ML20249C233

Informs Commission of Staff Insp & Programmatic Findings in Incident Involving CC Drega & to Obtain Commission Approval to Provide Encl Rept to State of Vermont

ML20249C233
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/20/1998
From:	Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
SECY-98-110, SECY-98-110-01, SECY-98-110-1, SECY-98-110-R, NUDOCS 9806260244
Download: ML20249C233 (8)

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0 POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)

May 20.1998 SECY-98-110 EQB:

The Commissioners FROM L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

REPORT ON INSPECTION AND PROGRAMMATIC FINDINGS RELATING TO THE CARL C. DREGA INCIDENT PURPOSE:

To inform the Commission of the staff's inspection and programmatic findings in the incident involving Carl C. Drega and to obtain the Commission's approval to provide the attached report to the State of Vermont and to licensees that had employed Mr. Drega, as well as to place it in the Public Document Room.

BACKGROUND:

In August 1997, Carl C. Drega was involved in shootings in New England that left four people dead. He was subsequently killed in a confrontation with police. Mr. Drega had worked at, and been granted unescorted access to, three nuclear plants. NRC staff conducted inspections to determine whether the licensees who employed Mr. Drega acted properly in granting him enescorted access, whether the authorization and fitness-for-duty programs of these licensees were adequately implemented, and whether the individual exhibited any traits that might have led the licensees to deny him access. Inspections were conducted by a senior program manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and a senior inspector from Region I, with the assistance of an investigator from the Office of Investigation's Region I Field Office.

DISCUSSION:

Mr. Drega was employed at Vermont Yankee (1992 and 1995), Pilgrim (1997), and Indian Point 3 (1997) as a temporary employee. During the inspection effort, it was reported that Mr. Drega might have worked at Seabrook. However, although Mr. Drega had applied for employment at 4

Seabrook, the licensee noticed that he was living in his trailer on company grounds and asked i

l him to leave before his request for employment had been granted.

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Contact:

R. P. Rosano, NRR NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 301-415-3282 WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE D[:)b 9006260244 900520 1p b C-9 MhC ^; y' PDR SECY

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Therefore, the inspection' effort covered three nuclear plants: Vermont Yankee (inspection

.j Report [lR] 50-271/9707, August 26,1997), Pilgrim (IR 50-293/9709, August 27-28,1997), and Indian Point 3 (IR 50-296/9708, August 29,1997).' The inspection team concluded that each of the licensees had followed its security plan commitments and other applicable requirements.

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Therefore, no violations were fond regarding the employment or access authorization of Mr. Droga.

Following the inspections, the Safeguards Branch, NRR, conducted a programmatic review of NRC's access authorization requirements to determine whether additional measures might have identified Mr. Droga as potentially dangerous before the events of August 1997, thus preventing

. him from gaining authorization for unescorted access to licensed faci 8ities. The staff con::luded

that it is not likely that additional NRC requirements cou!d have identified Mr. Droga's latent tendencies to violence and, therefore, would not have raised questions sufficient to deny him access.

' Since Mr. Droga had originally been granted temporary access authorization, the staff also considered whether the NRC should continue to allow licensees to grant temporary unescorted access authorization to employees on the basis of less than full background investigations. The staff concluded that temporary unescorted access authorization is appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION That the Comminion approve re!*ase of the attached final report on the incident involving Carl C. Droga to the licensees that were the subjects of the inspection effort and to the state liaison officer from Vermont, as well as to place it in the Public Document Room.

HQIg:

The attached inspection reports referenced herein have already been issued to the licensees.

L. J> eph Callan Exe ive Director for Operations Attachments: 1. Final Report on incident involving Carl C. Droga

2. Inspection Report 50-271/9707 (Vermont Yankee)

3. Inspection Report 50-293/9709 (Pilgrim)

4. Inspection Report 50-296/9708 (Indian Point 3)

3 Commissioners' completed vote sheets / comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Friday, June 5. 1998_.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT May 29, 1998, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION Commissioners OGC 1

l OCAA OIG OPA OCA CIO CFO EDO PSGB REGION I SECY

1 Final Report on incident involvina Carl C. Drena 1.-

Overview On August 19,1997, Casi C. Droga was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. Droga was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcemord officers '

When it was discovered that Droga had been granted unescorted access to Vermord Yankee (1992 and 1995), Pilgrim (1997), and indsen Point 3 (19g7) as a temporary employee, NRC dispetched an inspection team composed of a senior inspector from ReDion I and a senior program manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR's) Safeguards Branch (PSGB), Division of Reactor Program Management, assisted by an investigator from the Office of I

investigations * (Ol's) Field Office in Regiori 1.8 The objective of the visits was to determine through inspection, interviews, and records checks whether (a) the licensees' access authorization programs were properly implemented a1d administered, (b) the licensees' access control equipment was property installed and operated and the appropriate procedures were implemented, (c) the licensees

• fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs were property implemented and administered, and (d) the licensees conducted adequate background investigations of Droga, considered the information developed during that investigation, and acted property in granting him unescorted access.

3 The inspections did not identify violations of regulations or licensee commitments with respect to the access authorization programs, access control equipment, or FFD programs. Furthermore, the inspectors concluded through interviews and reconds checks that the individual had not exhsbited aberrant behavior that would have warranted a denial of urmscorted access authorization by any of the three licensees for which he worked.

Followng review of the inspection findings, PSGB initiated a study of the potential programmatic implications of the incedent. Specifically, in light of the finding that there were no violations, the staff considered the two programmatic components of access control, that is, access authonzation and entry controls, to determine whether additional requirements might reduce the

' in early reports of the investigation into this matter, comments made concoming the possibility that Droga had been stockpiling explosives, w components useful in constructing explosives, at his house in a search of his residence, bomt*-making materials were found.-

According to comments made to NRC's Office of Investigations Field Office in Region I, the Federal Bureau of investigation did not find any indication of what Droga had planned to do with the explosive devices.

I 2 During the inspection effort, it was reported that Droga had worked at Seabrook. The inspectors determined that although Droga had applied for employment at Seabrook, he was asked to leave the property and was ultimately not hired after he attempted to live in his trailer on company grounds. The licensee did conclude, however, amer completing the access authorization process that it had begun, that Droga would have been granted authorization for unescorted access at Seabrook but for the incident involving living in his trailer on company grounds.

2 likelihood that a person who might pose a threat to the public health and safety could gain unescorted access to licensed facilities.

II.-

Renulatory Basio Since Droga worked as a temporary employee, the regulations concoming granting of unescorted access authonzation to temporary employees were examined. Regulations in 10 CFR 73.56(c)(2) allow licensees' access authorizaten programs to specify conditions for permitting temporary access. Regulatory Guide 5.66 (RG), Section B, irni,ryereies the guidelmes for temporary access in the appended NUMARC 89-01 " Guidelines for Access Authortzstion Programs," to which all commercial power reactor licensees have committed, as discussed in Section Ill.B.2, below,

lil, fjagDGE inspections were conducted at the three facilities at which Droga worked: Vermont Yankee (Inspection Report [lR] 50-271/9707, August 26,1997), Pilgrim (IR 50-293/9709, August 27-28, 1997), and indian Point 3 (IR 50-296/9708, August 29,1997). With respect to licensee commitments at each site, the inspection team -

reviewed the access authorization program commitments and procedures, tested the access control equipment (metals and explosives detectors, x-ray machines) reviewed the FFD and behavioral observation programs and procedures, and acdited the training program records for supervisors (to ensure that required FFD and behavioral observation training had been conducted).

With respect to Droga, the inspection team -

. interviewed his former supervisors and co-workers, reviewed the licornees' records of background screening conducted before granting unescorted access authorization to Droga, and reviewed Droga's general employee training records and FFD chemical testing records.

A. Inspection and Compliance issues

1. Access Authorization Program The inspectors examined components of the licensees' access authorization programs,

' including procedures for background screening, psychological evaluation, processing of cnmenal history information, and decisionmaking. Special attention was paid to the processing of Droga's application for unescorted access authonzation. No violations were found in the implementation of the access authonzation programs at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.

2. Access Control Equipment and Procedures The inspectors reviewed the licensees' installation instructions, operating procedures, and testing procedures for access control equipment in place at the primary access

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portals through which personnel are processed onto the site. Security force members were interviewed and observed carrying out tests of the equipment. The inspectors found no violations in the installation or operation of the access control equipment and j

found adequate testing procedures and schedules of testing at each of the licensed facsidies at which Droga had been employed.

3. Fitness-for-Duty Program

' The inspectors reviewed procedures for chemical testing and also reviewed general employee and supervisory training for fitness for duty.- Special attention was paid to Draga's experience (for general employee training) and to his supervisors (for supervisory training). The inspectors found no violations in the implementation or management of the FFD programs or in the conduct of training at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been e,Tv;cgd.

4. Granting of Unescorted Access Authorization

' in reviewing the information found by the licensees in conducting background screening for Droga, the inspectors did not find sufficient reason to expect a licensee to deny unescorted access for him. Furthermore, after reviewing records of Droga's performance and interviewing his supervisors, the inspectors concluded that there was no basis for a licensee to revoke Draga's unescorted access authorization.

B. Programmatic issues J

1. Current Requirements Current NRC requirements would not have prevented Droga from gaining authorization for unescorted access. This conclusion is bome out by the fact that licensees that complied with their commitments and the NRC's expectations concoming the granting of access authorization appear to have had an adequate basis to grant Drega unescorted access.

l The decision to grant unescorted access is intertwined with the decision to employ an j

individual. Consequently, the NRC has established no disqualifying criteria for j

licensees to use in deciding whether to grant unescorted access and expects the licensees to rely on required information in making their own decisions. The staff is satisfied that the three licensees did what would be expected and complied with current requirements and commitments in their physical security plans. The staff is also

- satisfied that the licensees made reasonable decisions in deciding to grant Drega unescorted access, considering the information available to the licensees when the i.

decisions were made.

c 2. New Requirements

. The staff considered whether additional background checks would provide a higher level of assurance as to an individual's integrity, such as contacts with local law enforcement, review of driving records, and telephune interviews with the applicant's i

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4 neighbors or associates. These additional checks could uncover personal data not found in more formal records (such as employment records, psychological evaluations, and existing criminal records) and could provide the hiring licensee with new tools for

. evaluating personal traits and judging the appropdateness of granting unescorted access to an individual. The staff decided that such additional checks would require the expenditure of additional resources by the licensees with no resulting quantifiable increase in assurance concoming the individual's integrity. The staff also determined that licensees might face complex legal challenges in using such information to deny access, an action that, in practical terms, would effectively deny em+;syment.

Therefore, requiring such additional checks would not be appropriate at this time.

The staff also considered whether the conditions for granting femporary unescorted access should be changed. The granting of temporary access, that is, authorization for unescorted access before r, complete background investigation is completed, carries with it certain implied risks. However, licensees experience periodic fluctuations in site population, including large-and short-term-increases in the site workforce during outages that necessitate quick tumeround in granting access, a need that is satisfied by the granting of temporary access by the licensees to the new hires. NUMARC 89-01, the appendix to RG 5.66, states that temporary access authonzation will be based on (a) verification of identity, (b) psychological evaluation, (c) credit check, (d) one developed reference, (e) the initiation of a criminal history check, and (f) a check of the applicant's employment history for the past year. When the licensee has completed those steps and considered the information obtained, it may grant temporary authorization for unescorted access to the applicant for not more than 180 days pending completion of the checks required by the access authorization program.

The staff met with Nuclear Energy Institute officials to discuss the Personnel Access Data System (PADS), a computer-based system for recording background information on employees who have worked with temporary access authorization at one or more nuclear power facilities. PADS provides a corps of " pre-approved" nuclear employees who3a unescorted access authorization can be granted by successive licensee employers who subscribe to PADS and who access it for a record of the applicant's history in the industry. - This system, when it is fully operational and reaches 100 percent subscription by the nuclear power industry, could provide substantial savings in time and money in the access authorization program, as well as an increase in the overall assurance that temporary employees are trustworthy and reliable.

Considering the progress being made to implement PADS, the staff recommends no changes to the agency's approach to grants of temporary taescorted access at this time. If PADS does not reach full subscription, if future incidents in temporary access warrant, or if conditions in the industry's application of access authorization change, the staff will reconsider this position and determine whether new requirements are

- necessary.

IV.

flecommendations A. Current Requirements

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The sta# recommends no changes to current requirements at this time.

B. New Requirements-The sta# recommends no new requirements at this time.

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-September 4, 1997 Mr. Donald A. Reid -

, Senior Vice President,; Operations,

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 271/97-07

Dear Mr. Raid:

This letter tronsmits the report of the NRC's specialinspection of your Access Authorization Program conducted by Messrs. G. C. Smith of this office and R. Rosano of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station on August 26,1997. Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the enclosed report. The inspection consisted of interviews and examination of selected procedures and representative records. Our findings were discussed with Mr.' R. Wanczyk and other members of your staff by Mr. Smith by telegnone on September 3,1997.

The inspectors determined that your access authorization program meets the applicable regulatory requirements.

in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Michael C. Modes, Chief

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Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards BranchI Division of Reactor Safety

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1 Docket No.~ 50-271

Enclosure:

- NRC Region I inspection Report No. 50 271/97-07 i

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R. McCullough, Operating Experience Coordinator. Vermont Yankee R. Wanczyk, Director, Safety and Regulatory Affairs G. Maret, Plant Manager J. Duffy, Licen. ing Engineer, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation J. Gilroy, Directc. Vermont Public interest Research Group, Inc.

D. Tefft, Adminisu itor, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts D. Lewis, Esquire G. Bisbee, Esquire T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee State of Vermont, SLO Designee Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)

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Mr. Donald A. Reid 3

Distribution w/ encl:

Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)

PUBLIC Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector H. Miller, RA W. Axelson, DF;A G. Morris, DRS C. Cowgill, DRP D. Bearde, DRP J. Wiggins, DRS L. Nicholson, DRS C. Miskey, DRS (2)

Distribution w/enci (VIA E-MAIL):

W. Dean, OEDO K. Jabbour, NRR S. Bajwa, NRR R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

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L U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No:

50 271 l

Report No:

50 271/97-07 l

Licensee:

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 1

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Facility:

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Location:

Vernon, Vermont Dates:

August 26,1997 Inspectors:

G. C. Smith, Sr. Security Specialist R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager Approved by:

Michael C. Modes, Chief j

Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety l

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SUMMARY

On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the individual from being granted unescorted access.

The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licensee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured portions of their plant.

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Report Details 88 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 General On August 19,1997, an individual.was involved in shootings in New Hampshim and. Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in.

New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to three nuclear power plants, special inspections were initiated at each of the plants to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in order to determine if they met the regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual being granted unescorted access.

The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and 1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 based on completion of all components of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to indian Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update of his activities for the approximate 2-month period between the time he left Pilgrim and began work at IP-3, as provided for in tSe AA requirements. The NRC inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP-3.

S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures a.

insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's accgss authorization program.

b.

Observations and Findinas The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA procedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the l

requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66, " Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.

c.

Conclusions.

.The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented, met all regulatory requirements.

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2 S8.3 Backaround Investigation (BI) Elements a.

Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequacy of the program in determining the true identity of the individual and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access.

b.

Observation and Findinos The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI) and determined that the scope and depth of the B1 met the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received from the U.S. Attorney General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995). In both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspectors determined that the information had been properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access. Another l

licensee, Boston Edison, submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal history check.

c.

Conclusion Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prio'r arrests, the inspectors concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either l

licensee to initiate the criminal history checks.

l S8.4 Psychological Evaluations a.

inspection Scooe The inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements, b.

Observations. Findinos and Conclusions The licen# contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological wing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psycholog,ical tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinicalinterview was indicated, I

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3 the psych logist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.

The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinical interview and the psychologist -

conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site.

access be granted.

The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

S8.5 Behavior Observation Proaram (BOP) a.

Insoection Scone i

The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the licensees' programs.

b.

Observations and Findinas The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness-for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plans indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adverse changes in behavior.

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Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.

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S8.6 Temoorarv Access Authorization a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted

-l access authorization, as permitted by the rule.

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'b.

' Observations Findinas and Conclusions The records of the abbrev;eteri scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation from a developed reference, past i

year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access authorization. The inspectors noted that,in these records of abbreviated scope investigation, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access authorization following receipt of the full 5-year investigation.

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S6.7 Audits a.-

Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each licensee to conduct Bl.

b.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive'in scope and depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic deficiencies were identified.

S8.8 Search Eauioment a.

Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and package' search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment end observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.

b.

Observations and Findinas Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment determined that it was operable.

c.

Conclusion The inspectors determined that the personnel ano package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan requirements and was capable of performing its intended functions.

=X1-Exit interview An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary findings were presented. The licensees acknowledged the preliminary inspection findings.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED Licensee R. Wanczyk, Director of Regulatory' Affairs and Safety G. Morgan, Security Manager D. McElway, Liaison Engineer J. Moriarty, Security Operations Specialist State of Vermont W. Sherman, Nuclear Engineer All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.

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September 4, 1997 E. Thomas Boulette, PhD Senior Vice President - Nuclear Boston Edison Company Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360-5599

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-293/97-09

Dear Dr. Boulette:

This letter transmits the report of the NRC's specialinspection of your Access Authorization Program conducted by Messrs. G. C. Smith of this office and R. Rosano of d

the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on August 27-28, 1997. Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the enclosed report. The inspection consisted of interviews and examination of selected procedures and representative records. Our findings were discussed with Mr. W. Riggs and other members of your staff by Mr. Smith by telephone on September 3,1997.

The inspectors determined that your access authorization program meets the applicable regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room IPDR).

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

l Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

t Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-293

Enclosure:

NRC Region Iinspection Report No. 50 293/97-09 l

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cc w/encf:

L. Olivier, Vice President - Nuclear and Station Director T. Sullivan, Plant Department Manager N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information Manager-R. Hallisey, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray The Honorable Joseph Gallitano -

- 8. Abbenet, Department of Public (Jtilities

~ Chairman Plymouth Board of Selectmen Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee Plymouth Civil Defense Director P. Gromer, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources

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J. Miller, Senior issues Manager J. Fleming A. Nogee, MASSPIRG Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee

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E. Thomas Boulette, PhD 3

Distribution w/ encl:

Regien i Docket Room (with concurrences)

PUBLIC Nuclear Safety Information Center.(NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector R. Conte, DRP M. Conner, DRP C. O'Daniell, DRP W. Axelson, DRA J. Wiggins, DRS L. Nicholson, DRS C. Miskey, DRS (2)

Distribution w/enci (VIA E MAIL):

R. Eaton, NRR A. Wang, NRR W. Dean, OEDO R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR DOCDESK Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

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09/q /97 M# 09/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY L _ _ _ _: ___--

e U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No:

50-293 Report No:

50 293/97-09 Licensee:

Boston Edison Company Facility:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Location:

Plymouth, MA Dates:

August 27 28, 1997 f

Inspectors:

G. C. Smith, Sr. Security Specialist R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager Approved by:

Michael C. Modes, Chief I

Emergency. Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety i

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0 O W 293 PDR

l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

.On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inboections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization protirams, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the individual from being granted unescorted access.

' The licensee's access aut' orization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and h

determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licensee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured portions of their plant.

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Reoort Details 88 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1. General On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement' authorities. ' Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to.

three nuclear power plants, special inspections were initiated at each of the plants to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in order to determine if they met the regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual being granted unescorted access.

The individual had been cranted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and

-1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 based on completion of all components of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to indian Point (lP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update of his activities for the approximate 2-month period between the time he left Pilgrim and began work at IP-3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP 3.

S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedsggg a.

Insoection ScQQA The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization program.

. b.

Observations and Findinas The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA procedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the

. requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66,7" Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants."' Interviews with personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations,' the Plan and the' AA procedures.

c.

Conclusions

The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA' program, as implemented. -

met all regulatory requirements.

____'-._OL--.-----

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~2 S8.3 Backaround investigation (BI) Elements a.

'Insoection Scone

The inspector's reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequacy of the program in determining the true identity.of the individual and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit

' history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access.:

b.

Observation and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI) and determined that the scope and depth of the Bl met the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments

.on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with' 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all-information_ received from the U.S. Attorney General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995). In both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspectors determined that the information had been properly evaluated and adjudicated' prior to granting unescorted access. In addition, Boston Edison submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal history check.

c.

Conclusion

%Ithough the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the inspectors cr cluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either licensee to initiate the criminal history checks.

S8.4 Psychological Evaluations a.

Insoection Scone

' The' inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements.

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. b.

Qhservations. Findinas and Conclusions l

The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the-L, psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinicalinterview was indicated; l

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3 the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.

The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinicalinterview and the psychologist conducting the intervien recommended, after conducting the interview, that site access be granted.

The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

S8.5 Sebavior Observation Proaram (BOP) a.

Insoection Scooe The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the licensees' programs.

b.

Observations and Findinos The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness-for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plans indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adverse changes in behavior.

c.

Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.

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S8.6 Temporary Access Authorization a.

Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope j

investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rule.

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b.

Observations, Findinas and Conclusions l

The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation from a developed reference, past year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access authorization. The inspectors noted +. hat, in these records of abbreviated scope investigation, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access authorization following receipt of the full 5-year investigation.

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4 S8.7 Audits l

a, Ipsoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each licensee to conduct Bl.

b.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic deficiencies were identified.

S8.8 Search Eauioment a.

Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.

b.

Observations and Findinas Test procedures were adequete to properly evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment determined that it was operable.

c.

Gpnclusion The inspectors determined that the personnel and package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan requirements and was capable of performing its intended functions.

X1 Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary findings were presented. The licensees acknowled<3ed the preliminary inspection

findings, o

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED Licensee J. Neal, Protection Services Department Mc mger N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations Manager E. Neary, Security Operations Supervisor W. Riggs, Nuclear Services Group Manager T. Campbell, Security Services Supervisor Contractor R. Wheat, Project Manager, Protection Technology

- N. Medcalf, Administrator, Protection Technology C. Stanley, Security Specialist, Protection Technology All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel, i

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September 4,1997 Mr. Robert J. Barrett Site Executive Officer

- New York Power Authority Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 21C.

Suchanan, NY 10511

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-286/97-08

Dear Mr. Barrett:

- This letter transmits the report of the NRC's specialinspection of your Access Authorization Program conducted by Mr.- E. B. King of this office at the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power. Plant on August 29,1997. Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the enclosed report. The inspection consisted of interviews and examination of selected procedures and representative records. Our findings were discussed with Mr. D. Quinn and other members of your staff by Mr. King by telephone on September 3, 1997.

The inspector determined that your access authorization program meets the applicable regulatory requirements.

in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Rnom (PDR).

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Prope sJness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50 286

])

Enclosure:

NRC Region i inspection Report No. 50 286/97 08 M

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Mr. Robert J. Barrett 2

cc w/enci:

C. D. Rapplayea, Chairman and Chlef Executive Officer R. Schoenberger, President and Chief Operating Officer J. Knubel, Chief Nc.:9ar Officer and Senior Vice President H. P. Salmon, Jr., Vice President of Nuclear Operations W. Josiger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Management J. Kelly, Director - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Director - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President - Appraisal and Compliance Services R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance G. C. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. D. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing, NYPA K. Peters, Licensing Manager A. Donahue, Mayor, Village of Buchanan C. W. Jackson, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager (Con Ed)

C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law Chairman, Standing Committee on Energy, NYS Assembly Chairman, Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly T. Morra, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee Chairman, Committee on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions The Honorable Sandra Galef, NYS Assembly P. D. Eddy, Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York G. T. Goering, Consultant, New York Power Authority J. E. Gagliardo, Consultant, New York Power Authority E. S. Beckjord, Consultant, New York Power Authority i

F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research i

and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority i

I

Mr. Robert J. Barrett 3

Distribd-w/ encl:

H. Miller, RA W. Axelson, DRA Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)

Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector J. Rogge, DRP R. Barkley, DRP R. Junod, DRP J. Wiggins, DRS L. Nicholson, DRS C. Miskey, DRS (2)

Distribution w/enci(VIA E-MAIL):

W. Dean, EDO Coordinator A. Dromerick, NRR G. Wunder, NRR J. Harold, NRR M. Campion, RI inspection Program B;'nch, NRR (IPAS)

R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR L Cunningham, NRR DOCDESK D. Serenci, PAO 1

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\EP&SB\\ KING \\lP39708. INS n

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w w con OFFICE Rl/DRS Rl/DRP ///ffl Rl/DRS l, n NAME Eking W JRogge //ffF MModes 1/M &

l DATE-09/04/97 09//J49F/

09/ Uf97 '

09/ /97 09/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY.

e U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION i Docket No:

50 286 Report No:

50-286/97-08 Licensee:

New York Power Authority Facility:

Indian Point Station, Unit 3 Location:

Buchanan, New York Dates:

August 29,1997 Inspector:

Edward B. King, Physical Security inspector Approved by:

Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety

-)

707

iOMO 970904 PDR ADOCK 05000286 e

PDR

1 1

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the individual from being granted unescorted access.

The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 29,1997,and determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licensee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured portions of their plant.

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Reoort Details S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 General On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement -

authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in New Hampshire Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to three nuclear power plants, special inspections were initiated at each of the plants to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in order to determine if they met the regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual being granted unescorted access.

The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and 1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 based on completion of all components of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to indian Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and cn update of his activities for the approximate 2-month period between the time he left Pilgrim and began work at IP 3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC inspection included a review of the AA prngrams at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP-3.

S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedurgg a.

Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed the licensee's security plan and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization program.

b.

Observations and Findinos l

The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA procedures disclosed I

that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66, " Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with personnel discicaed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.

c.

Conclusions The inspector's review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented, met all regulatory requirements.

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2 S8.3 Backoround investigation (Bil Elements f

a.

Insoection Scoon i

The inspector reviewed records and conducted interviews ir: order to determine the adequacy of the program in determining the true ;J9ntity o! the individual and to develop information concerning employment histery, educational history, credit history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individur.1 prior to granting unescorted access, b.

Observation and Findinol The inspector reviewed the results of the individual's backgrounr1 investigation (BI) and determined that the scope and depth of the BI rnet the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination for access authorization in accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating crimine,I history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received from the U.S. Attorney General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995). In both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspector determined that the information had been properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access. Another licensee, Boston Edison, submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuir.g this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal histnry check.

c.

Conclusion Although the 1996 criminal histe v check did not identify any prior arrests, the inspector concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either licensee to initiate the crirninal history checks.

I S8.4 Psychological Evaluatig_r.tt a.

Inspection Scone The inspector reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements, b.

Observations. Findinas and Conclusions The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinicalinterview was indicated, l

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3 the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee.' The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.

The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinical interview and the psychologist conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site

- access be granted.

The inspector determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

S8.5 Behavior Observation Prooram (BOP) a.

Inspection Scone The inspector reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the

' licensees' programs..

b.

Observations and Fmdenas The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plans indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adverse changes in behavior.

- c.

Conclusion q

The inspector concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.

S8.6 Temoorary Access Authorization a.

Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rule.'

b.

Observations. Findinas and Conclusions

. The records of the abbreviste'd scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation from a developed reference, past 1

~

year's employment history,' and a credit check) on which to base temporary access

)

. authorization.E The inspector noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope j

investigation,' there was no data which necessitated rescission of access ~

.)

authorization following receipt of the full 5-year investigation.

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S8.7 Search Eouioment

}

a.

Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and observed licensee testing of the search equipment in assess its effectiveness.

b.

Observations and Findinos Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment determined that it was operable.

c.

Conclusion The inspector determined that the personnel and package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan requirements and was cepable of performing its intended functions.

l X1 Exit interview 1

l An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary findings were presented. The licensees acknowledged the preliminary inspection findings.

t, r.

5 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED Licensee D. Quinn, General Manager Support Services J. Hahn, Director Security T. Weber, (Acting) Security Manager J. Mosher, Senier Investigator C. Faison, (Acting) Licensing Manager All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.

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