ML20249A735
| ML20249A735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/20/1998 |
| From: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-62FR25146, FRN-63FR32600, RULE-PR-71 AF59-2-002, AF59-2-2, NUDOCS 9806180157 | |
| Download: ML20249A735 (23) | |
Text
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W MY 21 A10:13 OFF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION F:Li, ADJL'i -
r 10 CFR Part 71 RIN 3150-AF59 Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTlON: Final rule.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)is amending its regulations to add vitrified high-level waste (HLW) contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport to the forms of plutonium which are exempt from the double-containment packaging requirements for transportation of plutonium. This amendment responds to a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Departme it of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (DOE /OCRWM). This final rule grants the petition for rulemaking, with modifications, and completes NRC action on the petition.
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This final rule also will make a minor correction regarding the usage of metne and English units, l-to be consistent with existing NRC policy on such use.
/k l198 EFFECTIVE DATE: (30 6ye '
^" rQunwum.. um TeeEw.7Eem cn). The N
incorporation by reference of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler an l
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L M,,"'"L v'H MI 64.m ultsl98 cf (p3fR32400 i
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Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill, editions through the 1993 Edition, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of (30 days from the date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton [ telephone (301) 415-8520 EXE@nrc. gov] or Mark Haisfield { telephone (301) 415-6196, e-mail MFH@nrc. gov Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, l
Washington, DC 20555-0001.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
i in 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) adopted the special requirements i
10 CFR 71.63 that regulate the shipment of plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquer l
[20 Curies) per package. These requirements specify that plutonium must l
that packages used to transport plutonium must provide a separate inner contain
" double-containment" requirement). In adopting these requirements, the AEC specific l
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excluded from the double-containment requirement plutonium in the for.n of reactor elements, metal or metal alloys, anJ, on a case-by-case basis, other plutonium-b l
that the agency determines do not require double containment. The Statement of Consideration for the original rule (39 FR 20960 June 17,1974), specifies that plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be exempted from the l
L requirement."
71.63(b) to add On November 30,1993 DOE /OCRWM petitioned the NRC to amend f
- vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister to the forms of plutonium which are ex 2
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the double-containment packaging requirements of Part 71. The NRC published a notice of receipt for the petition, docketed as PRM-71-11, in the FEDERAL REGISTER on February 18,1994 (59 FR 8143). Three comments were received on the petition.
Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), DOE is the Federal agency responsible for developing and administering a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear fuel. DOE plans to ship the vitrified HLW in sealed canisters from four storage locations: Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford, Washington; West Valley, New York and Idaho Falls, Idaho; directly to the geologic repository in transportation packages certified by the NRC. Currently this HLW exists mostly in the form ofliquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor fuels. DOE proposes to encapsulate the HLW in a borosilicate glass matrix. The HLW is added to molten g! ass and the mixture is then poured into a stainless steel canister and allowed to solidify (i.e., vitrify). The canister is then seal-welded shut. The canisters will eventually be placed inside Type B transportation packages for transport to the geologic repository or an interim storage facility.
The beneficial aspect of this amendment would be the elimination of an unnecessary requirement that DOE transport vitrified HLW in a separate inner container (i.e., a second barrier which is subject to the leak testing requirements of 9 71.63(b)). The Commission believes that the vitrified HLW form in its seated canister provides sufficient defensa-in-depth for l
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protection of public health and safety and the. environment, when transported inside an NRC-certified Type B transportation package. The Commission agrees with DOE's assertion that shipments of this form of plutonium are comparable to shipments of (irradiated) reactor fuel elements which are exempt from the double-containment requirement. Therefore, the I
Commission agrees that the double-containment requirement is unnecessary. Additional b'eneficial aspects of this amendment would be a reduction in DOE's costs associated with the 3
transportation of HLW from production sites to the geologic repository or an interim facility; and the simplification of the NRC staffs review of DOE's application transportation package.
Although, in most other types of shipments, DOE is not subject to the requ Part 71, the NWPA requires that DOE's transport of spent nuclear fuel or HLW to repository or a monitored retrievable storage facility be in packages certifie packages used to transpon vitrified HLW containea in sealed canisters will NRC as Type B packages. Type B packages are designed to withstand the norma hypotliciical accident conditions spelt.ad in Part 71. The canistered vitrified subject to the special transport controls for a " Highway Route Controlled Qu U.S. Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Part 397.
NWPA requires DOE to provide technical assistance and funds to train ernerge L
along the planned routes.
DOE asserted that shipments of vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister wil adversely affect public health and safety and the environment if shipped withou containment. DOE stated that a separate inner container is unnecessary bec degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister and th nonrespirability of the s:'id, plutonium-bearing waste form. In addition, DOE I
vitrified HLW in sealed canista provides a comparable level of protection to reactor fuel elements, which the Commission previously oetermined should double-containment requirement (39 FR 20960).
On June 1,1995, the NRC staff met with DOE in a public meeting to discuss th petitioner's request and the possible alternative of requesting an NRC
@ 71.63(b)(3) to exempt vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister ft om I-4 t
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containment requirement. ~ DOE informed the NRC in a letter dated January 25.1996 of its intent to seek an exemption under @ 71.63(b)(3), The NRC received DOE's exemption request on July 16.1996, in which DOE also requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held in abeyance until a decision was reached on the exemption request. In response to DOE's request, the NRC staff prepared a Commission paper (SECY-96-215, dated October 8,1996) outlining and requesting Commission approval of the NRC staffs proposed approach for making an exemption under 71.63(b)(3). However,in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated October 31,1996, the Commission disapproved the NRC stafi's plan and directed ihm this policy issue be addressed by rulemaking rather than by exemption.
'The NRC published a proposed rule in the FEDERAL REGISTER on May 8,1997 (62 FR 25146)in response to DOE's petition. The Statemer.t of Considerations for the proposed rule contains a complete discussion of DOE's petition, comments received on the petition, and the NRC's analysis of those comments.
Discussion The NRC is amending 10 CFR 71.63 based on its evaluation of the petition submitted by i
the DOE; the attachment to the petition, " Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)" (Technical Justification); the three l
public ccmments received on the petition after its publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER; and I
seven comments on the proposed rule. In amending 71.63, the NRC is accepting, with modifications, the petition submitted by DOE, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs.
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in the early 1970's, the AEC anticipated that a large number of shipments o P
d nitrate liquids could result from the spent fuel reprocessing anticipated at t a concern about leakage of liquids because of the potential for a large numb (probably of more complex design) to be shipped due to reprocessing I
possibility of human error resulting from handling this expanded shipping In 1973, the AEC proposed a rule which would deal with this problem by d
that shipments of plutonium containing greater than 20 curies be shipped i il (b) requiring that the solid plutonium be shipped in an inner cor,taine form" requirements as they t>n existed; i.e., not only would the nhole pac Part 71 requirements but the inner container would separately have to mee i that requirements. One alternative tc the proposed rule the AEC considered wa This shipments of plutonium be in nonrespirable form, either in a single or alternative was rejected, apparently because fuel fabricators did not hav plutonium in a nonrespirable form.
In 1974, the AEC published a final rule which contained two signif proposed rule:
(1) The AEC abandoned the "special form" requirement and in
" double containment"; i.e., the inner container was required not to r t
f when the whole package was subjected to the normal and hypothetic i
Part 71, but no separate tests were required for the inner container. Do containment was required to take account of the fact that the AEC require that the plutonium be in a nonrespirable form; and d
(2) The AEC exempted two forms of plutonium altogether-react metal or metal alloy-on the basis that these forms were " ess(
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therefore did not require double containment The exemption provision pla;.ed in the regulation also indicates that the AEC saw the possibility that other forms of plutonium l
would be similar enough to these two fornis to also qualify for exemption from the double-conta! ament requirement because they were also essentially nonrespirable In the statement of considerations accompanying the final rule, the AEC stated that
'. solid forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be exempt from the double containment requirements" (39 FR 20960).
DOE's petition argues that a particular form of plutonium-vitrified high-!evel waste contt.:..ad i a sealed canister-is s"'ar enough te irradiated reactor fuel elements to qualify for its own exemption from the double-containment requirement. This is because of (1) the material properties of the vitrified HLW, (2; the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister, and (3) the NRC-approved quality assurance program implemented by DOE makes it highly unlikely that any plutonium would be released from an NRC-certified transportation package under the normal or hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71. The NRC is required to certify the transportation packages used for vitrified HLW pursuant to Section 180 of the NWPA and every transportation package for vitrified HLW will be required to meet the standards for accident-resistant packages (i.e., Type B packages) set forth in Part 71.
The tests described in DOE's Technical Justification demonstrate that the canisters containing the vitrified HLW provide an additional barrier to the release of radionuclides and compare favorably to the cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor fuel elements. The comparison is based upon physical drop tests, upon the material properties and dimensions of the sealed canisters, and the effects of radiation damage to materials.
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DOE's analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of plutonium in the HLW canisters than in irradiated reactor fuel elements. However, the DOE has not established an upper limit on plutonium concentration for these vitnfied HLW canisters, and the NRC is not basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double-containment requirement based on the plutonium's concentration.
In its Technical Justification, DOE described the physical characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified HLW, including that the canistered waste form be capable of withstanding a 7-meter drop onto a flat, essentially unyielding surface, without breaching or 1 DOE's " Waste Accc ptance dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by F System Requirements Document (WASRD)," Rev. O, which is referenced in the Tc.:hnical Justification. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test, onto an essentially unyielding surface, which is required by the hypothetical accident conditions of & 71.73. The 9-meter drop test is performed on the entire transportation package under the Part 71 certification process. The 7-meter drop test standard only applies to the canistered HLW.
The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant to the demonstration that the canistereo HLW represents an essentially nonrespirable form for shipping plutonium.
The NRC believes that the 7-meter canister drop test is a more severe challenge than the 9-meter drop test for an f.RC-approved Type B package. This is because the Type 8 package and the impact limiters will absorb much of the energy which would otherwise be expended against the canister.
In some of DOE's tests, the HLW canisters were dropped from 9 meters-2 meters above DOE's 7-meter design standard-and portions of the testing included deliberately introducing flaws (0.95 cm holes) in the canisters' walls. For those HLW canisters tested with the 0.95 cm holes, the quantity of respirable plutonium released through these holes was less 8
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than 0.74 TBq (20 curies). This review of DOE's Technical Justification has provided the NRC staff confidence that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitnfied HLW in a sealed canister is essentially nonrespirable.
The NRC does not control the requirements in, or changes to, DOE's WASRD.
Because of concerns that DOE's WASRD could be changed in the future, the NRC added the requirement in the proposed rule that vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister meet the design criteria of 9 60.135(b) and (c). However, in response to comments received on the proposed rulemaking, the Commission has reconsidered its proposed imposition of referencing Part 60 desi;;n criteria. The final rule, instead, incorporates one of the design requirements from Part 60 into this rule The other Part 60 design requirements are satisfied by other existing Part 71 requirements and other language in the final rule. Additionally, the Commission
. has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements for handling by referencing appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria. The explanation for this change is discussed below. Further, the NRC staff does perform technical reviews to certify package designs. For a HLW package, the review wou L
include the sealed canister as well as the radioactive contents in the form of vitrified expected that an application for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister
' design and vitrified HLW c mtents with characteristics and attributes comparable to those
' described in the Technical Justification.
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Comm:nts on ths Proposed Ruls This section presents a summary of the principal comments received on the p rule, the NRC's response to the comments, and changes made to the final rule these comments. The Commission received seven comment letters fr the proposed rule. One was from a member of the public, two were from nati one was from a transportation cask designer, one was from a consulting company, an was from DOE. In addition, DOE submitted a subsequent letter commenting on one o other comments. Over-II, five of the six commenters supported the proposed rule and remaining commenter, while not specifically opposing the rule, proposed chan performance of the canister and limiting its contents. Copies of these letters public inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Docum 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
Comment. DOE and another commenter objected to the proposed rule's use of d criteria from Part 60. DOE noted that basing canistered waste approved for trans 9 71.63 upon the rules for disposal of HLW under @ 60.135(b) and (c) approval for transport packages wil; not take place until a repository or int becomes available; and hat this may not be the case. The commenters are certification for transport packages under the proposed rule is sought before a license application for a repository or interim storage facility is submitted, this s and impede progress on the HLW cask certification process. One commen use of Part 60 criteria.
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Response. The Commission has reconsidered tne need to reference Part 60 cntena for canistered vitnfied HLW 'in the amended regulation The Commiss:on agrees that it is best to avoid incorporating into Part 71-which contains standards for the packaging and transportation of radioactive matenals-requirements referenced from Part 60 which are intended for the l
permanent disposal of HLW in a geologic repository. The NRC staff has analyzed the l
requirements contained in @ 60.135(b) ano (c) and has det. rmined that the intended e
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an be achieved by requirement-that the canistered vitnfied HLW maintain ts n egn y-c reliance on existing Part 71 requirements and language from the proposed rule for all of the l
Part 60 req.6 ements, but one. That one requirement is to desigo ne canister to maintain t
waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. This has been added to the final rule. Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements by referencing appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria.
The design criteria in @ 60.135(b) require tha+ the waste package shall not contain explosive, pyrophoric, or chemically reactive materials or free liquids in amounts that coul
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cause harm; that waste packages shall be designed to maintain waste containment during
- handling; and that waste packages have unique identification numbers. The design enteria 60.135(c) require that tb waste 2e in solid form and plaird in a sealed container; that any particulate waste forms be consolidated into an encapsulating matrix; and that any co radioactive waste be reduced to noncombustible form. As noted, the Commission believed that by referencing tnese criteria in the proposed rule, it could assure the integrity of the c vitrified HLW.
The Commission now believes that the intep.ity objective can be achieved by relying on i
requirements in the final rule and other requirements in Part 71 First, as stated above 11 l
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rule has added language that the canister be des:gnec c ma:ntain waste containment dunng Second the rule requires that the HLW be vitnfied handling activities associated with transport and thus be in a solid form for encapsulation. Vinf ration of HLW uses molten glass and this high temperature process will reduce any combustible radioactive waste into a nonco form. Finally, the Part 6L requirement that a unique identification number be attached to the HLW canister is not relevant for transpodation Third, the Commission believes the integnty objective can be achieved by relying on other requirements in Part 71. Part 71 already requires that the transportation packages emically reactive materials or free liquids. Section not et..ain explosive, pyrophoric, o:
71.43(d) requires that:
A package must be made of matenals and construction that assure that there will be no significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among the packaging components, among package contents, or between the packaging components and the package contents including possible reaction resulting from inleakage of water, to the maximum credible extent. Account must be taken of the behavior of materials under irradiation.
71.63(a) that the plutonium be in a solid form also will assure that The existing requirement in the waste will be in solid form and that the waste package will be free of liquids.
Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting the canister design requirements for handling by referencing appropriate American Socie Mechanical Engineers Siler and Pressure Vessel Code enteria. Use of the ASME B Pressure Vessel Code would ensure that the canister would be designed to maintain wa containment during handling, including normalloading and unloading activities. Cer of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Section Vill. are excluded because t appropriate for a sealed canister containing vitrified HLW. For example, the pressure relief device and openings to inspect the interior are unnecessary and 12 l
' compromise the long term integnty of the canister Specific alternatives to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessei Code cnteria may be considered and approved without resorting to exemptions f*om the regulation.
Final. Bide The final rule has been revised to read as follows: Vitrified high-level waste contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. - As one method of meeting these design requirements the NRC will consider acceptable a canister which is designed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section Vill, x...ans through the 1995 Edition. However, this canister need not ba designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill. Parts UG-46, UG-115 through UG-120, UG-125 through UG-136, UW-60, UW-65, UHA-60, and UHA-65 ano the canister's final closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill, Parts UG-99 and UW-11.
Necessary language to incorporate by reference the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code i
has also been added.
Comment. Four of the six commenters stated that the NRC should evaluate the
' technical bases for } 71.63, or referred to a Commission SRM to SECY-96-215, dated October 31,1996, which directed the NRC staff to " address whether the technical basis for 10 CFR 71.63 remains valid, or whether a revision or elimination of portions of 10 CFR 71.63 is needed to provide flexibility for current and future technologies." One of the commenters noted that the Internat;onai Atomic Energy Agency standards do not impose a double-containment requirement. Four of the commenters recommended that if the NRC retained the double containment provision, that the rule use performance-based criteria for dispersibility and
- respirability as a basis for exemption, or that double containment only be required for " highly 13
dispersible materials." One of the commenters recommended that @ 71.63 be eliminated entirely. One commenter expressed an interest in any Commission action on S 71.63, and recommended that the evaluation of @ 71.63 take the form of an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Resoonse: The Commission believes that those comments to evaluate the te 71.63, to revise $ 71 " (other than for vitrified HLW in canisters), or to eliminate the
' basis for rule, are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The NRC staff recently reviewed the technical bases for 9 71.63, as directed in the SRM to SECY-96-215. The NRC staff concluded, in SECY-97-li8, dated September 29,1997, that the technical bases remain valid, and that the provisions provide adequate flexibility for current and future technologies. Except for the changes made in this rulemaking for vitrified HLW in canisters, the NRC staff concluded th 71.63 should remain unchanged. The NRC staff will further consider potential provisions in modifications to 9 71.63 in its response to a petition for rulemaking, dated September 25,19 l
(Docket No. PRM-71-12). The NRC published a notice of receipt for the petition in the PEGISTER (63 FR 8362, dated February 19,1998).
Comment. One_commenter suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require m
that HLW canister desigr., fabrication, test, and fill be conducted under a quality assurance program that meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the requirements of Part 71, S This commenter also suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to canisters of HLW in shipping packages which have been demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the HLW canisters without allowing canister failure under the hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71, Subpart F, when considered as a transportation system.
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Response - The technical basis given in the DOE petition for an exemptior, is that a separate inner container is unnecessary because of the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister and the non-respirability of the solid, plutonium-beanng waste form. In support of its petition. DOE submitted a Technical Justification which included a description of a representative HLW canister together with the results of 7-meter and 9-meter drop testing of the canisters and a description of the standards used for canister fabrication an filling.
The technical review performed by the NRC staff to certify a HLW package would include tha sealed canister as well as th? radioactive contents in the form of vitrifia expected that an application for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister design and vitrified HLW contents with characteristics and integrity comparable to those described in the DOE petition. The DOE HLW canisters will be subject to an NRC approved quality assurance plan.
The final rule has been revised to specify that the vitrified high-level waste be contained I
in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. These standards would apply to all canisters containing vitnfied HLW transported under this provision and will provide reasonable assurance that the package l
adequately protects pub, nealth and safety.
Comment. One commenter soggested that the proposed rule be changed to require l
that the exemption will only apply to vitrified HLW from which plutonium has been removed p l
to transfer to HLW storage tanks. The commenter suggested the vitrified HLW be restricted l
no more thar 3.7 TBq (100 Ci) of plutonium.
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Resoonse Tne Statement of Considerations for the original rule (39 FR 20960) did not discuss activity limits (quantity limits). nor did the Commission adopt activity limits on the other forms of plutonium that are exempt from @ 7163(b). Rather, any limitations on the quantity of plutonium that can be shipped in a transportation package-for any exempt form of plutonium-are due to the inherent design features of the specific transportation package being used These design features are reviewed by the NRC as part of the package certification process. The commenter has not provided any technical basis for requiring activity limits on this form of plutonium. The final rule does not specify a quantity limit for this exemption.
Regulatory Action The NRC is amending 10 CFR 71.63 based on its evaluation of the petition submitted by DOE; the attachment to the petition " Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)," the three comments received on the petition',
and the seven comments received on the proposed rule. Section 71.63(b) specifies special provisions for shipping plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 curies) per package, including a separate inner containment system, except when plutonium is in solid form of reactor fuel elements, metal, or meta, alloys. t, amending @ 7163(b), the NRC is granting, with modification, the petition submitted by DOE to eliminate these special provisions when transporting vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment dunng handling activities associated with transport. The final rule completes NRC action on PRM-71-11. In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required that the HLW canister meet design enteria contained in 60135(b) and (c). The final rule, instead, i
incorporates these requirements into Part 71 16 L
In addition, the NRC has corrected the usage of units in S 7163. The metnc units are used first with the English units in parenthesis.
l Criminal Penalties l
For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) the Commission is issuing the final rule under one or more of sections 161b,161i, or 161o of the AEA. 'Nillful violations of the rule will be subject to criminal enforcement.
i Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations Under the" Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs" approved by the Commission on June 30,1997 (62 FR 46517), this rule is classified as compatibility category "NRC " This regulation addresses areas of exclusive NRC authority.
However, a State may adopt these provisions for the purposes of clarity and communication, as long as the State does not adopt regulations or program elements that would cause the State to regulate these areas.
Finding of No Significant Environmentalimpact: Availability The Co,nmission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule will not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, and therefore, an environmentalimpact statement is not required. The final rule change 1
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exempts shipments of vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister designed to mainta containment during handling activities associated with transport. The purpose of the dou containment rule is to ensure safety by requiring plutonium to be shipped as a solid, un double containment thereby minimizing the likelihood of leakage during transport a possible packaging errors. The Commission believes that the plutonium within contained in a sealed canister is essentially nonrespirable and this form of plutonium p level of protection comparable to irradiated reactor fuel elements-which are exemp double-containment requirement. Therefore, double containment is unnecessary for v KLW contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste cont.inment during h activities associated with transport.
- The final environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document R Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental asses and the finding of no significant impact are avai!able from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nu Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing 0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.
Papeiwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirem subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existi requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approva number 3150-0008.
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e Public Protection Notification 1
If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information t
collection.
Regulatory Analysis l'
The Commission has prepared a final regulatory analysis,o tNs final regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission.
The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
- Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification c mmission As required by tha Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the o
l certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. DOE is the only transporter of vitrified HLW. No other entities are involved.
l DOE is not a small entity as defined in 10 CFR 2.810.
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Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
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in accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, I
.the NRC has determine t a t s ac on si not a major rule and has verified this determination d h t hi ti with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.
I Backfit Analysis L
l ihe NRC has determined that ole backfit rule,10 CFR 50.109, does not soply to this rule, and therefore, a backfit analysis is not required because these amendments do not involve l
any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).
l List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71 l.
i Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons t out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act'of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C.
552 and 553; the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.
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PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
- 1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:
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AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 57. 62. 63, 81,161.182,183. 68 Stat. 930, 932, 933. 935, 948,.953,954, as amended, sec. 1701,106 Stat. 2951,2952,2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073,2077, f
2092,2093,2111,2201,2232,2233,2297f); secs. 201, as amended,202,206,88 Stat.1242, l
f as amended, 1244,1246 (42 U S.C. 5841,5842,5846).
Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295,94 Stat,789-790.
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- 2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as follows:
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$ 71.63 Special requirements for plutonium shipments.
(a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be shipped as a solid.
(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) cer package must be packaged in a separate inner container placed within outer packaging that meets the requirements of Subparts E and F of this part for packaging of materialin normal form. If the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in @ 71.71 (" Normal conditions of transport"), the separate inner container must not release plutonium as demonstrated to a sensitivity of 10-* A /h. If the entire 2
package is subjected to the tests specified in @ 71.73 (" Hypothetical accident conditions"), th separate inner container must restrict the loss of plutonium to not more than A in 1 week.
2 Solid plutonium in the following forms is exempt from the requirements of '.his paragraph.
. (1) Reactor fuel elements, (2) Metal or metal alloy; 21
(3) Vitrified high-level waste contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain containment during handling activities associated with transport. As one method of meetin these design requirements, the NRC will consider acceptable a canister which is de accordance with the American Society of Mechan; cal Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Press i
d t
. Vessel Code, Section Vill, editions through the 1995 Edition. However, this can ster nee no be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill, Parts UG-46, UG UG-120, UG-125 through UG-136, UW-60, UW-65, UHA-60, and UHA-65 and the ca final closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Sectio Parts UG-99 and UW 11. The Director of the Federal Register :; proves this incorporat reference in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of the ASM and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill, editions through the 1995 Edition, may be p from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, United Engineering Center, 3 St., New York, NY 10017. It is also available for inspection at the NRC Library, Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 or at the Office of the Federal Register,800 Nort Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC.; and 1
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e (4) Other plutonium bearing sohds that the Commission determines should De exempt from the requirements of this section Dated at Rockville Maryland. this day of May.1998 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/
I s%y John C. Hovie.
.apretary of the Commission.
i l
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