ML20255A142
| ML20255A142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/2020 |
| From: | Strope M Point Beach |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-III |
| References | |
| EA-20-081, IR 2020012 | |
| Download: ML20255A142 (15) | |
Text
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POINT BEACH September 11, 2020 NRC 2020-0027 EA-20-081 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC (NextEra) Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2020012, 05000301/2020012; EA-20-081
References:
- 1. NRC Letter, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 - NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2020012, 05000301/2020012; Preliminary White Finding and Apparent Violations dated August 3, 2020 (ML20216A765)
- 2. NextEra Letter, Response to Inspection Report 05000266/2020012, 05000301/20200012, dated August 12, 2020 (ML20225A252)
In Reference 1, the NRC documented a finding and apparent violations involving transportation of radioactive material as Low Specific Activity - II (LSA-11) that exceeded the LSA shipping limits for radiation levels as specified in 49 CFR 173.427.
By letter dated August 12, 2020 (Reference 2), NextEra informed the NRC that a regulatory conference was not requested and that a written response would be provided addressing the finding and the apparent violations. The enclosure to this letter provides this written response.
NextEra appreciates the opportunity to provide new information and perspectives in support of the NRC's final significance and enforcement determinations. As a result of the shipping error, NextEra performed a thorough root cause evaluation resulting in corrective actions included in this response. During this investigation, new information was discovered that is material to understanding the matter.
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241
Document Control Desk Page 2 Specifically, NextEra has determined that an overly conservative 3-meter dose rate was taken of the shipping package prior to shipment. An accurate 3-meter dose rate, at a level less than 1 rem/hr, has since been determined through several analytical evaluations. Accordingly, NextEra does not believe that the apparent violations of 49 CFR 172 and 173 requirements, cited in Reference 1, occurred. To the extent that the NRG concludes that violations of regulatory requirements occurred, this response further provides information that demonstrates that the finding does not rise to the level of WHITE significance and should be characterized as no higher than GREEN.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.
If you have any questions please contact Mr. Eric Schultz, Licensing Manager, at (920) 755-7854.
Sincerely, NextEra Point Beach, LLC Michael Strope Site Vice President cc:
Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC
Enclosure:
Enclosure NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2020012, 0500030112020012; Preliminary White Finding and Apparent Violations EA 20-081
( 12 pages follow)
Restatement of NRC Findings A finding of low to moderate safety significance (Preliminary White) and associated Apparent Violations were reviewed and evaluated by the inspectors involving the licensee's transport of a radioactive material package as Low Specific Activity -
11 (LSA-11) that exceeded the LSA shipping limits for radiation levels as specified in 49 CFR 173.427. The licensee's staff did not recognize that measured radiation levels were in excess of 10 mSv/ hour (1 Rem/hour) at 3 meters from the unshielded package which exceeded the conditions for transporting LSA material; and thus, failed to ship the package as a Type B shipment. Consequently, the shipment did not contain the appropriate emergency response information for a shipment containing primary resin as required by 49 CFR 172.602(a) and did not contain the appropriate package markings as required by 49 CFR 172.302(a).
NextEra Response Apparent violation 1 - As discussed in detail below, NextEra believes that it did not violate 49 CFR 172.602 because further analysis has demonstrated that the actual dose of the shipment did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material, such that shipment 19-037 did in fact contain the correct Emergency Response Guide (ERG).
Alternatively, to the extent the NRG concludes that a violation of 49 CFR 172.602 occurred (as the actual dose of the shipment exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material or otherwise), NextEra demonstrates herein that the finding does not rise to the level of WHITE and should be characterized as no higher than GREEN because: (1) the language in ERG 162 is substantially similar to that in ERG 163 with respect to the actions of first responders, (2) the content of the provided emergency response guidance addresses the elements required by regulation, and (3) the shipment was conservatively shipped in a Type B package and hence the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.
Apparent violation 2 - NextEra did not violate 49 CFR 172.302, 172.332, and 172.101 because the shipment was properly labeled, as the actual dose of the shipment did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material.
Apparent violation 3 - NextEra did not violate 49 C.F.R.173.427(a)(1) because: (1) NextEra transported the shipment as Type B(U) package notwithstanding that the shipment did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material; or (2) if the NRG finds that the contents of the shipment exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material, there is no violation of 49 CFR 173.427 as NextEra used the proper Type B(U) packaging for the shipment.
Apparent violation 4 - NextEra did not violate 49 CFR 173.22 because the shipment was properly classified as LSA-11 material (UN3321 ), as the shipment did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (1 Oft.) from the unshielded material.
NextEra acknowledges that an error was made in classifying and labeling this shipment based on the dose as measured in the field. Based on the measured dose, the package should have been classified and labeled as a Type B shipment and it was not. However, as described below in the Additional Information for Consideration section, during its investigation of the incident, Page 1of12
NextEra identified evidence of a conservative action with a significant impact on the disposition of this matter and the determination of its significance. Specifically, NextEra discovered that the dose rate from this shipment did not, in fact, exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material. The field measurement was performed in an overly conservative manner (too close to the package). As a result, the package, as shipped, did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material and was therefore properly labeled and classified as LSA-11. This shipment did not violate 49 CFR Parts 172 or 173, and NextEra more fully explains the underlying facts and NextEra's basis for its regulatory conclusion in the response below.
NextEra has performed a Root Cause Investigation (RCE) under Condition Report (CR) 2360869 to determine the causal factors behind the performance deficiency. A summary of the RCE and the prompt and comprehensive corrective actions taken is included in this report.
Additional Information for Consideration:
NextEra has concluded that shipment 19-037 did in fact contain: the correct package identification, the correct label, the correct material description, and the correct ERG was provided to the carrier. This conclusion is supported by new information relative to an evaluation of actual dose rates associated with shipment 19-037, as well as additional perspectives on the degree to which NextEra complied with the requirements of 49 CFR 172 and 173. NextEra views the circumstances surrounding shipment 19-037 as having significance to a level that supports a GREEN finding.
The Actual Dose Rate Shows There Was No Violation of Regulatory Requirements:
The critical information relied upon in characterizing this shipment was NextEra's dose survey record PBPROD-M-20190529-10, dated 5/29/19. This document recorded numerous 3-meter dose rates measured at various locations around the shipping liner. Several of these 3-meter dose rate measurements exceeded 1 rem/hr and several others ranged from 600 - 863 mr/hr.
During the RCE investigation performed in response to this matter, NextEra identified that the information documented in the dose survey record appeared unrealistic based on the wide range of values recorded. Further investigation was performed comparing the RADMAN (shipping software) predicted 3-meter value, the Energy Solutions dose survey upon receipt of the shipment, and the NextEra survey record.
The RCE team interviewed the technician who took the survey dose rates. The technician indicated, based on concerns associated with dose rates of the unshielded cask, that he took measurements from an approximate distance and in a manner that did not allow validation or consistency of measured distance. These findings were documented in the Corrective Action Program under CR 2365265.
Given that a consistent measured distance was not used in the dose survey, NextEra determined that additional evaluation was warranted. This evaluation, using the actual contents of the liner, concluded the highest expected dose rate at 3 meters would have been 841 mr/hr.
The evaluation also concluded that the survey data was obtained at a conservative distance of 2.2-2.4 meters (i.e. less than 3 meters). Taking these dose rates from a conservative distance resulted in higher dose rates recorded on the survey for unshielded 3-meter readings than actually existed. This evaluation, as documented in Evaluation HP-100-080420 revision 0, also Page 2of12
incorporated actual contact survey data from the shipment receiver, Energy Solutions, which further supported the conclusions reached.
NextEra contracted with RSCS Inc., a recognized leader in radiation protection services, to obtain an independent evaluation of the expected dose rate at 3 meters. RSCS concluded the highest calculated dose rate at 3 meters would be 837 mr/hr (documented in RSCS TSO 20-083 revision 1 ). An exposure rate was calculated for each nuclide for 1 Ci of activity homogenized in the resin. This provided an mR per hour rate, per unit of activity for each nuclide, that was then used to determine the effective exposure rate. The exact contents of the shipment were used in these calculations which were performed using the industry software Microshield.
NextEra uses the NRG-endorsed RADMAN shipping software. When the contents of shipment 19-037 were entered into RADMAN at the time the package was originally prepared for shipment (May 2019), the calculated 3-meter dose rate from RADMAN was 814 mr/hr. The RADMAN, NextEra evaluation, and RSCS evaluation 3-meter dose values are all within 4%.
These results, combined with the overly conservative field measured dose rates, provide assurance that the actual dose rate at 3 meters was in fact less than 1 rem/hr with significant margin to account for uncertainties.
Thus, three analytical evaluations demonstrate that the contents in shipment 19-037 would not have exceeded the 1 rem/hr rate at 3 meters distance if the shipment had been measured precisely and not in a conservative fashion. As such, an LSA-11 shipment was correct, the United Nations (UN) number UN 3321 was correct, and so NextEra has concluded that shipment 19-037 did in fact contain correct package identification, the correct label, and the correct material description. As a result, the correct emergency response information, consistent with ERG 162, was provided to the carrier. Accordingly, NextEra respectfully disagrees that the apparent violations of 49 CFR 172 and 173 requirements, cited in Reference 1, occurred.
NextEra does recognize that an error was made when reviewing the overly conservative dose rate measurements to determine the proper shipping information. The RCE determined that the Point Beach shipping process did not contain enough detail to drive validation of critical parameters when preparing a package for shipment, including the lack of a consistent method for performing dose rate surveys. This will be corrected as outlined in "Corrective steps that will be taken".
While NextEra concurs that a performance deficiency was present for this issue, our view is that any associated violations that may be determined by NRC do not rise to a level greater than GREEN. This position is supported by the evaluations showing that the radwaste shipment was ultimately packaged and shipped properly (considering an accurate and realistic 3-meter dose rate) and hence the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized in any fashion.
Additional Information Demonstrating that the Significance of the Finding Should be Characterized as No Higher Than Green To the extent that the NRC concludes that there was a violation of 49 CFR 172.602, NextEra offers the following perspectives that support the contention that a significance level of WHITE is not appropriate for this matter and that the significance should be no higher than GREEN.
The perspectives outlined below are the result of reviews conducted by NextEra, combined with consultation with industry experts in the areas of radwaste shipping, emergency response/first Page 3 of 12
response, Department of Transportation regulations, and implementation of radiological controls for nuclear facilities.
(a) The shipment was conservatively shipped in a Type B package:
Although labeled and marked as LSA-11, the shipment was shipped in the more robust container, used for a Type B shipment. Hence, the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.
(b) The carrier had sufficient emergency response information to comply with 49 CFR 172.602(a) and 172.600(c):
NRC's guidance on the significance determination process for public radiation safety (Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix D) indicates as follows with respect to non-compliance with 49 CFR 172.602: "if the licensee fails to provide the required emergency response information to the shipment carrier (the shipment leaves the licensee's facility and control without the required information), the finding is WHITE." As explained below, the shipment carrier in this case had sufficient emergency response information to comply with 49 CFR 172.602(a) and 172.600(c),
such that the significance of any violation of these regulations determined by NRC should be no higher than GREEN.
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, which require the provision of emergency response information to radwaste shippers, do not specifically require the use of an ERG from the Emergency Response Guidebook to provide emergency response information. In the case of shipment 19-037, emergency response guidance consistent with ERG 162 was provided, where ERG 163 should have been provided if the shipment had exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (1 Oft.) from the unshielded material. NextEra recognizes that the ERGs represent a consensus means of satisfying DOT requirements, and that there are differences between ERG 162 and ERG 163. However, the emergency response guidance supplied with shipment 19-037, consistent with ERG 162, contained the required guidance for the physical actions related to response to a potential emergency, as required by regulation. The required regulatory elements related to physical response to a radwaste shipment emergency are immediate hazards to health, risks of fire or explosion, immediate precautions to be taken in the event of an incident, immediate methods for handling of fires, initial methods for handling spills or leaks, and preliminary first aid measures. These elements were addressed in the provided guidance such that the health and safety of the first responders and the public would have been maintained in the event of a shipping accident. In fact, the immediate precautions guidance of both ERG 162 and 163 is identical in physical response content. This guidance shapes the actions of first responders, and serves to override the impact of any additional, informational, differences in content between the two ERGs. Given the level of general knowledge of a first responder regarding radiation hazards and the obvious radioactive labeling of the shipment (Reference Figure 1 ), the guidance provided with shipment 19-037 served to adequately inform and dictate physical response actions and thereby would have protected the health and safety of any first responder or member of the public in the event of an emergency.
NextEra understands that Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix D represents guidance to be used and interpreted by the NRC relative to significance determination. In NextEra's view, a WHITE level of significance would be justified only if a substantial amount of emergency guidance was missing from the shipment which was not the case in this matter. NextEra performed a review of recent NRC violations involving cases where an improper shipping name was used. As the proper shipping name is directly tied to a specific ERG, we understand that Page 4of12
these cases would have resulted in the shippers providing the incorrect ERG. In the cases reviewed, the NRG evaluated this condition (incorrectly supplied ERG) as having a GREEN level of significance. This demonstrates that it was judged that sufficient guidance to protect public health and safety was provided, even from the incorrect ERG. Reference Table 1, NRG Enforcement Precedent Examples, for additional detail.
Accordingly, emergency response guidance was provided with shipment 19-037 that satisfied the requirements and intent of 49 CFR 172.602(a) and 49 CFR 172.600(c) and that the health and safety of the first responders and public would not have been substantially impacted by the minor differences between ERGs 163 and 162. Prior NRG precedents with respect to similar occurrences support the conclusion that the deficiencies as described in Reference 1 would not rise to a WHITE level of significance.
Enforcement Considerations As requested in Reference 1, NextEra provides the following responses to explain the basis for disputing the apparent violations:
Apparent violation 1 per Reference 1:
NextEra disagrees with apparent violation 1. This apparent violation asserts that NextEra failed to provide the required emergency response information under 49 CFR 172.600(c) and 172.602(a). Specifically, the apparent violation provides that Point Beach provided information from ERG 162 for LSA-11 material (UN3321), instead of information from Guide 163 for a Type B(U) package (UN2916), from the Emergency Response Guidebook with the shipping paper.
This violation appears to be the basis for the NRC's preliminary determination of a WHITE finding, rather than GREEN, under NRG Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (pages D-8 to D-9), which states (emphasis added): "For Block N2 (49 CFR 172.602 non-compliance), if the licensee fails to provide the required emergency response information to the shipment carrier (the shipment leaves the licensee's facility and control without the required information), the finding is WHITE.
There was no violation of DOT regulations in this case because the actual dose of the shipment was less than 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material, as is discussed at length, above. NextEra's additional analytical evaluations show that the contents in shipment 19-037 would not have exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material if it had been measured precisely and not in an overly conservative fashion. Based on these evaluations, an LSA-11 shipment designation was correct, and the correct Emergency Response Guide information was provided to and maintained by the carrier.
Alternatively, with respect to the required form of emergency response information, 49 CFR 172.602(b) requires that the information may be presented in one of three ways: (i) on a shipping paper, (ii) in a document, other than a shipping paper, that includes both the basic description and technical name of the hazardous material and the emergency response information (e.g., a material safety data sheet); or (iii) related to the information on a shipping paper, a written notification in a separate document (e.g., an emergency response guidance Page 5 of 12
document), in a manner that cross-references the description of the hazardous material on the shipping paper with the emergency response information contained in the separate document.
In this case, NextEra provided form RP-AA-108-1002-F-10, Revision 4 with the shipping paper.
This information met the required content of emergency response information as set forth in 49 CFR 172.602(a), which requires that the emergency response information contain: (1) the basic description and technical name of the hazardous material; (2) immediate hazards to health; (3) risks of fire or explosion; (4) immediate precautions to be taken in the event of an accident or incident; (5) immediate methods for handling fires; (6) initial methods for handling spills or leaks in the absence of fire; and (7) preliminary first aid measures. The Form RP-AA-108-1002-F-10, Revision 4 provided with the shipping paper contains the same hazard, public safety, response to fire and/or spills/leaks, and first aid information as is contained in ERG 162. This form contained the basic description and technical name of the hazardous material, although it designated the material as UN3321 LSA-11 material instead of UN2916 Type B(U) package. As a result, even setting aside NextEra's position regarding the actual dose rate, the differences between the emergency response information NextEra provided and that included on ERG 163 are not sufficient to justify a WHITE finding with respect to 49 CFR 172.602(a).
Finally, because the apparent violation ultimately depends on the proper classification of the radioactive material to be shipped, NextEra believes that this issue should be evaluated as part of the classification issue addressed below in apparent violation 4, rather than as a separate emergency response information violation.
Apparent violation 2 per Reference 1:
NextEra disagrees with apparent violation 2. The apparent violation asserts that NextEra improperly labeled the shipment as LSA-11 material (UN3321), instead of Type B(U) package (UN2916), thereby violating 49 CFR 173.302(a). Rather, the shipment was properly labelled, as the actual dose of the shipment did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material, as discussed above.
Alternatively, NextEra believes this should be treated as part of the classification issue discussed in apparent violation 4 below, rather than as a separate violation, since proper labeling is dependent on proper classification in this case.
Apparent violation 3 per Reference 1:
NextEra disagrees with apparent violation 3. The apparent violation asserts that NextEra transported the shipment as LSA-11 material (UN3321 ), instead of Type B(U) package (UN2916), and that the measured external dose rate in the field exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material, thereby violating 49 CFR 173.427(a)(1). As explained above, NextEra's additional analytical evaluations show that the contents in shipment 19-037 would not have exceeded the 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) if it had been measured precisely and not in an overly conservative fashion.
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Alternatively, the requirements of 49 GFR 173.427 are focused on packaging, not on classification or labeling. If the NRG finds that the contents of the shipment exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material, there is no violation of 49 GFR 173.427 because NextEra used the proper Type B(U) packaging for the shipment.
Apparent violation 4 per Reference 1:
NextEra disagrees with apparent violation 4. The apparent violation asserts that NextEra improperly classified the shipment as LSA-11 material (UN3321), instead of Type B(U) package (UN2916), given that the measured external dose rate in the field exceeded 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (10 ft.) from the unshielded material as specified in 49 GFR 173.427(a)(1),
thereby violating 49 GFR 173.22. NextEra did not violate 49 GFR 173.22. The shipment was properly classified as LSA-11 material (UN3321), as the shipment did not exceed 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (1 Oft.) from the unshielded material as previously discussed.
However, to the extent the NRG disagrees with that conclusion, this shipment could represent a violation of 49 GFR 173.22(a)(1) in that NextEra would have failed to class and describe the hazardous material correctly. According to the Hazardous Materials Table in 49 GFR 172.101, "Radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-11) non fissile or fissile-excepted" is UN3321, and "Radioactive material, Type B(U) package non fissile or fissile-excepted" is UN2916. It should be noted, though, that with respect to the classification and description of hazardous material, the NRG guidance in NUREG-1608/RAMREG-003 (at page 4-3) explains:
When an unshielded LSA material exceeds 10 mSvlhr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (9.9 ft.),
what is the proper shipping name? The proper shipping name in these cases is "Radioactive material, n.o.s." with the identification number of "UN2982" and, with one exception described below, a Type B package is required due to the quantity of material.
If a material can otherwise satisfy the LSA requirements, but the 10 mSvlhr (1 rem/hr) at 3 m (9. 9 ft) unshielded dose rate limit is exceeded, then the material no longer meets the intent of the LSA material regulations justifying the use of less robust packaging that would otherwise be required for Type B quantities of material. Also, Type B packages are not excepted from DOT marking and labeling requirements, as other packages for LSA sometimes are [49 CFR 173.427 (DOT, 1996)].
NextEra notes that "Radioactive material, n.o.s" and UN2982 no longer appear in the Hazardous Materials Table in 49 GFR 172.101.
This shipment would not represent a violation of the 49 GFR 173.22(a)(2) requirements regarding packaging, however, because it was appropriately shipped in a Type B package.
Under 49 GFR 173.403, "Type B package" means "a packaging designed to transport greater than an A 1 or A2 quantity of radioactive material that, together with its radioactive contents, is designed to retain the integrity of containment and shielding required when subjected to the normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident test conditions set forth in 10 GFR part 71." See also 49 GFR 173.416 (Authorized Type B Packages).
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Reason for the Apparent Violation The root cause for the issues associated with these apparent violations was that the Radwaste shipment checklist RP-AA-108-1002-F06, Energy Solutions Waste Processor Shipment Checklist, did not contain sufficient detail to drive validation of critical parameters when determining the Proper Shipping Name and Emergency Response Guide.
There were two Contributing Causes (CC) identified:
CC-1: Lack of adequate risk recognition by station leadership related to radwaste shipping, as evidenced by an overreliance on a single site individual for key aspects of the process, resulted in an insufficient level of program oversight.
CC-2: Inconsistent method of performance and documentation of resin liner surveys has resulted in potentially unreliable data for use in package characterization and shipment preparation.
Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken Following the identification of the error in March 2020, Radiation Protection implemented the following actions: verified the shipment was safely transported, stored, processed, and ultimately buried; established additional review requirements; communicated requirements for site specific reviewer for all radwaste shipments; and coached the Radwaste Shipper on Procedure Use and Adherence standards.
The NextEra Radiation Protection Management Peer Team developed a fleet checklist to perform reviews of shipments and additional oversight by the Point Beach Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager prior to a shipment leaving site was implemented.
Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken:
Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR) 1: Revise radwaste shipping checklist RP-AA-108-1002-F06, and applicable similar checklists, to include documented validation of critical parameters when determining proper shipping names and emergency response guide.
The following critical parameters will be included at a minimum: Shipment date, survey date(s), waste distribution, volume, weight, contact dose rates, 1-meter dose rates, 3-meter dose rates, contamination levels, Certificate of Compliance packaging requirements met, Proper Shipping Name assigned, correct emergency contact numbers and ERG included.
Additional Corrective Actions (CA):
CA 1-1: Incorporate a management oversight risk matrix within procedure to drive observation and oversight of key risk-sensitive elements of the shipping process. Utilize risk matrix obtained from Duke Energy shipping procedure as an example. Also, incorporate guidance from SER 2-09, Recurring Events: Radioactive Shipments Exceed Regulatory Limits.
CA 1-2: Revise radwaste shipping program document to require development of an annual projected high or elevated risk radwaste shipment schedule and include a method for periodic review and oversight of the schedule.
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CA 1-3: Create a Point Beach projected high or elevated risk radwaste shipment schedule through the end of 2021 and provide to station management for review and challenge.
CA 1-4: Create a Point Beach On-Demand PM including Model Work Order for resin shipments to include a High-risk attribute, assignment of Maintenance personnel to provide oversight for RDW 16.17, Radwaste Related Complex Lift Procedure, and the associated vendor cask loading procedure including the rigging lift plans.
CA 2-1: Revise applicable shipping and survey procedures to include the option for use of RADMAN calculated 3-meter dose rates vs. measured 3-meter dose rates and include cautions/warnings for use of measured 3-meter dose rates, use of the RADMAN override feature, and the potential impact on PSN/ERG.
CA 2-2: Develop a consistent method for performing Point Beach liner contact, 1-meter, and 3-meter survey points and revise Point Beach Radiation Protection Work Plan 160A, Resin Liner to Shipping Cask Transfer, to reflect the survey method.
CA 2-3: Revise the PBN "liner survey" template within the Radiation Survey Software to remove unnecessary data fields and to align with the revised Point Beach Work Plan 160A; ensure expectation for use is communicated to Point Beach RP technicians.
Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved:
NextEra is in full compliance. The additional corrective actions identified above will be completed by November 10, 2020 with final effectiveness review to be completed by February 12, 2021.
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Table 1; NRC Enforcement Precedent Examples Station NRC Inspection Relevant Content Report Palisades May 2013 "failed to use the proper shipping name and proper UN (United Nations) number when shipping radioactive resin in a Type B Cask."
NRC Safety Significance Determination: "determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Specifically, the Inspectors determined that the finding did not involve the Radioactive Effluent Release Program or the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. The finding did involve the transportation of radioactive material. However, no external radiation levels or surface contamination levels were exceeded, the finding did not involve the certificate of compliance, there was no failure to make notifications or provide emergency information, there was no breach of the package during transit, and there was no low-level burial mound non-conformance."
Browns Ferry May 2016 failed "to include the correct Proper Shipping Name (PSN) on radioactive material shipping papers in accordance with the requirements of DOT regulation 49 CFR 172.202. This resulted in multiple Low Specific Activity (LSA) shipments containing quantities exceeding an A2 value being shipped as "UN2915, Radioactive Material, Type A Package".
NRC Safety Significance Determination: "The issue involved transportation, but there were no radiation limits exceeded, and there was no package breach. In addition, it did not involve a Certificate of Compliance or low-level burial problem, nor was there a failure to make notifications or provide emergency response information. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance
!Green)."
Columbia April 2017 "failed to provide the correct identification number and proper shipping name, radionuclide activity, net waste volume, surface radiation level, and waste classification."
NRC Safety Significance Determination: "the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) radiation limits were not exceeded, (2) there was no breach of a package during transit, (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue, (4) it did not involve a 10 CFR 61.55 waste underclassification, and 15) it did not involve a Page10of12
failure to make notifications or provide emergency information."
Arkansas Nuclear November 2016 "failed to include the correct identification number and One the proper shipping name on the shipping paper of a hazardous material shipment. Specifically, the shipping manifest for shipment RSR 14-099 incorrectly described the package as "UN2915, Radioactive Material, Type A Package, 7, Fissile Excepted RQ -
Radionuclides." The correct description was "UN3321, Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA-11), 7."
This occurred due to an error with RADMAN (versions 8 and 9.1.1 ), a radioactive materials management software program the licensee used to characterize, classify, manifest, and document packaged radioactive waste for shipment."
NRC Safety Significance Determination: "... the inspectors determined this violation to be of very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) radiation limits were not exceeded; (2) there was no breach of a package during transit; (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue; (4) it was not a low level burial ground nonconformance; and (5) it did not involve a failure to make notifications or provide emergency response information."
FitzPatrick August 2018 provided an incorrect "shipping description on the shipping paper for shipment [[::JAF-2016-1613|JAF-2016-1613]] from FitzPatrick to Tennessee did not include the proper shipping name and identification number for the material."
NRC Safety Significance Determination: "This violation of verv low safetv sianificance fGreenl..."
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Figure 1; SHIPMENT 19-037 Prior to Leaving Site Items of note:
Packaged in Type B container (conservative to the labeling/marking applied)
Clearly identifiable as a radioactive shipment Clearly tied via UN number (3321) to available and adequate emergency response guidance Page 12of12