ML20311A510
| ML20311A510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2017 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML20311A510 (282) | |
Text
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : March 29, 2002
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : March 27, 2002
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : March 26, 2002
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Last modified : March 01, 2002
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 4 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Steam Pressure Loop Instrument Test Resulting in Reactor Trip Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for surveillance tests. On July 16, 2001, maintenance technicians failed to follow surveillance procedure IP/2/A/3001/002E and improperly isolated the wrong channel, initiating a Unit 2 reactor trip. This issue was more than minor because it had a actual impact on safety, in that, it initiated a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of low safety significant because although it did initiate a reactor trip, it did not affect mitigating equipment and the impact of the reactor trip was minimal.
This event is in the licensee corrective action program as PIP M-01-3139 (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Resulted in NC System Leakage Event Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be established covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for maintenance. On January 15, 2002, work procedures for maintenance on valve 1NV414 were performed that did not contain adequate precautions to control plant conditions. This resulted in a Unit 2 reactor coolant system leak. This issue had a credible impact on safety because the leak exceeded TS allowed values. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the source of the leak was promptly isolated by operators, the leak was within the capacity of makeup flow to the VCT, leakage was directed to a boric acid tank, and the leak did not disable any mitigating systems. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-0177 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Performance of ECCS Recirculation Sump Inspection (Section 1R20)
A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified for the inadequate performance of a surveillance inspection of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sump. The licensee had completed this TS required inspection, but failed to identify or evaluate an abnormal amount of hardened boric acid deposits platted out within the sump. The finding was more than minor because it could have had a credible impact on safety by reducing the reliability of the ECCS pumps during accident scenarios when undissolved pieces of the boric acid could enter the suction of the pumps and cause possible damage to the pumps. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the determination that mitigation systems were previously capable of performing their safety function. (Section 1R20). A licensee identified second example of this NRC identified NCV was identified in IR 02-02 (Section 4OA7). Specifically, the performance of PT/1/A/4700/056, Unit 1 Containment Building Civil Structures Inspection, failed to identify the accumulation of boron and other foreign material within in the ECCS sump until corrective actions by the licensee identified it on April 18, 2002. The finding was of very low safety significance because mitigation systems were concluded to have been past operable based on engineering analysis performed by the licensee.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 4 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation.
The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 4 Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control Two Areas as Locked High Radiation Areas Contrary to TS 5.7.2, during fuel movement on March 2, 2002, two areas were identified by the licensee with general area dose rates exceeding 1000 mrem/hr which were not controlled as locked high radiation areas and were accessed by individuals. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the location of the elevated dose rates relative to the individuals' work areas, appropriate worker actions including exiting the area when elevated dose rates were initially detected, and monitoring results which indicated no significant unexpected exposures were received by the workers. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIPs M-02-01017 and M-02-01018 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of an Individual to Respond Appropriately to an Alarming ED Contrary to TS 5.7.1, on February 27, 2002, an individual worker in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, posted as a high radiation area, failed to respond appropriately to his Electronic Dosimeter (ED) integrated dose alarm. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on monitoring results which indicated the worker was in low dose rate areas within the posted high radiation area when the alarm sounded and no over-exposures occurred. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-00907 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding.
(Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 4 prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance.
One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : July 22, 2002
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 5 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Steam Pressure Loop Instrument Test Resulting in Reactor Trip Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for surveillance tests. On July 16, 2001, maintenance technicians failed to follow surveillance procedure IP/2/A/3001/002E and improperly isolated the wrong channel, initiating a Unit 2 reactor trip. This issue was more than minor because it had a actual impact on safety, in that, it initiated a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of low safety significant because although it did initiate a reactor trip, it did not affect mitigating equipment and the impact of the reactor trip was minimal. This event is in the licensee corrective action program as PIP M-01-3139 (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Resulted in NC System Leakage Event Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be established covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for maintenance. On January 15, 2002, work procedures for maintenance on valve 1NV414 were performed that did not contain adequate precautions to control plant conditions.
This resulted in a Unit 2 reactor coolant system leak. This issue had a credible impact on safety because the leak exceeded TS allowed values. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the source of the leak was promptly isolated by operators, the leak was within the capacity of makeup flow to the VCT, leakage was directed to a boric acid tank, and the leak did not disable any mitigating systems. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-0177 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Performance of ECCS Recirculation Sump Inspection (Section 1R20)
A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified for the inadequate performance of a surveillance inspection of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sump. The licensee had completed this file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 5 TS required inspection, but failed to identify or evaluate an abnormal amount of hardened boric acid deposits platted out within the sump. The finding was more than minor because it could have had a credible impact on safety by reducing the reliability of the ECCS pumps during accident scenarios when undissolved pieces of the boric acid could enter the suction of the pumps and cause possible damage to the pumps. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the determination that mitigation systems were previously capable of performing their safety function. (Section 1R20). A licensee identified second example of this NRC identified NCV was identified in IR 02-02 (Section 4OA7). Specifically, the performance of PT/1/A/4700/056, Unit 1 Containment Building Civil Structures Inspection, failed to identify the accumulation of boron and other foreign material within in the ECCS sump until corrective actions by the licensee identified it on April 18, 2002. The finding was of very low safety significance because mitigation systems were concluded to have been past operable based on engineering analysis performed by the licensee.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 5 Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control Two Areas as Locked High Radiation Areas Contrary to TS 5.7.2, during fuel movement on March 2, 2002, two areas were identified by the licensee with general area dose rates exceeding 1000 mrem/hr which were not controlled as locked high radiation areas and were accessed by individuals. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the location of the elevated dose rates relative to the individuals' work areas, appropriate worker actions including exiting the area when elevated dose rates were initially detected, and monitoring results which indicated no significant unexpected exposures were received by the workers. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIPs M-02-01017 and M 01018 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 5 Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of an Individual to Respond Appropriately to an Alarming ED Contrary to TS 5.7.1, on February 27, 2002, an individual worker in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, posted as a high radiation area, failed to respond appropriately to his Electronic Dosimeter (ED) integrated dose alarm. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on monitoring results which indicated the worker was in low dose rate areas within the posted high radiation area when the alarm sounded and no over-exposures occurred. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-00907 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2002 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/03/2003
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 5 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Steam Pressure Loop Instrument Test Resulting in Reactor Trip Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for surveillance tests. On July 16, 2001, maintenance technicians failed to follow surveillance procedure IP/2/A/3001/002E and improperly isolated the wrong channel, initiating a Unit 2 reactor trip. This issue was more than minor because it had a actual impact on safety, in that, it initiated a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of low safety significant because although it did initiate a reactor trip, it did not affect mitigating equipment and the impact of the reactor trip was minimal. This event is in the licensee corrective action program as PIP M-01-3139 (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Resulted in NC System Leakage Event Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be established covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for maintenance. On January 15, 2002, work procedures for maintenance on valve 1NV414 were performed that did not contain adequate precautions to control plant conditions.
This resulted in a Unit 2 reactor coolant system leak. This issue had a credible impact on safety because the leak exceeded TS allowed values. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the source of the leak was promptly isolated by operators, the leak was within the capacity of makeup flow to the VCT, leakage was directed to a boric acid tank, and the leak did not disable any mitigating systems. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-0177 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 14, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Not Considering the TS Bases Required Operating Time in an Operability Determination A finding was identified for not considering the Technical Specification (TS) bases required operating time in an operability determination for equipment in a degraded condition. Following the discovery of a refrigerant leak on the A control room area chiller, the licensee concluded that the condition did not affect operability. However, in making the determination, the licensee did not consider the design bases of the control room area chilled water system to maintain the control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. Upon considering the TS bases operating time without establishing compensatory measures, the licensee declared the train inoperable. Not considering the TS bases
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 5 operating requirements in operability determinations with equipment in degraded conditions could become a more significant safety concern because it may result in TS LCOs not being met. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the A train control room area chiller was not inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Performance of ECCS Recirculation Sump Inspection (Section 1R20)
A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified for the inadequate performance of a surveillance inspection of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sump. The licensee had completed this TS required inspection, but failed to identify or evaluate an abnormal amount of hardened boric acid deposits platted out within the sump. The finding was more than minor because it could have had a credible impact on safety by reducing the reliability of the ECCS pumps during accident scenarios when undissolved pieces of the boric acid could enter the suction of the pumps and cause possible damage to the pumps. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the determination that mitigation systems were previously capable of performing their safety function. (Section 1R20). A licensee identified second example of this NRC identified NCV was identified in IR 02-02 (Section 4OA7). Specifically, the performance of PT/1/A/4700/056, Unit 1 Containment Building Civil Structures Inspection, failed to identify the accumulation of boron and other foreign material within in the ECCS sump until corrective actions by the licensee identified it on April 18, 2002. The finding was of very low safety significance because mitigation systems were concluded to have been past operable based on engineering analysis performed by the licensee.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Compensatory Measures Result in Degradation of Flood Mitigation Function for EDG Areas A non-cited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified involving degradation of the flood mitigation function for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) areas. Specifically, the inspectors identified that station personnel responsible for implementing compensatory measures for flood protection on July 10, 2001, were not cognizant of their responsibilities and that the associated flood protection procedures were inadequate to ensure timely closure of a flood door protecting the Unit 1 EDGs from a design basis turbine building flood. This condition was assessed over a six hour time period on July 10, 2001, as well as similar periods of time over the last 18 months when the subject door in either unit was opened without any discernable compensatory action in place. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This was due to the relatively small period of duration per year, and the minimal effects that turbine building flooding would have on the availability of offsite power for those periods in question. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification Failure to follow procedure (Technical Specification 5.4.1) for PT/2/A/4350/026C, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification. The procedure indicates that all manipulations of controls at the panel shall be performed by a licensed reactor operator. A non-licensed operator performed the auxiliary shutdown manipulations during the performance of the test, contrary to the requirements of the procedure. This is captured in the licensee's corrective action program under PIP M-00-4140. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (Section 4OA7).
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 5 Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance: Dec 16, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedure for removal of 120VAC inverters from service Inadequate procedure (TS 5.4.1) for removal of Unit 2 120VAC vital inverters from service. During plant solid RCS operation in Mode 5, de-energizing the vital inverters resulted in an inoperable Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system required by Technical Specification 3.4.12. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator.
A finding was identified associated with the depth and effectiveness of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for failures of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator. The licensee's corrective actions for recent SSF-related problems have not been commensurate with the risk significance of the system. A recent Problem Investigation Process report, which documented a jacket water coolant leak and subsequent emptying of the engine's radiator, was not screened to include a root cause evaluation. The licensee did not perform comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the need for performing additional preventive maintenance on the SSF diesel generator components. The inspectors identified vendor-recommended maintenance practices that were not being implemented and service bulletins authored by the vendor that were not included in the associated controlled vendor manual located on site. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not directly linked to any specific period of unavailability for the SSF diesel generator. This instance of ineffective corrective action was an isolated example and is not considered indicative of the licensee's overall corrective action program. (Section 4OA2b).
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control Two Areas as Locked High Radiation Areas Contrary to TS 5.7.2, during fuel movement on March 2, 2002, two areas were identified by the licensee with general area dose rates exceeding 1000 mrem/hr which were not controlled as locked high radiation areas and were accessed by individuals. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the location of the elevated dose
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 5 rates relative to the individuals' work areas, appropriate worker actions including exiting the area when elevated dose rates were initially detected, and monitoring results which indicated no significant unexpected exposures were received by the workers. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIPs M-02-01017 and M 01018 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of an Individual to Respond Appropriately to an Alarming ED Contrary to TS 5.7.1, on February 27, 2002, an individual worker in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, posted as a high radiation area, failed to respond appropriately to his Electronic Dosimeter (ED) integrated dose alarm. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on monitoring results which indicated the worker was in low dose rate areas within the posted high radiation area when the alarm sounded and no over-exposures occurred. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-00907 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Proper Search of Individuals Entering Protected Area A non-cited violation was identified when a security officer failed to properly search two individuals prior to allowing them unescorted access to the protected area. Requirements violated were established in the McGuire Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. While the risk was low in this case, this issue was identified as more than a minor finding because granting site access to individuals who have not been properly searched can have a credible impact on safety. Additionally, the granting of access to improperly searched individuals can be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process and identifying this finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, without a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee's response band and a Green finding. (Section 3PP2)
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 16, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of the Electronic Switching to Provide the Central Alarm Station Operator with the Capability to Properly Assess Potential Penetrations at the Perimeter Prior to Individuals Gaining Access A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the failure of the licensee's electronic switching on September 12, 2000, to provide the central alarm station operator with the capability to properly assess potential penetrations at the perimeter prior to individuals gaining access to the protected area (Section 3PP3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action process. Generally, issues were prioritized and evaluated appropriately, and in a timely fashion. The evaluations of significant problems were of sufficient depth to determine the likely root or apparent causes, as well as address the potential extent of the circumstances contributing to the problem and provide a clear basis to establish corrective actions. Corrective actions that addressed the causes of problems were generally identified and implemented. Reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be adequately broad based and effective in providing management a tool for identifying adverse trends. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management. The inspectors identified that an element of the corrective action program had not been fully developed, in that limited quarterly trending of issues was performed.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 15, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. One exception involved a recent condition adverse to quality in which the standby shutdown facility's (SSF) diesel generator was unavailable following the complete draining of radiator coolant because of heater shell pin-hole leaks. The licensee did not perform an in-depth root cause analysis and thorough corrective actions following its discovery of the degraded condition. Also, for potential safety equipment operability issues, the licensee did not always conduct or document thorough evaluations of present or past inoperability. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Last modified : December 02, 2002
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Steam Pressure Loop Instrument Test Resulting in Reactor Trip Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for surveillance tests. On July 16, 2001, maintenance technicians failed to follow surveillance procedure IP/2/A/3001/002E and improperly isolated the wrong channel, initiating a Unit 2 reactor trip. This issue was more than minor because it had a actual impact on safety, in that, it initiated a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of low safety significant because although it did initiate a reactor trip, it did not affect mitigating equipment and the impact of the reactor trip was minimal. This event is in the licensee corrective action program as PIP M-01-3139 (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Resulted in NC System Leakage Event Licensee Identified Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1., which requires that written procedures shall be established covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for maintenance. On January 15, 2002, work procedures for maintenance on valve 1NV414 were performed that did not contain adequate precautions to control plant conditions. This resulted in a Unit 2 reactor coolant system leak. This issue had a credible impact on safety because the leak exceeded TS allowed values. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the source of the leak was promptly isolated by operators, the leak was within the capacity of makeup flow to the VCT, leakage was directed to a boric acid tank, and the leak did not disable any mitigating systems. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-0177 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 14, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Not Considering the TS Bases Required Operating Time in an Operability Determination A finding was identified for not considering the Technical Specification (TS) bases required operating time in an operability determination for equipment in a degraded condition. Following the discovery of a refrigerant leak on the A control room area chiller, the licensee concluded that the condition did not affect operability. However, in making the determination, the licensee did not consider the design bases of the control room area chilled water system to maintain the control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. Upon considering the TS bases operating time without establishing compensatory measures, the licensee declared the train inoperable. Not considering the TS bases operating requirements in operability determinations with equipment in degraded conditions could become a more significant safety concern because it may result in TS LCOs not being met. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the A train control room area chiller was not inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Performance of ECCS Recirculation Sump Inspection (Section 1R20)
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. was identified for the inadequate performance of a surveillance inspection of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sump. The licensee had completed this TS required inspection, but failed to identify or evaluate an abnormal amount of hardened boric acid deposits platted out within the sump. The finding was more than minor because it could have had a credible impact on safety by reducing the reliability of the ECCS pumps during accident scenarios when undissolved pieces of the boric acid could enter the suction of the pumps and cause possible damage to the pumps. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the determination that mitigation systems were previously capable of performing their safety function. (Section 1R20). A licensee identified second example of this NRC identified NCV was identified in IR 02-02 (Section 4OA7). Specifically, the performance of PT/1/A/4700/056, Unit 1 Containment Building Civil Structures Inspection, failed to identify the accumulation of boron and other foreign material within in the ECCS sump until corrective actions by the licensee identified it on April 18, 2002. The finding was of very low safety significance because mitigation systems were concluded to have been past operable based on engineering analysis performed by the licensee.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control Two Areas as Locked High Radiation Areas Contrary to TS 5.7.2, during fuel movement on March 2, 2002, two areas were identified by the licensee with general area dose rates exceeding 1000 mrem/hr which were not controlled as locked high radiation areas and were accessed by individuals. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the location of the elevated dose rates relative to the individuals' work areas, appropriate worker actions including exiting the area when elevated dose rates were initially detected, and monitoring results which indicated no significant unexpected exposures were received by the workers. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIPs M-02-01017 and M 01018 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure of an Individual to Respond Appropriately to an Alarming ED Contrary to TS 5.7.1, on February 27, 2002, an individual worker in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, posted as a high radiation area, failed to respond appropriately to his Electronic Dosimeter (ED) integrated dose alarm. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on monitoring results which indicated the worker was in low dose rate areas within the posted high radiation area when the alarm sounded and no over-exposures occurred. This issue is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-02-00907 (Section 4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action process. Generally, issues were prioritized and evaluated appropriately, and in a timely fashion. The evaluations of significant problems were of sufficient depth to determine the likely root or apparent causes, as well as address the potential extent of the circumstances contributing to the problem and provide a clear basis to establish corrective actions. Corrective actions that addressed the causes of problems were generally identified and implemented. Reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be adequately broad based and effective in providing management a tool for identifying adverse trends. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management. The inspectors identified that an element of the corrective action program had not been fully developed, in that limited quarterly trending of issues was performed.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Last modified : March 25, 2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 2 McGuire 2 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 14, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Not Considering the TS Bases Required Operating Time in an Operability Determination A finding was identified for not considering the Technical Specification (TS) bases required operating time in an operability determination for equipment in a degraded condition. Following the discovery of a refrigerant leak on the A control room area chiller, the licensee concluded that the condition did not affect operability. However, in making the determination, the licensee did not consider the design bases of the control room area chilled water system to maintain the control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. Upon considering the TS bases operating time without establishing compensatory measures, the licensee declared the train inoperable. Not considering the TS bases operating requirements in operability determinations with equipment in degraded conditions could become a more significant safety concern because it may result in TS LCOs not being met. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the A train control room area chiller was not inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 22, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/22/2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 2 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate surveys of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent Particulate Radionuclides The licensee failed to have proper sample line configuration and flow characteristics to assure sample representativeness of particulate radionuclides collected for monitoring and quantifying the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent airborne effluents in accordance with the Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual Table 11.7.11-1.
An NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified. This violation is greater than minor in that the failure to have proper sample line configurations and flow characteristics could result in non-representative collection of particulate radionuclides used to evaluate doses to members of the public from airborne effluent releases. This issue is associated with the process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to protect public from exposure to radiation. The violation is of very low safety significance because current operations have resulted in negligible release of particulate radionuclides and resultant doses to the public (Section 2PS1.1).
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Physical Protection Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action process. Generally, issues were prioritized and evaluated appropriately, and in a timely fashion. The evaluations of significant problems were of sufficient depth to determine the likely root or apparent causes, as well as address the potential extent of the circumstances contributing to the problem and provide a clear basis to establish corrective actions. Corrective actions that addressed the causes of problems were generally identified and implemented. Reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be adequately broad based and effective in providing management a tool for identifying adverse trends. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management. The inspectors identified that an element of the corrective action program had not been fully developed, in that limited quarterly trending of issues was performed.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Last modified : May 30, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 07/22/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 2 McGuire 2 2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 14, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Not Considering the TS Bases Required Operating Time in an Operability Determination A finding was identified for not considering the Technical Specification (TS) bases required operating time in an operability determination for equipment in a degraded condition. Following the discovery of a refrigerant leak on the A control room area chiller, the licensee concluded that the condition did not affect operability. However, in making the determination, the licensee did not consider the design bases of the control room area chilled water system to maintain the control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. Upon considering the TS bases operating time without establishing compensatory measures, the licensee declared the train inoperable. Not considering the TS bases operating requirements in operability determinations with equipment in degraded conditions could become a more significant safety concern because it may result in TS LCOs not being met. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the A train control room area chiller was not inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 22, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 10/08/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 2 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate surveys of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent Particulate Radionuclides The licensee failed to have proper sample line configuration and flow characteristics to assure sample representativeness of particulate radionuclides collected for monitoring and quantifying the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent airborne effluents in accordance with the Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual Table 11.7.11-1.
An NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified. This violation is greater than minor in that the failure to have proper sample line configurations and flow characteristics could result in non-representative collection of particulate radionuclides used to evaluate doses to members of the public from airborne effluent releases. This issue is associated with the process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to protect public from exposure to radiation. The violation is of very low safety significance because current operations have resulted in negligible release of particulate radionuclides and resultant doses to the public (Section 2PS1.1).
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Physical Protection Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action process. Generally, issues were prioritized and evaluated appropriately, and in a timely fashion. The evaluations of significant problems were of sufficient depth to determine the likely root or apparent causes, as well as address the potential extent of the circumstances contributing to the problem and provide a clear basis to establish corrective actions. Corrective actions that addressed the causes of problems were generally identified and implemented. Reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be adequately broad based and effective in providing management a tool for identifying adverse trends. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management. The inspectors identified that an element of the corrective action program had not been fully developed, in that limited quarterly trending of issues was performed.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Last modified : September 04, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 10/08/2003
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 2 McGuire 2 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take Prompt Actions to Resolve Control Room Environmental Chiller Issue A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for failure to take prompt action to remedy an identified problem documented in a Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) associated with the ability to restart control room cooling following a station blackout (SBO) event. This finding was considered to be more than minor based on the fact that subsequent NRC review revealed that the licensee had been untimely in initiation of corrective action. The lack of corrective actions in an existing PIP could lead to untimely action to mitigate response to a SBO event. The licensee had committed to respond to a SBO event by re-energizing a train of control room chillers shared between the two Units within forty five minutes. However, on March 31, 1999, the licensee identified that the time for chiller re-energization may be as great as 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The licensee did not identify the corrective actions necessary to understand the expected consequences of the temperature rise in the control room as a result of the increased time to re-energization. Therefore, the mitigation systems and cornerstone objective of ensuring the continued reliability of equipment needed to respond to a postulated event (10 CFR 50.63) could be affected. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no actual loss of function of a safety train or system and no design or qualification issue. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 01/12/2004
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 2 Significance: Mar 22, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate surveys of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent Particulate Radionuclides The licensee failed to have proper sample line configuration and flow characteristics to assure sample representativeness of particulate radionuclides collected for monitoring and quantifying the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent airborne effluents in accordance with the Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual Table 11.7.11-1.
An NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified. This violation is greater than minor in that the failure to have proper sample line configurations and flow characteristics could result in non-representative collection of particulate radionuclides used to evaluate doses to members of the public from airborne effluent releases. This issue is associated with the process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to protect public from exposure to radiation. The violation is of very low safety significance because current operations have resulted in negligible release of particulate radionuclides and resultant doses to the public (Section 2PS1.1).
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : December 01, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 01/12/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 2 McGuire 2 4Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for removing from service the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to the 1D steam generator A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) when the 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump containment isolation valve for the 1D steam generator (1CA42B) was closed to perform maintenance on October 14, 2003 (Section 1R13). This finding was considered to be more than minor because the inadequate risk assessment resulted in the assignment of an incorrect risk action level (color) for this maintenance activity. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because had the error not occurred the only additional action required would have been management awareness of the additional risk associated with the activity.
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take Prompt Actions to Resolve Control Room Environmental Chiller Issue A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for failure to take prompt action to remedy an identified problem documented in a Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) associated with the ability to restart control room cooling following a station blackout (SBO) event. This finding was considered to be more than minor based on the fact that subsequent NRC review revealed that the licensee had been untimely in initiation of corrective action. The lack of corrective actions in an existing PIP could lead to untimely action to mitigate response to a SBO event. The licensee had committed to respond to a SBO event by re-energizing a train of control room chillers shared between the two Units within forty five minutes. However, on March 31, 1999, the licensee identified that the time for chiller re-energization may be as great as 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The licensee did not identify the corrective actions necessary to understand the expected consequences of the temperature rise in the control room as a result of the increased time to re-energization. Therefore, the mitigation systems and cornerstone objective of ensuring the continued reliability of equipment needed to respond to a postulated event (10 CFR 50.63) could be affected. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no actual loss of function of a safety train or system and no design or qualification issue. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 04/22/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 2 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 22, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate surveys of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent Particulate Radionuclides The licensee failed to have proper sample line configuration and flow characteristics to assure sample representativeness of particulate radionuclides collected for monitoring and quantifying the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Plant Vent airborne effluents in accordance with the Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual Table 11.7.11-1.
An NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified. This violation is greater than minor in that the failure to have proper sample line configurations and flow characteristics could result in non-representative collection of particulate radionuclides used to evaluate doses to members of the public from airborne effluent releases. This issue is associated with the process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to protect public from exposure to radiation. The violation is of very low safety significance because current operations have resulted in negligible release of particulate radionuclides and resultant doses to the public (Section 2PS1.1).
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : March 02, 2004 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\MCG2\mcg2_pim.html 04/22/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have pre-fire plans for the Unit 1 and 2 interior and exterior doghouses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have pre-fire (strategy) plans for the interior and exterior doghouse fire areas as part of the fire fighting procedures. The dog houses contain safety-related main steam piping and main steam isolation valves, steam generator power operated relief valves, main steam safety valves, main feed piping and isolation valves, and auxiliary feedwater piping and isolation valves.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because the manual fire suppression defense-in-depth feature was moderately impacted, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because the dog houses are physically independent (separated by distance and enclosed in 3-hour fire barriers) and either the interior or exterior doghouse can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for fire protection safe shutdown The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology.
This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-in-depth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have a rated 3-hour barrier around the SSF power system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have a 3-hour-rated fire barrier that enclosed the SSF power system equipment as described in the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 6.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because it is a degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth feature to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety in order to minimize the affect of fire, which affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because B safe shutdown train equipment can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions and is physically independent of the SSF.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Include Valve 2CA0007A in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room Fire 07/14/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 license condition 2.C.(7), in that, the licensee failed to properly analyze the impact of a fire on Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system valve 2CA0007A for potential fires in the control room and Fire Area 4. Immediate corrective action by the licensee was to revise fire response procedures to incorporate a time critical local operator manual action to de-energize the valve to preclude spurious closure.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety objective. This performance deficiency potentially degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection.
However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because review and analysis could not identify credible or likely fire scenarios in the chosen fire areas that would lead to loss or degradation of the secondary heat removal function as a result of spurious closure of 2CA007A, auxiliary feedwater turbine pump suction valve.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Feb 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Deviation from Design Requirements for Line Slope and Drain Legs for Containment Pressure Transmitter Impulse Lines Was not Identified or Evaluated The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The licensee had failed to identify and evaluate the impact on design of sloping the impulse lines for the containment pressure transmitters downward from the containment towards the transmitters without low point drain legs installed. This configuration was a deviation from the licensee's design requirements, and introduced the potential for water intrusion in the instrument impulse lines during normal operation and accident conditions.
In response to this condition, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and entered the finding into their corrective program (Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No. M-04-00713). The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective, in that the formation of a loop seal would have the potential to affect the performance capability of instruments used for automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, and post-accident monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, or post-accident monitoring capability (loss of function). (Section 1R21.21. b).
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for removing from service the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to the 1D steam generator A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) when the 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump containment isolation valve for the 1D steam generator (1CA42B) was closed to perform maintenance on October 14, 2003 (Section 1R13). This finding was considered to be more than minor because the inadequate risk assessment resulted in the assignment of an incorrect risk action level (color) for this maintenance activity. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because had the error not occurred the only additional action required would have been management awareness of the additional risk associated with the activity.
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take Prompt Actions to Resolve Control Room Environmental Chiller Issue A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for failure to take prompt action to remedy an identified problem documented in a Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) associated with the ability to restart control room cooling following a station blackout (SBO) event. This finding was considered to be more than minor based on the fact that subsequent NRC review revealed that the licensee had been untimely in initiation of corrective action. The lack of corrective actions in an existing PIP could lead to untimely action to mitigate response to a SBO event. The licensee had committed to respond to a SBO event by re-energizing a train of control room chillers shared between the two Units within forty five minutes. However, on March 31, 1999, the licensee identified that the time for chiller re-energization may be as great as 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The licensee did not identify the corrective actions necessary to understand the expected consequences of the temperature rise in the control room as a result of the increased time to re-energization. Therefore, the mitigation systems and cornerstone objective of ensuring the continued reliability of equipment needed to respond to a postulated event (10 CFR 50.63) could be affected. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no actual loss of function of a safety train or system and no design or qualification issue. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf) 07/14/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : May 05, 2004 07/14/2004
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 2Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous extinguishers.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of the operating license condition for fire protection for failing to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous fire extinguishers from plant fire areas that contain safety-related equipment. The non-updated fire strategy plans could decrease the effectiveness of the fire brigade. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection equipment availability and degraded the ability to meet the manual suppression Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low safety significance because the areas where the inspectors found extinguishers missing did not have both trains of safe shutdown and the standby shutdown system in the same fire area while utilizing 20 foot separation between trains, hence, the significance of the fire brigade's decreased effectiveness was reduced.
(Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Emergency Lighting System under 10 CFR 50.65a(1).
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (maintenance rule) for failing to demonstrate that the performance of the emergency lighting battery system was being effectively controlled after it exceeded its Maintenance Rule a(2) performance. The licensee had not established goals nor monitored the performance of the batteries per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The finding is more than minor because of the affected reliability objective of the Equipment Performance attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Portions of the emergency lighting were not available to perform their intended function of supporting operator actions to mitigate the consequences of fires upon loss of all other lighting. The finding is of very low safety significance because there is no design deficiency, the finding does not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events, in accordance with MC 0609, Safety Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have pre-fire plans for the Unit 1 and 2 interior and exterior doghouses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have pre-fire (strategy) plans for the interior and exterior doghouse fire areas as part of the fire fighting procedures. The dog houses contain safety-related main steam piping and main steam isolation valves, steam generator power operated relief valves, main steam safety valves, main feed piping and isolation valves, and auxiliary feedwater piping and isolation valves.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because the manual fire suppression defense-in-depth feature was moderately impacted, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because the dog houses are physically independent (separated by distance and enclosed in 3-hour fire barriers) and either the interior or exterior doghouse can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for fire protection safe shutdown The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology.
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-in-depth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have a rated 3-hour barrier around the SSF power system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have a 3-hour-rated fire barrier that enclosed the SSF power system equipment as described in the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 6.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because it is a degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth feature to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety in order to minimize the affect of fire, which affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because B safe shutdown train equipment can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions and is physically independent of the SSF.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Include Valve 2CA0007A in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room Fire The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 license condition 2.C.(7), in that, the licensee failed to properly analyze the impact of a fire on Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system valve 2CA0007A for potential fires in the control room and Fire Area 4. Immediate corrective action by the licensee was to revise fire response procedures to incorporate a time critical local operator manual action to de-energize the valve to preclude spurious closure.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety objective. This performance deficiency potentially degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because review and analysis could not identify credible or likely fire scenarios in the chosen fire areas that would lead to loss or degradation of the secondary heat removal function as a result of spurious closure of 2CA007A, auxiliary feedwater turbine pump suction valve.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Feb 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Deviation from Design Requirements for Line Slope and Drain Legs for Containment Pressure Transmitter Impulse Lines Was not Identified or Evaluated The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The licensee had failed to identify and evaluate the impact on design of sloping the impulse lines for the containment pressure transmitters downward from the containment towards the transmitters without low point drain legs installed. This configuration was a deviation from the licensee's design requirements, and introduced the potential for water intrusion in the instrument impulse lines during normal operation and accident conditions. In response to this condition, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and entered the finding into their corrective program (Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No. M 00713). The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective, in that the formation of a loop seal would have the potential to affect the performance capability of instruments used for automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, and post-accident monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, or post-accident monitoring capability (loss of function). (Section 1R21.21. b).
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for removing from service the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to the 1D steam generator A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) when the 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump containment isolation valve for the 1D steam generator (1CA42B) was closed to perform maintenance on October 14, 2003 (Section 1R13). This finding was considered to be more than minor because the inadequate risk assessment resulted in the assignment of an incorrect risk action level (color) for this maintenance activity. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because had the error not occurred the only additional action required would have been management awareness of the additional risk associated with the activity.
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Significance: Sep 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take Prompt Actions to Resolve Control Room Environmental Chiller Issue A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for failure to take prompt action to remedy an identified problem documented in a Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) associated with the ability to restart control room cooling following a station blackout (SBO) event. This finding was considered to be more than minor based on the fact that subsequent NRC review revealed that the licensee had been untimely in initiation of corrective action. The lack of corrective actions in an existing PIP could lead to untimely action to mitigate response to a SBO event. The licensee had committed to respond to a SBO event by re-energizing a train of control room chillers shared between the two Units within forty five minutes. However, on March 31, 1999, the licensee identified that the time for chiller re-energization may be as great as 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The licensee did not identify the corrective actions necessary to understand the expected consequences of the temperature rise in the control room as a result of the increased time to re-energization. Therefore, the mitigation systems and cornerstone objective of ensuring the continued reliability of equipment needed to respond to a postulated event (10 CFR 50.63) could be affected. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no actual loss of function of a safety train or system and no design or qualification issue. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 08, 2004
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 4 McGuire 2 3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to comply with design control for a design assumption associated with the nuclear service water system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified by the inspectors for inadequate design control involving an assumption that supported nuclear service water flow following a seismic event. The assumption was that non-seismic condenser circulating water pipe would be available for an extended period of time after a seismic event as the discharge path for nuclear service water train A.
Similar to Example 3.a. of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, this issue is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events and associated attributes of design control and protection from external factors (seismic). Following the identification of the issue, the licensee performed a seismic evaluation of the piping and determined that it would sufficiently perform the relied upon minimal service water flow function after a seismic event. Consequently, the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing an unreviewed safety question associated with the nuclear service water system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to plant procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The unreviewed safety question dealt with extending the availability of non-seismic condenser circulating water piping to perform a safety-related function following a seismic event. This issue is more than minor because it would require NRC review prior to implementation. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the non-seismic piping would not collapse or kink, and although it may leak, it will provide the necessary minimal service water flow function. Since the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation.
(Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a design change to the facility associated with the auxiliary feedwater system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 was identified by the inspectors for changing the design of the auxiliary feedwater system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report without performing a safety evaluation or obtaining a Technical Specification change. The change reduced the required number of trains of auxiliary feedwater from three independent trains to two independent trains to safely shutdown the reactor.
This failure to perform a safety evaluation and submit a Technical Specification change is more than minor because it would require an NRC review prior to implementation. Because there was no evidence to indicate that the licensee had used the change the safety significance was determined to be very low. Consequently, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation and Protection of Cables Associated With Redundant Trains of Instrumentation Located in the Same Fire Area A non-cited violation of Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.7 was identified by the
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 4 inspectors for failure to comply with McGuire's approved fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
Specifically, Train A and Train B cables for the primary and backup power supplies for all four reactor protection system (RPS) channels were routed in close proximity in Room 803A (Unit 1 Fire Area 15/17) and Room 805A (Unit 2 Fire Area 16/18). The cables did not have adequate protection (i.e., 20-feet separation or fire barriers) to remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute, and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. This finding is of very low safety significance because the likelihood of a fire, in either room 803A or 805A, that would damage all four reactor protection system channels was relatively low due to the small ignition sources and the horizontal distance of the ignition sources from the cables. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous extinguishers.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of the operating license condition for fire protection for failing to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous fire extinguishers from plant fire areas that contain safety-related equipment. The non-updated fire strategy plans could decrease the effectiveness of the fire brigade. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection equipment availability and degraded the ability to meet the manual suppression Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low safety significance because the areas where the inspectors found extinguishers missing did not have both trains of safe shutdown and the standby shutdown system in the same fire area while utilizing 20 foot separation between trains, hence, the significance of the fire brigade's decreased effectiveness was reduced. (Section 1R05)
The inspectors identified a second example of non-cited violation 05000369,370/2004004-01 which involved inadequate fire strategy plans and was a violation of the license condition for fire protection. The strategy plan for fire area 21, auxiliary building 750 elevation, did not identify that class D combustibles were located in the fire zone and identified that extinguishants were in locations where none existed. The strategy plan for fire area 4, auxiliary building elevation 716, did not list one of the rooms that was in the fire area. The failure to have comprehensive pre-fire strategy plans was considered a degradation for manual fire fighting effectiveness. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire), procedure quality, and design control. The licensee's corrective actions for the previous violation have not yet been implemented for these fire areas. The inspectors determined these corrective actions would likely have identified the deficiencies. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. (Section 1R05 of IR 05000369,370/2004005)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Emergency Lighting System under 10 CFR 50.65a(1).
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (maintenance rule) for failing to demonstrate that the performance of the emergency lighting battery system was being effectively controlled after it exceeded its Maintenance Rule a(2) performance. The licensee had not established goals nor monitored the performance of the batteries per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The finding is more than minor because of the affected reliability objective of the Equipment Performance attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Portions of the emergency lighting were not available to perform their intended function of supporting operator actions to mitigate the consequences of fires upon loss of all other lighting. The finding is of very low safety significance because there is no design deficiency, the finding does not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events, in accordance with MC 0609, Safety Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have pre-fire plans for the Unit 1 and 2 interior and exterior doghouses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have pre-fire (strategy) plans for the interior and exterior doghouse fire areas as part of the fire fighting procedures. The dog houses contain safety-related main steam piping and main steam isolation valves, steam generator power operated relief valves, main steam safety valves, main feed piping and isolation valves, and auxiliary feedwater piping and isolation valves.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because the manual fire suppression defense-in-depth feature was moderately impacted, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because the dog houses are physically independent (separated by distance and enclosed in 3-hour fire
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 4 barriers) and either the interior or exterior doghouse can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR - (two examples)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-in-depth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF.
However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.
The inspectors identified an additional example of a previously identified non-cited violation (05000369,370/2004003-02) for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e). Specifically, the inspectors noted a failure to resolve an UFSAR discrepancy with the Design Basis Document regarding feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements could have an impact on future stroke time tests and subsequent performance of the isolation valves. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures. (IR 05000369,370/2004008; Section 4OA2c.(3).2)
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have a rated 3-hour barrier around the SSF power system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have a 3-hour-rated fire barrier that enclosed the SSF power system equipment as described in the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 6.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because it is a degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth feature to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety in order to minimize the affect of fire, which affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because B safe shutdown train equipment can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions and is physically independent of the SSF.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Include Valve 2CA0007A in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room Fire The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 license condition 2.C.(7), in that, the licensee failed to properly analyze the impact of a fire on Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system valve 2CA0007A for potential fires in the control room and Fire Area 4. Immediate corrective action by the licensee was to revise fire response procedures to incorporate a time critical local operator manual action to de-energize the valve to preclude spurious closure.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety objective. This performance deficiency potentially degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection.
However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because review and analysis could not identify credible or likely fire scenarios in the chosen fire areas that would lead to loss or degradation of the secondary heat removal function as a result of spurious closure of 2CA007A, auxiliary feedwater turbine pump suction valve.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Feb 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Deviation from Design Requirements for Line Slope and Drain Legs for Containment Pressure Transmitter Impulse Lines Was not Identified or Evaluated The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The licensee had failed to identify and evaluate the impact on design of sloping the impulse lines for the containment pressure transmitters downward from the containment towards the transmitters without low point drain legs installed. This configuration was a deviation from the licensee's design requirements, and introduced the potential for water intrusion in the instrument impulse lines during normal operation and accident conditions.
In response to this condition, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and entered the finding into their corrective program (Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No. M-04-00713). The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 4 mitigating systems cornerstone objective, in that the formation of a loop seal would have the potential to affect the performance capability of instruments used for automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, and post-accident monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, or post-accident monitoring capability (loss of function). (Section 1R21.21. b).
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 13, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for removing from service the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to the 1D steam generator A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) when the 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump containment isolation valve for the 1D steam generator (1CA42B) was closed to perform maintenance on October 14, 2003 (Section 1R13). This finding was considered to be more than minor because the inadequate risk assessment resulted in the assignment of an incorrect risk action level (color) for this maintenance activity. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because had the error not occurred the only additional action required would have been management awareness of the additional risk associated with the activity.
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 29, 2004
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 5 McGuire 2 4Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Plant Equipment Issues - Two Examples The inspectors identified the first example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to thoroughly evaluate and take timely corrective actions to resolve a problem with the Instrument Air (VI) supply to the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, steam supply from the "B" steam generator to the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDCAP).
Specifically, following identification of a nitrogen leak into the redundant VI supply for the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, the licensee isolated the redundant instrument air supply which backs up the nitrogen supply that maintains the TDCAP steam admission valve in the closed position. Subsequently, high nitrogen usage depleted the available nitrogen and allowed 2SA-49AB to open and inadvertently start the TDCAP. This auxiliary feedwater addition to all four steam generators resulted in an overpower condition and required operator action to mitigate the reactivity event. This finding was considered more than minor because it resulted in an inadvertent TDCAP start which delivered flow to all four steam generators. This caused an over-power condition in the reactor; thereby, affecting the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective by increasing the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the operators implemented immediate manual actions to maintain reactor power less than 102% rated thermal power and the TDCAP was able to perform its design function at all times due to the fail-safe design of the valve actuator to open. (Section 4OA2b.(3).1)
The inspectors identified a second example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take adequate corrective actions to preclude repetitive issues with spent fuel pool (KF) cooling pump motor bearings. Specifically, repetitive challenges to KF pump motor bearings due to inadequate lubrication issues have resulted in increased unavailability of the pumps due to failures and increased unreliability of the system to meet its intended function. This finding was determined to be more than minor, in that it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective by affecting the availability and reliability of the KF cooling system to maintain the spent fuel pool within the design limits. The improper venting of the spent fuel cooling pump motor oil level resulted in the repetitive failures of the pump motor. Failure of the pump motor adversely affects the ability to reliably maintain cooling in the spent fuel pool. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the availability of a redundant SFP cooling pump and because the allowable temperature limits were not exceeded. (Section 4OA2c.(3).1)
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to comply with design control for a design assumption associated with the nuclear service water system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified by the inspectors for inadequate design control involving an assumption that supported nuclear service water flow following a seismic event. The assumption was that non-seismic condenser circulating water pipe would be available for an extended period of time after a seismic event as the discharge path for nuclear service water train A.
Similar to Example 3.a. of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, this issue is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events and associated attributes of design control and protection from external factors (seismic). Following the identification of the issue, the licensee performed a seismic evaluation of the piping and determined that it would sufficiently perform the relied upon minimal service water flow function after a seismic event. Consequently, the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing an unreviewed safety question associated with the nuclear service water system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to plant procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The unreviewed safety question dealt with extending the availability of non-
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 5 seismic condenser circulating water piping to perform a safety-related function following a seismic event. This issue is more than minor because it would require NRC review prior to implementation. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the non-seismic piping would not collapse or kink, and although it may leak, it will provide the necessary minimal service water flow function. Since the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation.
(Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a design change to the facility associated with the auxiliary feedwater system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 was identified by the inspectors for changing the design of the auxiliary feedwater system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report without performing a safety evaluation or obtaining a Technical Specification change. The change reduced the required number of trains of auxiliary feedwater from three independent trains to two independent trains to safely shutdown the reactor.
This failure to perform a safety evaluation and submit a Technical Specification change is more than minor because it would require an NRC review prior to implementation. Because there was no evidence to indicate that the licensee had used the change the safety significance was determined to be very low. Consequently, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation and Protection of Cables Associated With Redundant Trains of Instrumentation Located in the Same Fire Area A non-cited violation of Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.7 was identified by the inspectors for failure to comply with McGuire's approved fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
Specifically, Train A and Train B cables for the primary and backup power supplies for all four reactor protection system (RPS) channels were routed in close proximity in Room 803A (Unit 1 Fire Area 15/17) and Room 805A (Unit 2 Fire Area 16/18). The cables did not have adequate protection (i.e., 20-feet separation or fire barriers) to remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute, and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. This finding is of very low safety significance because the likelihood of a fire, in either room 803A or 805A, that would damage all four reactor protection system channels was relatively low due to the small ignition sources and the horizontal distance of the ignition sources from the cables. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous extinguishers.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of the operating license condition for fire protection for failing to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous fire extinguishers from plant fire areas that contain safety-related equipment. The non-updated fire strategy plans could decrease the effectiveness of the fire brigade. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection equipment availability and degraded the ability to meet the manual suppression Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low safety significance because the areas where the inspectors found extinguishers missing did not have both trains of safe shutdown and the standby shutdown system in the same fire area while utilizing 20 foot separation between trains, hence, the significance of the fire brigade's decreased effectiveness was reduced. (Section 1R05)
The inspectors identified a second example of non-cited violation 05000369,370/2004004-01 which involved inadequate fire strategy plans and was a violation of the license condition for fire protection. The strategy plan for fire area 21, auxiliary building 750 elevation, did not identify that class D combustibles were located in the fire zone and identified that extinguishants were in locations where none existed. The strategy plan for fire area 4, auxiliary building elevation 716, did not list one of the rooms that was in the fire area. The failure to have comprehensive pre-fire strategy plans was considered a degradation for manual fire fighting effectiveness. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire), procedure quality, and design control. The licensee's corrective actions for the previous violation have not yet been implemented for these fire areas. The inspectors determined these corrective actions would likely have identified the deficiencies. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. (Section 1R05 of IR 05000369,370/2004005)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 5 Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Emergency Lighting System under 10 CFR 50.65a(1).
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (maintenance rule) for failing to demonstrate that the performance of the emergency lighting battery system was being effectively controlled after it exceeded its Maintenance Rule a(2) performance. The licensee had not established goals nor monitored the performance of the batteries per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The finding is more than minor because of the affected reliability objective of the Equipment Performance attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Portions of the emergency lighting were not available to perform their intended function of supporting operator actions to mitigate the consequences of fires upon loss of all other lighting. The finding is of very low safety significance because there is no design deficiency, the finding does not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events, in accordance with MC 0609, Safety Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have pre-fire plans for the Unit 1 and 2 interior and exterior doghouses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have pre-fire (strategy) plans for the interior and exterior doghouse fire areas as part of the fire fighting procedures. The dog houses contain safety-related main steam piping and main steam isolation valves, steam generator power operated relief valves, main steam safety valves, main feed piping and isolation valves, and auxiliary feedwater piping and isolation valves.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because the manual fire suppression defense-in-depth feature was moderately impacted, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because the dog houses are physically independent (separated by distance and enclosed in 3-hour fire barriers) and either the interior or exterior doghouse can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR - (two examples)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-in-depth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF.
However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.
The inspectors identified an additional example of a previously identified non-cited violation (05000369,370/2004003-02) for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e). Specifically, the inspectors noted a failure to resolve an UFSAR discrepancy with the Design Basis Document regarding feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements could have an impact on future stroke time tests and subsequent performance of the isolation valves. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures. (IR 05000369,370/2004008; Section 4OA2c.(3).2)
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to have a rated 3-hour barrier around the SSF power system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have a 3-hour-rated fire barrier that enclosed the SSF power system equipment as described in the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 6.
This finding was considered to be more than minor because it is a degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth feature to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety in order to minimize the affect of fire, which affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because B safe shutdown train equipment can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions and is physically independent of the SSF.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 5 Significance: Mar 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Include Valve 2CA0007A in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room Fire The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 license condition 2.C.(7), in that, the licensee failed to properly analyze the impact of a fire on Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system valve 2CA0007A for potential fires in the control room and Fire Area 4. Immediate corrective action by the licensee was to revise fire response procedures to incorporate a time critical local operator manual action to de-energize the valve to preclude spurious closure.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety objective. This performance deficiency potentially degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection.
However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because review and analysis could not identify credible or likely fire scenarios in the chosen fire areas that would lead to loss or degradation of the secondary heat removal function as a result of spurious closure of 2CA007A, auxiliary feedwater turbine pump suction valve.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Feb 13, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Deviation from Design Requirements for Line Slope and Drain Legs for Containment Pressure Transmitter Impulse Lines Was not Identified or Evaluated The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The licensee had failed to identify and evaluate the impact on design of sloping the impulse lines for the containment pressure transmitters downward from the containment towards the transmitters without low point drain legs installed. This configuration was a deviation from the licensee's design requirements, and introduced the potential for water intrusion in the instrument impulse lines during normal operation and accident conditions.
In response to this condition, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and entered the finding into their corrective program (Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No. M-04-00713). The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective, in that the formation of a loop seal would have the potential to affect the performance capability of instruments used for automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, and post-accident monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, or post-accident monitoring capability (loss of function). (Section 1R21.21. b).
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R
SUMMARY
Overall, the licensee maintained an effective program for the identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). In general, the licensee consistently prioritized issues in accordance with their CAP and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. Minor problems were identified related to thoroughness of corrective action program issue documentation. The inspectors considered the licensee's CAP tracking program adequately supported tracking of identified issues, as well as the proposed corrective actions to resolve problems and implement improvement initiatives. The system also supported the ability to perform efficient and productive CAP trending at a variety of plant employee levels.
Formal root cause evaluations for significant conditions adverse to quality were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions developed for lower level root and contributing causes were generally timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety-significance of the issue. Although the licensee incorporated a wide variety of root cause techniques, the use of simplistic root and apparent cause evaluations techniques for lower level Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs), such as change analysis, could improve the reliability of apparent causes for some lower level issues and provide improved basis for PIP documentation. Several examples were identified where immediate corrective actions were not through or timely, as well as where vendor oversight could have been improved.
The licensee's periodic self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the CAP and covered all areas of plant performance. Corrective actions for previous performance examples were being actively monitored within self-assessments and audits of the CAP. Overall, the ability to perform critical self-assessments was considered an effective program attribute, especially when identifying repetitive equipment issues. Assessments were also effective in evaluating human performance areas for improvement, which indicated an emphasis on continuous improvement. With few exceptions, reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive.
Improved review of operating experience between other sites from the same utility was noted.
Site management was adequately involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Improvements were seen in the area of trending reviews identifying areas warranting increased management attention and focus. In one specific area of corrective actions for previous containment cleanliness issues, the licensee was not effective in precluding NRC identification of foreign material inadvertently left in the containment.
Based on discussions with plant personnel and the low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management and that a safety conscious work environment existed.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Last modified : March 09, 2005
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 5 McGuire 2 1Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Comply With RCS Leakage Detection TS for Containment Radiation Gaseous Monitors A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.15, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation, was identified by the inspectors for failing to take actions required for containment radiation gaseous monitors being inoperable. Specifically, the monitors were unable to detect a 1 gpm RCS leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> due to current activity concentrations (i.e., < 0.1 percent failed fuel) and TS required Actions B.1 (24-hour containment atmosphere sample) or B.2 (24-hour RCS water inventory balance) were not performed. The finding is greater than minor because the containment particulate and gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function of alerting control room operators of elevated reactor coolant system unidentified leakage, for an extended period of time. This inoperability resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1 gpm was indicated through the reactor coolant system water balance surveillance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance, in that licensee operations and engineering personnel determined the radiation monitors to be operable without consideration of all available information. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Surveillance Procedures for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation surveillance procedures for surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2, channel operational test of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; SR 3.4.15.3, channel calibration of containment floor and equipment sump (F&ES) level monitoring system; SR 3.4.15.4, channel calibration of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; and SR 3.4.15.5, channel calibration of containment ventilation condensate drain tank (VCDT) level monitor. Procedures for containment radiation particulate and gas monitors had not set the alarms to leakage values equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and had not tested the end device used by the operators to provide alarm indication of potentially excessive reactor coolant system unidentified leakage for multiple containment leakage monitors, including level indication (F&ES and VCDT) and radiation monitors. The finding was greater than minor because the surveillance procedures had not provided assurance that the necessary quality of systems or components were maintained. Consequently, this resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because excessive leakage had not existed based on reactor coolant inventory water balances and that the alarm indication functioned properly when tested. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, in that the licensee's operability determination failed to adequately evaluate whether surveillance requirements had been met and actions to determine the "time to alarm" given current RCS activity levels were not prompt. (Section 1R22b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Plant Equipment Issues - Two Examples The inspectors identified the first example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to thoroughly evaluate and take timely corrective actions to resolve a problem with the Instrument Air (VI) supply to the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, steam supply from the "B" steam generator to the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDCAP).
Specifically, following identification of a nitrogen leak into the redundant VI supply for the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, the licensee isolated the redundant instrument air supply which backs up the nitrogen supply that maintains the TDCAP steam admission valve in the closed position. Subsequently, high nitrogen usage depleted the available nitrogen and allowed 2SA-49AB to open and inadvertently start the TDCAP. This auxiliary feedwater addition to all four steam generators resulted in an overpower condition and required operator action to mitigate the reactivity event. This finding was considered more than minor because it resulted in an inadvertent TDCAP start which delivered flow to all four steam generators. This caused an over-power condition in the reactor; thereby, affecting the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective by increasing the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the operators implemented immediate manual actions to maintain reactor power less than 102% rated thermal power and the TDCAP
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 5 was able to perform its design function at all times due to the fail-safe design of the valve actuator to open. (Section 4OA2b.(3).1)
The inspectors identified a second example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take adequate corrective actions to preclude repetitive issues with spent fuel pool (KF) cooling pump motor bearings. Specifically, repetitive challenges to KF pump motor bearings due to inadequate lubrication issues have resulted in increased unavailability of the pumps due to failures and increased unreliability of the system to meet its intended function. This finding was determined to be more than minor, in that it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective by affecting the availability and reliability of the KF cooling system to maintain the spent fuel pool within the design limits. The improper venting of the spent fuel cooling pump motor oil level resulted in the repetitive failures of the pump motor. Failure of the pump motor adversely affects the ability to reliably maintain cooling in the spent fuel pool. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the availability of a redundant SFP cooling pump and because the allowable temperature limits were not exceeded. (Section 4OA2c.(3).1)
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to comply with design control for a design assumption associated with the nuclear service water system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified by the inspectors for inadequate design control involving an assumption that supported nuclear service water flow following a seismic event. The assumption was that non-seismic condenser circulating water pipe would be available for an extended period of time after a seismic event as the discharge path for nuclear service water train A.
Similar to Example 3.a. of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, this issue is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events and associated attributes of design control and protection from external factors (seismic). Following the identification of the issue, the licensee performed a seismic evaluation of the piping and determined that it would sufficiently perform the relied upon minimal service water flow function after a seismic event. Consequently, the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing an unreviewed safety question associated with the nuclear service water system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to plant procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The unreviewed safety question dealt with extending the availability of non-seismic condenser circulating water piping to perform a safety-related function following a seismic event. This issue is more than minor because it would require NRC review prior to implementation. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the non-seismic piping would not collapse or kink, and although it may leak, it will provide the necessary minimal service water flow function. Since the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation.
(Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a design change to the facility associated with the auxiliary feedwater system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 was identified by the inspectors for changing the design of the auxiliary feedwater system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report without performing a safety evaluation or obtaining a Technical Specification change. The change reduced the required number of trains of auxiliary feedwater from three independent trains to two independent trains to safely shutdown the reactor.
This failure to perform a safety evaluation and submit a Technical Specification change is more than minor because it would require an NRC review prior to implementation. Because there was no evidence to indicate that the licensee had used the change the safety significance was determined to be very low. Consequently, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 5 Inadequate Separation and Protection of Cables Associated With Redundant Trains of Instrumentation Located in the Same Fire Area A non-cited violation of Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.7 was identified by the inspectors for failure to comply with McGuire's approved fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
Specifically, Train A and Train B cables for the primary and backup power supplies for all four reactor protection system (RPS) channels were routed in close proximity in Room 803A (Unit 1 Fire Area 15/17) and Room 805A (Unit 2 Fire Area 16/18). The cables did not have adequate protection (i.e., 20-feet separation or fire barriers) to remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute, and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. This finding is of very low safety significance because the likelihood of a fire, in either room 803A or 805A, that would damage all four reactor protection system channels was relatively low due to the small ignition sources and the horizontal distance of the ignition sources from the cables. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous extinguishers.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of the operating license condition for fire protection for failing to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous fire extinguishers from plant fire areas that contain safety-related equipment. The non-updated fire strategy plans could decrease the effectiveness of the fire brigade. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection equipment availability and degraded the ability to meet the manual suppression Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low safety significance because the areas where the inspectors found extinguishers missing did not have both trains of safe shutdown and the standby shutdown system in the same fire area while utilizing 20 foot separation between trains, hence, the significance of the fire brigade's decreased effectiveness was reduced. (Section 1R05)
The inspectors identified a second example of non-cited violation 05000369,370/2004004-01 which involved inadequate fire strategy plans and was a violation of the license condition for fire protection. The strategy plan for fire area 21, auxiliary building 750 elevation, did not identify that class D combustibles were located in the fire zone and identified that extinguishants were in locations where none existed. The strategy plan for fire area 4, auxiliary building elevation 716, did not list one of the rooms that was in the fire area. The failure to have comprehensive pre-fire strategy plans was considered a degradation for manual fire fighting effectiveness. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire), procedure quality, and design control. The licensee's corrective actions for the previous violation have not yet been implemented for these fire areas. The inspectors determined these corrective actions would likely have identified the deficiencies. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. (Section 1R05 of IR 05000369,370/2004005)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 12, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Emergency Lighting System under 10 CFR 50.65a(1).
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (maintenance rule) for failing to demonstrate that the performance of the emergency lighting battery system was being effectively controlled after it exceeded its Maintenance Rule a(2) performance. The licensee had not established goals nor monitored the performance of the batteries per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The finding is more than minor because of the affected reliability objective of the Equipment Performance attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Portions of the emergency lighting were not available to perform their intended function of supporting operator actions to mitigate the consequences of fires upon loss of all other lighting. The finding is of very low safety significance because there is no design deficiency, the finding does not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events, in accordance with MC 0609, Safety Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 5 Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedural Guidance for Conducting ISFSI Radiation Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for failure to follow radiation protection procedures used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72. Specifically, on August 24, 2004, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) area dose rate surveys were conducted using portable radiation monitoring instrumentation, a RO-20 ion chamber survey meter, which did not cover the lower range of radiation levels expected (i.e., less than 0.05 millirem per hour), for selected boundary trending points. Further, the dose rate values documented (i.e., less than 0.1 mrem/hr) for the subject trending point locations, did not allow verification that the established procedural limits used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72 requirements were met. This finding is more than minor in that the failure to accurately monitor and properly evaluate the quarterly dose rate results could prevent identification of unexpected/elevated dose rates associated with ISFSI operations and is associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding affects the cornerstone objective to prevent/minimize radiation exposure to personnel. The issue is of very low safety significance because the procedurally established dose rate limits are based on conservative occupancy factors, and results of proper dose rate surveys conducted prior and subsequent to the subject date were within established dose rate limits. (Section 2OS1)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Breathing Air Capacity for Supplied-Air Respiratory Equipment A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for use of inadequate in-service breathing air (VB) system equipment to supply Delta Suit' respiratory protective equipment. Specifically, on March 25, 2004, available VB system capacity was inadequate to supply adequate air flow to six workers using supplied-air Delta Suits' for steam generator (SG) work activities. The finding is more than minor in that it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone Plant Equipment and Instrumentation attribute and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. The issue is of very low safety significance because the flow monitoring equipment used to identify degraded or failed VB system operations alerted responsible staff. The subject SG workers immediately ceased work activities and exited the work area without any unexpected internal contamination or resultant doses. (Section 2OS3)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R
SUMMARY
Overall, the licensee maintained an effective program for the identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). In general, the licensee consistently prioritized issues in accordance with their CAP and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. Minor problems were identified related to thoroughness of corrective action program issue documentation. The inspectors considered the licensee's CAP tracking program adequately supported tracking of identified issues, as well as the proposed corrective actions to resolve problems and implement improvement initiatives. The system also supported the ability to perform efficient and productive CAP
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 5 trending at a variety of plant employee levels.
Formal root cause evaluations for significant conditions adverse to quality were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions developed for lower level root and contributing causes were generally timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety-significance of the issue. Although the licensee incorporated a wide variety of root cause techniques, the use of simplistic root and apparent cause evaluations techniques for lower level Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs), such as change analysis, could improve the reliability of apparent causes for some lower level issues and provide improved basis for PIP documentation. Several examples were identified where immediate corrective actions were not through or timely, as well as where vendor oversight could have been improved.
The licensee's periodic self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the CAP and covered all areas of plant performance. Corrective actions for previous performance examples were being actively monitored within self-assessments and audits of the CAP. Overall, the ability to perform critical self-assessments was considered an effective program attribute, especially when identifying repetitive equipment issues. Assessments were also effective in evaluating human performance areas for improvement, which indicated an emphasis on continuous improvement. With few exceptions, reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive.
Improved review of operating experience between other sites from the same utility was noted.
Site management was adequately involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Improvements were seen in the area of trending reviews identifying areas warranting increased management attention and focus. In one specific area of corrective actions for previous containment cleanliness issues, the licensee was not effective in precluding NRC identification of foreign material inadvertently left in the containment.
Based on discussions with plant personnel and the low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management and that a safety conscious work environment existed.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Last modified : June 17, 2005
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 5 McGuire 2 2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Comply With RCS Leakage Detection TS for Containment Radiation Gaseous Monitors A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.15, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation, was identified by the inspectors for failing to take actions required for containment radiation gaseous monitors being inoperable. Specifically, the monitors were unable to detect a 1 gpm RCS leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> due to current activity concentrations (i.e., < 0.1 percent failed fuel) and TS required Actions B.1 (24-hour containment atmosphere sample) or B.2 (24-hour RCS water inventory balance) were not performed. The finding is greater than minor because the containment particulate and gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function of alerting control room operators of elevated reactor coolant system unidentified leakage, for an extended period of time. This inoperability resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1 gpm was indicated through the reactor coolant system water balance surveillance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance, in that licensee operations and engineering personnel determined the radiation monitors to be operable without consideration of all available information. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Surveillance Procedures for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation surveillance procedures for surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2, channel operational test of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; SR 3.4.15.3, channel calibration of containment floor and equipment sump (F&ES) level monitoring system; SR 3.4.15.4, channel calibration of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; and SR 3.4.15.5, channel calibration of containment ventilation condensate drain tank (VCDT) level monitor. Procedures for containment radiation particulate and gas monitors had not set the alarms to leakage values equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and had not tested the end device used by the operators to provide alarm indication of potentially excessive reactor coolant system unidentified leakage for multiple containment leakage monitors, including level indication (F&ES and VCDT) and radiation monitors. The finding was greater than minor because the surveillance procedures had not provided assurance that the necessary quality of systems or components were maintained. Consequently, this resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because excessive leakage had not existed based on reactor coolant inventory water balances and that the alarm indication functioned properly when tested. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, in that the licensee's operability determination failed to adequately evaluate whether surveillance requirements had been met and actions to determine the "time to alarm" given current RCS activity levels were not prompt. (Section 1R22b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Plant Equipment Issues - Two Examples The inspectors identified the first example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to thoroughly evaluate and take timely corrective actions to resolve a problem with the Instrument Air (VI) supply to the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, steam supply from the "B" steam generator to the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDCAP).
Specifically, following identification of a nitrogen leak into the redundant VI supply for the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, the licensee isolated the redundant instrument air supply which backs up the nitrogen supply that maintains the TDCAP steam admission valve in the closed position. Subsequently, high nitrogen usage depleted the available nitrogen and allowed 2SA-49AB to open and inadvertently start the TDCAP. This auxiliary feedwater addition to all four steam generators resulted in an overpower condition and required operator action to mitigate the reactivity event. This finding was considered more than minor because it resulted in an inadvertent TDCAP start which delivered flow to all four steam generators. This caused an over-power condition in the reactor; thereby, affecting the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective by increasing the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the operators implemented immediate manual actions to maintain reactor power less than 102% rated thermal power and the TDCAP
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 5 was able to perform its design function at all times due to the fail-safe design of the valve actuator to open. (Section 4OA2b.(3).1)
The inspectors identified a second example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take adequate corrective actions to preclude repetitive issues with spent fuel pool (KF) cooling pump motor bearings. Specifically, repetitive challenges to KF pump motor bearings due to inadequate lubrication issues have resulted in increased unavailability of the pumps due to failures and increased unreliability of the system to meet its intended function. This finding was determined to be more than minor, in that it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective by affecting the availability and reliability of the KF cooling system to maintain the spent fuel pool within the design limits. The improper venting of the spent fuel cooling pump motor oil level resulted in the repetitive failures of the pump motor. Failure of the pump motor adversely affects the ability to reliably maintain cooling in the spent fuel pool. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the availability of a redundant SFP cooling pump and because the allowable temperature limits were not exceeded. (Section 4OA2c.(3).1)
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement Fire Mitigation Actions For Containment A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish, implement, and maintain an adequate abnormal procedure for combating plant fires in the reactor containment building. The procedure was not consistent with the plant design documents regarding which safe shutdown equipment is credited as the assured shutdown train.
This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to maintain abnormal and emergency procedures consistent with the design basis, could become a more significant safety concern. Additionally, it impacts the Reactor Safety Cornerstone of Mitigating Systems to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to an event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the way the procedure is currently written, the operators could still achieve and maintain hot standby. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the fire mitigation strategies. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement SLC Test Requirements for Fire Protection Sprinklers A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate procedures to implement fire protection sprinkler inspection requirements for the reactor building annulus contained in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, in that six sprinklers' spray patterns were discovered obstructed.
The finding is greater than minor because the finding is associated with both a degradation in the fire protection defense in depth feature and an increase in the likelihood of an initiating event, in that, in the event of a U2 annulus fire, the cables affected by the obstructed sprinklers include those which could cause all four reactor coolant pumps to trip, consequently causing a reactor trip. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the low number of ignition sources and the availability of one complete safe shutdown train. This issue contained elements of both problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance. The operators failed to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the sprinklers, such as obstructions, as specified by the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) requirements. In addition, following the discovery of this finding, several procedural issues were found. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MSIV 2SM-1 Fails to Close A self revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to take timely and adequate corrective actions to resolve adverse conditions that resulted in a Unit 2 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) being inoperable.
The finding is considered greater than minor because it had a direct impact on the MSIV to perform its safety function, which is to close during a high energy line break or steam generator tube rupture. The finding affects both the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones, in that the failure to close impacts the equipment performance (reliability, availability) attribute and containment isolation (minimization of radiological releases) attribute, respectively. Based on the results of the Phase 3 SDP analysis, the finding is considered of very low safety
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 5 significance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly evaluate data and deficiencies associated with the MSIVs; therefore, failing to take prompt corrective action to prevent recurrence of adverse conditions and preclude the valve from becoming inoperable. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to comply with design control for a design assumption associated with the nuclear service water system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified by the inspectors for inadequate design control involving an assumption that supported nuclear service water flow following a seismic event. The assumption was that non-seismic condenser circulating water pipe would be available for an extended period of time after a seismic event as the discharge path for nuclear service water train A.
Similar to Example 3.a. of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, this issue is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events and associated attributes of design control and protection from external factors (seismic). Following the identification of the issue, the licensee performed a seismic evaluation of the piping and determined that it would sufficiently perform the relied upon minimal service water flow function after a seismic event. Consequently, the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing an unreviewed safety question associated with the nuclear service water system The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to plant procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The unreviewed safety question dealt with extending the availability of non-seismic condenser circulating water piping to perform a safety-related function following a seismic event. This issue is more than minor because it would require NRC review prior to implementation. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the non-seismic piping would not collapse or kink, and although it may leak, it will provide the necessary minimal service water flow function. Since the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation.
(Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a design change to the facility associated with the auxiliary feedwater system A non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 was identified by the inspectors for changing the design of the auxiliary feedwater system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report without performing a safety evaluation or obtaining a Technical Specification change. The change reduced the required number of trains of auxiliary feedwater from three independent trains to two independent trains to safely shutdown the reactor.
This failure to perform a safety evaluation and submit a Technical Specification change is more than minor because it would require an NRC review prior to implementation. Because there was no evidence to indicate that the licensee had used the change the safety significance was determined to be very low. Consequently, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 11, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation and Protection of Cables Associated With Redundant Trains of Instrumentation Located in the Same Fire Area A non-cited violation of Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.7 was identified by the inspectors for failure to comply with McGuire's approved fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
Specifically, Train A and Train B cables for the primary and backup power supplies for all four reactor protection system (RPS) channels were routed in close proximity in Room 803A (Unit 1 Fire Area 15/17) and Room 805A (Unit 2 Fire Area 16/18). The cables did not have adequate protection (i.e., 20-feet separation or fire barriers) to remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute, and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. This finding is of very low safety significance because the likelihood of a fire, in either room 803A or 805A, that would damage all four reactor protection system channels was relatively low due to the small ignition sources and the horizontal distance of the ignition sources from the cables. (Section 4OA5)
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 5 Inspection Report# : 2004005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedural Guidance for Conducting ISFSI Radiation Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for failure to follow radiation protection procedures used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72. Specifically, on August 24, 2004, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) area dose rate surveys were conducted using portable radiation monitoring instrumentation, a RO-20 ion chamber survey meter, which did not cover the lower range of radiation levels expected (i.e., less than 0.05 millirem per hour), for selected boundary trending points. Further, the dose rate values documented (i.e., less than 0.1 mrem/hr) for the subject trending point locations, did not allow verification that the established procedural limits used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72 requirements were met. This finding is more than minor in that the failure to accurately monitor and properly evaluate the quarterly dose rate results could prevent identification of unexpected/elevated dose rates associated with ISFSI operations and is associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding affects the cornerstone objective to prevent/minimize radiation exposure to personnel. The issue is of very low safety significance because the procedurally established dose rate limits are based on conservative occupancy factors, and results of proper dose rate surveys conducted prior and subsequent to the subject date were within established dose rate limits. (Section 2OS1)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Breathing Air Capacity for Supplied-Air Respiratory Equipment A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for use of inadequate in-service breathing air (VB) system equipment to supply Delta Suit' respiratory protective equipment. Specifically, on March 25, 2004, available VB system capacity was inadequate to supply adequate air flow to six workers using supplied-air Delta Suits' for steam generator (SG) work activities. The finding is more than minor in that it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone Plant Equipment and Instrumentation attribute and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. The issue is of very low safety significance because the flow monitoring equipment used to identify degraded or failed VB system operations alerted responsible staff. The subject SG workers immediately ceased work activities and exited the work area without any unexpected internal contamination or resultant doses. (Section 2OS3)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R
SUMMARY
Overall, the licensee maintained an effective program for the identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). In general, the licensee consistently prioritized issues in accordance with their CAP and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. Minor problems were identified related to thoroughness of corrective action program issue documentation. The inspectors considered the licensee's CAP tracking program adequately supported tracking of identified issues, as well as the proposed corrective actions to resolve problems and implement improvement initiatives. The system also supported the ability to perform efficient and productive CAP trending at a variety of plant employee levels.
Formal root cause evaluations for significant conditions adverse to quality were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions developed for lower level root and contributing causes were generally timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety-significance of the issue. Although the licensee incorporated a wide variety of root cause techniques, the use of simplistic root and apparent cause evaluations techniques for lower level Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs), such as change analysis, could improve the reliability of apparent causes for some lower level issues and provide improved basis for PIP documentation. Several examples were identified where immediate corrective actions were not through or timely, as well as where vendor oversight could have been improved.
The licensee's periodic self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the CAP and covered all areas of plant performance. Corrective actions for previous performance examples were being actively monitored within self-assessments and audits of the CAP. Overall, the ability to perform critical self-assessments was considered an effective program attribute, especially when identifying repetitive equipment issues. Assessments were also effective in evaluating human performance areas for improvement, which indicated an emphasis on continuous improvement. With few exceptions, reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive.
Improved review of operating experience between other sites from the same utility was noted.
Site management was adequately involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Improvements were seen in the area of trending reviews identifying areas warranting increased management attention and focus. In one specific area of corrective actions for previous containment cleanliness issues, the licensee was not effective in precluding NRC identification of foreign material inadvertently left in the containment.
Based on discussions with plant personnel and the low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management and that a safety conscious work environment existed.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Last modified : August 24, 2005
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 5 McGuire 2 3Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Comply With RCS Leakage Detection TS for Containment Radiation Gaseous Monitors A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.15, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation, was identified by the inspectors for failing to take actions required for containment radiation gaseous monitors being inoperable. Specifically, the monitors were unable to detect a 1 gpm RCS leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> due to current activity concentrations (i.e., < 0.1 percent failed fuel) and TS required Actions B.1 (24-hour containment atmosphere sample) or B.2 (24-hour RCS water inventory balance) were not performed. The finding is greater than minor because the containment particulate and gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function of alerting control room operators of elevated reactor coolant system unidentified leakage, for an extended period of time. This inoperability resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1 gpm was indicated through the reactor coolant system water balance surveillance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance, in that licensee operations and engineering personnel determined the radiation monitors to be operable without consideration of all available information. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Surveillance Procedures for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation surveillance procedures for surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2, channel operational test of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; SR 3.4.15.3, channel calibration of containment floor and equipment sump (F&ES) level monitoring system; SR 3.4.15.4, channel calibration of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; and SR 3.4.15.5, channel calibration of containment ventilation condensate drain tank (VCDT) level monitor. Procedures for containment radiation particulate and gas monitors had not set the alarms to leakage values equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and had not tested the end device used by the operators to provide alarm indication of potentially excessive reactor coolant system unidentified leakage for multiple containment leakage monitors, including level indication (F&ES and VCDT) and radiation monitors. The finding was greater than minor because the surveillance procedures had not provided assurance that the necessary quality of systems or components were maintained. Consequently, this resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because excessive leakage had not existed based on reactor coolant inventory water balances and that the alarm indication functioned properly when tested. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, in that the licensee's operability determination failed to adequately evaluate whether surveillance requirements had been met and actions to determine the "time to alarm" given current RCS activity levels were not prompt. (Section 1R22b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Plant Equipment Issues - Two Examples The inspectors identified the first example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to thoroughly evaluate and take timely corrective actions to resolve a problem with the Instrument Air (VI) supply to the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, steam supply from the "B" steam generator to the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDCAP).
Specifically, following identification of a nitrogen leak into the redundant VI supply for the actuator of steam admission valve 2SA-49AB, the licensee isolated the redundant instrument air supply which backs up the nitrogen supply that maintains the TDCAP steam admission valve in the closed position. Subsequently, high nitrogen usage depleted the available nitrogen and allowed 2SA-49AB to open and inadvertently start the TDCAP. This auxiliary feedwater addition to all four steam generators resulted in an overpower condition and required operator action to mitigate the reactivity event. This finding was considered more than minor because it resulted in an inadvertent TDCAP start which delivered flow to all four steam generators. This caused an over-power condition in the reactor; thereby, affecting the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective by increasing the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the operators implemented immediate manual actions to maintain reactor power less than 102% rated thermal power and the TDCAP
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 5 was able to perform its design function at all times due to the fail-safe design of the valve actuator to open. (Section 4OA2b.(3).1)
The inspectors identified a second example of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take adequate corrective actions to preclude repetitive issues with spent fuel pool (KF) cooling pump motor bearings. Specifically, repetitive challenges to KF pump motor bearings due to inadequate lubrication issues have resulted in increased unavailability of the pumps due to failures and increased unreliability of the system to meet its intended function. This finding was determined to be more than minor, in that it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective by affecting the availability and reliability of the KF cooling system to maintain the spent fuel pool within the design limits. The improper venting of the spent fuel cooling pump motor oil level resulted in the repetitive failures of the pump motor. Failure of the pump motor adversely affects the ability to reliably maintain cooling in the spent fuel pool. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the availability of a redundant SFP cooling pump and because the allowable temperature limits were not exceeded. (Section 4OA2c.(3).1)
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Timely Correction to Update the USFAR for the SSF A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for untimely corrective action to update the Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report (UFSAR) related to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF). This issue was originally identified on February 17, 2004, and as of August 3, 2005, no corrective action had been taken to include the SSF in the UFSAR either by revision or approved change package for the next revision, and the corrective action item was closed. The issue was determined to be a severity level IV violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000369,370/2004003. The untimely corrective action was considered for being a cited violation in accordance with section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. However, because the licensee completed and approved a UFSAR change package and adequately determined the cause of the untimely corrective action prior to the end of the inspection period, no additional information would be gained from the licensee providing a written response. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement Fire Mitigation Actions For Containment A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish, implement, and maintain an adequate abnormal procedure for combating plant fires in the reactor containment building. The procedure was not consistent with the plant design documents regarding which safe shutdown equipment is credited as the assured shutdown train.
This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to maintain abnormal and emergency procedures consistent with the design basis, could become a more significant safety concern. Additionally, it impacts the Reactor Safety Cornerstone of Mitigating Systems to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to an event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the way the procedure is currently written, the operators could still achieve and maintain hot standby. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the fire mitigation strategies. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement SLC Test Requirements for Fire Protection Sprinklers A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate procedures to implement fire protection sprinkler inspection requirements for the reactor building annulus contained in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, in that six sprinklers' spray patterns were discovered obstructed.
The finding is greater than minor because the finding is associated with both a degradation in the fire protection defense in depth feature and an increase in the likelihood of an initiating event, in that, in the event of a U2 annulus fire, the cables affected by the obstructed sprinklers include those which could cause all four reactor coolant pumps to trip, consequently causing a reactor trip. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the low number of ignition sources and the availability of one complete safe shutdown train. This issue contained elements of both problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance. The operators failed to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the sprinklers, such as obstructions, as specified by the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) requirements. In
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 5 addition, following the discovery of this finding, several procedural issues were found. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MSIV 2SM-1 Fails to Close A self revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to take timely and adequate corrective actions to resolve adverse conditions that resulted in a Unit 2 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) being inoperable.
The finding is considered greater than minor because it had a direct impact on the MSIV to perform its safety function, which is to close during a high energy line break or steam generator tube rupture. The finding affects both the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones, in that the failure to close impacts the equipment performance (reliability, availability) attribute and containment isolation (minimization of radiological releases) attribute, respectively. Based on the results of the Phase 3 SDP analysis, the finding is considered of very low safety significance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly evaluate data and deficiencies associated with the MSIVs; therefore, failing to take prompt corrective action to prevent recurrence of adverse conditions and preclude the valve from becoming inoperable. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the UFSAR for CAPRMs A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) related to inclusion of the license amendment request safety analysis information pertaining to the use of alternative instrumentation and procedures in place of seismic qualification for the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitors (CAPRMs). The issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the alternative methodology for RCS leakage detection after a seismic event with unqualified CAPRMs, as described in the licensee's safety analysis, was material to the acceptability of the license amendment requests. The inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedural Guidance for Conducting ISFSI Radiation Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for failure to follow radiation protection procedures used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72. Specifically, on August 24, 2004, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) area dose rate surveys were conducted using portable radiation monitoring instrumentation, a RO-20 ion chamber survey meter, which did not cover the lower range of radiation levels expected (i.e., less than 0.05 millirem per hour), for selected boundary trending points. Further, the dose rate values documented (i.e., less than 0.1 mrem/hr) for the subject trending point locations, did not allow verification that the established procedural limits used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72 requirements were met. This finding is more than minor in that the failure to accurately monitor and properly evaluate the quarterly dose rate results could prevent identification of unexpected/elevated dose rates associated with ISFSI operations and is associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding affects the cornerstone objective to prevent/minimize radiation exposure to personnel. The issue is of very low safety significance because the procedurally established dose rate limits are based on conservative occupancy factors, and results of proper dose rate surveys conducted prior and subsequent to the subject date were within established dose rate limits. (Section 2OS1)
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 5 Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Breathing Air Capacity for Supplied-Air Respiratory Equipment A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for use of inadequate in-service breathing air (VB) system equipment to supply Delta Suit' respiratory protective equipment. Specifically, on March 25, 2004, available VB system capacity was inadequate to supply adequate air flow to six workers using supplied-air Delta Suits' for steam generator (SG) work activities. The finding is more than minor in that it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone Plant Equipment and Instrumentation attribute and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. The issue is of very low safety significance because the flow monitoring equipment used to identify degraded or failed VB system operations alerted responsible staff. The subject SG workers immediately ceased work activities and exited the work area without any unexpected internal contamination or resultant doses. (Section 2OS3)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 05, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R
SUMMARY
Overall, the licensee maintained an effective program for the identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). In general, the licensee consistently prioritized issues in accordance with their CAP and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. Minor problems were identified related to thoroughness of corrective action program issue documentation. The inspectors considered the licensee's CAP tracking program adequately supported tracking of identified issues, as well as the proposed corrective actions to resolve problems and implement improvement initiatives. The system also supported the ability to perform efficient and productive CAP trending at a variety of plant employee levels.
Formal root cause evaluations for significant conditions adverse to quality were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions developed for lower level root and contributing causes were generally timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety-significance of the issue. Although the licensee incorporated a wide variety of root cause techniques, the use of simplistic root and apparent cause evaluations techniques for lower level Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs), such as change analysis, could improve the reliability of apparent causes for some lower level issues and provide improved basis for PIP documentation. Several examples were identified where immediate corrective actions were not through or timely, as well as where vendor oversight could have been improved.
The licensee's periodic self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the CAP and covered all areas of plant performance. Corrective actions for previous performance examples were being actively monitored within self-assessments and audits of the CAP. Overall, the ability to perform critical self-assessments was considered an effective program attribute, especially when identifying repetitive equipment issues. Assessments were also effective in evaluating human performance areas for improvement, which indicated an emphasis on continuous improvement. With few exceptions, reviews of sampled operating experience information were comprehensive.
Improved review of operating experience between other sites from the same utility was noted.
Site management was adequately involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Improvements were seen in the area of trending reviews identifying areas warranting increased management attention and focus. In one specific area of corrective actions for previous containment cleanliness issues, the licensee was not effective in precluding NRC identification of foreign material inadvertently left in the containment.
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 5 Based on discussions with plant personnel and the low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management and that a safety conscious work environment existed.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Last modified : November 30, 2005
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 4 McGuire 2 4Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Comply With RCS Leakage Detection TS for Containment Radiation Gaseous Monitors A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.15, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation, was identified by the inspectors for failing to take actions required for containment radiation gaseous monitors being inoperable. Specifically, the monitors were unable to detect a 1 gpm RCS leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> due to current activity concentrations (i.e., < 0.1 percent failed fuel) and TS required Actions B.1 (24-hour containment atmosphere sample) or B.2 (24-hour RCS water inventory balance) were not performed. The finding is greater than minor because the containment particulate and gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function of alerting control room operators of elevated reactor coolant system unidentified leakage, for an extended period of time. This inoperability resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1 gpm was indicated through the reactor coolant system water balance surveillance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance, in that licensee operations and engineering personnel determined the radiation monitors to be operable without consideration of all available information. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Surveillance Procedures for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation surveillance procedures for surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2, channel operational test of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; SR 3.4.15.3, channel calibration of containment floor and equipment sump (F&ES) level monitoring system; SR 3.4.15.4, channel calibration of containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor; and SR 3.4.15.5, channel calibration of containment ventilation condensate drain tank (VCDT) level monitor. Procedures for containment radiation particulate and gas monitors had not set the alarms to leakage values equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and had not tested the end device used by the operators to provide alarm indication of potentially excessive reactor coolant system unidentified leakage for multiple containment leakage monitors, including level indication (F&ES and VCDT) and radiation monitors. The finding was greater than minor because the surveillance procedures had not provided assurance that the necessary quality of systems or components were maintained. Consequently, this resulted in a potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because excessive leakage had not existed based on reactor coolant inventory water balances and that the alarm indication functioned properly when tested. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, in that the licensee's operability determination failed to adequately evaluate whether surveillance requirements had been met and actions to determine the "time to alarm" given current RCS activity levels were not prompt. (Section 1R22b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Timely Correction to Update the USFAR for the SSF A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for untimely corrective action to update the Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report (UFSAR) related to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF). This issue was originally identified on February 17, 2004, and as of August 3, 2005, no corrective action had been taken to include the SSF in the UFSAR either by revision or approved change package for the next revision, and the corrective action item was closed. The issue was determined to be a severity level IV violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000369,370/2004003. The untimely corrective action was considered for being a cited violation in accordance with section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. However, because the licensee completed and approved a UFSAR change package and adequately determined the
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 4 cause of the untimely corrective action prior to the end of the inspection period, no additional information would be gained from the licensee providing a written response. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement Fire Mitigation Actions For Containment A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish, implement, and maintain an adequate abnormal procedure for combating plant fires in the reactor containment building. The procedure was not consistent with the plant design documents regarding which safe shutdown equipment is credited as the assured shutdown train.
This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to maintain abnormal and emergency procedures consistent with the design basis, could become a more significant safety concern. Additionally, it impacts the Reactor Safety Cornerstone of Mitigating Systems to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to an event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the way the procedure is currently written, the operators could still achieve and maintain hot standby. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the fire mitigation strategies. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement SLC Test Requirements for Fire Protection Sprinklers A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate procedures to implement fire protection sprinkler inspection requirements for the reactor building annulus contained in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, in that six sprinklers' spray patterns were discovered obstructed.
The finding is greater than minor because the finding is associated with both a degradation in the fire protection defense in depth feature and an increase in the likelihood of an initiating event, in that, in the event of a U2 annulus fire, the cables affected by the obstructed sprinklers include those which could cause all four reactor coolant pumps to trip, consequently causing a reactor trip. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the low number of ignition sources and the availability of one complete safe shutdown train. This issue contained elements of both problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance. The operators failed to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the sprinklers, such as obstructions, as specified by the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) requirements. In addition, following the discovery of this finding, several procedural issues were found. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MSIV 2SM-1 Fails to Close A self revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to take timely and adequate corrective actions to resolve adverse conditions that resulted in a Unit 2 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) being inoperable.
The finding is considered greater than minor because it had a direct impact on the MSIV to perform its safety function, which is to close during a high energy line break or steam generator tube rupture. The finding affects both the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones, in that the failure to close impacts the equipment performance (reliability, availability) attribute and containment isolation (minimization of radiological releases) attribute, respectively. Based on the results of the Phase 3 SDP analysis, the finding is considered of very low safety significance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly evaluate data and deficiencies associated with the MSIVs; therefore, failing to take prompt corrective action to prevent recurrence of adverse conditions and preclude the valve from becoming inoperable. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 4 Failure to Update the UFSAR for CAPRMs A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) related to inclusion of the license amendment request safety analysis information pertaining to the use of alternative instrumentation and procedures in place of seismic qualification for the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitors (CAPRMs). The issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the alternative methodology for RCS leakage detection after a seismic event with unqualified CAPRMs, as described in the licensee's safety analysis, was material to the acceptability of the license amendment requests. The inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedural Guidance for Conducting ISFSI Radiation Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for failure to follow radiation protection procedures used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72. Specifically, on August 24, 2004, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) area dose rate surveys were conducted using portable radiation monitoring instrumentation, a RO-20 ion chamber survey meter, which did not cover the lower range of radiation levels expected (i.e., less than 0.05 millirem per hour), for selected boundary trending points. Further, the dose rate values documented (i.e., less than 0.1 mrem/hr) for the subject trending point locations, did not allow verification that the established procedural limits used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72 requirements were met. This finding is more than minor in that the failure to accurately monitor and properly evaluate the quarterly dose rate results could prevent identification of unexpected/elevated dose rates associated with ISFSI operations and is associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding affects the cornerstone objective to prevent/minimize radiation exposure to personnel. The issue is of very low safety significance because the procedurally established dose rate limits are based on conservative occupancy factors, and results of proper dose rate surveys conducted prior and subsequent to the subject date were within established dose rate limits. (Section 2OS1)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Breathing Air Capacity for Supplied-Air Respiratory Equipment A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for use of inadequate in-service breathing air (VB) system equipment to supply Delta Suit' respiratory protective equipment. Specifically, on March 25, 2004, available VB system capacity was inadequate to supply adequate air flow to six workers using supplied-air Delta Suits' for steam generator (SG) work activities. The finding is more than minor in that it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone Plant Equipment and Instrumentation attribute and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. The issue is of very low safety significance because the flow monitoring equipment used to identify degraded or failed VB system operations alerted responsible staff. The subject SG workers immediately ceased work activities and exited the work area without any unexpected internal contamination or resultant doses. (Section 2OS3)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Last modified : March 03, 2006
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 3 McGuire 2 1Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Repetitive Fire Strategy Plan Deficiencies A non-cited violation was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action to ensure accuracy of all fire strategy plans in response to two previous multiple example NCVs. Permanent combustible storage locations were identified in the auxiliary building 733 elevation electrical penetration rooms for both units which were not identified in the fire strategy plans. The non-updated fire strategy plans affect the effectiveness of the fire brigade.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire) and procedure quality. The finding was of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Timely Correction to Update the USFAR for the SSF A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for untimely corrective action to update the Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report (UFSAR) related to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF). This issue was originally identified on February 17, 2004, and as of August 3, 2005, no corrective action had been taken to include the SSF in the UFSAR either by revision or approved change package for the next revision, and the corrective action item was closed. The issue was determined to be a severity level IV violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000369,370/2004003. The untimely corrective action was considered for being a cited violation in accordance with section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. However, because the licensee completed and approved a UFSAR change package and adequately determined the cause of the untimely corrective action prior to the end of the inspection period, no additional information would be gained from the licensee providing a written response. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement Fire Mitigation Actions For Containment A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish, implement, and maintain an adequate abnormal procedure for combating plant fires in the reactor containment building. The procedure was not consistent with the plant design documents regarding which safe shutdown equipment is credited as the assured shutdown train.
This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to maintain abnormal and emergency procedures consistent with the design basis, could become a more significant safety concern. Additionally, it impacts the Reactor Safety Cornerstone of Mitigating Systems to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to an event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the way the procedure is currently written, the operators could still achieve and maintain hot standby. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the fire mitigation strategies. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures to Implement SLC Test Requirements for Fire Protection Sprinklers A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, was identified by the inspectors for failing to establish, implement, and maintain adequate procedures to implement fire protection sprinkler inspection requirements for the reactor building annulus contained in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, in that six sprinklers' spray patterns were discovered obstructed.
The finding is greater than minor because the finding is associated with both a degradation in the fire protection defense in depth feature and an increase in the likelihood of an initiating event, in that, in the event of a U2 annulus fire, the cables affected by the obstructed sprinklers include those which could cause all four reactor coolant pumps to trip, consequently causing a reactor trip. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the low number of ignition sources and the availability of one complete safe shutdown train. This issue contained elements of both problem identification and resolution, as well as human performance. The operators failed to properly identify and correct deficiencies associated with the sprinklers, such as obstructions, as specified by the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) requirements. In addition, following the discovery of this finding, several procedural issues were found. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MSIV 2SM-1 Fails to Close A self revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to take timely and adequate corrective actions to resolve adverse conditions that resulted in a Unit 2 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) being inoperable.
The finding is considered greater than minor because it had a direct impact on the MSIV to perform its safety function, which is to close during a high energy line break or steam generator tube rupture. The finding affects both the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones, in that the failure to close impacts the equipment performance (reliability, availability) attribute and containment isolation (minimization of radiological releases) attribute, respectively. Based on the results of the Phase 3 SDP analysis, the finding is considered of very low safety significance. This issue contained elements of problem identification and resolution, as it involved failures to properly evaluate data and deficiencies associated with the MSIVs; therefore, failing to take prompt corrective action to prevent recurrence of adverse conditions and preclude the valve from becoming inoperable. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the UFSAR for CAPRMs A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) related to inclusion of the license amendment request safety analysis information pertaining to the use of alternative instrumentation and procedures in place of seismic qualification for the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitors (CAPRMs). The issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the alternative methodology for RCS leakage detection after a seismic event with unqualified CAPRMs, as described in the licensee's safety analysis, was material to the acceptability of the license amendment requests. The inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 3 Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Review Licensee Assessments and Vendor Evaluations for Observed U1/U2 Unit Vent Volume Flow Rate Changes to Assure Representative Sampling The inspectors identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1302(a) for failure to ensure surveys of particulate radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas by the unit vents were adequate to demonstrate compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public. Specifically, an evaluation of the effect of changes in the operational unit vent volumetric flow rates determined that isokinetic sampling conditions were not maintained during normal ventilation alignments for Unit 1 or maintenance-related ventilation alignments for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The licensee therefore was not assured that the unit vent particulate measurements obtained using 1/2-EMF-35 were accurate. This issue was initially identified as an Unresolved Item following an onsite inspection in January 2005.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to maintain isokinetic sampling conditions for the Unit 1/Unit 2 plant ventilation effluent streams could result in inaccurate measurement and reporting of airborne particulate radionuclides in samples and resultant dose estimates. This finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee had other means by which dose from particulate releases could be assessed and the licensee did not exceed the limits in 10 CFR 50 Appendix I or 10 CFR 20.1301(d).
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 25, 2006
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 4 McGuire 2 2Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of EDG under-frequency not included in ECCS pump test acceptance criteria Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not account for emergency diesel generator underfrequency in test acceptance criterion for ASME Section XI testing of the high head safety injection (NV) pumps 1A and 1B. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and performed an operability assessment which determined that the pumps were operable.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because although the NV pump acceptance criteria were not conservative with respect to the safety analyses, these analyses had sufficient margin to compensate for the reduced pump performance if operated at the reduced-frequency. (Section 1R21.2.1.5)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maximum differential pressure for containment sump isolation valves.
Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate the impact of leakage past the pressure isolation check valves during low head safety injection (ND) pump operation in minimum flow (for a pump test or during a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA)), in determining the maximum differential pressure (dP) across the containment sump isolation motor operated valves (MOVs). This leakage could potentially increase pressure which may challenge the capability of these MOVs to open following a SBLOCA. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program with an action to implement a modification to install ND suction relief valves on both units to address long term operability.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the analysis of additional test data showed that the maximum dP at the containment sump isolation valves was less than the thrust capability of the valve actuators. (Section 1R21.2.1.6)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Valve positioner not analyzed for seismic requirements Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate potential failure of the non-safety
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 4 related valve positioner in the safety related nuclear service water valves, and the impact of the failure on the capability of the valves to perform their design function following a seismic event. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to pursue a long term engineering resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design/qualification deficiency would not result in a loss of function. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both nuclear service water pumps if the corresponding flow control valves were to fail closed. The nuclear service water pump vendor provided documentation which indicated that the pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value for up to two hours without sustaining damage, which was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem before pump damage occurred. (Section 1R21.2.1.12)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of post-accident elevated temperatures not analyzed for nuclear service water piping inside containment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not perform an analysis or use other means to demonstrate that the non-safety related nuclear service water system piping inside containment, which was credited in emergency procedures for post-accident mitigation, was qualified for the elevated temperatures predicted for a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break inside containment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to revise the affected procedures and evaluate the affected systems.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design deficiency did not result in an actual loss of function. The non-safety related portion of the nuclear service water system is designed to isolate on a loss of coolant accident signal. Post-accident realignment of the system would be required in order to create the scenario where the piping could be exposed to the potentially elevated temperatures/pressures. (Section 1R21.2.1.14)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Repetitive Fire Strategy Plan Deficiencies A non-cited violation was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action to ensure accuracy of all fire strategy plans in response to two previous multiple example NCVs. Permanent combustible storage locations were identified in the auxiliary building 733 elevation electrical penetration rooms for both units which were not identified in the fire strategy plans. The non-updated fire strategy plans affect the effectiveness of the fire brigade.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire) and procedure quality. The finding was of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Timely Correction to Update the USFAR for the SSF A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for untimely corrective action to update the Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report (UFSAR) related to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF). This issue was originally identified on February 17, 2004, and as of August 3, 2005, no corrective action had been taken to include the SSF in the UFSAR either by revision or approved change package for the next revision, and the corrective action item was closed. The issue was determined to be a severity level IV violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000369,370/2004003.
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 4 The untimely corrective action was considered for being a cited violation in accordance with section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
However, because the licensee completed and approved a UFSAR change package and adequately determined the cause of the untimely corrective action prior to the end of the inspection period, no additional information would be gained from the licensee providing a written response. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the UFSAR for CAPRMs A non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) related to inclusion of the license amendment request safety analysis information pertaining to the use of alternative instrumentation and procedures in place of seismic qualification for the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitors (CAPRMs). The issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the alternative methodology for RCS leakage detection after a seismic event with unqualified CAPRMs, as described in the licensee's safety analysis, was material to the acceptability of the license amendment requests. The inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA2b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Review Licensee Assessments and Vendor Evaluations for Observed U1/U2 Unit Vent Volume Flow Rate Changes to Assure Representative Sampling The inspectors identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1302(a) for failure to ensure surveys of particulate radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas by the unit vents were adequate to demonstrate compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public. Specifically, an evaluation of the effect of changes in the operational unit vent volumetric flow rates determined that isokinetic sampling conditions were not maintained during normal ventilation alignments for Unit 1 or maintenance-related ventilation alignments for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The licensee therefore was not assured that the unit vent particulate measurements obtained using 1/2-EMF-35 were accurate.
This issue was initially identified as an Unresolved Item following an onsite inspection in January 2005.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to maintain isokinetic sampling conditions for the Unit 1/Unit 2 plant ventilation effluent streams could result in inaccurate measurement and reporting of airborne particulate radionuclides in samples and resultant dose estimates. This finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee had other means by which dose from particulate releases could be assessed and the licensee did not exceed the limits in 10 CFR 50 Appendix I or 10 CFR 20.1301(d).
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Last modified : August 25, 2006
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 4 McGuire 2 3Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of EDG under-frequency not included in ECCS pump test acceptance criteria Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not account for emergency diesel generator underfrequency in test acceptance criterion for ASME Section XI testing of the high head safety injection (NV) pumps 1A and 1B. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and performed an operability assessment which determined that the pumps were operable.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because although the NV pump acceptance criteria were not conservative with respect to the safety analyses, these analyses had sufficient margin to compensate for the reduced pump performance if operated at the reduced-frequency. (Section 1R21.2.1.5)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maximum differential pressure for containment sump isolation valves.
Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate the impact of leakage past the pressure isolation check valves during low head safety injection (ND) pump operation in minimum flow (for a pump test or during a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA)), in determining the maximum differential pressure (dP) across the containment sump isolation motor operated valves (MOVs). This leakage could potentially increase pressure which may challenge the capability of these MOVs to open following a SBLOCA. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program with an action to implement a modification to install ND suction relief valves on both units to address long term operability.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the analysis of additional test data showed that the maximum dP at the containment sump isolation valves was less than the thrust capability of the valve actuators. (Section 1R21.2.1.6)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 4 Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Valve positioner not analyzed for seismic requirements Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate potential failure of the non-safety related valve positioner in the safety related nuclear service water valves, and the impact of the failure on the capability of the valves to perform their design function following a seismic event. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to pursue a long term engineering resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design/qualification deficiency would not result in a loss of function. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both nuclear service water pumps if the corresponding flow control valves were to fail closed. The nuclear service water pump vendor provided documentation which indicated that the pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value for up to two hours without sustaining damage, which was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem before pump damage occurred. (Section 1R21.2.1.12)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of post-accident elevated temperatures not analyzed for nuclear service water piping inside containment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not perform an analysis or use other means to demonstrate that the non-safety related nuclear service water system piping inside containment, which was credited in emergency procedures for post-accident mitigation, was qualified for the elevated temperatures predicted for a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break inside containment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to revise the affected procedures and evaluate the affected systems.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design deficiency did not result in an actual loss of function. The non-safety related portion of the nuclear service water system is designed to isolate on a loss of coolant accident signal. Post-accident realignment of the system would be required in order to create the scenario where the piping could be exposed to the potentially elevated temperatures/pressures. (Section 1R21.2.1.14)
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Repetitive Fire Strategy Plan Deficiencies A non-cited violation was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action to ensure accuracy of all fire strategy plans in response to two previous multiple example NCVs. Permanent combustible storage locations were identified in the auxiliary building 733 elevation electrical penetration rooms for both units which were not identified in the fire strategy plans. The non-updated fire strategy plans affect the effectiveness of the fire brigade.
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 4 This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire) and procedure quality. The finding was of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Review Licensee Assessments and Vendor Evaluations for Observed U1/U2 Unit Vent Volume Flow Rate Changes to Assure Representative Sampling The inspectors identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1302(a) for failure to ensure surveys of particulate radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas by the unit vents were adequate to demonstrate compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public. Specifically, an evaluation of the effect of changes in the operational unit vent volumetric flow rates determined that isokinetic sampling conditions were not maintained during normal ventilation alignments for Unit 1 or maintenance-related ventilation alignments for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The licensee therefore was not assured that the unit vent particulate measurements obtained using 1/2-EMF-35 were accurate. This issue was initially identified as an Unresolved Item following an onsite inspection in January 2005.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to maintain isokinetic sampling conditions for the Unit 1/Unit 2 plant ventilation effluent streams could result in inaccurate measurement and reporting of airborne particulate radionuclides in samples and resultant dose estimates. This finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee had other means by which dose from particulate releases could be assessed and the licensee did not exceed the limits in 10 CFR 50 Appendix I or 10 CFR 20.1301(d).
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Last modified : December 21, 2006
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 1 of 7 McGuire 2 4Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to identify and evaluate multiple boric acid leaks.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings. Licensee activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance with site procedures, in that, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate multiple boric acid leaks on safety related components. These site procedures required plant personnel to identify, document, and evaluate all evidence of boric acid leakage. The licensee immediately entered the improperly evaluated leaks into their corrective action system, and completed an initial operability review.
This finding is greater than minor because if the failure to properly evaluate boric acid leaks continued, then unidentified /
unevaluated degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or other, susceptible, safety related components could continue and lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the IMC 0609, Appendix A, Phase 1 SDP worksheet. The finding screened as Green because leakage of boric acid is characterized as a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiator, but the identified leakage did not contribute to the increased likelihood of a primary or secondary LOCA, and the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The violation is associated with the Work Practices Component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area in that the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding compliance with the boric acid corrosion control program procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the off-site power system under 10 CFR 50.65 a(1).
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for the licensees failure to establish goals and monitor the performance of the offsite power system per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The licensee reclassified the offsite power system (OSP) from a(1) status to a (2) status without having monitored system performance against established goals, or documenting a technical justification to demonstrate that monitoring under a(1) was not required because the system performance was being effectively controlled such that it remained capable of performing its intended function. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3218.
The finding is more than minor because, in accordance with MC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues and Enforcement Manual section 8.1.11, Maintenance Rule a(1) and a(2) violations are not minor because they involve structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that have demonstrated some degraded performance or condition. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no design deficiency, the finding did not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 2 of 7 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately correct UFSAR deficiencies for the SSF.
A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action for the last Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) which did not include all the important information for the standby shutdown facility (SSF), the subject of two previous NCVs. The UFSAR did not include that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump suction condenser circulating water makeup source was isolated by two dc power-operated valves which open automatically on low pump suction pressure, even though it was important information to demonstrate required system power source and suction supply diversity. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3240.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and had a material impact on licensed activities. The inadequate UFSAR information had been used in a 10 CFR 50.59 screening that resulted in not performing a safety evaluation when required, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement and was characterized as a Severity Level IV.
The failure to adequately update the UFSAR for the SSF was the subject of two previous violations (NCVs 05000369,370/2004003-02, and NCV 05000369,370/2005004-01 for untimely corrective action). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for station blackout.
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the station blackout rule (10 CFR 50.63) implementation. Some station blackout (SBO) mitigating equipment described in the submitted information and analysis have been changed, and because they were not contained in the UFSAR, were not evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59 for their effect on station blackout mitigation, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP)
M-06-3244.
The finding is more than minor because it had a material impact on licensed activities. The missing UFSAR information identified the systems and methodology used to combat a station blackout as described in the station blackout rule. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of EDG under-frequency not included in ECCS pump test acceptance criteria Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not account for emergency diesel generator underfrequency in test acceptance criterion for ASME Section XI testing of the high head safety injection (NV) pumps 1A and 1B. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and performed an operability assessment which determined that the pumps were operable.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because although the NV pump acceptance criteria were not conservative with respect to the safety analyses, these analyses had sufficient margin to compensate for the reduced pump performance
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 3 of 7 if operated at the reduced-frequency. (Section 1R21.2.1.5)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maximum differential pressure for containment sump isolation valves.
Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate the impact of leakage past the pressure isolation check valves during low head safety injection (ND) pump operation in minimum flow (for a pump test or during a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA)), in determining the maximum differential pressure (dP) across the containment sump isolation motor operated valves (MOVs). This leakage could potentially increase pressure which may challenge the capability of these MOVs to open following a SBLOCA. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program with an action to implement a modification to install ND suction relief valves on both units to address long term operability.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the analysis of additional test data showed that the maximum dP at the containment sump isolation valves was less than the thrust capability of the valve actuators. (Section 1R21.2.1.6)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Valve positioner not analyzed for seismic requirements Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate potential failure of the non-safety related valve positioner in the safety related nuclear service water valves, and the impact of the failure on the capability of the valves to perform their design function following a seismic event. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to pursue a long term engineering resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design/qualification deficiency would not result in a loss of function. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both nuclear service water pumps if the corresponding flow control valves were to fail closed. The nuclear service water pump vendor provided documentation which indicated that the pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value for up to two hours without sustaining damage, which was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem before pump damage occurred. (Section 1R21.2.1.12)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of post-accident elevated temperatures not analyzed for nuclear service water piping inside containment
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 4 of 7 Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not perform an analysis or use other means to demonstrate that the non-safety related nuclear service water system piping inside containment, which was credited in emergency procedures for post-accident mitigation, was qualified for the elevated temperatures predicted for a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break inside containment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to revise the affected procedures and evaluate the affected systems.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design deficiency did not result in an actual loss of function. The non-safety related portion of the nuclear service water system is designed to isolate on a loss of coolant accident signal. Post-accident realignment of the system would be required in order to create the scenario where the piping could be exposed to the potentially elevated temperatures/pressures. (Section 1R21.2.1.14)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Repetitive Fire Strategy Plan Deficiencies A non-cited violation was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action to ensure accuracy of all fire strategy plans in response to two previous multiple example NCVs. Permanent combustible storage locations were identified in the auxiliary building 733 elevation electrical penetration rooms for both units which were not identified in the fire strategy plans. The non-updated fire strategy plans affect the effectiveness of the fire brigade.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire) and procedure quality. The finding was of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design and test control for ice condenser lower inlet doors.
Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XVI; Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the UFSAR, Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the T.S. surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. The issue was
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 5 of 7 determined to be more than minor because an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break LOCA; however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The cause of this issue is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance-Resources, because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation and procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate QA activities to ensure waste shipments are characterized in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20 Appendix G, Section III.A.3 for failure to conduct adequate Quality Assurance (QA) activities to ensure compliance with the waste characterization requirements of 10 CFR 61.55. The NCV included three examples: the failure to analyze for required plutonium isotopes in a primary filter waste stream sample analyzed on April 15, 2005; the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analyses of Cerium-144 in a spent fuel pool cooling (KF) filter waste stream sample collected February 25, 2004; and the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analysis results for Cesium-137 in a chemical and volume control (NV) filter waste stream sample dated February 25, 2004. The failure to identify missing or anomalous isotope values could have resulted in the potential shipment of improperly characterized radioactive waste to a licensed burial site or waste processor.
These examples are more than minor because they adversely affect the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that they involve an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because none of the reviewed waste stream data had been used to characterize waste that had been shipped to an offsite licensed burial or processing facility.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to train HAZMAT employees.
An NCV of 10 CFR 71.5 and 49 CFR172.704(a) was identified for failure to provide required training to hazardous material (Hazmat) employees involved in the preparation and loading of packages containing radioactive material for public transport. Specifically, inspectors identified that two individuals involved in the preparation and closure of a Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A Specification Package on September 6, 2005 had not received the required Hazmat training.
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 6 of 7 This violation is more than minor because it adversely affects the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that it involves an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because the shipment in question did not result in a breach of package or loss of licensed material during transport.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Review Licensee Assessments and Vendor Evaluations for Observed U1/U2 Unit Vent Volume Flow Rate Changes to Assure Representative Sampling The inspectors identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1302(a) for failure to ensure surveys of particulate radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas by the unit vents were adequate to demonstrate compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public. Specifically, an evaluation of the effect of changes in the operational unit vent volumetric flow rates determined that isokinetic sampling conditions were not maintained during normal ventilation alignments for Unit 1 or maintenance-related ventilation alignments for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The licensee therefore was not assured that the unit vent particulate measurements obtained using 1/2-EMF-35 were accurate. This issue was initially identified as an Unresolved Item following an onsite inspection in January 2005.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to maintain isokinetic sampling conditions for the Unit 1/Unit 2 plant ventilation effluent streams could result in inaccurate measurement and reporting of airborne particulate radionuclides in samples and resultant dose estimates. This finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee had other means by which dose from particulate releases could be assessed and the licensee did not exceed the limits in 10 CFR 50 Appendix I or 10 CFR 20.1301(d).
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform 72.48 evaluations for 72.212 changes.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified for failing to evaluate changes to the written evaluations required by 72.212(b)(2) using the requirements of 72.48(c). Even though licensee procedure NSD 211, 10 CFR 72.48 Process, required that one be performed, the licensee had not performed any 72.48(c) evaluations for any changes to the 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations for the NAC-UMS casks or the TN-32 casks since the requirement was included in the rule (5 revisions). This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3729.
This issue is greater than minor because the failure to perform 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Page 7 of 7 Last modified : March 01, 2007
McGuire 2 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to identify and evaluate multiple boric acid leaks.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings. Licensee activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance with site procedures, in that, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate multiple boric acid leaks on safety related components. These site procedures required plant personnel to identify, document, and evaluate all evidence of boric acid leakage. The licensee immediately entered the improperly evaluated leaks into their corrective action system, and completed an initial operability review.
This finding is greater than minor because if the failure to properly evaluate boric acid leaks continued, then unidentified /
unevaluated degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or other, susceptible, safety related components could continue and lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the IMC 0609, Appendix A, Phase 1 SDP worksheet. The finding screened as Green because leakage of boric acid is characterized as a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiator, but the identified leakage did not contribute to the increased likelihood of a primary or secondary LOCA, and the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The violation is associated with the Work Practices Component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area in that the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding compliance with the boric acid corrosion control program procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the off-site power system under 10 CFR 50.65 a(1).
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for the licensees failure to establish goals and monitor the performance of the offsite power system per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The licensee reclassified the offsite power system (OSP) from a(1) status to a (2) status without having monitored system performance against established goals, or documenting a technical justification to demonstrate that monitoring under a(1) was not required because the system performance was being effectively controlled such that it remained capable of performing its intended function. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3218.
The finding is more than minor because, in accordance with MC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues and Enforcement Manual section 8.1.11, Maintenance Rule a(1) and a(2) violations are not minor because they involve structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that have demonstrated some degraded performance or condition. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no design deficiency, the finding did not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately correct UFSAR deficiencies for the SSF.
A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action for the last Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) which did not include all the important information for the standby shutdown facility (SSF), the subject of two previous NCVs. The UFSAR did not include that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump suction condenser circulating water makeup source was isolated by two dc power-operated valves which open automatically on low pump suction pressure, even though it was important information to demonstrate required system power source and suction supply diversity. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3240.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and had a material impact on licensed activities. The inadequate UFSAR information had been used in a 10 CFR 50.59 screening that resulted in not performing a safety evaluation when required, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement and was characterized as a Severity Level IV.
The failure to adequately update the UFSAR for the SSF was the subject of two previous violations (NCVs 05000369,370/2004003-02, and NCV 05000369,370/2005004-01 for untimely corrective action). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for station blackout.
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the station blackout rule (10 CFR 50.63) implementation. Some station blackout (SBO) mitigating equipment described in the submitted information and analysis have been changed, and because they were not contained in the UFSAR, were not evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59 for their effect on station blackout mitigation, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP)
M-06-3244.
The finding is more than minor because it had a material impact on licensed activities. The missing UFSAR information identified the systems and methodology used to combat a station blackout as described in the station blackout rule. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of EDG under-frequency not included in ECCS pump test acceptance criteria Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not account for emergency diesel generator underfrequency in test acceptance criterion for ASME Section XI testing of the high head safety injection (NV) pumps 1A and 1B. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and performed an operability assessment which determined that the pumps were operable.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because although the NV pump acceptance criteria were not conservative with respect to the safety analyses, these analyses had sufficient margin to compensate for the reduced pump performance if operated at the reduced-frequency. (Section 1R21.2.1.5)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maximum differential pressure for containment sump isolation valves.
Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate the impact of leakage past the pressure isolation check valves during low head safety injection (ND) pump operation in minimum flow (for a pump test or during a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA)), in determining the maximum differential pressure (dP) across the containment sump isolation motor operated valves (MOVs). This leakage could potentially increase pressure which may challenge the capability of these MOVs to open following a SBLOCA. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program with an action to implement a modification to install ND suction relief valves on both units to address long term operability.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the analysis of additional test data showed that the maximum dP at the containment sump isolation valves was less than the thrust capability of the valve actuators. (Section 1R21.2.1.6)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Valve positioner not analyzed for seismic requirements Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not evaluate potential failure of the non-safety related valve positioner in the safety related nuclear service water valves, and the impact of the failure on the capability of the valves to perform their design function following a seismic event. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to pursue a long term engineering resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design/qualification deficiency would not result in a loss of function. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both nuclear service water pumps if the corresponding flow control valves were to fail closed. The nuclear service water pump vendor provided documentation which indicated that the pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value for up to two hours without sustaining damage, which was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem before pump damage occurred. (Section 1R21.2.1.12)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: May 19, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of post-accident elevated temperatures not analyzed for nuclear service water piping inside containment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee did not perform an analysis or use other means to demonstrate that the non-safety related nuclear service water system piping inside containment, which was credited in emergency procedures for post-accident mitigation,
was qualified for the elevated temperatures predicted for a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break inside containment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program with actions to revise the affected procedures and evaluate the affected systems.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the design deficiency did not result in an actual loss of function. The non-safety related portion of the nuclear service water system is designed to isolate on a loss of coolant accident signal. Post-accident realignment of the system would be required in order to create the scenario where the piping could be exposed to the potentially elevated temperatures/pressures. (Section 1R21.2.1.14)
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design and test control for ice condenser lower inlet doors.
Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XVI; Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the UFSAR, Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the T.S. surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. The issue was determined to be more than minor because an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break LOCA; however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The cause of this issue is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance-Resources, because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation and procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate QA activities to ensure waste shipments are characterized in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20 Appendix G, Section III.A.3 for failure to conduct adequate Quality Assurance (QA) activities to ensure compliance with the waste characterization requirements of 10 CFR 61.55. The NCV included three examples: the failure to analyze for required plutonium isotopes in a primary filter waste stream sample analyzed on April 15, 2005; the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analyses of Cerium-144 in a spent fuel pool cooling (KF) filter waste stream sample collected February 25, 2004; and the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analysis results for Cesium-137 in a chemical and volume control (NV) filter waste stream sample dated February 25, 2004. The failure to identify missing or anomalous isotope values could have resulted in the potential shipment of improperly characterized radioactive waste to a licensed burial site or waste processor.
These examples are more than minor because they adversely affect the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that they involve an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because none of the reviewed waste stream data had been used to characterize waste that had been shipped to an offsite licensed burial or processing facility.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to train HAZMAT employees.
An NCV of 10 CFR 71.5 and 49 CFR172.704(a) was identified for failure to provide required training to hazardous material (Hazmat) employees involved in the preparation and loading of packages containing radioactive material for public transport. Specifically, inspectors identified that two individuals involved in the preparation and closure of a Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A Specification Package on September 6, 2005 had not received the required Hazmat training.
This violation is more than minor because it adversely affects the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that it involves an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because the shipment in question did not result in a breach of package or loss of licensed material during transport.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform 72.48 evaluations for 72.212 changes.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified for failing to evaluate changes to the written evaluations required by 72.212(b)(2) using the requirements of 72.48(c). Even though licensee procedure NSD 211, 10 CFR 72.48 Process, required that one be performed, the licensee had not performed any 72.48(c) evaluations for any
changes to the 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations for the NAC-UMS casks or the TN-32 casks since the requirement was included in the rule (5 revisions). This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3729.
This issue is greater than minor because the failure to perform 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Last modified : June 01, 2007
McGuire 2 2Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to identify and evaluate multiple boric acid leaks.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings. Licensee activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance with site procedures, in that, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate multiple boric acid leaks on safety related components.
These site procedures required plant personnel to identify, document, and evaluate all evidence of boric acid leakage.
The licensee immediately entered the improperly evaluated leaks into their corrective action system, and completed an initial operability review.
This finding is greater than minor because if the failure to properly evaluate boric acid leaks continued, then unidentified / unevaluated degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or other, susceptible, safety related components could continue and lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the IMC 0609, Appendix A, Phase 1 SDP worksheet. The finding screened as Green because leakage of boric acid is characterized as a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiator, but the identified leakage did not contribute to the increased likelihood of a primary or secondary LOCA, and the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The violation is associated with the Work Practices Component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area in that the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding compliance with the boric acid corrosion control program procedures. H.4.b]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the off-site power system under 10 CFR 50.65 a(1).
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for the licensees failure to establish goals and monitor the performance of the offsite power system per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The licensee reclassified the offsite power system (OSP) from a(1) status to a(2) status without having monitored system performance against established goals, or documenting a technical justification to demonstrate that monitoring under a(1) was not required because the system performance was being effectively controlled such that it remained capable of performing its intended function. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3218.
The finding is more than minor because, in accordance with MC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues and Enforcement Manual section 8.1.11, Maintenance Rule a(1) and a(2) violations are not minor because they involve structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that have demonstrated some degraded performance or condition. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no design deficiency, the finding did not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: Feb 09, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Appropriate Corrective Actions for Valve Positioners not Analyzed for Seismic Requirements The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
Specifically, the licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions in response to a Green NCV issued for nonconformance with respect to the seismic qualification of positioners on the RN to KC Heat Exchanger flow control valves. This finding is of very low safety significance because the design/qualification deficiency did not result in a loss of function per Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-020. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both RN pumps if the corresponding flow control valves failed to close. In addition, the RN pump vendor provided documentation to the licensee which indicated that the RN pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value of 2700 gpm for up to two hours without sustaining damage. This was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem. This finding has a cross cutting aspect of timely corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution. P.1.d] (Section 4OA2a.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately correct UFSAR deficiencies for the SSF.
A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action for the last Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) which did not include all the important information for the standby shutdown facility (SSF), the subject of two previous NCVs. The UFSAR did not include that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump suction condenser circulating water makeup source was isolated by two dc power-operated valves which open automatically on low pump suction pressure, even though it was important information to demonstrate required system power source and suction supply diversity. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3240.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and had a material impact on licensed activities. The inadequate UFSAR information had been used in a 10 CFR 50.59 screening that resulted in not performing a safety evaluation when required, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement and was characterized as a Severity Level IV. The failure to adequately update the UFSAR for the SSF was the subject of two previous violations (NCVs 05000369,370/2004003-02, and NCV 05000369,370/2005004-01 for untimely corrective action). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence. P.1.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for station blackout.
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the station blackout rule (10 CFR 50.63) implementation. Some station blackout (SBO) mitigating equipment described in the submitted information and analysis have been changed, and because they were not contained in the UFSAR, were not evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59 for their effect on station blackout mitigation, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3244.
The finding is more than minor because it had a material impact on licensed activities. The missing UFSAR information identified the systems and methodology used to combat a station blackout as described in the station blackout rule. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence. P.1.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design and test control for ice condenser lower inlet doors.
Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XVI; Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the UFSAR, Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the T.S. surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. The issue was determined to be more than minor because an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break LOCA; however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The cause of this issue is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance- Resources, because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation and procedures. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate QA activities to ensure waste shipments are characterized in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20 Appendix G, Section III.A.3 for failure to conduct adequate Quality Assurance (QA) activities to ensure compliance with the waste characterization requirements of 10 CFR 61.55. The NCV included three examples: the failure to analyze for required plutonium isotopes in a primary filter waste stream sample analyzed on April 15, 2005; the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analyses of Cerium-144 in a spent fuel pool cooling (KF) filter waste stream sample collected February 25, 2004; and the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analysis results
for Cesium-137 in a chemical and volume control (NV) filter waste stream sample dated February 25, 2004. The failure to identify missing or anomalous isotope values could have resulted in the potential shipment of improperly characterized radioactive waste to a licensed burial site or waste processor.
These examples are more than minor because they adversely affect the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that they involve an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because none of the reviewed waste stream data had been used to characterize waste that had been shipped to an offsite licensed burial or processing facility.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to train HAZMAT employees.
An NCV of 10 CFR 71.5 and 49 CFR172.704(a) was identified for failure to provide required training to hazardous material (Hazmat) employees involved in the preparation and loading of packages containing radioactive material for public transport. Specifically, inspectors identified that two individuals involved in the preparation and closure of a Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A Specification Package on September 6, 2005 had not received the required Hazmat training.
This violation is more than minor because it adversely affects the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that it involves an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because the shipment in question did not result in a breach of package or loss of licensed material during transport.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Feb 09, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The team observed several minor plant material condition deficiencies during plant system walkdowns that had gone undetected by licensee personnel. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues. For some lower significance issues, investigations lacked thoroughness or the documentation was not sufficient to substantiate conclusions. Formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions specified for problems were generally adequate, although some corrective actions were not complete or comprehensive. Audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform 72.48 evaluations for 72.212 changes.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified for failing to evaluate changes to the written evaluations required by 72.212(b)(2) using the requirements of 72.48(c). Even though licensee procedure NSD 211, 10 CFR 72.48 Process, required that one be performed, the licensee had not performed any 72.48(c) evaluations for any changes to the 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations for the NAC-UMS casks or the TN-32 casks since the requirement was included in the rule (5 revisions). This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3729.
This issue is greater than minor because the failure to perform 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Last modified : August 24, 2007
McGuire 2 3Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to identify and evaluate multiple boric acid leaks.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings. Licensee activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance with site procedures, in that, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate multiple boric acid leaks on safety related components.
These site procedures required plant personnel to identify, document, and evaluate all evidence of boric acid leakage.
The licensee immediately entered the improperly evaluated leaks into their corrective action system, and completed an initial operability review.
This finding is greater than minor because if the failure to properly evaluate boric acid leaks continued, then unidentified / unevaluated degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or other, susceptible, safety related components could continue and lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the IMC 0609, Appendix A, Phase 1 SDP worksheet. The finding screened as Green because leakage of boric acid is characterized as a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiator, but the identified leakage did not contribute to the increased likelihood of a primary or secondary LOCA, and the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The violation is associated with the Work Practices Component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area in that the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding compliance with the boric acid corrosion control program procedures. H.4.b]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the off-site power system under 10 CFR 50.65 a(1).
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for the licensees failure to establish goals and monitor the performance of the offsite power system per 10 CFR 50.65a(1). The licensee reclassified the offsite power system (OSP) from a(1) status to a(2) status without having monitored system performance against established goals, or documenting a technical justification to demonstrate that monitoring under a(1) was not required because the system performance was being effectively controlled such that it remained capable of performing its intended function. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3218.
The finding is more than minor because, in accordance with MC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues and Enforcement Manual section 8.1.11, Maintenance Rule a(1) and a(2) violations are not minor because they involve structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that have demonstrated some degraded performance or condition. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no design deficiency, the finding did not represent an actual loss of a safety function, nor does this involve a risk significant system for mitigating fire, flood, seismic, or severe weather events.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Written Safety Evaluation for a Change to the Facility The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for removing the approved seismic qualification methodology (WCAP-8110, supplement 9) from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without performing a written safety evaluation. This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-5016.
The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to the facility as described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluation would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November 21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is considered an accepted methodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retention characteristics of the ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. Removal of this approved methodology from the licensing basis would constitute a change in methodology and would require NRC review and approval. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Sep 04, 2007 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For A Nonconformance Associated With ECCS Throttle Valves The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to take adequate corrective action for a nonconformance, identified in Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-96-0530, associated with potential clogging of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) cold leg injection throttle valves during high pressure recirculation. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement PIP credited inspections of the inside of the ECCS sump, as evidenced by the 2006 discovery of a significant amount of aged yellow duct tape inside the Unit 2 ECCS sump around the suction and guard pipe of both ECCS trains. In addition, the licensee failed to identify and take actions to process a design change per their design control program for the resolution discussed in PIP M-96-0530, to evaluate the resolution/change under 10 CFR 50.59, and to process a licensing basis change under 10 CFR 50.71(e) to revise the UFSAR.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the tape could have a detrimental affect on the availability and reliability of both trains of high and intermediate head ECCS pump when called upon during an accident. In particular, the tape had the potential to have detrimental effects on the high pressure recirculation function due to potential clogging of the ECCS throttle valves, which have openings as small as 0.1 inches wide in the radial dimension. The issue was evaluated under IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase II, and was determined to be a greater than green finding. A Phase III risk assessment was performed by a Region II Senior Reactor Analyst who also found the issue to be potentially greater than green. This finding is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate correct actions in the area of problem identification and resolution (P.1.d). (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2007008 (pdf)
Significance: Feb 09, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Appropriate Corrective Actions for Valve Positioners not Analyzed for Seismic Requirements The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
Specifically, the licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions in response to a Green NCV issued for nonconformance with respect to the seismic qualification of positioners on the RN to KC Heat Exchanger flow control valves. This finding is of very low safety significance because the design/qualification deficiency did not result in a loss of function per Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-020. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both RN pumps if the corresponding flow control valves failed to close. In addition, the RN pump vendor provided documentation to the licensee which indicated that the RN pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value of 2700 gpm for up to two hours without sustaining damage. This was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem. This finding has a cross cutting aspect of timely corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution. P.1.d] (Section 4OA2a.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately correct UFSAR deficiencies for the SSF.
A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action for the last Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) which did not include all the important information for the standby shutdown facility (SSF), the subject of two previous NCVs. The UFSAR did not include that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump suction condenser circulating water makeup source was isolated by two dc power-operated valves which open automatically on low pump suction pressure, even though it was important information to demonstrate required system power source and suction supply diversity. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3240.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and had a material impact on licensed activities. The inadequate UFSAR information had been used in a 10 CFR 50.59 screening that resulted in not performing a safety evaluation when required, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement and was characterized as a Severity Level IV. The failure to adequately update the UFSAR for the SSF was the subject of two previous violations (NCVs 05000369,370/2004003-02, and NCV 05000369,370/2005004-01 for untimely corrective action). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence. P.1.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for station blackout.
An NRC-identified NCV was identified for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the station blackout rule (10 CFR 50.63) implementation. Some station blackout (SBO) mitigating equipment described in the submitted information and analysis have been changed, and because they were not contained in the UFSAR, were not evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59 for their effect on station blackout mitigation, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3244.
The finding is more than minor because it had a material impact on licensed activities. The missing UFSAR information identified the systems and methodology used to combat a station blackout as described in the station blackout rule. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence. P.1.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design and test control for ice condenser lower inlet doors.
Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XVI; Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits The licensee subsequently received the
supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the UFSAR, Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the T.S. surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. The issue was determined to be more than minor because an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break LOCA; however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The cause of this issue is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance- Resources, because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation and procedures. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate QA activities to ensure waste shipments are characterized in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55.
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20 Appendix G, Section III.A.3 for failure to conduct adequate Quality Assurance (QA) activities to ensure compliance with the waste characterization requirements of 10 CFR 61.55. The NCV included three examples: the failure to analyze for required plutonium isotopes in a primary filter waste stream sample analyzed on April 15, 2005; the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analyses of Cerium-144 in a spent fuel pool cooling (KF) filter waste stream sample collected February 25, 2004; and the failure to account for differences between licensee and vendor analysis results for Cesium-137 in a chemical and volume control (NV) filter waste stream sample dated February 25, 2004. The failure to identify missing or anomalous isotope values could have resulted in the potential shipment of improperly characterized radioactive waste to a licensed burial site or waste processor.
These examples are more than minor because they adversely affect the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that they involve an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because none of the reviewed waste stream data had been used to characterize waste that had been shipped to an offsite licensed burial or processing facility.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to train HAZMAT employees.
An NCV of 10 CFR 71.5 and 49 CFR172.704(a) was identified for failure to provide required training to hazardous material (Hazmat) employees involved in the preparation and loading of packages containing radioactive material for public transport. Specifically, inspectors identified that two individuals involved in the preparation and closure of a Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A Specification Package on September 6, 2005 had not received the required Hazmat training.
This violation is more than minor because it adversely affects the program and process attributes of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone, in that it involves an occurrence in the licensees radioactive material transportation program that is contrary to NRC regulations. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because the shipment in question did not result in a breach of package or loss of licensed material during transport.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse toQuality The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.172 for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with not performing 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-4321. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to promptly correct and perform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function.
It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely correct action in the area of problem identification and resolution P.1.d]. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 09, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The team observed several minor plant material condition deficiencies during plant system walkdowns that had gone undetected by licensee personnel. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues. For some lower significance issues, investigations lacked thoroughness or the documentation was not sufficient to substantiate conclusions. Formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions specified for problems were generally adequate, although some corrective actions were not complete or comprehensive. Audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed
to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Oct 06, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform 72.48 evaluations for 72.212 changes.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified for failing to evaluate changes to the written evaluations required by 72.212(b)(2) using the requirements of 72.48(c). Even though licensee procedure NSD 211, 10 CFR 72.48 Process, required that one be performed, the licensee had not performed any 72.48(c) evaluations for any changes to the 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations for the NAC-UMS casks or the TN-32 casks since the requirement was included in the rule (5 revisions). This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3729.
This issue is greater than minor because the failure to perform 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Last modified : December 07, 2007
McGuire 2 4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Nov 02, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For A Nonconformance Associated With ECCS Throttle Valves.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) final significance determination for a finding at Duke Power Companys (Duke) McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) involving the failure to take adequate corrective actions for an identified nonconformance. This nonconformance involved the discovery that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) cold leg injection throttle valves had the potential for clogging during high pressure recirculation because their narrow plug-to-seat clearances were smaller than the ECCS sump screen openings. More specifically, Dukes corrective action failed to adequately implement credited inspections of the inside of the ECCS sump. This was evidenced by the 2006 discovery, during an unrelated inspection, of a significant amount of aged yellow duct tape inside the Unit 2 ECCS sump around the suction and guard pipe of both ECCS trains. As documented in our Choice Letter dated September 10, 2007, this finding was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary greater than Green issue (i.e., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance), as well as identified as an apparent violation (AV 05000370/ 2007008-01) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
The NRC has determined that it is not likely that the two HHI throttle valves which are 2.75 turns open would clog to the point of precluding sufficient decay heat removal.
As such, it has been concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized in the mitigating systems cornerstone as having very low safety significance (Green). This final significance determination should not be construed as minimizing the importance of maintaining ECCS sump foreign material exclusion. Rather, it reflects how fortuitous it was that the foreign material consisted entirely of soft debris and that MNS has robust ECCS pump and ND heat exchanger designs, as well as the redundancy of both an IHI and HHI system (the latter of which has two of its four throttle valves approximately 2.75 turns open).
Additionally, the finding was also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements, as delineated in the Choice Letter and presented during the regulatory conference (see Enclosure 2). As previously addressed in the Choice Letter, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution (Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, P.1.(d)), and is reflective of the importance in properly implementing established engineering processes to ensure plant licensing and design bases are maintained when dispositioning conditions adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2007010 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Written Safety Evaluation for a Change to the Facility The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for removing the approved seismic qualification
methodology (WCAP-8110, supplement 9) from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without performing a written safety evaluation. This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-5016.
The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to the facility as described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluation would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November 21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is considered an accepted methodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retention characteristics of the ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. Removal of this approved methodology from the licensing basis would constitute a change in methodology and would require NRC review and approval. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance: Feb 09, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Appropriate Corrective Actions for Valve Positioners not Analyzed for Seismic Requirements The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
Specifically, the licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions in response to a Green NCV issued for nonconformance with respect to the seismic qualification of positioners on the RN to KC Heat Exchanger flow control valves. This finding is of very low safety significance because the design/qualification deficiency did not result in a loss of function per Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-020. The licensee determined that adequate loads existed to prevent damage to both RN pumps if the corresponding flow control valves failed to close. In addition, the RN pump vendor provided documentation to the licensee which indicated that the RN pumps could satisfactorily operate at flow rates below the minimum flow value of 2700 gpm for up to two hours without sustaining damage. This was considered adequate time to detect and respond to the problem. This finding has a cross cutting aspect of timely corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution. P.1.d] (Section 4OA2a.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse toQuality The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.172 for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with not performing 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-4321. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to promptly correct and perform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function.
It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely correct action in the area of problem identification and resolution P.1.d]. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 09, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The team observed several minor plant material condition deficiencies during plant system walkdowns that had gone undetected by licensee personnel. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues. For some lower significance issues, investigations lacked thoroughness or the documentation was not sufficient to substantiate conclusions. Formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed. Corrective actions specified for problems were generally adequate, although some corrective actions were not complete or comprehensive. Audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Last modified : February 04, 2008
McGuire 2 1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish and Maintain Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water (Section 1R11)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. for failure to adequately establish and maintain procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 5, Procedures for Abnormal Conditions. Specifically, loss of nuclear service water (RN) procedures were not established and maintained with an adequate safety analysis for the sharing of nuclear service water between units.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e. loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that this finding did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because these procedural steps had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the area of human performance H.2.c] because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures had complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation to assure nuclear safety. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Foreign Material Exclusion Control Procedures (Section 1R13)
A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, for failure to adequately implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, was identified. Specifically, foreign material exclusion control procedures as described in work orders were not implemented.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of one train of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the human performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because the foreign material (i.e., divers knife) was discovered in the 2A RN strainer as a result of the loss of safety equipment functionality. Data related to the frequency of high RN strainer differential pressure alarms was reviewed by the NRC staff for the seasonal macro-fouling periods of 2006 and 2007 to determine the total actual exposure time that macro-fouling occurred. Based on the data, a collective period of less than 30 days was selected as a conservative, bounding exposure number to determine the significance of the collective seasonal macro-fouling for the period from 2006 until January 28, 2008. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix A pre-solved risk tables for loss of one train of nuclear service water for less than 30 days. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.b] because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making when deciding not to implement foreign material procedures. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nuclear Service Water System Flow Analysis Deficiencies (Section 4OA5.2)
The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the RN pumps. Specifically, the licensee did not perform system hydraulic analyses or use other means to demonstrate that RN pumps 1A and 1B could perform their safety function under the most limiting design basis conditions.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because subsequent engineering analysis, completed in March 2008, demonstrated there was no loss of RN system safety function capability when the worst case design basis accident (DBA) limiting values were input into the RN system flow analysis. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Nov 02, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For A Nonconformance Associated With ECCS Throttle Valves.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) final significance determination for a finding at Duke Power Companys (Duke) McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) involving the failure to take adequate corrective actions for an identified nonconformance. This nonconformance involved the discovery that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) cold leg injection throttle valves had the potential for clogging during high pressure recirculation because their narrow plug-to-seat clearances were smaller than the ECCS sump screen openings. More specifically, Dukes corrective action failed to adequately implement credited inspections of the inside of the ECCS sump. This was evidenced by the 2006 discovery, during an unrelated inspection, of a significant amount of aged yellow duct tape inside the Unit 2 ECCS sump around the suction and guard pipe of both ECCS trains. As documented in our Choice Letter dated September 10, 2007, this finding was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary greater than Green issue (i.e., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance), as well as identified as an apparent violation (AV 05000370/ 2007008-01) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
The NRC has determined that it is not likely that the two HHI throttle valves which are 2.75 turns open would clog to the point of precluding sufficient decay heat removal.
As such, it has been concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized in the mitigating systems cornerstone as having very low safety significance (Green). This final significance determination should not be construed as minimizing the importance of maintaining ECCS sump foreign material exclusion. Rather, it reflects how fortuitous it was that the foreign material consisted entirely of soft debris and that MNS has robust ECCS pump and ND heat exchanger designs, as well as the redundancy of both an IHI and HHI system (the latter of which has two of its four throttle valves approximately 2.75 turns open).
Additionally, the finding was also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements, as delineated in the Choice Letter and presented during the regulatory conference (see Enclosure 2). As previously addressed in the Choice Letter, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution (Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, P.1.(d)), and is reflective of the importance in properly implementing established engineering processes to ensure plant licensing and design bases are maintained when dispositioning conditions adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2007010 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Written Safety Evaluation for a Change to the Facility The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for removing the approved seismic qualification methodology (WCAP-8110, supplement 9) from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without performing a written safety evaluation. This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-5016.
The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to the facility as described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluation would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November 21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is considered an accepted methodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retention characteristics of the ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. Removal of this approved methodology from the licensing basis would constitute a change in methodology and would require NRC review and approval. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take adequate corrective action for ensuring containment spray isolation valve thrust capacity.
The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for inadequate corrective action associated with the prevention of exceeding the thrust capacities of containment spray (NS) isolation valves (due to differential pressure), which could have prevented the NS system from performing its intended safety function.
This issue is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the NS system and is related to the equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because a temporary gauge installed to detect cross-train pressurization during NS pump runs revealed the unexpected existence of significant cross-system leakage from the residual heat removal (ND) system. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix H, which indicates that containment spray does not impact large early release frequency for pressurized water reactor plants. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance (H.1.b). (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse toQuality The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.172 for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with not performing 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-4321. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to promptly correct and perform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function.
It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely correct action in the area of problem identification and resolution P.1.d]. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Last modified : June 05, 2008
McGuire 2 2Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR to Reflect Those Portions of RN Shared Between Units (Section 1R11.1)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to include information related to those portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system that are shared between Units, as reflected in License Amendments issued for both Units on January 4, 1988.
This issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the designation of which portions of the RN system were shared between units, as described in the License Amendments, was material to the NRCs review of the licensees response to Generic Letter 91-13, Request for Information related to the Resolution of Generic Issue 130, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites. The licensees response revealed that they had procedures that allowed sharing of the RN discharge, which was specifically designated as not shared in Figure 7-1 of the Technical Specifications. As such, the UFSAR could not be relied upon to determine the shared portions and their safety implications. However, the inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of thorough evaluation in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(c)]. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Main Feedwater Tempering Line Valves Into the Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program (Section 1R12)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) for failure to scope the credited main feedwater tempering lines (one per steam generator) and associated valves into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program.
This finding was more than minor because, similar to Example 7.d of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix-E, "Examples of Minor Issues," effective control of component condition could not be demonstrated, since the appropriate preventative maintenance was not being performed due to not being scoped into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program. The licensee satisfactorily tested the functionality of the eight manual valves (two per tempering line) on each unit within the past few years, providing reasonable assurance that the manual valves would operate as required if needed. However, the functionality of the four check valves (one per tempering line) on each unit and the associated flow paths could not be demonstrated at this time; but, the licensee did perform an evaluation of all potential failure mechanisms and determined that the check valves would likely perform their function. The inspectors determined this finding to have very low safety significance, using NRC IMC 0609.04 Phase 1 Initial Screening, in that this finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function for equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65, and was not risk significant for external initiating events. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish and Maintain Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water (Section 1R11)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. for failure to adequately establish and maintain procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 5, Procedures for Abnormal Conditions. Specifically, loss of nuclear service water (RN) procedures were not established and maintained with an adequate safety analysis for the sharing of nuclear service water between units.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e. loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that this finding did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because these procedural steps had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the area of human performance H.2.c] because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures had complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation to assure nuclear safety. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Foreign Material Exclusion Control Procedures (Section 1R13)
A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, for failure to adequately implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, was identified. Specifically, foreign material exclusion control procedures as described in work orders were not implemented.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of one train of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the human performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because the foreign material (i.e., divers knife) was discovered in the 2A RN strainer as a result of the loss of safety equipment functionality. Data related to the frequency of high RN strainer differential pressure alarms was reviewed by the NRC staff for the seasonal macro-fouling periods of 2006 and 2007 to determine the total actual exposure time that macro-fouling occurred. Based on the data, a collective period of less than 30 days was selected as a conservative, bounding exposure number to determine the significance of the collective seasonal macro-fouling for the period from 2006 until January 28, 2008. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix A pre-solved risk tables for loss of one train of nuclear service water for less than 30 days. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.b] because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making when deciding not to implement foreign material procedures. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nuclear Service Water System Flow Analysis Deficiencies (Section 4OA5.2)
The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the RN pumps. Specifically, the licensee did not perform system hydraulic analyses or use other means to demonstrate that RN pumps 1A and 1B could perform their safety function under the most limiting design basis conditions.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of
very low safety significance because subsequent engineering analysis, completed in March 2008, demonstrated there was no loss of RN system safety function capability when the worst case design basis accident (DBA) limiting values were input into the RN system flow analysis. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Nov 02, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For A Nonconformance Associated With ECCS Throttle Valves.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) final significance determination for a finding at Duke Power Companys (Duke) McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) involving the failure to take adequate corrective actions for an identified nonconformance. This nonconformance involved the discovery that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) cold leg injection throttle valves had the potential for clogging during high pressure recirculation because their narrow plug-to-seat clearances were smaller than the ECCS sump screen openings. More specifically, Dukes corrective action failed to adequately implement credited inspections of the inside of the ECCS sump. This was evidenced by the 2006 discovery, during an unrelated inspection, of a significant amount of aged yellow duct tape inside the Unit 2 ECCS sump around the suction and guard pipe of both ECCS trains. As documented in our Choice Letter dated September 10, 2007, this finding was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary greater than Green issue (i.e., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance), as well as identified as an apparent violation (AV 05000370/ 2007008-01) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
The NRC has determined that it is not likely that the two HHI throttle valves which are 2.75 turns open would clog to the point of precluding sufficient decay heat removal.
As such, it has been concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized in the mitigating systems cornerstone as having very low safety significance (Green). This final significance determination should not be construed as minimizing the importance of maintaining ECCS sump foreign material exclusion. Rather, it reflects how fortuitous it was that the foreign material consisted entirely of soft debris and that MNS has robust ECCS pump and ND heat exchanger designs, as well as the redundancy of both an IHI and HHI system (the latter of which has two of its four throttle valves approximately 2.75 turns open).
Additionally, the finding was also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements, as delineated in the Choice Letter and presented during the regulatory conference (see Enclosure 2). As previously addressed in the Choice Letter, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution (Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, P.1.(d)), and is reflective of the importance in properly implementing established engineering processes to ensure plant licensing and design bases are maintained when dispositioning conditions adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2007010 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Written Safety Evaluation for a Change to the Facility The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for removing the approved seismic qualification methodology (WCAP-8110, supplement 9) from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without performing a written safety evaluation. This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-5016.
The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to the facility as described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluation would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November 21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is considered an accepted methodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retention characteristics of the ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. Removal of this
approved methodology from the licensing basis would constitute a change in methodology and would require NRC review and approval. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of Unit 2 MSIVs Prior to Surveillance Testing (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a for failure to establish an adequate procedure to test main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Specifically, written test control procedures did not prevent and, therefore, resulted in pre-conditioning of the valves prior to their surveillance requirement stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because the use of test procedures that allow preconditioning, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. Inspection Manual Chapter 9900 Section C.1.c defines pre-conditioning as the alteration, variation, manipulation, or adjustment, of the physical condition of structures, systems and components (SSCs) before TS surveillance or ASME code testing. Pre-conditioning can affect the acceptability of test results and can have a direct effect on the determination of operability of the affected system or component by masking the true as-found condition. As such, this issue also affects the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of maintaining containment functionality and the associated attributes of SSC barrier performance, and procedure quality, by affecting the determination of operability related to the containment isolation function of the MSIVs. This issue is of very low safety significance because there was insufficient information to show that the MSIVs were inoperable during the short period of time that they were required in Modes 3, 2 and 1; therefore, it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance [H.1.(b)]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take adequate corrective action for ensuring containment spray isolation valve thrust capacity.
The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for inadequate corrective action associated with the prevention of exceeding the thrust capacities of containment spray (NS) isolation valves (due to differential pressure), which could have prevented the NS system from performing its intended safety function.
This issue is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the NS system and is related to the equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because a temporary gauge installed to detect cross-train pressurization during NS pump runs revealed the unexpected existence of significant cross-system leakage from the residual heat removal (ND) system. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix H, which indicates that containment spray does not impact large early release frequency for pressurized water reactor plants. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance (H.1.b). (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse toQuality The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.172 for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with not performing 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-4321. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to promptly correct and perform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function.
It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely correct action in the area of problem identification and resolution P.1.d]. (Section 4OA5)
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2008
McGuire 2 3Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 20, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Implementation of Safety-Related RN Strainer Backwash 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.
Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action that was implemented failed to ensure that the design and licensing basis required capability for manual strainer backwash be maintained during accident conditions. Specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address macro-fouling (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump=s strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response from higher strainer macro-fouling rates and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection (SI) and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a SI or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fouling.
This violation is associated with a White finding for Units 1 and 2.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR to Reflect Those Portions of RN Shared Between Units (Section 1R11.1)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to include information related to those portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system that are shared between Units, as reflected in License Amendments issued for both Units on January 4, 1988.
This issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the designation of which portions of the RN system were shared between units, as described in the License Amendments, was material to the NRCs review of the licensees response to Generic Letter 91-13, Request for Information related to the Resolution of Generic Issue 130, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites.
The licensees response revealed that they had procedures that allowed sharing of the RN discharge, which was specifically designated as not shared in Figure 7-1 of the Technical Specifications. As such, the UFSAR could not be relied upon to determine the shared portions and their safety implications. However, the inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of thorough evaluation in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(c)]. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Main Feedwater Tempering Line Valves Into the Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program (Section 1R12)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) for failure to scope the credited main feedwater tempering lines (one per steam generator) and associated valves into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program.
This finding was more than minor because, similar to Example 7.d of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix-E, "Examples of Minor Issues," effective control of component condition could not be demonstrated, since the appropriate preventative maintenance was not being performed due to not being scoped into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program. The licensee satisfactorily tested the functionality of the eight manual valves (two per tempering line) on each unit within the past few years, providing reasonable assurance that the manual valves would operate as required if needed. However, the functionality of the four check valves (one per tempering line) on each unit and the associated flow paths could not be demonstrated at this time; but, the licensee did perform an evaluation of all potential failure mechanisms and determined that the check valves would likely perform their function. The inspectors determined this finding to have very low safety significance, using NRC IMC 0609.04 Phase 1 Initial Screening, in that this finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function for equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65, and was not risk significant for external initiating events. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish and Maintain Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water (Section 1R11)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. for failure to adequately establish and maintain procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 5, Procedures for Abnormal Conditions. Specifically, loss of nuclear service water (RN) procedures were not established and maintained with an adequate safety analysis for the sharing of nuclear service water between units.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e. loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that this finding did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because these procedural steps had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the area of human performance H.2.c] because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures had complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation to assure nuclear safety. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Foreign Material Exclusion Control Procedures (Section 1R13)
A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, for failure to adequately implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, was identified. Specifically, foreign material exclusion control procedures as described in work orders were not implemented.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of one train of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the human performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because the foreign material (i.e., divers knife) was discovered in the 2A RN strainer as a result of the loss of safety equipment functionality. Data related to the frequency of high RN strainer differential pressure alarms was reviewed by the NRC staff for the seasonal macro-fouling periods of 2006 and 2007 to determine the total actual exposure time that macro-fouling occurred. Based on the data, a collective period of less than 30 days was selected as a conservative, bounding exposure number to determine the significance of the collective seasonal macro-fouling for the period from 2006 until January 28, 2008. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix A pre-solved risk tables for loss of one train of nuclear service water for less than 30 days. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.b] because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making when deciding not to implement foreign material procedures. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nuclear Service Water System Flow Analysis Deficiencies (Section 4OA5.2)
The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the RN pumps. Specifically, the licensee did not perform system hydraulic analyses or use other means to demonstrate that RN pumps 1A and 1B could perform their safety function under the most limiting design basis conditions.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because subsequent engineering analysis, completed in March 2008, demonstrated there was no loss of RN system safety function capability when the worst case design basis accident (DBA) limiting values were input into the RN system flow analysis. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Nov 02, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action For A Nonconformance Associated With ECCS Throttle Valves.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) final significance determination for a finding at Duke Power Companys (Duke) McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) involving the failure to take adequate corrective actions for an identified nonconformance. This nonconformance involved the discovery that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) cold leg injection throttle valves had the potential for clogging during high pressure recirculation because their narrow plug-to-seat clearances were smaller than the ECCS sump screen openings. More specifically, Dukes corrective action failed to adequately implement credited inspections of the inside of the ECCS sump. This was evidenced by the 2006 discovery, during an unrelated inspection, of a significant amount of aged yellow duct tape inside the Unit 2 ECCS sump around the suction and guard pipe of both ECCS trains. As documented in our Choice Letter dated September 10, 2007, this finding was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary greater than Green issue (i.e., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance), as well as identified as an apparent violation (AV 05000370/ 2007008-01) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
The NRC has determined that it is not likely that the two HHI throttle valves which are 2.75 turns open would clog to the point of precluding sufficient decay heat removal.
As such, it has been concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized in the mitigating systems cornerstone as having very low safety significance (Green). This final significance determination should not be construed as minimizing the importance of maintaining ECCS sump foreign material exclusion. Rather, it reflects how fortuitous it was that the foreign material consisted entirely of soft debris and that MNS has robust ECCS pump and ND heat exchanger designs, as well as the redundancy of both an IHI and HHI system (the latter of which has two of its four throttle valves approximately 2.75 turns open).
Additionally, the finding was also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements, as delineated in the Choice Letter and presented during the regulatory conference (see Enclosure 2). As previously addressed in the Choice Letter, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective actions in the area of problem identification and resolution (Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, P.1.(d)), and is reflective of the importance in properly implementing established engineering processes to ensure plant licensing and design bases are maintained when dispositioning conditions adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2007010 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of Unit 2 MSIVs Prior to Surveillance Testing (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a for failure to establish an adequate procedure to test main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Specifically, written test control procedures did not prevent and, therefore, resulted in pre-conditioning
of the valves prior to their surveillance requirement stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because the use of test procedures that allow preconditioning, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. Inspection Manual Chapter 9900 Section C.1.c defines pre-conditioning as the alteration, variation, manipulation, or adjustment, of the physical condition of structures, systems and components (SSCs) before TS surveillance or ASME code testing. Pre-conditioning can affect the acceptability of test results and can have a direct effect on the determination of operability of the affected system or component by masking the true as-found condition. As such, this issue also affects the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of maintaining containment functionality and the associated attributes of SSC barrier performance, and procedure quality, by affecting the determination of operability related to the containment isolation function of the MSIVs. This issue is of very low safety significance because there was insufficient information to show that the MSIVs were inoperable during the short period of time that they were required in Modes 3, 2 and 1; therefore, it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance [H.1.(b)]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take adequate corrective action for ensuring containment spray isolation valve thrust capacity.
The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for inadequate corrective action associated with the prevention of exceeding the thrust capacities of containment spray (NS) isolation valves (due to differential pressure), which could have prevented the NS system from performing its intended safety function.
This issue is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the NS system and is related to the equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because a temporary gauge installed to detect cross-train pressurization during NS pump runs revealed the unexpected existence of significant cross-system leakage from the residual heat removal (ND) system. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix H, which indicates that containment spray does not impact large early release frequency for pressurized water reactor plants. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance (H.1.b). (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R
The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, the team identified examples where reportability issues were not dispositioned in a timely manner, root causes were not adequately identified, and corrective actions were not focused to correct problems.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : November 26, 2008
McGuire 2 4Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment for Switchyard Activities The inspectors identified a NCV of 10CFR50.65(a)(4) for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for Unit 1 when the performance of switchyard activities affected both units, and were categorized as risk significant for Unit 2.
This finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) M-08-6297, and plan to take actions to enhance risk assessment techniques. No immediate corrective action was taken because the work was almost completed by the time the licensee confirmed their error. This finding is greater than minor when compared to IMC 0612 Appendix B, minor question 5(e) because the Unit 1 risk assessment failed to consider maintenance activities that were occurring in the switchyard that affected both units and would have resulted in a higher risk category if properly assessed and could increase the likelihood of initiating events such as loss of offsite power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the time to boil in the spent fuel pool was slightly over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, which would have allowed sufficient time such that upon a loss of offsite power there would have been a reasonable likelihood for success of actions taken to recover off-site power. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.a]. (Section R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 20, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Implementation of Safety-Related RN Strainer Backwash 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.
Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action that was implemented failed to ensure that the design and licensing basis required capability for manual strainer backwash be maintained during accident conditions. Specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address macro-fouling (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump=s strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response
from higher strainer macro-fouling rates and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection (SI) and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a SI or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fouling.
This violation is associated with a White finding for Units 1 and 2.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR to Reflect Those Portions of RN Shared Between Units (Section 1R11.1)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to include information related to those portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system that are shared between Units, as reflected in License Amendments issued for both Units on January 4, 1988.
This issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the designation of which portions of the RN system were shared between units, as described in the License Amendments, was material to the NRCs review of the licensees response to Generic Letter 91-13, Request for Information related to the Resolution of Generic Issue 130, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites. The licensees response revealed that they had procedures that allowed sharing of the RN discharge, which was specifically designated as not shared in Figure 7-1 of the Technical Specifications. As such, the UFSAR could not be relied upon to determine the shared portions and their safety implications. However, the inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of thorough evaluation in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(c)]. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Main Feedwater Tempering Line Valves Into the Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program (Section 1R12)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) for failure to scope the credited main feedwater tempering lines (one per steam generator) and associated valves into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program.
This finding was more than minor because, similar to Example 7.d of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix-E, "Examples of Minor Issues," effective control of component condition could not be demonstrated, since the appropriate preventative maintenance was not being performed due to not being scoped into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program. The licensee satisfactorily tested the functionality of the eight manual valves (two per tempering line) on each unit within the past few years, providing reasonable assurance that the manual valves would operate as required if needed. However, the functionality of the four check valves (one per tempering line) on each unit and the associated flow paths could not be demonstrated at this time; but, the licensee did perform an evaluation of all potential failure mechanisms and determined that the check valves would likely perform their function. The inspectors determined this finding to have very low safety significance, using NRC IMC 0609.04 Phase 1 Initial Screening, in that this finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function for equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65, and was not risk significant for external initiating events. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish and Maintain Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water (Section 1R11)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a. for failure to adequately establish and maintain procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 5, Procedures for Abnormal Conditions. Specifically, loss of nuclear service water (RN) procedures were not established and maintained with an adequate safety analysis for the sharing of nuclear service water between units.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e. loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that this finding did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because these procedural steps had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the area of human performance H.2.c] because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures had complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation to assure nuclear safety. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Foreign Material Exclusion Control Procedures (Section 1R13)
A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, for failure to adequately implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, was identified. Specifically, foreign material exclusion control procedures as described in work orders were not implemented.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of one train of the RN system (ultimate heat sink) and is related to the human performance and procedure quality attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was considered self-revealing because the foreign material (i.e., divers knife) was discovered in the 2A RN strainer as a result of the loss of safety equipment functionality. Data related to the frequency of high RN strainer differential pressure alarms was reviewed by the NRC staff for the seasonal macro-fouling periods of 2006 and 2007 to determine the total actual exposure time that macro-fouling occurred. Based on the data, a collective period of less than 30 days was selected as a conservative, bounding exposure number to determine the significance of the collective seasonal macro-fouling for the period from 2006 until January 28, 2008. The issue is of very low safety significance based on review IMC 0609 Appendix A pre-solved risk tables for loss of one train of nuclear service water for less than 30 days. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.b] because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making when deciding not to implement foreign material procedures. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nuclear Service Water System Flow Analysis Deficiencies (Section 4OA5.2)
The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the RN pumps. Specifically, the licensee did not perform system hydraulic analyses or use other means to demonstrate that RN pumps 1A and 1B could perform their safety function under the most limiting design basis conditions.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because subsequent engineering analysis, completed in March 2008, demonstrated there was no loss of RN system safety function capability when the worst case design basis accident (DBA) limiting values were input into the RN system flow analysis. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of Unit 2 MSIVs Prior to Surveillance Testing (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a for failure to establish an adequate procedure to test main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Specifically, written test control procedures did not prevent and, therefore, resulted in pre-conditioning of the valves prior to their surveillance requirement stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because the use of test procedures that allow preconditioning, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. Inspection Manual Chapter 9900 Section C.1.c defines pre-conditioning as the alteration, variation, manipulation, or adjustment, of the physical condition of structures, systems and components (SSCs) before TS surveillance or ASME code testing. Pre-conditioning can affect the acceptability of test results and can have a direct effect on the determination of operability of the affected system or component by masking the true as-found condition. As such, this issue also affects the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of maintaining containment functionality and the associated attributes of SSC barrier performance, and procedure quality, by affecting the determination of operability related to the containment isolation function of the MSIVs. This issue is of very low safety significance because there was insufficient information to show that the MSIVs were inoperable during the short period of time that they were required in Modes 3, 2 and 1; therefore, it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance [H.1.(b)]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control a Locked-High Radiation Area Barrier [EA-08-268]
The inspectors identified a NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2 for the licensees failure to control access to a locked-high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, on September 30, 2006, a contract radiation protection technician (RPT) left the reactor head inspection stand LHRA barrier unlocked and unguarded from approximately 5:05 to 5:21 a.m. Dose rates as high as 10 rad/hr at 30 cm and 4 rad/hr general area were present inside the reactor head stand LHRA. The significance of the violation was assessed using traditional enforcement because it involved willfulness
[EA-08-268]. In accordance with Supplement IV, Health Physics, of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC determined that the safety significance of this violation was SL IV because the situation described in example 7 of a SL III violation (the finding involves a situation with a substantial potential for exposure in excess of applicable limits) did not exist and, per example 9 of a SL IV violation, was a matter with more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance. Although this violation involved willfulness, it was dispositioned as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy because the licensee identified the violation and promptly discussed it with regional health physics inspectors, the violation involved the acts of a low-level individual, the violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement, and significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee. The finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-06-4479. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, the team identified examples where reportability issues were not dispositioned in a timely manner, root causes were not adequately identified, and corrective actions were not focused to correct problems.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : April 07, 2009
McGuire 2 1Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment for Switchyard Activities The inspectors identified a NCV of 10CFR50.65(a)(4) for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for Unit 1 when the performance of switchyard activities affected both units, and were categorized as risk significant for Unit 2.
This finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) M-08-6297, and plan to take actions to enhance risk assessment techniques. No immediate corrective action was taken because the work was almost completed by the time the licensee confirmed their error. This finding is greater than minor when compared to IMC 0612 Appendix B, minor question 5(e) because the Unit 1 risk assessment failed to consider maintenance activities that were occurring in the switchyard that affected both units and would have resulted in a higher risk category if properly assessed and could increase the likelihood of initiating events such as loss of offsite power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the time to boil in the spent fuel pool was slightly over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, which would have allowed sufficient time such that upon a loss of offsite power there would have been a reasonable likelihood for success of actions taken to recover off-site power. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.a]. (Section R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the sharing of the nuclear service water system between units in abnormal operating procedures (APs). Specifically, the licensee had neither developed a safety analysis to demonstrate the safety of this activity nor revised the procedural steps that allowed sharing. This finding is more than minor because it affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system (ultimate heat sink) and was related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e., loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that it did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because the subject procedural steps of the APs had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution P.1.d], because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. The licensee plans to revise the procedure, complete a calculation to support the donating of one train of nuclear service water to the other unit when two trains are available from the donor unit, and perform an associated 10 CFR 50.59 review. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Describe the Load Sequencer Function in the FSAR The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) for failing to include in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) a description and analysis of the separate accelerated sequencer function that loads the safety-related equipment onto the safety-related emergency A.C. power system buses using different criteria than the committed sequencer function described in the UFSAR. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to have a description of the accelerated sequencer function in the UFSAR had a material impact on licensed activities, in that any modifications to safety-related systems, such as the modification that removed the seal-in function from the control room chiller digital control system, would need to consider the interaction with the accelerated sequencer (in addition to the separate committed load sequencer) to ensure that risk significant equipment, as modified, would function as analyzed. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement, because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation, because the occurrence of the control room chiller failing to start (after being dropped by the accelerated load sequencer) when required by the committed load sequencer function during testing, had very low safety significance. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective action in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(d)]. This aspect was chosen because the licensee recognized, as documented in a January 12, 2007 letter to the NRC, that there were content problems with the UFSAR and was in the process of trying to correct it. However, the inspectors could not find any completed interim corrective action documented in the licensees corrective action program that would alert/caution UFSAR users that compensatory actions were needed in order to perform adequate evaluations such as for operability, reportability, or 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee intends to add the accelerated sequence function to the UFSAR and install seal-in functions for the affected load blocks in the accelerated sequence. (Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 20, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Implementation of Safety-Related RN Strainer Backwash 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.
Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action that was implemented failed to ensure that the design and licensing basis required capability for manual strainer backwash be maintained during accident conditions. Specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address macro-fouling (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump=s strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response from higher strainer macro-fouling rates and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection (SI) and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a SI or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fouling.
This violation is associated with a White finding for Units 1 and 2.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR to Reflect Those Portions of RN Shared Between Units (Section 1R11.1)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to include information related to those portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system that are shared between Units, as reflected in License Amendments issued for both Units on January 4, 1988.
This issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the designation of which portions of the RN system were shared between units, as described in the License Amendments, was material to the NRCs review of the licensees response to Generic Letter 91-13, Request for Information related to the Resolution of Generic Issue 130, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites. The licensees response revealed that they had procedures that allowed sharing of the RN discharge, which was specifically designated as not shared in Figure 7-1 of the Technical Specifications. As such, the UFSAR could not be relied upon to determine the shared portions and their safety implications. However, the inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of thorough evaluation in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(c)]. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Main Feedwater Tempering Line Valves Into the Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program (Section 1R12)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) for failure to scope the credited main feedwater tempering lines (one per steam generator) and associated valves into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program.
This finding was more than minor because, similar to Example 7.d of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix-E, "Examples of Minor Issues," effective control of component condition could not be demonstrated, since the appropriate preventative maintenance was not being performed due to not being scoped into the Maintenance Rule monitoring program. The licensee satisfactorily tested the functionality of the eight manual valves (two per tempering line) on each unit within the past few years, providing reasonable assurance that the manual valves would operate as required if needed. However, the functionality of the four check valves (one per tempering line) on each unit and the associated flow paths could not be demonstrated at this time; but, the licensee did perform an evaluation of all potential failure mechanisms and determined that the check valves would likely perform their function. The inspectors determined this finding to have very low safety significance, using NRC IMC 0609.04 Phase 1 Initial Screening, in that this finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function for equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65, and was not risk significant for external initiating events. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Pre-conditioning of Unit 2 MSIVs Prior to Surveillance Testing (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a for failure to establish an adequate procedure to test main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Specifically, written test control procedures did not prevent and, therefore, resulted in pre-conditioning of the valves prior to their surveillance requirement stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because the use of test procedures that allow preconditioning, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. Inspection Manual Chapter 9900 Section C.1.c defines pre-conditioning as the alteration, variation, manipulation, or adjustment, of the physical condition of structures, systems and components (SSCs) before TS surveillance or ASME code testing. Pre-conditioning can affect the acceptability of test results and can have a direct effect on the determination of operability of the affected system or component by masking the true as-found condition. As such, this issue also affects the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of maintaining containment functionality and the associated attributes of SSC barrier performance, and procedure quality, by affecting the determination of operability related to the containment isolation function of the MSIVs. This issue is of very low safety significance because there was insufficient information to show that the MSIVs were inoperable during the short period of time that they were required in Modes 3, 2 and 1; therefore, it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance [H.1.(b)]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control a Locked-High Radiation Area Barrier [EA-08-268]
The inspectors identified a NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2 for the licensees failure to control access to a locked-high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, on September 30, 2006, a contract radiation protection technician (RPT) left the reactor head inspection stand LHRA barrier unlocked and unguarded from approximately 5:05 to 5:21 a.m. Dose rates as high as 10 rad/hr at 30 cm and 4 rad/hr general area were present inside the reactor head stand LHRA. The significance of the violation was assessed using traditional enforcement because it involved willfulness
[EA-08-268]. In accordance with Supplement IV, Health Physics, of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC determined that the safety significance of this violation was SL IV because the situation described in example 7 of a SL III violation (the finding involves a situation with a substantial potential for exposure in excess of applicable limits) did not exist and, per example 9 of a SL IV violation, was a matter with more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance. Although this violation involved willfulness, it was dispositioned as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy because the licensee identified the violation and promptly discussed it with regional health physics inspectors, the violation involved the acts of a low-level individual, the violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement, and significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee. The finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-06-4479. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, the team identified examples where reportability issues were not dispositioned in a timely manner, root causes were not adequately identified, and corrective actions were not focused to correct problems.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : May 28, 2009
McGuire 2 2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment for Switchyard Activities The inspectors identified a NCV of 10CFR50.65(a)(4) for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for Unit 1 when the performance of switchyard activities affected both units, and were categorized as risk significant for Unit 2.
This finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) M-08-6297, and plan to take actions to enhance risk assessment techniques. No immediate corrective action was taken because the work was almost completed by the time the licensee confirmed their error. This finding is greater than minor when compared to IMC 0612 Appendix B, minor question 5(e) because the Unit 1 risk assessment failed to consider maintenance activities that were occurring in the switchyard that affected both units and would have resulted in a higher risk category if properly assessed and could increase the likelihood of initiating events such as loss of offsite power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the time to boil in the spent fuel pool was slightly over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, which would have allowed sufficient time such that upon a loss of offsite power there would have been a reasonable likelihood for success of actions taken to recover off-site power. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.a]. (Section R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Implement Design Control Measures For Fire Protection Green: A non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for inadequate design control measures associated with the downgrading of a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the electrical penetration room and essential switchgear room for each train in both Units. The licensee failed to update the fire strategy plans and the design basis documents, including the fire protection program plan, the fire hazards analysis, and the safe shutdown analysis, to reflect the new fire confinement configurations. The licensee intends to perform the fire hazards analysis and revise the design documents and the fire strategy plans.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the fire confinement and fire suppression systems and was associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attribute in that this failure could affect the ability to respond to a fire. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and Fire Confinement, were evaluated as having low degradation because the failure to adequately perform design control measures in support of the modification was mitigated by the fact that the fire barrier was not actually removed; would likely have performed its intended function; and that the inspectors review of the equipment and actions for each of the combined areas indicated that safe shutdown for a fire in the combined areas could be accomplished from either the other redundant train or the alternate safe shutdown facility (both located in other fire areas). There is no cross cutting aspect with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance in that it was a human performance error that occurred 10
years ago. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Procedures Not Appropriate to the Circumstances for A Train RN Temporary Testing Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to provide procedures appropriate to the circumstances. The temporary test procedure for flow testing the A Train of nuclear service water (RN) failed to provide adequate pump suction strainer backwash capability resulting in the macrofouling of the 2A RN pump suction strainer. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report M-09-02216.
This finding is more than minor because it rendered the 2A RN pump unavailable and affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink), and was related to the external events, configuration control, equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of conservative assumptions H.1(b) as described in the Decision-Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, because the licensees assumption, that macrofouling of the RN pump suction strainers was not a concern while aligned to the standby nuclear service water pond, was non-conservative. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Ultimate Heat Sink LIcensing Basis Document Inaccuracies SLIV: A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to adequately identify and correct ultimate heat sink licensing basis document inaccuracies.
The finding is more than minor because the failure to have an accurate description of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in the licensing basis documents had a material impact on licensed activities. In addition, an accurately defined UHS is necessary to adequately assess plant modifications, operability determinations, and technical specification entry conditions. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation because the NRC determined the standby nuclear service water pond met the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27 in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and it does not result in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action P.1(c) in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate this issue such that the resolutions addressed all the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for RN System Flow Balancing The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to provide adequate procedures for flow balancing of the service water (RN) system. The RN flow balance procedure was inadequate in that it made no provision in the acceptance criteria to limit or evaluate minimum flow control valve seat/disc clearance, and subsequent potential for increased flow obstruction, resulting from system flow balancing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prvent undesirable consequences. Specifically, changing position of the flow control valves without consideration of potential flow obstruction could impact the capability to adequately cool safety related equipment. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate Design Basis Information Related to the Isolation Time for Safety Related MOVs into Instructions and Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to assure that the applicable design bases were correctly translated into the in-service test (IST) acceptance criteria for safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs). Specifically, the licensee's testing did not account for test inaccuracies associated with limit switch actuation or minimum EDG frequency into IST stroke time testing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornsertone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Not accounting for test inaccuracies and EDG under frequency, the IST did not ensure that MOV isolation times referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were verified by testing. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined that it was of very low safety significance (green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Verification of the Design Adequacy of the Control Circuit Voltage for 600 VAC Safety Related Motors The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the control circuit voltage for 600 VAC safety related motors fed from motor control centers. Specifically, there was no voltage drop calculation or cable configuration specification for the control circuits that established the adequacy of the control circuit to energize the safety related motors. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornsertone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Due to the lack of appropriate analysis, the 600V motor control circuit design basis accident capability was not assured and further evaluation was required to demonstrate that the equipment could perform its safety function. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), because it was a design deficiency determined not to have resulted in the loss of safety function. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Appendix R Emergency Lighting Credited for Operator Action The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of McGuire Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to implement and maintain their Fire Protection Program as described in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to take prompt, adequate corrective action to ensure installation of an emergency light for a local operator manual action at Breaker 2EMXB-2A. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff to carry flashlights until the light can be installed.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it affects the objective of ensuring reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on the high likelihood of operators completing the task using flashlights. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance in the area of Resources H.2.c], because the licensee failed to ensure the modification package was accurate to reflect the correct breaker that required an emergency light as described in the corrective action. (Section 1R05.01)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pertinent Fire Brigade Information and Guidance Not Identified in Fire Fighting Strategies The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and the Fire Protection Program as contained in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee implemented a deficient fire pre-plan strategy in fire areas 10/12 which failed to provide pertinent information and guidance on alternate available communications to assist the fire brigade for a fire within the area as required by the licensing basis. The licensee entered the problem into their corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff of the potential inability to use radios in fire areas 10/12.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the ability of the licensee to maintain communications for a fire in fire areas 10/12 and is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and respective attribute of protection against external factors, i.e. fire. The safety significance of the deficient fire pre-plan strategy was determined to be very low because the fire pre-plan strategy would not impede the fire brigades ability to extinguish a fire in the specified fire areas. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification & Resolution for the Corrective Action Program component P.1c] because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the previously identified problems associated with the fire preplans to ensure that the corrective actions were effective in identifying and correcting issues with the communications availability for the fire brigade.
(Section 1R05.08)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the sharing of the nuclear service water system between units in abnormal operating procedures (APs). Specifically, the licensee had neither developed a safety analysis to demonstrate the safety of this activity nor revised the procedural steps that allowed sharing. This
finding is more than minor because it affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system (ultimate heat sink) and was related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e., loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that it did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because the subject procedural steps of the APs had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution P.1.d], because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. The licensee plans to revise the procedure, complete a calculation to support the donating of one train of nuclear service water to the other unit when two trains are available from the donor unit, and perform an associated 10 CFR 50.59 review. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Describe the Load Sequencer Function in the FSAR The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) for failing to include in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) a description and analysis of the separate accelerated sequencer function that loads the safety-related equipment onto the safety-related emergency A.C. power system buses using different criteria than the committed sequencer function described in the UFSAR. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to have a description of the accelerated sequencer function in the UFSAR had a material impact on licensed activities, in that any modifications to safety-related systems, such as the modification that removed the seal-in function from the control room chiller digital control system, would need to consider the interaction with the accelerated sequencer (in addition to the separate committed load sequencer) to ensure that risk significant equipment, as modified, would function as analyzed. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement, because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation, because the occurrence of the control room chiller failing to start (after being dropped by the accelerated load sequencer) when required by the committed load sequencer function during testing, had very low safety significance. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective action in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(d)]. This aspect was chosen because the licensee recognized, as documented in a January 12, 2007 letter to the NRC, that there were content problems with the UFSAR and was in the process of trying to correct it. However, the inspectors could not find any completed interim corrective action documented in the licensees corrective action program that would alert/caution UFSAR users that compensatory actions were needed in order to perform adequate evaluations such as for operability, reportability, or 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee intends to add the accelerated sequence function to the UFSAR and install seal-in functions for the affected load blocks in the accelerated sequence. (Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 20, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Implementation of Safety-Related RN Strainer Backwash 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.
Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action that was implemented failed to ensure
that the design and licensing basis required capability for manual strainer backwash be maintained during accident conditions. Specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address macro-fouling (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump=s strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response from higher strainer macro-fouling rates and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection (SI) and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a SI or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fouling.
This violation is associated with a White finding for Units 1 and 2.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Actions for Containment Isolation Valve Inadequate Closing Margins Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for untimely corrective action for containment isolation valves (CIVs) which could spuriously open during an event requiring containment isolation. Specifically, the licensee had not completed an extent of condition review, from a previously reported event, to identify other CIVs which could spuriously open. The licensee immediately declared the Unit 1 CIVs inoperable and took actions through plant modifications and procedural alignment changes necessary to restore operability. CIV operability was not required because Unit 2 was in Mode 5, but similar changes were made on Unit 2 CIVs prior to Unit 2 re-entering Mode 4 when CIV operability was required.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment in that CIVs may not remain closed when required during design basis accidents and is related to the containment isolation attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. Because the 2008 CIV deficiency revealed itself through a change in functionality of equipment, this issue is considered self-revealing. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the penetrations involved closed piping within containment such that even if both the inboard and outboard CIVs were to open, a significant breach in the piping would need to occur to provide a viable release pathway. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedures
H.2(c) in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees corrective action program procedures failed to establish timeliness criteria for the reviews. (Section 4OA3).
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Control a Locked-High Radiation Area Barrier [EA-08-268]
The inspectors identified a NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2 for the licensees failure to control access to a locked-high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, on September 30, 2006, a contract radiation protection technician (RPT) left the reactor head inspection stand LHRA barrier unlocked and unguarded from approximately 5:05 to 5:21 a.m. Dose rates as high as 10 rad/hr at 30 cm and 4 rad/hr general area were present inside the reactor head stand LHRA. The significance of the violation was assessed using traditional enforcement because it involved willfulness
[EA-08-268]. In accordance with Supplement IV, Health Physics, of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC determined that the safety significance of this violation was SL IV because the situation described in example 7 of a SL III violation (the finding involves a situation with a substantial potential for exposure in excess of applicable limits) did not exist and, per example 9 of a SL IV violation, was a matter with more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance. Although this violation involved willfulness, it was dispositioned as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy because the licensee identified the violation and promptly discussed it with regional health physics inspectors, the violation involved the acts of a low-level individual, the violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement, and significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee. The finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-06-4479. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding McGuire PI&R The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, the team identified examples where reportability issues were not dispositioned in a timely manner, root causes were not adequately identified, and corrective actions were not focused to correct problems.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensees processes for performing and
managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : August 31, 2009
McGuire 2 3Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment for Switchyard Activities The inspectors identified a NCV of 10CFR50.65(a)(4) for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for Unit 1 when the performance of switchyard activities affected both units, and were categorized as risk significant for Unit 2.
This finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) M-08-6297, and plan to take actions to enhance risk assessment techniques. No immediate corrective action was taken because the work was almost completed by the time the licensee confirmed their error. This finding is greater than minor when compared to IMC 0612 Appendix B, minor question 5(e) because the Unit 1 risk assessment failed to consider maintenance activities that were occurring in the switchyard that affected both units and would have resulted in a higher risk category if properly assessed and could increase the likelihood of initiating events such as loss of offsite power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the time to boil in the spent fuel pool was slightly over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, which would have allowed sufficient time such that upon a loss of offsite power there would have been a reasonable likelihood for success of actions taken to recover off-site power. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of decision making in the area of human performance H.1.a]. (Section R13)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank requirements (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a license amendment to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank requirements. The licensee intends to revise the UFSAR to reflect the licensing basis described in the license amendment and is developing procedural guidance for cross-connecting the fuel oil storage tanks.
This finding was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I, to determine that the issue was more than minor because not including the new licensing basis for the safety-related fuel oil storage tanks in the UFSAR would have a material impact on licensed activities associated with this equipment. This issue was considered a Severity Level IV violation because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. No cross-cutting aspect was identified. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Adequately Implement Design Control Measures For Fire Protection Green: A non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for inadequate design control measures associated with the downgrading of a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the electrical penetration room and essential switchgear room for each train in both Units. The licensee failed to update the fire strategy plans and the design basis documents, including the fire protection program plan, the fire hazards analysis, and the safe shutdown analysis, to reflect the new fire confinement configurations. The licensee intends to perform the fire hazards analysis and revise the design documents and the fire strategy plans.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the fire confinement and fire suppression systems and was associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attribute in that this failure could affect the ability to respond to a fire. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and Fire Confinement, were evaluated as having low degradation because the failure to adequately perform design control measures in support of the modification was mitigated by the fact that the fire barrier was not actually removed; would likely have performed its intended function; and that the inspectors review of the equipment and actions for each of the combined areas indicated that safe shutdown for a fire in the combined areas could be accomplished from either the other redundant train or the alternate safe shutdown facility (both located in other fire areas). There is no cross cutting aspect with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance in that it was a human performance error that occurred 10 years ago. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Procedures Not Appropriate to the Circumstances for A Train RN Temporary Testing Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to provide procedures appropriate to the circumstances. The temporary test procedure for flow testing the A Train of nuclear service water (RN) failed to provide adequate pump suction strainer backwash capability resulting in the macrofouling of the 2A RN pump suction strainer. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report M-09-02216.
This finding is more than minor because it rendered the 2A RN pump unavailable and affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink), and was related to the external events, configuration control, equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of conservative assumptions H.1(b) as described in the Decision-Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, because the licensees assumption, that macrofouling of the RN pump suction strainers was not a concern while aligned to the standby nuclear service water pond, was non-conservative. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Ultimate Heat Sink LIcensing Basis Document Inaccuracies SLIV: A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to adequately identify and correct ultimate heat sink licensing basis document inaccuracies.
The finding is more than minor because the failure to have an accurate description of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in the licensing basis documents had a material impact on licensed activities. In addition, an accurately defined UHS is necessary to adequately assess plant modifications, operability determinations, and technical specification entry conditions. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation because the NRC determined the standby nuclear service water pond met the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27 in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and it does not result in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater
safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action P.1(c) in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate this issue such that the resolutions addressed all the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for RN System Flow Balancing The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to provide adequate procedures for flow balancing of the service water (RN) system. The RN flow balance procedure was inadequate in that it made no provision in the acceptance criteria to limit or evaluate minimum flow control valve seat/disc clearance, and subsequent potential for increased flow obstruction, resulting from system flow balancing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prvent undesirable consequences. Specifically, changing position of the flow control valves without consideration of potential flow obstruction could impact the capability to adequately cool safety related equipment. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate Design Basis Information Related to the Isolation Time for Safety Related MOVs into Instructions and Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to assure that the applicable design bases were correctly translated into the in-service test (IST) acceptance criteria for safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs). Specifically, the licensee's testing did not account for test inaccuracies associated with limit switch actuation or minimum EDG frequency into IST stroke time testing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornsertone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Not accounting for test inaccuracies and EDG under frequency, the IST did not ensure that MOV isolation times referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were verified by testing. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined that it was of very low safety significance (green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Verification of the Design Adequacy of the Control Circuit Voltage for 600 VAC Safety Related Motors The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion
III, "Design Control," for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the control circuit voltage for 600 VAC safety related motors fed from motor control centers. Specifically, there was no voltage drop calculation or cable configuration specification for the control circuits that established the adequacy of the control circuit to energize the safety related motors. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornsertone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Due to the lack of appropriate analysis, the 600V motor control circuit design basis accident capability was not assured and further evaluation was required to demonstrate that the equipment could perform its safety function. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), because it was a design deficiency determined not to have resulted in the loss of safety function. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Appendix R Emergency Lighting Credited for Operator Action The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of McGuire Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to implement and maintain their Fire Protection Program as described in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to take prompt, adequate corrective action to ensure installation of an emergency light for a local operator manual action at Breaker 2EMXB-2A. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff to carry flashlights until the light can be installed.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it affects the objective of ensuring reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on the high likelihood of operators completing the task using flashlights. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance in the area of Resources H.2.c], because the licensee failed to ensure the modification package was accurate to reflect the correct breaker that required an emergency light as described in the corrective action. (Section 1R05.01)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pertinent Fire Brigade Information and Guidance Not Identified in Fire Fighting Strategies The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and the Fire Protection Program as contained in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee implemented a deficient fire pre-plan strategy in fire areas 10/12 which failed to provide pertinent information and guidance on alternate available communications to assist the fire brigade for a fire within the area as required by the licensing basis. The licensee entered the problem into their corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff of the potential inability to use radios in fire areas 10/12.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the ability of the licensee to maintain communications for a fire in fire areas 10/12 and is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and respective attribute of protection against external factors, i.e. fire. The safety significance of the deficient fire pre-plan strategy was determined to be very low because the fire pre-plan strategy would not impede the fire brigades ability to extinguish a fire in the specified fire areas. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification & Resolution for the Corrective Action Program component P.1c] because the licensee failed to
thoroughly evaluate the previously identified problems associated with the fire preplans to ensure that the corrective actions were effective in identifying and correcting issues with the communications availability for the fire brigade.
(Section 1R05.08)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the sharing of the nuclear service water system between units in abnormal operating procedures (APs). Specifically, the licensee had neither developed a safety analysis to demonstrate the safety of this activity nor revised the procedural steps that allowed sharing. This finding is more than minor because it affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system (ultimate heat sink) and was related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e., loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that it did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because the subject procedural steps of the APs had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution P.1.d], because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. The licensee plans to revise the procedure, complete a calculation to support the donating of one train of nuclear service water to the other unit when two trains are available from the donor unit, and perform an associated 10 CFR 50.59 review. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Describe the Load Sequencer Function in the FSAR The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) for failing to include in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) a description and analysis of the separate accelerated sequencer function that loads the safety-related equipment onto the safety-related emergency A.C. power system buses using different criteria than the committed sequencer function described in the UFSAR. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to have a description of the accelerated sequencer function in the UFSAR had a material impact on licensed activities, in that any modifications to safety-related systems, such as the modification that removed the seal-in function from the control room chiller digital control system, would need to consider the interaction with the accelerated sequencer (in addition to the separate committed load sequencer) to ensure that risk significant equipment, as modified, would function as analyzed. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement, because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation, because the occurrence of the control room chiller failing to start (after being dropped by the accelerated load sequencer) when required by the committed load sequencer function during testing, had very low safety significance. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective action in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(d)]. This aspect was chosen because the licensee recognized, as documented in a January 12, 2007 letter to the NRC, that there were content problems with the UFSAR and was in the process of trying to correct it. However, the inspectors could not find any completed interim corrective action documented in the licensees corrective action program that would alert/caution UFSAR users that compensatory actions were needed in order to perform adequate evaluations such as for operability, reportability, or 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee intends to add the accelerated sequence function to the UFSAR and install seal-in functions for the affected load blocks in the accelerated sequence. (Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 20, 2008
Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Implementation of Safety-Related RN Strainer Backwash 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.
Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action that was implemented failed to ensure that the design and licensing basis required capability for manual strainer backwash be maintained during accident conditions. Specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address macro-fouling (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump=s strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response from higher strainer macro-fouling rates and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection (SI) and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a SI or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fouling.
This violation is associated with a White finding for Units 1 and 2.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Actions for Containment Isolation Valve Inadequate Closing Margins Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for untimely corrective action for containment isolation valves (CIVs) which could spuriously open during an event requiring containment isolation. Specifically, the licensee had not completed an extent of condition review, from a previously reported event, to identify other CIVs which could spuriously open. The licensee immediately declared the Unit 1 CIVs inoperable and took actions through plant modifications and procedural alignment changes necessary to restore operability. CIV operability was not required because Unit 2 was in Mode 5, but similar changes were made on Unit 2 CIVs prior to Unit 2 re-entering Mode 4 when CIV operability was required.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment in that CIVs may not remain closed when required during design basis accidents and is related to the containment isolation attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. Because the 2008 CIV deficiency revealed itself through a change in functionality of equipment, this issue is considered self-revealing. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the penetrations involved closed piping within containment such that even if both the inboard and outboard CIVs were to open, a significant breach in the piping would need to occur to provide a viable release pathway. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedures
H.2(c) in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees corrective action program procedures failed to establish timeliness criteria for the reviews. (Section 4OA3).
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to properly calibrate area radiation monitors (Section 2OS3)
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) for the licensees failure to ensure that area radiation monitors (ARMs) used for quantitative measurements were calibrated. The licensee failed to complete the detector sensitivity verification with an appropriate radioactive source during the previous two calibrations of the reactor coolant (NC) filter area ARMs. The licensee initiated Problem Investigative Process (PIP)
M-09-4036 to evaluate this issue.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Plant Facilities/Equipment and Instrumentation and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to properly calibrate the ARMs could compromise the evaluation of radiological hazards causing unintended dose to radiation workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of maintaining long term plant safety in the area of Human Performance, under the Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure procedures and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety by maintenance of design margins (i.e. appropriate calibration) and minimization of preventative maintenance deferrals (i.e. allowing for critical steps to be marked N/A, effectively deferring the calibration until the next calibration cycle)
H.2(a). (Section 2OS3).
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Control a Locked-High Radiation Area Barrier [EA-08-268]
The inspectors identified a NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2 for the licensees failure to control access to a locked-high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, on September 30, 2006, a contract radiation protection technician (RPT) left the reactor head inspection stand LHRA barrier unlocked and unguarded from approximately 5:05 to 5:21 a.m. Dose rates as high as 10 rad/hr at 30 cm and 4 rad/hr general area were present inside the reactor head stand LHRA. The significance of the violation was assessed using traditional enforcement because it involved willfulness
[EA-08-268]. In accordance with Supplement IV, Health Physics, of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC determined that the safety significance of this violation was SL IV because the situation described in example 7 of a SL III violation (the finding involves a situation with a substantial potential for exposure in excess of applicable limits) did not exist and, per example 9 of a SL IV violation, was a matter with more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance. Although this violation involved willfulness, it was dispositioned as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy because the licensee identified the violation and promptly discussed it with regional health physics inspectors, the violation involved the acts of a low-level individual, the violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement, and significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee. The finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-06-4479. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 10, 2009
McGuire 2 4Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank requirements (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a license amendment to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank requirements. The licensee intends to revise the UFSAR to reflect the licensing basis described in the license amendment and is developing procedural guidance for cross-connecting the fuel oil storage tanks.
This finding was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I, to determine that the issue was more than minor because not including the new licensing basis for the safety-related fuel oil storage tanks in the UFSAR would have a material impact on licensed activities associated with this equipment. This issue was considered a Severity Level IV violation because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. No cross-cutting aspect was identified. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Implement Design Control Measures For Fire Protection Green: A non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for inadequate design control measures associated with the downgrading of a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the electrical penetration room and essential switchgear room for each train in both Units. The licensee failed to update the fire strategy plans and the design basis documents, including the fire protection program plan, the fire hazards analysis, and the safe shutdown analysis, to reflect the new fire confinement configurations. The licensee intends to perform the fire hazards analysis and revise the design documents and the fire strategy plans.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the fire confinement and fire suppression systems and was associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attribute in that this failure could affect the ability to respond to a fire. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and Fire Confinement, were evaluated as having low degradation because the failure to adequately perform design control measures in support of the modification was mitigated by the fact that the fire barrier was not actually removed; would likely have performed its intended function; and that the inspectors review of the equipment and actions for each of the combined areas indicated that safe shutdown for a fire in the combined areas could be accomplished from either the other redundant train or the alternate safe shutdown facility (both located in other fire areas). There is no cross cutting aspect with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance in that it was a human performance error that occurred 10 years ago. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Procedures Not Appropriate to the Circumstances for A Train RN Temporary Testing Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to provide procedures appropriate to the circumstances. The temporary test procedure for flow testing the A Train of nuclear service water (RN) failed to provide adequate pump suction strainer backwash capability resulting in the macrofouling of the 2A RN pump suction strainer. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report M-09-02216.
This finding is more than minor because it rendered the 2A RN pump unavailable and affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink), and was related to the external events, configuration control, equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of conservative assumptions H.1(b) as described in the Decision-Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, because the licensees assumption, that macrofouling of the RN pump suction strainers was not a concern while aligned to the standby nuclear service water pond, was non-conservative. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Ultimate Heat Sink LIcensing Basis Document Inaccuracies SLIV: A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to adequately identify and correct ultimate heat sink licensing basis document inaccuracies.
The finding is more than minor because the failure to have an accurate description of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in the licensing basis documents had a material impact on licensed activities. In addition, an accurately defined UHS is necessary to adequately assess plant modifications, operability determinations, and technical specification entry conditions. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation because the NRC determined the standby nuclear service water pond met the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27 in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and it does not result in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action P.1(c) in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate this issue such that the resolutions addressed all the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for RN System Flow Balancing The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to provide adequate procedures for flow balancing of the service water (RN) system. The RN flow balance procedure was inadequate in that it made no provision in the acceptance criteria to limit or evaluate minimum flow control valve seat/disc clearance, and subsequent potential for increased flow obstruction, resulting from system flow balancing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond
to initiating events to prvent undesirable consequences. Specifically, changing position of the flow control valves without consideration of potential flow obstruction could impact the capability to adequately cool safety related equipment. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate Design Basis Information Related to the Isolation Time for Safety Related MOVs into Instructions and Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to assure that the applicable design bases were correctly translated into the in-service test (IST) acceptance criteria for safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs). Specifically, the licensee's testing did not account for test inaccuracies associated with limit switch actuation or minimum EDG frequency into IST stroke time testing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornsertone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Not accounting for test inaccuracies and EDG under frequency, the IST did not ensure that MOV isolation times referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were verified by testing. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined that it was of very low safety significance (green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Verification of the Design Adequacy of the Control Circuit Voltage for 600 VAC Safety Related Motors The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the control circuit voltage for 600 VAC safety related motors fed from motor control centers. Specifically, there was no voltage drop calculation or cable configuration specification for the control circuits that established the adequacy of the control circuit to energize the safety related motors. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornsertone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Due to the lack of appropriate analysis, the 600V motor control circuit design basis accident capability was not assured and further evaluation was required to demonstrate that the equipment could perform its safety function. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), because it was a design deficiency determined not to have resulted in the loss of safety function. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Appendix R Emergency Lighting Credited for Operator Action The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of McGuire Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to implement and maintain their Fire Protection Program as described in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to take prompt, adequate corrective action to ensure installation of an emergency light for a local operator manual action at Breaker 2EMXB-2A. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff to carry flashlights until the light can be installed.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it affects the objective of ensuring reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on the high likelihood of operators completing the task using flashlights. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance in the area of Resources H.2.c], because the licensee failed to ensure the modification package was accurate to reflect the correct breaker that required an emergency light as described in the corrective action. (Section 1R05.01)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pertinent Fire Brigade Information and Guidance Not Identified in Fire Fighting Strategies The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and the Fire Protection Program as contained in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee implemented a deficient fire pre-plan strategy in fire areas 10/12 which failed to provide pertinent information and guidance on alternate available communications to assist the fire brigade for a fire within the area as required by the licensing basis. The licensee entered the problem into their corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff of the potential inability to use radios in fire areas 10/12.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the ability of the licensee to maintain communications for a fire in fire areas 10/12 and is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and respective attribute of protection against external factors, i.e. fire. The safety significance of the deficient fire pre-plan strategy was determined to be very low because the fire pre-plan strategy would not impede the fire brigades ability to extinguish a fire in the specified fire areas. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification & Resolution for the Corrective Action Program component P.1c] because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the previously identified problems associated with the fire preplans to ensure that the corrective actions were effective in identifying and correcting issues with the communications availability for the fire brigade.
(Section 1R05.08)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Abnormal Procedures for Loss of Nuclear Service Water The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the sharing of the nuclear service water system between units in abnormal operating procedures (APs). Specifically, the licensee had neither developed a safety analysis to demonstrate the safety of this activity nor revised the procedural steps that allowed sharing. This finding is more than minor because it affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system (ultimate heat sink) and was related to the design control and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. In addition, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e., loss of RN on both units). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the fact that it did not represent an actual loss of system safety function nor a loss of
a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, because the subject procedural steps of the APs had never been used. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution P.1.d], because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. The licensee plans to revise the procedure, complete a calculation to support the donating of one train of nuclear service water to the other unit when two trains are available from the donor unit, and perform an associated 10 CFR 50.59 review. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Describe the Load Sequencer Function in the FSAR The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) for failing to include in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) a description and analysis of the separate accelerated sequencer function that loads the safety-related equipment onto the safety-related emergency A.C. power system buses using different criteria than the committed sequencer function described in the UFSAR. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to have a description of the accelerated sequencer function in the UFSAR had a material impact on licensed activities, in that any modifications to safety-related systems, such as the modification that removed the seal-in function from the control room chiller digital control system, would need to consider the interaction with the accelerated sequencer (in addition to the separate committed load sequencer) to ensure that risk significant equipment, as modified, would function as analyzed. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement, because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation, because the occurrence of the control room chiller failing to start (after being dropped by the accelerated load sequencer) when required by the committed load sequencer function during testing, had very low safety significance. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective action in the area of problem identification and resolution [P.1.(d)]. This aspect was chosen because the licensee recognized, as documented in a January 12, 2007 letter to the NRC, that there were content problems with the UFSAR and was in the process of trying to correct it. However, the inspectors could not find any completed interim corrective action documented in the licensees corrective action program that would alert/caution UFSAR users that compensatory actions were needed in order to perform adequate evaluations such as for operability, reportability, or 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee intends to add the accelerated sequence function to the UFSAR and install seal-in functions for the affected load blocks in the accelerated sequence. (Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 20, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Implementation of Safety-Related RN Strainer Backwash 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. This requirement is implemented through the Duke Quality Assurance Program Topical Report and procedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process.
Contrary to the above, between 2003 and August 7, 2007, the licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality related to macro-fouling of the nuclear service water (RN) strainers, in that the corrective action that was implemented failed to ensure that the design and licensing basis required capability for manual strainer backwash be maintained during accident conditions. Specifically, the 2003 plant modification that was implemented to address macro-fouling (i.e., upgrade and reclassification of the strainer backwash function to safety-related): (1) utilized non-safety-related instrument air (VI) to maintain each RN pump=s strainer backwash discharge valve open, but did not provide a means to manually open (or bypass) the discharge valve to support backwash operations
upon a loss of VI; and (2) did not account for the impact on timely operator response from higher strainer macro-fouling rates and expected (nuisance) strainer differential pressure alarms (without fouling) at the onset of high RN flow events (i.e., safety injection (SI) and loss of VI). As such, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that the RN system would be able to perform its safety-related function upon a SI or loss of VI event during periods of macro-fouling.
This violation is associated with a White finding for Units 1 and 2.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Actions for Containment Isolation Valve Inadequate Closing Margins Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for untimely corrective action for containment isolation valves (CIVs) which could spuriously open during an event requiring containment isolation. Specifically, the licensee had not completed an extent of condition review, from a previously reported event, to identify other CIVs which could spuriously open. The licensee immediately declared the Unit 1 CIVs inoperable and took actions through plant modifications and procedural alignment changes necessary to restore operability. CIV operability was not required because Unit 2 was in Mode 5, but similar changes were made on Unit 2 CIVs prior to Unit 2 re-entering Mode 4 when CIV operability was required.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment in that CIVs may not remain closed when required during design basis accidents and is related to the containment isolation attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. Because the 2008 CIV deficiency revealed itself through a change in functionality of equipment, this issue is considered self-revealing. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the penetrations involved closed piping within containment such that even if both the inboard and outboard CIVs were to open, a significant breach in the piping would need to occur to provide a viable release pathway. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedures
H.2(c) in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees corrective action program procedures failed to establish timeliness criteria for the reviews. (Section 4OA3).
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Significance: Dec 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Biennial exercise was not an adequate test The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to conduct a biennial exercise that was technically accurate and challenging, to the extent that it was not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program, as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-09-04560, M-09-05183, and M-09-05186, and planned to conduct a re-demonstration drill in May 2010. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Response Organization Performance attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone, in that a biennial exercise that is not technically accurate and challenging is not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern. This finding was
evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness SDP and determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because there was no loss of planning standard function. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting component of work practices in the area of Human Performance, because the licensee did not ensure the supervisory and management oversight of work activities supported nuclear safety
H.4(c). (Section 1EP1)
Inspection Report# : 2009501 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to properly calibrate area radiation monitors (Section 2OS3)
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) for the licensees failure to ensure that area radiation monitors (ARMs) used for quantitative measurements were calibrated. The licensee failed to complete the detector sensitivity verification with an appropriate radioactive source during the previous two calibrations of the reactor coolant (NC) filter area ARMs. The licensee initiated Problem Investigative Process (PIP)
M-09-4036 to evaluate this issue.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Plant Facilities/Equipment and Instrumentation and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to properly calibrate the ARMs could compromise the evaluation of radiological hazards causing unintended dose to radiation workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of maintaining long term plant safety in the area of Human Performance, under the Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure procedures and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety by maintenance of design margins (i.e. appropriate calibration) and minimization of preventative maintenance deferrals (i.e. allowing for critical steps to be marked N/A, effectively deferring the calibration until the next calibration cycle)
H.2(a). (Section 2OS3).
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 01, 2010
McGuire 2 1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for FPP documents incorporated by reference The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the Fire Protection Program (FPP) documents that were incorporated by reference. This issue is in the licensee=s corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process Report (PIP) M-10-0655. The licensee intends to either provide the required updates to the referenced documents or incorporate the FPP directly into the UFSAR.
The updated information for the UFSAR was important because it identified the elements of the FPP, fire hazards analysis, and safe shutdown analysis that are a portion of the basis for the FPP. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC=s ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue is not minor because not having an updated portion of the UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform adequate regulatory reviews for license amendments and inspections. Consequently, it can have a material impact on licensed activities. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation in Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was not screened for associated cross-cutting aspects because it dealt with traditional enforcement. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately implement the FIre Protection Program (FPP) for the Standby Shutdown System (SSS)
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of the FPP required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.4 for failing to take adequate design control measures associated with the addition of the standby shutdown system (SSS) for both Units. Specifically, the licensee failed to include a fire hazards analysis (FHA) in the FPP for the SSS, and failed to enter the SSS into the quality assurance program (QAP). The licensee performed a functionality assessment for the area where the SSS is located. The licensee intends to add the SSS to the FHA and the QAP. In addition, any previous modifications made to the SSS will be reviewed and corrective action taken as appropriate.
The performance deficiency was greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) systems and is associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attributes. Specifically, there was no FHA that demonstrated the availability and capability that at least one SSD train would be free of fire and capable of performing safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50.48, (a)(2)(iii). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and post-fire SSD, were evaluated as having low degradation. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance.
(Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to flow test nuclear service water "A" train standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) supply header at maximum design.
A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for the licensees failure to flow test the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) A Train Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) unit common supply header at maximum design flow. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-09-2216 and has taken corrective actions to increase the minimum required flow velocity, frequency, and duration of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header test procedure.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the cornerstone attributes of protection against external events and equipment performance and the Mitigating Systems objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate flushing of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header led to ineffective flushes and the accumulation of corrosion products which challenged the design function of the NSWS system. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase I - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to determine the safety significance.
Since the finding was related to a seismic initiating event, a Phase III was required to be performed by an NRC Senior Risk Analyst. The Phase III analysis calculated the risk increase to be less than 1E-7 for both conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability, resulting in a determination of very low risk significance (Green). This performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures H.2(c) as described in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank requirements (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a license amendment to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank requirements. The licensee intends to revise the UFSAR to reflect the licensing basis described in the license amendment and is developing procedural guidance for cross-connecting the fuel oil storage tanks.
This finding was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I, to determine that the issue was more than minor because not including the new licensing basis for the safety-related fuel oil storage tanks in the UFSAR would have a material impact on licensed activities associated with this equipment. This issue was considered a Severity Level IV violation because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. No cross-cutting aspect was identified. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Implement Design Control Measures For Fire Protection Green: A non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for inadequate design control measures associated with the downgrading of a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the electrical penetration room and essential switchgear room for each train in both Units. The licensee failed to update the fire strategy plans and the design basis documents, including the fire protection program plan, the fire hazards analysis, and the safe shutdown analysis, to reflect the new fire confinement configurations. The licensee intends to
perform the fire hazards analysis and revise the design documents and the fire strategy plans.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the fire confinement and fire suppression systems and was associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attribute in that this failure could affect the ability to respond to a fire. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and Fire Confinement, were evaluated as having low degradation because the failure to adequately perform design control measures in support of the modification was mitigated by the fact that the fire barrier was not actually removed; would likely have performed its intended function; and that the inspectors review of the equipment and actions for each of the combined areas indicated that safe shutdown for a fire in the combined areas could be accomplished from either the other redundant train or the alternate safe shutdown facility (both located in other fire areas). There is no cross cutting aspect with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance in that it was a human performance error that occurred 10 years ago. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Procedures Not Appropriate to the Circumstances for A Train RN Temporary Testing Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to provide procedures appropriate to the circumstances. The temporary test procedure for flow testing the A Train of nuclear service water (RN) failed to provide adequate pump suction strainer backwash capability resulting in the macrofouling of the 2A RN pump suction strainer. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report M-09-02216.
This finding is more than minor because it rendered the 2A RN pump unavailable and affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system (ultimate heat sink), and was related to the external events, configuration control, equipment performance and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of a single train of RN for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of conservative assumptions H.1(b) as described in the Decision-Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, because the licensees assumption, that macrofouling of the RN pump suction strainers was not a concern while aligned to the standby nuclear service water pond, was non-conservative. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Ultimate Heat Sink LIcensing Basis Document Inaccuracies SLIV: A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to adequately identify and correct ultimate heat sink licensing basis document inaccuracies.
The finding is more than minor because the failure to have an accurate description of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in the licensing basis documents had a material impact on licensed activities. In addition, an accurately defined UHS is necessary to adequately assess plant modifications, operability determinations, and technical specification entry conditions. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation because the NRC determined the standby nuclear service water pond met the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27 in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and it does not result in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action P.1(c) in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate this issue such that the resolutions addressed all the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for RN System Flow Balancing The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to provide adequate procedures for flow balancing of the service water (RN) system. The RN flow balance procedure was inadequate in that it made no provision in the acceptance criteria to limit or evaluate minimum flow control valve seat/disc clearance, and subsequent potential for increased flow obstruction, resulting from system flow balancing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prvent undesirable consequences. Specifically, changing position of the flow control valves without consideration of potential flow obstruction could impact the capability to adequately cool safety related equipment. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate Design Basis Information Related to the Isolation Time for Safety Related MOVs into Instructions and Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to assure that the applicable design bases were correctly translated into the in-service test (IST) acceptance criteria for safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs). Specifically, the licensee's testing did not account for test inaccuracies associated with limit switch actuation or minimum EDG frequency into IST stroke time testing. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornsertone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Not accounting for test inaccuracies and EDG under frequency, the IST did not ensure that MOV isolation times referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were verified by testing. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined that it was of very low safety significance (green), in that no actual loss of safety system function was identified. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Verification of the Design Adequacy of the Control Circuit Voltage for 600 VAC Safety Related Motors The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to establish measures to verify the design capability of the control circuit voltage for 600 VAC safety related motors fed from motor control centers. Specifically, there was no voltage drop calculation or cable configuration specification for the control circuits that established the adequacy of the control circuit to energize the safety related motors. The licensee entered this deficiency into their CAP for resolution.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and affected the cornsertone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Due to the lack of appropriate analysis, the 600V motor control circuit design basis accident capability was not assured and further evaluation was required to demonstrate that the equipment could perform its safety function. The team assessed this finding for significance in accordance with the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green), because it was a design deficiency determined not to have resulted in the loss of safety function. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because the performance deficiency did not reflect current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for Appendix R Emergency Lighting Credited for Operator Action The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of McGuire Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to implement and maintain their Fire Protection Program as described in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to take prompt, adequate corrective action to ensure installation of an emergency light for a local operator manual action at Breaker 2EMXB-2A. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff to carry flashlights until the light can be installed.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it affects the objective of ensuring reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on the high likelihood of operators completing the task using flashlights. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance in the area of Resources H.2.c], because the licensee failed to ensure the modification package was accurate to reflect the correct breaker that required an emergency light as described in the corrective action. (Section 1R05.01)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: May 14, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pertinent Fire Brigade Information and Guidance Not Identified in Fire Fighting Strategies The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and the Fire Protection Program as contained in design basis document MCS-1465.00-00-008, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. Specifically, the licensee implemented a deficient fire pre-plan strategy in fire areas 10/12 which failed to provide pertinent information and guidance on alternate available communications to assist the fire brigade for a fire within the area as required by the licensing basis. The licensee entered the problem into their corrective action program and issued a night order informing Operations staff of the potential inability to use radios in fire areas 10/12.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the ability of the licensee to maintain communications for a fire in fire areas 10/12 and is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and respective attribute of protection against external factors, i.e. fire. The safety significance of the deficient fire pre-plan strategy was determined to be very low because the fire pre-plan strategy would not impede the fire brigades ability to extinguish a fire in the specified fire areas. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification & Resolution for the Corrective Action Program component P.1c] because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the previously identified problems associated with the fire preplans to ensure that the corrective actions were effective in identifying and correcting issues with the communications availability for the fire brigade.
(Section 1R05.08)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Actions for Containment Isolation Valve Inadequate Closing Margins Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for untimely corrective action for containment isolation valves (CIVs) which could spuriously open during an event requiring containment isolation. Specifically, the licensee had not completed an extent of condition review, from a previously reported event, to identify other CIVs which could spuriously open. The licensee immediately declared the Unit 1 CIVs inoperable and took actions through plant modifications and procedural alignment changes necessary to restore operability. CIV operability was not required because Unit 2 was in Mode 5, but similar changes were made on Unit 2 CIVs prior to Unit 2 re-entering Mode 4 when CIV operability was required.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment in that CIVs may not remain closed when required during design basis accidents and is related to the containment isolation attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. Because the 2008 CIV deficiency revealed itself through a change in functionality of equipment, this issue is considered self-revealing. The violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in IMC 0609 SDP Phase 1 screening based on the penetrations involved closed piping within containment such that even if both the inboard and outboard CIVs were to open, a significant breach in the piping would need to occur to provide a viable release pathway. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedures
H.2(c) in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees corrective action program procedures failed to establish timeliness criteria for the reviews. (Section 4OA3).
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Significance: Dec 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Biennial exercise was not an adequate test The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to conduct a biennial exercise that was technically accurate and challenging, to the extent that it was not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program, as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-09-04560, M-09-05183, and M-09-05186, and planned to conduct a re-demonstration drill in May 2010. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Response Organization Performance attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone, in that a biennial exercise that is not technically accurate and challenging is not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern. This finding was evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness SDP and determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because there was no loss of planning standard function. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting component of work practices in the area of Human Performance, because the licensee did not ensure the supervisory and management oversight of work activities supported nuclear safety
H.4(c). (Section 1EP1)
Inspection Report# : 2009501 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to properly calibrate area radiation monitors (Section 2OS3)
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) for the licensees failure to ensure that area radiation monitors (ARMs) used for quantitative measurements were calibrated. The licensee failed to complete the detector sensitivity verification with an appropriate radioactive source during the previous two calibrations of the reactor coolant (NC) filter area ARMs. The licensee initiated Problem Investigative Process (PIP)
M-09-4036 to evaluate this issue.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Plant Facilities/Equipment and Instrumentation and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to properly calibrate the ARMs could compromise the evaluation of radiological hazards causing unintended dose to radiation workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of maintaining long term plant safety in the area of Human Performance, under the Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure procedures and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety by maintenance of design margins (i.e. appropriate calibration) and minimization of preventative maintenance deferrals (i.e. allowing for critical steps to be marked N/A, effectively deferring the calibration until the next calibration cycle)
H.2(a). (Section 2OS3).
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 26, 2010
McGuire 2 2Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for FPP documents incorporated by reference The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the Fire Protection Program (FPP) documents that were incorporated by reference. This issue is in the licensee=s corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process Report (PIP) M-10-0655. The licensee intends to either provide the required updates to the referenced documents or incorporate the FPP directly into the UFSAR.
The updated information for the UFSAR was important because it identified the elements of the FPP, fire hazards analysis, and safe shutdown analysis that are a portion of the basis for the FPP. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC=s ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue is not minor because not having an updated portion of the UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform adequate regulatory reviews for license amendments and inspections. Consequently, it can have a material impact on licensed activities. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation in Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was not screened for associated cross-cutting aspects because it dealt with traditional enforcement. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately implement the FIre Protection Program (FPP) for the Standby Shutdown System (SSS)
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of the FPP required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.4 for failing to take adequate design control measures associated with the addition of the standby shutdown system (SSS) for both Units. Specifically, the licensee failed to include a fire hazards analysis (FHA) in the FPP for the SSS, and failed to enter the SSS into the quality assurance program (QAP). The licensee performed a functionality assessment for the area where the SSS is located. The licensee intends to add the SSS to the FHA and the QAP. In addition, any previous modifications made to the SSS will be reviewed and corrective action taken as appropriate.
The performance deficiency was greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) systems and is associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attributes. Specifically, there was no FHA that demonstrated the availability and capability that at least one SSD train would be free of fire and capable of performing safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50.48, (a)(2)(iii). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and post-fire SSD, were evaluated as having low degradation. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance.
(Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to flow test nuclear service water "A" train standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) supply header at maximum design.
A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for the licensees failure to flow test the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) A Train Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) unit common supply header at maximum design flow. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-09-2216 and has taken corrective actions to increase the minimum required flow velocity, frequency, and duration of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header test procedure.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the cornerstone attributes of protection against external events and equipment performance and the Mitigating Systems objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate flushing of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header led to ineffective flushes and the accumulation of corrosion products which challenged the design function of the NSWS system. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase I - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to determine the safety significance.
Since the finding was related to a seismic initiating event, a Phase III was required to be performed by an NRC Senior Risk Analyst. The Phase III analysis calculated the risk increase to be less than 1E-7 for both conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability, resulting in a determination of very low risk significance (Green). This performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures H.2(c) as described in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank requirements (Section 1R22)
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a license amendment to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank requirements. The licensee intends to revise the UFSAR to reflect the licensing basis described in the license amendment and is developing procedural guidance for cross-connecting the fuel oil storage tanks.
This finding was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I, to determine that the issue was more than minor because not including the new licensing basis for the safety-related fuel oil storage tanks in the UFSAR would have a material impact on licensed activities associated with this equipment. This issue was considered a Severity Level IV violation because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. No cross-cutting aspect was identified. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
Significance: Dec 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Biennial exercise was not an adequate test The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to conduct a biennial exercise that was technically accurate and challenging, to the extent that it was not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program, as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-09-04560, M-09-05183, and M-09-05186, and planned to conduct a re-demonstration drill in May 2010. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Response Organization Performance attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone, in that a biennial exercise that is not technically accurate and challenging is not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern. This finding was evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness SDP and determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because there was no loss of planning standard function. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting component of work practices in the area of Human Performance, because the licensee did not ensure the supervisory and management oversight of work activities supported nuclear safety
H.4(c). (Section 1EP1)
Inspection Report# : 2009501 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a HRA
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.7.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a high radiation area (HRA). Specifically, on September 17, 2009, a crane flagman on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) that did not allow access to a HRA, inadvertently entered an unposted but guarded transient HRA and recorded an electronic dosimeter (ED) dose rate alarm at 128 mrem/hr. The worker was unable to hear the alarm due to wearing a headset and not wearing an auxiliary alarm device as specified in station procedures for HRA entries. The worker had been briefed to not enter the area when an irradiated instrument was on the floor and that the guard would prevent his entering the area. The guard was not positioned to prevent entry into the area and did not detect the flagman entering the area until he had already passed the source. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-10-05506.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of exposure control and affected the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation because it resulted in unplanned or unintended radiation dose. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not an ALARA finding or overexposure, did not have a substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of radiological safety in the work control component of the Human Performance area because the licensee did not adequately control the areas as a HRA. H.3(a) (Section 2RS1).
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to properly calibrate area radiation monitors (Section 2OS3)
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) for the licensees failure to ensure
that area radiation monitors (ARMs) used for quantitative measurements were calibrated. The licensee failed to complete the detector sensitivity verification with an appropriate radioactive source during the previous two calibrations of the reactor coolant (NC) filter area ARMs. The licensee initiated Problem Investigative Process (PIP)
M-09-4036 to evaluate this issue.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Plant Facilities/Equipment and Instrumentation and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to properly calibrate the ARMs could compromise the evaluation of radiological hazards causing unintended dose to radiation workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of maintaining long term plant safety in the area of Human Performance, under the Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure procedures and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety by maintenance of design margins (i.e. appropriate calibration) and minimization of preventative maintenance deferrals (i.e. allowing for critical steps to be marked N/A, effectively deferring the calibration until the next calibration cycle)
H.2(a). (Section 2OS3).
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 02, 2010
McGuire 2 3Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition for control room area chilled water system An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality involving both trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) being out of service at the same time. This resulted in insufficient corrective action to preclude repetition. The licensee reopened the root cause investigation to determine the cause and was resolving the high cycle fatigue issue on the hot gas bypass line.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that failing to identify corrective actions to preclude repetition could result in the loss of safety function of more risk-significant equipment such as emergency diesel generators. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of supervisory and management oversight in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because managements establishment of the scope and reviews of the completed root cause evaluation failed to provide adequate oversight to ensure the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality was determined and corrective actions were taken to preclude repetition. H.4(c) (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for a modification to the VG system An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a modification to the emergency diesel generator air start system (VG) on both units. This modification installed cross-connect piping between the two VG receivers on each emergency diesel generator to allow maintaining receiver pressure when an air compressor was out of service. Licensee corrective actions include updating the UFSAR and Design Basis Documents and processing a Technical Specification (TS) change to make the TS applicable to the cross-connected configuration. This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs M-10-5299 and M-10-5504.
This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R04)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for new EDG tripping functions A NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee failed to update the UFSAR following a modification that installed new protective functions for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-10-05718 This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for FPP documents incorporated by reference The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the Fire Protection Program (FPP) documents that were incorporated by reference. This issue is in the licensee=s corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process Report (PIP) M-10-0655. The licensee intends to either provide the required updates to the referenced documents or incorporate the FPP directly into the UFSAR.
The updated information for the UFSAR was important because it identified the elements of the FPP, fire hazards analysis, and safe shutdown analysis that are a portion of the basis for the FPP. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC=s ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue is not minor because not having an updated portion of the UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform adequate regulatory reviews for license amendments and inspections. Consequently, it can have a material impact on licensed activities. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation in Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was not screened for associated cross-cutting aspects because it dealt with traditional enforcement. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately implement the FIre Protection Program (FPP) for the Standby Shutdown System (SSS)
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of the FPP required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.4 for failing to take adequate design control measures associated with the addition of the standby shutdown system (SSS) for both Units. Specifically, the licensee failed to include a fire hazards analysis (FHA) in the FPP for the SSS, and failed to enter the SSS into the quality assurance program (QAP). The licensee performed a functionality assessment for the area where the SSS is located. The licensee intends to add the SSS to the FHA and the QAP. In addition, any previous modifications made to the SSS will be reviewed and corrective action taken as appropriate.
The performance deficiency was greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) systems and is associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attributes. Specifically, there was no FHA that demonstrated the availability and capability that at least one SSD train would be free of fire and capable of performing safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50.48, (a)(2)(iii). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and post-fire SSD, were evaluated as having low degradation. There was no cross-cutting
aspect associated with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance.
(Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to flow test nuclear service water "A" train standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) supply header at maximum design.
A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for the licensees failure to flow test the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) A Train Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) unit common supply header at maximum design flow. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-09-2216 and has taken corrective actions to increase the minimum required flow velocity, frequency, and duration of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header test procedure.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the cornerstone attributes of protection against external events and equipment performance and the Mitigating Systems objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate flushing of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header led to ineffective flushes and the accumulation of corrosion products which challenged the design function of the NSWS system. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase I - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to determine the safety significance.
Since the finding was related to a seismic initiating event, a Phase III was required to be performed by an NRC Senior Risk Analyst. The Phase III analysis calculated the risk increase to be less than 1E-7 for both conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability, resulting in a determination of very low risk significance (Green). This performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures H.2(c) as described in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Dec 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Biennial exercise was not an adequate test The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to conduct a biennial exercise that was technically accurate and challenging, to the extent that it was not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program, as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-09-04560, M-09-05183, and M-09-05186, and planned to conduct a re-demonstration drill in May 2010. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Response Organization Performance attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone, in that a biennial exercise that is not technically accurate and challenging is not an adequate test of the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the licensees emergency response capabilities. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern. This finding was evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness SDP and determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because there was no loss of planning standard function. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting component of work practices in the area of Human Performance, because the licensee did not ensure
the supervisory and management oversight of work activities supported nuclear safety
H.4(c). (Section 1EP1)
Inspection Report# : 2009501 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a HRA
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.7.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a high radiation area (HRA). Specifically, on September 17, 2009, a crane flagman on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) that did not allow access to a HRA, inadvertently entered an unposted but guarded transient HRA and recorded an electronic dosimeter (ED) dose rate alarm at 128 mrem/hr. The worker was unable to hear the alarm due to wearing a headset and not wearing an auxiliary alarm device as specified in station procedures for HRA entries. The worker had been briefed to not enter the area when an irradiated instrument was on the floor and that the guard would prevent his entering the area. The guard was not positioned to prevent entry into the area and did not detect the flagman entering the area until he had already passed the source. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-10-05506.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of exposure control and affected the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation because it resulted in unplanned or unintended radiation dose. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not an ALARA finding or overexposure, did not have a substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of radiological safety in the work control component of the Human Performance area because the licensee did not adequately control the areas as a HRA. H.3(a) (Section 2RS1).
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 29, 2010
McGuire 2 4Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition for control room area chilled water system An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality involving both trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) being out of service at the same time. This resulted in insufficient corrective action to preclude repetition. The licensee reopened the root cause investigation to determine the cause and was resolving the high cycle fatigue issue on the hot gas bypass line.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that failing to identify corrective actions to preclude repetition could result in the loss of safety function of more risk-significant equipment such as emergency diesel generators. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of supervisory and management oversight in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because managements establishment of the scope and reviews of the completed root cause evaluation failed to provide adequate oversight to ensure the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality was determined and corrective actions were taken to preclude repetition. H.4(c) (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generators Fuel Transfer System Niagara Flow Meters The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality in that a single vulnerability failure of the fuel transfer (FD) system Niagara flow meters identified in 2003 could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. In addition, these flow meters were identified as a Category A risk component which required preventative maintenance (PM) strategy and no PM or inspection for these flow meters was ever performed. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as PIP M-10-6442 and the license intends to replace the flow meters for 1A EDG and 2A EDG in 2011.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality for the FD system flow meters identified in 2003 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone in that it adversely affected the reliability of the EDGs to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences in that the flow meters could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because there was no loss of safety function of any EDG train. The inspectors determined that the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, component of Work
Control, and aspect of Work Planning was applicable because the licensee did not incorporate risk insights in their plan work activities to remove this potential single vulnerability failure of Niagara flow meters in a timely manner.
H.3(a) (4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for a modification to the VG system An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a modification to the emergency diesel generator air start system (VG) on both units. This modification installed cross-connect piping between the two VG receivers on each emergency diesel generator to allow maintaining receiver pressure when an air compressor was out of service. Licensee corrective actions include updating the UFSAR and Design Basis Documents and processing a Technical Specification (TS) change to make the TS applicable to the cross-connected configuration. This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs M-10-5299 and M-10-5504.
This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R04)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for new EDG tripping functions A NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee failed to update the UFSAR following a modification that installed new protective functions for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-10-05718 This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately update the UFSAR for FPP documents incorporated by reference The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the Fire Protection Program (FPP) documents that were incorporated by reference. This issue is in the licensee=s corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process Report (PIP) M-10-0655. The licensee intends to either provide the required updates to the referenced documents or incorporate the FPP directly into the UFSAR.
The updated information for the UFSAR was important because it identified the elements of the FPP, fire hazards analysis, and safe shutdown analysis that are a portion of the basis for the FPP. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC=s ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue is not minor because not having an updated portion of the UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform adequate regulatory reviews for
license amendments and inspections. Consequently, it can have a material impact on licensed activities. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation in Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was not screened for associated cross-cutting aspects because it dealt with traditional enforcement. (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately implement the FIre Protection Program (FPP) for the Standby Shutdown System (SSS)
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of the FPP required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.4 for failing to take adequate design control measures associated with the addition of the standby shutdown system (SSS) for both Units. Specifically, the licensee failed to include a fire hazards analysis (FHA) in the FPP for the SSS, and failed to enter the SSS into the quality assurance program (QAP). The licensee performed a functionality assessment for the area where the SSS is located. The licensee intends to add the SSS to the FHA and the QAP. In addition, any previous modifications made to the SSS will be reviewed and corrective action taken as appropriate.
The performance deficiency was greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) systems and is associated with the design control and protection against external factors (fire) attributes. Specifically, there was no FHA that demonstrated the availability and capability that at least one SSD train would be free of fire and capable of performing safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50.48, (a)(2)(iii). The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, based on the fact that the categories of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls, and post-fire SSD, were evaluated as having low degradation. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this performance deficiency because it was not representative of current licensee performance.
(Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to flow test nuclear service water "A" train standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) supply header at maximum design.
A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for the licensees failure to flow test the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) A Train Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) unit common supply header at maximum design flow. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-09-2216 and has taken corrective actions to increase the minimum required flow velocity, frequency, and duration of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header test procedure.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the cornerstone attributes of protection against external events and equipment performance and the Mitigating Systems objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate flushing of the A Train SNSWP unit common supply header led to ineffective flushes and the accumulation of corrosion products which challenged the design function of the NSWS system. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase I - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to determine the safety significance.
Since the finding was related to a seismic initiating event, a Phase III was required to be performed by an NRC Senior Risk Analyst. The Phase III analysis calculated the risk increase to be less than 1E-7 for both conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability, resulting in a determination of very low risk significance (Green). This performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures H.2(c) as described in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a HRA
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.7.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a high radiation area (HRA). Specifically, on September 17, 2009, a crane flagman on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) that did not allow access to a HRA, inadvertently entered an unposted but guarded transient HRA and recorded an electronic dosimeter (ED) dose rate alarm at 128 mrem/hr. The worker was unable to hear the alarm due to wearing a headset and not wearing an auxiliary alarm device as specified in station procedures for HRA entries. The worker had been briefed to not enter the area when an irradiated instrument was on the floor and that the guard would prevent his entering the area. The guard was not positioned to prevent entry into the area and did not detect the flagman entering the area until he had already passed the source. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-10-05506.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of exposure control and affected the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation because it resulted in unplanned or unintended radiation dose. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not an ALARA finding or overexposure, did not have a substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of radiological safety in the work control component of the Human Performance area because the licensee did not adequately control the areas as a HRA. H.3(a) (Section 2RS1).
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous
Significance: N/A Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 McGuire PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable.
However, the inspectors identified several examples where issues were not prioritized in accordance with site CAP guidance and two examples of evaluations which lacked appropriate rigor. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified.
Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : March 03, 2011
McGuire 2 1Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition for control room area chilled water system An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality involving both trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) being out of service at the same time. This resulted in insufficient corrective action to preclude repetition. The licensee reopened the root cause investigation to determine the cause and was resolving the high cycle fatigue issue on the hot gas bypass line.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that failing to identify corrective actions to preclude repetition could result in the loss of safety function of more risk-significant equipment such as emergency diesel generators. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of supervisory and management oversight in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because managements establishment of the scope and reviews of the completed root cause evaluation failed to provide adequate oversight to ensure the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality was determined and corrective actions were taken to preclude repetition. H.4(c) (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for GL 91-13 An NRC-identified SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect their response to Generic Letter (GL) 91-13, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites, which described capabilities in existing procedures for cross-connecting nuclear service water (RN) between units. Licensee corrective actions include submitting a license amendment and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This performance deficiency (PD) was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to obtain a license amendment for RN sharing between units An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for making changes to the UFSAR, section 9.2, and Abnormal Procedure AP-20, Loss of RN, which required prior NRC approval. The changes allowed donating a train of nuclear service water to the unit experiencing a loss of service water (LOSW) event by opening the unit crossover valves. Licensee corrective actions include removing the steps from AP-20, submitting a license amendment request, and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to eliminate fish in the SNSWP A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. The licensee had previously identified that the fish population in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) had significantly increased but failed to perform the annual fish eradication of the SNSWP to prevent macro-fouling of the RN pump suction strainers. This resulted in the licensee declaring both trains of RN inoperable and entry into TS 3.0.3 for both units. Licensee corrective actions included chemically treating the SNSWP to eliminate the macro-fouling source, flushing the RN intake lines, and establishing a periodic chemical treatment of the SNSWP.
This PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system to provide long term decay heat removal because the macro-fouling of the suction strainers rendered the RN pumps inoperable. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, with an exposure time of greater than 30 days. A Phase 3 SDP analysis was required to be performed and determined the resultant core damage frequency (CDF) was <1E-6 (Green). This finding was determined to be directly related to the conservative assumptions aspect of the Decision Making component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees decisions to defer the macro-fouling treatment of the SNSWP were non-conservative H.1(b).
(Section 4OA3.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generators Fuel Transfer System Niagara Flow Meters The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality in that a single vulnerability failure of the fuel transfer (FD) system Niagara flow meters identified in 2003 could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. In addition, these flow meters were identified as a Category A risk component which required preventative maintenance (PM) strategy and no PM or inspection for these flow meters was ever performed. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as PIP M-10-6442 and the license intends to replace the flow meters for 1A EDG and 2A EDG in 2011.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality for the FD system flow meters identified in 2003 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone in that it adversely affected the reliability
of the EDGs to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences in that the flow meters could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because there was no loss of safety function of any EDG train. The inspectors determined that the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, component of Work Control, and aspect of Work Planning was applicable because the licensee did not incorporate risk insights in their plan work activities to remove this potential single vulnerability failure of Niagara flow meters in a timely manner.
H.3(a) (4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for a modification to the VG system An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a modification to the emergency diesel generator air start system (VG) on both units. This modification installed cross-connect piping between the two VG receivers on each emergency diesel generator to allow maintaining receiver pressure when an air compressor was out of service. Licensee corrective actions include updating the UFSAR and Design Basis Documents and processing a Technical Specification (TS) change to make the TS applicable to the cross-connected configuration. This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs M-10-5299 and M-10-5504.
This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R04)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for new EDG tripping functions A NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee failed to update the UFSAR following a modification that installed new protective functions for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-10-05718 This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a HRA
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.7.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a high radiation area (HRA). Specifically, on September 17, 2009, a crane flagman on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) that did not allow access to a HRA, inadvertently entered an unposted but guarded transient HRA and recorded an electronic dosimeter (ED) dose rate alarm at 128 mrem/hr. The worker was unable to hear the alarm due to wearing a headset and not wearing an auxiliary alarm device as specified in station procedures for HRA entries. The worker had been briefed to not enter the area when an irradiated instrument was on the floor and that the guard would prevent his entering the area. The guard was not positioned to prevent entry into the area and did not detect the flagman entering the area until he had already passed the source. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as PIP M-10-05506.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of exposure control and affected the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation because it resulted in unplanned or unintended radiation dose. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not an ALARA finding or overexposure, did not have a substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of radiological safety in the work control component of the Human Performance area because the licensee did not adequately control the areas as a HRA. H.3(a) (Section 2RS1).
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 McGuire PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable.
However, the inspectors identified several examples where issues were not prioritized in accordance with site CAP guidance and two examples of evaluations which lacked appropriate rigor. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified.
Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : June 07, 2011
McGuire 2 2Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition for control room area chilled water system An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to determine the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality involving both trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) being out of service at the same time. This resulted in insufficient corrective action to preclude repetition. The licensee reopened the root cause investigation to determine the cause and was resolving the high cycle fatigue issue on the hot gas bypass line.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that failing to identify corrective actions to preclude repetition could result in the loss of safety function of more risk-significant equipment such as emergency diesel generators. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of supervisory and management oversight in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because managements establishment of the scope and reviews of the completed root cause evaluation failed to provide adequate oversight to ensure the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality was determined and corrective actions were taken to preclude repetition. H.4(c) (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for GL 91-13 An NRC-identified SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect their response to Generic Letter (GL) 91-13, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites, which described capabilities in existing procedures for cross-connecting nuclear service water (RN) between units. Licensee corrective actions include submitting a license amendment and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This performance deficiency (PD) was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to obtain a license amendment for RN sharing between units An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for making changes to the UFSAR, section 9.2, and Abnormal Procedure AP-20, Loss of RN, which required prior NRC approval. The changes allowed donating a train of nuclear service water to the unit experiencing a loss of service water (LOSW) event by opening the unit crossover valves. Licensee corrective actions include removing the steps from AP-20, submitting a license amendment request, and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to eliminate fish in the SNSWP A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. The licensee had previously identified that the fish population in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) had significantly increased but failed to perform the annual fish eradication of the SNSWP to prevent macro-fouling of the RN pump suction strainers. This resulted in the licensee declaring both trains of RN inoperable and entry into TS 3.0.3 for both units. Licensee corrective actions included chemically treating the SNSWP to eliminate the macro-fouling source, flushing the RN intake lines, and establishing a periodic chemical treatment of the SNSWP.
This PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system to provide long term decay heat removal because the macro-fouling of the suction strainers rendered the RN pumps inoperable. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, with an exposure time of greater than 30 days. A Phase 3 SDP analysis was required to be performed and determined the resultant core damage frequency (CDF) was <1E-6 (Green). This finding was determined to be directly related to the conservative assumptions aspect of the Decision Making component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees decisions to defer the macro-fouling treatment of the SNSWP were non-conservative H.1(b).
(Section 4OA3.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generators Fuel Transfer System Niagara Flow Meters The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality in that a single vulnerability failure of the fuel transfer (FD) system Niagara flow meters identified in 2003 could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. In addition, these flow meters were identified as a Category A risk component which required preventative maintenance (PM) strategy and no PM or inspection for these flow meters was ever performed. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as PIP M-10-6442 and the license intends to replace the flow meters for 1A EDG and 2A EDG in 2011.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality for the FD system flow meters identified in 2003 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone in that it adversely affected the reliability
of the EDGs to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences in that the flow meters could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because there was no loss of safety function of any EDG train. The inspectors determined that the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, component of Work Control, and aspect of Work Planning was applicable because the licensee did not incorporate risk insights in their plan work activities to remove this potential single vulnerability failure of Niagara flow meters in a timely manner.
H.3(a) (4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for a modification to the VG system An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for a modification to the emergency diesel generator air start system (VG) on both units. This modification installed cross-connect piping between the two VG receivers on each emergency diesel generator to allow maintaining receiver pressure when an air compressor was out of service. Licensee corrective actions include updating the UFSAR and Design Basis Documents and processing a Technical Specification (TS) change to make the TS applicable to the cross-connected configuration. This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs M-10-5299 and M-10-5504.
This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R04)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for new EDG tripping functions A NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee failed to update the UFSAR following a modification that installed new protective functions for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-10-05718 This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to notify the NRC of a situation related to public health and safety
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72 was identified when the licensee did not notify the NRC that they had reported a non-routine event related to the health and safety of the public to another government agency. The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of leakage in a FERC-licensed intake dike and did not notify NRC within four hours of notifying FERC. The licensee entered this condition into their correction action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-11-3600.
The failure to notify the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 about a notification to FERC of a significant condition related to public health and safety was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to submit an LER for a valid RPS actuation An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, was identified for the licensees failure to submit an LER within 60 days for a valid reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. The reactor was manually tripped when control rod L-13 did not respond as expected during rod control movement testing. The licensee entered this condition into their CAP as PIP M-11-2694.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to submit an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) was a PD. This PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned for traditional enforcement violations.
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding
2010 McGuire PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable.
However, the inspectors identified several examples where issues were not prioritized in accordance with site CAP guidance and two examples of evaluations which lacked appropriate rigor. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified.
Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : October 14, 2011
McGuire 2 3Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate ND venting procedures The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to establish acceptance criteria to determine operability in surveillance procedures used to vent the decay heat removal (ND) system in Modes 5, 6, and No-Mode in preparation for Mode 6. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-11-04745 The licensees failure to establish adequate acceptance criteria for ND venting surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4200/036 and PT/2/A/4200/036 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to establish acceptance criteria for surveillance tests which establish the basis for the ND system operability in modes 5 and 6 would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that conditions which could impact system operability could remain undetected. In addition, the finding adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a quantitative assessment was not required based on the criteria in Attachment 1. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of implementation of operating experience in the Operating Experience component in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to implement operating experience from Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 into station procedures P.2(b).
(Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for GL 91-13 An NRC-identified SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect their response to Generic Letter (GL) 91-13, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites, which described capabilities in existing procedures for cross-connecting nuclear service water (RN) between units. Licensee corrective actions include submitting a license amendment and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This performance deficiency (PD) was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment for RN sharing between units An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for making changes to the UFSAR, section 9.2, and Abnormal Procedure AP-20, Loss of RN, which required prior NRC approval. The changes allowed donating a train of nuclear service water to the unit experiencing a loss of service water (LOSW) event by opening the unit crossover valves. Licensee corrective actions include removing the steps from AP-20, submitting a license amendment request, and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to eliminate fish in the SNSWP A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. The licensee had previously identified that the fish population in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) had significantly increased but failed to perform the annual fish eradication of the SNSWP to prevent macro-fouling of the RN pump suction strainers. This resulted in the licensee declaring both trains of RN inoperable and entry into TS 3.0.3 for both units. Licensee corrective actions included chemically treating the SNSWP to eliminate the macro-fouling source, flushing the RN intake lines, and establishing a periodic chemical treatment of the SNSWP.
This PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system to provide long term decay heat removal because the macro-fouling of the suction strainers rendered the RN pumps inoperable. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, with an exposure time of greater than 30 days. A Phase 3 SDP analysis was required to be performed and determined the resultant core damage frequency (CDF) was <1E-6 (Green). This finding was determined to be directly related to the conservative assumptions aspect of the Decision Making component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees decisions to defer the macro-fouling treatment of the SNSWP were non-conservative H.1(b).
(Section 4OA3.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generators Fuel Transfer System Niagara Flow Meters The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality in that a single vulnerability failure of the fuel transfer (FD) system Niagara flow meters identified in 2003 could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. In addition, these flow meters were identified as a Category A risk component which required preventative maintenance (PM) strategy and no PM or inspection for these flow meters was ever performed. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as PIP M-10-6442 and the license intends to replace the flow meters for 1A EDG and 2A EDG in 2011.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality for the FD system flow meters identified in 2003 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone in that it adversely affected the reliability of the EDGs to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences in that the flow meters could potentially restrict fuel flow to the EDGs which would impact their safety function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because there was no loss of safety function of any EDG train. The inspectors determined that the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, component of Work Control, and aspect of Work Planning was applicable because the licensee did not incorporate risk insights in their plan work activities to remove this potential single vulnerability failure of Niagara flow meters in a timely manner.
H.3(a) (4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to notify the NRC of a situation related to public health and safety
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72 was identified when the licensee did not notify the NRC that they had reported a non-routine event related to the health and safety of the public to another government agency. The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of leakage in a FERC-licensed intake dike and did not notify NRC within four hours of notifying FERC. The licensee entered this condition into their correction action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-11-3600.
The failure to notify the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 about a notification to FERC of a significant condition related to public health and safety was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to submit an LER for a valid RPS actuation An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, was identified for the licensees failure to submit an LER within 60 days for a valid reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. The reactor was manually tripped when control rod L-13 did not respond as expected during rod control movement testing. The licensee entered this condition into their CAP as PIP M-11-2694.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to submit an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) was a PD. This PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned for traditional enforcement violations.
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Oct 22, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 McGuire PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable.
However, the inspectors identified several examples where issues were not prioritized in accordance with site CAP guidance and two examples of evaluations which lacked appropriate rigor. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified.
Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : January 04, 2012
McGuire 2 4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate ND venting procedures The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to establish acceptance criteria to determine operability in surveillance procedures used to vent the decay heat removal (ND) system in Modes 5, 6, and No-Mode in preparation for Mode 6. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-11-04745 The licensees failure to establish adequate acceptance criteria for ND venting surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4200/036 and PT/2/A/4200/036 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to establish acceptance criteria for surveillance tests which establish the basis for the ND system operability in modes 5 and 6 would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that conditions which could impact system operability could remain undetected. In addition, the finding adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a quantitative assessment was not required based on the criteria in Attachment 1. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of implementation of operating experience in the Operating Experience component in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to implement operating experience from Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 into station procedures P.2(b).
(Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update the UFSAR for GL 91-13 An NRC-identified SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect their response to Generic Letter (GL) 91-13, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites, which described capabilities in existing procedures for cross-connecting nuclear service water (RN) between units. Licensee corrective actions include submitting a license amendment and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This performance deficiency (PD) was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a license amendment for RN sharing between units An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for making changes to the UFSAR, section 9.2, and Abnormal Procedure AP-20, Loss of RN, which required prior NRC approval. The changes allowed donating a train of nuclear service water to the unit experiencing a loss of service water (LOSW) event by opening the unit crossover valves. Licensee corrective actions include removing the steps from AP-20, submitting a license amendment request, and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.
This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to eliminate fish in the SNSWP A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. The licensee had previously identified that the fish population in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) had significantly increased but failed to perform the annual fish eradication of the SNSWP to prevent macro-fouling of the RN pump suction strainers. This resulted in the licensee declaring both trains of RN inoperable and entry into TS 3.0.3 for both units. Licensee corrective actions included chemically treating the SNSWP to eliminate the macro-fouling source, flushing the RN intake lines, and establishing a periodic chemical treatment of the SNSWP.
This PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system to provide long term decay heat removal because the macro-fouling of the suction strainers rendered the RN pumps inoperable. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, with an exposure time of greater than 30 days. A Phase 3 SDP analysis was required to be performed and determined the resultant core damage frequency (CDF) was <1E-6 (Green). This finding was determined to be directly related to the conservative assumptions aspect of the Decision Making component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensees decisions to defer the macro-fouling treatment of the SNSWP were non-conservative H.1(b).
(Section 4OA3.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to notify the NRC of a situation related to public health and safety
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72 was identified when the licensee did not notify the NRC that they had reported a non-routine event related to the health and safety of the public to another government agency. The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of leakage in a FERC-licensed intake dike and did not notify NRC within four hours of notifying FERC. The licensee entered this condition into their correction action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-11-3600.
The failure to notify the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 about a notification to FERC of a significant condition related to public health and safety was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to submit an LER for a valid RPS actuation An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, was identified for the licensees failure to submit an LER within 60 days for a valid reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. The reactor was manually tripped when control rod L-13 did not respond as expected during rod control movement testing. The licensee entered this condition into their CAP as PIP M-11-2694.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to submit an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) was a PD. This PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned for traditional enforcement violations.
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Last modified : March 02, 2012
McGuire 2 1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Operable Fire Assembly in Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to maintain an operable fire assembly resulting in an unsealed pipe penetration through a 3-hour rated fire barrier wall separating the Unit 2 Train A/B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room from the Unit 2 mechanical penetration equipment room. The licensee reinstalled pipe caps on each end of the unsealed pipe.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the unsealed opening adversely impacted the ability of the fire barrier to perform its intended safety function. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fire barrier deficiency represented a low fire degradation rating. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component because station personnel failed to follow fire protection impairment procedures for breaching a fire assembly. H.4(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Condition Adverse to Quality into the CAP A NRC-identified Green finding was identified for the failure to follow the sites corrective action program (CAP) procedure which required the initiation of a PIP for a degraded 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) Bellofram seal. The degraded Bellofram seal contributed to the improper setup of the 2B EDG governor actuator which resulted in the 2B EDG not achieving the required 105 percent full power output.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the capability of the EDG to provide continuous and adequate load margin was affected. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of implements the CAP with a low threshold in the Corrective Action Program component in the area of the Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not enter the condition into the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate ND venting procedures The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to establish acceptance criteria to determine operability in surveillance procedures used to vent the decay heat removal (ND) system in Modes 5, 6, and No-Mode in preparation for Mode 6. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-11-04745 The licensees failure to establish adequate acceptance criteria for ND venting surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4200/036 and PT/2/A/4200/036 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to establish acceptance criteria for surveillance tests which establish the basis for the ND system operability in modes 5 and 6 would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that conditions which could impact system operability could remain undetected. In addition, the finding adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a quantitative assessment was not required based on the criteria in Attachment 1. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of implementation of operating experience in the Operating Experience component in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to implement operating experience from Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 into station procedures P.2(b).
(Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to notify the NRC of a situation related to public health and safety
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72 was identified when the licensee did not notify the NRC that they had reported a non-routine event related to the health and safety of the public to another government agency. The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of leakage in a FERC-licensed intake dike and did not notify NRC within four hours of notifying FERC. The licensee entered this condition into their correction action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-11-3600.
The failure to notify the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 about a notification to FERC of a significant condition related to public health and safety was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to submit an LER for a valid RPS actuation An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, was identified for the licensees failure to submit an LER within 60 days for a valid reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. The reactor was manually tripped when control rod L-13 did not respond as expected during rod control movement testing. The licensee entered this condition into their CAP as PIP M-11-2694.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to submit an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) was a PD. This PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned for traditional enforcement violations.
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Last modified : May 29, 2012
McGuire 2 2Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement planned compensatory measures for impaired auxiliary building fire hose stations An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement adequate compensatory measures for multiple impaired manual fire hose stations (FHSs) in accordance with the approved fire protection program. Gated wye valves were not installed as required during a periodic flush of multiple auxiliary building (AB) FHSs rendering them inoperable. The licensee took actions to install the gated wye valves in the affected FHSs to restore them to operable. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-12-2816.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that manual fire suppression capability was impaired. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it represented a low degradation of the manual fire suppression function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of planning and coordination of work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities to ensure that adequate compensatory measures were established for impaired fire hose stations. H.3(a) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Potential Blocking of TDCA Pump Lube Oil Cooler During Certain Fire Events The NRC identified a NCV of License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to evaluate potential blockage of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDCA) pump lube oil cooler when pump suction is aligned to the circulating water (RC) system. Specifically, during certain fire events causing loss of plant control, the NRC identified that if the RC system piping was aligned to the suction of the TDCA pump as in accordance with the licensing basis, it could result in blockage of cooling water flow for the TDCA pump lube oil cooler. Immediate actions included performing a functional assessment and evaluating potential long term corrective actions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2174.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E question 3j in that, there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system when suction was supplied from RC system. In addition, the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, and IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Phase 1 and determined to be of low safety significance because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown. The NRC determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this
performance deficiency because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for EDG Exhaust Ventilation System The NRC identified a NCV of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to ensure adequate tornado missile protection for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) exhaust relief and backdraft dampers as required. Specifically, 12 inches of the upper portion of the EDG Building ventilation system exhaust dampers were exposed and not protected from a tornado-generated missile. The licensee initiated compensatory measures in the form of concrete jersey barriers in front of each exhaust damper opening to provide additional shielding for the unprotected opening. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2158.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reiliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undersirable consequences. Specifically, there was reasonable doubt the EDG ventilation exhaust would remain functional to support EDG operation in the event tornado-induced missiles damaged the exhaust backdraft relief dampers. The NRC performed a Phase 1 evaluation per IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and determined that the finding was potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events (e.g., tornadoes). Consequently, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by a senior reactor analyst, who determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., delta-LERF < 1.0E-7). The NRC determined there was a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems with adequate tornado missile protection such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. P.1(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Operable Fire Assembly in Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to maintain an operable fire assembly resulting in an unsealed pipe penetration through a 3-hour rated fire barrier wall separating the Unit 2 Train A/B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room from the Unit 2 mechanical penetration equipment room. The licensee reinstalled pipe caps on each end of the unsealed pipe.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the unsealed opening adversely impacted the ability of the fire barrier to perform its intended safety function. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fire barrier deficiency represented a low fire degradation rating. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component because station personnel failed to follow fire protection impairment procedures for breaching a fire assembly. H.4(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Condition Adverse to Quality into the CAP A NRC-identified Green finding was identified for the failure to follow the sites corrective
action program (CAP) procedure which required the initiation of a PIP for a degraded 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) Bellofram seal. The degraded Bellofram seal contributed to the improper setup of the 2B EDG governor actuator which resulted in the 2B EDG not achieving the required 105 percent full power output.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the capability of the EDG to provide continuous and adequate load margin was affected. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of implements the CAP with a low threshold in the Corrective Action Program component in the area of the Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not enter the condition into the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate ND venting procedures The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to establish acceptance criteria to determine operability in surveillance procedures used to vent the decay heat removal (ND) system in Modes 5, 6, and No-Mode in preparation for Mode 6. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-11-04745 The licensees failure to establish adequate acceptance criteria for ND venting surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4200/036 and PT/2/A/4200/036 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to establish acceptance criteria for surveillance tests which establish the basis for the ND system operability in modes 5 and 6 would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that conditions which could impact system operability could remain undetected. In addition, the finding adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a quantitative assessment was not required based on the criteria in Attachment 1. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of implementation of operating experience in the Operating Experience component in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to implement operating experience from Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 into station procedures P.2(b).
(Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 12, 2012
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 3Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to correctly implement technical specifications adversely affects requalification operating test quality An NRC-identified finding was identified associated with the quality of the simulator scenarios developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification annual operating test. The licensee failed to follow the Technical Specification (TS) rules of usage for concurrent inoperability as shown in TS Example 1.3-3. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as PIP M-12-4157.
The performance deficiency (PD) was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that it impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance. The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement planned compensatory measures for impaired auxiliary building fire hose stations An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement adequate compensatory measures for multiple impaired manual fire hose stations (FHSs) in accordance with the approved fire protection program. Gated wye valves were not installed as required during a periodic flush of multiple auxiliary building (AB) FHSs rendering them inoperable. The licensee took actions to install the gated wye valves in the affected FHSs to restore them to operable. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-12-2816.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that manual fire suppression capability was impaired. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it represented a low degradation of the manual fire suppression function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of planning and coordination of work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities to ensure that adequate Page 1 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 compensatory measures were established for impaired fire hose stations. H.3(a) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Potential Blocking of TDCA Pump Lube Oil Cooler During Certain Fire Events The NRC identified a NCV of License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to evaluate potential blockage of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDCA) pump lube oil cooler when pump suction is aligned to the circulating water (RC) system. Specifically, during certain fire events causing loss of plant control, the NRC identified that if the RC system piping was aligned to the suction of the TDCA pump as in accordance with the licensing basis, it could result in blockage of cooling water flow for the TDCA pump lube oil cooler. Immediate actions included performing a functional assessment and evaluating potential long term corrective actions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2174.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E question 3j in that, there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system when suction was supplied from RC system. In addition, the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, and IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Phase 1 and determined to be of low safety significance because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown. The NRC determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this performance deficiency because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for EDG Exhaust Ventilation System The NRC identified a NCV of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to ensure adequate tornado missile protection for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) exhaust relief and backdraft dampers as required. Specifically, 12 inches of the upper portion of the EDG Building ventilation system exhaust dampers were exposed and not protected from a tornado-generated missile. The licensee initiated compensatory measures in the form of concrete jersey barriers in front of each exhaust damper opening to provide additional shielding for the unprotected opening. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2158.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reiliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undersirable consequences. Specifically, there was reasonable doubt the EDG ventilation exhaust would remain functional to support EDG operation in the event tornado-induced missiles damaged the exhaust backdraft relief dampers. The NRC performed a Phase 1 evaluation per IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and determined that the finding was potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events (e.g., tornadoes). Consequently, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by a senior reactor analyst, who determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., delta-LERF < 1.0E-7). The NRC determined there was a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems with adequate tornado missile protection such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. P.1(c)
Page 2 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Operable Fire Assembly in Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to maintain an operable fire assembly resulting in an unsealed pipe penetration through a 3-hour rated fire barrier wall separating the Unit 2 Train A/B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room from the Unit 2 mechanical penetration equipment room. The licensee reinstalled pipe caps on each end of the unsealed pipe.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the unsealed opening adversely impacted the ability of the fire barrier to perform its intended safety function. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fire barrier deficiency represented a low fire degradation rating. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component because station personnel failed to follow fire protection impairment procedures for breaching a fire assembly. H.4(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Condition Adverse to Quality into the CAP A NRC-identified Green finding was identified for the failure to follow the sites corrective action program (CAP) procedure which required the initiation of a PIP for a degraded 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) Bellofram seal. The degraded Bellofram seal contributed to the improper setup of the 2B EDG governor actuator which resulted in the 2B EDG not achieving the required 105 percent full power output.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the capability of the EDG to provide continuous and adequate load margin was affected. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of implements the CAP with a low threshold in the Corrective Action Program component in the area of the Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not enter the condition into the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Page 3 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 30, 2012 Page 4 of 4
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 4Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain complete and accurate pre-fire plans An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to maintain pre-fire plans in areas that contain safety-related equipment.
The inspectors identified that all copies of fire strategy plan view for the Unit 2 lower annulus and containment were missing from their pre-fire plans and unavailable to the Fire Brigade Leader and Operations personnel in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 reactor building. Corrective actions included replacement of the missing fire strategy plan views and additional review of the fire strategy books located in the Fire Brigade Leaders Kit, Control Room, and Emergency Preparedness office. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M 12-08270.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, it degraded the manual fire suppression capability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire brigade consisted of plant personnel familiar with the plant layout and associated fire hazards and appropriate fire-fighting equipment was available. The cause of the PD was directly related to the aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures of the Resources Component in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the Fire Brigade Program Administrator failed to include all approved plan view updates into the fire brigade response strategies. H.2(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to correctly implement technical specifications adversely affects requalification operating test quality An NRC-identified finding was identified associated with the quality of the simulator scenarios developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification annual operating test. The licensee failed to follow the Technical Specification (TS) rules of usage for concurrent inoperability as shown in TS Example 1.3-3. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as PIP M-12-4157.
The performance deficiency (PD) was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that it impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance. The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Page 1 of 5
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Significance: Aug 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for quick cause evaluations in accordance with McGuire's quality assurance program
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by inspectors for the licensees failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for Quick Cause Evaluations (QCE) in accordance with McGuires Quality Assurance Program. Specifically, Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 212, Cause Analysis, requires in part that an Extent of Condition review shall be conducted as soon as possible when a QCE is performed. One example included the licensees failure to perform an extent of condition assessment for a QCE of the safety-related NSW system. To address this issue, the license entered PIP M-12-6309 into their CAP.
The failure to perform the required extent of condition assessments for QCE in accordance with NSD 212 was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to evaluate events for extent of condition applicability for the Nuclear Service Water issue (PIP M-12-0106) was not only a failure to follow a procedure requirement, but allowed the station to be susceptible to the existence of similar discrepancies in other systems, units, organizations, programs, processes, components, or trains. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than allowed technical specification allowed outage time. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures H.4(b). (Section 4OA2.a(3))
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement planned compensatory measures for impaired auxiliary building fire hose stations An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement adequate compensatory measures for multiple impaired manual fire hose stations (FHSs) in accordance with the approved fire protection program. Gated wye valves were not installed as required during a periodic flush of multiple auxiliary building (AB) FHSs rendering them inoperable. The licensee took actions to install the gated wye valves in the affected FHSs to restore them to operable. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-12-2816.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that manual fire suppression capability was impaired. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it represented a low degradation of the manual fire suppression function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of planning and coordination of work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities to ensure that adequate compensatory measures were established for impaired fire hose stations. H.3(a) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Potential Blocking of TDCA Pump Lube Oil Cooler During Certain Fire Events Page 2 of 5
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 The NRC identified a NCV of License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to evaluate potential blockage of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDCA) pump lube oil cooler when pump suction is aligned to the circulating water (RC) system. Specifically, during certain fire events causing loss of plant control, the NRC identified that if the RC system piping was aligned to the suction of the TDCA pump as in accordance with the licensing basis, it could result in blockage of cooling water flow for the TDCA pump lube oil cooler. Immediate actions included performing a functional assessment and evaluating potential long term corrective actions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2174.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E question 3j in that, there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system when suction was supplied from RC system. In addition, the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, and IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Phase 1 and determined to be of low safety significance because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown. The NRC determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this performance deficiency because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for EDG Exhaust Ventilation System The NRC identified a NCV of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to ensure adequate tornado missile protection for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) exhaust relief and backdraft dampers as required. Specifically, 12 inches of the upper portion of the EDG Building ventilation system exhaust dampers were exposed and not protected from a tornado-generated missile. The licensee initiated compensatory measures in the form of concrete jersey barriers in front of each exhaust damper opening to provide additional shielding for the unprotected opening. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2158.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reiliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undersirable consequences. Specifically, there was reasonable doubt the EDG ventilation exhaust would remain functional to support EDG operation in the event tornado-induced missiles damaged the exhaust backdraft relief dampers. The NRC performed a Phase 1 evaluation per IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and determined that the finding was potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events (e.g., tornadoes). Consequently, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by a senior reactor analyst, who determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., delta-LERF < 1.0E-7). The NRC determined there was a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems with adequate tornado missile protection such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. P.1(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Operable Fire Assembly in Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to maintain an operable fire assembly resulting in an unsealed pipe penetration through a 3-hour rated fire barrier wall separating the Unit 2 Train A/B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room from the Unit 2 mechanical penetration equipment room. The licensee reinstalled pipe caps on each end of the unsealed pipe.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Page 3 of 5
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the unsealed opening adversely impacted the ability of the fire barrier to perform its intended safety function. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fire barrier deficiency represented a low fire degradation rating. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component because station personnel failed to follow fire protection impairment procedures for breaching a fire assembly. H.4(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Condition Adverse to Quality into the CAP A NRC-identified Green finding was identified for the failure to follow the sites corrective action program (CAP) procedure which required the initiation of a PIP for a degraded 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) Bellofram seal. The degraded Bellofram seal contributed to the improper setup of the 2B EDG governor actuator which resulted in the 2B EDG not achieving the required 105 percent full power output.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the capability of the EDG to provide continuous and adequate load margin was affected. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train. The finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of implements the CAP with a low threshold in the Corrective Action Program component in the area of the Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not enter the condition into the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Page 4 of 5
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R Summary The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems, and corrective actions specified for problems were consistent with licensee CAP procedures. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, plant operations, and cause evaluations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Last modified : February 28, 2013 Page 5 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 1Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Revise Turbine Inlet Pressure Calibration Procedure Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 15, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuires Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensees inadequate implementation of modifications that results in nonfunctional fire doors. The Licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.
The licensees inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.02)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain complete and accurate pre-fire plans An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to maintain pre-fire plans in areas that contain safety-related equipment.
The inspectors identified that all copies of fire strategy plan view for the Unit 2 lower annulus and containment were Page 1 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 missing from their pre-fire plans and unavailable to the Fire Brigade Leader and Operations personnel in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 reactor building. Corrective actions included replacement of the missing fire strategy plan views and additional review of the fire strategy books located in the Fire Brigade Leaders Kit, Control Room, and Emergency Preparedness office. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M 12-08270.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, it degraded the manual fire suppression capability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire brigade consisted of plant personnel familiar with the plant layout and associated fire hazards and appropriate fire-fighting equipment was available. The cause of the PD was directly related to the aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures of the Resources Component in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the Fire Brigade Program Administrator failed to include all approved plan view updates into the fire brigade response strategies. H.2(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to correctly implement technical specifications adversely affects requalification operating test quality An NRC-identified finding was identified associated with the quality of the simulator scenarios developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification annual operating test. The licensee failed to follow the Technical Specification (TS) rules of usage for concurrent inoperability as shown in TS Example 1.3-3. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as PIP M-12-4157.
The performance deficiency (PD) was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that it impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance. The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for quick cause evaluations in accordance with McGuire's quality assurance program
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by inspectors for the licensees failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for Quick Cause Evaluations (QCE) in accordance with McGuires Quality Assurance Program. Specifically, Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 212, Cause Analysis, requires in part that an Extent of Condition review shall be conducted as soon as possible when a QCE is performed. One example included the licensees failure to perform an extent of condition assessment for a QCE of the safety-related NSW system. To address this issue, the license entered PIP M-12-6309 into their CAP.
The failure to perform the required extent of condition assessments for QCE in accordance with NSD 212 was Page 2 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to evaluate events for extent of condition applicability for the Nuclear Service Water issue (PIP M-12-0106) was not only a failure to follow a procedure requirement, but allowed the station to be susceptible to the existence of similar discrepancies in other systems, units, organizations, programs, processes, components, or trains. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than allowed technical specification allowed outage time. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures H.4(b). (Section 4OA2.a(3))
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement planned compensatory measures for impaired auxiliary building fire hose stations An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement adequate compensatory measures for multiple impaired manual fire hose stations (FHSs) in accordance with the approved fire protection program. Gated wye valves were not installed as required during a periodic flush of multiple auxiliary building (AB) FHSs rendering them inoperable. The licensee took actions to install the gated wye valves in the affected FHSs to restore them to operable. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-12-2816.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that manual fire suppression capability was impaired. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it represented a low degradation of the manual fire suppression function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of planning and coordination of work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities to ensure that adequate compensatory measures were established for impaired fire hose stations. H.3(a) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Potential Blocking of TDCA Pump Lube Oil Cooler During Certain Fire Events The NRC identified a NCV of License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to evaluate potential blockage of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDCA) pump lube oil cooler when pump suction is aligned to the circulating water (RC) system. Specifically, during certain fire events causing loss of plant control, the NRC identified that if the RC system piping was aligned to the suction of the TDCA pump as in accordance with the licensing basis, it could result in blockage of cooling water flow for the TDCA pump lube oil cooler. Immediate actions included performing a functional assessment and evaluating potential long term corrective actions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2174.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E question 3j in that, there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system when suction Page 3 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 was supplied from RC system. In addition, the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, and IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Phase 1 and determined to be of low safety significance because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown. The NRC determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this performance deficiency because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for EDG Exhaust Ventilation System The NRC identified a NCV of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to ensure adequate tornado missile protection for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) exhaust relief and backdraft dampers as required. Specifically, 12 inches of the upper portion of the EDG Building ventilation system exhaust dampers were exposed and not protected from a tornado-generated missile. The licensee initiated compensatory measures in the form of concrete jersey barriers in front of each exhaust damper opening to provide additional shielding for the unprotected opening. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2158.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reiliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undersirable consequences. Specifically, there was reasonable doubt the EDG ventilation exhaust would remain functional to support EDG operation in the event tornado-induced missiles damaged the exhaust backdraft relief dampers. The NRC performed a Phase 1 evaluation per IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and determined that the finding was potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events (e.g., tornadoes). Consequently, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by a senior reactor analyst, who determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., delta-LERF < 1.0E-7). The NRC determined there was a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems with adequate tornado missile protection such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. P.1(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Page 4 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R Summary The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems, and corrective actions specified for problems were consistent with licensee CAP procedures. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, plant operations, and cause evaluations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Last modified : June 04, 2013 Page 5 of 5
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 2Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Revise Turbine Inlet Pressure Calibration Procedure A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow the requirements of the station modification program manual EDM 601 during implementation of a high pressure turbine replacement modification revision. This resulted in Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) calibration procedures not being revised with the proper setpoints.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that AMSAC actuated causing a turbine trip. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need for work groups to maintain appropriate interfaces and communicate, coordinate with each other during important work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because necessary revisions to the AMSAC input device calibration procedures were not adequately communicated.
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 15, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuires Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensees inadequate implementation of modifications that results in nonfunctional fire doors. The Licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.
The licensees inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance Page 1 of 4
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.02)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain complete and accurate pre-fire plans An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to maintain pre-fire plans in areas that contain safety-related equipment.
The inspectors identified that all copies of fire strategy plan view for the Unit 2 lower annulus and containment were missing from their pre-fire plans and unavailable to the Fire Brigade Leader and Operations personnel in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 reactor building. Corrective actions included replacement of the missing fire strategy plan views and additional review of the fire strategy books located in the Fire Brigade Leaders Kit, Control Room, and Emergency Preparedness office. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M 12-08270.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, it degraded the manual fire suppression capability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire brigade consisted of plant personnel familiar with the plant layout and associated fire hazards and appropriate fire-fighting equipment was available. The cause of the PD was directly related to the aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures of the Resources Component in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the Fire Brigade Program Administrator failed to include all approved plan view updates into the fire brigade response strategies. H.2(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to correctly implement technical specifications adversely affects requalification operating test quality An NRC-identified finding was identified associated with the quality of the simulator scenarios developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification annual operating test. The licensee failed to follow the Technical Specification (TS) rules of usage for concurrent inoperability as shown in TS Example 1.3-3. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as PIP M-12-4157.
The performance deficiency (PD) was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that it impacted the licensees ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance. The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Page 2 of 4
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for quick cause evaluations in accordance with McGuire's quality assurance program
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by inspectors for the licensees failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for Quick Cause Evaluations (QCE) in accordance with McGuires Quality Assurance Program. Specifically, Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 212, Cause Analysis, requires in part that an Extent of Condition review shall be conducted as soon as possible when a QCE is performed. One example included the licensees failure to perform an extent of condition assessment for a QCE of the safety-related NSW system. To address this issue, the license entered PIP M-12-6309 into their CAP.
The failure to perform the required extent of condition assessments for QCE in accordance with NSD 212 was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to evaluate events for extent of condition applicability for the Nuclear Service Water issue (PIP M-12-0106) was not only a failure to follow a procedure requirement, but allowed the station to be susceptible to the existence of similar discrepancies in other systems, units, organizations, programs, processes, components, or trains. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than allowed technical specification allowed outage time. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures H.4(b). (Section 4OA2.a(3))
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Page 3 of 4
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding PI&R Summary The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems, and corrective actions specified for problems were consistent with licensee CAP procedures. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, plant operations, and cause evaluations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Last modified : September 03, 2013 Page 4 of 4
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 3Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Revise Turbine Inlet Pressure Calibration Procedure A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow the requirements of the station modification program manual EDM 601 during implementation of a high pressure turbine replacement modification revision. This resulted in Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) calibration procedures not being revised with the proper setpoints.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that AMSAC actuated causing a turbine trip. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need for work groups to maintain appropriate interfaces and communicate, coordinate with each other during important work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because necessary revisions to the AMSAC input device calibration procedures were not adequately communicated.
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 15, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuires Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensees inadequate implementation of modifications that results in nonfunctional fire doors. The Licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.
The licensees inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance Page 1 of 3
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.02)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain complete and accurate pre-fire plans An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to maintain pre-fire plans in areas that contain safety-related equipment.
The inspectors identified that all copies of fire strategy plan view for the Unit 2 lower annulus and containment were missing from their pre-fire plans and unavailable to the Fire Brigade Leader and Operations personnel in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 reactor building. Corrective actions included replacement of the missing fire strategy plan views and additional review of the fire strategy books located in the Fire Brigade Leaders Kit, Control Room, and Emergency Preparedness office. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M 12-08270.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, it degraded the manual fire suppression capability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire brigade consisted of plant personnel familiar with the plant layout and associated fire hazards and appropriate fire-fighting equipment was available. The cause of the PD was directly related to the aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures of the Resources Component in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the Fire Brigade Program Administrator failed to include all approved plan view updates into the fire brigade response strategies. H.2(c)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Page 2 of 3
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 03, 2013 Page 3 of 3
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 4Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Revise Turbine Inlet Pressure Calibration Procedure A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow the requirements of the station modification program manual EDM 601 during implementation of a high pressure turbine replacement modification revision. This resulted in Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) calibration procedures not being revised with the proper setpoints.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that AMSAC actuated causing a turbine trip. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need for work groups to maintain appropriate interfaces and communicate, coordinate with each other during important work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because necessary revisions to the AMSAC input device calibration procedures were not adequately communicated.
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 15, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuires Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensees inadequate implementation of modifications that results in nonfunctional fire doors. The Licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.
The licensees inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance Page 1 of 2
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.02)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 24, 2014 Page 2 of 2
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 1Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible materials in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in the 2A residual heat removal (ND)/containment spray (NS) heat exchanger room near safe shutdown equipment in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee initiated immediate corrective actions to evaluate the transient combustible fire loading and remove all the unapproved transient combustibles from the area. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program (CAP).
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with procedure NSD 313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that a fire involving transient combustibles could have affected nearby power cables and motor operator for valve 2ND-58A which provides a safe shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of Teamwork in the Human Performance area because multiple groups were responsible for bringing the transient combustibles into the area and the individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that transient combustible control processes were appropriately implemented (H.4). (Section 1R05.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control the use of self-extinguishing fire lids An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, FPP, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in waste receptacles equipped with self-extinguishing fire lids in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee took actions to correct all waste receptacles in the plant that were filled beyond the manufacturers specification or had loosely fitted lids. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program.
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with the requirements of NSD-313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the self-extinguishing function Page 1 of 2
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 was not retained which could allow the spread of the fire and adversely affect mitigating system equipment in the area. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 30, 2014 Page 2 of 2
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 2Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible materials in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in the 2A residual heat removal (ND)/containment spray (NS) heat exchanger room near safe shutdown equipment in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee initiated immediate corrective actions to evaluate the transient combustible fire loading and remove all the unapproved transient combustibles from the area. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program (CAP).
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with procedure NSD 313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that a fire involving transient combustibles could have affected nearby power cables and motor operator for valve 2ND-58A which provides a safe shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of Teamwork in the Human Performance area because multiple groups were responsible for bringing the transient combustibles into the area and the individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that transient combustible control processes were appropriately implemented (H.4). (Section 1R05.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control the use of self-extinguishing fire lids An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, FPP, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in waste receptacles equipped with self-extinguishing fire lids in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee took actions to correct all waste receptacles in the plant that were filled beyond the manufacturers specification or had loosely fitted lids. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program.
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with the requirements of NSD-313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the self-extinguishing function Page 1 of 3
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 was not retained which could allow the spread of the fire and adversely affect mitigating system equipment in the area. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Jun 26, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial PI&R Summary The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The threshold for initiating Problem Identification Program entries (PIPs) in the corrective action program (CAP) was appropriately low, as evidenced by the types of problems identified and the number of PIPs entered annually into the CAP. However, the team did identify deficiencies in the areas of identification of problems, prioritization and evaluation of identified problems, and effectiveness of corrective actions. The team noted that the licensees 2014 CAP audit results were in line with the teams observations and findings.
Page 2 of 3
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified.
Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based upon interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments and a review of the 2013 Safety Culture Assessment Report, the team determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2014007 (pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2014 Page 3 of 3
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 3Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible materials in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in the 2A residual heat removal (ND)/containment spray (NS) heat exchanger room near safe shutdown equipment in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee initiated immediate corrective actions to evaluate the transient combustible fire loading and remove all the unapproved transient combustibles from the area. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program (CAP).
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with procedure NSD 313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that a fire involving transient combustibles could have affected nearby power cables and motor operator for valve 2ND-58A which provides a safe shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of Teamwork in the Human Performance area because multiple groups were responsible for bringing the transient combustibles into the area and the individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that transient combustible control processes were appropriately implemented (H.4). (Section 1R05.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control the use of self-extinguishing fire lids An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, FPP, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in waste receptacles equipped with self-extinguishing fire lids in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee took actions to correct all waste receptacles in the plant that were filled beyond the manufacturers specification or had loosely fitted lids. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program.
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with the requirements of NSD-313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the self-extinguishing function Page 1 of 2
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 was not retained which could allow the spread of the fire and adversely affect mitigating system equipment in the area. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 26, 2014 Page 2 of 2
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 4Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials and Ignition Sources in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program
- Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 exterior doghouses in accordance with the FPP requirements of Nuclear System Directive (NSD)-313, Control of Transient Fire Loads. Specifically, temporary electric portable heaters were energized for several days without implementing required hourly fire watches, locating the energized heaters greater than prescribed separation distances from safety-related equipment, and preventing other transient combustible materials from being located near the heaters. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and took corrective actions to de-energize the heaters, distance the heaters away from safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables, and remove unnecessary transient combustibles from the area.
The failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency (PD) . The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, a fire could have affected nearby safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions (H.4). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2014005 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible materials in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in the 2A residual heat removal (ND)/containment spray (NS) heat exchanger room near safe shutdown equipment in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee initiated immediate corrective actions to evaluate the transient combustible fire loading and remove all the unapproved transient combustibles from the area. This Page 1 of 3
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program (CAP).
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with procedure NSD 313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that a fire involving transient combustibles could have affected nearby power cables and motor operator for valve 2ND-58A which provides a safe shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of Teamwork in the Human Performance area because multiple groups were responsible for bringing the transient combustibles into the area and the individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that transient combustible control processes were appropriately implemented (H.4). (Section 1R05.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control the use of self-extinguishing fire lids An NRC-identified NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, FPP, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control the storage of transient combustibles in waste receptacles equipped with self-extinguishing fire lids in accordance with the FPP requirements. The licensee took actions to correct all waste receptacles in the plant that were filled beyond the manufacturers specification or had loosely fitted lids. This condition was placed in the licensees corrective action program.
The licensees failure to control the storage of transient combustibles in accordance with the requirements of NSD-313 was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the self-extinguishing function was not retained which could allow the spread of the fire and adversely affect mitigating system equipment in the area. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 2 of 3
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 26, 2015 Page 3 of 3
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 1Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials and Ignition Sources in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program
- Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 exterior doghouses in accordance with the FPP requirements of Nuclear System Directive (NSD)-313, Control of Transient Fire Loads. Specifically, temporary electric portable heaters were energized for several days without implementing required hourly fire watches, locating the energized heaters greater than prescribed separation distances from safety-related equipment, and preventing other transient combustible materials from being located near the heaters. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and took corrective actions to de-energize the heaters, distance the heaters away from safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables, and remove unnecessary transient combustibles from the area.
The failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency (PD) . The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, a fire could have affected nearby safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions (H.4). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2014005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Page 1 of 2
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 16, 2015 Page 2 of 2
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 2Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Establish Compensatory Actions for Obstructed Fire Sprinkler Spray Nozzle Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Procedures, was identified for failure to evaluate and establish adequate compensatory measures for an impaired fire protection automatic water sprinkler system. Specifically, a solid deck scaffold platform was erected below a sprinkler system spray nozzle that would have obstructed the nozzle spray pattern protecting safe shutdown equipment involving the 2B2 component cooling water pump/motor. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as nuclear condition report (NCR) 01931412 and implemented immediate corrective actions to remove the scaffolding obstructing the sprinkler nozzle.
The failure to evaluate scaffolding obstruction of a sprinkler system spray nozzle and implement required fire protection compensatory actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate compensatory actions for an obstructed sprinkler nozzle would have reduced the licensees ability to quickly extinguish fires in the area. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, , Initial Characterization of Findings. Using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was assigned a category of fixed fire protection systems. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it was assigned a low degradation rating that was based upon meeting the criteria described in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements. Specifically, less than ten percent of the sprinkler nozzles were nonfunctional, there were functional nozzles within five feet of the combustibles of concern, and the system was nominally code compliant. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the human performance area, because the licensee failed to follow scaffolding erection procedures which explicitly required not erecting scaffolding that could obstruct sprinkler nozzles unless approved by a fire protection engineer and necessary compensatory actions were implemented (H.8).
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Protection System DC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Ratings Page 1 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of GE model TED molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) design. In the second example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of Eaton model HFB MCCB design. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 01929605 and AR 193674193674 which determined the systems were operable because upstream protective devices provided protection from a failed HFB and/or TED MCCBs, and that the HFB and TED MCCBs would be replaced with MCCBs that have adequate ratings.
The licensees failure to design the Class 1E electric system MCCBs in accordance with IEEE 308-1971 Sections 4.1 and 5.3.5 was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Periodic Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to scope some Class 1E molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) into the Class 1E MCCB testing program. In the second example, the licensees test procedure pre-conditioned the Class 1E MCCBs before testing their safety function. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 1936760 and AR 01934403, which determined the systems were operable because an engineering review of previous TED breaker testing and PM's has not shown a trend of degradation of the breakers ability to perform its function. In addition, the licensee planned develop a more extensive and adequate testing program.
The licensees failure to perform adequate MCCB testing in accordance with IEEE 308-1971, Section 6.3, Periodic Equipment Tests, was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials and Ignition Sources in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program
- Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 exterior doghouses in accordance with the FPP requirements of Nuclear System Directive (NSD)-313, Control of Transient Fire Loads. Specifically, temporary electric portable heaters Page 2 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 were energized for several days without implementing required hourly fire watches, locating the energized heaters greater than prescribed separation distances from safety-related equipment, and preventing other transient combustible materials from being located near the heaters. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and took corrective actions to de-energize the heaters, distance the heaters away from safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables, and remove unnecessary transient combustibles from the area.
The failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency (PD) . The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, a fire could have affected nearby safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions (H.4). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2014005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Page 3 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Last modified : August 07, 2015 Page 4 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 3Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement a Temporary Modification for a Leak Enclosure
- Green: A self-revealing Green finding (FIN) was identified for failure to adequately implement the modification procedural requirements of engineering directives manual (EDM)-601, Engineering Change Manual, for a temporary modification that installed a valve leak seal enclosure on main steam drain valve 2SM-27. Specifically, EDM-601 required the weight and vibration response of the enclosure to be evaluated as part of the installation. The failure to consider this resulted in vibration induced piping failure upstream of the valve and an unexpected rapid plant down power.
The failure to adequately implement a temporary modification in accordance with EDM-601 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a rapid down power to approximately 20 percent and subsequent actions to take the Unit 2 turbine generator offline to repair the leak.
Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the it did not contribute to both the cause of a reactor trip and affect mitigation equipment. The finding had a cross cutting aspect of consistent process, as described in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions during implementation of a temporary modification [H.13]. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Establish Compensatory Actions for Obstructed Fire Sprinkler Spray Nozzle Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Procedures, was identified for failure to evaluate and establish adequate compensatory measures for an impaired fire protection automatic water sprinkler system. Specifically, a solid deck scaffold platform was erected below a sprinkler system spray nozzle that would have obstructed the nozzle spray pattern protecting safe shutdown equipment involving the 2B2 component cooling water pump/motor. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as nuclear condition report (NCR) 01931412 and implemented immediate corrective actions to remove the scaffolding obstructing the sprinkler nozzle.
Page 1 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 The failure to evaluate scaffolding obstruction of a sprinkler system spray nozzle and implement required fire protection compensatory actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate compensatory actions for an obstructed sprinkler nozzle would have reduced the licensees ability to quickly extinguish fires in the area. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, , Initial Characterization of Findings. Using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was assigned a category of fixed fire protection systems. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it was assigned a low degradation rating that was based upon meeting the criteria described in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements. Specifically, less than ten percent of the sprinkler nozzles were nonfunctional, there were functional nozzles within five feet of the combustibles of concern, and the system was nominally code compliant. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the human performance area, because the licensee failed to follow scaffolding erection procedures which explicitly required not erecting scaffolding that could obstruct sprinkler nozzles unless approved by a fire protection engineer and necessary compensatory actions were implemented (H.8).
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Protection System DC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Ratings
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of GE model TED molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) design. In the second example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of Eaton model HFB MCCB design. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 01929605 and AR 193674193674 which determined the systems were operable because upstream protective devices provided protection from a failed HFB and/or TED MCCBs, and that the HFB and TED MCCBs would be replaced with MCCBs that have adequate ratings.
The licensees failure to design the Class 1E electric system MCCBs in accordance with IEEE 308-1971 Sections 4.1 and 5.3.5 was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Periodic Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to scope some Class 1E molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) into the Class 1E MCCB testing program. In the second example, the licensees test procedure pre-Page 2 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 conditioned the Class 1E MCCBs before testing their safety function. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 1936760 and AR 01934403, which determined the systems were operable because an engineering review of previous TED breaker testing and PM's has not shown a trend of degradation of the breakers ability to perform its function. In addition, the licensee planned develop a more extensive and adequate testing program.
The licensees failure to perform adequate MCCB testing in accordance with IEEE 308-1971, Section 6.3, Periodic Equipment Tests, was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials and Ignition Sources in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program
- Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 exterior doghouses in accordance with the FPP requirements of Nuclear System Directive (NSD)-313, Control of Transient Fire Loads. Specifically, temporary electric portable heaters were energized for several days without implementing required hourly fire watches, locating the energized heaters greater than prescribed separation distances from safety-related equipment, and preventing other transient combustible materials from being located near the heaters. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and took corrective actions to de-energize the heaters, distance the heaters away from safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables, and remove unnecessary transient combustibles from the area.
The failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency (PD) . The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, a fire could have affected nearby safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions (H.4). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2014005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Page 3 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 15, 2015 Page 4 of 4
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 4Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement a Temporary Modification for a Leak Enclosure
- Green: A self-revealing Green finding (FIN) was identified for failure to adequately implement the modification procedural requirements of engineering directives manual (EDM)-601, Engineering Change Manual, for a temporary modification that installed a valve leak seal enclosure on main steam drain valve 2SM-27. Specifically, EDM-601 required the weight and vibration response of the enclosure to be evaluated as part of the installation. The failure to consider this resulted in vibration induced piping failure upstream of the valve and an unexpected rapid plant down power.
The failure to adequately implement a temporary modification in accordance with EDM-601 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a rapid down power to approximately 20 percent and subsequent actions to take the Unit 2 turbine generator offline to repair the leak.
Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the it did not contribute to both the cause of a reactor trip and affect mitigation equipment. The finding had a cross cutting aspect of consistent process, as described in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions during implementation of a temporary modification [H.13]. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 11, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Completely and Accurately Translate the Safe Shutdown Analysis to Procedures Green. The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for Unit 1, for having an inadequate procedure to support safe shutdown for a fire in fire area (FA) 15/17. Specifically, the licensees deterministic safe shutdown analysis identified the need for a procedural action to de-energize PORV 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, breaker 8. This action was not translated to Enclosure 15 of McGuire fire safe shutdown procedure AP-45. This item was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as action requests (ARs) 1979875 and 1983360, and the licensee initiated a procedure change to incorporate the missing action.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Page 1 of 4
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event (Task 1.4.5-B). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding did not represent current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Establish Compensatory Actions for Obstructed Fire Sprinkler Spray Nozzle Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Procedures, was identified for failure to evaluate and establish adequate compensatory measures for an impaired fire protection automatic water sprinkler system. Specifically, a solid deck scaffold platform was erected below a sprinkler system spray nozzle that would have obstructed the nozzle spray pattern protecting safe shutdown equipment involving the 2B2 component cooling water pump/motor. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as nuclear condition report (NCR) 01931412 and implemented immediate corrective actions to remove the scaffolding obstructing the sprinkler nozzle.
The failure to evaluate scaffolding obstruction of a sprinkler system spray nozzle and implement required fire protection compensatory actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate compensatory actions for an obstructed sprinkler nozzle would have reduced the licensees ability to quickly extinguish fires in the area. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, , Initial Characterization of Findings. Using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was assigned a category of fixed fire protection systems. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it was assigned a low degradation rating that was based upon meeting the criteria described in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements. Specifically, less than ten percent of the sprinkler nozzles were nonfunctional, there were functional nozzles within five feet of the combustibles of concern, and the system was nominally code compliant. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the human performance area, because the licensee failed to follow scaffolding erection procedures which explicitly required not erecting scaffolding that could obstruct sprinkler nozzles unless approved by a fire protection engineer and necessary compensatory actions were implemented (H.8).
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Protection System DC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Ratings
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of GE model TED molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) design. In the second example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of Eaton model HFB MCCB design. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 01929605 and AR 193674193674 which determined the systems were operable because upstream protective devices provided protection from a failed HFB Page 2 of 4
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 and/or TED MCCBs, and that the HFB and TED MCCBs would be replaced with MCCBs that have adequate ratings.
The licensees failure to design the Class 1E electric system MCCBs in accordance with IEEE 308-1971 Sections 4.1 and 5.3.5 was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Periodic Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to scope some Class 1E molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) into the Class 1E MCCB testing program. In the second example, the licensees test procedure pre-conditioned the Class 1E MCCBs before testing their safety function. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 1936760 and AR 01934403, which determined the systems were operable because an engineering review of previous TED breaker testing and PM's has not shown a trend of degradation of the breakers ability to perform its function. In addition, the licensee planned develop a more extensive and adequate testing program.
The licensees failure to perform adequate MCCB testing in accordance with IEEE 308-1971, Section 6.3, Periodic Equipment Tests, was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 3 of 4
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Report Unit 2 Unplanned Valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Mode 4.
SL IV: An NRC identified Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required NRC event notification within eight hours for an unplanned valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (CA) system. The unplanned valid actuation occurred during main turbine and main feedwater pump safety injection (SI) train trip function testing with Unit 2 in Mode 4 on October 7, 2015.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and subsequently reported this CA actuation to the NRC on October 15, 2015.
The failure to submit an event notification to the NRC within eight hours of occurrence of an unplanned valid CA system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was a performance deficiency (PD). Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this PD was dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process and was determined to be a SL IV violation. Because this SL IV violation was not repetitive or willful, and did not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this violation. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2015004 (pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2016 Page 4 of 4
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 1Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement a Temporary Modification for a Leak Enclosure
- Green: A self-revealing Green finding (FIN) was identified for failure to adequately implement the modification procedural requirements of engineering directives manual (EDM)-601, Engineering Change Manual, for a temporary modification that installed a valve leak seal enclosure on main steam drain valve 2SM-27. Specifically, EDM-601 required the weight and vibration response of the enclosure to be evaluated as part of the installation. The failure to consider this resulted in vibration induced piping failure upstream of the valve and an unexpected rapid plant down power.
The failure to adequately implement a temporary modification in accordance with EDM-601 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a rapid down power to approximately 20 percent and subsequent actions to take the Unit 2 turbine generator offline to repair the leak.
Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the it did not contribute to both the cause of a reactor trip and affect mitigation equipment. The finding had a cross cutting aspect of consistent process, as described in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions during implementation of a temporary modification [H.13]. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Extinguishers in Contaminated Radiation Control Zones in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program.
Green. An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for failure to perform annual maintenance on fire extinguishers located in contaminated radiation control zones (RCZs). The licensee took immediate corrective action to replace the past due fire extinguishers and entered the issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02009794.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because if left uncorrected the PD could have the potential to Page 1 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, fire extinguishers located in any contaminated RCZs may not be functional for firefighting purposes due to lack of maintenance. Every fire extinguisher, five total, located in a contaminated RCZ, did not have its annual maintenance up-to-date. The longest duration without annual maintenance was six years for two of the five extinguishers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) within the mitigating system cornerstone because it would not affect the ability to reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition, in that, for each of the fire areas where the out-of-date extinguishers were present, there were also properly maintained fire extinguishers and hose stations outside of the RCZ. The out-of-date extinguishers were weighed and it was determined that they would have performed their function, if needed. The cause of the PD was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of field presence in the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee failed to correct deviations from the FPP and ensure proper oversight of the vendor contracted to perform fire extinguisher maintenance. [H.2] (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2016001 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 11, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Completely and Accurately Translate the Safe Shutdown Analysis to Procedures Green. The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for Unit 1, for having an inadequate procedure to support safe shutdown for a fire in fire area (FA) 15/17. Specifically, the licensees deterministic safe shutdown analysis identified the need for a procedural action to de-energize PORV 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, breaker 8. This action was not translated to Enclosure 15 of McGuire fire safe shutdown procedure AP-45. This item was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as action requests (ARs) 1979875 and 1983360, and the licensee initiated a procedure change to incorporate the missing action.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event (Task 1.4.5-B). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding did not represent current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Establish Compensatory Actions for Obstructed Fire Sprinkler Spray Nozzle Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Procedures, was identified for failure to evaluate and establish adequate compensatory measures for an impaired fire protection automatic water sprinkler system. Specifically, a solid deck scaffold platform was erected below a sprinkler system spray nozzle that would have obstructed the nozzle spray pattern protecting safe shutdown equipment involving the 2B2 component cooling water pump/motor. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as nuclear condition report (NCR) 01931412 and implemented immediate corrective actions to remove the scaffolding obstructing the sprinkler nozzle.
The failure to evaluate scaffolding obstruction of a sprinkler system spray nozzle and implement required fire protection compensatory actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely Page 2 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate compensatory actions for an obstructed sprinkler nozzle would have reduced the licensees ability to quickly extinguish fires in the area. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, , Initial Characterization of Findings. Using the guidance in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was assigned a category of fixed fire protection systems. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it was assigned a low degradation rating that was based upon meeting the criteria described in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements. Specifically, less than ten percent of the sprinkler nozzles were nonfunctional, there were functional nozzles within five feet of the combustibles of concern, and the system was nominally code compliant. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the human performance area, because the licensee failed to follow scaffolding erection procedures which explicitly required not erecting scaffolding that could obstruct sprinkler nozzles unless approved by a fire protection engineer and necessary compensatory actions were implemented (H.8).
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Protection System DC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Ratings
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of GE model TED molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) design. In the second example, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of Eaton model HFB MCCB design. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 01929605 and AR 193674193674 which determined the systems were operable because upstream protective devices provided protection from a failed HFB and/or TED MCCBs, and that the HFB and TED MCCBs would be replaced with MCCBs that have adequate ratings.
The licensees failure to design the Class 1E electric system MCCBs in accordance with IEEE 308-1971 Sections 4.1 and 5.3.5 was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 05, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Periodic Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers
- Green: The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, consisting of two examples. In one example, the licensee failed to scope some Class 1E molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) into the Class 1E MCCB testing program. In the second example, the licensees test procedure pre-conditioned the Class 1E MCCBs before testing their safety function. The licensee initiated Action Request (AR) 1936760 and AR 01934403, which determined the systems were operable because an engineering review of previous TED breaker testing and PM's has not shown a trend of degradation of the breakers ability to perform its function. In Page 3 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 addition, the licensee planned develop a more extensive and adequate testing program.
The licensees failure to perform adequate MCCB testing in accordance with IEEE 308-1971, Section 6.3, Periodic Equipment Tests, was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency affected the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. No cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Report Unit 2 Unplanned Valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Mode 4.
SL IV: An NRC identified Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was Page 4 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 identified for the licensees failure to make a required NRC event notification within eight hours for an unplanned valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (CA) system. The unplanned valid actuation occurred during main turbine and main feedwater pump safety injection (SI) train trip function testing with Unit 2 in Mode 4 on October 7, 2015.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and subsequently reported this CA actuation to the NRC on October 15, 2015.
The failure to submit an event notification to the NRC within eight hours of occurrence of an unplanned valid CA system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was a performance deficiency (PD). Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this PD was dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process and was determined to be a SL IV violation. Because this SL IV violation was not repetitive or willful, and did not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this violation. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2015004 (pdf)
Last modified : July 11, 2016 Page 5 of 5
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 2Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement a Temporary Modification for a Leak Enclosure
- Green: A self-revealing Green finding (FIN) was identified for failure to adequately implement the modification procedural requirements of engineering directives manual (EDM)-601, Engineering Change Manual, for a temporary modification that installed a valve leak seal enclosure on main steam drain valve 2SM-27. Specifically, EDM-601 required the weight and vibration response of the enclosure to be evaluated as part of the installation. The failure to consider this resulted in vibration induced piping failure upstream of the valve and an unexpected rapid plant down power.
The failure to adequately implement a temporary modification in accordance with EDM-601 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a rapid down power to approximately 20 percent and subsequent actions to take the Unit 2 turbine generator offline to repair the leak.
Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the it did not contribute to both the cause of a reactor trip and affect mitigation equipment. The finding had a cross cutting aspect of consistent process, as described in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions during implementation of a temporary modification [H.13]. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Extinguishers in Contaminated Radiation Control Zones in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program.
Green. An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for failure to perform annual maintenance on fire extinguishers located in contaminated radiation control zones (RCZs). The licensee took immediate corrective action to replace the past due fire extinguishers and entered the issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02009794.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because if left uncorrected the PD could have the potential to Page 1 of 4
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, fire extinguishers located in any contaminated RCZs may not be functional for firefighting purposes due to lack of maintenance. Every fire extinguisher, five total, located in a contaminated RCZ, did not have its annual maintenance up-to-date. The longest duration without annual maintenance was six years for two of the five extinguishers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) within the mitigating system cornerstone because it would not affect the ability to reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition, in that, for each of the fire areas where the out-of-date extinguishers were present, there were also properly maintained fire extinguishers and hose stations outside of the RCZ. The out-of-date extinguishers were weighed and it was determined that they would have performed their function, if needed. The cause of the PD was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of field presence in the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee failed to correct deviations from the FPP and ensure proper oversight of the vendor contracted to perform fire extinguisher maintenance. [H.2] (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2016001 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 11, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Completely and Accurately Translate the Safe Shutdown Analysis to Procedures Green. The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for Unit 1, for having an inadequate procedure to support safe shutdown for a fire in fire area (FA) 15/17. Specifically, the licensees deterministic safe shutdown analysis identified the need for a procedural action to de-energize PORV 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, breaker 8. This action was not translated to Enclosure 15 of McGuire fire safe shutdown procedure AP-45. This item was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as action requests (ARs) 1979875 and 1983360, and the licensee initiated a procedure change to incorporate the missing action.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event (Task 1.4.5-B). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding did not represent current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform general visual examinations of containment moisture barriers associated with containment liner leak chase test connections.
Green: An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.55a, Codes and Standards, was identified for the licensees failure to perform general visual examinations of moisture barrier material in the reactor containment leak-chase channel test connections in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME BPV Code),Section XI, Subsection IWE. The licensee performed the required examinations in Unit 1 during the March 2016 refueling outage and initiated corrective actions to revise the Page 2 of 4
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Containment Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan. The licensee also planned to perform similar examinations in Unit 2 prior to the end of the first containment ISI period. Additionally, the licensee performed a containment operability determination to justify continuous operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment based on the results of all visual examinations, extent of condition activities, and the results of containment integrated leak rate tests. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02038505.
The failure to conduct the required visual examination of moisture barrier material in accordance with the ASME BPV Code was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was of more than minor significance per IMC-0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because the current Containment ISI Plan did not adequately implement the ASME BPV Code requirements for the examination of moisture barriers, and if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant concern. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) per IMC-0609 because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to implement the ASME BPV code requirements in the Containment ISI Plan when a reasonable opportunity was available through the review of NRC Information Notice (IN) 2014-07. [P.3] (Section 1R08)
Inspection Report# : 2016002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Page 3 of 4
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Failure to Report Unit 2 Unplanned Valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Mode 4.
SL IV: An NRC identified Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required NRC event notification within eight hours for an unplanned valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (CA) system. The unplanned valid actuation occurred during main turbine and main feedwater pump safety injection (SI) train trip function testing with Unit 2 in Mode 4 on October 7, 2015.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and subsequently reported this CA actuation to the NRC on October 15, 2015.
The failure to submit an event notification to the NRC within eight hours of occurrence of an unplanned valid CA system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was a performance deficiency (PD). Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this PD was dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process and was determined to be a SL IV violation. Because this SL IV violation was not repetitive or willful, and did not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this violation. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2015004 (pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2016 Page 4 of 4
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 3Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Extinguishers in Contaminated Radiation Control Zones in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program.
Green. An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for failure to perform annual maintenance on fire extinguishers located in contaminated radiation control zones (RCZs). The licensee took immediate corrective action to replace the past due fire extinguishers and entered the issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02009794.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because if left uncorrected the PD could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, fire extinguishers located in any contaminated RCZs may not be functional for firefighting purposes due to lack of maintenance. Every fire extinguisher, five total, located in a contaminated RCZ, did not have its annual maintenance up-to-date. The longest duration without annual maintenance was six years for two of the five extinguishers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) within the mitigating system cornerstone because it would not affect the ability to reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition, in that, for each of the fire areas where the out-of-date extinguishers were present, there were also properly maintained fire extinguishers and hose stations outside of the RCZ. The out-of-date extinguishers were weighed and it was determined that they would have performed their function, if needed. The cause of the PD was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of field presence in the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee failed to correct deviations from the FPP and ensure proper oversight of the vendor contracted to perform fire extinguisher maintenance. [H.2] (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2016001 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 11, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Completely and Accurately Translate the Safe Shutdown Analysis to Procedures Green. The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for Unit 1, for having an inadequate procedure to support safe shutdown for a fire in fire area (FA) 15/17. Specifically, the licensees deterministic safe shutdown analysis identified the need for a procedural action to de-energize PORV 1NC-34A at power supply 1EVDA, breaker 8. This action was not translated to Enclosure 15 of McGuire fire safe shutdown procedure AP-45. This item was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as action requests (ARs) 1979875 and 1983360, and the licensee initiated a procedure change to incorporate the missing action.
Page 1 of 3
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event (Task 1.4.5-B). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding did not represent current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform general visual examinations of containment moisture barriers associated with containment liner leak chase test connections.
Green: An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.55a, Codes and Standards, was identified for the licensees failure to perform general visual examinations of moisture barrier material in the reactor containment leak-chase channel test connections in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME BPV Code),Section XI, Subsection IWE. The licensee performed the required examinations in Unit 1 during the March 2016 refueling outage and initiated corrective actions to revise the Containment Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan. The licensee also planned to perform similar examinations in Unit 2 prior to the end of the first containment ISI period. Additionally, the licensee performed a containment operability determination to justify continuous operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment based on the results of all visual examinations, extent of condition activities, and the results of containment integrated leak rate tests. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02038505.
The failure to conduct the required visual examination of moisture barrier material in accordance with the ASME BPV Code was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was of more than minor significance per IMC-0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because the current Containment ISI Plan did not adequately implement the ASME BPV Code requirements for the examination of moisture barriers, and if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant concern. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) per IMC-0609 because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to implement the ASME BPV code requirements in the Containment ISI Plan when a reasonable opportunity was available through the review of NRC Information Notice (IN) 2014-07. [P.3] (Section 1R08)
Inspection Report# : 2016002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Page 2 of 3
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Report Unit 2 Unplanned Valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Mode 4.
SL IV: An NRC identified Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required NRC event notification within eight hours for an unplanned valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (CA) system. The unplanned valid actuation occurred during main turbine and main feedwater pump safety injection (SI) train trip function testing with Unit 2 in Mode 4 on October 7, 2015.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and subsequently reported this CA actuation to the NRC on October 15, 2015.
The failure to submit an event notification to the NRC within eight hours of occurrence of an unplanned valid CA system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was a performance deficiency (PD). Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this PD was dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process and was determined to be a SL IV violation. Because this SL IV violation was not repetitive or willful, and did not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this violation. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2015004 (pdf)
Last modified : December 08, 2016 Page 3 of 3
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 McGuire 2 4Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Extinguishers in Contaminated Radiation Control Zones in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program.
Green. An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified for failure to perform annual maintenance on fire extinguishers located in contaminated radiation control zones (RCZs). The licensee took immediate corrective action to replace the past due fire extinguishers and entered the issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02009794.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because if left uncorrected the PD could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, fire extinguishers located in any contaminated RCZs may not be functional for firefighting purposes due to lack of maintenance. Every fire extinguisher, five total, located in a contaminated RCZ, did not have its annual maintenance up-to-date. The longest duration without annual maintenance was six years for two of the five extinguishers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) within the mitigating system cornerstone because it would not affect the ability to reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition, in that, for each of the fire areas where the out-of-date extinguishers were present, there were also properly maintained fire extinguishers and hose stations outside of the RCZ. The out-of-date extinguishers were weighed and it was determined that they would have performed their function, if needed. The cause of the PD was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of field presence in the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee failed to correct deviations from the FPP and ensure proper oversight of the vendor contracted to perform fire extinguisher maintenance. [H.2] (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2016001 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform general visual examinations of containment moisture barriers associated with containment liner leak chase test connections.
Page 1 of 3
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Green: An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.55a, Codes and Standards, was identified for the licensees failure to perform general visual examinations of moisture barrier material in the reactor containment leak-chase channel test connections in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME BPV Code),Section XI, Subsection IWE. The licensee performed the required examinations in Unit 1 during the March 2016 refueling outage and initiated corrective actions to revise the Containment Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan. The licensee also planned to perform similar examinations in Unit 2 prior to the end of the first containment ISI period. Additionally, the licensee performed a containment operability determination to justify continuous operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment based on the results of all visual examinations, extent of condition activities, and the results of containment integrated leak rate tests. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request (AR) 02038505.
The failure to conduct the required visual examination of moisture barrier material in accordance with the ASME BPV Code was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was of more than minor significance per IMC-0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because the current Containment ISI Plan did not adequately implement the ASME BPV Code requirements for the examination of moisture barriers, and if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant concern. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) per IMC-0609 because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to implement the ASME BPV code requirements in the Containment ISI Plan when a reasonable opportunity was available through the review of NRC Information Notice (IN) 2014-07. [P.3] (Section 1R08)
Inspection Report# : 2016002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Page 2 of 3
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - McGuire 2 Miscellaneous Last modified : February 01, 2017 Page 3 of 3
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries > McGuire 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 2Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 10, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to translate required gasket replacement requirements into limit switch maintenance manual.
Green. The team identified a green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate requirements necessary for maintaining the environmental qualification of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) NAMCO EA-180 limit switches into maintenance procedures. The licensee evaluated the impact of the incorrect guidance and determined that the PORV limit switches remained operable.
The licensee plans to correct the affected procedures. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as NCR 02095333.
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Inadequate survey results in unposted high radiation area.
A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to Page 1 of 2
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings conduct an adequate area radiation survey in Room 619 of the auxiliary building (waste gas decay tank (WGDT) room). Specifically, on April 19, 2016, a high radiation area (HRA) was identified near WGDT "A" in the WGDT room when a worker entering the area received a dose rate alarm on his electronic dosimeter (ED) and follow-up surveys revealed dose rates as high as 110 mrem/hr at 30cm. Also, as a result of the licensee's failure to perform a survey, the area was not barricaded and posted in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area." The licensee immediately barricaded and posted the area as an HRA, performed an apparent cause evaluation to determine additional long term actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02021742.
The licensee's failure to conduct an area radiation survey to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels near WGDT "A" was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, failure to identify, post and control HRAs could allow workers to enter HRAs without knowledge of the radiological conditions in the area and receive unintended occupational exposure. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process." The finding was not related to the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the area of human performance because the possibility of significant dose rate changes in the WGDT room during startup was a latent issue for which the licensee failed to recognize and plan.
Inspection Report# : 2017002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : August 03, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, August 10, 2016 Page 2 of 2
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> McGuire 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 2Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 10, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to translate required gasket replacement requirements into limit switch maintenance manual.
Green. The team identified a green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate requirements necessary for maintaining the environmental qualification of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) NAMCO EA-180 limit switches into maintenance procedures. The licensee evaluated the impact of the incorrect guidance and determined that the PORV limit switches remained operable.
The licensee plans to correct the affected procedures. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as NCR 02095333.
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Inadequate survey results in unposted high radiation area.
A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct an adequate area radiation survey in Room 619 of the auxiliary building (waste gas decay tank (WGDT)
Page 1 of 2
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings room). Specifically, on April 19, 2016, a high radiation area (HRA) was identified near WGDT "A" in the WGDT room when a worker entering the area received a dose rate alarm on his electronic dosimeter (ED) and follow-up surveys revealed dose rates as high as 110 mrem/hr at 30cm. Also, as a result of the licensee's failure to perform a survey, the area was not barricaded and posted in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area." The licensee immediately barricaded and posted the area as an HRA, performed an apparent cause evaluation to determine additional long term actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02021742.
The licensee's failure to conduct an area radiation survey to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels near WGDT "A" was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, failure to identify, post and control HRAs could allow workers to enter HRAs without knowledge of the radiological conditions in the area and receive unintended occupational exposure. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process." The finding was not related to the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the area of human performance because the possibility of significant dose rate changes in the WGDT room during startup was a latent issue for which the licensee failed to recognize and plan.
Inspection Report# : 2017002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : September 05, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 07, 2017 Page 2 of 2
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> McGuire 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 3Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Feb 10, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to translate required gasket replacement requirements into limit switch maintenance manual.
Green. The team identified a green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate requirements necessary for maintaining the environmental qualification of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) NAMCO EA-180 limit switches into maintenance procedures. The licensee evaluated the impact of the incorrect guidance and determined that the PORV limit switches remained operable.
The licensee plans to correct the affected procedures. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as NCR 02095333.
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Inadequate survey results in unposted high radiation area.
A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct an adequate area radiation survey in Room 619 of the auxiliary building (waste gas decay tank (WGDT)
Page 1 of 2
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings room). Specifically, on April 19, 2016, a high radiation area (HRA) was identified near WGDT "A" in the WGDT room when a worker entering the area received a dose rate alarm on his electronic dosimeter (ED) and follow-up surveys revealed dose rates as high as 110 mrem/hr at 30cm. Also, as a result of the licensee's failure to perform a survey, the area was not barricaded and posted in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area." The licensee immediately barricaded and posted the area as an HRA, performed an apparent cause evaluation to determine additional long term actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02021742.
The licensee's failure to conduct an area radiation survey to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels near WGDT "A" was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, failure to identify, post and control HRAs could allow workers to enter HRAs without knowledge of the radiological conditions in the area and receive unintended occupational exposure. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process." The finding was not related to the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the area of human performance because the possibility of significant dose rate changes in the WGDT room during startup was a latent issue for which the licensee failed to recognize and plan.
Inspection Report# : 2017002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : November 29, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017 Page 2 of 2
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 1 of 2 Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> McGuire 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 4Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 22, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to translate required gasket replacement requirements into limit switch maintenance manual.
Green. The team identified a green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate requirements necessary for maintaining the environmental qualification of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) NAMCO EA-180 limit switches into maintenance procedures. The licensee evaluated the impact of the incorrect guidance and determined that the PORV limit switches remained operable.
The licensee plans to correct the affected procedures. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as NCR 02095333.
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 30, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Inadequate survey results in unposted high radiation area.
A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2) was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct an adequate area radiation survey in Room 619 of the auxiliary building (waste gas decay tank (WGDT) https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/mcg2/mcg2-pim.html 04/19/2018
NRC: McGuire 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 2 of 2 room). Specifically, on April 19, 2016, a high radiation area (HRA) was identified near WGDT "A" in the WGDT room when a worker entering the area received a dose rate alarm on his electronic dosimeter (ED) and follow-up surveys revealed dose rates as high as 110 mrem/hr at 30cm. Also, as a result of the licensee's failure to perform a survey, the area was not barricaded and posted in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, "High Radiation Area." The licensee immediately barricaded and posted the area as an HRA, performed an apparent cause evaluation to determine additional long term actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 02021742.
The licensee's failure to conduct an area radiation survey to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels near WGDT "A" was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, failure to identify, post and control HRAs could allow workers to enter HRAs without knowledge of the radiological conditions in the area and receive unintended occupational exposure. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process." The finding was not related to the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the area of human performance because the possibility of significant dose rate changes in the WGDT room during startup was a latent issue for which the licensee failed to recognize and plan.
Inspection Report# : 2017002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : February 01, 2018 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/mcg2/mcg2-pim.html 04/19/2018