ML20309B004
| ML20309B004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Consolidated Interim Storage Facility |
| Issue date: | 11/03/2020 |
| From: | Public Commenter Public Commenter |
| To: | NRC/NMSS/DREFS |
| NRC/NMSS/DREFS | |
| References | |
| 85FR27447 | |
| Download: ML20309B004 (11) | |
Text
From:
dave mccoy <dave@radfreenm.org>
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WCS_CISFEIS Resource Cc:
Don Hancock; Pierard, Kevin, NMENV; Kevin Kamps; dcurran@harmoncurran.com; Stringer, Stephanie, NMENV; Janet Greenwald/CARD
Subject:
[External_Sender] NRC's WCS Licensing Fiasco Attachments:
10.29.2020 WCS.Supplemental.Comments.CA.docx
Dear Madam/Sir,
Attached are Citizen Action New Mexico's Supplemental Comments for WCS. Please note especially the comment regarding the synergistic effect of materials in use to cause corrosion and inability for long term servicing of these wastes in a repository. NRC should halt the licensing process NOW!.
Dave McCoy, J.D,, Executive Director Citizen Action New Mexico dave@radfreenm.org
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85FR27447 Comment Number:
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1 November 3, 2020 Sent by email: WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov CITIZEN ACTION NEW MEXICO (CANM) SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS TO WCS Docket No. 72-1050; NRC-2016-0231 - Environmental Impact Statement Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Project (CISFSF)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is illegally continuing to process the above WCS application along with the application for the Holtec site. Governors, Native Ameican tribes and regulatory authorities of both New Mexico and Texas are in opposition to the proposed Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities (CISFs). That should have ended the matter there, but the NRC is willing to force its inept CISF program onto these unconsenting states regardless of legal violations, adverse public and regulatory opinion, lack of safety, financial uncertainty, environmental justice discrimination and several technical deficiencies. NRC bypassed promised public hearings to instead hold difficult virtual meetings during a pandemic without consideration of reasonable time extensions. NRC has not produced a culture of transparency, participation, and collaboration.
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) the Department of Energy (DOE) is precluded from (1) entering into a contract with Holtec, Inc. and (2) taking title to the high level nuclear waste until a repository is available. See, 42 U.S.C. 10131(a)(5)1, 42 U.S.C.
10222(a)(5)(A)2, 42 U.S.C. 10162 (b).3 Thus, the NWPA states that interim storage facilities, 1 (5) the generators and owners of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have the primary responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to pay the costs of, the interim storage of such waste and spent fuel until such waste and spent fuel is accepted by the Secretary of Energy in accordance with the provisions of this chapter 2 (5)Contracts entered into under this section shall provide that (A)following commencement of operation of a repository, the Secretary shall take title to the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as expeditiously as practicable upon the request of the generator or owner of such waste or spent fuel; 3 (b)AUTHORIZATION The Secretary is authorized to site, construct, and operate one monitored retrievable storage facility subject to the conditions described in sections 10163 through 10169 of this title.
2 like the Holtec and WCS sites, are the responsibility of private utilities, not the DOE, not the backs of the taxpayers. A title transfer of the spent fuel to DOE is prohibited by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as Amended. That law bars title transfer to DOE, for interim storage, unless and until a permanent repository is licensed and operating. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) bars the NRC from knowingly issuing - or even considering - a license whose terms would violate federal law.
Milestones and development of Yucca Mountain as a repository is dead in the water. After siting the facility in 1978, the plan was withdrawn by the DOE in March 2010.
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1006/ML100621397.pdf No other repository is on the foreseeable horizon for selection or development now after 42 years. Thus, NRC is acting as a shill for the nuclear industry and wasting taxpayer dollars on what it knows to be an impermissible contract scheme. NRC should halt the CISF licensing process now as it lacks any legal validity. Proceeding further lends itself to the growing lack of public confidence in the NRC as a regulatory agency. CISFs have been rejected in Utah and Tennessee by public opposition. Public opposition in New Mexico and Texas is firm.
See Figure 8 in GAO-15-141 Spent Nuclear Fuel Liability https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666454.pdf for four major challenges to CISFs that are still unresolved. DOE does not have legislative authority from Congress for managing spent nuclear fuel since funding was suspended in 2010. (GAO at p. 20). NRC is therefore complicit in a scheme, without legislative authority, cooked up by the DOE, Holtec and WCS, to approve two illicit waste dumps in Texas and New Mexico.
These CANM comments are supplemental to all prior comments both oral (Dave McCoy) and written for the above WCS and Holtec CISFs. CANM objects to both the Texas WCS and New Mexico Holtec sites. The two sites are improperly analyzed as if the other site does not exist. There could be accidental radiological and transportation events at either site that would impact on the operation and exposures of the other site.
WCS has not provided the meaning of interim. In the absence of any search for a nuclear waste repository site and the absence of such repository, the term interim becomes meaningless. Any placement of nuclear waste at the Holtec and WCS sites will become de facto illegal nuclear waste disposal in unsuitable locations that cannot provide deep geological disposal for permanent protection of the public health and environment.
Identification of suitable deep geological repository locations that were required to be made under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act beginning in 1987 do not exist. Identification of 11 Monitored Retrievable Sites for an integral MRS were revoked in 1987 by amendment to the NWPA.
3 In 2013, A federal appeals court ruled Tuesday that the Energy Department must stop collecting fees of about $750 million a year that are paid by consumers and intended to fund a program for the disposal of nuclear waste. The reason, the court said, is that there is no such program. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/us/energy-dept-is-told-to-stop-collecting-fee-for-nuclear-waste-disposal.html Long-term Storage: The Licensees have failed to demonstrate that utilization of the interim storage, associated systems, and storage system, as proposed pursuant to the requested permit, is adequate to accommodate a segmented plan for storage of high level nuclear reactor fuel elements safely either for the length of time contemplated by its analysis or for what is reasonably likely to be a substantially longer period of time than 120 years or a permanent condition during which there may be no repository. Thus, both the WCS and Holtec sites must be jointly analyzed for their suitability as eventual permanent repository sites for the disposal of the nuclear reactor waste. Neither location is suitable as a repository site. The two sites have not been analyzed for suitability of permanent deep geologic disposal in their respective locations that are above the Permian Basin producing petroleum, near the major Ogallala aquifer, potash mining, agricultural activity and widespread karst formations. Minority and low income populations are in proximity and environmental justice concerns are not satisfied.
At present, the storage of high level nuclear waste is in areas at reactor sites away from the public. By contrast, moving tens of thousands of containers across the country presents an obvious potential for public exposure to accidents and radiation. The second transport to a repository would increase risks. The whole CISF scheme is just plain stupid from a risk assessment viewpoint considering that each of 20,000 containers has a Chernobyl amount of radiation moving through Anytown, USA and across bridges and rivers.
The proposed licensees have not analyzed the long term damage to the fuel assemblies and the effect of moving them from reactor sites around the country and then the expense and difficulties of removing the containers once again (perhaps thousands of years later) from the interim site to a permanent repository. High burnup fuel transport issues are not examined and resolved by NRC. Monitoring for degraded, damaged fuel assemblies, containment and repackaging issues prior to secondary transport are unresolved. For high burnup fuel, dissolved hydrogen can change the characteristics of the cladding and, if certain conditions exist, can cause the cladding to become brittle over time. (GAO at p.25).
The inadequacy of rail transport infrastructure is ignored. Lack of rail to some shut down reactor sites exists and would require heavy-haul-truck to rail or barge to rail. Such a second move even in 100 years is doubtful to achieve. Conditions that may prevent any secondary transport of the reactor wastes have been presented by the public but are either not accepted for review and/or not analyzed by NRC.
4 In its April 18, 2017 letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Waste Control Specialists indicates that it was recommended by the 2012 Blue Ribbon Commission on Americas Nuclear Future. This is a gross overstatement by WCS and far from the truth. There is no mention of WCS at all in the Blue Ribbon Commission Report. While WCS may have mentioned they had a site in Texas, there was no specificity as to whether that site is suitable or desired for a CISF. WCS and Holtec are not desired by the states of New Mexico and Texas and are also unsuitable locations.
Statement of Purpose and Need NRC: The proposed CISF is needed to provide away-from-reactor storage capacity that would allow SNF, GTCC, and small quantities of MOX fuel to be transferred from reactor sites and stored for the 40-year license term, before a permanent repository is available.
CANM Comment: There is no analysis of why it is necessary to move the waste before establishment of a repository. The length of time and suitability of existing reactor sites for continued storage is not analyzed.
NRC: Additional away-from reactor storage capacity is needed, in particular, to provide the option for away-from-reactor storage so that stored SNF at decommissioned reactor sites may be removed and the land at these sites could be made available for other uses.
CANM Comment: This is a circular argument to justify the purpose and need in which the NRC begins with what they are trying to end with. The need for a CISF does not consider whether continued storage operation at specific reactor sites may be continued or even expanded by licensing extensions. It is not explained why storage cannot be continued at these sites as it is or with some modifications. What other uses at the reactor sites are not explained as being in conflict with continued storage. DOE has identified that onsite storage is reliable for at least the next 100 years so that if NRC claims that a repository will be identified before then are true, there is no need to move the wastes until a repository is identified and constructed.
The purpose and need statement violates NEPA by eliminating consideration of the alternative for continued on-site storage at reactors with modifications. This should be considered also in the No Action Alternative. The statement of the agencys underlying purpose and need is critical to identifying the range of reasonable alternatives. NRC only identifies the alternative of doing nothing vs. the CISF. But the nothing is not described as applied to the various individual reactor sites. The description of the No Action Alternative is not described as it exists in comparison with costs, environmental effects, transportation and other aspects of the proposed WCS action.
5 Site Selection Process NRC: The two remaining states (Texas and New Mexico) were selected for further evaluation, based on public statements from the respective State Governors in which support for hosting a CISF was expressed at the time of the screening process (ISP, 2020).
ISP then considered 54 counties in Texas and 2 counties in New Mexico for additional consideration, of which the applicant selected 2 counties in Texas (Andrews and Loving Counties) and 2 counties in New Mexico (Lea and Eddy Counties), given previous expressions from those counties of a willingness to host a CISF.
CANM Comment: Site selection should include the criteria as to whether the Holtec and WCS sites are reasonable for a repository because of future inability to remove the wastes to another site especially if no repository site can be identified. Then identify what are the environmental impacts of that disposal or leaving the waste at the interim site. A repository site should first be identified before allowing a CISF.
CANM Comment: Governor, Legislators, congressional delegates. NM regulatory agencies Native American indigenous and public are in opposition to the selection of the Holtec and WCS sites for numerous reasons. Governor Lujan-Grisham also sent a letter to President Trump against plans.
NRC: The applicant identified seven states in the western and 4 southwestern U.S. with basic characteristics (e.g., low population and arid to semi-arid climate)
CANM Comment: these were very limited siting criteria. Full set of criteria were not set out with comparisons to Holtec and WCS sties and for suitability as permanent repository sites in the event wastes cannot be moved. Environmental criteria did not consider resource use. Actual environmental conditions used for the siting process are not set forth taking into consideration factors such as climate change Reasonable Alternatives Are Not Considered NRC: The alternatives have been established based on the purpose and need for the proposed project. Under the No-Action alternative, the NRC would not approve the ISP license application for the proposed CISF. The No-Action alternative would result in ISP not constructing or operating the proposed CISF. As further detailed in EIS Section 2.3, other alternatives considered at the proposed CISF project, but eliminated from detailed analysis include storage at a government-owned CISF, alternative design and storage technologies, and an alternative location.
6 CANM Comment: A statement of purpose and need is inadequate to justify rejection of the No Action alternative. By not analyzing the status of storage existing that is achievable at each reactor site, no reasonable assessment of purpose, need and alternatives can be deemed reliable.
NRC: The No-Action alternative would result in ISP not constructing nor operating the proposed CISF.
CANM Comment: There is an absence of discussion of how the waste could otherwise be maintained.
Decommissioning NRC: Ch. 4 The decommissioning discussion is based on the best currently available information. Because decommissioning is anticipated to take place well into the future, not all technological changes that could improve the decommissioning process can be predicted.
CANM Comment: NRC regulations provide that all applications for a license to operate an interim storage facility must include a plan for the future decommissioning of the site. See IO C.F.R. § 72.130. I. No decommissioning plan exists with this application. Applicants must (as part of their application) estimate the cost of decommissioning and provide financial assurances as to their ability to pay for decommissioning. See IO C.F.R. § 72.30(b);
see also IO C.F.R. § 72.22(e)(3). No financial assurance is present with the application to provide that decommissioning will be carried out. 10 C.F.R. § 72.30(e). 10 C.F.R. § 72.54(e).
CANM Comment: Not all intractable problems can be identified either that may make decommissioning extremely expensive and preclude transportation to another site. Then what? Many problems have been already identified by the public that could well be intractable such as: leaking containers, chloride induced cracking of containment, stress corrosion cracking at weld joints, lack of repackaging, hydrogen explosions, criticality events, railway failures, other states or tribal nation refusal to allow transport through their states, terrorist attacks.
CANM Comment: It is unknown whether the containers and storage materials used during interim storage are even compatible for the 120 year time frame or acceptable for later disposal in a repository!!!!!
Chemical and Engineering News JANUARY 30, 2020 l APPEARED IN VOLUME 98, ISSUE 5 Proposed nuclear waste storage materials may have a corrosion problem. Current
7 safety assessment models dont take into account the synergistic reactions between different materials used in these storage systems. But current nuclear waste storage assessment models do not consider the chemical interactions between these materials when they are brought together. According to experiments by Guo and his colleagues, if water gets inside the steel canister and works its way into the tiny gap between the canister and the glass or ceramic, it can trigger a string of corrosive reactions that degrades both materials. These results could impact the projected service life of nuclear waste in repositories. Present models may be underestimating the risk of corrosion in nuclear waste disposal systems, Source: https://cen.acs.org/energy/nuclear-power/Proposed-nuclear-waste-storage-materials/98/i5?utm_source=YMAL&utm_medium=YMAL&utm_campaign=CEN&utm_cont ent=pos1 NRC: Ch. 8 The applicant provided the schedule for all the activities in EIS Table 8.3-4, except for SNF 2 transportation from the proposed CISF to the repository and the proposed CISF decommissioning. The NRC staff assumed the schedule for these two activities. For the proposed action (Phase 1), the NRC staff assumed that (i) the SNF transportation from the proposed CISF to a repository would take the same amount of time it took to transport the SNF from the generation sites to the proposed CISF, and (ii) the proposed CISF would be utilized for the full license term. For the proposed action (Phase 1), this meant that transporting SNF to a repository would occur during project years 39 and 40. For full build-out (Phases 1-8), the NRC staff assumed that the SNF transportation from the proposed CISF to a repository starts after the last SNF is received from the generation sites and continues until the end of the proposed CISF license term. For full build-out (Phases 1-8),
this meant that transporting SNF to a repository would occur during project years 31 to 40.
CANM Comment: There is no Decommissioning Plan available and none can be made available without the identification and location of a repository site. The NRC assumptions in this regard are just nonsensical.
Violations of NEPA A Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) is necessary for the cumulative environmental effects of two planned CISFs. Also, Equal Protection Amendment and Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (EO 12898) are also not considered for application for the local area as compared with other locations and where the wastes are currently at existing reactor sites.
The NEPA statement of Small impacts relies on the lack of any Safety Analysis Review that should consider failed transport, containment failures, criticality and hydrogen
8 explosions. The Small impacts statements throughout the DEIS ignore public comments, technical information and result from unreasonable limitations on the scope of review.
NEPA Cost/Benefit analysis-There is no Decommissioning Plan or repository that would allow a reasonable cost/benefit analysis for what may be required or unable to accomplish for move to a distant repository.
NEPA failed Cumulative Impacts analysis - there is no analysis of the proposal that Holtec also be sited only 40 miles away. No cumulative impacts for the operation of two CISFs is set forth in relation to necessary parameters such as resource usage, aquifers, increased accidents potential, environmental justice, need for consideration of both sites as repository locations, Terrorism: use of RPG on trains, melt rails with blow torch or freeze with liquid nitrogen and other aspects.
The DEIS represents a segmented NEPA analysis because the environmental consequences are not considered for the 120 year full cumulative effects for the operation of either one or both of the CISFs. Operation of both will have more potential for accidents and contamination and radiation exposure to the public. NRC has several proposed actions pending for CISFs at the same time and those actions will have cumulative or synergistic environmental effects. (See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 41 (1976); 40 C.F.R.1508.25 (1989) ). NRC must consider the cumulative and possible synergistic environmental effects of numerous projects, new facilities and the handling of associated wastes planned for New Mexico and Texas.
The following issues that are deemed out of scope by the NRC are essential to an EIS:
- Concerns associated with the Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding and national progress in developing a permanent repository
- Legacy issues from prior nuclear activities not in the vicinity of the proposed project
- Site-specific issues at other facilities
- Hardened On-site Storage (HOSS)
Conclusion The WCS EIS violates the National Environmental Policy Act and the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Submitted 19/29/2020 Dave McCoy, J.D., Executive Director Citizen Action New Mexico
9 dave@radfreenm.org