension 1.04 Maximum Stress S 1.44 I Maximum Stress S 1.39 2.7.1.2.2 Verification Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-3 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 3.06 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 3 in the centre of the cask lid under maximum design temperature. The assessment is perfonned with the local stress intensity value.
The factor of safety for the retention ring amounts to 2.01 (see Section 2.7.1.2.5).
The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.6, Tab A 111 and Fig. A 115 to 120).
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-4~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-3 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under 9 m Flat Drop Lid Side; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress (-]
Location Material No. category Min.design Max.design temperature temperature Cask Head 1 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 4.22 >>5.0 FIiiet Cask Head 2 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 3.53 4.68 Fillet SA-182M 3 Cask Lid S.111ens1v 3.48 3.06 Grade F316 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-4 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (ltem-5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.24 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pas. 3 in the web between the canister lid pockets under minimum design temperature. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value.
The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.6, Tab A 113 and Fig. A 121 to 126).
~~Table 2.7-4 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under 9 m Flat Drop Lid Side; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]~~
Factor of Safety Position No. Location Materfal Stress [-]
category Min.design Max.design temperature temperature Headrlng 1 ~ 1.61 2.34 Item 2-5 Canister Body 2
Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 s.~ 1.79 >>5.0 Ud (Web) 3 ~ 1.24 1.40 ltem3 Clamping Element 4 't >>5.0 >>5.0 ltem4
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page2.7-5~~
~~1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390~~
2. 7.1.2.3 Bolting Verification The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 1. 7 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.7-5). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 2.4 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.7-6). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.6). The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.7-5 A 1 - Cask lid bolt assessment- Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
~~Min. Temp. Max. Temp.~~
A1 Flat Drop Ud Side Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 5.0 3.8 3.7 3.0 Shear 16.7 14.3 14.3 12.5 Tension plus Shear 20.0 14.3 125 9.1 Maximum Stress S 23 2.2 L9 1.7 Table 2.7-6 A 1 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
A1 Flat Drop Lld Side Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 7.0 2.6 7.7 2.4 Shear 44.6 23,8 48.4 2L2 Tension plus Shear 48.0 6.8 58.4 5.5 Maximum Stress S 5.8 2.6 6.1 2.4 2.7.1.2.4 Evaluation of Canister Buckling Limits -Axial Compression The maximum allowable compressive stress is calculated according to Division 3 0/VB 3133.6 (b))
Level A and WB 3224.1 (e) Level Das follows (see Table 2.7-7):
Calculation of factor A:
0.125 A=~)
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-6~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Determination of factor B according to step 3 (with Figure CS-1; BPVC Section 11, Part D), with Input and output as shown in Fehlerl Verwelsquelle konnte nlcht gefunden werden ..
Table 2.7-7 Input and output values for calculation of allowable axJal compression Dimension - - Symbol Un~ Value Inside Radius R [mm]
Shell thickness {min.) T [mm]
E-Modulus{120°C) E [MPa] 187700 F~ctor A [-]
Factor B [MPa] 72 Adm. axlal compr. Level A B [MPa] 72 Adm. axlal compr. Level D 1.6*8 [MPa] 108 The allowable axial compression amounts to 108 MPa for level D loads (according to Mandatory Appendix Sec. 3 XXVll-3400 (b)), see Table 2.7-7.
The flat drop bottom side direction is evaluated, since the mass of the canister lid acts additionally onto the canister cross section. In the lid side orientation, the canister lid rests on the retention ring, which reduces the load onto the canister shelf cross section.
The nominal stresses in the canister shell cross section due to level D loads from the flat drop loa_d cases are lesser than the allowable axial compressive stress for level D loads. The axial compres-sion criterion is satisfied.
Dimension -- Symbol Unit. Value Inside Radius Ri [mm]
Outside Radius Ro [mm]
Longitudinal loaded Cross section In Canister A [mm2]
Mass {Canister Body + Canister Lid) m [kg]
Inertia load a '[g]
Resulting compressive force F [N]
Compressive stress (J [MPa] 72.89 Adm. axial compr. Level D 1.6*8 [MPa] 108 Minimum Factor of Safety s [-] 1.48
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-7~~
~~1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@_)GNS per 10 CFR2.390~~
2. 7 .1.2.6 Verification Retention RJng The retention ring of the cask is assessed in this load case under maximum design temperature for admissible material values of SA-182M Grade F316 with the inertia load for minimum design tem-perature.
The static inertia loading amounts to The minimal shear section In the retention ring amounts to The factor of safety amounts to 2.58 and is evaluated as follows:
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
T.maar = 78.5 MPa 202.4MPa Factor of safety= ]8.S MPa = 258 The thread shear section in the cast base material amounts to The factor of safety amounts to 2.01 and is evaluated as follows:
[Proprietary Information wrthheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Tmear ='60.SMPa 122.2MPa Factor of safety= _ AIPa = 201 60 8 The detailed assessment is presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.6, Tab. A 112).
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-8~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.1.3 End Drop: 9 m Flat Drop onto Bottom Side (A 4)
The dynamic impact analysis of the CASTOR geo69 packaging shows that the maximum ex-pected inertia loading from the 9 m flat drop onto bottom side Is (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182). The flat drop onto bottom side describes a 9 m free drop onto the flat end of the bottom impact limiters. To account for dynamic effects mainly concerning the lid bolting in the static simulation, a dynamic load factor is estab-lished in Appendix 2-1 (Tab. A 182), which increases the weight of the cask lid, resp. canister lid.
To preserve force equilibrium, this additional weight is subtracted from the cask, resp. canister body.
The details of the performed simulations are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapters 9, 1O and Sec-tions 9.8.8 and 10.8.8). The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design temperatures (according to Table 2.7 2). Bolt preload effects (according to Ap-pendix 2-1, Tab. A 178), internal and external pressure (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 179) and the Impact loads (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182) are combined.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
The assessment of the pure shear utilization in this load case Is covered by the load case 9 m Flat Drop onto Lid Side (see Section 2. 7.1.2).
2.7.1.3.1 Verification Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-8 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.8 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 2 in the cask lid under minimum design temperature. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.9, Tab. A 132 and Fig. A 155 to Fig. A 160).
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-8 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under 9 m Flat Drop Bot-tom-Side; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
Location Material No. category Min.design Max.design tempe~re temperature cask Bottom 1 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Recess SA-182M 2 Cask Lid 1.80 4.68 Grade F316 s."'""""'
The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-9
~~presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.~~
The form pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment The minimum factor of safety amounts to 2.25 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pas. 2 in the canister lid under maximum de-sign temperature. The assessment is performed with the local stress Intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.9, Tab. A 133 and Fig. A 161 to Fig. A 164).
Table 2.7-9 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under 9 m Flat Drop Bottom Side; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]
Factor of Safety Stress [-]
Position No. Location Material category Min.design Max.design temperature temoorature Canister Body 1 PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid 2 5-..y 2.36 2.25 Item 3 2.7.1.3.2 Verification Bolting at Cask Lid and Canister Lid The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety In the cask lid bolting amounts to 3.6 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.7-10). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 2.1 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.7-11). The evaluated
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-10~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.9). The seal tightness of the cask and canister llds is demonstrated , since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.7-10 A 4 - Cask lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
A4 Flat Drop Bottom Side Mln.Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 5.3 4.3 4.5 3.6 Shear 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 Tension plus Shear 25.0 20.0 20.0 12.5 Maximum Stress S 4.8 4.3 3.7 3.7 Table 2.7-11 A 4 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factm of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max.'Temp.
A4 Flat Drop Bottom Side Min. Preload Max.Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 4.8 2.3 4.1 2.1 Shear 119.0 35.7 84.8 24.2 Tension plus Shear 22.7 5.2 17.0 4.4 Maximum Stress S 5.2 2.5 4.6 2.2
2. 7 .1.3.3 Basket Verifications for Vertical Loads The verifications for vertical loads are carried out analytically. Because of thermal restraints are excluded [6], so that strains in vertical direction can only be caused by deceleration loads.
The calculations are executed for NCT and HAC with decelerations of The safety factors are defined according to Table 2.1-3. The resulting stresses are compared to the criteria for the membrane stresses as listed in Table 2.1-2.
The calculation are presented in Appendix 2-2 for the (Tab. A 1), for (Tab. A 2), for the (Tab. A 3) and for the (Tab. A 4). All verifications are successful.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-11~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.1.4 9 m Side Drop (A 3)
The impact analysis of the 9 m side drop provides a maximum expected inertial loading under for the canister (Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182). The inertia loadings include dynamic load factors of ).
The details of the performed simulations are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapters 9 and 10, Sec-tions 9.8.7 and 10.8.7). The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design temperatures (according to Appendix 2-1, Table 2.7 2). Bolt preload effects (ac-cording to Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 178), internal and external pressure (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 179) and the impact loads (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182) are combined.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-9 pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
2.7.1.4.1 Verification Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluations show. Table 2.7-12 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 2.08 for the Pm + Pb criterion and occurs at Pos. 4 in the cask lid under minimum design temperature. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Ap-pendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.8, Tab. A 126 and Fig. A 143 to Fig. A 148).
Table 2.7-12 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under 9 m Side Drop; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
location Material No. category Min. design Max.design temperature temperature Cask Head 1
FIiiet SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 4.20 4.n Cask Head 2 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 3.71 >>5.0 Fillet Cask Bottom 3 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Recess SA-182M Pm 2.n 3.04 4 Cask Lid Grade F316 Pm+Pb 208 2.35
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-12~~
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluations show. Table 2.7-13 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (ltem-5) and washers (ltem-7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.57 for the pure shear criterion and occurs at Pos. 2 in the head ring under maximum design temperature. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.8, Tab. A 126 and Fig. A 143 to Fig. A 148).
Table 2.7-13 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under 9 m Side Drop; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of Safety Stress [-]
Posftlon No. Location Material category Min.design Max.design temperabJre temoerature.
Headrfng (Section) 1 PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-5 Headrfng (Hole) 2 't 3.33 3.13 Item 2-5 canister Body (Bottom) 3 PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid (Center) 4 51,,._ >>5.0 >>5.0 ltem3 Lid Pm 3.71 3.85 5
ltem3 P,. + Pb 3.52 3.28 damping Element 6 't >>5.0 >>5.0 ltem4
2. 7.1.4.2 Boltlng Vertflcatlon The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 1.5 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2. 7-14). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 1.6 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.7-15). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.8). The seal tightness of the cask and canister llds is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-13~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-14 A 3 - Cask lld bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-1 Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
A3 9m Side Droo Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 5.3 3.6 3.6 29 Shear 25.0 16.7 16.7 14.3 Tension plus Shear 25.0 125 11.1 7.7 Maximum Stress S 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.5 Table 2.7-16 A 3 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
A3SideDrop Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 25 1.7 24 1.6 Shear 13.7 128 121 121 Tension plus Shear 6.1 28 5.3 25 Maximum Stress S 21 1.6 1.9 1.6 2.7.1.4.3 Basket verifications for Side Loads The verifications for side loads are carried out numerically with the calculation model described in Appendix 2-2.
Load-Bearing Capacity Analyses For NCT and HAC linear-elastic verifications are not successful. So according to Figure 2.1-1 the evaluation Is carried out by means of load-bearing capacity analyses as described in Appendix 2-2 (Section 3.3.2). Wrth a safety factor of 1.5 for NCT and 1.1 for HAC it must be proven that a decel-eration of (NCT) and (HAC) respectively will not cause global structural failure. For HAC limit load analyses with a deceleration up to are performed in order to investigate safety margins.
Fig. A 5 to Fig. A 13 in Appendix 2-2 show the courses of the global reaction forces and the global energies for NCT with and without additional thermal load and for HAC without thermal load in all decisive drop orientations. Stable equilibrium states are reached for all required decelerations.
Structural failure due to local yielding appears only at a drop orientation of at a load of about The required deceleration however is proven with a margin of nearly For the drop
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-14~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 orientations of the fuel basket remains stable even under a load of Fig. A 14 to Fig. A 22 in Appendix 2-2 show the deformed structure at maximum deceleration.
Verification of Admlsslble Defonnatlons According to Appendix 2-2 (Section 3.3.3) the deformations of the fuel basket are evaluated by considering a sequence of the loads resulting from NCT and HAC. Including the Intermediate and final unloading phases the load sequence has the following form: NCT--+ 1 g --+ HAC --+ 1 g.
The residual deformations and plastic strains from the cumulative loads are determined for the decisive HAC drop orientations with and without additional thermal load. Furthermore it is shown that even under maximum load the sheets will not cause loads on the FA Fig. A 23 to Fig. A 28 in Appendix 2-2 show the courses of the global reaction forces and the global energies. In Appendix 2-2 (Fig. A 29 to Fig. A 34) the deformations of the fuel basket after the final unloading are depicted, for each load case in drop direction and transverse to it.
Fig. A 35 to Fig. A 40 in Appendix 2-2 show the distribution of the plastic strains, each scaled to The maximum value con-sidering all components and all load* cases is Fig. A 41 to Fig. A 46 in Appendix 2-2 show the exaggerated deformation (displacement factor 10 -
20) of the sheets at the point of maximum load and the variation of the internal diameter of the most compressed receptacle over time. The minimum value of all receptacles and all load cases is The maximum width of a FA is So the gap between FA and surrounding receptacle will never be closed.
Verification of Stablllty According to Appendix 2-2 (Section 3.3.4) for all drop angles with and without additional thermal load the stability of the fuel basket has to be verified, taking into account initial Imperfections as depicted in Appendix 2-2 (Figure 13). With the required safety factor of 1.1 on the deceleration under HAC of Fig. A 47 to Fig. A 52 in Appendix 2-2 show the courses of the global reaction forces and the global energies and Fig. A 53 to Fig. A 58 the deformed structure under maximum load. Under all condi-tions the fuel basket remains stable.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page2.7-15~~
~~1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.1.5 Comer Drop~~
~~2. 7.1.6.1 9 m Edge Drop onto the Lid Side (A 2)~~
In this load case, the response of the CASTOR geo69 Package to the 9 m comer drop is ana-lysed for impact on the lid end. The edge drop describes a comer drop, where the centre of gravity is moved over the comer in order to avoid rotation of the package. The analyses are performed using the simulation model as described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapters 9 and 10, Sections 9.8.6 and 10.8.6). The edge drop onto lid side occurs at a drop angle of . That is, the longitudinal axis of the containment vessel is at an angle of from the impact surface. The dynamic analysis of the drop orientation calculated maximum inertia loadings of (see Appendix 2-1 Tab. A 182).
The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design tem-peratures (according to Table 2.7 2). Bolt preload effects (according to Appendix 2-1 Tab. A 182),
internal and external pressure (see Appendix 2-1 Tab. A 179) and the impact loads (see Appen-dix 2-1 Tab. A 179) are combined.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
Verification Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-16 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The
~inimum factor of safety amounts to 1. 70 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 3 in the cask lid under minimum design temperature. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value.
The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.7, Tab. A 120 and Fig. A 127 to Fig. A 132).
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-16
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-16 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under Edge Drop Lid Side; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
Location Materfal No. category Min.design Max. design temperature temperature Cask Head 1 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 2.22 1.73 Fillet Cask Head 2 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F 4.03 4.97 Fillet SA-182M 3 Cask Lid Grade F316 s,mensly 1.70 2.68 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluations show. Table 2.7-17 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The fonn pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment The minimum factor of safety amounts to 2.09 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 4 in the canister lid for maximum design tempera-ture. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1. 7, Tab. A 121 and Fig. A 133 to Fig. A 142).
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-17
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation wrthheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-17 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under Edge Drop Lid Side; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]
Factor of Safety Stress [-]
Position No. Location Material category Min.design Max.design temperature temperature Headring 1 (Transition recess) PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-5 Headr1ng 2 (Groove) PL +Pb+Q+F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-5 Canister Body 3 PL+ Pb+Q + F >>5.0 >>5.0 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Ud (Web) Pa, 2.27 2.09 4
ltem3 Pa,+ Pb 3.05 2.10 Ud (Center) 5 Item 3 s.__, >>5.o >>5.0 Clamping Element 6 't >>5.0 >>5.0 ltem4 Verification Botting at Cask lld and Canister lld The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 1.5 at minimum bolt preload under maximum design tem-perature (see Table 2.7-18). The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 2.3 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.7-19). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.7). The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.7-18 A 2 - Cask lld bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
A2 Edge Drop Ud Side Min. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 4.5 3.7 3.2 2.7 Shear 16.7 20.0 14.3 14.3 Tension plus Shear 20.0 125 9.1 7.1 Maximum Stress S 22 22 LS L6 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-18
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-19 A 2 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
A2 Edge Drop Ud Side Min. Preload Max. Preload *Min. Pre load Max. Preload Tension 6.1 2.6 4.9 2.3 Shear 71.4 29.8 56.5 22.6 Tension plus Shear 37.5 6.6 24.0 5.1 Maximum Stress S 5.8 2.6 4.8 2.3 2.7.1.6.2 9 m Edge Drop onto Bottom Side {A 6)
In this load case, the response of the CASTO~geo 69 Canister to the 9 m comer drop is ana-lysed for impact on the bottom end. The edge drop describes a comer drop, where the centre of gravity is moved over the comer due to rotation of the package. The analysis is performed using the simulation model as described in Appendix 2-1 (Section 10.8.9). The edge drop onto the bot-tom side occurs at a drop angle of . That is, the longitudinal axis of the containment vessel is at an angle of from the impact surface. The dynamic analysis of the drop orientation calculat-ed maximum inertia loadings of (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182).
Wrth regards to the integrity of the cask the drops onto the bottom side of the cask are covered from these onto the lid side. The stiffness of the cask bottom area in corn-parison with the lid system is higher. The drops onto the bottom side of the cask do not lead to an ovalisation of the cask body.
The details of the performed simulation are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter 10 and Sec-
- tion 11.1.10). The simulation and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design temperatures (according to Table 2.7 2). Bolt preload effects (according to Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 178), internal and external pressure (see Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.7, Tab. A 179) and the impact loads (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 182) are combined.
The stress results indicate that the canister structure can withstand the applied impact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the canister lid bolting are satisfied.
The assessment of the pure shear utilization In this load case is covered by the load case 9 m edge drop onto the lid side (see Section 2.7.1.5.1).
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-19
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Verification Canister parts The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-20 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment. The head ring (Item 2-5) is not as-sessed, since the load case edge drop Lid side shows higher loading in the head area. The mini-mum factor of safety amounts to 1.07 for the Pm + Pb criterion and occurs at Pos. 1 in the bottom of the canister body under minimum design temperature. The details of the stress assessment are presented in the appendix, section Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.10, Tab. A 136 and Fig. A 165 to Fig. A 174).
Table 2.7-20 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under Edge Drop Lid Side; Minimum Factors of Safety [-]
Factor of Safety Stress [-]
Position No. Location Material category MJn.deslgn Max.design temperature temperature canister Body Pm 1.10 1.45 1
Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 P.+Pb 1.07 1.45 Lid (Center) 2 Item 3 ~ >>5.0 >>5.0 Lid P., 3.78 3.92 3
Item 3 P., + Pb 3.17 3.05 Bolting Verification The assessment criteria of the canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 1. 7 at maximum bolt preload under maximum design temperature (see Table 2.7-21). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.10).
The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-20~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-21 A 6 - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [- I Min. Temp. Max. Temp.
AS Edge Drop Bottom Side Mlri. Preload Max. Preload Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 3.5 1.9 3.3 1.7 Shear 51.0 223 37.7 18.8 Tension plus Shear 125 3.4 10.7 3.0 Maximum Stress S 3.8 20 3.4 1.8 2.7.1.6 Oblique Drop The analyses of the oblique drop results in acceleration values that are covered by the ones for side drop evaluation.
2.7.1.7 Summary of Results The summary of damage on all drop orientations is presented In section 2.7.8.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-21~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.2 Crush As the mass of the CASTOR geo69 package is greater than 500 kg the Crush Test is not appli-cable.
2.7.3 Puncture 2.7.3.1 1 m Puncture laterally onto Lid Side (Cask Model only) (A 6)
This load case is not considered since a higher significance is expected by the following load case 1 m Puncture laterally onto Center (Cask Model only) (A 7), where the package do~ drop onto the unprotected centre of the cask body.
2.7.3.2 1 m Puncture laterally onto Center (Cask Model only) (A 7)
This load case simulates a 1 m side ~rap of the cask onto a 150 mm diameter bar. The most se-vere damage to the body resulting from the puncture drop will occur in this load case. When drop-ping laterally onto the centre of the cask, the cask is not protected by the impact limiters in the cen-tre region and the dead weight of the whole package acts onto the puncture bar. This direction covers the 1 m lid side and bottom drop onto the puncture bar.
The puncture bar as specified in 10 CFR 71, is a vertical, cylindrical, mild steel bar 150 mm in di-ameter and is placed in the longitudinal centre of gravity of the cask.
The impact force exerted *by the bar on the cask surface is calculated assuming the bar behaves as an elastic, perfectly plastic material with yield strength of 280 MPa which is a typical yield strength of mild steel [3]. The impact load is calculated from the properties of the puncture bar to:
7r F = -4 * (150 mm.) 2
~~280 .MPa =. 4950 1cN The equilibrium of forces is preserved by applying a global inertia load that results in a weight force equal to the applied puncture force.~~
The considered assembly of the CASTO~ geo69 Transport Package consists of the cask, cask lid and Its respective bolting, closure plate with respective bolting, impact limiters Including respective bolting, as well as the canister including the content mass which means a total weight of respectively for the half model in the simulation.
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-22
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The details of the performed simulations are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter 9 and Sec-tion 9.8.9). The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design temperatures. Bolt preload effects (according to Tab. A 178), Internal and external pressure (see Tab. A 179). Since the bolt preloads have no influence on the assessed location in the cask, only maximum bolt preloads are simulated.
The stress results indicate that the cask structure can withstand the applied impact loadings used in the analysis.
2. 7.3.2.1 Verification Cask parts The stress criteria for the cask *parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-22 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.10 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 1 in the cask body centre under maximum design temperature. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Sec-tion 11.1.11, Tab. A 138, Fig. A 175 and Fig. A 176).
Table 2.7-22 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under 1 m Puncture Lat-erally; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
Location Material ,,
No. category Min. ~eslgn Max. design temperature temperature 1 Cask Body SA-874M Sirens1y 1.10 1.07 2.7.3.2.2 Botting Verification The cask lid bolting is not assessed in this load case since the results are covered by the 9 m side drop results.
2.7.3.3 1 m Puncture laterally onto Bottom Side (Cask Model only) (A 8)
This load case is not considered since a higher significance is expected by the former load case 1 m Puncture laterally onto Center (Cask Model only) (A 7), where the package does drop onto the unprotected centre of the cask body.
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-23
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.3.4 1 m Puncture vertically onto Lid Side (Cask Model only) (A 9)
This load case is not considered since the assessment of the former load case End Drop: 9 m Flat Drop onto Lid Side (A 1) covers the results and the lid side is protected by the lid impact limiter.
2.7.3.5 1 m Puncture vertlcally onto Center of Bottom (Cask Model only) (A 10)
This load case simulates a 1 m flat drop of the cask bottom end onto a 150 mm diameter bar. This load case is basically similar to the load case 1 m Puncture laterally onto Center (Cask Model only)
(A 7).
Compared to previous described load case, the bottom impact limiter and the closure plate are neglected, which is a conservative assumption, since the bar will have to puncture the impact limit-er and closure plate first, before hitting the cask body. The identical puncture bar from Sec-tion 2.7.3.2 is placed centrically onto the bottom end of the cask body.
The impact load amounts to 4950 kN and is calculated in Section 2.7.3.2.
The equilibrium of forces is preserved by applying a global inertia load that results in a weight force equal to the applied puncture force.
The considered assembly of the CASTOR geo69 Transport Package consists of the cask, cask lid and its respective bolting, lid impact limiter including respective bolting, as well as the canister in-cluding the content mass. The bottom impact limiter and the closure plate are not considered which means a total weight of (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 1), re-spectively for the half model in the simulation.
The details of the performed simulations are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter 9, Section 9.8.9).
The simulations and evaluations are performed for both, the maximum and minimum design tem-peratures (according to Table 2.7 2). Bolt preload effects (according to Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 178),
Internal and external pressure (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 179). Since the bolt preloads have no influence on the assessed location in the cask, only maximum bolt preloads are simulated and as-sessed.
The stress results Indicate that the cask structure can withstand the applied Impact loadings used In the analysis.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-24~~
~~1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390~~
2. 7 .3.5.1 Verification Cask parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-23 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.15 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 1 In the centre of the cask body bottom under maximum design temperature. The assessment Is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.12, Tab. A 139, Fig. A 177 and Fig. A 178).
Table 2.7-23 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under 1 m Puncture Ver-tically; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Factor of safety Position Stress [-]
Location - Materl~I No. category Min.design Max. design tem1>erature temperature 1 Cask Body SA-874M SinlllnSly 1.20 1.15 2.7.4 Thermal 2.7.4.1 Fire accident {A 11 a)
The analysis of the thermal accident is presented here. The maximum internal pressure during the HAC thermal accident amounts to Additionally, to the internal pressure inside the cask cavity, pressures resulting from the thermal expansion of the moderator rods inside the inner and outer moderator drilling rows are applied (see Fig. A 179). For the inner row a pressure of is applied, while for the outer row a pressure of a is applied (see Fig. A 179).
The transient thermal analysis of the cask and canister for the 30-minute thermal fire accident is not part of this document and is reported in Chapter 3. The results in tenns of temperature fields are used as nodal load Input for the structural analysis. The event starts at 20°C room temperature.
From there on, eight different time steps are observed and combined with the mechanical load conditions. The temperature plots are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Sections 9.8.11 and 10.8.10).
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page2.7-25~~
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Propnetary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The stress analysis of the cask and canister parts due to fire accident are performed as part of the HAC load combination. The details of the performed simulations are described in Appendix 2-1 (Chapters 9 and 10, Sections 9.8 11 and 10.8.10). Bolt preload effects (according to Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 178) and internal pressure (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 179) are considered.
The stress results indicate that the cask and canister structure can both withstand the applied im-pact loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are satisfied.
2. 7 .4.1.1 Verification Cask and Canister parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-24 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.82 for the PL+ Pb + Q + F criterion and occurs at Pas. 1 in the cask in the webs between the moderator drilling holes. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.13, Tab. A 140 and Fig. A 179 to Fig. A 183).
Table 2.7-24 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under Fire Accident; Min-imum Factors of Safety [*]
Factor of Position Stress Location Material safety No. category
[-]
1 Cask Body SA-874M PL +Pb+Q+F 1.82 SA-182M 2 Cask Lid Sintenstv L98 Grade F316 The stress criteria for the canister parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2. 7-25 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the canister parts.
The form pieces (Item 5) and washers (Item 7) are not part of the stress assessment, since they are not critical to the structural integrity of the containment. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.63 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 3 in the canister lid. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appen--
dix 2-1 (Section 11.1.13, Tab. A 141, Fig. A 184to Fig. A 190).
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-26
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-26 Summary of stress assessment of Canister Components under Fire Accident; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
Stress Factor of Safety Position No. Location Material category [-)
Headring (Hole) 1 't 3.64 Item 2-5 Canister Body 2 ~ 3.01 Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid 3 ~ L63 ltem3 e 4 damping Element ltem4
't >>5.0
2. 7.4.1.2 Bolting Verification The assessment criteria of the cask and canister lid bolting are fulfilled. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 1.1 at maximum bolt preload (see Table 2.7-26). The min-imum factor of safety in the canister lid bolting amounts to 2.0 at maximum bolt preload (see Table 2.7-27). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix2-1 (Section 11.1.13). The seal tightness of the cask and canister lids is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are ob-served.
Table 2.7-26 A 11 a - Cask lld bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Max. Temp.
All a Fire Accident Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 28 24 Shear 7.7 7.1 Tension plus Shear 7.1 5.6 Maximum Stress S L2 Ll 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. O Page 2.7-27
1014--SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-27 A 11 a - Canister lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
Max. Temp.
A11 a Fire Accident Min. Preload Max. Preload Tension 3.5 20 Shear 37.7 21.2 Tension plus Shear 122 4.1 Maximum Stress S 3.6 21 2.7.4.2 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures Design temperatures and applied pressures are given in the following Table 2.7-28 and Table 2.7-29.
Table 2.7-28 Design temperatures rC1 Cold Envi- Fire Max. Design Min. Design Component Parts ronment Item Temperatures Temperatures name List Accident rCJ rCJ rCJ rCJ Cask body 2 Cask lld
~
55 C:
- C:
CD E
(t)
~~0) 0 Cask lid bolting 0 C')~~
I
...J 62,63 15
~~i !(t)~~
Retention Ring a.
Cl 21 E
~~u; ...al~~
-.1- .!:
.E
~
T""
Closure Plate 0 7 j e :J T""
-29°C -40oc "I!!CD Closure Plate a. a.
9 screws ~
Canister body 2
-i !
~~J C:~~
C)
I
...J
~~0. IO ~~~
~~m"O Canister lid 3 I-~~
~ ~
~IO T""
0 Canister lld T""
4,5,6,7 bolting
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-28~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-29 Applied Internal and external pressures for every load case for cask and canis-ter assembly Internal External Load case Component Pressure Pressure
[MPa] [MPa]
cask Normal Conditions of Transport (NCD Canister cask Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAG)
Canister Cask Cavity Cask inner Moderator Drilling Row Fire Accident Cask outer Moderator Drilling Row Canister Deep Water Immersion Cask cask Pressure Test Canister 2.7.4.3 Dlfferential Thermal Expansions The occurrence of thennal stresses is minimized by sufficiently large gaps in axial and radial direc-tion, which allows for free thennal expansion of the different components without contact and re-straint 2.7.4.4 Stress Calculations The calculations are described in sections 2.7.1 to 2.7.3.
2.7.4.6 Comparison with allowable Stresses The results presented in the previous sections show that the allowable stresses are met.
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-29~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.6 Immersion - Fissile Material The criticality analyses in chapter 6 ls performed with considering water flooding.
2.7.6 Immersion -All Packages The Immersion under a head of water of at least 15 m for 8 h is covered by the Deep Water Im-mersion Test (section 2.7.7).
2.7.7 Deep Water Immersion Test (Cask model only) (A 11 b) 10 CFR 71.61 requires that the containment vessel be subjected to an external water pressure of e 2 MPa for a period of not less than one hour without collapse, buckling, or in leakage of water. The containment boundary consists of the cask, closure plate and cask lid assembly.
This analysis evaluates the containment vessel stresses when the 2 MPa external pressure Is di-rectly applied to the outer surface of the containment vessel.
The analysis does only apply for the cask model, since the canister is enclosed by the cask and will therefore never be exposed to the external pressure. A linear-elastic material model is used. By showing that stresses do not exceed the stress limits and therefore no yielding occurs, it can be expected, that no buckling will emerge since the wall thickness of the cask is high.
The critical membrane and membrane plus bending stress intensities for the critical cask compo-nents are summarized in the following.
The evaluation of the cask bolt lids and the gasket compression will show, that no in leakage oc-curs. The simulation model of the cask is described in detail in Appendix 2-1 (Chapter 9 and Sec-tiof! 9.8.12). Bolt preload effects (according to Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 178) and external pressure (see Appendix 2-1, Tab. A 179) are considered. The simulations are performed for maximum de-sign temperature (see Table 2.7-28).
The stress results indicate that the cask structure can withstand the applied loadings used in the analysis. The assessment criteria of the cask lid bolting are satisfied.
The assessment of the pure shear utilization is not performed in this load case since the canister lid is pressed onto the head ring seat and therefore no higher loading compared to the assembly state can occur.
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-30
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information with held per 10 CFR2.390 2.7.7.1 Verification Cask parts The stress criteria for the cask parts are fulfilled as the following evaluation shows. Table 2.7-30 presents the assessed minimum factors of safety of the critical components of the cask parts. The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.02 for the Pm criterion and occurs at Pos. 2 in the fillet at the cask lid. The assessment is performed with the local stress intensity value. The details of the stress assessment are presented in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.14, Tab. A 146, Fig. A 191 to Fig. A 193).
Table 2.7-30 Summary of stress assessment of Cask Components under Deep Water Im-mersion; Minimum Factors of Safety[-]
C Factor of Position Stress Location Material safety No. category
[-]
Cask Head 1 SA-874M PL+Pb+Q+F >>5.0 Fillet SA-182M 2 cask Lid s.ntanslty 1.02 Grade F316 2.7.7.2 Botting Verification The assessment criteria of the cask lid bolting are satisfied. The minimum factor of safety in the cask lid bolting amounts to 2.4 at minimum bolt preload (see Table 2.7-31). The evaluated bolt stresses are summarized in Appendix 2-1 (Section 11.1.14). The seal tightness of the cask lid is demonstrated, since the bolt assessment criteria are observed.
Table 2.7-31 A 11 b - Cask lid bolt assessment - Minimum factors of safety[-]
Factor of Safety [-]
McQ<.Temp.
All b Deep Water Immersion Min; Preload Max. Preload Tension 29 2.6 Shear 33.3 33.3 Tension plus Shear 8.3 7.1 Maximum Stress S 2.4 25
~~2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-31~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 1b CFR2.390 2.7.8 Summary of Damage The summary of all evaluated minimum factors of safety during hypothetical accident conditions is presented in Table 2.7-32 for the cask parts and in Table 2.7-33 for the canister parts. All require-ments are met.
Table 2.7-32 Stress assessment- summary under HAC at Cask Min. Factor LoadCase Location Material of safety
[-]
SA-182M Al Flat Drop Lid Side Cask Lid 3.06 Grade F316 SA-182M A2 Edge Drop Lid Side Cask Lid 1.70 Grade F316 SA-182M A3 9m Side Drop Cask Lid 2.08 Grade F316 SA-182M A4 Flat Drop Bottom Side Cask Lid 1.80 Grade F316 A7 lm Puncture laterally center Cask Body SA-874M 1.07 of cask AlO 1m Puncture vertically
, Cask Bo!:ly SA-874M 1.15 center of bottom .
Alla Fire Accident Cask Body SA-874M 1.82 SA-182M Allb Deep Water Immersion Cask Lid 1.02 Grade F316 2,7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-32
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-33 Stress assessment- summary under Hypothetical Accident Conditions at Can-ister Min. Factor of LoadCase Location Material safety
[-]
Lid (Web) Lid (Web)
Al Flat Drop Lid Side 1.24 Item 3 ltem3 Lid (Web) Lid (Web)
A2 Edge Drop Lid Side 2.09 ltem3 ltem3 Hea<:frlng (Hole)
A3 9m Side Drop 1.57 Item 2-5 A4 Flat Drop Bottom Lid (Pocket) 2.00 Side ltem3 AS Edge Drop Bottom' Canister Body 1.07 Side Item 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 Lid Alla Fire Accident 1.63 Item 3 The summary of all evaluated minimum factors of safety is presented in Table 2.7-34 for the cask lid bolts and in Table 2.7-35 for the canister lid bolts. Factors of safety higher than 5.0 are depicted as ">>5.0". All requirements are met The minimum factor of safety amounts to 1.1 in the load case fire accident Table 2.7-34 Bolt assessment-summary under Hypothetical Accident Conditions; Cask Lid Bolts Minimum Factor of Safety[-)
load Case Tension Shear Tension plus Shear Maximum Stress S Al Flat Drop Ud Side 3.0 >>5 >>5 1.7 A2 Edge Drop Ud Side 2.7 >>5 >>5 1.5 A3 9m Side DroD 2.9 >>5 >>5 1.5 A4 Flat Drop Bottom Side 3.6 >>5 >>5 3.7 A71m Puncture late rat 3.6 >>5 >>5 3.2 A10 1m Puncture Vertical Bottom Side 3.7 >>5 >>5 3.7 All a Fire Accident 2.4 >>5 >>5 1.1 Alt b Deep Water Immersion 2.6 >>5 >>5 2.4 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-33
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 2.7-35 Bolt assessment- summary under Hypothetical Accident Conditions; Canister Lid Bolts Minimum Factor of Safety[-]
Load Case Tension Shear Tension plus Shear Maximum Stress S Al Flat Drop Lid Side 24 >>5 >>5 24 A2 Edge Drop Lid Side 2.3 >>5 >>5 2.3 A3Slde Drop 1.6 >>5 25 1.6 A4 Flat Drop Bottom Side 2.1 >>5 4.4 2.2 AS Edge Drop Bottom Side 1.7 >>5 3.0 1.8 All a Fire Accident 20 >>5 4.1 21 List of References
[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 7.8 Load Combinations for the structural analysis of shipping casks for radioactive material Revision 1; March 1989 2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 2.7, Rev. 0 Page 2.7-34
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.8 Accident Conditions for Air Transport of Plutonium Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Air Transport is excluded for the CASTO~ geo69 package.
2.8 Accident Conditions for Air Transport of Plutonium Section 2.8, Rev. 0 Page 2.8-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.9 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Air Transport is excluded for the CASTOR geo69 package.
2.9 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Section 2.9, Rev. 0 Page 2.9-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.10 Speclal Fonn Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed The CASTOR geo69 package is not designed to transport radioactive material in special fom,.
2.10 Special Fom, Section 2.10, Rev. 0 Page 2.10-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.11 Fuel Rods Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Cladding is not considered to provide containment of radioactive material under NCT or HAC as described in chapter 4.
2.11 Fuel Rods Section 2.11, Rev. 0 Page 2.11-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 2.12 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 2.12 Appendix Section 2.12, Rev. O Page 2.12-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Appendix 2-1 1014-TR-00024 Rev. O Structural Evaluation Containment Transport Package CASTOR111 geo69 Appendix 2-2 1014-TR-00028 Rev. O structural Evaluation Basket and Shielding Elements Transport Package CASTOR geo69 Appendix 2-3 1014-TR-00026 Rev. 0 Structural Evaluation Load Attachment Points Transport Package CASTO~ geo69 2.12 Appendix Section 2.12, Rev. 0 Page 2.12-2
APPENDIX 2-1 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnformtlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 2-1 in total 369 pages Structural Evaluation Containment Transport Package CASTOR geo69 Document No.: 1014-TR-0002 4 Rev. 0 Name Date Slgnatuf8 Prepared by OM-CM November 20, 2020 Reviewed by OM-CM Alo,,'fJIIW2.3,l.DZD I" Approved by OM 2q_ J../:;,Ju. Zo 20 This document shall not be cited, reprcxluced in whole or in part, or made avaDable to third parties without the prior written consent of GNS Gesellschaft tor Nuklear-Service mbH, Essen. All rights reserved by GNS.
Thie document contains business and trade secrets of GNS.
APPENDIX 2-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary Information wlthheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 2-2 in total 95 pages Structural Evaluation Basket and Shielding Elements Transport Package CASTOR geo69 Document No.: 1014-TR-00028 Rev. 0 Name Date Signature Prepared by OM-CM October23,20 20 Reviewed by OM-CM ~2.3,2.0 Z,eJ Approved by OM
4/ A.v 'u!J.W This document shall not be cited, reproduced In whole or in part, or made available to third parties without the prior written consent of GNS Gesellschaft tor Nuklear-Servlce mbH, Essen. All rights reserved by GNS.
This document contains business and trade secrets of GNS.
APPENDIX 2~3 to 1014-SR--00001 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 2-3 In total 56 pages Structural Evaluation Load Attachment Points Transport Package CASTOR geo69 Document No.: 1014-TR-00026 Rev. 0 Name Date Signature Prepared by DM-CM November 26, 2020 Reviewed by DM-CM JI~ J.11 J.Od{)
Approved by DM : 1-. 'l-. J-bv. 7.0u.9 This document shall not be cited, reproduced in whole or In part, or made available to third parties without the prior written consent of GNS Gesellschaft tor Nuklear-Service mbH, Essen. All rights reserved by GNS.
This document contains business and trade secrets of GNS.
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Propnetary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 3 Thennal Evaluation 3.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 3.0 Overview Section 3.0, Rev. 0 Page 3.0-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In this chapter, it is shown that the CASTOR geo69 package fulfils all the requirements for Type B(U)F packages with regard to thermal aspects. The thermal design for transport fulfills the 10 CFR71 requirements for normal conditions of transport (NCT) and hypothetical accident condi-tions (HAC).
The temperature distribution within the package and the maximum temperatures of the compo-nents are calculated by numerical methods applying the finite element method (FEM).
The proofs show that all calculated temperatures are below the corresponding admissible values and a save heat removal during transport is ensured.
The following verification objectives are considered for the thermal design under normal conditions of transport (NCT):
1. The safe enclosure of the content must be ensured. For this purpose, the temperatures of the design-relevant lid gaskets shall not exceed the admissible limit values of ac-cording to section 2.2.1 for continuous operation. Furthermore, the temperatures of the lid gaskets and the mean temperature of the canister filling gas are used for the verification of the containment in chapter 4.
~~2. The integrity of the fuel rod cladding must be ensured. For this purpose, it is shown that the maximum cladding temperature does not exceed the admissible limit value of 400 °C ac-cording to [1].~~
3. The effectiveness of the shielding must be ensured. For this purpose, the maximum tem-peratures for the moderator components must stay permanently below the maximum ad-missible temperature of according to section 2.2.1. Furthermore, the mean temperatures of the moderator components are taken into account for the shielding analyses chapter 5 and the moderator design section 2.2.1.
4. The maximum temperature at the accessible surface of the package shall not exceed 50 °C according to 10 CFR71 § 71.43 (g) during transport in a non-exclusive use shipment and without insolation taken into account. During transport in an exclusive use shipment, the maximum admissible temperature amounts to 85 °C.
The admissible component temperatures of the package are demonstrably not exceeded and meet sufficiently large safety margins.
The following verification objectives are taken into account for the thermal design under hypothet-ical accident conditions of transport:
3.0 Overview Section 3.0, Rev. 0 Page 3.0-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390
5. The safe enclosure of the content must be ensured even for HAC. Therefore, the maximum temporary temperatures of the cask and canister lid gaskets are limited to These are the maximum temporary temperatures for which failure of the metal gaskets can be excluded according to section 2.2.1.
~~6. The cladding temperatures are shown to remain below the admissible value of 570 °C for HAC according to [1].~~
7. The thermal degradation of the moderators shielding effectiveness under HAC is taken into account in the shielding analyses in chapter 5, therefore the assessment of the moderator component temperatures is omitted.
List of References
[1] Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel Interim staff Guidance -11, Rev. 3 Spent Fuel Project Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2003) 3.0 Overview Section 3.0, Rev. 0 Page 3.0-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.1 Description of Thennal Design Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 3.1 Description of Thermal Design Section 3.1, Rev. 0 Page 3.1-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information Withheld (@)GN S per 10 CFR2.390 3.1.1 Design Features
A detailed description of the CASTOR~ geo69 can be found in section 1.2.1. The packaging con-sists of a thick-walled cask body made of ductile cask iron (DCI) and an inner canister made of stainless steel. The canister accommoda tes up to 69 spent fuel assemblies (FA) from boiling water reactors (BWR). Their maximum decay heat amounts to 18.5 kW, while different homogeneo us and heterogene ous loading patterns are possible. A description of the different loading patterns can be found in section 3.1.2.
The safe enclosure of the content is ensured by two independen t barriers, the canister with re-openable lid and the cask with bolted lid. Both are sealed by metal gaskets. The temperatur e of the gaskets is examined in the thermal evaluation for NCT and HAC to ensure the long-term tightening function.
The FA are kept in position by the basket sheets and the outer sheets which ensure besides criti-cality safety a sufficient heat removal from the FA The basket sheets are made of boronized alu-minium, the outer sheets are made of steel. Additional component s inside the canister are the round segments and the shielding elements, which are both made of aluminium.
During transportation, the package is positioned horizontally. It is equipped with one lid- and one bottom-side impact limiter. In chapter 3.3.1 it is shown that no personnel barrier is needed to meet the requirements of § 71.43 (g), in which the maximum temperature of the accessible surface un-der exclusive use is limited to 85 °C.
The heat removal within the package is achieved by conduction, convection and radiation. Conduc-tion takes place mainly inside walls of the cask and the canister and within the basket sheets. Ra-diation takes place between all surfaces that border a gaseous atmosphere. Heat removal from the package to the environmen t takes place by convection and radiation without using active cooling mechanism s or other coolants. In order to improve the heat dissipation on the outside, the cask is equipped with radial fins. Due to the high thermal resistance of the impact limiters and the gaps in the lid system, the majority of the thermal energy is dissipated by the fin zone.
To enhance heat removal from the FA, the space between cask and canister and the inner space of the canister are backfilled with the filling gas helium, which has a high thermal conductivity. Ad-ditionally, the temperature gradients that occur radially cause a convective flow, which further en-hances the heat removal.
The disclosure of the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) can be found in chapter 4.
3.1 Description of Thermal Design Section 3.1, Rev. 0 Page 3.1-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Inside the cask wall, moderator rods are placed for radial neutron shielding. Furthermore, moderator plates are placed in the cask bottom and in the lid area for axial neutron shielding. All moderator components are made of The containment relevant components of the package are designed in accordance with the 2017 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section 111, Division 3 [1].
3.1.2 Content's Decay Heat The cask can be loaded with a maximum of 69 FA of six different types from BWR according to section 1.2.2. Their summarized maximum decay heat is limited to 18.5 kW. There are three bounding loading patterns, all fitting into a certain scheme of six position groups of FA. These load-
- ing patterns are identified by their decay heat per FA and therefore are called thermal require-ments. The three thermal requirements are shown in Figure 3.1-1 .
. For the thermal evaluation of NCT, all thermal requirements are examined. Based on NCT, the most unfavorable thermal requirement is identified for the eval-uation of HAC.
The active length of the FA and the axial heat power distribution depend on the type of the FA, the burnup profile additionally depends on the irradiation time and the decay time. All allowed types of FA are listed in Table 3.1-1. For the modelling of the FA, the most unfavourable conditions are considered, see section 3.3.1 for details.
3.1 Description of Thermal Design Section 3.1, Rev. O Page 3.1-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2 390
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 3.1-1 Thennal Requirements (TR1-3) with maximum decay heat per FA position In W, top view 3.1 Description of Thennal Design Section 3.1, Rev. 0 Page 3.1-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.1-1 Considered types of FA
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
3.1.3 Summary Tables of Temperatures The component temperatures of the package are summarized in Table 3.3-5 for NCT and a con-servative high ambient temperature (hot case) and discussed in section 3.3.2.1. The influence of the radial displacement of the components inside the cask on the maximum temperatures is sum-marized in Table 3.3-7. For NCT and a conservative low ambient temperature (cold case), the component temperatures are assumed to be uniformly at -40 °C, as discussed in section 3.3.2.2.
The temperature of the accessible surface of the package Is given In Table 3.3-6 and discussed in section 3.3.2.3.
The maximum temperatures for HAC and the time of occurrence are given in Table 3.4-2 and dis-cussed in section 3.4.
The applicable temperature limits of the materials and components are given In Table 3.2-9.
3.1 Description of Thermal Design Section 3.1, Rev. 0 Page 3.1-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.1.4 Summary Tables of Maximum Pressures The calculation of the maximum pressures for NCT and HAC and a discussion on flammable gas-es can be found in chapter 4.
List of References
[1] 2017 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, An International Code Section Ill Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components Division 3 Containment Systems for Transportation and Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Material 3.1 Description of Thermal Design Section 3.1, Rev. 0 Page 3.1-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 3.2 Material Properties and ComponentSpecffications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.2.1 Materlal Properties The relevant material data of the components of the package on which the thermal calculations are based, include
- the thermal conductMty k [W / (m
~~K)],~~
- the density p [kg / m3],
- the specific heat capacity c, [J / (kg
~~K)],~~
- the emissMty E [-].
Materials used for the package are ductile cast iron for the cask body and stainless steel for the canister, the bottom closure plate, the retention ring and the lids. The moderator material, which is
- used in the moderator rods and the moderator plates is made of . The relevant material data of the cask, the canister and the moderator components can be found in Table 3.2-1.
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnatJon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.2-1 Material data of cask and canister components Component, Heat conduc- Spec. heat Temperature, Density, Reference oc tlvlty, capacity, material kg/m 3 W/(m
~~K) J/(kg~~
K) 20 37.5 455 50 38.5 461 100 39.73 479 Cask body 150 40.45 495 Ductile cast iron section 2.2.1 7200 SA-874M 200 40.73 508 250 40.64 521 300 40.23 535 325 39.93 542 20 100 150 Canister body 200 section 2.2.1 250 300 350 400 Canister lid section 2.2.1 Cask lld Retention ring See SA-240M 316L Closure plate SA-240M See SA-240M 316L 22Cr-5Ni-3Mo-N Moderator rods Moderator plates section 2.2.1 (bottom / lld) 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The basket sheets are made of boronized aluminium, the round segments and the shielding ele-ments are made of aluminium. The outer sheets are made of steel. The relevant material data of the basket material, the outer sheets and the round segments can be found in Table 3.2-2.
Table 3.2-2 Materlal data of the basket Heat conduc- Spec. heat Component, Temperature, Density, Reference oc tivlty, capacity, material kg/ma W/(m
~~K) J/(kg~~
K) 20 134.0 898 50 137.6 909 75 140.8 923 Round segments 100 143.6 934 Shleldlng elements section 2.2.1 2690 125 145.9 942 SB-209 Alloy 5454 150 148.0 951 175 150.0 961 200 151.9 972 Basket sheets section 2.2.1 AI-B4C-MMC Outer sheets section 2.2.1 See SA-240M 316L SA-240M 316 The impact limiters use polyurethane foams of various densities as crush material. The sheets of the casing, the spacers and the load distribution plate are made of aluminium. The penetration e protection plate is made of steel. The relevant material data of the impact limiters can be found in Table 3.2-3.
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.2-3 Material data of the impact llmlters Component, Heat conduc- Spec. heat Temperature, Density, Reference oc tlvlty, capacity, material kg/~
W/(m
~~K) J/(kg. K)~~
Plates Spacers 1 section 2.2.1 Spacer section 2.2.1 Load distribution plate section 2.2.1 Penetration protection plate section 2.2.1 Crush material (PU-Foam section 2.2.1 Crush material (PU-Foam section 2.2.1
1) In the calcuatlons, the material data of EN AW-7020 Is used for the spacers leading to a by about 10 % higher heat conductivity. An additional calculation with the EN AW-5083 H 111 material data shows that the Influence on the temperatures Is minor Oess than 0.2 K difference In the hd and bottom region).
The fuel assemblies contain a various number of fuel rods filled with fuel pellets made of uranium oxide. The structural components such as cladding, water rods, spacers and fuel channels are made of zlrcaloy. The space between the fuel rods Is filled with helium. Wrthin the numerical model of the package, the FA are not modelled in detail, but they are replaced by homogenized zones.
The material data of these zones are calculated separately, which is described in section 3.3.1.
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. O Page 3.2-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The material data of FA-components are listed in Table 3.2-4, the calculated material data, which are applied In the homogenized zones, can be found in Table 3.2-5.
Table 3.2-4 Material data of the fuel assemblies Thermal Spec. heat Component, Temperature, Density, Reference conductivity, capacity, material oc kg/m~
J/(kg. K)
W/(m
K)
Fuel pellets
[1] 20-400 10600 303 (U02) (radial / ~
20 13.6 296 Cladding tubes, 100 14.3 310 Water rods, 200 15.2
[2] 6550 323 Fuel channel (Zircaloy) 300 16.4 334 400 18.0 344 Table 3.2-6 Calculated material data of the homogenized FA-zones applied In the 30--FE model
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The coefficients of thennal expansion In Table 3.2-6 are used to evaluate the radial and axial gaps between the components. The emissivities of the relevant components can be found in Table 3.2-7.
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-6
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The internal space of the canister and the space between cask and canister are backfilled with helium. The gaps between cask and impact limiters as well as the gap around the bottom modera-tor plate are filled with dry air. The material data of the gases can be found in Table 3.2-8.
Conservatively, the solar absorption coefficients of all outer surfaces are assumed to be 1.
Material properties of ASME-material are taken from 2.2.1 in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Part II Section D (Metric). Other material properties base on manufacturers specifications and individual material qualification. The material properties of the gases and the emission coefficients are taken from reliable literature sources.
Table 3.2-6 Coefficient of thermal expansion of the relevant components
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.2-7 Applied emissivity of the relevant components Component Reference Emissivity Cask body, outer surface (painted) section 2.2.1 0.93 Cask body, inner cavity (Thermaline) section 2.2.1 0.6 Cask body (untreated) section 2.2.1 0.5 Canister (stainless steel) section 2.2.1 0.36 Cask lid (stainless steel) section 2.2.1 0.36 Canister lid (stainless steeQ section 2.2.1 0.36 Closure plate (stainless steel) section 2.2.1 0.36 Retention ring (stainless steel) section 2.2.1 0.36 Moderator rods and discs (polyethylene) section 2.2.1 0.9 Impact limiter sheets (aluminium, untreated) section 2.2.1 0.1 Load distribution plate (aluminium, untreated) section 2.2.1 0.1 Cladding and water rods (zircaloy, untreated) [2] 0.8 Basket sheets (aluminium, anodized) section 2.2.1 0.55 Outer sheets (stainless steel) section 2.2.1 0.36 Fuel channels (Zircaloy, untreated) [2] 0.8 Round segments (aluminium, anodized) section 2.2.1 0.55 Shielding elements (aluminium, anodized) section 2.2.1 0.55 Ambience chosen 1 Emissivity of the fire § 71.73 c) 0.9 Cask surface (During fire and cooling phase) § 71.73 c) 0.8 e Table 3.2-8 Material data of the gases Heat conduc- Spec. heat Temperature, Density Fluid Literature oc tivlty, capacity, kg/m:a W/(m
K) J/(kg. K) 20 0.0257 100 0.0314 200 0.0380 720 Air (dry) [3] 1.188 300 0.0441 (p =const.)
400 0.0500 500 0.0556 25 0.1536 100 0.1793 Helium [3] 200 3115 0.2116 0.166 300 0.2420 (p =const.)
400 0.2708 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.2.2 Component Specifications The temperatures of the following components of the package are limited to certain admissible values under NCT:
- the fuel rods,
- the lid gaskets,
- the moderator material,
- the surface of the package.
The integrity of the fuel rod cladding must be ensured. For this purpose, the maximum cladding temperature must not exceed the admissible limit of 400 °C for normal conditions of transport ac-cording to [4].
The safe enclosure of the content must be ensured. For this purpose; the temperatures of the de-sign-relevant lid gaskets must stay below the admissible limit value of according to section 2.2.1 for continuous operation. Furthermore, the temperatures of the lid gaskets and the mean temperature of the filling gas in the cask cavity are used for the verification of the containment.
The effectiveness of the shielding is ensured when the maximum temperatures of the moderator components are below the maximum admissible application temperatures of according to section 2.2.1. Furthermore, the mean temperatures of the moderator components are used for the shielding analyses and the moderator design.
The maximum temperature at the accessible surface of the package must remain under 85 °c dur-ing transport in an exclusive use shipment according to §71.43 (g).
During hypothetical accident conditions, the safe enclosure of the content must be ensured. There-fore, the maximum temperatures of the cask and canister lid gaskets are limited to These are the maximum temporary temperatures for which failure of the metal gaskets can be excluded according to section 2.2.1.
The cladding temperatures are shown to remain below the admissible value of 570 °C for acci-dents according to [4].
As the thermal degradation of the moderators shielding effectiveness under accident conditions of transport is taken Into account in the shielding analyses, assessment of the moderator component temperatures is omitted.
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.2-9 Temperature llmlts of components Maximum Maximum Component, material Literature temperature temperature NCTrc1 HAC rCJ Fuel rod [4] 400 570 Gaskets section 2.2.1 Moderator material section 2.2.1 -
Cask surface (accessible surface)
§71.43 (g) 85 -
Cask body Ductile cast iron section 2.2.1 343 -
SA874 Canister Form piece section 2.2.1 427 -
Head ring Canister lld section 2.2.1 427 -
Clamping element Cask lld Retention ring section 2.2.1 427 -
Closure plate section 2.2.1 316 -
SA-240M Outer sheets Round segment section 2.2.1 121 -
SB-209 Alloy 5454 Basket sheets section 2.2.1 250 -
AJ..B4C-MMC Plates of the impact llmlter section 2.2.1 66 -
Crush material section 2.2.1 127 -
3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. 0 Page 3.2-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] SCALE 4.4a: A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and Personal Computers Oak Ridge National Laboratory NUREG/CR-0200 ORNL/RSIC, CCC-545, 2000
[2] MATPRO-Version 11 (Revision 2): A Handbook of Materials Properties for Use in the Anal-ysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behaviour US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0497-REV-2, 1981
[3] McAdams W. H.
Heat Transmission (3 rd edition)
McGraw Hill (1985)
[4] Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel Interim Staff Guidance -11, Rev. 3 Spent Fuel Project Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2003) 3 2 Material Properties and Component Specifications Section 3.2, Rev. O Page 3.2-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 3.3 Thennal Evaluation under Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 For the evaluation of NCT, the following stationary numerical calculations, based on the finite ele-ment method (FEM) are evaluated:
- 3D-FE model, including insolation, thennal requirement 1-3
- 3D-FE model, without lnsolation, thennal requirement 2
- Section model, Including insolation, thermal requirement 1-3, centrically aligned
- Section model, including insolation, thennal requirement 1-3, radial displacement The calculations cover all cases with a maximum heat load as requested by 10 CFR71, Including the hot case and the hot case without insolation for the detennlnation of the temperature of the accessible surface. The case with a minimum content heat load, no insolation (cold case) is dis-cussed In section 3.3.2.2. The Influence of inhomogeneous loadings according to section 3.1.2 on the temperature distribution of the package is examined. Additional calculations with a section model are made in order to quantify the influence of the radial displacement of canister, basket and fuel assemblies on the temperature field.
3.3.1 Description of the Numerical Model The numerical model, including the geometrical model, the boundary conditions and assumptions are specified in the following sections.
3.3.1.1 Calculation Methods The calculation methods for the thennal analysis are validated for the thermal design of transport and storage casks for several other cask designs of GNS. This includes especially the comparison of calculations with experimental tests results.
For the numerical calculations, the FEM software ANSYS mechanical [1] is used. ANSY~. Inc.
extensively verifies and validates the ANSYS program as part of a quality assurance process.
Additionally, each used program version is verified and validated especially for the application to the thennal design of transport and storage casks by GNS.
3.3.1.2 Geometric Modelling For the numerical calculations, a three-dimensional, finite element (3D-FE) model Is used, repre-senting one half of the package, taking into account Its symmeby. The calculation model is shown in Figure 3.3-1 and Figure 3.3-2. The calculation model consists of approximately 610000 elements and covers all thermally relevant components, which are itemized in the design parts lists. An overview of the design parts lists can be found in section 1.2. For all component dimensions, nom-3.3 Thennal Evaluation under Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information with held @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 inal values from the particular ~esign drawings and the temperature-depen dent material properties from section 3.2.1 are applied. The manufacturing tolerances of the components are tight, so that their impact on the temperature distribution can be neglected.
The FA are modelled as homogenized zones, details can be found in section 3.3.1.4. The fins on the cask surface are not explicitly modelled. Instead, the increased convective heat transfer Is tak-en into account by an effective surface enlargement factor, which is explained in section 3.3.1.3.
For transportation, the cask is equipped with each one lid and bottom side impact limiter. Those are mainly made of polyurethane foam as crush material, which is enclosed by aluminum sheets.
Further relevant components are the penetration protection plate (made of steel) and the load dis-tribution plate (made of aluminum).
The free space within the canister and the space between canister and cask are backfilled with the filling gas helium. The gaps between the cask and the impact limiters, as well as the gap around the bottom moderator plate are filled with dry air. All gases inside the package are assumed as stagnant, therefore only heat conduction and thermal radiation are considered. The positive effects on heat transmission by convective flows are neglected.
All surfaces within the package that adjoin gas atmosphere participate in radiation exchange. The corresponding values for the emissivity, which can be found in Table 3.2-7, are assigned to the surfaces.
The FA are centrically arranged in the basket, as well as the basket in the canister and the canister in the cask. In reality, the horizontal position of the package during the transport causes an eccen-tric arrangement of the basket, the fuel assemblies and the canister, which leads to local contacts between the components on the bottom and Increased gaps on the opposite side. This effect has both positive and negative effects on the temperatures, depending on the specific component. The impact of the radial displacement Is evaluated in 3.3.1. 7.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-3
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Figure 3.3-1 Overall view of the 3D-FE model 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-4
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Figure 3.3-2 Cross-sectional area of the 3D-FE model All components are modelled with nominal values in the 3D-FE model, which are related to a com-ponent temperature of 20 °C.
In reality, the gaps are smaller due to the higher thermal expansion of the inner components compared to the outer components.
Taking the most unfavorable manufacturing tolerances into account, the summarized This shows that even for the most unfavorable tolerance pairings, the package meets sufficiently large safety margins.
3.3 Thennal Evaluation under Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-1 Thennal expansion for the outer and Inner radlal gap
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
3.3.1.3 Modelling of the Fins In order to improve the convective heat removal from the cask surface, radial fins are located on the outer surface of the cask, . The fin geometry is not modelled in detail in the 3D-FE model. Instead, the fin zone is modelled as a smooth cylindrical surface on which a heat transfer coefficient is applied. The fins are taken into account by multiplying the convective heat transfer coefficient (see section 3.3.1.6.1) by a surface enlargement factor. This factor considers the geometrical surface enlargement and the fin effectiveness. The surface enlargement factor KF is calculated analytically according to [2]:
with tanhX l]Fia:;::_X_
X=q,*!!;-j2*h 2 k*s 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 A schematic representation can be found in Figure 3.3-3, a summary of the applied geometrical values and physical properties is given In Table 3.3-2.
According to [3], these are conservative high values for natural convection in air. A high value for the HTC itself Is conservative, as it leads to a lower value for the fin efficiency. For the thermal conductMty, the value of DCI at a tempera-ture of 100 °C is applied, as fin temperatures will be in this range (see section 3.3.2.1 ).
¢ dT
.. ~!'
S'
- Free cask surface
- Surface of fins Ai:..
- Base surface of fins As
<i'ld ~
Figure 3.3-3 Schematic representation of a fin 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-2 Input values for the calculation of the surface enlargement factor
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The surface enlargement factor is applied to convective amount of the HTC only. The enhance-ment of the radiative heat transfer by the fins ls conservatively neglected. The reason ls that the major part of the fin surface is almost perpendicular to the ambient, facing towards neighboring fins (see Figure 3.3-3). As parallel fins have a similar temperature, almost no heat is transferred be-tween neighboring fins. Furthermore, the radiative heat transfer between the lateral surfaces of the fins and the ambient can be neglected as the view factors are very small.
3.3.1.4 Modelling of the Fuel Assemblles The 69 FA are not modelled in detail in the 3D-FE model, instead a simplified geometry is used as shown in Figure 3.3-1.
Table 3.3-3 shows the different FA types. The calculation of the homogenized material properties is conducted for all possible types of FA, 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-3 Calculated radial thermal conductivity of considered types of FA
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3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Nonna! Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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3.3.1.4.1 Axial thennal conductivity, density, heat capacity
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3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-10
1014--SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.3.1.4.2 Thermal conductivity In radial direction
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3.3 Thennal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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Figure 3.3-4 Comparison of the slmpllfled and detailed FA model 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390)
Figure 3.3-6 Comparison of the temperature distribution of the detalled and the slmplifled FA model 3.3.1.4.3 Axlal heat load distribution The decay heat generation is distributed heterogeneously along the active length of the FA, which is taken into consideration by the axial heat load profile. The detailed axial heat load profiles are calculated for all possible types of FA and for various decay times. The calculations are based on the bumup calculations in section 1.2.2. The resulting peaking factors are summarized in Table 3.1-1.
The detailed profiles are shown in Figure 3.3-6. The axial heat load profile reflects the 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 relative local heat power, the absolute heat power of the FA depends on the position and the ther-mal requirement and can be found In section 3.1.2.
e
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 3.3-6 Detailed and slmpllfled axlal heat load profile 3.3.1.4.4 Summary 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-15
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.3.1.6 Heat Removal Mechanisms The heat removal from the package to the ambience is purely passive; an active heat removal sys-tem is not necessary. The decay heat generated In the pellets is transferred by thermal conduction and radiation to the cladding tubes. From there, it is transferred via thermal radiation, convection and conduction to the fuel channels, the basket sheets and the canister wall. Between the canister and the cask, the heat transfer also occurs by conduction, convection and radiation. Within the canister and cask body, the heat is transferred by conducti!Jn only.
From the outer surface of the package, the heat is removed by convection and radiation to the am-bience. To enhance convective heat transfer, the cylindrical surface of the cask is equipped with fins. The surrounding air is conservatively considered as still, no wind QGCurs.
Conservatively, the calculation does not take into account the convective heat transfer il')slde the canister and the cask. Therefore, in all gaps filled with helium or air, only conduction and radiation is considered.
Most of the heat is transferred radially to the cask surface. Due to the insulating effect of the impact limiters and the gaps between the lids, the axial heat transfer Is reduced severely.
3.3.1.6 Boundary Conditions 3.3.1.6.1 Heat transfer coefficients on the package surface The heat removal from the package surface occurs by free convection to the surrounding air and radiative heat transfer to the environment. The fins are not modelled in detail, the cask is consid-ered cylindrical instead (see Figure 3.3-1). The fins are taken into account by a surface enlarge-ment factor, which is explained in section 3.3.1.3. On the outer surface of the 3D-FE model, an effective, temperature-dependent HTC heff is applied, which consists of a convective amount heonv and a radiative amount hRad he!r = heonv + hRad.
The convective heat transfer coefficient hConv is derived from the Nusselt number, which is defined as h*L Nu=-
k 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-16
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 where h - heat transfer coefficient [W / (m 2
~~K)],~~
L - characteristic length [m],
k - thermal conductivity [WI (m
~~K)].~~
The Nusselt law according to [5] for the turbulent heat transfer by free convection at a vertical plane is applied Nu= 0.13 *(Gr* Pr) 1r.i where Nu - Nusselt number, Gr - Grashof number, Pr - Prandtl number.
The correlation is used for the HTC of all outer surfaces of the package, including cask surface (with/ without fins) and ir:npact limiters. The Grashof number Gr can be interpreted as the ratio of the buoyancy force to the viscous force in a free convection flow system. It is defined as 3
g- J3 *AT* L Gr= v2 where g - gravitational acceleration [9.81 m/s2],
13 - coefficient of thermal expansion [1/K],
flT - Temperature difference between package wall and ambient temperature TP - TA.Conv [K],
L - characteristic length [m],
v - Kinematic viscosity [m 2 / s].
The Prandtl number Pr is a measure for the ratio of the relative thicknesses of the hydrodynamic to the thermal boundary layers. For all material properties, the temperature dependent values of dry air are considered, which can be found in Table 3.3-4. The mean temperature of the package wall and the bulk temperature is taken as reference temperature.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. O Page 3.3-17
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-4 Material properties of dry air based on [2]
Temperature A p V Pr oc 10-3 W/(m*K) 10-31/K 10*1 m 2/s -
20 25.69 3.421 153.5 0.7148 30 26.43 3.307 162.9 0.7134 40 27.16 3.200 172.7 0.7122 60 28.60 3.007 192.7 0.7100 80 30.01 2.836 213.5 0.7083 100 31.39 2.683 235.2 0.7070 120 32.75 2.546 257.5 0.7060 140 34.08 2.422 280.7 0.7054 160 35.39 2.310 304.6 0.7050 180 36.68 2.208 329.3 0.7049
~~200 37.95 2.115' 354.7 0.7051 250 41.06 1.912.~~
421.2 0.7063 300 44.09 1.745 491.8 0.7083 350 47.05 1.605 566.5 0.7109 400 49.96 1.486 645.1 0.7137 800 71.54 0.932 1402 0.7342 The assumption of a vertical plate is feaslble, as the diameter of the cylindrical cask is large com-pared to the thickness of the boundary layer. According to [5], the correlation is valid for isothermal surfaces. Table 3.3-5 shows, that the difference between maximum surface temperature and cir-cumferential average temperature Is less than 1K, which means that the ,assumption is applicable.
The convective heat transfer coefficient within the finned zone is multiplied by the surface en-largement factor for consideration of the enhanced convective heat transfer by the fins.
The factor is derived in section 3.3.1.3.
The radiative amount hRact of the effective heat transfer coefficient Is deviated from the Stefan-Bolzmann-law as follows where T P is the surface temperature of the package and cr is the Stefan Boltzmann constant (cr = 5.67
~~10"8 WI (m 2~~
K"')). E denotes the emissivity of the corresponding surfaces, which can be found In Table 3.2-7. TA.Rad stands for the ambient temperature for radiation. T A.conv stands for the ambient temperature for convection.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-18
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 For the ambient temperature for convection T A.conv, as well as for radiation TA.Rad, a temperature of 38 °C is applied, according to §71.71.
3.3.1.6.2 lnsolation According to§ 71.71, insolation over a period of 12 h per day has to be considered. In the thermal analyses, it Is taken Into account by constant heat fluxes, whic~ are applied on the package sur-face. The following heat fluxes are considered:
- Flat surfaces transported horizontally
~~Base none~~
~~Other surfaces 800W/m 2 (> 800 g cal/ (cm 2~~
~~12 h)~~
~~- Flat surfaces not transported horizontally 200 W/m 2 (> 200 g cal/ (cm 2~~
~~12 h)~~
~~- Curved surfaces 4.00W/m 2 (> 400 g cal/ (cm 2~~
~~12 h)~~
The requested heat fluxes by 10 CRF71 are overestimated by these assumptions, since tempera-tures for NCT are examined by stationary calculations, which relates to an insolation of 24 h per day. The absorption coefficient of the surfaces is conservatively set to 1. The determination of the maximum temperature of the accessible surface is additionally carried out without insolation ac-cording to § 71.43.
3.3.1. 7 Radial Dis placement of Canister, Basket and Fuel Assemblies As described before, in the 3D-FE model the components inside the cask (FA, basket, canister) are in concentric alignment. For transportation, the cask is placed In horizontal position, which causes a .radial displacement of the canister, the basket and the fuel assemblies with local contact at the bottom and an increased gap at the top, see Figure 3.3-7. This causes higher temperatures in certain components. To take this Into account, an additional section model Is used which con-sists of the mid-part of the 3D-FE model, Illustrated in Figure 3.3-8. Utilizing this model, two calcu-lations are compared, one where the components are centrically aligned, one where the radial dis-placement is implemented. The temperature differences are added to the component temperatures for NCT of the 30-FE model. For some components, the radial displacement leads to lower tem-peratures due to the reduced helium gap at the bottom, which is conservatively neglected. In this way, It is assured that only the negative effects of the radial displacement are taken Into account.
The results of the radial displacement is discussed in section 3.3.2.4.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-19
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The section model is set adiabatically at the top and bottom surface, which causes higher tempera-tures than the 3D-FE model. All other boundary conditions, dimensions and material properties are the same as for the 3D-FE model.
Figure 3.3-7 shows a schematic illustration of the two cases, Figure 3.3-8 the implementation in the section model. The thermal contact resistance between the components is considered by a 0.5 mm helium gap at the bottom side.
Centrically aligned Radial displacement Figure 3.3-7 Schematic illustration of the radial displacement 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-20
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Figure 3.3-8 Section model with and without radlal displacement and detailed view of the gaps (component names as in Figure 3.3-2) 3.3 Them,al Evaluation under Nom,al Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-21
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.3.2 Heat and Cold 3.3.2.1 Results for the Hot Case The resulting temperatures for the hot case are summarized in Table 3.3-5. The three thermal re-quirements, as defined in section 3.1.2, only have a minor impact on the temperatures. Below, the design-relevant temperatures are compared to their limit values according to section 3.0.
The maximum temperature of the fuel rods is 214 °C and therefore significantly lower than the maximum allowable temperature of 400 °C.
The maximum temperature for the inner moderator rods is 109 °C, for the bottom moderator plate 120°C and 106 °C for the lid moderator plate. Therefore, all moderator material is well below the maximum allowable temperature of The highest gasket temperature of 107 °C occurs in the tightening plug gasket. The maximum al-lowable temperature for the gaskets is according to section 2.2.1, therefore, all gasket tern-peratures are below the temperature limit.
Figure 3.3-9 and Figure 3.3-10 show the temperature distribution for all three them1al require-ments.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-22
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-6 Component temperatures for NCT (hot case) for thennal requirements 1-3 Temperature rcJ Component, type of temperature Thermal requirement 1 2 3 Fuel rods - maximum 213 214 214 Cask surface - maximum 84 85 85 Cask surface, hottest plane - circumferential average 84 85 85 Cask surface - longitudinal average 84 85 85 Cavity surface- maximum 95 96 96 Cavity surface - hottest plane - circumferential average 95 96 96 Cavity bottom - maximum 121 123 123 Cavity bottom - surface average 115 116 116 Bottom closure plate - maximum 105 105 105 Bottom closure plate - area average 103 104 104 Moderator rods (inner row) (MR-i) - maximum 108 109 109 MR-i - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod 105 106 106 MR-i - volume-averaged, hottest rod 94 94 94 Moderator rods (outer row) (MR-o) - maximum 104 105 105 MR-o - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod 103 104 104 MR-o - volume-averaged, hottest rod 90 91 91 Inner canister surface - maximum 117 118 118 Inner canister surface - hottest plane - circ. average 116 117 117 Outer canister surface - maximum 116 117 117 Outer canister surface - hottest plane - circ. average 115 116 116 Canister bottom - maximum 137 138 138 Moderator plate (bottom) - maximum 118 120 120 Moderator plate (bottom) - volume averaged 110 111 111 Moderator plate (lid) - maximum 105 106 106 Moderator plate (lid) - volume averaged 99 100 100 Retention ring - maximum 94 95 95 Closure plate - maximum 105 105 106 Closure plate - volume averaged 103 104 104 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-23
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,atJon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-5 Component temperatures for NCT (hot case) for thermal requirements 1-3 (con-tinued)
Temperature rCJ Component, type of temperature Thermal requirement 1 2 3 Trunnion - maximum 102 103 103 Trunnion - screws 1 - maximum 110 Fuel channels - maximum 204 202 202 Basket sheets - maximum 201 199 200 Round segment - maximum 158 160 161 Outer sheets - maximum 165 167 167 Shielding element - maximum 163 166 166 Filling gas canister - volume-averaged 166 168 168 Filling gas cask - volume averaged 102 103 103 Canister lid - maximum 114 115 115 Canister lid - volume-averaged 108 109 109 Canister lid gasket - maximum 104 104 104 Canister lid - screws 1 - maximum 110 Cask lid - maximum 98 98 98 Cask lid - volume averaged 94 95 95 Cask lid gasket - maximum 92 93 93 Cask lid- screws 1 - maximum 110 Protection cap gasket - maximum 95 95 95 Blind flange gasket - maximum 95 96 96 Tightening plug gasket 106 107 107 1
for the screw temperature, the surface temperature plus a safety margin is used 3.3 Them,al Evaluation under Nom,al Condrtions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-24
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 3.3-9 Temperature distribution of the cask for NCT (hot case) for thermal requirement 1 (top) and thermal requirement 2 (bottom) 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-25
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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Figure 3.3-10 Temperature distribution of the cask for NCT (hot case) for thermal require-ment 3 3.3.2.2 Results for the Cold Case According to §71. 71 (2), the relevant temperatures of the package shall be examined for a con-servative low ambient temperature of -40 °C, the minimum allowable content heat load and no insolation considered. The minimum content heat is assumed to be zero, therefore all components of the package are assumed to be at ambient temperature of -40 °C.
3.3.2.3 Results for the Hot Case under Absence of lnsolation According to §71.43 (g), the maximum temperature of the accessible surfaces shall be examined at an ambient temperature of 38 °C with no insolation considered. For the CASTOR~ geo69, the accessible surface equates to the outer package surface. The results in Table 3.3-5 or NCT show that the different loading patterns only have a minor effect on the surface temperature, therefore only thennal requirement 2 is evaluated. The relevant temperatures are listed in Table 3.3-6. The maximum temperature of the package surface amounts to 67 °C. The temperature limit for an ex-clusive use shipment is 85 °C according to §71.43. Therefore, the package meets the requirement of §71.43 (g).
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-26
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfomiation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.3-6 Surface temperatures for thermal requirement 2 without insolatlon Component, type of temperature Temperature rCJ Cask surface - maximum 67 Cask surface, hottest plane - circumferential average 67 Cask surface - longitudinal average 66 3.3.2.4 Results for radial displacement of the Canister, Basekt and FA As explained in section 3.3.1. 7, the horizontal position of the package causes an eccentric align-ment of certain components which affects the temperature distribution. Therefore, the section model of the package is used to quantify the temperature increase in relevant components as de-scribed in section 3.3.1.7. Two calculations (with and without radial displacement) are compared, and a temperature increase is derived. This temperature increase is added to the component tem-peratures from the 3D-FE model in order to get conservative high temperatures. In Table 3.3-7, the absolute temperatures and the resulting temperature increases for all relevant components from the section model are listed. Components are listed only if the radial displacement leads to higher temperatures. In some components, the temperature level is decreased due to the reduced gap size at the downside, which is conservatively neglected.
Table 3.3-7 Comparison of component temperatures with and without radial displacement, (thermal requirement In brackets)
Radial displacement Component, type of temperature rCJ AT[K]
No Yes Cask surface - maximum (3) 89 99 +10 Cavity surface - maximum (1) 101 118 +17 MR-i - maximum (1) 101 117 +16 MR-i - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod (1) 98 113 +15 MR-i-volume-ave raged, hottest bore (1) 98 113 +15 MR-o - maximum (1) 96 110 +14 MR-o - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod (1) 93 105 +12 MR-o -volume-averaged , hottest bore (1) 93 105 +12 Round segments - maximum (1) 179 183 +4 In Table 3.3-8, the derived temperature increases from Table 3.3-7 are added to the temperatures for NCT from Table 3.3-5 and Table 3.3-6 to get the corrected temperatures T eorr.
3.3 Thennal Evaluation under Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-27
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In the section model, temperatures are overestimated as it is set adiabatically at top and bottom, therefore, it is only suitable for the derivation of temperature differences.
Table 3.3-8 Corrected component temperatures for NCT under consideration of the radial dis placement Trc1 ~T[K] TCorT rCJ (Table 3.3-6, (Table Component, type of temperature re] Figure 3.3-7) 3.3-11)
Cask surface - maximum 85 +10 95 Cask surface - maximum (no insolation) 67 +10 77 Cavity surface - maximum 96 +17 113 MR-i - maximum 109 +16 125 MR-i - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod 106 +15 121 MR-i - volume-averaged, hottest rod 94 +15 109 MR-o - maximum 105 +14 119 MR-o - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod 104 +12 116 MR-o - volume-averaged, hottest rod 91 +12 103 Round segments - maximum 161 +4 165 The resulting temperatures T eorr in Table 3.3-8 show, that all design-relevant component tempera-tures are below their temperature limit defined in section 3.0.
Figure 3.3-11 Comparison of the temperature distribution for centrically (left) and eccentrically (right) aligned components for thermal requirements 1-3 in the section model shows a comparison
- of the centrically and eccentrically aligned case for all 3 thermal requirements.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-28
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Figure 3.3-11 Comparison of the temperature distribution for centrlcally (left) and eccentri-cally (right) allgned components for thermal requirements 1--3 In the section model 3.3.3 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure The calculation of the MNOP can be found and a discussion on the generation of flammable gases in chapter 4 "Containmenr.
3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-29
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.3.4 Maximum Thennal Stresses The occurrence of thermal stresses is minimized by sufficiently large gaps In axial and radial direc-tion, which allows for free thermal expansion of the different components without contact and re-straint. The discussion of thermal stresses due to temperature gradients within the components can be found in the structural evaluations .
. Therefore, a contact of these components by thermal expansion in radial direction Is excluded.
In section 3.4.4, the gap widths for the two axial gaps between canister and basket and canister and cask lid are evaluated for HAC. As the initial conditions for HAC are equal to NCT, the gap widths for t = 0 can be used for NCT.
Therefore, both axial gaps are sufficiently large to prevent re-straint forces during NCT.
List of References
[1] ANSYs<<>
Release 17.2 UP20160718, C 2016 SAS IP Inc.
[2] VDI Heat Atlas Springer (2010)
[3] J.P. Holman Heat Transfer McGraw Hill (2010)
[4] SCALE 4.4a: A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations and Personal Computers Oak Ridge National Laboratory NUREG/CR-0200 ORNLJRSIC, CCC-545, 2000
[5] McAdams W. H.
Heat Transmission (3 rd edition)
McGraw Hill (1985) 3.3 Thermal Evaluation under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 3.3, Rev. 0 Page 3.3-30
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.4 Thermal Evaluatlon und Hypothetlcal Accident Conditions Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 3 4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 According to 10 CFR 71, the effects of a series of sequent hypothetical accident scenarios has to be evaluated. In this chapter the effects of a 30 min fire test on the temperature distribution are described. Therefore, safety-important temperatures are evaluated. The maximum temperature of the fuel rods and the lid gaskets remain below their temperature limits.
For the thennal evaluation under hypothetical accident conditions, the package is exposed to a fully-engulfing pool fire with an average flame temperature of 800 °C for a duration of 30 minutes and a subsequent cooling phase. For HAC, only thermal requirement 2 is considered, as it leads to slightly higher temperatures than the thennal requirements 1 and 3 3.4.1 Initial Conditions The initial conditions of the hypothetical fire accident comply with the results of the stationary cal-culation (hot case). The package dissipates heat by natural convection and radiation according to section 3.3.1.6.1, the ambient temperature amounts to 38 °C and the package is exposed to the sun according to section 3.3.1.6.2. Therefore, the initial temperature field of the package is equiva-lent to the one shown in Figure 3.3-9 (Thennai requirement 2).
3.4.2 Fire Test Conditions The temperature distribution during the fire test is calculated by a transient FEM analysis, which consists of three parts, an initial phase with a stationary temperature distribution, a 30 min fire phase and a subsequent cooling phase of 35.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months . Due to the thennal inertia of the package, the maximum terpperatures inside the package are reached several hours after the end of the fire phase. For the analysis, the same 3D-FE model is utilized as for NCT, (described in section 3.3.1.5), while several boundary conditions and modelling assumptions differ.
For the transient calculation under HAC, the heat storage capacity of the fins is taken into account.
The heat flux caused by insolation according to section 3.3.1.6.2 is considered during all three phases, conservatively.
3.4 Thennal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.4.2.1 Thennal Boundary Conditions during the Fire Phase As stated In section 3.3.1.6.2, the HTC consists of a convective and a radiative amount. For the fire phase, hconv is derived from the Nusselt law according to [1]
Nu=C-~*Pr a 11 where Pr is the Pranc:ltl number, as defined In section 3.3.1.6.1 and Re denotes the Reynolds number based on the diameter D v*D R8_z)=-,
V where v: velocity of the fluid [mis],
D: cask diameter [m],
v: kinematic viscosity [m2/s].
The parameters C and m depend on the Reynolds number Re. The heat transfer coefficient Is cal-culated for a temperature of 800 °C according to the fire test regulations and additionally for a suf-ficiently low temperature of 400°C.
The gas velocity inside the fire can be estimated by 5 mis according to [2]. For the kinematic vis-cosity v, the Prandtl Number Pr and the thermal conductMty k, the material properties of dry air from Table 3.3-4 according to [3] are used. In Table 3.4-1, the input variables and the results for Re, Nu and hare summarized.
3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation Withheld @)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 3.4-1 Input values and calculated values of the heat transfer coefficient
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
For the flame temperature of 800 °C, a heat transfer coefficient of around 6. 7 W / (m 2* K) is calcu-lated, for a lower temperature of 400 °C, the HTC is around 8.7 W / (m 2* K) due to the higher Reynolds number. Conservatively, a reasonably high convective HTC of 15 W / (m 2* K) is applied during the fire phase.
The higher HTC takes into account that the gas atmosphere under pool fire conditions is a complex composition of mainly air, CO2, water vapor and additional components such as soot particles. The exact gas mixture is varying locally and over the time. As the real material properties of the gas cannot be evaluated, the HTC is calculated using the material data of air, which represents the major part of the flue gas.
The convective HTC is applied on the outer surface of the package and set constant during the fire phase. Within the finned zone of the cask, the convective HTC is multiplied by the surface en-largement factor of (see section 3.3.1.3).
The radiative heat transfer coefficient during the fire phase is calculated as described in section 3.3.1.5. For the ambient temperature, the flame temperature of 800 °C is set For the emissivity E an effective emissivity is calculated. Therefore, the fire is treated as a cylinder that surrounds the cask. According to [1], the effective emissivity between two concentric cylinders is given by 3.4 Thennal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @ GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The ambient temperature for convection and radiation is set to 800 °C according to, §71 .73 (c) .
The described boundary conditions lead to a heat flux shown in Figure 3.4-1 , which is in the range recommended in [2].
80 70 60 I
N'
";' 40 so i:;:::: ~ I heat flux
'!ii 30 C1J
~~c l~ iative heat flux 20 10 0~~
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Package surface temperatau re [°C]
Figure 3.4-1 Resulting heat flux during fire phase (surface enlargement factor is not consid-ered) 3.4.2.2 Thermal Boundary Conditions during the Cooling Phase During the cooling phase, the same temperature dependent heat transfer coefficients than for NCT are applied (see section 3.3.1.5). The emissivity of the package surface is the same as for the fire phase. The ambient temperature is also set to 38 °C and insolation is considered by heat fluxes according to section 3.3.1.6 (constant over time) .
3.4.2.3 Modelling of the Impact Limiters during HAC According to section 2 .7 , the impact limiters remain on the package after the hypothetical accident conditions "9 m free drop onto an unyielding surface" and "1 m drop on to a mild steel bar", thus, their isolating effect can be credited. The resulting deformation of the impact limiters affects the thermal resistance and therefore has to be examined. The deformation leads to, first a reduced thermal resistance due to the smaller transport distance of the heat, and second, an increased 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 thermal conductivity of the material due to a higher density. During the fire phase, this leads to a higher heat input, during the cooling phase, this leads to a better heat removal. In section 3.4.3.1, undeformed impact limiters are assumed, the effect of a deformation is examined by an additional calculation in section 3.4.3.2.
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
As the heat storage capacity of the impact limiters is not affected by the compression, the density and specific heat capacity is the same for both cases.
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 3.4-2 Correlation between thennal conductivity and density of the polyurethane foam 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.4.3 Maximum Temperatures and Pressures 3.4.3.1 Maximum Temperatures In Table 3.4-2, the maximum temperatures and their time of appearance (t = 0: ignition of fire) is shown for all relevant components. Below, the design relevant temperatures are compared with their limit values according to section 3.0.
The hottest fuel rod reaches after 17 h its maximum temperature of 237 °C, which is considerably lower than the maximum allowable fuel rod temperature for HAC of 570 °C.
The temperatures of the gaskets are between 121 °c and 127 °C, which is lower than the maxi-mum allowable gasket temperature of at least 370 °C.
Table 3.4-2 Maximum component temperatures for HAC and time of appearance after Ignition of the fire Component, type of temperature Maximum Time of temperature rc1 appearance [h]
Fuel rods - maximum 237 17 Cask surface - maximum 380 0.5 Cavity surface - maximum 183 2.3 Moderator rods (inner rem) (MR-Q - maximum 199 1.1 MR-i - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod 180 2.2 MR-i - volume-averaged, hottest rod 174 2.5 Moderator rods (outer row) (MR-o)- maximum 310 0.5 MR-o - area-average hottest plane, hottest rod 186 0.6 MR-o -volume-averaged, hottest rod 183 1.7 Moderator plate (bottom) - maximum 145 15 Moderator plate (bottom) - volume averaged 137 10.5 Moderator plate (lid) - maximum 126 29 Moderator plate (lid) - volume averaged 119 21 Canister wall - maximum 180 3.0 Basket sheets - maximum 223 19 Shielding elements - maximum 193 11 Filling gas canister - volume averaged 192 15 Filling gas cask - volume averaged 145 3 Canister lld gasket - maximum 127 12 Cask lid gasket - maximum 127 4.5 Protection cap gasket - maximum 121 8.5 Blind flange gasket - maximum 122 7.5 Tightening plug gasket - maximum 127 19 3.4 Thennal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In Figure 3.4-3, the temperature distribution of the package is shown for two different time steps.
First, the end of the fire phase after 0.5 h, where the maximum cask surface temperature Is reached. Second, after 17 h, when the hottest fuel rod reaches its maximum temperature.
In Figure 3.4-4, the temperature distribution of the lid system is shown for the maximum tempera-tures of both gaskets.
In Figure 3.4 Figure 3.4-7, the temperature development over time for relevant components is shown.
In Figure 3.4-8 and Figure 3.4-9 the volume averaged temperatures of the moderator rods for dif-ferent heights over the time are shown, which are used for the moderator evaluation.
The temperatures for the post-fire steady state conditions are similar to the temperatures for the stationary results. Exemplarily, the post-fire steady state temperature for the package surface amounts to approx. 93 °C, which is 9 K above the temperature of the stationary results, as shown in Figure 3.4-7. This is due to the fact that the emissivity after the fire is lower than for NCT
. All other component temperatures shift accordingly.
3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-8
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Figure 3.4-3 Temperature distribution of the components after 0.6 hand 17 h (HAC) 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-9
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Figure 3.4-4 Temperature distribution In the lid system for maximum gasket temperatures (HAC) 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-10
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Figure 3.4-6 Temperatures of the filling gases and the hottest fuel rod over time (HAC)
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Figure 3.4-6 Temperatures of the gaskets over time (HAC) 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3A, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-11
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Figure 3.4-7 Temperatures of cask and cavity surfaces and canister over time (HAC) 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3A, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-12
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Figure 3.4-8 Volume-averaged temperatures of the Inner moderator rods for different heights over time (HAC) (z = 0: upper side of closure plate) 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 1 0 CFR2.390
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Figure 3.4-9 Volume-avera ged temperatures of the outer moderator rods for different heights over time (HAC) (z = 0: upper side of closure plate) 3.4.3.2 Maximum Temperatures for Defonned Impact Limiters An additional calculation is perfonned in order to quantify the effects 'of defonned impact limiters.
The initial temperature field is calculated with undefonned impact limiters (equivalent to NCT from section 3.3.2.1).
The resulting temperatures over the time are shown in Fig-ure 3.4-1 O for the gaskets, the results for the undefonned impact limiters from section 3.4.3.1 are shown by the dashed lines. The comparison shows that the even very conservative assumptions 3 4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 for the deformation have only a minor effect on the resulting temperatures. The maximum tempera-tures of the undeformed state are higher than for the deformed state, which means that the positive effect of the better heat removal during cooling phase outweighs the negative effect of a higher heat input during fire phase. The highest temperature differences appear in the direct surrounding of the Impact limiters (difference for the cask lid gasket: 1.4 K), further inside the package, the ef-fect can be neglected (difference for the canister lid gasket: 0.2 K, tightening plug gasket O K). The results show that the assumptions made for section 3.4.3.1 are sufficiently conservative.
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Figure 3.4-10 Temperatures of the gaskets over time (HAC) for deformed (continuous llnes) and undeformed (dashed llnes) Impact llmiters 3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3A, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-15
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.4.3.3 Maximum Pressures The calculation of the maximum pressures under HAC and a discussion on the generation of flammable gases can be found in chapter 4 "Containment".
3.4.4 Maximum Thennal Stresses The occurrence of thermal stresses is minimized by sufficiently large gaps in axial and radial direc-tion, which allows for free thermal expansion of the different components without contact and re-straint. The discussion of thermal stresses due to temperature gradients within the components can be found in the structural evaluations.
In Figure 3.4-11, the axial gap width of the gaps between canister and basket sheets and cask and canister is shown.
The gaps in radial direction behave in a similar manner as the corresponding components (cask, canister, basket) are the same.
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
This shows that, at any time, the gap widths in axial and radial direction are sufficiently large to prevent restraint forces.
3.4 Thermal Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-16
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Figure 3.4-11 Development of the axial gaps over time (HAC) 3.4.6 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Air Transport is excluded for the CASTOR~ geo69 package.
List of References
[1] Theodore L. Bergman Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer (7 th editon) 2011
[2] A Guide For Thermal Testing Transport Packages For Radioactive Material
- Hypothetical Accident Conditions -
Division of Transportation and Packaging Safety, Office of Risk Analysis and Technology 1993
[3] VDI Heat Atlas Springer (2010) 3.4 Them,al Evaluation und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 3.4, Rev. 0 Page 3.4-17
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 3.6 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 3.5 Appendix Section 3.6, Rev. 0 Page 3.5-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4 Containment 4.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 4.0 Overview Section 4.0, Rev. 0 Page 4.0-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In this chapter the compliance of the CASTOR~ geo69 containment system with the permitted ac-tivity release limits specified in 10 CFR 71, § 71.51 (a)(1) for normal conditions of transport (NCT) and § 71.52 (a)(2) for hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) is demonstrated.
4.0 Overview Section 4.0, Rev. 0 Page4.0-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.1 Description of the Containment System Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 4.1 Description of the Containment System SectJon 4.1, Rev. 0 Page 4.1-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.1.1 Containment Boundary The containment system of the CASTOR~ geo69 is constiMed by the following subassemblies (item numbers acc. the Design Parts Lists and Drawings listed in section 1.3):
a) Inner containment (canister lid) canister body (Item 2),
canister lid (Item 3) and clamping elements (Item 4), thread bolts (Item 6) and metal gasket (Item 16 (Ag) with a torus diameter of ), as well as
- tightening plug (Item 10) in the canister lid and metal gasket (Item 13 (Ag) with a torus diameter of ).
b) Outer containment (cask lid) cask body (Item 2),
cask lid (Item 55) and hexagonal screws (Item 62), hexagonal head screws for sealing (Item 63) and metal gasket (Item 69 (Ag) with a torus diameter of ),
protection cap (Item 113) in the cask lid, cap screws (Item 37) and metal gasket (Item 44 (Ag) with a torus diameter of ), as well as blind flange (Item 89) in the cask lid, cap screws (Item 37) and metal gasket (Item 71 (Ag) with a torus diameter of ).
As listed above, the outer jackets of all metal gaskets of the containment system are made of silver (Ag). The canister body (Item 2) is designed by welding Items 2-2 to 2-5 together.
- The cask CASTOR geo69 is designed for FA with moderate bum-up as well as high bum-up fuel with an averaged bum-up above 45 GWd/MgHM and therefore a double (inner and outer) contain-ment is required. In a conservative way, only the outer containment (cask lid) is taken into account for the containment analysis.
This implies considering the failure of the inner containment. When considering the double con-tainment, the calculated activity release decreases significantly. In addition, the design pressure values are separately calculated inside the inner (canister) and the outer containment (cask).
It should be noted that the monolithic cask body and the lids can be considered as leak-tight, so the containment analysis can be reduced to the gasket sealing system.
The potential leakage paths of the outer containment are shown in Figure 4.1-1.
4.1 Description of the Containment System Section 4.1, Rev. 0 Page 4.1-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Environment 1
I I I Metal gasket (Item 44 , Ag) Metal gasket (Item 69, Ag) Metal gasket (Item 71 , Ag) in the protection cap (Item 113) in the cask lid (Item 55) in the blind flange (Item 89) 1 ., 1 I
Welded claddings 1
Fuel matrix Figure 4.1-1 Leakage paths of the outer containment The sealing effect is the result of the sealing function of the metal gaskets employed. Each metal 9 gasket consists of a helical spring made of Nimonic surrounded by an inner jacket of stainless steel and an outer jacket of silver.
The sealing effect of a metal gasket is based on the plastic deformation of the outer jacket, which is the result of the pretension force induced by the screwed connection of the lid. The ductility is larger for the outer jacket of the metal gasket than for the inner jacket so that the gasket will adapt to the surface structure of the sealing surface. The function of the inner jacket is to distribute uni-formly the force due to pressure that is generated during the compression of the helical spring over the outer jacket. For metal gaskets, capillary leakage is the only relevant potential leakage mecha-nism and continuous venting is precluded.
For each containment, a maximum reference air leakage rate of at least 1
~~10-7 ref m3/s (leak test criterion) is proven by measurement after loading (see chapter 7). This maximum reference air leakage rate for the outer containment is proven again before transportation .~~
The minimum support width of the metal gaskets are estimated from the torus diameter (listed in the Design Parts Lists and Drawings acc. to section 1.3) , resulting in a leakage hole length of for Item 16 and Item 69 resp. for Item 13, Item 44 and Item 71 , as given in Table 4.1-1 .
4.1 Description of the Containment System Section 4.1 , Rev. 0 Page 4.1-3
1014--SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.1-1 Gasket parameters Estimated Torus minimum Component Item no. diameter, support width, mm mm 13 Canister 16 44 Cask 69 71 The outer containment boundary is shown in Figure 4.1-2 and in more detail at the leakage paths in Figure 4.1-3 and Figure 4.1-4. The inner containment boundary is shown in Figure 4.1-5 and In more detail at the leakage path In Figure 4.1-6.
There are no valves or pressure relief systems in the containment.
Due to pretension of the screws (see chapter 2), unintended opening and opening due to internal pressure are excluded.
Due to the inner containment system, which constitutes the second containment, the transportation of high bum-up fuel with an averaged bum-up above 45 GWd/MgHM and of a plutonium content in solid form exceeding 0.74 TBq is permissible (cf. Appendix 4-1).
Due to the materials used for the containment system, significant chemical, galvanic or other reac-tions are excluded (see section 2.2.2).
4.1 Description of the Containment System Section 4.1, Rev. 0 Page 4.1-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2 390]
Figure 4.1-2 Outer containment (cask}
4.1 Description of the Containment System Section 4.1, Rev. 0 Page 4.1-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Propnetary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 4.1-3 Containment boundary detall at the cask lid with protection cap
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 4.1-4 Containment boundary detall atthe cask lid with bllnd flange 4.1 Description of the Containment System Section 4.1, Rev. 0 Page 4.1-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 4.1-6 Inner containment (canister)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 4.1-6 Containment boundary detail at the canister lid with tightening plug 4 1 Description of the Containment System Section 4.1, Rev. 0 Page 4.1-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.1.2 Codes and Standards For calculating activity release from the cask to define allowable leakage rates, analytical calcula-tions in case of overpressure compared to the ambient atmosphere according to ANSI N14.5 [1] by means of the Knudsen equation are performed. The volume leakage rates through the containment are consistently calculated in accordance with ANSI N14.5 [1] and ISO 12807 [2].
The compliance of the CASTOR~ geo69 containment system with the permitted activity release limits specified in 10 CFR 71, § 71.51 (a)(1) for normal conditions of transport (NCT) and
§ 71.52 (a)(2) for hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) is demonstrated.
4.1.3 Special Requirements for Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel The content of the CASTOR geo69 cask specified in section 1.2.2 does not include damaged SNF, so there are no special requirements regarding damaged SNF necessary.
List of References
[1] ANSI N14.5-2014, American National Standard For Radioactive Materials - Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment
[2] ISO 12807:2018(E)
Safe transport of radioactive materials - Leakage testing on packages 4.1 Descnptlon of the Containment System Section 4.1, Rev. O Page 4.1-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page 4.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Propnetary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.2.1 Pressurization The canister inside the CASTO~ geo69 cask contains SNF during NCT. The interior space inside the canister is drained, dried, evacuated and backfilled with helium gas prior to final closure of the canister. The dry interior space inside the cask with a loaded canister is evacuated and backfilled with helium gas prior to final closure of the cask. Therefore, no vapors or gases are present which could cause a reaction or explosion inside the canister and the cask. Procedural steps ensure a maximum total pressure of PHe,o (cf. Appendix 4-2) inside the canister as well as inside the cask and prevent over-pressurization during dispatching of the cask.
Wrth the procedure described in Appendix 4-2 the maximum internal pressure for NCT is calculat-ed for the two different containments assumed in section 4.1.1. There are no combustible gases inside the containment.
Assuming the inner containment, the maximum absolute pressure inside the canister results with the boundary conditions given in Table 4.2-1.
Assuming the outer containment, the maximum absolute pressure inside the cask re-sults with the boundary conditions given in Table 4.2-2. For this calculation the two different areas filled with helium (canister and cask) are combined to one summed volume. The amount of filling gas helium in each area is added to the amount of gas inside the cask (n = nHe,carnater + nHe,Cask +
nFG + nFR) substituting the summand PHe,o
~~T gaa / T He.a in the equation for Pu (Appendix 4-2).~~
~~Wrthout implying the failure of the inner containment while regarding the outer containment, the maximum absolute pressure inside the cask without impacts from the content is ob-~~
~~tained with Pu= PHe,o~~
~~T gas/ T He,o (Appendix 4-2) and (covering NCT value for the fill-ing gas of the cask in chapter 3).~~
The maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) is the value of the upstream absolute pressure Pu for NCT, reduced by the atmospheric pressure at mean sea level, i. e. 101.3 kPa. Wrth a maxi-mum absolute pressure 4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page4.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.2-1 Boundary conditions for canister pressure calculation (Ncn
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 4.2-2: Boundary conditions for cask pressure calculation (Ncn
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Wrth the procedure described in Appendix 4-2, the minimum internal pressure results for the inner resp. outer containment boundary.
4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page 4.2-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Structural integrity and containment of the CASTOR~ geo69 package are not impaired in NCT (cf.
chapter 2).
4.2.2 Containment Criteria The basic requirements for llcensing the casks for safe transport of radioactive materials are laid out in the 10 CFR 71. According to§ 71.51 the following requirements have to be fulfilled for NCT.
Under the tests to demonstrate the package's ability to withstand NCT (10 CFR 71. 71 ),
- the loss or dispersal of radioactive contents must be restricted to max. 1o-6 A2 per hour,
- no significant increase in external surface radiation levels may result and
- no substantial reduction of the effectiveness of the CASTOR~ geo69 packaging may result.
The ~ value of mixtures of radionuclides is calculated as stipulated in appendix A, paragraph IV in 10 CFR71. This includes the use of 1O ~ for 85 Kr also for NCT, as it is present in a mixture of nu-clides. In line with 10 CFR71, the ambient pressure is assumed as 25 kPa for NCT.
4.2.3 Compliance with the Containment Criteria As the containments are not impaired in NCT (cf. chapter 2), the design leakage rate of the con-sidered containment is not greater than 10-7 ref*cm 3/s (leak-tight according to 0) and no significant increase in external surface radiation levels caused by potentially released fines or crud is en-sured. Therefore, no dedicated activity release calculations are required.
Nevertheless, the reference air leakage rate corresponding to the allowable leakage hole diameter for NCT which would lead to 100 % utilization of the NCT limit value is calculated for the outer con-tainment as follows.
Wrth the procedure described in Appendix 4-2 and using values for fs, f G from Appendix 4-2 and for V from Table 4.2-2, the activity mobilization inside the cask is shown in Table 4.2-3 for gases and volatiles, in Table 4.2-4 for fines and crud and in Table 4.2-5 summed up for the nuclide mixture for NCT. Wrth the A2 values from 10 CFR71, the mobilized actMty and activity concentration are cal-culated for each nuclide as well as for each category of nuclides depending on their mobility type (effective values). The listed activity fraction fN(Q is the ratio between the mobilized content AN(Q for nuclide i and the sum of mobilized contents. The relative values of fNO)/~(j) in Table 4.2-5 show that crud contributes most to activity release (in terms of use of limit value).
4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page4.2-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.2-3 Mobilized activity and activity concentration for gases and volatiles for NCT
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
4.2 Containment under Nonnal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page 4.2-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.2-4: Mobilized activity and activity concentration for fines and crud for NCT
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page 4.2-6
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.2-6: Mobllized activity and activity concentration summed up for the nucllde mix-ture for NCT
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The allowable leakage rate NCT is obtained from the allowable activity release rate RN via LN(Pu) = RN /CN, where CN denotes the sum of mobilized activity concentration in Table 4.2-5. With the ~ value of of the nuclide mixture (see Table 4.2-5) and the containment criterion that the loss or dispersal of radioactive contents must be restricted to max. 10-e ~ per hour (cf. sec-tion 4.2.2; ), the following allowable leakage rate is ob-tained:
for NCT.
The maximum allowable leakage hole diameter for which the allowable leakage rate LN yields is calculated by solving the Knudsen equation (cf. Appendix 4-2) for NCT. For the calculations, the cask atmosphere Is considered as helium gas. This is conservative, because it yields a lower vis-cosity and smaller molecular mass, and thus results in a smaller allowable leakage hole diameter and smaller reference air leakage rate compared to the mixture with relevant contributions of fis-sion gas (e. g. Xenon). As described in section 4.2.2, a reduced ambient pressure of Pd = 25 kPa is considered. The gasket temperature valid for the gaskets of the outer containment is taken from chapter 3. The relevant parameters as well as the allowable leakage hole diameter which result from solving the Knudsen equation for NCT are shown in Table 4.2-6.
The leakage hole diameter calculated in Table 4.2-6 is used to determine a reference leakage rate of dry air leaking from Pu = 1 atm to Pd = 0.01 atm at a temperature of 298 K The relevant parame-ters as well as the resulting reference air leakage rate at standard conditions are shown in Table 4.2-7.
This assessment Is independent of filters or a mechanical cooling system.
4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page 4.2-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.2-6: Allowable leakage hole diameter corresponding to the allowable leakage rate for NCT
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 4.2-7: Reference air leakage rate corresponding to the allowable leakage hole diame-ter for NCT
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
List of References
[1] Anderson, B. L. et al., NUREG/CR-6487, November 1996 Containment Analysis for Type B Packages Used to Transport Various Contents 4.2 Containment under Normal Conditions of Transport Section 4.2, Rev. 0 Page4.2-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.3 Containment und Hypothetlcal Accident Conditions Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. O Page 4.3-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Propnetary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 4.3.1 Pressurization The canister inside the CASTO~ geo69 cask contains SNF during HAC. The interior space inside the canister is drained, dried, evacuated and backfilled with helium gas prior to final closure of the canister. The interior space inside the cask with a loaded canister is evacuated and backfilled with helium gas prior to final closure of the cask. Therefore, no vapors or gases are present which could cause a reaction or explosion inside the canister and the cask. Procedural steps ensure a maxi-mum total pressure of PHe,o (cf. Appendix 4-2) inside the canister as well as inside the cask and prevent over-pressurization during dispatching of the cask.
Wrth the procedure described in Appendix 4-2 the maximum internal pressure for HAC is calculat-ed for the two different containments assumed in section 4.1.1. There are no combustible gases inside the containment.
Assuming the inner containment, the maximum absolute pressure inside the canister results with the boundary conditions given in Table 4.3-1.
Assuming the outer containment, the maximum absolute pressure inside the cask results with the boundary conditions given in Table 4.3-2. For this calculation the two different are-as filled with helium (canister and cask) are combined to one summed volume. The amount of fill-ing gas helium in each area is added to the amount of gas inside the cask (n = nHe,cemster + nHe,Cask +
nFG + nFR) substituting the summand PHe,o
~~Tgas / T 1-1e,o in the equation for Pu (cf. Appendix 4-2).~~
Without implying the failure of the inner containment while regarding the outer containment, the maximum absolute pressure inside the cask without impacts from the content is ob-
- tained by Pu = PHe,o
~~T gas/ T He,o (cf. Appendix 4-2) and (covering HAC value for the filling gas of the cask in chapter 3).~~
Structural integrity and containment of the CASTOR geo69 package are not impaired in HAC (cf.
chapter 2).
4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page 4.3-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.3-1 Boundary conditions for canister pressure calculatlon (HAC)
[Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 4.3-2: Boundary conditions for cask pressure calculatlon (HAC)
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390) 4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page 4.3-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev 0 Propnetary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 4.3.2 Containment Criteria The basic requirements for licensing the casks for safe transport of radioactive materials are laid out in the 10 CFR 71. According to § 71.51 the following requirements have to be fulfilled for HAC.
Under the tests to demonstrate the package's ability to withstand HAC (1 0 CFR 71. 73),
- there would be no escape of 86 Kr exceeding 10 ~ per week and
- no escape of other radioactive material exceeding a total amount ~ per week.
The ~ value of mixtures of radionuclides is calculated as stipulated in appendix A, paragraph IV in 10 CFR71. In line with 10 CFR71, the ambient pressure is assumed as 100 kPa for HAC.
4.3.3 Compliance with Containment Criteria As the containments are not impaired in HAC (cf. chapter 2), the design leakage rate of the con-sidered containment is not greater than 10-7 ref*cm 3/s (leak-tight according to chapter 7). There-fore, no dedicated activity release calculations are required.
Nevertheless, the reference air leakage rate corresponding to the allowable leakage hole diameter for HAC which would lead to 100 % utilization of the HAC limit value is calculated for the outer con-tainment as follows.
With the procedure described in Appendix 4-2 and using values for fs, fo from Appendix 4-2 and for V from Table 4.3-2, the activity mobilization inside the cask is shown in Table 4.3-3 for gases and volatiles, in Table 4.3-4 for fines and crud and in Table 4.3-5 summ~ up for the nuclide mix-ture for HAC. Wrth the ~ values from 10 CFR71, the mobilized activity and activity concentration are calculated for each nuclide as well as for each category of nuclides depending on their mobility type (effective values). The listed activity fraction fA(i) is the ratio between the mobilized content AA(i) for nuclide i and the sum of mobilized contents. The relative values of fA(i)/~O) in Table 4.3-5 show that crud contributes most to activity release (in tenns of use of limit value).
4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page4.3-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.3-3 Moblllzed activity and activity concentration for gases and volatiles for HAC
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page 4.3-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.3-4: Mobilized activity and activity concentration for fines and crud for HAC
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page 4.3-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.3-5: Mobilized activity and activity concentration summed up for the nuclide mix-ture for HAC
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The allowable leakage rate HAC is obtained from the allowable activity release rate RA via LA(Pu) = RA /CA, where CA denotes the sum of mobilized activity concentration in Table 4.3-5. With the Aa. value of of the nuclide mixture (see Table 4.3-5) and the containment criteria ac-cording to section 4.3.2 (here: ), the following allowable leak-age rate is obtained:
for HAC.
The maximum allowable leakage hole diameter for which the allowable leakage rate LA yields is calculated by soMng the Knudsen equation (cf. Appendix 4-2) for HAC. Similar to NCT, the cask atmosphere is considered as helium gas. As described In section 4.3.2, an ambient pressure of Pct = 100 kPa is considered. The gasket temperature valid for the gaskets of the outer containment is taken from chapter 3. The relevant parameters as well as the allowable leakage hole diameter e for HAC are shown in Table 4.3-6.
The leakage hole diameter calculated In Table 4.3-6 is used to determine a reference leakage rate of dry air leaking from Pu= 1 atm to Pd= 0.01 atm at a temperature of 298 K. The relevant parame-ters as well as the resulting reference air leakage rate at standard conditions are shown in Table 4.3-7.
This assessment is independent of filters or a mechanical cooling system.
4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page 4.3-7
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 4.3-6: Allowable leakage hole diameter corresponding to the allowable leakage rate for HAC
[Proprietary Information wrthheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 4.3-7: Reference air leakage rate corresponding to the allowable leakage hole diame-ter for HAC
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
List of References
[1] Anderson, B. L. et al., NUREG/CR-6487, November 1996 Containment Analysis for Type B Packages Used to Transport Various Contents 4.3 Containment und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 4.3, Rev. 0 Page 4.3-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages Section 4.4, Rev. 0 Page 4.4-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The leak-tightness of the containments (container and cask) is ensured with leak-tightness testing compliant with ANSI N14.5 [1]. The relevant procedures for fabrication leakage rate testing, pre-shipment leakage rate testing, periodic leakage rate testing and maintenance leakage rate testing are defined in chapter 7 resp. chapter 8. The leakage tests and the structural analysis in chapter 2 demonstrate that the requirements associated with the reference air leakage rates for NCT (cf.
Table 4.2-7) and HAC (cf. Table 4.3-7) are met.
List of References
[1] ANSI N14.5-2014, American National Standard For Radioactive Materials - Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment 4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages Section 4.4, Rev. 0 Page 4.4-2
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 4.6 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Appendix 4-1 Content Appendix 4-2 Calculation Concepts 4.5 Appendix Section 4.5, Rev. 0 Page 4.5-1
APPENDIX 4-1 to 1014-SR-00001 Content Assumptions
- The crud activity of is estimated for a cask loading.
- An initial fuel rod filling gas pressure of is assumed for all fuel rods of all FA in the cask loading.
- Residual water vapor is excluded in the calculations regarding design pressure values.
The spent uranium oxide (UOX) FA have a maximum heavy metal mass of and a maximum FA-averaged final discharge burn-up of Based on the activity values per FA the total activity content per cask loading with 69 FA is determined by multiplying the maximum value per nuclide over all FA types (FA No 1 to FA No 6) with the number of FA per cask loading. These covering values are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Activity content of a cask loading with 69 FA
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
For crud depositions, additional activity is taken into account. The surface specific crud activity is taken as 4.64
~~107 Bq/cm2 (1254~~
10-S CVcm2, see [1]). As 60 Co is the only significant contributor to crud activity after short cooling of the FA, the whole c,:ud activity is assumed as 60 Co. Taking the fuel types ,info account, a conservative valu,e for the crud actlvrry of is estimated for a cask loading with 69 FA (kFA) by the following calculation:
Page 1 of 3
APPENDIX 4-1 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnforamtlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Wrth this conservative assessment, potential residual contamination on the inside surfaces of the package (from previous transports) is covered.
The fission gas production is in very good approximation linearly dependent on the produced energy during reactor operation. The maximum fission gas masses
) are summarized in Table 2 as *specific gas production values for each fission gas (in unit mol/GWd) for UOX FA.
Table 2: Specific production of fission gas
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The total produced amount of fission gas GFG in a loading is calculated via:
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
For the cask content, the maximum produced amount of fission gas is obtained for 69 UOX FA with . In this case, GFG = is obtained.
The fuel rod filling gas helium is considered for the FA No 5 (GE 12) as a covering amount for the other FA types. The gas volume in a fuel rod of and the number of fuel rods 92.are given in section 1.2.2 of the SAR. Higher values for the gas volume in a fuel rod of up to for other FA. No result to a lower total gas volume for a FA because of lower numbers of Page 2 of 3
APPENDIX 4-1 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnforamtlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 FR per FA for those FA types.
, a total amount of fuel rod filling gas for a cask loading with 69 FA is calculated to by using the ideal gas law and set to GFR = for the design pressure calculations.
List of References
[1] Anderson, B. L. et al., NUREG/CR-6487, November 1996 Containment Analysis for Type B Packages Used to Transport Various Contents Page 3 of 3
APPENDIX 4-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnforamtion withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Calculation Concepts Assumptions
- The crud activity of is estimated for a cask loading.
- An initial fuel rod filling gas pressure of Is assumed for all fuel rods of all FA in the cask loading.
- Residual water vapor is excluded in the calculations regarding design pressure values.
Detennlnatlon of design pressure values Information on the minimum and maximum pressure Pu inside the canister or the ca~ is required for various analyses.
The absolute pressure is obtained by using the ideal gas law Pu= n *. Rurrv
T gas/ V, where n is the amount of gas, Rurnv is the universal gas constant 8.314 J/mol/K, T gaa is the absolute gas temperature (volume average) and Vis the free gas volume inside the canister or the cask. In addition, the assumed maximum helium filling partial pressure of the canister is temperature-corrected by the gas temperature T gas under test conditions. Therefore, Pu is calculated by:
Pu= PHe,O . T gas/ T He,O + n . RunlV . T gaa / V.
Procedural steps ensure a maximum total pressure of PHe,o =
) inside the canister as well as Inside the cask.
To determine the maximum absolute pressure Pu, the values of n and T gas are maximized while V is minimized. Therefore, the influence parameters are estimated as follows:
- maximum amount of gas n:
All relevant gas contributions have to be added. This includes the maximum amount of gas released from the content, i. e. fission gas and filling gas of the fuel rods. How this value is deduced is explained below.
- maximum absolute gas temperature Tgas:
In the context of the thermal design calculations, the maximum volume averaged gas temperature is calculated for various test conditions.
- minimum free gas volume V:
The free gas volume is calculated based on the canister and cask design. From the canister cavity volume, the displacement volumes of the basket and the fuel assemblies are subtracted. The free gas volume inside fuel rods that are considered to have failed is not included in the total free gas volume.
Page 1 of 4
APPENDIX 4-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnforamtion withheld per 10 CFR2.390 For maximum pressure considerations, the gas release from the content is calculated as follows:
- The fraction of failed fuel rods fs is assumed as 0.03 (3 %) for NCT and as 1 (100 %)
for HAC (see [11).
- The maximum total amount of filling gas of the fuel rods is detennined based on the information provided for the fuel rods. For each fuel rod that is assumed to have failed, the full amount of filling gas is assumed to be released into the canister resp. the cask.
- The produced amount of fission gas is detennined via bum-up calcu*lations.
- According to [1], the fraction of fission gas release fo is used as 0.3 (30 %). For each fuel rod that is assumed to have failed, the fraction fo of the produced fission gas is assumed to be released into the cavity of the canister resp. cask.
The moderator disc between the canister lid and the cask lid might cause an additional amount of radiolysis gas from irradiation. The energy dose from gamma irradiation of the lid-end moderator disc, which is made of the ultrahigh molecular weight polyethylene , is given as about in the shielding evaluation. Taking a G-value for hydrogen of 4 molecules per 100 eVfor polyethylene (with ultrahigh molecular weight) into account (cf. [21), a negligible amount of results in a year.
After the cask drying process, no residual water has to be assumed to be present as vapor after dispatch. Further gases are not fanned during operation of the package, either.
The maximum pressure which can occur is the value of the absolute pressure Pu for HAC with the combination of high internal temperatures due to thennal test conditions and the covering value for fuel rod failure.
The minimum internal cask pressure that can occur is detennined by considering the minimum amount of filling gas of the canister resp. the cask and a minimum assumed gas temperature (set to the ambient temperature of -40 °C, see test condition 10 CFR 71.71(c)(2)). Furthennore, gas released from the content is neglected.
Activity moblllzatlon The activity content is classified in four categories, in line with the approach in [1]. The categories are gaseous substances, volatile substances, particulate substances from fuel and particulate substances from crud. Based on [1], the nuclides are classified as follows: 3 H and Page 2 of 4
APPENDIX 4-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnforamtlon withheld per 10 CFR2.390 86 89 90 106 134 137 Kr as gases, Sr, Sr, Ru, Cs and Cs as volatiles, all nuclides from Appendix 4-1 as particulate substances from fuel and 60 Co as particulate substance from crud.
The fraction of failed fuel rods fs and the fraction of fission gas release fo are introduced above.
According to [1], the fraction of volatiles that are released due to a cladding breach is fv =
2
~~1o-4 for NGT and HAG, the mass fraction of fuel that is released as fines due to a cladding breach is fF = 3~~
~~1o-5 for NGT and HAG and the fraction of crud that spalls-off rods Is f c = 0.15 for NGT and fc = 1.0 for HAG.~~
The activity concentration of the gases 3H and 86 Kr is obtained by multiplying the total activity of the concerned nuclides from Appendix 4-1 with the fraction of failed fuel rods fs' and the fraction of fission gas release fG and dividing the result by the free gas volume V. In the same way but using the fraction of failed fuel rods fs and the fraction fv resp. 'fF the activity concentrations for volatiles resp. particulate substances from fuel (fines) are defined. For the activity concentration of crud only the fraction fc is taken into account.
Volumetric leakage rate The volumetric leakage rate L from the cask atmosphere is calculated by means of the Knudsen equation [3]0:
L(Pa) = Lc(pa) + Lm(Pa),
Lc(p.)= 1~a* :a *ff>u-pd),'
with Lc(pa) : viscous volumetric flow rate, m 3/s Lm(Pa) : molecular volumetric flow rate, m 3/s
µ dynamic viscosity of the gas, Pa
~~s M molar mass of the gas molecules, kg/mol R universal gas constant (R = 8.314 J~~
~~mo~ 1~~
~~K-1),~~
T gas temperature within the leakage hole (gasket tem~rature), K Pu upstream pressure, Pa Pd downstream pressure, Pa Pa average pressure (Pa = (Pu + Pct)/2), Pa a leakage hole length, m D leakage hole diameter, m.
Page 3 of 4
APPENmX 4-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary lnforamtion withheld per 10 CFR2.390 The Knudsen equation describes the combined viscous (first term) and molecular (second term) flow of a gaseous substance with temperature T, molar mass M, and dynamic viscosity
µ. The flow through a straight leakage hole (with length a and diameter D) is driven by the pressure difference between the absolute upstream pressure Pu and the absolute downstream pressure l)d. The Knudsen equation Is valid for the average pressure Pa =(pu +pd)'2 and is renormalized to the operation conditions of the cask via L.6:>J=L.6:>.. )*P.,/Pu to allow multiplica-tion with the upstream activity concentration for calculating the actMty release rates.
List of References
[1] Anderson, 8. L. et al., NUREG/CR-6487, November 1996 Containment Analysis for Type B Packages Used to Transport Various Contents
[2] AMEC/200615/001 Issue 3, Determination of G-values for use in SMOGG gas generation calculations
[3] ANSI N14.5-2014, American National Standard For Radioactive Materials - Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment Page 4 of 4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 5 Shleldlng Evaluation 6.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 5.0 Overview Section 6.0, Rev. 0 Page 5.0-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The shielding analysis of the CASTORIPJ geo69 package engineered to serve as a Type B(U)F-96 packaging for transporting radioactive material is presented in this document. The CASTORIPJ geo69 package is designed to accommodate 69 spent nuclear fuel assemblies (SNF) from boiling water reactors (BWR). There are six SNF types described in section 1.2.2 authorised for transport in the CASTOR geo69 package.
There are three bounding loading patterns TR1, TR2 and TR3 defined in section 1.2.2 all fitting into a certain scheme of six: position groups of SNF with identical characteristics (Figure 5.0-1). These loading patterns are identified by their decay heat per SNF in a specific position groups, and there-fore, are called thermal requirements. The analysis Is performed separately for every of the pat-terns. Once the regulatory dose rate limits are met for the three bounding loading patterns, any arbitrary loading of the cask with SNF would satisfy the regulatory limits as well.
- The package consists of the transport and storage cask CASTORIPJ geo69 (the cask) and the set of two impact limiters: bottom impact limiter and lid impact limiter.
This chapter contains the following information:
~~1. A description of the shielding features of the CASTOR geo69 package.~~
~~2. A description of the bounding source terms for each loading pattern TR1 to TR3.~~
~~3. A description of the shielding model and materials.~~
4. Analysis methods and results to show that 10 CFR71.47 radiation level limits are met dur-ing normal conditions of transport (NCT) and that the 10 CFR71.51 dose rate limit is not exceeded following hypothetical accident conditions (HAC).
5.0 Overview Section 6.0, Rev. 0 Page 5.0-2
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Figure 6.0-1 Position groups of the basket 5.0 Overview Section 5.0, Rev. 0 Page 5.0-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 6.1 Description of Shieldlng Design Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. O Page 5.1-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 5.1.1 Design Features The principal sources of radiation from SNF are:
Gamma radiation originating from a decay of actinides and radioactive fission products, of fuel and hardware activation products generated during reactor operation, as well as sec-ondary gamma particles from neutron capture,
~~Neutron radiation from spontaneous fission, from (a,n)-reactions in fuel materials, from secondary neutrons produced by fission via subcritical multiplication, and from (y,n)-~~
reactions. The latter source is however negligible.
The major parts of the package relevant for the shielding of radiation sources are:
~~the basket with 69 positions to accommodate SNF,~~
~~the canister with its lid,~~
~~the cask body (with its lid) incorporating moderator rods and plates.~~
Shielding from gamma radiation is provided by the steel structure of the canister and the lid system and by the ductile cask iron (DCI) of the cask body. In order to make neutron shielding effective, the neutrons have to be thermalised and then absorbed. For this purpose, the moderator rods and plates made of unborated ultra high-molecula r polyethylene (UHMW PE) are incorporated Into the cask body. Together with relatively high carbon contents in the DCI, they provide an effective way to thermalise neutrons. Sufficient DCI behind the polyethylene rods towards the external surface of the cask not only allows for an efficient absorption of neutrons, but greatly supresses the high en-ergetic secondary gamma radiation.
The borated structures of the basket ( ) are not primarily aimed to improve the shield-ing performance of the cask, but nevertheless diminish the thermal part of the neutron spectrum around the SNF to some extent. This helps to reduce the dose rate contributions (mostly) from the inner fuel assemblies.
Additional basket elements (round segments and shielding elements) made of aluminium are add-ed to the basket not only to stabilise it, but to provide some additional gamma shielding.
The cross-sectional top view of the package (quarter cut) is presented in Figure 5.1-1, while the elevation section of the package is displayed in Figure 5.1-2. These views are directly generated from the calculation Inputs (here the NCT input). The colour code corresponds to the materials used in the calculations. Different colours selected for the moderator rods are used to distinguish longer and shorter rods. In section 5.3 the shielding model of the package is presented in greater detail.
5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-2
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Figure 5.1-1 Cross section of the package model (2020 mm above cask bottom) 5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-3
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Figure 5.1-2 Elevation section of the package model
- The most important dimensions of the package for the shielding calculations in its central plane are presented in Figure 5.1-3 (standard MCNP colours are desaturated). The dimensions according to the technical drawings in section 1.3 are highlighted as blue text, the implementation into the shielding model as green text. The thicknesses of the materials relevant for the shielding analysis are set to their minimum.
The occurring gaps are filled with air.
5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-4
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Figure 6.1-3 Cross section of the package model with major dimensions (In mm)
Axially the main shielding is provided by:
~~a cask bottom part consisting of thick DCI part ( bottom mod-erator plate, and a (in Its middle part) closure plate;~~
~~the lid system consisting of the canister lid ( ), moderator plate ), and cask lid ).~~
The dose rates on the face sides of the package are much smaller than on the shell side, which is decisive for the design, 5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Besides polyurethane foam (varying thickness) both impact limiters include steel as housing and inner lying structure sheets, it is however conservatively not modelled. The impact limiters do not bear a dedicated shielding function.
Present shielding analysis is not based on the latest version of the design drawings for the impact limiters (from 12/02/2020). Although the radial structure of the impact limiters has not been changed, there are some minor deviations in the axial dimensioning of the pieces which are ad-dressed here.
In general, both impact limiters have gained in the length along the cask axis. This means that there is less material modelled compared to the actual build. Probably the most important aspect for the evaluation of the external dose rate is that which is conservative.
The thicknesses of the components relevant for shielding, mainly the penetration protection as-sembly, remain; the openings for the trunnions are even smaller than before, which in turn has a small positive effect on the dose rates.
Possible negative impact of the bigger lid side central opening on the dose rates of the lid side of the cask should be more than compensated by other conservative assump-tions made. Firstly, the plating of the polyurethane foam is not taken into account in the shielding model at all; its presence would provide a better shielding. And secondly, the length growth would not only provide more material but also shift the normally occupied space further from the package.
Overall, the final design of the impact limiters should not negatively affect the dose rate outside the package. It is expected that the dose rates around the gap between cooling fins and the lid side impact limiter become smaller.
The densities of the materials are reduced relative to their nominal values as discussed in section 5.3.2.
6.1.1.1 Classification of the Fuel Assemblles The fuel assemblies are generally classified by their type (SNF number, see section 1.2.2) and by their maximum allowed decay heat. These two quantities, geometry and heat, complemented by the minimum initial enrichment and maximum bum-up including bum-up uncertainty unambiguous-ly define the bounding source terms described in detail in section 5.2.
5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 In the shielding model, the design of the SNF No 6, Atrium-10A, is used. The choice is governed by the presence of the part length rods, by the thickness of the fuel pellets and cladding, and by the largest water channel (3x3), which minimises the self-shielding of the peripheral SNF. With this choice, the conservative configuration is realised.
5.1.1.2 Package during Nonnal Conditions of Transport The 10CFR71.47 external radiation requirements during NCT for an exclusive shipment addressed in the present shielding analysis are as follows:
~~2 mSv/h on the external surface of the package. No credit has been taken of closed transport vehicle.~~
2 mSv/h at any point on the outer surface of the vehicle, including the top and underside of the vehicle. No credit has been taken of the vehicle or enclosure. Since the dose rate val-ues on the surface of the arbitrary vehicle or enclosure are lower than on the surface of the package, and the same dose rate limit requirements apply, no separate dose rate values are calculated.
~~0.1 mSv/h at any point 2 meter from the outer lateral surfaces of the vehicle. Conservative-ly, the dose rates are calculated at a distance of 2 meters from the outer surfaces of the package.~~
~~0.02 mSv/h in any normally occupied space. This Is supposed to be the lid side of the package.~~
~~In case of shipment under non-exclusive use, the NCT dose rate limit is:~~
~~0.1 mSv/h at 1 m from the surface of the package.~~
The CASTOR geo69 will be transported with impact limiters. The width of the transport vehicle is yet unknown; therefore, no credit is taken of the transportation means. The lateral surfaces of the vehicle are conservatively assumed to be directly located at the tips of cooling fins.
The information about particular dose rates Is gained from detectors positioned all around the cask.
Besides this geometry-independent mesh of detectors ( ), separate volu-metrlc detectors are modelled in order to control the calculation process. The maximum dose rates are always searched for in different dose rate locations.
A unique feature of the CASTOR~ geo69 are the moderator rods placed directly in the cask body.
The rods are made of UHMW PE without neutron absorbing additives and serve the neutron mod-eration purpose only. From the transportation point of view, few standard situations are to be con-sidered:
5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation Withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Two shielding models, cold and hot, are analysed. One of the two delivering the highest external dose rates is considered as representative for the package design. Figure 5.1-4 and Figure 5.1-5 illustrate these two shielding models for the inner and outer moderator rods, respectively. In both cases the geometry of the setup is implemented according to section 2.2.1, and the tolerances are chosen such that the air gaps are maximised.
CASTOR geo69 will transport high burn-up spent fuel, therefore, the impact of the 3-percent fuel failure under NCT is evaluated according to [1]. The source occurring du~ to fuel failure is relocat-ed to the bottom and to the top regions of the canister, the regions with potentially lower shielding performance due to flattenings in the trunnion regions and due to finite axial size of the moderator rods.
5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-8
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Figure 5.1-4 Inner moderator rods under different operating conditions (dimensions In mm)
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Figure 6.1-6 Outer moderator rods under different operating conditions (dimensions In mm) 5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 5.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 5.1.1.3 Package during Hypothetical Accident Conditions The 10CFR71.51 external radiation dose rate limit for hypothetical accident conditions Is:
~~The external radiation dose rate shall not exceed 10 mSv/h at 1 m from the external surface of the package.~~
The hypothetical accident conditions of transport have two bounding consequences which affect the shielding performance of the package. These are the (partial) loss of the neutron moderator as a result of the design basis fire and damage of the impact limiters as a result of the drop.
In a conse,vative fashion, the shielding analysis of the accident assumes that the moderator mate-rial and the impact limiters are completely lost. These assumptions are highly conservative, since neither the moderator material, not the impact limiters are destroyed by the accident according to chapter 2.
The Structural analysis in chapter 2 shows that the basket, canister, and the cask remain largely unaltered throughout the HAC. Localised damage to the cask shell experienced after the pin punc-ture will have a negligible impact on the dose rate at 1 m from the surface.
The impact of the 100-percent fuel failure under HAC according to [1] is evaluated. The damaged fuel relocation is considered. The dose rates are analysed when the fuel is kept within the basket cell but pushed either to the bottom or to the top of the canister.
5.1.1.4 Computer Codes The code system MCNP6 in version 2.0 [2] is used to calculate the dose rates. The source terms are calculated with the SCALE 6.2 code system [3] using TRITON [4] and ORIGAMI [5] modules.
These codes are described in Appendix 5-1.
5.1.2 Summary Table of Maximum Radiation Levels Table 5.1-1 provides the maximum dose rates at the package surface, at 1 m from the surface of the cask (package) and at 2 m from the surface of the cask (package) for normal conditions of transport. A location 1 m from the package at Its lid side is identified as a normally occupied space (vehicle driver). The values presented are the most unfavourable ones among all considered load-ing patterns (TR1 through TR3) and fuel arrangements.
Since the maximum total dose rate exceeds 0.1 mSv/h at 1 m from the surface of the package, the shipments have to be carried out under exclusive use.
5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.1-1 Maximum dose rates at different locations for the CASTOR~ geo69 package un-der normal conditions of transport Dose Rate Location Gammas, mSv/h Neutrons, mSv/h 10CFR71.47 Umlt, Totals, mSv/h mSv/h Cask Surface 1 578 2 Shell Side 1 m from package 0168 0.1*
2 m from package 0088 01 CnkSurface 0.005 2 1 m from package /
Ud Side 0004 01* /0.02 normally occupied apace 2 m from package 0002 0.1 Cask Surface 0.033 2 Bottom Side 1 m from package 0.021 0.1*
2 m from package 0.009 0.1
fl00-8XcluYVel.188 Table 5.1-2 provides the maximum dose rates at 1 m from the cask (package) surface for the hy-pothetical accident conditions. The values presented are the most unfavourable ones among all considered loadlng patterns and fuel arrangements.
Table 6.1-2 Maximum dose rates at 1 m for the CASTOR3 geo69 package under hypothetical accident conditions Dose Rate Location Gammas, mSv/h 10CFR71.51 Limit, Neutrons, mSv/h Totals, mSv/h mSvn, Shell Side 2.461 10 UdSide 1.531 10 Bottom Side 1.374 10 5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] NUREG-2224, Dry Storage and Transportation of High Bumup Spent Fuel (Draft for Comment), Washington, DC, July 2018
[2] C.J. Werner (ed.), MCNP User's Manual- Code Version 6.2, LA-UR-17-29981, 2017
[3] SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2. 8. T. Rearden, M.A. Jessee, Eds. ORNL/TM-2005/39, 2017
[4] TRITON: A Multipurpose Transport, Depletion, and Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis Module in: SCALE Code System ORNL/TM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017
[5] ORIGAMI: A Code for Computing Assembly lsotopics with ORIGEN in: SCALE Code Sys-tem ORNL/TM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017 5.1 Description of Shielding Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 5.1-12
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.2 Source Specification Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 5.2 Source Specification Section 6.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 The procedure to identify bounding source terms for each loading pattern TR1 to TR3 is presented in this section. For each fuel assembly described in section 1.2.2 the following quantities are known:
~~lattice parameters and geometry,~~
~~minimum initial enrichment (see also Table 5.2-1),~~
~~maximum end burn-up (with bum-up uncertainty, see Table 5.2-1),~~
~~maximum allowed decay heat.~~
Wrth these parameters bum-up and depletion calculations are performed (see section 1.2.2 for an extended description). To accurately account for an axial distribution, 24 indMdual calculations are executed for a single geometry resulting in nodal values for the physical SNF properties. Cooling times of up to more than 45 years are analysed for each SNF separately, and decay heat, gamma and neutron source terms are compared to find the maximum values. This helps to unambiguously Identify the minimum cooling times, at which the decay heat required by the certain loading pattern (in each position group) is just reached. Otherwise, the particular SNF are not authorised for load-ing.
The decay heat as well as the radiation sources are calculated for every SNF geometry using ORIGAMI with the necessary libraries generated beforehand using TRITON (see Appendix 5-1) as discussed in section 1.2.2. The validity of the ORIGAMI output Is checked against multiple TRITON calculations (see Appendix 5-2).
5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The radiation sources relevant for the dose rate outside of the cask consist of gamma and neutron radiation from the active zone of the SNF as well as from gamma radiation due to SOCo from the activated hardware including fuel rod plena and tie plates.
The minimum cooling times required to reach a certain decay heat according to loading patterns TR1 to TR3 are given in Table 5.2-2. The values from SNF GE 8x8-1 and GE 8:xB-2 are practically undistinguishable and hence are not separated. Some field are left vacant, either because the cooling times are smaller than the minimum cooling times for this particular SNF type (section 1.2.2), or when the cooling times are far too long to be reasonable. The latter include two high burn-up SNF, the GE12 and Atrium-10A Table 6.2-1 Boundary conditions for the bum-up calculations
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Table 6.2-2 Minimum coollng times {in years) needed to reach certain decay heat
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5.2.1 Gamma Source The gamma-radiation of the spent fuel is analysed In seven energy groups (see Table 5.2-3), rep-resenting energies relevant for the dose rate outside of the cask. The gamma particles with even lower energy are so well shielded that they do not significantly contribute to the outer dose rate.
The- high energy gamma particles possess tiny source term strengths and, therefore, do not con-tribute to the dose rate either.
5.2 Source Specification Section 6.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.2-3 Gamma energy structure Energy group, I = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average group energy, MeV 0.575 0.85 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75 3.5 Lower group energy, MeV 0.45 0.7 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Upper group energy, MeV 0.7 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 4 The gamma source Is determined for every SNF type described in section 1.2.2. The total source strength in each gamma energy group is calculated by summation of the 24 axial nodal values stemming from the conservative axial burn-up profile discussed above.
This confirms close to linear behaviour of the total gamma source as a function of the assembly burn-up.
This justifies the use of the high burn-up profile for the generation of the axial source strength dis-tributions. The axial gamma source strength profile used in present shielding calculations are dis-played in Figure 5.2-1. Different shapes of the profiles in various groups can be related to the most contributing nuclides.
5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-4
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Figure 5.2-1 Axlal gamma source strength distributions As discussed above, the nodal gamma sources are determined. It is checked that no increase of the source tem,s over time occurs. For all seven groups the sources monotonously decrease.
The resulting gamma sources calculated based on Table 5.2-2 for every SNF type are summarised in Table 5.2-4 to Table 5.2-10. The sources are nomialised to one megagram of heavy metal to account for the differences in the mass of the SNF including the mass in the shielding model. The bold value are the maximum sources for each fixed decay heat.
Besides gamma particles stemming from the fuel pellet stack, there is also a gamma radiation from activated hardware: the end fittings and plenum springs. The primary source of activity in the non-fuel regions of a SNF arise from the activation of 59Co to SOCo. The activity (and the source) of 60Co is detem,ined during bum-up calculations as well.
This value is scaled with the maximum burn-up of the particular SNF and corre-sponding masses of the end fittings and plena. The flux scaling factors of 0.1 for the top end fittings and of 0.2 for the bottom end fittings and plenum springs are applied according to PNL-6906 [1].
The activities are finally decayed to the desired cooling time from Table 5.2-2. The gamma sources for each SNF type are given in Table 5.2-11 to Table 5.2-13.
5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Some older SNF may have higher SSC<> Impurity level in their structural elements (including spac-ers), the minimum cooling times specified in section 1.2.2, however, imply that the actMty of 60 Co is largely cooled down.
Yet another gamma source arises from (n,y) reactions in the package materials. This source is properly accounted for in MCNP, when neutron calculations are performed in a coupled neutron-gamma mode, which is the case for the present shielding analysis.
The bounding gamma source for each loading pattern TR1 to TR3 is constructed from the maxi-mum individual sources corresponding to the selected decay heat. The final sources used for the shielding analysis are reported in Table 5.2-14 for TR1, in Table 5.2-15 for TR2, and in Table 5.2-16 for TR3 decoded after position groups (see Figure 5.0-1).
The bounding gamma energy release rate for the gamma radiation from the spent fuel Is summa-rised in Table 5.2-17.
Table 6.2-4 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group 1=1
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5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.2-6 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group 1=2
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Table 6.2-6 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group 1=3
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Table 6.2-7 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group 1=4
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1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.2-8 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group 1=6
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Table 6.2-9 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group i=6
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Table 6.2-10 SNF type dependent gamma sources for energy group 1=7
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5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.2-11 SNF type dependent gamma sources for the bottom end fittings
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Table 6.2-12 SNF type dependent gamma sources for the top end fittings
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Table 6.2-13 SNF type dependent gamma sources for the plenum springs
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5.2 Source Specification Section 6.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.2-14 Bounding gamma source for TR1 Gamma Source for ThennaJ Requirement 1 Position Group AtoF Decay Heat, W 260 y1 1/s/MgHM 3.90E+15 y2 1/s/Mgl-M 3.50E+14 y3 1/s/MgHM 1.00E+14 y4 1/s/Mgl-M 3.83E+12 y5 1/s/MgHM 1.05E+11 y6 1/s/MgHM 1.39E+10 y7 1/s/MgHM 1.80E+09 Bottom End Fitting 1/s 1.38E+12 Top End Fitting 1/s 3.18E+11 Plenum Spring 1/s 2.97E+11 Table 6.2-15 Bounding gamma source for TR2 Gamma Source for Thennal Requirement 2 Position Group A B C D E F Decay Heat, W 150 200 460 200 330 200 y1 1/s/MQHM 1.95E+15 2.87E+16 6.00E+15 2.87E+15 4.06E+15 2.87E+15 y2 1/s/MQHM 1.99E+13 6.62E+13 6 35E+14 6.62E+13 8.49E+13 6.62E+13 y3 1/s/MQHM 1 31E+13 4.29E+13 1.72E+14 4.29E+13 5.92E+13 4.29E+13 y4 1/s/MQHM 6.88E+11 1.95E+12 6.33E+12 1.95E+12 2 70E+12 1.95E+12 y5 1/s/MQHM 8.78E+09 1.32E+10 1.34E+11 1.32E+10 1 81E+10 1.32E+10 y6 1/s/MgHM 614E+08 8.46E+08 1.91E+10 8.46E+08 1.52E+09 8.46E+08 y7 1/s/MgHM 6.15E+07 1.11 E+08 2.59E+09 1.11E+08 2 32E+08 111E+08 Bottom End Frtting 1/s 4.82E+10 4.22E+11 2.43E+12 4.22E+11 5 35E+11 4.22E+11 Top End FrtlJng 1/s 1.11E+10 9.74E+10 5.94E+11 9.74E+10 1.31E+11 9.74E+10 Plenum Spnng 1/s 1 04E+10 9 09E+10 5 89E+11 9.09E+10 1.30E+11 9.09E+10 Table 5.2-16 Bounding gamma source for TR3 Gamma Source for Thermal Requirement 3 Position Group A B C D E F Decay Heat, W 150 230 450 230 230 210 y1 1/s/Mgl-lM 1.95E+15 3.42E+15 6.00E+15 3.42E+15 3.42E+15 3.03E+15 y2 1/s/MQHM 1.99E+13 1.72E+14 6.35E+14 1.72E+14 1.72E+14 8.56E+13 y3 1/s/MgHM 1.31E+13 7.22E+13 1.72E+14 7.22E+13 7.22E+13 5.05E+13 y4 1/s/Mgl-lM 6.88E+11 2.98E+12 6.33E+12 2.98E+12 2.98E+12 2.23E+12 y5 1/s/MQHM 8 78E+09 2.44E+10 1.34E+11 2.44E+10 2.44E+10 1.43E+10 y6 1/s/MgHM 6.14E+08 2.34E+09 1.91E+10 2.34E+09 2.34E+09 1.09E+09 y7 1/s/MgHM 6.15E+07 3.24E+08 2.59E+09 3.24E+08 3.24E+08 1 22E+08 Bottom End Frtting 1/s 4.82E+10 9.30E+11 2.43E+12 9.30E+11 9 30E+11 5.49E+11 Top End Frttlng 1/s 1.11E+10 2 15E+11 5.94E+11 2.15E+11 2.15E+11 1.27E+11 Plenum Spnng 1/s 1 04E+10 2 OOE+11 5.89E+11 2.00E+11 2.00E+11 1.18E+11 5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation with held @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.2-17 Bounding energy release rate per Mg heavy metal Decay Heat, W 150 200 210 230 260 330 450 yl MeV/s/Mg1-t.t 1 12E+15 1.65E+16 1.74E+15 1.97E+16 2.24E+15 2.33E+15 3.45E+15 y2 MeV/s/MgHM 1.69E+13 5.63E+13 7.28E+13 1.46E+14 2.98E+14 7.22E+13 5.40E+14 y3 MeV/s/Mgi-§,1 1.64E+13 5 36E+13 6.31E+13 9.03E+13 1.25E+14 7.40E+13 2.15E+14 y4 MeV/s/MgHM 1.20E+12 3.41E+12 3.90E+12 5 22E+12 6.70E+12 4 73E+12 1.11E+13 y5 MeV/e/Mgl3/4ol 1.98E+10 2 97E+10 3.22E+10 5.49E+10 2.36E+11 4.07E+10 3.02E+11 y6 MeV/s/MgHM 1.69E+09 2.33E+09 3.00E+09 6.44E+09 3.82E+10 418E+09 5.25E+10 y7 MeV/s/Mgl3/4ol 215E+08 3 89E+08 4.27E+08 1.13E+09 6.30E+09 8.12E+08 9.07E+09 5.2.2 Neutron Source The neutron sources are detennined in an analogous way as the gamma ones. The two relevant e neutron energy spectra - from spontaneous fission and from (a,n) reactions - exhibit different axial distributions due to the weaker bum-up towards the ends of the SNF (see Figure 5.2-2). It is checked, whether energy distributions of these two spectra could be realised by internal means of the MCNP code system (continuous en~rgy distributions). While the energy spectrum from the spontaneous fission could be nicely described by the Watt spectrum from 244 Cm (parameters a= 0.902523 MeV, b = 3.72033 MeV-1, see [2D, for the (a,n) energy spectrum no internal function has been found as it is rather a modified Maxwell distribution currently not implemented in the code. Finally, for (a,n)-neutrons a histogram function generated by ORIGAMI is utilised in the anal-ysis.
The subcritical neutron multiplication is properly taken into account during particle transport with MCNP.
5.2 Source Specification Section 6.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-11
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Figure 6.2-2 Axial neutron source strength distributions The nodal neutron source is detennined in the same fashion (simultaneously) as the gamma one and is shown in Table 5.2-18 for spontaneous fission and in Table 5.2-19 for the (a,n)-reactions.
The bounding neutron source for each loading pattern TR1 to TR3 is constructed from the maxi-mum individual sources corresponding to the selected decay heat. The final sources used for the shielding analysis are reported in Table 5.2-20 for TR1, in Table 5.2-21 for TR2, and in Table 5.2-22 for TR3.
The total neutron sources for spontaneous fission and for (a,n)-reactions as a function of energy are displayed in Table 5.2-23 and Table 5.2-24, respectively.
5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.2-18 SNF type dependent neutron sources from spontaneous fission
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Table 6.2-19 SNF type dependent neutron sources from (a,n)-reactions
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Table 6.2-20 Bounding neutron source for TR1 Neutron Source for Thennal Requirement 1 Position Group AtoF Decay Heat, W 260 (a, n)-neutrons 1/s/Mgt-t.1 1.85E+07 spontaneous fission 1/s/MgHM 1.02E+09 Table 6.2-21 Bounding neutron source for TR2 Neutron Source for Thennal Requirement 2 Position Group A B C D E F Decay Heat, W 160 200 ~o 200 330 200 (a, n)-neutrons 1/s/MgHM 1.02E+07 1.32E+07 2.75E+07 1 32E+07 2.24E+07 1 32E+07 spontaneous frss1on 1/s/Mgl-lM 4.28E+08 7 69E+08 247E+09 7.69E+08 1.60E+09 7.69E+08 5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.2-22 Bounding neutron source for TR3 Neutron Source for ThennaJ Requirement 3 Position Group A B C D E F Decay Heat, W 150 230 450 230 230 210 (a,n)-neutrons 1/s/MgHM 1.02E+07 1.69E+07 2.75E+07 1.69E+07 1.69E+07 1 58E+07 spontaneous fission 1/s/MgHM 4.26E+OB 8.01E+OB 2.47E+09 8 01E+OB 8.01E+OB 8.43E+OB Table 6.2-23 Bounding spontaneous fission neutron source as a function of energy
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5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.2-24 Bounding (a,n)-reaction neutron source as a function of energy
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List of References
[1] PNL-6906 Vol. 1 to Vol. 3, UC-85, A. Luksic, Spent Fuel Assembly Hardware: Characteriza-tion and 10 CFR 61 Classification for Waste Disposal, 1989
[2] C.J. Werner (ed.), MCNP User's Manual - Code Version 6.2, LA-UR-17-29981, 2017 5.2 Source Specification Section 5.2, Rev. 0 Page 5.2-15
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 5.3 Shielding Model Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 5.3 Shielding Model Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Propnetary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The shielding analysis of the CASTOR geo69 is performed with MCNP6 2.0 (see Appendix 5-1).
A separate MCNP calculation is performed for each position group A to F for every twelve sources (seven gamma groups from the fuel pellet stack, two neutron spectra, top end fittings, bottom end fittings, and plenum springs).
In this Section, the shielding models for NCT as well as for the HAC are discussed. The infor-mation about individual parts of the cask and the materials used in models are described.
6.3.1 Configuration of Source and Shielding In total, seven shielding models of the package are analysed taking into account possible effect of the test of the packaging under different transport conditions. Especially under HAC there are two consequences affecting the shielding material. These are the changes to the moderator material as a result of the design basis fire, and damage of the impact limiters as a result of the 9 m drop. The shielding models evaluated are as follows:
Section 1.3 provides the drawings describing the CASTOR geo69 package. These drawings are used to create the MCNP models used in the shielding calculations.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The elevation sections of the NCT and HAC models are presented In Figure 5.3-1. The axial null of the scale corresponds to the cask bottom edge (lower edge of the closure plate). Being of low rele-vance for the shielding analysis, the screws, compression springs and gaskets are not modelled.
When appropriate they are substiMed by air, e.g. the heads of the lld bolting or the top of the bas-ket, or by surrounding material, e.g. inside the lid.
For the model with fuel reconfiguration under NCT an additional fuel region with 3 % of the source strength has been considered at the bottom of the canister (see Figure 5.3-2, left hand side) or close to its top In the region, where the shielding performance of the package _is expected to be minimal The standard NCT sources attributed to the fuel pellet stack remain and contribute to the external dose rate with a strength of 97 %. The end fittings and plenum springs from the standard NCT model contribute with a full strength. The rubbleised mixture of fuel and cladding is_ relocated within the basket cell, the mass packing fraction for the rubble is 0.58 [1].
Under HAC, a similar approach is used. The difference is that a 100 % fuel failure is assumed. As no damage of the basket structures occurs (see section 2.7), the rubble consisting of fuel and cladding (the rest of the SNF structures is conservatively neglected) remains in the basket cell (see Figure 5.3-3).
The principal components of the shielding model are explained in the following subsections. The methods and main measurements are presented.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 6.3, Rev. O Page 5.3-3
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Figure 5.3-1 Elevatlon sections of NCT (left) and HAC (right) models in the trunnion plane
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Figure 5.3-2 Source position in the NCT fuel fallure model - at the bottom of the canister (left) and in the region with the expected minimum shieldlng performance (right) 5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-4
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Figure 6.3-3 HAC rubble at the bottom (left) and at the top (right) of the package 5.3.1.1 Spent Fuel All 69 SNF are placed into the corresponding basket cells. Conservatively, Atrium-10A design is selected for the shielding model. The main reason for this is the lattice configuration. With the large water channel and part length rods the self-shielding effects are minimised. Additionally, this fuel design has the thinnest cladding and fuel channel thickness among other SNF.
The fuel rods including cladding are modelled indMdually. The cross section through the fuel mod-el in its lower part, where all the rods are present, is presented in Figure 5.3-4.
It is assumed that the SNF are complete and do not contain dummy rods. Possible loss of self-shielding due to possible absence of fuel rods is overcompensated by the actual loss of source strength at this location.
The end fittings enter the calculations in a simplified fashion as tie plates only. This approach is justified, since the source strength is scaled with the full mass of the end fittings. The plenum springs are modelled homogenised as steel pieces with reduced density ( ).
5.3 Shielding Model Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-5
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Figure 5.3-4 Spent fuel model (dimensions In mm}
6.3.1.2 Basket The basket in the shielding model (see Figure 5.1-1) consists of
, and round segments made of aluminium (SB-209 5454). The mounting elements are left out and replaced by air. As discussed in section 5.1.1.1 and shown in Figure 5.3-1, the thicknesses of the sheets are minimised and the outer di-ameter of the round segments is reduced according to the design tolerances.
6.3.1.3 Shleldlng Elements Shielding elements out of aluminium (SB-209 5454) are modelled as solid blocks (see Figure 5.3-5).
5.3 Shielding Model Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-6
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Figure 6.3-6 Shielding element 6.3.1.4 Canister The elevation view of the canister is presented in Figure 5.3-6.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.~7
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Figure 5.3-6 Canister elevatlon view (dimensions in mm) 6.3.1.6 Cask Body and Lid The cask body with lid is modelled with the unfavourable combination of the tolerances in radial direction.
Several so-called splitting levels (thin black lines in the model illustra-tions) are implemented into various components of the calculation model in order to increase its statistical perfonnance using variance reduction techniques.
The trunnions are modelled as solid pieces made of steel (upper trunnions,.SA-479M 414) or DCI (lower tilting studs), the corresponding flattenings of the cask body possess minimum dimensions.
The cask lid is modelled with the lid moderator plate mounted on its lower surface. The bolting of the lid is not modelled; the bolt heads are replaced with air.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-8
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Figure 6.3-7 Cooling fins (dimensions in mm) 6.3.1. 7 Moderators The moderator rods made of polyethylene ( ) are modelled (NCT only)
They are 1;1nalysed in two different con-figurations (when modelled at alQ, the design geometry representing the situation shortly after load-ing and the state of thermal equilibrium (see Figure 5.1-4 and Figure 5.1-5). Divergent from the design density of the resulting polyethylene at equilibrium is conservatively reduced according to the maximum temperature over the entire length of the rod (no axial temperature pro-file is assumed, see section 2.2). For the moderator plates (bottom and lid ones) only the density is reduced in equilibrium state, no expansion is Implemented.
5.3.1.8 Impact Limiters Both impact limiters are modelled (NCT only) with their principal dimensions. The model includes (see Figure 5.1-2) foam filling ( ), spacers and load distribution plate (alu-minium EN AW-7020),
foam is assumed to fill the volume homogeneously.
This dimension Is, however, not taken into ac-count when discussing the distance of 1 m and 2 m from the outer surface of the package. The reference external surface of the package is assumed to coincide with the external surface of the cask at the fin tip.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 5.3.1.9 Environment and Detectors The infonnation about particular dose rates is gained from detectors positioned all around the cask (see Figure 5.3-8). The infonnation in each detector cell is readily available; this analysis however concentrates under NCT on an evaluation of the dose rates at the package surface, and at dis-tances of 1m and of 2 m from the external surface of the package. For the HAC a distance of 1 m from the package surface is addressed. Besides this geometry-independent mesh of detectors, separate volumetric detectors are modelled in order to control the calculation process.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-10
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Figure 5.3-8 Detector raster (mesh tallylng) 5.3.2 Material Properties
- Compositions and densities of the materials used in the shielding model are presented in Table 5.3-1. For the moderator rods two densities are given, the nominal one for the shielding configura-tion shortly after loading, and the low one for the equilibrium configuration. The steel specification for the retention ring ( ) is very similar to that of the , for this reason no new material has been introduced.
The materials in Table 5.3-1 are arranged from inside to outside.
For the moderator material the temperature effects are studied as discussed in section 5.1.1.2.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. O Page 5.3-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The design basis for the material data is given in section 2.2.1.
5.3 Shielding Model Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.3-1 Material properties In the shielding model
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5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.3-1 Material properties in the shieldlng model (continued)
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5.3 Shielding Model Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 5.3-1 Material properties In the shielding model (continued}
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List of References
[1] NUREG-2224, Dry Storage and Transportation of High Bum up Spent Fuel (Draft for Comment), Washington, DC, July 2018 5.3 Shielding Model Section 5.3, Rev. 0 Page 5.3-15
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1014--SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.4.1 Methods As discussed in section 5.3 the MCNP6 code is used for the shielding analysis. The cross section data are based on ENDF/8-VII data. The MCNP code system is benchmarked against experi-mental data for a broad spectrum of gamma [1] and neutron [2] problems. Described shielding problems cover a wide range of energies and material compositions and involve both scattering and deep penetration. A good agreement between measured and calculated values has been demonstrated for all the validation scenarios.
The dose rates are calculated using volumetric mesh tallies (f4), multiplied by an appropriate flux-
. to-dose-rate conversion factor, heavy metal mass of the SNF in the shielding model (see section 5.3.1.1 ), and by the total source strength (per megagram heavy metal) for every radiation source term. Since the mesh is stretched around the entire geometry of the package, the locations of dose rate maxima are determined explicitly. Its use also allows for the evaluation of the wrapping dose rate distributions.
The NCT and HAC calculations are performed separately for six position groups introduced in Fig-ure 5.0-1. The elementary external dose rates from different position groups, folded with corre-sponding sources and superposed, allow for the evaluation of an arbitrary loading pattern provided it consists of no more than six position groups. In this evaluation, the loading patterns TR1 to TR3 are assessed.
Each set of the MCNP calculations is foreseen with a message digest (md5) providing its unique identification.
5.4.2 Input and Output Data Sample MCNP input files used to compute external dose rates, one for gamma radiation (NCT) und one for neutrons (HAC), are shown in Appendix 5-4. The output files being too large in size to be printed are presented in a shortened form (Appendix 5-5).
5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 5.4.3 Flux-to-Dose-Rate Conversion The conversion of the values calculated with MCNP for the spectral neutral and gamma flux densi-ty to the ambient equivalent dose is performed with the flux-to-dose-rate conversion factors accord-ing to ANSI/ANS-6.1 .1-1977 [3]. The conversion factors are exhibited in Table 5.4-1 and Table 5.4-2 for gamma radiation and neutrons, respectively.
Table 6.4-1 Conversion factors for gamma radiation Conversion Coefficient Conversion Coefficient Gamma Energy, Gamma Energy, (lncludlng Quallty Factor), (lncludlng Quality Factor),
MeV MeV mSv/h/(y/cm2 -s) mSv/h/(ylcm 2-s) 0.01 3.96E-05 1.4 2.51E-05 0 03 5.82E-06 1.8 2.99E-05 0.05 2.90E-06 2.2 3.42E-05 0.07 2 58E-06 2.6 3.82E-05 0.1 2.83E-06 2.8 4.01E-05 0.15 3.79E-06 3.25 4.41 E-05 0.2 5.01E-06 3.75 4.83E-05 0.25 6.31E-06 4.25 5.23E-05 0.3 7.59E-06 4.75 5.60E-05 0.35 8.78E-06 5 5.80E-05 04 9.85E-06 5.25 6.01E-05 0.45 1.08E-05 5 75 6 37E-05 0.5 1.17E-05 6.25 6.74E-05 0.55 1.27E-05 6.75 7.11E-05 0.6 1.36E-05 7.5 7.66E-05 0.65 1.44E-05 9 8.77E-05 07 1.52E-05 11 1.03E-04 0.8 1.68E-05 13 1.18E-04 1 1.98E-05 15 1.33E-04 5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2 390 Table 6.4-2 Conversion factors for neutrons Conversion Coefficient Neutron Energy, (lncludlng Quality Factor),
MeV mSv/h/(n/cm 2*s) 2.50E-08 3.67E-05 1.00E-07 3.67E-05 1.00E-06 4.46E-05 1.00E-05 4.54E-05 1.00E-04 4 18E--05 1.00E--03 3.76E-05 0.01 3.56E--05 0.1 2.17E-04 0.5 9.26E-04 1 1.32E--03 2.5 1.25E-03 5 1.56E--03 7 1.47E--03 10 1.47E-03 14 2.0BE--03 20 2.27E-03 6.4.4 External Radiation Levels The external radiation levels calculated with MCNP for each individual detector are modified by the corresponding statistical uncertainties provided by MCNP in the same tally. Thereby, instead of using a Gaussian error propagation, two standard deviations of MCNP are conservatively added to every single tallied value (penalising error propagation).
It is found that all the dose rates are below the regulatory limits assuming transport under exclusive use.
6.4.4.1 Normal Conditions of Transport Table 5.4-3 through Table 5.4-5 provides the maximum external dose rates for three loading pat-terns assuming the packaging shortly after loading (cold model). The moderator material is at room temperature. The md5 of these calculations is 3ce64279a9e39bda7b877b207245d4a6. The uncer-tainties from the penalising error propagation are included.
The dose rate distributions on the bottom and lid sides of the package are not spectacular with a maximum on the middle axis of the cask (independent on the loading pattern). The absolute values 5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 are very low compared to the shell side of the package (a few µSv/h on the surface), so that the normally occupied location, e.g. by the vehicle driver, anticipated on the lid side of the package does not come in the nearness of the dose rate limit.
The dose rate limit at 1 m from the surface of the package is exceeded for all three loading pat-terns (bounding sources), which hints on the exclusiveness of the transportation. The dose rate limit for all loading patterns is much more exploited at 2 m from the surface of the package com-pared to its surface.
The dose rate distributions on the surface of the package are shown in Figure 5.4-1.
Assuming the radiation from fuel only, the maximum of the dose rate is observed close to the mid-plane of the package.
The dose rate distribution at 2 m from the sur-face of the package does not reveal any irregularities, and the maximum is observed as expected close to mid-plane of the package {see Figure 5.4-2).
During the calculations, we adjust the run time of the particle transport so that the resulting statisti-cal uncertainties do not exceed 2 % at any point 2 m from the surface of the package. It is typically sufficient to guarantee a reasonable uncertainty on the surface of the package as well. Figure 5.4-3 displays fractional standard deviations of the calculated dose rates on the surface of package (see Figure 5.4-3, left) and in 2 m from the surface of the package (see Figure 5.4-3, right).
The dose rate distributions for other two loading patterns (TR2 and TR3) do not exhibit any particu-larities and are quite similar in shape (see Figure 5.4-4 for TR2 and Figure 5.4-5 for TR3).
5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-5
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Table 5.4-4 Maximum external dose rates for the cold shielding model under NCT (TR2)
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1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.4-6 Maximum external dose rates for the cold shleldlng model under NCT (TR3)
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5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 5.4-1 Dose rate distributions (TR1, cold model) at the surface of the package in mSv/h: total (top left), neutron (top right), fuel gamma (bottom left), and hard-ware gamma (bottom right) 5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 6.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 5.4-2 Dose rate distribution (TR1, cold model) at 2 m from the surface of the cask in
' mSv/h
[Propnetary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 5.4-3 Fractional standard deviation distributions at the surface of the package (left) and in 2 m from the package surface (right) for the cold shleldlng model (TR1) 5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.4-4 Dose rate distribution (TR2, cold model) at 2 m from the surface of the cask In mSv/h (left) and the corresponding fractional standard deviation (right)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 5.4-6 Dose rate distribution (TR3, cold model) at 2 m from the surface of the cask in mSv/h (left) and the corresponding fractional standard deviation (right)
Table 5.4-6 through Table 5.4-8 provides the maximum external dose rates for the packaging un-der regular operating conditions with an attained thermal equilibrium (hot shielding model, md5:
c8be18d5a42090e628472ac14ac9016e). The moderator material Is at maximum temperature with corresponding reduced density and expanded dimensions. As previously, all the maximum dose rates are revealed on the shell side of the package.
As before, the TR1 generates the highest dose rates among all loading patterns.
5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The dose rate distributions from the hot shielding model are fairly similar to those from the cold one, and are therefore not presented here.
Table 6.4-6 Maximum external dose rates for the hot shlelding model under NCT (TR1)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 5.4-7 Maximum external dose rates for the hot shlelding model under NCT (TR2)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0
~~Page 5.4-11~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.4-8 Maximum external dose rates for the hot shielding model under NCT (TR3)
[Propnetary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The fuel failur~ under NCT is evaluated for-TR1 only, Two cases are considered: the rubble at the canister bottom with weaker shielding capability of the package due to the bottom trunnion flattenings (md5:
c8be18d5a42090e628472ac14ac9016e, see Table 5.4-9) and the rubble close to the canister lid also in an area with a weaker shielding performance - the rubble Is positioned where the maximum effect is expected (md5: 5032019148e03514e5723435a22d2688, see Table 5.4-10). The relevant face side dose rates are given in brackets. .
The reconfiguration is considered for transportation packages shipped after 20 years of storage [4],
- therefore the bounding source is adjusted so that the minimum cooling time is not smaller than 20 years.
The redistribution of the fuel does not affect the shell dose rate in a negative way. The maximum dose rates (at the surface of the package and 2 m from the surface of the package) are lower than those from the failure unaffected shielding models.
Contrary to this, the face sides of the package detect higher dose rates compared to the undis-turbed model.
5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.4-9 Maximum external dose rates for TR1 under NCT with 3 % fuel fallure (bottom side)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
T~ble 6.4-10 Maximum external dose rates for TR1 under NCT with 3 % fuel failure (lld side)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
6.4.4.2 Hypothetical Accident Conditions The calculated dose rates for the package under HAC are presented In Table 5.4-11 for all consid-ered loading patterns (md5: 5032019146e03514e5723435a22d2688) as well as for the complete fuel failure gathered at the bottom of the canister md5: 7cd9c76b619a881b59e6352b81dd46dd) 5.4 Shieldlng Evaluation Section 6.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @_GNS per 10 CFR2.390 and at Its top (md5: 3a37d7a168848b7 e9463f4dcebe8ad9 6). As for the NCT, the maximum dose rates for the model without fuel failure are revealed on the shell side of the package. For the mod-els with the fully failed fuel, the dose rates are given for both the shell side and for the relevant face side (bracketed) of the package.
Despite of the missing impact limiters and moderator material, the exploitation of the dose rate limit Is smaller compared to the NCT.
Table 6.4-11 Maximum external dose rates under HAC
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
List of References
[1] Daniel J. Whalen, David E. Hollowell, and John S. Hendricks, Photon Benchmark Prob-lems, LA-12196, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1991
[2] Daniel J. Whalen, David A. Cardon, Jennifer L. Uhle, and John S. Hendricks, Neutron Benchmark Problems, LA-12212, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1991
[3] American Nuclear Society. Working Group ANS-6.1.1; American National Standards Insti-tute. American national standard neutron and gamma-ray flux-tCHlose-rate factors, La Grange Park, Ill.: The Society, 19TT
[4] NUREG-2224, Dry Storage and Transportation of High Bumup Spent Fuel (Draft for Comment), Washington, DC, July 2018 5.4 Shielding Evaluation Section 5.4, Rev. 0 Page 5.4-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.5 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Appendix 5-1 Computer Program Descriptions Appendix 5-2 Valldatlon of the ORIGAMI calculatlons Appendix 6-3 Calculation Results for the Long Term Behaviour Evaluation Appendix 6-4 MCNP Sample Input Appendix 5-6 MCNP Sample Output 5.5 Appendix Section 5.5, Rev 0 Page 5.5-1
APPENDIX 5-1 to f014-SR-00001 Computer Program Description MCNP [1] is a fully three-dimensional program that describes the coupled transport of neutrons and gammas. MCNP works according to the Monte Carlo technique used to simulate the histories of individual particles from their origin to the point of their absorption or when they leave the volume of interest A sufficient number of simulated particle histories allows for the description of the resulting location and energy-dependent particle densities and other physical quantities even for complex geometry arrangements. The results of Monte Carlo simulations are expected values of physical quantities according to their stochastic nature. The Information for a specific transport problem is gained using detectors allowing for the tallying of the particle characteristics at the respective location. In this report, geometry-independent meshes of volume detectors are used, where the particle flow was determined using track length estimation.
The SCALE code system (actual work using SCALE 6.2 [21) is developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). SCALE is a modular system used for nuclear analyses and consists of the functional and control modules as well as of the nuclear cross section libraries. The cross section libraries are application dependent and can either be based on the energy groups or on the continuous energy distribution. The former ones are microscopic and have to undergo a problem and geometry specific preparation carefully handling the resonance regions. These preparations are fully automated and are controlled by the functional modules BONAMI [3] (region of not resolved resonances) and CENTRM [4] / PMC [5] (region of resolved resonances).
In the sequence with the TRITON [6] control module it is made possible to perform the analysis
of the fuel assembly transverse cross section using the two dimensional (2D) transport calculations by the NEWT [7] functional module to obtain local neutron spectra. The subsequent burn-up and decay calculations are performed by the ORIGEN-S [8] functional module. The cross sections from the 252 group libraries based on ENDF/B-Vll.1 are employed.
ORIGAMI [9] computes detailed isotopic compositions, decay heat, and gamma and neutron radiation source spectra for light water reactor assemblies containing U02 fuel by using the ORIGEN code with pre-generated libraries, for a specified assembly power distribution.
ORIGAMI performs ORIGEN bum-up calculations for each of the specified power regions to obtain the spatial distribution of isotopes In the burned fuel.
Page 1 of 2
APPENDIX 5-1 to 1014-SR-00001 List of References
[1] C.J. Werner (ed.), MCNP User's Manual - Code Version 6.2, LA-UR-17-29981, 2017
[2] SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2. B. T. Rearden, M.A. Jessee, Eds. ORNUTM-2005/39, 2017
[3] BONAM!: Resonance Self-Shielding by the Bondarenko Method in: SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2, ORNUTM-2005/39, 2017
[4] CENTRM: A Neutron Transport Code for Computing Continuous-Energy Spectra in General One-Dimensional Geometries and Two-Dimensional Lattice Cells in: SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2, ORNUTM-2005/39, 2017
[5] PMC: A Program to Produce Multigroup Cross Sections using Pointwise Energy Spectra from CENTRM in: SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2, ORNUTM-2005/39, 2017
[6] TRITON: A Multipurpose Transport, Depletion, and Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis Module in: SCALE Code System ORNUTM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017
[7] NEWT: A New Transport Algorithm for Two-Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Analysis in Non-Orthogonal Geometries in: SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2, ORNUTM-2005/39, 2017
[8] ORIG EN: Neutron Activation, Actinide Transmutation, Fission Product Generation, and Radiation Source Term Calculation in: SCALE Code System, Version 6.2.2, ORNUTM-2005/39, 2017
[9] ORIGAMI: A Code for Computing Assembly lsotopics with ORIGEN in: SCALE Code System ORNUTM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2, 2017 Page 2 of 2
APPENDIX 5-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Validation of the ORIGAMI calculations
[Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390)
Figure 1 Comparison of the TRITON and ORIGAMI bum-up and depletion calculati.ons Page 1 of 1
APPENDIX 5-3 to 1014-SR-00001 Calculation Results for the Long Tenn Behaviour Evaluatlon
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Table 1 Energy doses and neutron fluxes for different packaging components
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Page 1 of 1
APPENDIX 5-4 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 5-4 in total 20 pages Page 1 of 20
APPENDIX 5-5 to 1014-SR--00001 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 5-5 in total 2 pages Page 1 of 2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6 Critlcality Evaluation 6.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.0 Overview Section 6.0, Rev. O Page 6.0-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This chapter describes the proof of subcriticality for the content described in section 1.2.2 in accor-dance with requirements from 10 CFR71.
The maximum values for the effective neutron multiplication factor k and the calculational bias with its uncertainty llku with a 95 % probability at a 95 % confidence level fulfil the acceptance criteria k + Llku < 0.95 for all considered cask loadings and demonstrate the compliance with requirements for nom,al and hypothetical accident conditions of transport (NCT and HAC), as required by
§ 71.55 and § 71.59.
The Criticality Safety Index is zero (CSI = 0.0) due to the analysis of infinite array of densely packed casks.
6.0 Overview Section 6.0, Rev. 0 Page 6.0-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.1 Description of Crtticallty Design Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.1 Descnption of Criticality Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 6.1-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.1.1 Design Features The cask CASTO~ geo69 consists of the cylindrical canister with bolted lid system and the cask body with bolted lid system, as described in section 1.2.1. The fuel basket is designed to accom-modate of up to 69 BWR FA and is placed into the canister.
The containment system of the cask CASTO~ geo69 represents a double-barrier structure and is built by the canister body with its lid system (inner containment barrier) and the cask body with its lid system (outer containment barrier), as described in. section 1.2.1.
For ensuring the criticality safety of CASTOR~ geo69, a combination of the following design measures is used:
- limitation of the fissile content of the fuel,
- geometrical positioning of the FA within a fuel basket and
- fixed neutron absorbing structures in the fuel basket.
The following conservative assumptions are made in the criticality safety analysis:
The cask CASTOR geo69 is designed to exclude the water leakage into the canister cavity under normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport (moderator exclusion). Due to a very low reactivity of dry fuel, the cask reactivity under normal and hypothetical accident conditions is bounded by the reactivity of the fully flooded cask.
~~6. 1 Description of Criticality Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 6.1-2~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The applicable codes and standards are summarized as follows:
- 10 CFR 71,
- ISG-19 [1],
- ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 [2].
6.1.2 Summary Table of Criticality Evaluation The final results of the criticality evaluation as well as the corresponding internal and external moderation conditions are provided in the summary Table 6.1-1 for all investigated FA types (FA no.). The results are obtained under bounding conditions for NCT and HAC, as discussed in sec-tions 6.3.4 through 6.7, and include the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors k and the calculational bias with its uncertainty Llku. All contributions to the final results are determined with a 95 % probability at a 95 % confidence level, as discussed in section 6.8.2 and Appendix 6-1.
For reference purposes a unique alphanumeric identification number (calc. ID) is assigned to each calculation.
The following cases are evaluated in the criticality safety analysis:
- infinite array of flooded packages (reference case for NCD,
- single, fully reflected package (water inside and outside of the cask) according to 10 CFR 71.55(b), (d) and (e),
- infinite array of undamaged packages under NCT (void inside and outside of the cask) ac-cording to 10 CFR 71.59(a)(1),
infinite array of damaged packages under HAC (void inside and outside of the cask) according to 10 CFR 71.59(a)(2).
6.1 Description of Cnticality Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 6.1-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Infonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.1-1 Summary table of criticallty evaluatJon lnflnlta array of flooded Slngle, fully reflected Infinite array Caae packages package of undamaged/damaged (bounding model for NCT) (NCT) packages (NCT/HAC)
Internal FA no. 100% 100% 0%
moderation External 0% 100% 0%
moderation Fuet type k+Aku calc. ID k+Aku calc.lD k+Aku calc. ID 1 GE 8x8-1 0.84386 20IZ09ny02 0.84387 20hr09qR02 0.35051 20E~
2 GE 8x8-2 0.85061 20da09vS02 0.85034 20bM09JV'02 0.34374 ~N09a/J02 3 SPC 8x8-2 0.84625 20rq00TJ02 0.84629 20AV091Y02 0.33861 20DB09dw02 4 GE98 8x8 0.88137 20U09Vo02 0.88145 20ed09nP02 0 36399 20JJOQzw02 5 GE12 LUA 0.90514 20Xb09e!02 0.90527 20Np09QB02 0.39113 20la08IJ02 6 ATRIUM-10A 0.93729 20nSO!IIZ02 0.93725 20U09eS02 0.42457 201dl9gn02 As provided in Table 6.1-1, the results demonstrate the compliance with requirements for NCT and HAC, as required by § 71.55 and § 71.59.
6.1.3 Criticality Safety Index The criticality safety analysis is performed for an infinite array of densely packed casks, i. e. the Criticality Safety Index is zero (CSI = 0.0).
List of References
[1] Interim Staff Guidance - 19, "Moderator Exclusion under hypothetical Accident Conditions and Demonstrating Subcriticality of Spent Fuel under the Requirements of 10 CFR 71.55(e)"
[2] ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014: Nuclear Criticality Safety In Operations with Fissile Material Outside Reactors.
6.1 Description of Criticality Design Section 6.1, Rev. 0 Page 6.1-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2 390 6.2 Fissile Material Content Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.2 Fissile Material Content Section 6.2, Rev. 0 Page 6.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The criticality safety analysis is performed for the content described in section 1.2.2. The calcula-tion model takes upper limits for the use of unirradiated fissile material (max. fuel density, max. fuel enrichment) in the FA into account. All investigated fuel types are in a solid metal dioxide form (UO2).
6.2 Fissile Material Content Section 6.2, Rev. 0 Page 6.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Propnetary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.3 General Considerations Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This section addresses the assessment methodology used to evaluate criticality of the package.
The CASTOR geo69 cask is designed for the accommodation of different types of BWR spent FA.
To take a large number of relevant model parameters into account, for example the fabrication tolerances and the uncertainties in material compositions of FA or basket structures, the calcula-tions of the neutron multiplication factors are performed using bounding models.
The analyzed FA represent square-pitched lattices of fuel rods. The qualitatively same impact of some model parameters on the system reactivity for all FA no. can be assumed. For example, the decrease of the moderator density or the increase of the absorber concentration in the fuel basket structures will reduce the reactivity of all FA no.
However, the distinctions of different FA no. lead to quantitative differences in reactivity impact of the same model parameter, i.e. the criticality calculations must be performed for each FA type and each cask loading pattern separately. For such calculations the same set of conservative model parameters can be applied.
Based on these assumptions, bounding calculation models (bounding models) for NCT and HAG are derived as described below and shown in Figure 6.3-1 Basic Bounding Bounding model model for NCT model for HAG Figure 6.3-1 Development of bounding models The bounding model for NCT is determined using sensitivity analyses based on a basic calculation model (basic model), as described in section 6.3.4.1. The basic model is based on the package and content descriptions from section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 and contains either nominal, representative or expected to be bounding values for geometry, material compositions and densities of the cask, fuel basket and inventory.
Based on this basic model sensitivity analyses are performed for a full homogeneous cask loading with a reference FA (ATRIUM-10A) only, as described in section. 6.3.4.1 The sensitivity analyses bound all fabrication tolerances, uncertainties In material compositions, axial and radial FA dis-placements within the basket receptacles as well as optimal moderation conditions. The effect of a variation of a certain parameter is described as a deviation (D.k in pcm, I.e. 1Q-6) of the calculated k-value to the k-value of the basic model. If the variation of a certain parameter leads for the refer-ence FA to an increase in reactivity, the same behavior can be expected for all the other FA no.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-2
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. per 10 CFR2.390 The corresponding basic model of each FA no. is then adapted according to the possible tolerance range of this parameter.
With the above mentioned approach a bounding model for NCT for each FA no. is developed. The bounding model for NCT is described in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.
On the basis of this bounding model for NCT additional proof of its conservativity as well as anal-yses concerning the package behavior under HAC are usually performed leading for each FA no.
to a bounding model for HAC. The proof of the conservatlvity of the bounding model for NCT is provided in section 6.3.6. As the damage of the cask wall and bottom as well as the loose of integ-rity of the cask and canister lid systems under HAC are excluded, as shown in [1] and section 2.7 the bounding model for HAC is identical (except for inner moderation condition) to the bounding 9 model for NCT, described in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.
Based on the bounding model for NCT the compliance with the requirements of § 71.55 and
§ 71.59 is demonstrated in sections 6.4 through 6. 7.
Every possible mixed loading of the cask with FA no. for which safe subcriticality can be demon-strated is bounded by the maximum effective neutron multiplication factor k of a full homogeneous cask loading with one of these FA no.
6.3.1 Model Configuration In the bounding calculation model for NCT the cylindrical canister and cask body with the corre-sponding bottom and top (lid system) structures are considered. The model represents an infinite array of densely packed and fully flooded casks. The volume outside the casks is filled with void.
The calculation model does not include an explicit consideration of neither the sealing system nor other outer parts, e. g. moderator rods inside the cask body, cooling fins, trunnions or impact limit-ers, as well as the axial gaps between the canister and the cask.
The radial and axial cross sections of the bounding model for NCT are shown in Figure 6.3-2 and Figure 6.3-3.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-3
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Figure 6.3-2 Radial cross section of the bounding model for NCT 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page6.~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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Figure 6.3-3 Axial cross section of the bounding model for NCT 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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Figure 6.3-4 Cross sections of the analyzed FA 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
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Figure 6.3-5 Radial cross section of the bounding model for NCT for a homogeneous full cask load Ing with ATRl~M-1 OA 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-6 Axial cross section of the bounding model for NCT for a homogeneous full cask loadlng with the ATRIUM-10A Comparing to the basic model used as a starting point for the development of the bounding model for NCT, as described in section 6.3.4.1, the following modifications are incorporated in the bound-ing model for NCT (cf. section 6.3.5):
- bounding material densities and compositions,
- maximum clad inner diameter,
- minimum clad outer diameter,
- minimum inner dimension of basket receptacles, radial displacement of all FA towards the center of the fuel basket.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.3.2 Material Properties The bounding material densities and compositions are detennined using the sensitivity analysis, as described in section 6.3.4.1, and are listed in Table 6.3-1 and Table 6.3-2.
The fuel basket contains fIXed neutron absorbing structures (boronated basket sheets). The pres-ence and the proper distribution of boron in the basket sheets at time of fabrication are ensured by quality measures. Loss of absorber material as a result of physical, chemical and corrosive mech-anisms can be excluded according to chapter 2.
The Loss of absorber material through direct neutron absorption (and, thus, transmutation to a non-absorbing isotope) is inconsequential because any measurable depletion would take millions
~~of years of routine operation as a result of the extremely low neutron flux levels in a subcritical sys-tem.~~
6.3.3 Computer Code and Cross-Section Libraries The criticality calculations for the CASTOR geo69 are perfonned using the 3-dimensional Monte-Carlo program KENO-VI from the SCALE 6.2 code package [2]. The neutron multiplication factors are calculated using the 252-group neutron cross sections based on the ENDF/8-Vll.1 evaluation (V7.1-252n, T = 293 K).
In the criticality calculations the number of neutron generations with 20,000 neutrons per genera-tion as well as the number of first neutron generations to be skipped is chosen in such a way, that the standard deviation of the calculated neutron multiplication factors is below 20 pcm.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-9
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld per 10 CFR2.390 The criticality safety analysis as well as the validation of the used calculation system, i.e. the Mon-te-Carlo program together with the cross-section library, is performed under the same or compara-ble boundary conditions.
6.3.4 Demonstration of Maximum Reactivity Based on the basic model, the sensitMty analysis for the full cask loading with the most reactive FA type (ATRIUM-1OA) is performed and bounding models for NCT and HAC are derived, as de-scribed in section 6.3.
6.3.4.1 Development of Bounding Model for NCT
~~The sensitMty analysis for the development of the bounding model for NCT includes the following evaluations:~~
- material densities and compositions,
- pellet diameter,
- length of active zone,
- clad inner and outer diameter,
- thickness of FA internals,
- inner and outer dimensions of FA channel,
- axial and radial displacement 0ncluding clustering) of FA,
- axial position of part-length fuel rods,
- FA orientation within basket receptacles,
- temperature,
- dimension of basket receptacles,
- thickness of basket sheets,
- thickness of outer sheets,
- canister dimensions,
- radial displacement of canister within the cask cavity,
- outer boundary conditions for the cask,
- partial vertical and horizontal flooding of the cask cavity,
- moderator rod material in the cask wall, 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-10
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- shielding element structure.
The results of the analysis are presented in sections 6.3.4.1.1 to 6.3.4.1.22.
6.3.4.1.1 Material Densities and Compositions 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-11
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.3-1 Detennlnation of materlal densities for bounding model
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6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.3-2 Determination of material compositions for bounding model
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6.3.4.1.2 Pellet Diameter The pellet diameter is parametrically varied within a range of -200 µm/+150 µm at a fixed fuel den-sity of The results given in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 show no statistically significant influence of this pa-rameter on the reactivity.
As a result, no changes need to 1,?e considered in the bounding model.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.3.4.1.3 Length of Active Zone The length of the active zone is parametrically varied between +/-20 mm, that corresponds to a height of about two single fuel pellets. The results provided in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 show no statistically significant influence of this parameter on the reactivity.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.4 Clad Inner and Outer Diameter The clad inner diameter is varied between -150 µm/+200 µm; the clad outer diameter between
+/-200 µm. The results for both variations are given in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9. It can be seen that the clad thickness has a significant influence on the reactivity.
As a result, the maximum inner and minimum outer clad diameters are considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.6 Thickness of Water Channel The thickness of the water channel of the reference FA (ATRIUM-10A) is parametrically varied by the variation of the outer channel dimension between +/-200 µm at a fixed inner channel dimension.
The results given in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 show a significant increase of reactivity at smaller thicknesses of the water channel.
As a result, the minimum thicknesses of the FA internals, as already implemented in the basic model, are considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.6 Inner and Outer Dimensions of FA Channel The inner and outer dimensions of the FA channel are separately varied between +/-200 µm, result-
- ing in a variation of the wall thickness of the FA channel. The results of criticality calculations are given in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9. It can be seen that the wall thickness of the FA channel has no statistically significant influence of the reactMty.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.7 Axial Dlsplacement of FA The axial displacement of the FA is varied between +/-40 mm. The results provided in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 show no significant influence on reactivity.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-14
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 6.3.4.1.8 Radlal Displacement of FA The reactMty impact of the radial displacement of the FA within the fuel basket is parametrically investigated via simultaneous shift of all FA towards the basket center or towards the basket periphery The results of these calculations are shown in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9. It can be seen that the displacement towards the basket center leads to significant increase of reactivity.
As a result, the maximum possible displacements of the FA towards the basket center are consid-ered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.9 Clustering Additionally to the radial displacement of all FA towards the basket center or the basket periphery, as discussed in section 6.3.4.1.8, the building of FA conglomerates (clustering) within the fuel bas-ket is investigated. The selected configuration is shown in Figure 6.3-7 and results in the significant decrease of reactivity (see Table 6.3-3) comparing to the reference (basic) model with FA centered within the basket receptacles.
As a result, the maximum possible displacements of the FA towards the basket center are consid-ered in the bounding model, as discussed in section 6.3.4.1.8.
Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-7 FA clustering 6.3.4.1.10 Axlal Position of Part-Length Fuel Rods The axial position of the part-length fuel rods is varied up to 40 mm beginning at the lower edge of the full-length fuel rods. The results presented in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 indicate the reactivi-ty decrease by the axial shift of the part-length fuel rods towards the center of the active zone.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-15
1014--SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 As a result, no axial displacement of the part-length fuel rods, as already implemented in the basic model, Is considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.11 FA Orientation within Basket Receptacles During the basket loading with FA different orientations of FA internals (water rods/channeQ rela-tive to the neighboring FA are possible. This effect Is Investigated via the fuel lattice rotation of 90°,
180° and 270° for exemplary selected FA in the calculation model. The investigated configuration is presented in Figure 6.3-8 and shows no statistically significant influence (see Table 6.3-3) of the FA orientation within the basket receptacles on the reactivity.
As a result, the same orientation of all FA, as already implemented in the basic model, is consid-ered in the bounding model.
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-8 FA orientation 6.3.4.1.12 Temperature The temperature of structure materials is parametrically varied between O °C and 170 °C. The re-sults presented in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 confirm the reactivity decrease by increased tem-perature due to the Doppler broadening.
As a result, the room temperature (20 °C), as already implemented in the basic model, Is consid-ered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.13Dlmenslon of Basket Receptacles The inner dimension of the basket receptacles is parametrically varied within the possible tolerance range between at a fixed thickness of the basket sheets. The results provided in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 show significant reactMty Increase by decreased basket receptacles.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-16
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 As a result, the minimum possible inner dimension Is applied to all basket receptacles in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.14 Th lckness of Basket Sheets The thickness of borated aluminium sheets of the basket is parametrically increased up to As shown in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9, increased thickness of the basket sheets leads to the significant decrease of reactivity.
As a result, the minimum possible thickness of the basket sheets, as already implemented in the basic model, is considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.16 Thickness of Outer Sheets The thickness of the outer basket sheets is parametrically Increased up to . The results given in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 show no statistically significant influence of this parameter on the reactivity.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.16 Canister Dimensions The reactivity impact of the canister dimensions, such as inner and outer diameter (I.D. and O.D.)
as well as the wall thickness (T), is investigated via calculations for all possible combinations of minimum and maximum parameter values. The results are provided in Table 6.3-3 and confirm that the parameter set implemented in the basic model (maximum O.D. and n Is conservative.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.17 Radial Dis placement of Canister The radial displacement of the canister within the cask cavity is investigated via canister shift to-wards the cask wall. The result is provided in Table 6.3-3 and shows no influence of the radial can-ister position on the reactivity.
As a result, the canister cent~red within the cask cavity, as already implemented in the basic mod-el, Is considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.18 Outer Boundary Conditions The outer boundary conditions, such as external moderation and reflection, are evaluated for a single cask as well as for an Infinite array of similar densely packed casks. For a single cask, the full reflection is achieved by surrounding the cask with 20 cm water reflector. The results of the investigations with and without external moderation (water or void) are shown in Table 6.3-3. It can be seen that the external moderation has no impact on the reactMty due to the thick cask wall.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-17
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 As a result, an infinite array of similar, densely packed casks without external moderator, as al-ready implemented in the basic model, Is considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.19 Partial Flood Ing of the Cask The partial flooding of the cask Is investigated for the vertical and horizontal orientations of the cask. The results for both orientations are given in Table 6.3-3 and Figure 6.3-9 and indicate that the fully flooded condition is most conservative.
As a result, the fully flooded cask cavity with water (p = 1.0 g/cm 3), as already implemented in the basic model, is considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.20 Moderator Rod Material The impact of the moderator rod materia*1 as well as of the corresponding boreholes on the reactivi-ty is investigated. The results are given in Table 6.3-3 and indicate that the neglecting the mode-rator material and replacing it by the material of the cask body (cast iron) is most conservative.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.21 Shleldlng Element Structure The reactivity impact of the drain support in one shielding element is investigated. The results are given in Table 6.3-3 and indicate that the neglecting the drain support and replacing it by the mate-rial of the shielding element (aluminium) is most conservative.
As a result, no changes need to be considered in the bounding model.
6.3.4.1.22 Summary Results of Sensitivity Analysls The results of the sensitivity calculations described in the previous sections are summarized in Table 6.3-3 and presented in Figure 6.3-9.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. O Page 6.3-18
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.3-3 Summary results of the sensitivity analysis FA no. 6 FA no. 6 k-value for basic model 20dr09cc03 k-value for basic model 20dr09cc03 variation Lik,pcm calc. ID variation Ak, pcm calc. ID Pellet diameter, ~ In µm Thickness of water channel, ~ in µm
-200 -75 20ln09oF03 -200 66 20BC09Zb03
-150 -30 20un09uS03 -150 64 20ZW09cK03
-100 -41 20WZ09nh03 -100 13 20vx09FJ03
-50 -15 20aJ09fw03 -50 13 20TC09LA03 0 0 20Sx09IF03 0 0 20rJ09Jb03 50 12 20Rm09fs03 50 -46 20YJ09vu03 100 -9 20Xv09ra03 100 -51 20RM09r203 150 36 20xK09Vg03 150 -71 20ho09Py03 Length of active zone, ~ In mm 200 -86 20yJ09Fb03
-20 8 200to9zS03 Inner dimension of FA channel, ~ in µm
-15 10 20WF09aQ03 -200 -28 20HW09KZ03
-10 -2 20cH09Cy03 -150 1 20ee09xg03
-5 -34 20mw09o.Y03 -100 15 20RN09vw03 0 0 20hr09qH03 -50 -36 20k009QD03 5 -6 20a009do03 0 0 20Sz09vW03 10 3 20MU09h003 50 -5 20AZ09tW03 15 -21 20yX09zr03 100 -14 20Fl09qe03 20 -31 20So09UA03 150 -39 20MI09mK03 Clad inner diameter, ~ in µm 200 -29 20JT09PF03
-150 -452 20YL09eg03 Outer drmension of FA channel, ~ In µm
-100 -339 20Pk09nU03 -200 -22 200009F003
-50 -170 20MR09KC03 -150 -25 20Vz09ap03 0 0 20Gz09tK03 -100 -6 20yW09yN03 50 168 20yt090w03 -50 21 20Cf09CN03 100 272 20gT09vt03 0 0 20vJ09AI03 150 474 20hd09Py03 50 37 2out09wv03 200 625 20xU09cC03 100 31 20Rz09FI03 Clad outer diameter, ~ In l.lll1 150 -1 20yB09bg03
-200 759 20GE09hl03 200 -5 20EB09cR03
-150 583 20v009Jo03 Axial displacement of FA, ~ in mm
-100 333 20nR0BZP03 -40 -6 20x009kv03
-50 222 200Q09kK03 -30 -17 20wM09E003 0 0 20ES09h 03 -20 12 20pc09yn03 50 -207 20Sn09oe03 -10 -30 20y009HL03 100 -370 20Ww09qY03 0 0 20ol/-.'09Rl03 150 -613 20aG09kN03 10 -20 20U09TN03 200 -760 20XV091Y03 20 -47 20pX09qY03 30 15 20IW09Bo03 40 9 20a209XJ03 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-19
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.3-3 Summary results of the sensitivity analysis (continued}
Radial dlsolacement of F.A ti.. In mm Thickness of outer sheets ti.. in mm 510 20s0098103 0 2out09la03 459 20X009Xb03 -4 20Rt09xV03 413 20jJ09YW03 7 20sY09rg03 354 20Jz090o03 -2 20bf09LL03 273 20mU09JY()3 -27 20mJ09y\oV03 152 20vz09EF03 5 20fU09ol-l03 0 20hd09rU03 Canister dimensions, mm
-135 20el09ST03 -248 20zE09by03
-336 20Ee09Pg03 -47 20jv09Ba03
-519 20Nn09fU03 26 20ih09lf03
-739 20xe09uW03 0 20Jv09P:J03
-967 20HE09KN03 Radial displacement of canister
-1359 20tQ09jA03 to the cask wall -24 20aL09cq03 Axial position of part-lencr , fuel rods ti.. in mm Outer boundary condibons 0 0 20RJ09vC03 Array, ext mod. 0 % 0 20wm09SY03 5 -7 20Py09oN03 Array, ext mod. 100 % 4 20Wi09TH03 10 -33 20uF09Jx03 Single, ext. mod. 100 % -8 20Mr09LJ03 15 -70 201o098Y03 Sinale ext mod. O % -39 20pE09xn03 I
20 -78 20rZ09At.()3 Partial floodinQ (vertical), ti.. In cm 25 -85 20ly09pr03 -200 -619 20UM09uz03 30 -145 200X091..P03 -150 -405 20Pb09Kz03 35 -118 20ts09cK03 -100 -193 20zN09RC03 40 -120 20JH09eK03 -90 -164 20Yo09nW03 FA orientation within basket receptacles -80 -80 20Hd09Uc03 Clustering -235 20ek09Fc03 -70 -23 20qo09Jv03 Rotation 19 20SY09XK03 -60 29 20IA09eP03 Material temoerarure *c -50 5 2CNA09ro03 0 -12 20nN09E!03 -40 -32 20Jd09sJ03 10 -36 20Jx09CU03 -30 17 20SR090W03 20 0 20IJ09X....OO -20 31 20ab09at03 30 -124 20xv09pl03 -10 0 20cd09aw03 40 -253 20oR09DF03 0 0 20rt09gh03 70 -483 20MH09B003 Partial flooding (horizontal , number of dry FA rows 120 -1034 20Gr09xg03 0 0 20k009BF03 170 -1490 20Fq09vG03 1 -230 20Jx09MZ03 Dimension of basket race :rtacles. !J.. In mm 2 -474 20OH09eX03 179 20SD09Wf03 3 -918 20Fy09Vy03 0 20oK09za03 4 -1523 20yt09LW03
-214 20m09KB03 5 -2463 20sR09TV03
-368 20WN09UL03 Moderator rod materlal
-563 20ZY09dl03 Neglected 0 20JQ09jl03 Thickness of basket sheets ti.. in mm PE -189 20Fc09va03 0 20EZ09ED03 Vold 12 20h09CF03
-136 20Rm09NM03 Water -236 20hl09FS03
-224 20ar00Dj03 Shielding element strucb.Jre
-315 20XV09Jv03 Drain suaaort -61 20JI09UQ03
~ 20G109Ao03
-551 20F~OC03 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-20
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-9 Graphical representation of the summary results 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6 3-21
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2 390
[Propnetary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-9 Graphical representation of the summary results (continued) 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-22
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.3.6 Results for Bounding Model for NCT As discussed in section 6.3.4, the following conservative assumptions for the basic model are con-firmed:
- fully flooded gap between fuel pellet and clad,
- nominal pellet diameter,
- nominal length of the active zone,
- minimum thickness of FA internal structures,
- nomirial dimensions of FA channel,
- nominal axial position of FA,
- axial position of part-length fuel rods beginning at the lower edge of the active zone,
- same orientation of all FA within the basket receptacles,
- nominal temperature,
- nominal thickness of basket sheets,
- nominal thickness of outer sheets,
- maximum canister outer diameter with maximum wall thickness,
- no radial displacement of canister within the cask,
- void outside the cask (external moderation O %),
- infinite array of densely packed casks,
- fully flooded cask (internal moderation 100 %),
- - neglected moderator rods and sheets,
- neglected drain support in the shielding element.
Based on the sensitivity analysis in section 6.3.4, the following changes are applied to the basic model to develop the bounding model for NCT:
- bounding material densities and compositions,
- maximum clad inner diameter,
- minimum clad outer diameter,
- minimum inner dimension of basket receptacles,
- radial displacement of all FA towards the center of the fuel basket.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-23
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The criticality calculations using the bounding model for NCT are performed for all analyzed FA.
The results are summarized in Table 6.3-4 and include the maximum effective neutron multipli-cation factors k and the calculational bias with its uncertainty Llku. All contributions to the final re-sults are determined with a 95 % probability at a 95 % confidence level, as discussed in sec-tion 6.8.2 and Appendix 6-1 A sample input file for the bounding model for NCT with the FA of type ATRIUM-10A is provided in Appendix 6-2.
Table 6.3-4 Results for the bounding model for NCT Infinite array of flooded Case packages (bounding model for NCT)
Internal FA no. 100%
moderation External 0%
moderation Fuel type k+Aku calc. ID 1 GE 8:x8-1 0.84386 20IZ09ny02 2 GE 8x8-2 0.85061 20da09vS02 3 SPC 8x8-2 0.84625 20rq091J02 4 GE9B 8x8 0.88137 201109\/002 6 GE12 LUA 0.90514 20Xb09el02 6 ATRIUM-10A 0.93729 20nS09hZ02 6.3.6 Proof of Conservatlvtty of the Bounding Model for NCT Additional evaluations as a proof the conservativity of the bounding model for NCT is based on this model and includes:
- partial cask loading,
- planar fuel enrichment The results of the analysis are presented in sections 6.3.6.1 and 6.3.6.2.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-24
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Infonnatlon wtthheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.3.6.1 Partlal Cask Loading The impact of different empty basket positions on the reactivity is evaluated. The Investigated sin-gle empty basket positions (No. 6, 9, 32, 49, 51, 63, 64 and 69) are radially distributed within the fuel basket, as shown in Figure 6.3-10. The results of these different calculations are given in Ta-ble 6.3-5 and Figure 6.3-11 and confirm that the full cask loading is conservative.
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-10 Evaluated empty basket positions Table 6.3-5 Evaluation results for the partlal cask loadlng FA no. 6 k-value for NCT model 0.93032 20Xg09mz04 variation Ak, pcm calc. ID Number of empty basket position 12 -93 20fn09oF03 19 -409 20un09uS03 27 -1002 2Wfl09nh03 35 -1463 20aJ09fw03 36 -1197 20Sx091F03 37 -741 20Rm09fs03 38 -415 20Xv09ra03 39 -168 20xl<09Vg03 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-25
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 500 E
~~8. -500 o~~
~
~~E-1000 ~~~
~
,II:
<I
-1500 ...
-2){)0 0 10 20 30 40 50 Number of empty basket position Figure 6.3-11 Graphical representation of results for the partial cask loading 4lt 6.3.6.2 Planar Fuel Enrichment 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-26
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
Figure 6.3-12 Cross section of the fuel lattice and the group numbers (Group no.)
with different enrichments In the generic model Table 6.3-6 Investigated enrichment distributions
[Proprietary Information wrthheld per 10 CFR2.390]
The results of criticality calculations given in Table 6.3-7 and Figure 6.3-13 and confirm that the use of the planar-averaged uniform enrichment is conservative.
6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. 0 Page 6.3-27
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.3-7 Evaluatfon results for the planar fuel enrichment
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2 390]
Figure 6.3-13 Graphlcal representation of results for the planar fuel enrichment
- List of References
[1] ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014: Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissile Material Outside Reactors.
[2] B. T. Rearden and M.A. Jessee, Eds.
SCALE Code System, ORNL/TM-2005/39, Version 6.2.2 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (2017)
Available from Radiation Safety Information Computational Center as CCC-834 6.3 General Considerations Section 6.3, Rev. O Page 6.3-28
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.4 Single Package Evaluation Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.4 Single Package Evaluation Section 6.4, Rev. 0 Page 6.4-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.4.1 ConflguratJon The evaluations of the single package and the single containment are requested by § 71.55. As the outer containment barrier is built by the cask body and cask lid system, no separate analysis for the single containment according to § 71.55 is necessary.
The evaluation model incorporates the following changes comparing to the bounding model for NCT, described in section 6.3:
- single, fully reflected package: single fully flooded package surrounded with 20 cm water re-flector.
As the water leakage into the canister cavity under NCT and HAC is excluded, the configurations for a single package under NCT and HAC are bounded by the corresponding single fully flooded and fully reflected package, as described above.
6.4.2 Results The criticality calculations are perfonned for all analyzed FA. The results are summarized in Table 6.4-1 and include the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors k and the calculational bias with its uncertainty Liku. All contributions to the final results are determined with a 95 % probability at a 95 % confidence level, as discussed in section 6.8.2 and Appendix 6-1.
The results show that the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors including the calcula-tional bias with its uncertainty fulfil the acceptance criteria k + Llku < 0.95 for all investigated cask
- loadings and demonstrate the compliance with the requirements of§ 71.55.
6.4 Single Package Evaluation Section 6.4, Rev. 0 Page 6.4-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.4-1 Results for the single package evaluation Single, fully reflected Case package (Ncn Internal FA no. 100%
moderation External 100%
moderation Fuel type k+Aku calc. ID 1 GE 8x8-1 0.84387 20tv09qR02 2 GE 8x8-2 0.85034 20bM09JV02 3 SPC BxB-2 0.84629 20AV091Y02 4 GE9B 8x8 0.88145 20ed09nP02 5 GE12 LUA 0.90527 20Np09QB02 6 ATRIUM-10A 0.93725 20Lf09eS02 6.4 Single Package Evaluation Section 6.4, Rev. 0 Page 6.4-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.5 Evaluation of Package Arrays und Nonna! Conditions of Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.5 Evaluation of Package Arrays und Normal Conditlons of Transport Section 6.5, Rev. 0 Page 6.5-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.6.1 Configuration The evaluation of the package array under NCT Is requested by § 71.59(a)(1) and § 71.59(b).
The evaluation model incorporate the following changes comparing to the bounding model for NCT, described in section 6.3:
- infinite array of undamaged packages: array of dry densely packed packages with void be-tween the packages.
According to the sensitivity analysis in section 6.3.4, the external moderation has no impact on the reactivity and does not need to be analyzed.
6.6.2 Results The criticality calculations are performed for all analyzed FA. The results are summarized in Table 6.5-1 and include the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors k and the calculatlonal bias with its uncertainty Llku. All contributions to the final results are determined with a 95 % probability at a 95 % confidence level, as discussed in section 6.8.2 and Appendix 6-1.
The results for the infinite array of undamaged packages show that the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors including the calculational bias with its uncertainty fulfil the acceptance criteria k + Liku < 0.95 for all investigated cask loadings and demonstrate the compliance with the require-ments of § 71.59(a)(1). The criticality safety index CSI, determined according to § 71.59(b), is CSI = 0.0.
6.5 Evaluation of Package Arrays und Nonna! Conditions of Transport Section 6.5, Rev. 0 Page 6.5-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.6-1 Results for Infinite arrays of undamaged packages Infinite array Case of undamaged packages (NCT)
Internal FA no. 0%
moderation External 0%
moderation Fuel type k+Aku calc. ID 1 GE 8x8-1 0.35051 20EF09bR02 2 GE 8x8-2 0.34374 20hN09sh02 3 SPC 8x8-2 0.33861 20DB09dw02 4 GE9B 8x8 0.36399 20JJ09zw02 6 GE12 LUA 0.39113 20la09rj02 6 ATRIUM-10A 0.42457 20rk09gn02 6.5 Evaluation of Package Arrays und Normal Conditions of Transport Section 6.5, Rev. 0 Page 6.5-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.6 Package Arrays und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.6 Package Arrays und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 6.6, Rev. O Page 6.6-1
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.6.1 Configuration The evaluation of the package array under HAC is requested by§ 71.59(a)(2) and § 71.59(b).
The evaluation model incorporate the following changes comparing to the bounding model for NCT, described in section 6.3:
- infinite array of damaged packages: array of dry densely packed packages with void be-tween the packages.
According to the sensitMty analysis in section 6.3.4, the external moderation has no impact on the reactivity and does not need to be analyzed.
As the damage of the cask wall and bottom as well as the loose of integrity of the cask and canis-ter lid systems under HAC are excluded, the above mentioned bounding configuration for HAC is identical to the bounding configuration for the infinite array of undamaged packages under NCT, described in section 6.5.1.
6.6.2 Results The criticality calculations are performed for all analyzed FA. The results are summarized in Table 6.6-1 and include the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors k and the calculational bias with its uncertainty flku. All contributions to the final results are determined with a 95 % probability at a 95 % confidence level, as discussed in 6.8.2 and Appendix 6-1.
I The results for the infinite array of undamaged packages show that the maximum effective neutron multiplication factors including the calculational bias with its uncertainty fulfil the acceptance criteria k + Liku < 0.95 for all investigated cask loadings and demonstrate the compliance with the require-ments of § 71.59(a)(2). The criticality safety index CSI, determined according to § 71.59(b), is cs,= 0.0.
6.6 Package Arrays und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 6.6, Rev. 0 Page 6.6-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.6-1 Results for infinite arrays of damaged packages Infinite array Case of damaged packages (HAC)
Internal FA no. 0%
moderation External 0%
moderation Fuel type k+Aku calc. ID 1 GE 8x8-1 0.35051 20EF09bR02 2 GE BxB-2 0.34374 20hN09sh02 3 SPC 8x8-2 0.33861 20DB09dw02 4 GE98 8x8 0.36399 20JJ09zw02 6 GE12 LUA 0.39113 20La09rj02 6 ATRIUM-10A 0.42457 20rk09gn02 6.6 Package Arrays und Hypothetical Accident Conditions Section 6.6, Rev. 0 Page 6.6-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390
~~6. 7 Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Air Transport is excluded for the CASTOR geo69 package.~~
~~6. 7 Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Section 6.7, Rev O Page 6.7-1~~
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.8.1 Applicability of Benchmark Experiments 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2 390]
Figure 6.8-1 Frequency distribution of correlatlon coefficients between the application and selected benchmarks 6.8.2 Blas Determination 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.8-1 Results of benchmark calculatlons
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 6.8-1 Results of benchmark calculations (continued)
[Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390]
List of References
[1] International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments NEA Nuclear Science Committee September 2019 Edition, NEA/NSC/DOC(95)03 6.8 Benchmark Evaluation Section 6.8, Rev. 0 Page 6.8-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 6.9 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed Appendix 6-1 Methodological uncertainty Appendix 6-2 Sample Input File for Bounding Model for NCT (Cale. ID: 20nS09hZ02) 6.9 Appendix Section 6.9, Rev. 0 Page 6.9-1
APPENDIX 6-1 to 1014-SR-00001 Methodological uncertainty Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 6-1 in total 5 pages Page 1 of 5
APPENDIX 6-2 to 1014-SR-00001 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Complete Appendix 6-2 in total 8 pages Page 1 of 8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7 Package Operations 7.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 7.0 Overview Section 7.0, Rev. 0 Page 7.0-1
1014-SR-Ob001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This document provides a description of all designated essential package operations with the CASTO~ geo69 transport and storage cask acc. to RG 7.9 [1], comprising sufficient details re-garding preparation for package loading, package loading, preparation for transport, package un-loading, preparation of empty package for transport and other applicable operations. The opera-tions shall ensure the performance of the packaging and that It is operated in a manner consistent with the conditions assumed in the evaluation in the SAR acc. to 10 CFR 71.
All operations shall be performed according to detailed written and approved procedures and shall comply with the content of this document, the applicable codes and standards and the CoC. The preparation of these procedures is the responsibility of the user, they are thus site-specific. The results from test to be performed within the scope of the operations (e.g. leakage tests) shall be documented and become part of the quality documentation of the packaging.
The package operations have to be consistent with maintaining occupational radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) as required by 10 CFR 20.1101 (b) [2].
In general, even if not explicitly mentioned, all components shall be subject to visual inspections prior to handling to ensure they are in proper condition.
The mentioned components and items (except for equipment) are consistent with the package de-scription In section 1.2 and the corresponding drawings and parts lists according to the appendix 1.3 of chapter 1.
List of References
[1] Regulatory Guide 7.9, Rev. 2, March 2005 Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radio-active Material
~~U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research~~
[2] Title 10 CFR Part 20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7.0 Overview Section 7.0, Rev. 0 Page 7.0-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7.1 Package Loading Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 The CASTOR!!) geo69 is designated as transport and storage cask. The applicable loading-related preparations, tests, and inspections of the package described in the following comply with the transportation regulations 10 CFR 71 and the CoC. The description include inspections made be-fore loading to determine that the package is not damaged and radiation and surface contamina-tion levels are within allowable regulatory limits. Casks loaded to be directly stored on-site, must also comply with 10 CFR 72 [1 ]. Casks deployed at a storage facility must be confirmed to meet all conditions of the 10 CFR 71 CoC prior to transport on public routes. Instances in which the condi-tions of approval in the CoC were not observed in making a shipment shall be reported to the NRG.
The package is loaded and closed in accordance with detailed written and approved procedures, including procedures for the preservation of screws with lubricant where necessary and tightening methods for the installation of all lids. Each screw is installed with either a nominal tightening torque or a nominal preload. Table 7.1-1, Table 7.1-2 and Table 7.1-3 summarize the operations for preparation for loading, loading of contents and preparation for transport, respectively.
7.1.1 Preparation for Loading It is assumed that the transfer cask is already in the reactor hall and that the transfer lock and fur-ther equipment necessary for the transhipment of the canister from the transfer cask into the CASTOR geo69 cask is available. Further, it is assured that all components of the CASTORe geo69 CLU-System are in proper condition and ready for usage.
Table 7.1-1 Operations for preparation of loading Step Description Requirement A Accef2ll!J~!l! Qf lb!l! !l!!!!gw 121~yglng.
Del Ivery of the transport unit including the documents accompa-A1 nylng transport.
A2 Check of the validity of the CoC for the cask. Cask logbook Visual Inspection of the packaging for proper condition, defor-A3 matlon wear and corrosion.
Removal of Impact limiters If installed A4 on cask when accepted.
If the cask has previously been used with SNF:
A5 49 CFR 173.443 [2]
Contamination control, decontamination In case of any luues.
If the cask has previously been used with SNF:
A6 10 CFR 71.47 External dose rate measurement.
A7 Visual Inspection of the empty packaging A7.1 Visual Inspection of the outer surface coating of the cask.
V1Sual inspection of cask lid, blind flange and protection cap in installed A7.2 condition as far as accessible.
7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement Vlsual inspection of the trunnions in installed condition, as far as ac-A7.3 cessible.
Visual inspection of tilting studs and wear protection in installed condi-A7.41 tion as far as accessible.
Visual inspection of the preservation on wear protection and of the A7.5 hexaQon screws.
A7.6 3 Leak-tightness test of the wear protection.
2 Visual inspection of dosure plate, hexagon head screws, sealing A7.7 screws and seal oluQ in Installed condition as far as accessible.
Vlsual inspection of the preservation of the closure plate, hexagon A7.8 head screws and seal oluQ.
A7.9 3 Leak-tightness test of the closure plate and the sealing screws.
AB Transfer of the cask to handling position in the truck lock.
Load attachment on the trunnions, tilting of the cask into the vertical A8.1 orientation and subseauent lifting.
A8.2 Placement of the cask In the lock wagon.
Transfer of the lock wagon to the handling position In the truck lock and AB.3 ciosinQ of the service platform around the cask.
8 e~12gmt1on of :tl:H! tm~ cask f2r !cceoting tht ~!!llst!!:1 81 RemovaJ of the cask lid.
Visual Inspection of the six threaded holes for the load attachment on 81.1 too of the cask lid.
Remove hexagonal screws and hexagon head screws for sealing:
- Removal of the three hexagon screws at marked positions (see numbering on the cask lid),
- Visual inspection of the respective threaded holes In the cask body, as far as accessible, 81.2 - Visual inspection of threads of the three guide bolts,
- Installation of the three guide bolts in the corresponding threaded holes in the cask body,
- Installation of the lifting pintle on the cask lid,
- Removal of the remaining hexagonal screws and hexagon head screws for sealing.
Removal of the cask lid.
81.3 The liftioo ointle remains Installed on the cask lid.
81.4 Removal of the three guide bolts.
V1Sual Inspection after removing the cask lid:
- Cask lid as a whole,
- Seallng groove for metal gasket in the cask lid after removal of the 81.5 metal gasket,
- Sealing surface for metal gasket on the cask body,
- Hexagonal screws and hexagon head screws for sealing,
- Threaded holes for screws in cask bodv.
Vlsual Inspection of sealing surface protection of cask lid fit for impuri-81.6 ties and damaQe. Installation of in lid fit.
82 Removal of blind flange from cask lid.
82.1 Removal of the cap screws.
82.2 Removal of blind flange via the LAP located in the centre.
Visual inspection after removing the blind flange:
82.3 - Blind flange as a whole,
- Sealing groove for metal gasket in the blind flanQe after removal of 7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement the metal gasket,
- Sealing surface for metal gasket on the cask lid,
- Cap screws,
- Threaded holes for cap screws in the cask lid.
83 Removal of protection cap from cask lid.
B3.1 Removal of the cap screws.
B3.2 Removal of protection cap via the two LAPs.
Visual inspection after removing the protection cap:
- Protection cap as a whole,
- Sealing groove for metal gasket in the protection cap after removal B3.3 of the metal gasket,
- Sealing surface for metal gasket on the cask lid,
- Cap screws,
- Threaded holes for cap screws in the cask lid.
84 Disassembly of the retention ring.
84.1 84.2 B5 Installation of the lifting plntle on the canister lid.
86 Positioning of the transfer lock on top of the cask.
f Canister transfer into transfer ~k.
C1 Positioning of transfer cask on top of the CASTO~ geo69 cask.
Load attachment on the trunnions of the transfer cask and vertical C1.1 crane transfer to the handlino position in the truck lock.
Positioning of the transfer cask on the transfer lock on top of the CASTO~ geo69. Two centre bolts provide adjustment.
C1.2 The trunnions of the transfer cask remain attached to the traverse dur-ino the entire transhipment.
C2 Transfer of the canister Into the transfer cask.
C2.1 Opening of the bottom lid of the transfer cask via the transfer lock.
C2.2 Attachment of the lifting pintle on the canister lid.
C2.3 Lifting of the canister from the CASTOR geo69 into the transfer cask.
C2.4 Closure of the bottom lid of the transfer cask via the transfer lock.
Settling of the canister on the bottom lid of the transfer cask and strike C2.5 off from the crane.
Transfer of the transfer cask with canister to the service position in the C2.6 reactor hall.
Closing of the platform around the transfer cask and disassembly of C2.7 the crane traverse.
D P!:!!earatlon of canister !!!l~ tra[!sfer ~gk for IQ5!dlng.
D1 Preparation of the canister In the transfer cask.
7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-4
1014-SR-OOOQ1 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement D1 .1 D1.2 D1.3 D1.4 D1.5 D1.6 D1.7 D1.8 D1.9 D2 Preparation of the transfer cask.
D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D2.5 u
D2.6 D2.7 Removal of the sealing compound and removal of the hexagon screws not required 2 Removal of the sealing compound not required 3 A leak-tightness test is not required if the result of visual inspection of the preservation of the wear protection in step A7.5 and of closure plate in step A7.7 demonstrates condition according to specifi-cation.
4 In case the transfer cask lid is mounted 7.1.2 Loading of Contents This chapter describes the loading process of the canister after Its transfer inside the transfer cask to the underwater FA loading position on ground the spent fuel pool. Cask and canister loaded and 7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7 1-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 closed in accordance with detailed written and approved procedures, Including procedures for the preservation of screws with lubricant where necessary and tightening methods for the installation of all lids. Each screw is installed with either a nominal tightening torque or a nomlnal preload.
Table 7 .1-2 Operations for loading of contents Step Description Requirement E L21diae of thi ~!!!!tee in th~ FA ll2ri!9! (;!2011 E1 Loading of fuel assemblies.
Only the inventory defined in the valid CoC is pennitted to be loaded.
An approved corresponding loading plan in compliance with the CoC is E1.1 Coe, Loading plan required before loading to prove conformity between loading plan and transport licence.
Placing of fuel assemblies Into the specified loading positions in com-pllance with the specified loading plan.
E1.2 Before and after the loading of each individual fuel assembly, compari- Loading plan son of the fuel assembly number and the planned/implemented loading oosition. To be recorded in the loadini:i plan.
Final loading inspection of the canister by comparing the loading plan E1.3 with the actual loading configuration, following the four-eye principle". Loading plan To be recorded in the loadina olan.
E2 Removal of transfer cask with canister from the FA storage pool.
Visual inspection of a new metal gasket and the sealing ring in the E2.1 sealing groove of the canister lid. Assembly of the metal gasket Cask logbook Recordlna of the metal casket ldentffication in the cask loobook.
Underwater removing of sealing surface protection from the lid fit in the E2.2 canister body.
Underwater positioning of canister lid. V1Sual check for proper installs-E2.3 tion.
E2.4 E2.5 E2.6 E2.7 E2.8 Lifting of the transfer cask (incl. canister) above the water surface of E2.9 the FA storage pool. Decontamination of the outer surface of the trans-fer cask with deionized water.
Placement of transfer cask In the platfonn in the reactor hall and clo-E2.10 sure of the platfonn. Removal of the traverse from the transfer cask trunnions.
Dewatering and drying of annulus between canister and transfer cask E2.11 cavity.
P!!!12!!:!tiQn 2f canister !nd l!:!nsfer cask ~for!! l!;H!!;fing 2f ~n!I-f t&r Into CASTOR<<' n~RQ ,-_-1c Installation of the addltlonal temporary neutron and gamma F1 shlelding.
F2 Work and tests on the canister lld.
7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement F21 F2.2 F2.3 Check for proper installation of the canister lid F2.4 Disassembly of the lifting pintle from the canister lid.
Installation of the shielding plate (part of multi-equipment) on the canis-F2.5 ter lid.
F2.6 Vacuum drying of the canister cavity.
Setting of the blind plug and mounting of the quick connect incl. bond-F27 ed seal.
F2.8 Evacuation and helium filling of the canister via quick connect.
F2.9 F2.10 Visual inspection of a new Metal gasket.
Installation of new metal gasket, tightening plug and pressure nut and F2.11 tightening with nominal torque.
Recordina of the metal casket identmcation in the cask loabook.
F2.12 Leakage test of the metal gaskets of the canister lid system. ANSI N14.5 [3]
F3 Disassembly of the temporary additional shielding.
G Lo!!dlng of the CASTOR geo69 cask.
G1 Transfer of the canister into CASTOR geo69 cask.
Load attachment on the trunnions of the transfer cask and vertical G1.1 crane transfer from the platfonn in the reactor hall to the handling posi-tion in the truck lock.
Positioning of the transfer cask on the transfer lock on top of the CASTOR geo69 cask.
G1.2 Two centre bolts provide adjustment.
The trunnions of the transfer cask remam attached to the traverse dur-ina the entire transhipmenl
~~G1.3 G1.4 G1.5 Load attachment to the lifting pintle on the canister lid and slight lifting of the canister.~~
Opening of the bottom lid of the transfer cask via the transfer lock.
Lowering of the canister into the CASTOR~ geo69.
G16 Closure of the bottom lid of the transfer cask via the transfer loci<.
G1.7 Transfer of the transfer cask to the platfonn in the reactor hall.
Disassembly of the transfer lock. Installation of the temporary addition-G1.8 al shieldina and disassemblv of the liftina ointle from the canister lid.
G2 Assembly of the retention ring.
82.1 G3 Closure of the transport cask.
Removal of the sealing surface protection from the cask lid frt and in-G3.1 stallation of the auide bolts.
G3.2 Visual inspection of a new metal gasket 7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. O Page 7.1-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Propnetary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement Installation of blind flange with the new metal gasket and cap screws in G3.3 the cask lid. Tightening of the cap screws with nominal torque.
Recording of the metal gasket identification in the cask loabook.
G3.4 Check for proper installation of the blind flange.
V1Sual inspection and installation of a new metal gasket with clips in G3.5 the cask lid.
Recording of the metal Qasket identification in the cask loabook.
Lifting of the cask lid via the installed lifting pintle. Visual Inspection of G3.6 the proper installation and condition of the moderator plate, as far as accessible. Placement of the cask hd on the cask.
Installation of the hexagonal screv,.is and removal of the guide bolts.
G37 Installation of the three hexagon head screws for sealing. Tightening with nominal torque.
G3.8 Check for proper installation of the cask lid.
Vacuum drying of the cask interior and filling with helium using the G3.9 quick connect Adjustment of the helium pressure in the cask.
G3.10 V1Sual inspection of a new metal gasket Installation of protection cap with metal gasket and cap screws in the G3.11 cask lid. Tightening of the cap screws with nominal torque.
Recording of the metal gasket identification in the cask loabook.
G3.12 Check for proper installation of the protection cap.
G3.13 Leakage test of the metal gaskets of the cask lid system. ANSI N14.5 G3.14 Disassembly of the temporary additional shielding.
7.1.3 Preparation for Transport Table 7.1-3 Operations for preparation for transport Step Description Requirement H1 H2 H3 Work and meis!:!rements on tht CASTO~ geo69 tra!l!122tl 9!Sk Contamination measurement on the cask.
Dose rate measurement on the cask.
Visual inspection of the cask.
49 CFR 173.443 10 CFR 71.47 H3.1 V1Sual inspection of the surface coating; as far as accessible.
V1Sual inspection of the trunnions in installe:d condition, as far as ac-H3.2 cessible.
V1Sual inspectJon of tilting studs and wear protection in installed condi-H3.3 tion as far as accessible.
H4 Placement of transport cask on the trailer.
Opening of the platfonn Transfer of the cask via lock wagon out of the H4.1 truck lock Load attachment on the trunnions of the cask. Lifting of the cask and H4.2 placement on the turning support of the transoort frame on the trailer.
H4.3 Lowering of the cask into the horizontal orientation.
7.1 Package Loading Section 7 .1, Rev. O Page 7.1-8
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement Visual inspection of closure plate, hexagon head screws and seal plug H4.4 in installed condition where accessible.
4 Preoaration of R!Ckage for transj;!ort.
Replaclng the sealing screws and O-rings In the closure plate J1 with the seallng screws with valve.
J1.1 Visual check of the two sealing screws with valve for Integrity.
Removal of the two sealing screws and O-rings in the closure plate; J1.2 installation of sealing screws with valve and tightening with nominal toraue.
Preservation of cask according to requirements for "transport J2 conflgu ration".
J3 Installation of lid and bottom impact llmiter.
Visual check of the surface coating of the impact limiters. Check of J3.1 other surfaces and seals for visible damaaes i.e. dents or scratches.
J3.2 Positioning of the impact limiters on the cask; visual check for proper J3.3 seating, mounting of cap screws and washers and tightening with nom-inal torQue.
J41 Dose rate measurement on package. 10 CFR 71.47 J6 Temperature measurement on package. 10 CFR 71.43(g)
Preservation of Impact llmlters according to requirements for J6 "transport confinuratlon".
If a transport hood Is planned:
J7 Check for pennlsslbllltv of the planned transoort hood.
J81 Dose rate measurement on the transport unil 10 CFR 71.47 J9 Temperature measurement on the transport unit. 10 CFR 71.43(g)
Labelllng of the transport unit taking Into account the measured J10 dose rate (transport Index Tl) and the criticality safety Index (CSI) 10 CFR 71.5(ii) in compllance with the certificate of aooroval.
Complete the transport documentation and give clearance for J11 deoarture.
The dose rate measurements can be omitted, provided that the results of the dose rate measure-ment in step H2 was already in compliance with the requirements for transport on public routes.
7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] Title 10 CFR Part 72 Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related greater than Class C Waste U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[2] Title 49 CFR Part 173 Shippers - General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[3] ANSI N14.5-2014 American National Standard for Radioactive Materials -
Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment 7.1 Package Loading Section 7.1, Rev. 0 Page 7.1-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7.2 Package Unloading Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 7.2 Package Unloading Section 7.2, Rev. 0 Page 7.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Inforrnation withheld @GNS
. per 10 CFR2.390 The package is opened and unloaded in accordance with detailed written and approved proce-dures. Table 7.2-1 and Table 7.2-2 summarize the operations during receipt of package from carri-er and removal of the content, respectively.
7.2.1 Receipt of Package from Carrier The operations performed after receiving the package from carrier are in accordance with the re-quirements listed in 10 CFR 20.1906 [1], "Procedures for Receiving and Opening Packages".
Table 7.2-1 Operations during receipt of package from carrier Step Description .Requirement*
~~K K1 K2~~
§yrv~s am;j illll;z!ctlon1 gfter recel~t o( ttJe im~yge.
Transfer of the package Including transport papers.
RemovaJ of transport hood, if transport hood was used.
Visual check of the package for proper condition, deformation, K3 wear and corrosion. Check of type plates, labels tamper-Indicating devices on the ___ ., __ e.
K4 1 1 49 CFR 173.443 K5 Contamination measurement on the package.
K6 Dose rate measurement on the package. 10 CFR 71.47 K7 Visual inspection of the cask.
1<7.1 Visual inspection of the outer surface coating of the cask.
V1Sual inspection of cask lid, blind flange and protection In installed 1<7.2 condition as far as accessible.
V1Sual inspection of the trunnions and the tilting studs in installed con-1<7.3 dition as far as accessible.
V1Sual inspection of tilting studs and wear protection in installed condi-1<7.4 tion as far as accessible.
Visual inspection of the preservation on wear protection and of the 1<7.5 hexaaon screws.
Visual inspection of closure plate, hexagon head screws, sealing 1<7.6 screws with valve and seal plug in installed condition, as far as acces-sible.
Visual inspection of the preservation of the closure plate, hexagon 1<7.7 head screws and seal plug.
1<7.8 Leak-tightness test of the closure plate and the sealing screws.
KS Preparation of the cask for Interim storage.
Tilting of the package by application of the tilting studs and the corre-K8.1 spondina tumino suooort.
Load attachment on the trunnions and vertical crane transfer of the K8.2 cask to the desired storac:ie.
K8.3 Set up of CASTOR<<l geo69 storage configuration.
7.2 Package Unloading Section 7.2, Rev. 0 Page 7.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 Step Description Requirement_
K9 Interim storage of the cask in vertical orientation. 10 CFR 72 [2]
Contamination and dose rate measurement shall be performed as soon as practical after receipt of the package, but not later than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months after the package is received at the licensee's facility. If the package is received outside normal working hours, the monitoring shall be performed not later than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months from the beginning of the next working day.
7.2.2 Removal of Contents The following section describes the steps to be perfonned at a minimum for an unloading of a cask under water In a nuclear facility providing sufficient crane capacity (otherwise the CLU System must be used). The initial condition is that the impact limiters are already disassembled. The steps necessary to remove these items are described in Table 7.2-1. Mandatory for the complete dura-9 tlon of unloading of a cask is that the validity of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) is not exceed-ed.
The unloading In a FA storage pool requires the prior re-cooling of the canister and the loaded con-tents according to written and approved procedures to protect the loaded FAs from damage due to thermal shock. The owner Is responsible for this procedure, which is not described in detail in Ta-ble 7.2-2.
Table 7.2-2 Required steps for the unloading of contents Step Description Requirement b Qoenlng of the 1H1C!s§ge1 L1 Removal of the cask lld.
V1S1,1al inspection of the threaded holes for the load attachment on top L 1.1 of the cask lid.
Remove hexagonal screws and hexagon head screws for sealing:
- Removal of the three hexagon screws at marked positions (see numbering on the cask lid),
- Vrsual inspection of the threaded holes In the cask body, as far as access Ible, L1.2
- VtSual Inspection of thread on the three guide bolts,
- Installation of the three guide bolts In the corresponding threaded holes In the cask body,
- Installation of the lid hanger on the cask lld,
- Removal of the remaining hexagon screws.
Removal of the cask lid. The lifting plntle remains installed on the cask L1.3 lid. Removal of the 1::iuide bolts.
Visual inspection after removing the cask lid:
- Cask lid as a whole, L 1.4
- Sealing groove for metal seal in the cask lid,
- Sealing surface for metal seal on the cask body,
- Hexagonal screws and hexagon head screws for sealing,
- Threaded holes for hexagonal screws in cask body.
7.2 Package Unloading Section 7.2, Rev. 0 Page 7.2-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Ste,.1 Desl;rlptlon Requirement V1Sual Inspection of sealing surface protection of cask lid flt for impuri-L 1.5 ties and damaae and install in lid flt.
L2 Removal of blind flange from cask lld.
L2.1 Removal of the cap screws.
L2.2 Removal of blind flange via the LAP located in the centre.
Visual inspection after removing the blind flange:
- Blind flange as a whole,
- Sealing groove for metal gasket in the blind flange after removal of L2.3 the metal gasket,
- Sealing surface for metal gasket on the cask lid
- Cap screws,
- Threaded holes for can screws in the cask lid.
L3 Removal of protection cap from cask lld.
L3.1 Removal of the cap screws.
L3.2 Removal of protection cap via the two LAPs.
Visual inspection after removing the protection cap:
- Protection cap as a whole, L3.3
- Sealing groove for metal gasket in the protection cap,
- Sealing surface for metal gasket on the cask lid,
- Cap screws,
- Threaded holes for cap screws in the cask lid.
L4 Disassembly of the retention ring.
L4.1 L4.2 M Unl21~lng of tbe ~nlmr.
M1 Preparatlon of the canister for re-coollng.
M1.1 Installation of the lifting pintle on the canister lid.
M1.2 Removal of tightening plug and pressure nut from the canister lid.
M1.3 Evacuation of canister cavity via quick connect Flushing of the canister cavity with helium at ambient pressure via M1.4 Quick connect for cooling the FAs.
M1.5 M1.6 M2 Preparations before unloadlng.
Load attachment on the trunnions of the cask. Transfer of the cask to M2.1 the FA storaae oool.
M2.2 Partial lowering of the cask into the FA storage pool.
M2.3 FIiiing of the canister cavity with pool water.
7.2 Package Unloading Section 7.2, Rev. 0 Page 7.2-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Stw, Description Requirement M2.4 Removal of the dewatering lance.
M2.6 Lowering of cask and canister into the FA storage pool.
M2.5 Underwater removal of canister lid via the installed lifting pintle.
M3 Underwater unloading of the fuel assemblies.
7.2 Package Unloading Section 7.2, Rev. 0 Page 7.2-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] Title 10 CFR Part 20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[2] Title 10 CFR Part 72 Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level .
Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related greater than Class C Waste U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7.2 Package Unloading Section 7.2, Rev. 0 Page 7.2-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 7.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport Section 7.3, Rev. 0 Page 7.3-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This section includes inspections, tests and special preparations performed on the empty but con-taminated package to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 173.428 [1] for empty class 7 materials packaging. The essential elements for preparing an empty package for transport are similar to those required for transport as specified in Section 7.1.2 with several exemptions. A survey for removable contamination is performed to verify that the removable contamination on the internal and external surfaces are ALARA and that the limits of 49 CFR 173.421 (b), (c), and (e) are met Table 7.3-1 Required steps for preparation of the empty package Step Description Requirement H Wom 1nd mea1!:!rements on the !!!!Im ~ckage.
N1 Contamination measurement on the empty package. 49 CFR 173.428 The non-fixed contamination on the external surface shall not ex-N1.1 ceed the limits. Internal contamination shall not exceed 100 times 49 CFR 173.443(a) the limits.
N1.2 The canister shall contain less than 15 g of fissile material ( 235 U). 49 CFR 173.453(b)
N2 Closure of the empty package.
N2.1 Steps according to Table 7.1-2, G3 "Closure of the transport cask".
N3 Dose rate measurement on the empty package. 49 CFR 173.421(b)
N4 Visual inspection of the empty package. 49 CFR 173.428(b)
Visual inspection of the surface coating of the cask; as far as acces-N4.1 sible.
Visual inspection of the trunnions in installed condition, as far as N4.2 accessible.
Visual inspection of tilting studs and wear protection in installed con-N4.3 dition as far as accessible.
Visual inspection of closure plate, hexagon head screws and seal N4.4 plug in installed condition, where accessible.
Q Pre~m1!2a Qf 1!Je em1m lli!Ckage for tran![!o!l:
01 Placement of the cask on the trailer.
01.1 Steps according to 1-14 in Table 7.1-3.
02 Installation of Impact llmlters.
If desired, the impact limiters are installed, following the steps in 02.1 Table 7.1-3 J3.
03 1 Flnal dose rate measurement on the empty package. 49 CFR 173.421{b) 04 Labelling of the empty package.
Any labels previously applied In confonnance with 49 CFR 1n, 04.1 Subpart E are removed, obliterated, or covered and the "Empty" 49 CFR 172.450 [2]
label Is affixed to the oackaae.
The outside of each package is marked with the UN identification 04.2 49 CFR 172.101(e) number.
06 Complete the transport papers and give clearance for departure.
The dose rate measurements can be omitted, provided that the results of the dose rate measure-ment in step N3 was already in compliance with the requirements.
7.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport Section 7.3, Rev. 0 Page 7.3-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information wrthheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 List of References
[1] Title 49 CFR Part 173 Shippers - General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[2] Title 49 CFR Part 172 Hazardous Materials Table, Special Provisions, Hazardous Materials Communications, Emergency Response Information, Training Requirements, And Security Plans 7.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport Section 7.3, Rev. 0 Page 7.3-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7.4 Other Operations Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 7.4 Other Operations Section 7 .4, Rev. 0 Page 7.4-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7 .4.1 Preparation of package for transport foll owing a period of storage The operations for preparing the loaded CASTOR geo69 for transport following a period of stor-age (in excess of one year from the date of cask sealing and completion of leakage testing) are identical to the preparation for transport described in Section 7.1.3 of the SAR.
7.4 Other Operations Section 7.4, Rev. O Page 7.4-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. O Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 7.5 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 7.5 Appendix Section 7 .6, Rev. 0 Page 7.5-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8 Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program 8.0 Overview Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 8.0 Overview Section 8.0, Rev. 0 Page 8.0-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfom,ation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 This chapter provides a description of the acceptance and maintenance program for the CASTOR geo69 transport cask in compliance with Subpart G of 10 CFR Part 71.
8.0 Overview Section 8.0, Rev. 0 Page 8.0-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 8.1 Acceptance Tests Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 This section describes the acceptance tests performed before the first use of each CASTOR geo69 transport packaging. The described tests confinTI that each packaging Is fabricated in ac- _
cordance with the drawings and specifications of chapter 1 of this SAR.
8.1.1 Vlsual Inspections and Measurements The visual inspections of the packaging include a check of the manufacturing documentation for completeness and factual correctness, according the part lists and the corresponding drawings as listed in section 1.3.
The visual inspections should verify that the package has been fabricated and assembled in ac-cordance with these documents. The dimensions of all parts given in the manufacturing documen-9 tation shall be confonTI to the dimensions and tolerances specified in the drawings. Any occurring noncompliance with the part lists and drawings leads either to the further treatment of the part to correct its dimensions, or to the manufacturing of a new exemplar of that particular part. A verifica-tion that each part consists only of the materials specified in the part lists must be included In the manufacturing documentation. FurthenTiore, all components shall be visually tested for integrity and cleanliness. The package must be visibly marked in accordance with 10 CFR 71.85(c).
8.1.2 Weld Examinations The examination of welds shall verify that the fabrication of the packaging and its components con-finTis with the drawings listed in section 1.3. All weld examinations shall be perfonTied according to written procedures. Weld examination of containment welds shall be performed in accordance with the ASME BPVC, Section Ill, Division 3. The results shall be documented and become part of the
- quality documentation of the packaging. Personnel perfonTiing non-destructive examinations shall be qualified in accordance with Article WB-5520 of the ASME BPVC [1].
Weld seams exist on the canister body and the housing of the impact limiters. The non-destructive examination procedures applicable depend on the category of the weld seams. For the canister body, the welded joint categories according to WB-3251 [1] detenTiine the required exami-nation method and acceptance criteria.
Table 8.1-1 gives an overview on the required examinations of welds on the different parts of the packaging.
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 8.1-1: Required examination of welds Weld seam location Welded Joint category Coda I standard Requfrecl examination method Canister body A,B,C WB-3251 [1] RT+PT Impact limiters C ISO 10042 [2] VT+PT 8.1.2.1 Canister Body The acceptance criteria for penetration testing (PT) do not depend on the thickness t of the weld being examined and are specified in WB-5342 and WB-5352, respectively [1 ]. The following criteria apply to the canister body, which is part of the containment:
9
~~Only imperfections producing indications with major dimensions > 1.6 mm are relevant Im-perfections.~~
~~Cracks and linear indications are unacceptable.~~
~~Rounded indications > 5 mm are unacceptable.~~
~~Four or more rounded indications In a line separated by 1.5 mm or less edge to edge are unacceptable.~~
Ten or more rounded indications in any 40 cm 2 of surface with the major dimension of this area not to exceed 15 cm with the area taken in the most unfavourable location relative to the indications being evaluated are unacceptable.
The acceptance criteria for elongated indications detected via radiographic testing (RT) according to WB-5320 [1] depend on the wall thickness t. These criteria and the thickness t of the welds be-ing examined in the different parts of the package are listed in Table 8.1-2. Indications character-
- ized as a crack, a zone of incomplete fusion or zone incomplete penetration are generally inac-ceptable.
Table 8.1-2: Radiographic testing acceptance criteria for elongated Indications Part Weld location t[mm] We/dtype Acceptance criteria Item 2 Item 2-3 Canister body Full penetration Item 2 Item 2-4 All indications < t/3 1014-DPL-36855 butt weld Item 2 Item 2-5 In addition to the requirements according to Table 8.1-2, any group of aligned indications having an aggregate length greater than t in a length of 12t are unacceptable, unless the minimum distance 8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 between successive indications exceeds 6L, in which case the aggregate length is unlimited, L being the length of the largest indication.
Rounded indications in excess of that shown as acceptable in the ASME BPVC, Section Ill Appen-dices, Mandatory Appendix VI are unacceptable.
Location, types and size of each weld listed in Table 8.1-2 must be confirmed by the required ex-amination method before commissioning. Defects in weld metal detected by the examinations shall be eliminated and repaired when necessary or the indication shall be reduced to an acceptable limit.
8.1.2.2 Impact Limiter Housing 9 For the non-destructive examination of the weld seams in the canister housing, the acceptance criteria Each weld shall be tested via VT and PT. VT shall be performed according to ISO 17637 [3] or another applicable standard. PT shall be performed according to ISO 3452-1 [4] or another applicable standard. Defects detected by the examinations shall be eliminated and repaired when necessary or the Indication shall be reduced to an acceptable limit.
8.1.3 Structural and Pressure Tests All test shall be performed according to written procedures and shall comply with the applicable cods and standards mentioned in the following respective subsections. The results shall be docu-mented and become part of the quality documentation of the packaging.
8.1.3.1 Pneumatic and Hydrostatic Tests For the tests, the requirements of Article WB-6000 [1] are applicable. tests shall be performed with a maximum internal overpressure of at least 1.5 times the design pressure, which is in the cask (absolute pressure, ). The cask shall be tested with an Internal test pressure of . The external pressure of the canister is equal to the in-temal pressure of the cask. Since this pressure exceeds the internal design pressure in the canis-ter, which is (absolute pressure, ), the canister shall be pressure tested with a test pressure equal to 1.5 times the external design pressure, which equals The test pressure shall be maintained for at least ten minutes: The canister test pressure shall not be exceeded by more than 6 % during the test 8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 A deep water immersion test shall be considered for the cask according to IAEA Safety Standards
[5]. A pressure test with an external gauge pressure of at least 2 MPa and a test period of not less than 1 h shall be considered to meet these conditions.
The test pressures for cask and canister are listed in Table 8.1-3.
Table 8.1-3: Test pressure for cask and canister for different load conditions
- Absolute <<JSt pressure [MPa]
Containment Load condition ,I Test period [min]
Internal External Pneumatic test 10 Cask Deep Water lmmer-60 sion Test Canister Pneumatic test 10 After the test period time of the tests is exceeded, the initiation of the examination for leakage starts. For the examination of leakage, the internal pressure is reduced to 0.75 times the test pressure. All joints, connections and regions of high stress are tested for leaks. Leak testing is performed in accordance with ASME BPVC Section V, Article 10 [6] and ANSI N14.5 [7]. The max-imum standard pem,issible leakage rate according to Section 8.1.4 shall not be exceeded. The allowable volumetric leakage rate is exceeded, the containment material may be repaired in ac-cordance with WB-2500 [1] or disposed of.
8.1.3.2 Structural Tests Structural tests are performed on all lifting devices in tem,s of a static load test The applied load depends on the maximum weight that will be attached to the LAP during operation of the pack-age, multiplied with a certain load factor. The cask trunnions (Item 12) and the load attachment points on the canister lid (Item 3) are special lifting devices and thus tested with a load factor of three in order to fulfil the provisions of ANSI N14.6 [8]. All other lifting devices are tested with a load factor of 1.5. Furthem,ore, a hoist factor of 1.15 according to CMAA #70 applies to all lifting devices for slow crane operation. The loads for the static load tests are listed in Table 8.1-4.
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 8.1-4: Static load tests Lifting device (quantity) Load factor Max. weight attached [Mg] Load[kN]
Cask trunnions (2) 3x1.15 LAP on canister lid (12) 3x1.15 Tilting studs (2) 1.5 X 1.15 LAP on cask lid (6) 1.5 X 1.15 3.1 52.6 The load tests shall be perfom,ed under the conditions specified in the following subsections. All load tests are perfom,ed at room temperature.
8.1.3.2.1 Trunnions The static test load of must be distributed equally on the two trunnions. The direction of load application must be perpendicular to the axis of the trunnions. Bearing shells must be placed between lifting lug and the trunnion. The following requirements must be met:
~~Load-bearing width W ~ 45 mm~~
~~Mean lever am, L s 72,5 mm~~
~~Bearing shell radii R1 and R2 ~ 3 mm~~
~~Width of the lifting lug ~ R1 + R2 + W~~
Arc of contact between the bearing shell and the trunnion ~ 60° Before and after the load test, a visual inspection and MT or PT must be perfom,ed on the cap screws (Item 13), the corresponding threaded holes in the cask body and the installed trunnions, as far as accessible, to verify no distortion or cracking has occurred. The trunnion defom,ation be-tween the initial value prior to loading (null measurement) and after loading with the test load shall be determined. The trunnion deformation shall not exceed 0.01 mm. Otherwise, the deformed trunnions shall be replaced by new exemplars and the load test is repeated.
8.1.3.2.2 TIiting Studs The load test on the tilting studs has to be perfom,ed prior to the installation of the wear protec-tion (Item 183). The static test load of must be distributed equally on the two tilting studs and must be applied perpendicular to the axis of the tilting studs. Bearing shells must be used and the following requirements apply:
~~Load-bearing width W ~ 30 mm~~
~~Mean lever arm L ~ 50 mm~~
~~Bearing shell radii R1 and R2 ~ 3 mm 8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-6~~
~~1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390~~
Arc of contact between the bearing shell and the tilting stud ~ 45° A visual inspection of the of the tilting studs and the threads as well as MT or PT of the whole shell surface of the tilting studs and in the area of the transition radius are performed before and after the test load is applied, to verify no distortion or cracking has occurred. The deformation of the tilt-ing studs shall not exceed 0.01 mm. In case of a non-permitted deformation, the cask body shall be replaced by a new exemplar.
8.1.3.2.3 Cask Lid The static load of must be distributed equally on the threaded holes by using the lifting pintle for the cask lid. The load must be applied perpendicular to the cask lid surface. The strength class of the M24 bolts must not exceed 10.9 and their screw-in depth in the cask lid must be at least 20 mm. The test screws must be screwed into the lld by hand until the minimum re-quired screw-in depth is reached. A visual inspection of the threaded holes and a check of the screw-in depth on engagement must be performed before and after the load test. No adverse ef-fects on the trueness to gauge of the threaded holes are permissible. The cask lid must be re-placed by a new exemplar if the threaded holes do not pass the static load test.
8.1.3.2.4 Canister Lid The static load of must be distributed equally on the threaded holes by using the lifting pintle for the canister lid. The load must be applied perpendicular to the cask surface.
The strength class of the bolts must not exceed 10.9 and their screw-in depth in the canister lid must be at least 52 mm. The test screws must be screwed into the lid by hand until the mini-mum required screw-in depth is reached. A visual inspection of the threaded holes and a check of the screw-in depth on engagement must be performed before and after the load test. No ad-verse e effects on the trueness to gauge of the threaded holes are permissible. The canister lid must be replaced by a new exemplar if the threaded holes do not pass the static load test.
8.1.4 Leakage Tests Leak tests apply for all metal gasket of the containment systems. They shall be performed accord-ing to Article 10,Section V of the ASME BPVC [6] and ANSI N14.5 [7] and in accordance with writ-ten and approved procedures at any time after"the containment boundary fabrication Is complete (during assembly, dispatch after loading, etc.). The results shall be documented and become part of the quality documentation of the packaging.
The leak detector shall have a sensitivity of at least 10-10 Pa m3/s. The maximum standard permis-sible leakage rate is 10-7 Pa m3/s. A callbration of the leak detector is performed using a test leak 8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-7
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 before connecting the measuring setup to the test volume. Table 8.1-5 lists all metal gasket on which leakage test are to be performed.
Table 8.1-5: Seals with metal gaskets Containment Sealing surface Metal G8$ket Component Cask body (Item 2) Item 69 Cask lld (Item 55)
Cask Cask lid (Item 55) Item 44 Protection cap (Item 113) 1014-DPL-30934 Cask lid (Item 55) Item 71 Blind flange (Item 89)
Canister body (Item 2) Item 16 Canister lid (Item 3)
Canister 1014-DPL-36855 Canister lid (Item 3) Item 13 Tightening plug (Item 10)
Leak testing Is also performed on the elastomeric seals listed in Table 8.1-6. A less sensitive leak testing method can be used since these seals are not part of the containment.
Table 8.1-6: Elastomeric seals Containment Sea/ Component Leak testing method Sealing ring (Item 47) Closure plate (Item 7) Gas pressure rise Cask 1014-DPL-30934 Bonded Seal (Item 49) Wear protection Bubble test O-rino (Item 184) (Item 183)
The leak tightness is considered proven when the calculated standard leakage rate Is lower than the permissible one. In case of an unacceptable leakage rate the corresponding sealing barrier is depressurised and opened. The metal gasket or elastomeric seal is to be replaced, the sealing surface is checked for cleanliness and damage and necessary repairs are performed. After the new gasket/seal and the sealing surface are preserved the sealing is closed and a new leak test has to be performed.
8.1.6 Component and Material Tests All test shall be performed according to written procedures and shall comply with the applicable cods and standards mentioned In the following respective subsections. The results shall be docu-mented and become part of the quality documentation of the packaging.
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-8
1014-SR--00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8.1.5.1 Material Tests The materials used for the containment must conform to the requirements of one of the specifica-tions for material given in Section II of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [9], Part D, Ta-ble 2A, 2B, and 4. This requirement does not apply to seals and gaskets according to section WB-2121 (b) [1]. Table 8.1-7 gives an overview of the specified ferrous and nonferrous materials and the corresponding parts used in the package. Table 8.1-7 also includes components that do not fulfil a containment function. The required tests originate from the material standard, which is in-cluded in Section II of the ASME BPVC, Part A and B. Section 111, Division 3 of the ASME BPVC includes additional requirements for containment material. If not specified otherwise in Table 8.1-7, the required non-destructive examination shall be performed according to the applicable article in Section V of the ASME BPVC .
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-9
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 8.1-7: Specified materials Parts list Spec. No. Type/Grade UNSNo. Item No. Required material tests 1 1014-DPL-21, 55 30934 Tensile Test, PT, UT 2-5 36855 Tensile Test, Charpy Impact Test 13, 37 30934 (only Item 13), VP, MP or PT 26 36855 fonlv Item 13)
Brinell Hardness, Rockwell C, 11 36855 Charpy Impact Test, VT3, MT4 or PT 7 30934 89, 113, 183 30934 Tensile Test, Brinell Hardness or 30, 31 30984 Rockwell B, UT5 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 36855 7 36855 5, 9, 10 36855 Tensile Test, Average Grain 2 30984 Size UT PT Tensile Test, Brinell Hardness, 12 30934 Impact Toughness 2 , UT, MT or PT Tensile Test, Brinell Hardness (if 4 36855 annealed), Average Grain Size, UT PT Tensile Test, Brinell Hardness, 9,62,63 30934 Charpy Impact Test (Item 62, 6 36855 63), VP, MT4 or PT (except Item 9) 8, 53 30934 Tensile Test, Bend Test Tensile Test, Microstructure, 2 30934 Rapid-load fracture toughness, UT MT or PT 3 36855 Tensile Test, UT, PT 50 30984 Tensile Test, UT 2 3 33604 1Analysis of chemical composition is mandatory for all specified materials 2Testing of impact toughness according to Subsection WB-2300 [1]
3\/isual examination in accordance with the requirements of ASTM F788 [10]
4 Magnetic particle examination in accordance with the requirements of ASTM A275 [11]
5Straight beam or angle beam UT according to Subsection WB-2531 [1]
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-10
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 The impact toughness testing, if not specified differently in Table 8.1-7, is conducted according to Subsection WB-2331.1 [1] to detem,ine the reference temperature RT NDT at which the ductlle-to-brittle transition of the material occurs. This temperature is compared to the lowest seivice temper-ature (LST) of the material. Charpy impact tests are perfom,ed with three V-notched samples for each temperature. f:racture toughness tests consist of two test specimens, except for the ductile iron cask body, where a minimum of four samples is required. Ductile cast iron SA-874M is fracture toughness tested according to ASTM E1820 [12] at a temperature of -40 °C. Table 8.1-8 summa-rises the acceptance criteria for the required toughness tests. The trunnion material requires a min-imum difference between the LST and the reference temperature. The screw material only requires a minimum lateral expansion of the Charpy impact tests. The ductile cast iron requires that the average fracture toughness of all samples minus three times the standard deviation Is equal or bigger as 50 MPa mm 112
Table 8.1-8: Acceptance criteria for toughness testing Item No. Parts list LST Tou_ghnes:s BCCfJl)tarice criteria 2 1014-DPL-30934 -40 oc Kic,R(average)- 3oso ~ 50 MPa mm 1fl 12 1014-DPL-30934 -40°c LST - RTNOT =60.5 °C 13 1014-DPL-30934 -40 oc Lateral expansion =0.64 mm 62,63 1014-DPL-30934 -40 oc Lateral expansion =0.64 mm 11 1014-0PL-36855 -40 °C Lateral expansion =0.64 mm The package materials not listed in Table 8.1-7 do not confom, to the requirements of one of the specifications for material given in Section 11, Part D, Table 2A, 28, and 4 of the ASME BPVC.
These materials Include gaskets, sealing rings, moderator material and the Al-13.C-MMC used for the basket These materials and their requirem~nts are either specified by other standards, or they are tested indMdually for the use in the CASTOR~ packages and their qualification is documented.
Table 8.1-9 lists these materials.
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-11
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 8.1-9: Materials not specified In the ASME BPVC Parts I/st Material Type/Grade ltemNO.
1014-DPL-AI-S..C-MMC 10-27 30984 UHMW-PE 4,5, 54, 56 30934 Stainless steel 6, 31 30934 30 1 30934 Silicone VMQ 14 151 17 30 1 74 36855 Fluoroelastomer FKM 471,661, 941, 1841 30934 Ag, stainless steel, Ni- 44,69, 71 30934 Metal gasket alloy 13 16 36855 1Non-safety-related items Testing of the Aluminium-Boron Metal Matrix Composite (Al-8.iC-MMC) includes chemical compo-sition and tensile properties. The material tests of the UHMW-PE Include testing of elongation stress, density and the coefficient of thermal expansion. The metal gasket materials are tested individually for their chemical composition, tensile properties (except Ag) and hardness (except Ni-alloy). The operational reliability of the metal gaskets Is ensured via the required leakage tes~
(Section 8.1.4). Relevant evaluation in section 2.2 demonstrate that the material Is resistant to ex-isting ionising radiation in the CASTO~ geo69 System and does not suffer corrosion during long-term storage.
Welding consumables Type 316L in accordance with to SFA-5.9M [13] and SA FB 2 64 DC in ac-cordance with EN ISO 14174 [14] are used for the construction of the canister. The welding mate-rial is tested according to the applicable specification.
8.1.5.2 Component Tests After the acceptance of the materials, the components fabricated from these materials are ex-amined visually to ensure integrity and cleanliness. The dimensions of the components are checked to ensure compliance with the dimensional requirements according to the manufacturing drawings and the parts lists.
8.1.6.2.1 Basket Calibre Test The basket calibre test is used to simulate the loading of the canister with spent fuel in the nuclear facility. A replica of the intended fuel assembly is successively lowered into each chamber of the assembled basket to check if the fuel elements fit into the basket as requested. The calibre test is successfully completed when the replica fits into each chamber without hitting the chamber walls.
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-12
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8.1.6 Shieldlng Tests The performed dose rate calculations show that the dose rates calculated under conservative as-sumptions are always considerably below the regulatory dose rate limits for NCT and HAC. The components and materials serving as radiation shield for neutron and/or gamma radiation are test-ed as described in section 8.1.5.1 to eliminate the possibility of defects, voids or streaming paths in the shielding, which could lead to a deviation from the calculated radiation profile and a local viola-tion of a dose rate limit. Shielding materials are:
~~AI-S..C-MMC plates ( ) in the basket (neutron absorber)~~
~~moderator rods and moderator plates (neutron moderator)~~
~~Cask body (neutron and gamma absorber) 9~~
~~Shielding elements (gamma absorber)~~
~~Canister body and canister lid (gamma absorber)~~
~~Cask lid, closure plate (neutron and gamma absorber)~~
Each shielding component Is visually inspected to ensure homogeneity and the absence of cracks, voids, shrinkage holes and other defects in the material. The weld examination ensures the ab-sence of such defects in the welded joints in the canister body. The chemical composition of the materials and their properties (see section 8.1.5.1) ascertain that they exhibit the desired shielding properties used in the calculations.
8.1. 7 Thennal Test The thermal calculations performed provide reliable results in terms of three-dimensional tempera-
- ture distribution and temperature time dependency in the package. The results indicate. that the maximum temperatures during NCT and HAC (fire phase and cooling phase) are considerably be-low the limit values of each component. The materials used in the present CASTOR geo69 design are applied in several other transport and storage casks with a comparable design since many years. Thereby GNS exhibits many years of experience in modelling and simulation of their thermal behavior. The material tests specified in section 8.1.5.1 ensure that each material is manufatured in accordance with the applicable standard, which leads to reproducible thermal properties. The thermal properties of each material and the heat transfer between these materials determine the thermal behavior and heat dissipation in the package. Based on the established experience and the previous verification of the applied simulation models it is ensured by GNS that the simulations describe the actual thermal behavior of the package in use with adequate accuracy. Therefore, no thermal tests are designated for acceptance.
8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-13
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnatlon withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8.1.8 Miscellaneous Tests No miscellaneous acceptance tests are intended for the CASTOR geo69 packaging.
List of References
[1] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2017)
Section Ill, Division 3 - Containment Systems for Transportation and Storage of Spent Nu-clear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Material
[2] ISO 10042 (2018)
Welding - Arc-welded joints In aluminium and its alloys - Quality levels for imperfections
[3] ISO 17637 (2016)
Non-destructive testing of welds - Visual testing of fusion-welded joints
[4] ISO 3452-1 (2014)
Non-destructive testing - Penetrant testing Part 1: General principles
[5] IAEA Safety Standards, No. SSR-6, Rev. 1 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2018 Edition)
[6] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2017)
Section V - Non-destructive Testing
[7] ANSI N14.5 (2014)
Radioactive Materials - Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment
[8] ANSI N14.6 (1993)
Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More
[9] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2017)
Section 11 - Materials
[1 OJ ASTM F788 - 20 Standard Specification for Surface Discontinuities of Bolts, Screws, studs, and Rivets, Inch and Metric Series
[11) ASTM A275-18 Standard Practice for Magnetic Particle Examination of steel Forgings
[12) ASTM E1820- 20b Standard Test Method for Measurement of Fracture Toughness
[13) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2017)
Section II - Materials Part C: Specifications for Welding Rods, Electrodes, and Filler Metals
[14) EN ISO 14174 (2019)
Welding consumables - Fluxes for submerged arc welding and electroslag welding 8.1 Acceptance Tests Section 8.1, Rev. 0 Page 8.1-14
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 8.2 Maintenance Program Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 8.2 Maintenance Program Section 8.2, Rev. 0 Page 8.2-1
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 An ongoing maintenance program is defined and incorporated In the CASTOR~ geo69 System Operations Manual that will be prepared and issued to each user prior to delivery and first use of the CASTOR geo69 package. This document shall delineate the detailed inspections, testing, and parts replacement necessary to ensure continued radiological safety, proper handling, and containment perfonnance of the CASTOR., geo69 Package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 regula-tions, conditions in the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), and the design requirements and criteria contained in this SAR.
All test shall be perfonned according to written and approved procedures and shall comply with the applicable codes and standards. The results shall be documented and become part of the quality documentation of the packaging. The maintenance program includes periodic inspection and test-ing procedures as well as replacement schedules to ensure the continuous capability of the pack-age during Its operation time. Periodic testing is required In the following intervals:
~~Loaded package o Prior to transport after storage in an interim storage facility~~
Empty package o After 15 transports or not later than after 3 years o After 60 transports or not lager than after 6 years The testing procedures perfonned in the nuclear power plant on the loaded package prior to transport are described in the package operations. The testing procedure after 60 transports or 6 years includes additional tests on the cask, canister and basket compared to the testing proce-dure after 15 transports or 3 years. Each testing procedure includes the visual inspection of all components, coatings, sealing surfaces, threaded holes and screwing elements. In case of de-fonnation, erosion or corrosion the corresponding component has either to be repaired or re-placed.
8.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests 8.2.1.1 Structural Tests Periodic static load tests are perfonned on the load attachment points of the cask lid and the canis-ter lid after 60 transports or 6 years. The load tests of the trunnions are perfonned on the loaded package prior to transport after interim storage and on the empty package after 60 transports or 8.2 Maintenance Program Section 8.2, Rev. O Page 8.2-2
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.O Proprietary Information withheld per 10 CFR2.390 6 years. A load factor of 1.5 applies to these load tests according to ANSI N14.6 [1]. No periodic load test is performed on the tilting studs of the cask. The criteria to pass the periodic load tests are as specified in section 8.1.3.2. Furthermore, a maximum number of lifting operations applies to all load attachment points after which the corresponding component is replaced. These numbers are specified acc. to chapter 2 and the System Operations Manual. The load tests are accompa-nied by non-destructive examination according to Table 8.2-1, which is performed prior to and after the load tests.
8.2.2 Leakage Tests All seals specified in Section 8.1.4 are leak tested at intervals of 15 transports or 3 years. Metal gaskets, sealing rings and the corresponding seallng surfaces shall be visually examined. The metal gaskets and elastomerlc sealing rings may be replaced with new exemplars in the course of the leak tests. The application of used metal gaskets and elastomerlc seals is permitted as long as the required leak tightness is achieved. The test sensitivities and the equipment specified in Sec-tion 8.1.4 also apply to the periodic leak tests. Prior to transport leak testing is performed on the cask lid system, Including the cast lid, protection cap and blind flange. The leak tightness of the wear protection is also tested prior to transport.
8.2.3 Component and Material Tests Replaceable components that are important for handling and closure of the package are periodical-ly tested and replaced, in necessary. Table 8.2-1 gives an overview of all components with a peri-odic test and replacement schedule. The periodic static load tests are not included in Table 8.2-1.
Replaced components are documented in the cask logbook.
8.2 Maintenance Program Section 8.2, Rev. 0 Page 8.2-3
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary lnfonnation withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Table 8.2-1 Periodic tests and replacement schedules for components
.s} I!! t!
Component test method ~ ~ l [ Rep/&e9"!8'1t d:g C") C0 All metallic and elasto- V1Sual inspection, leak meric sealina rinas testini:i
- X X Automatic7 In case of cracks or when Visual inspection, MT or x1 x1 x2 the maximum number of Trunnion PT lifting operations Is ex-ceeded Visual inspection, MT or x3 In case of cracks or im-Cap screw x3 x4 PT Qaui:ie test proper deterioration In case of cracks or im-Hexagon screw Visual inspection X X X proper deterioration V1Sual inspection, MT or In case of cracks or Im-Cask lid system screws PT, llSUJJe test
- X X prooer deterioration V1Sual inspection, PT, In case of cracks or im-Canister closure system i:iauae test
- X X proper deterioration Quick connect and bonded seal
- - - X Automatic Visual Inspection, Cali- Replacement of individual Basket bra test
- x6 x6 oarts In case of visible cracks Shielding elements Visual Inspection - - X that are not reoairable In case of cracks or local Impact limiters V1Sual inspection - X - defonnatlon of the sur-face 0 Inspection of trunnions In installed condition 1 Inspection of trunnions after dismantlement (test range 100%)
2 Only the most highly stressed cap screws are dismantled and tested 3 All cap screvvs are dismantled and tested 4 Visual inspection and Calibre test are performed in the canister 5 Visual inspection and Calibre test are performed after removal of the basket from the canister 6 Automatic replacement at the discretion of the user e In cases where the calibre test is not passed successfully, a disassembly of the basket is neces-sary to find and replace any damaged parts. Sheets and segments are checked for deformation.
Screws and nuts must be checked via visual inspection and MT or PT. After replacement of the damaged parts the baeket is reassembled and the calibre test is repeated.
The moderator material fasteners are tested for tight fit after 15 transports or 3 years. The modera-tor material components do not have a fixed replacement schedule because no significant degen-eration of the material occurs during package operation and storage as long as the components are properly fixed.
8.2 Maintenance Program Section 8.2, Rev. O Page 8.2-4
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld (@)GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8.2.4 Thennal Tests The periodic inspection and (in case of deterioration) replacement of components ensures that the thermal behaviour of each component and the heat dissipation in the package remains consistent with the performed thermal calculations. Therefore, no periodic thermal tests are scheduled in the maintenance program.
8.2.5 Miscellaneous Tests In addition to the periodic tests and replacement schedules listed in, the periodic testing of an emp-ty CASTOR~ geo69 after 15 transports or not later than after 3 years and after 60 transports or not later than after 6 years includes the following test steps:
~~Visual inspection of the surface coating of the cask body~~
~~Visual inspection of the cask cavity wall and bottom~~
~~Visual inspection of the canister cavity wall and bottom (with installed fuel basket, as far as visible)~~
~~Visual inspection of all sealing surfaces for metal gaskets and inspection of the surface roughness of the sealing surfaces~~
~~Visual inspection and gauge test of all threaded holes in the cask body for fastening the cask lid and the impact limiters~~
~~Inspection of the nominal preload / tightening torque of all screws~~
~~Visual inspection and thread gauging of the threaded holes for blind flange and protection cap in the cask lid~~
~~Visual inspection and thread gauging of the threaded holes for the pressure nut in the can-ister lid~~
\
Visual inspection and thread gauging of the LAP in cask lid and canister lid 8.2 Maintenance Program Section 8.2, Rev. 0 Page 8.2-5
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev.a Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 Periodic testing of the impact limiters includes the following steps:
~~Visual inspection of the removed penetration protection~~
~~Visual Inspection of casing of the Impact limiters and of the surface coating of the coated parts~~
Visual inspection and thread gauging of the cap screws and visual inspection of the wash-ers A complete list of all necessary test steps for the periodic testing of the packaging will be imple-mented in the CASTOR geo69 System Operations Manual.
List of References
[1] ANSI N14.6 (1993)
Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More 8.2 Maintenance Program Section 8.2, Rev. 0 Page 8.2-6
1014-SR-00001 Non-Proprietary Version Rev. 0 Proprietary Information withheld @GNS per 10 CFR2.390 8.3 Appendix Name, Function Date Signature Prepared Reviewed 8.3 Appendix Section 8.3, Rev. 0 Page 8.3-1

ML21033A354

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