ML20249B128

Forwards TS Bases Pages B 3/4 3-1 & B 3/4 3-1a Re Protective & ESF Instrumentation.Pages Revised to Reflect Addition of Paragraphs to Explain Testing of Six Logic Matrix Channels, Per License 980317 Submittal

ML20249B128
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	06/18/1998
From:	William Reckley NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Hutchinson C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
TAC-MA1269, NUDOCS 9806220090
Download: ML20249B128 (5)

Text

.

Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson ~ June 180 1998 i

Vice President, OperEtions ANO Entergy Operations, Inc.

1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, AR 72801

SUBJECT:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 2 (ANO-2) PERTAINING TO PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM MATRIX LOGIC TESTING (TAC NO. MA1269)

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:

By letter dated March 17,1998, Entergy Operations, Inc., (EOl) submitted a change to Facility Operating License No. NPF-6, Appendix A - Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Section 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2, " Protective and Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Instrumentation." The change consists of adding paragraphs to explain that the testing of the six logic matrix channels associated with the plant protection system is performed as part of the testing of the four protection channels. The clarification resulted from a quality assurance audit that questioned the testing frequency needed for the logic matrix channels and confusion associated with having the six logic matrix channels within the four protection channel cabinets. EOI performed an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and determined that the change does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. The staff has no objection to this Bases change. Enclosed are the affected Bases pages, B 3/4 3-1 and B 3/4 3-ia.

Sincerely, l I

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

William Reckfey, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects lil/IV l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I

/ l Docket No. 50-368 l

Enclosure:

TS Pages B 3/4 3-1 and B 3/4 3-ia cc w/ encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION: fEb) h"hf}I@f7M @SRU Docket File PUBLIC PD4-1 r/f C.Hawes OGC ,

.'] T. Gwynn, RIV ACRS W. Reckley E. Adensam (EGA1)-

J.Hannon Document Name: AR2A1269.LTR l OFC PM/PD4-L ,, J.A/PD4-1 HICB - O PD/PDIV NAME WRecNy/ CHawM J el JHanno DATE [r /(~k/98 b/ ll /98 6lb/98 /b/98 COPY 980622o09o 9eo6fs YES/NO YES/NO hNO lE YES/NO PDR ADOCK 05o00368 RECORUtOPY P

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O UNITED STATES g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 30esS4001

%*****) June 18, 1998 Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Vice President, Operations ANO Entergy Operations, Inc.

1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, AR 72801-

SUBJECT:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 2 (ANO-2) PERTAINING TO PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM MATRIX LOGIC TESTING (TAC NO. MA1269)

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:

By letter dated March 17,1998, Entergy Operations, Inc., (EOl) submitted a change to Facility Operating License No. NPF-6, Appendix A- Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Sechon 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2, " Protective and Engineered Safety Features (ESF) instrumentation." The change consists of adding paragraphs to explain that the testing of the six logic matrix channels associated with the plant protection system is pesformed as part of the testing of the four protection channels. The clarification resulted from a quality assurance audit that questioned the testing frequency needed for the logic matrix channels and confusion associated with having the six logic matrix channels within the four protection channel cabinets. EOl performed an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and determined that the change does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. The staff has no objection to this Bases change. Enclosed are the affected Bases pages, B 3/4 3-1 and B 3/4 3-1a.

incerely, W

William Reckley, Project nager Project Directorate IV-1 i Division of Reactor Projects lil/IV l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-368

Enclosure:

TS Pages B 3/4 3-1 and B 3/4 3-1a -

cc w/ encl: See next page

o \

l b l Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Entergy Operations, Inc. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 cc:

Executive Vice President Vice President, Operations Support

& Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.  ;

Entergy Operations, Inc. P. O. Box 31995 P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Jackson, MS 39286-199 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway ,

Director, Division of Radiation P. O. Box 651 j Control and Emergency Management Jackson, MS 39205 ;i Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30 Little Rock, AR 72205-3867 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005-3502 Manager, Rockville Nuclear Licensing l Framatone Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852 Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Artington, TX 76011-8064 County Judge of Pope County Pope County Courthouse Russellville, AR 72801 l

i I

3/403 INSTRUMENTATION BASES ~

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parametet monitored by each channel or combination

, thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is ' required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design. for the protection and adtigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systesw is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the udnimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The triannual channel functional testing frequency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

The RPS Natrix Logic channels and the Initiation Logic channels are listed )

as separate functional units in Table 3.3-1 and are grouped together in the corresponding surveillance Table 4.3-1 as a single functional unit listed as Reactor Protection System (RPS) Logic. The RPS Logic contains six Matrix Logic channels and four Initiation Logic channels. For surveillance testing purposes, the RPS Logic is considered to have four channels or n=4 with respect to STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The associated triannual CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTING i requirements are performed during the individual channel PPS test. The six RPS Natrix Logic channels are divided up for testing purposes as follows: Matrix AB is tested with channel A, matrices BC and BD are tested with channel 5,  !

matrices AC and CD are tested with channel C, and matrix AD is tested with channel D. This testing methodology is supported by the analysis that was performed to extend the surveillance interval to the triannual frequency and also satisfies the STAGGERED TEST BASIS requirements for the RPS Matrix Logic channels.

Table 4.3-2 requires the Automatic Actuation Logic channels for each of the associated ESFAS functional units to have a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST performed on a triannual frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. These testing requirements also apply to the six ESFAS Matrix Logic channels and the four ESFAS Initiation Logic channels. For surveillance testing purposes, the ESFAS Matrix Logic

• • channels and the ESFAS Initiation Logic channels are considered to have four channels or n=4 with respect to STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The EShAS Matrix Logic channels are divided up for testing purposes like the RPS Natrix Logic channels.

This testing methodology is supported by the analysis that was petickmsd to extend the surveillance interval to the triannual frequency and also satisfies the STAGGERED TEST BASIS requirements for the ESFAS Matrix Logic channels.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 5 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. u w M4,189 Issued By NRC Letter Da,ted June Ill,1998

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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

, BASES I

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2)~ utilizing replacement sensors with certified

. response times.

Plant. Protective System (PPS) logic is designed for operation as a 2-out-of-3 logic, although normally it is operated in a 2-out-of-4 mode.

The RPS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable '

relays and upstream of the Reactor Trip circuit Breakers. The RPS Logic is divided into two parts, Matrix Logic, and Initiation Logic.

Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

The ESEAS Logic consists of everything downstream of tha bistable relays and upstream of the subgroup relays. The ESEAS Logic is divided into three parts, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, and Actuation Logic. Failures of individual histables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

Matrix Logic refers to the matrix power supplies, trip channel bypass contacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards, up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix contacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.

Initiation Logic consists of the trip path power source, matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including cantacts).

ESEAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the ESF Function; excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the initiation relay contacts mounted in the PPS cabinet.

For the purposes of this LCO, de-energization of up to three matrix power supplies due to a single failure, such as loss of a vital instrument bus, is to be treated as a single matrix channel failure, providing the affected matrix relays de-energize as designed to produce a half-trip. Although each of the six matrices within an ESEAS Function (e.g., SIA3, MSIS, CSAS, etc.) user separate power supplies, the matrices for the different ESEAS Functions share power supplies. Thus, failure of a matrix power supply may force entry 1,nto the Condition specified for each of the associated ESFAS Functional Units.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No.159 Issued By NRC Letter Dated June 18, 1998

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