ML20248M179
| ML20248M179 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/03/1977 |
| From: | Gossick L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Brzezinski Z PRESIDENT OF U.S. & EXECUTIVE OFFICES |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248M168 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-98-214 NUDOCS 9806150115 | |
| Download: ML20248M179 (4) | |
Text
8" UNITE 3 STATES
. '[c.'s f"a NUCLEAR REGULA10RY COMMISSION
$/I
?I.'
I r'ASHINGTON, D. C. 20565 N
Q.j%./
F58 August 3,1977 t
@,~t~ d Dr. Zbigniew P.rzezinski Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House
Dear Dr. Brzezinski:
a The Conunission has reviewed the Tokai reprocessing plant options paper as forwarded by the Secretary of State and wishes to provide the following coments.
Within the parameters set by the paper -- namely, avoiding protracted delay in operating lokai or unreasonably large costs for modification --
no basic technical options are readily apparent beyond, those seIfortTi '
J in the paper.
These parameters, of course, define what is e,ssentially
{
a political decision.
)
The paper notes correctly that none of the alternatives' considered would offer a foolproof technical solution to the problem of potential diversion or be one that would be recommended as a_ precedent or model for other cases, In tnis regard, the Commission wishes to note that, l
from a technical standpoint, coprocessing or blending would appear to of fer some add'tional proliferation resistance to national diversion over the conventional mode.
However,'whatever nonproliferation advantages would obtain from coprocessing or blending in terms of national diversion would depend on whether there was a facility capable of separating the plutonium.
(In fact, given such a facility, the plutonium riay be separated out, possibly in a matter of days, without much difficulty.)
i If a safeguarded coprocessing facility were built which was not capable of producing pure plutunium, then some nonproliferation advantage.
could be realized sinco major modifications to the plant or the construction of a covert facility would be required in order to separate the pluton 1itn f rom the coprocessed product.
Major modifica-tions to a facility subject to cantinuous safeguards would require time at.d be easily detectable at the outset.
A separate facility could be constructed clande.stinely, but such action would entail a further burden of secrecy and4rtsk of detection, particularly for a facility capable of separating significant amounts in a short time period.
l MC Dr4UM2NT HA*, EEEN DECLASSIFIED UNDER l
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Wahdc4Rh//bo:itv/ Number) 14 ciDechssii=:fon 6 /9 /9/
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2-Dr.*Brzezinski Coprocessing and blending would have some advantages in terms of potential subnational diversion.
However, these would still be limitedifthematerialweredecontaminatedsince,as;notdabove,J j
the plutonium could be separated in a matter of days. d j GAu er,
Also, as noted in the paper, Tokai. is intended, in large meast.re, to produce fue'l for advanced breeder reactor development.-!t_ should be recognized that coprocessed or blended material which could be utilized for such development would constitute weapon-usable material without being separated.
This would not, however, be an opM mum material for such use and, therefore, would appear of greater. concern with respect to subnational rather than national diversion.
Thus, while the Comission believes that coprocessing and blending are worth investigation and evaluation on an experimental basis, their inherent limitations in terms of offering any more proliferation resistance over conventional modes should be clearly recognized at-
~
the out*,et.
Commissioner Gilinsky is also providing a separate stat'ement of his additional views, as attached.
4 Sincerely, 4 ~4
-f.d. s,b h
I.-
1.. J. Gossicx M xecutive Director for Operations
'g 4
g *,
N 8
e___.-___.._-.-___.-____.______.-___-.-.
~
s rIsgA ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY
\\
This memorandum seems to have accepted at the outset that at least a limited amount of reprocessing in the Tokai facility
,, R will be permitted.
The memorandum does not question the N@.
Japanese negotiating team's view that early reprocessing is
-extremely important to Japan and it assumes alternative
' sources of plutonium will not be availabic, despite the possibility that the U.S.
might provide plutonium-for Ja an's research and development program.
The Options / Coprocessing
-<A The memorandum seems to view coprocessing as an important objective -- the options are listed in terms.of increasing commitment to coprocessing.
But this seems inconsistent with statements clsewhere (page 8) that " coprocessing por,sc is not widely regarded as a significant additive prolif eration-resistant stop," and the statement on page 12 in the joint ~
U.S.-Japan report that "~it might be relatively easy for the diverter to separate the plutonium from the products" unless some,fissior. products are left in. ~Indeed, recent drafts of HRC's GESMO safeguards supple, ment takes the position that a sub-natior.a1 group could transform coprocessed (MOX) fuel to f
weapons in only.a matter of days.
In view of this, the rationale for pushing the Japanese to accept coprocessing needs further explanation.
The. dressing up of Option 1 with-safeguards studies suggests the problem is some measurement deficiency.
The reason we do not want reprocessing to go forward is not becaunc safe-guards instrur..ents are inadequate or inadequately tested, but because no amount of instrumentation will provide the timely warning that we demand of effective safeguards.
The rear.on reprocessing in Japan is significant is because it sets a precedent for decisions elsewhere.
If we go forwcrd despite this, the problem is to contain the precedent.
Above all, we should avoid giving the impression that the-proliferation problems posed by reprocessing can be adequately remedied by ar.
of the options proposed.
i Need for belay My own view is that theMong-range interests of both countrics dictate that reprocessing'at Tukai be held up further, at least for a limited time so as not to create a precedent at this ju,ncture which other nation,s could rely upon to just2fy thcar own reprocessing efforts.
Attempting to distinguish l
Tokai's operating because it will be'on an " experimental" or -
" limited" basis or because it will provide plutonium only for an approved purpose (ads anced reactor research) will prove difficult:
the point is that we will have approved plutonium separation under a given set of safeguards condi-tions which we regard as unsatisfactory but others will want to duplicate.
Even two years from now, as the President's message sinks in, agreements are tightened, and fuel supplies become more assured, the situation may'be changed so that the precedential impact of a decision taken at that timelto permit reprocessing at Tokai may be considerably reduced.
Hence the need to play for time.
-a-The memorandum also fails to discuss the link.between the Tokai decision and our efforts to restrain reprocessing in
[
the U.K.,
France, and the F.R.G.
The relative attractiveness of the various Tokai options depends importantly on how we plan to deal with Western Europe.
Tokai is the initial test of our anti-reprocessing policy, which takes place in a conthxt where'-- unlike the European setting -- the U.S -
~
possesses the requisite legal authority to obtain a more favorable outcome.
Put directly, we cannot hope to achieve more with Europe than we do in Japan".
It should be noted that"any. discrimination against Japan which might result initially may be reversible if'our negotiations with the U.K.,
France, and Germany succeed.
Better toEwork towards this result than, in the name of avoiding discrimination, cede to the Japanese what the Europeans already have obtained.
As an additional matter, the paper on page 4 dismisses too lightly the pressures that will be created to get Barnwell moving after Tokai operates.
Both plants are at the same stage of development, though Barnwell is several times larger.
Both need to build plutonium oxide ~Tacilities.
Both require government support and the argument will be made here that the whole point of holding up U.S.
develop-ment was to make it possible to convince others to hold off.
If they are not holding off, it will be argued it makes no sense for us to hold off.
We may then find our whole inter-national plutonium policy unraveling.
p pm-g
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.,4 NUCLEAR REGULAlORY COMMISSION 3-9
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u August 3, 1977 t
Dr. Zbianiew P.rzezinski d
Assistant to the President for M[~
National Security Af fairs The White House
~
Dear Dr. Brzezinski:
j The Conimission has reviewed the Tokai reprocessing plant options paper as forwarded by the Secretary of State and wishes to provide the following comnents.
Within the parameters set by the paper -- namely, avoiding protracted delay in operating Tokai or unreasonably large costs for modification --
no basic technical options are readily apparent beyond those seIfort'li '
in the paper.
These parameters, of course, define what is e,ssentially a political decision.
The paper notes correctly that none of the alternatives' considered would offer a foolproof technical solution to the problem of potential diversion or be one that would be recommended as a. precedent or model for other cases.
In tnis regard, the Commission wishes to note that, from a technical standpoint, coprocessing or blending would appear to of fer some add'tional proliferation resistance to national diversion over the conventional mode.
However,~whatever nonproliferation advantages would obtain f rom coprocessing or blending in terms of national diversion would depend on whether there was a facility capable of separating the plutonium.
(In fact, given such a facility, the plutonium ray be separated out, possibly in a matter of days,
)
without much difficulty.)
If a safeguarded coprocessing facility were built which was not capable f
of producing pure plutunium, then some nonproliferation advantage.
could be realized sinco major modifications to the plant or the construction of a covert facility would be required in order to separate the pluton mn from the coprocessed product.
Major modifica-tions to a facility subject to cantinuous safeguards would require
- time ar.d be easily detec table at the outset.
A separate facility could be constructed clandestinely, but such action would entail a further burden of secrecy a'nd4rlik of detection, particularly for a f acility capable of separating significant amuunts in a short time period.
THS DOCUM NT HAS BEEN DECLASSIRED UNDE Tb!-ROVCICT'. 9EOig(8,dhAm DATED 4/17/95 l
'O M c Q of-khl U /
l (Dec!assicati n/p*arortW/ Number) l MeoiDeclassik tion 6 /5//91
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Dr. Brzezinski.
l l
Coprocessing and. blending would have some advantages in terms of potential subnational diversion.
Ilowever, these would still be limited if the material were decontaminated since, as pot d bove,0 j
the plutonium could be separated in a matter of days.'u /-
dajou e
~
Also, as noted in the paper, Tokai is intended, in large meastre, to produce fue'l for advanced breeder reactor development. -4t. should be recognized that coprocessed or blended material which could be utilized for such development would constitute weapon-usable material withqut being separated.
This would not, however, be an optimum material for such use and, therefore, would appear of greater. concern with respect to subnational rather than national diversion.
Thus, while the Commission believes that coprocessing and blending are worth investigation and evaluation on an experimental basis, their inherent limitations in terms of offering any more proliferation resistance over conventional modes should be clearly recognized at the outset.
Commissioner Gilinsky is also providing a separate stat'ement of his additional views, as attached.
Sincerely,
'I'-
. /. xC,,
s
,i f
L. _Y.-Gossick s \\ -(xecutive Director for Operations v
a k
9 $
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UNITE 3 STATES v y.
y
'9 NUCLEAR REGULAlORY COMMISSION gy y
C'ASHINGTON, D. C. 20S56 j :I ;
l
' Q%l '
$[
.,,,.f s.
August 3,1977 t
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski Assistant to the President for Oq'L National Security Affairs The White House
~~
Dear Dr. Brzezinski:
~
m The Commission has reviewed the Tokai reprocessing plant options paper as forwarded by the Secretary of State and wishes to provide the following coier,ents.
Within the parameters set by the paper -- namely, avoiding protracted delay in operating Tokai or unreasonably large costs for modific_a. tion --
no basic technical options are readily apparent beyond.those set fortTi in the paper.
These paraineters, of course, define what is e,ssentially a political decision.
The paper notes correctly that none of the alternatives' considered would offer a foolproof technical solution to the problem of potential diversion or be one that would be recommended as a. precedent or model for other cases, in tnis regard, the Commission wishes to note that, from a technical standpoint, coprocessing or blending would appear to of fer some add'tional proliferation resistance to national diversion over the conventional mode.
However,'whatever nonproliferation advantages would obtain f rom coprocessing or blending in terms of national diversion would depend on whether there was a facility capable of separating the plutonium.
(In fact, given such a facility, the plutonium nay be separated out, possibly in a matter of days, without much dif ficulty. )
If a safeguarded coprocessing facility were built which was not cepable of productag pure plutonium, then some nonproliferation advantage,
could be realized sinc" major modifications to the plant or the construction of a covert facility would be required in order to separate the plutonio.n f rom the coprocessed product.
Major modifica-tions to a facility subject to cantinuous safeguards would require time ar.d be easily detectable at the outset.
A separate facility could be constructed clandestinely, but such action would entail a further burden of secrecy a'hd 'rlsk of detection, particularly for a facility capable of separating sign'h icant amounts in a short time period.
fHASBEENDECLASSIRED
.p D'ecQ og DjiED4/17/gs
- N S
UEP'E
.n q,,.
c l
%ww-sy l
a
Dr. Brzezinski.
Coprocessing and blending would have some advantages in terms of potential subnational diversion, flowever, these would still be limited if the material were decontaminated since, as;dpot d bove, j
theplutoniumcouldbeseparatedinamatterofdays.,7 0.A e/,
Also, as noted in the paper, Tokai is intended, in large meast.re, to produce fue'l for advanced breeder reactor development. -dt_ should be recognized that coprocessed or blended material which could be utilized for such development would constitute weapon-usable material withqut being separated.
This would not, however, be an optimum material for such use and, therefore, would appear of greater.conceln with respect to subnational rather than national diversion.
Thus, while the Commission believes that coprocessing and blending are worth investigation and evaluation on an experimental basis, their inherent limitations in terms of offering any more proliferation resistance over conventional modes should be clearly recognized at-the outset.
Commissioner Gilinsky is also providing a separate statsment of his additional views, as attached.
Sincertly,
A '- -< 4. 4,0
,1 t
L. _V.'Gossick b xecutive Director for Operations s
a s
N
.p
%g
~
I "Ib
"'8 5
e
~N r'.
's i=%A ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY
\\
This snemorandum seems to have accepted at the outset that at
?b.,k least a limited amount of reprocessing in the Tokai facility will be permitted.
The memorandum does not question the N
Japanese negotiating team's view that early reprocessing is extremely important to Japan and it assumes alternative
' sources of plutonium will not be available, despite the i
possibility that the U.S.
might provide plutoniumuror Jal an's research and development program.
I The gptions/ Coprocessing 7~
The memorandum seems to view coprocessing as an important objective -- the options are listed in terms of increasing commitment to coprocessing.
But this seems inconsistent with statements elsewhere (page 8) that " coprocessing per _se is not widely regarded as a significant additive proliferation-resistant step," and the statement on page 12 in the joint ~
U.S.-Japan report that "it might be relatively easy for the diverter to separate the plutonium from the products" unless some fissior. products are lef t in.
Indeed, recent drafts of NRC's GESMO safeguards supple, ment takes the position that a sub-national group could transform coprocessed (MOX) fuel to 73 weapons in only a matter of days.
In view of this, the rationale for pushing the Japanese to accept coprocessing needs further explanation.
The dressing up of Option 1 with safeguards studies suggests the problem is sorae measurement deficiency.
The reason we do not want reprocessing to go forward is not becaunc safe-guards instrur..ents are inadequate or inadequately tested, but because no amount of instrumentation will provide the timely warning that we demand of effective safeguards.
The rear.on reprocessing in Japan is significant is because it sets a precedent for decisions elsewhere.
If we go forwcrd despite this, the problem is to contain the precedent.
Above all, we should avoid giving the impression that the-proliferation prob 1 cms posed by reprocessing can.be adequately remedied by.g.i of the options proposed.
2 Need for belay My own view in that theMong-range interests of both countries dictate that reprocessing'at Takai be held up further, at least for a limited time so as not to create a precedent at this ju,ncture which other nations could rely upon to justify their own reprocessing efforts.
Attempting to distinguish Tokai's opera:ing because it will be'on an " experimental" or -
m 9
- limited" basis or because it will provide plutonium only for an approved purpose (advanced reactor research) will prove difficult:
the point is that we will have approved plutonium separation under a given set of safeguards condi-tions which we regard as unsatisfactory but others will want to duplicate.
Even two years froh. now, as the President's message sinks in, agreements are tightened, and fuel supplies become more assured, the situation may'be changed so that the 7,
precedential impact of a decision taken at that time _to permit reprocessing at Tokai may be considerably reduced.
Hence the need to play for time.
-a-The memorandum also fails to discuss the link.betwe'en the Tokai decision and our efforts to restrain reprocessing in 7
the U.K.,
France, and the F.R.G.
The relative attractiveness of the various Tokai options depends importantly on how we plan to deal with Western Europe.
Tokai is the initial test of our anti-reprocessing policy, whien takes place in a context where -- unlike the European setting -- the U.S ~
~
possesses the requisite legal authority to obtain a more favorable outcome.
Put directly, we cannot hope to achieve more with Europe than we do in. Japan'.
It should be noted that"hny discrimination against Japan which might result initially may be reversible if'our negotiations with the U.K.,
France, and Germany succeed.
Better to' work towards this result than, in the name of avoiding discrimi ation, cede to the Japanese what the Europeans already have obtained As an additional matter, the paper on page 4 dismisses too l
lightly the pressures that will be created to get Barnwell moving after Tokai operates.
Both plants are at the same stage of development, though Barnwell is several times
]
larger.
Both need to build plutenium oxide Tacilities.
Both require government support and the argument will be made here that the whole point of holding up U.S.
develop-ment was to make it possible to convince others to hold off.
If they are not holding off, it will be argued it makes no sense for us to hold off.
We may then find our whole inter-national plutonium policy unraveling.
'9, 9
8 4
i b
E' M A ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY i
This memorandum seems to have accepted at the outset that at EE,R least a limited amount of reprocessing in the Tokai facility will be permitted.
The memorandum does not question the Japanese negotiating team's view that early reprocessing is N
l cxtremely important to Japan and it assumes alternative
' sources of plutonium will not be availabic, despite the possibility that the U.S.
might provide plutoniumsfor Jalan's research and development program.
I The options / Coprocessing 7"
The memorandum seems to view coprocessing as an important objective -- the options are listed in termssof increasing commi tar.c n t to coprocessing.
But this seems inconsistent with statements clsewhere (page 8) that " coprocessing per se is not widely regarded as a significant additive proliferaETon-resiblant step," and the statement on page 12 in the joint ~
U.S.-Japan report that
"~it might be relatively easy for the
~
diverter to separate the plutonium from the products" unless somg fissior. product s are left in.
Indeed, recent drafts of NRC's GESMO safeguards supple, ment takes the position that a sub-national group could transform coprocess,ed (MOX) fuel to 73 weapons in only a matter of days.
In view of this, the rationale for pushing the Japanese to accept coprocessing needs further explanation.
The dressing up of Option 1 with safeguards studies suggests the problem is some measurement deficiency.
The reason we do not want reprocessing to go forward is not becausc safe-guards instrur..ents are inadequate or inadequately tested, but because no amount of instrumentation will provide the timely warning that we demand of effective safcauerds.
The reason reprocessing in Japan is significant is because it sets a precedent for decisions elsewhere.
If we go forwcrd despite this, the prob]cm is to contain the precedent.
Above all, we should avoid giving the impression that the-proliferation prob 1 cms posed by reprocessing can.be adequately romcGicd by a[.*z of the options proposed.
Need for bul.Q My own view in that the'Qong5 range interests of both countries dictate that repro essing'at TnAai be held up further, at least for a limited time so as not to create a precedent at this,iuncture which other nations could rely upon to justi~fy their own reprocessing efforts.
Attempting to distinguish Tokai's operating because it will be'on an " experimental" or ~
g
- limited" basis or because it will provide plutonium only for an approved purpose (advanced reactor research) will prove difficult:
the point is that we will have approved plutonium separation under a given set of safeguards condi-tions which we~ regard as unsatisfactory but others will want to duplicate.
Even two years from now, as the President's message sinks in', agreements are tightened, and fuel supplies become more ascured, the situation may'be changed so that the 7 precedential impact of a decision taken at that time _to permit reprocessing at Tokai may be considerably reduced.
Hence the need to play for time.
Y
.A The mehorandum also fails to discuss the link.betwe'en the Tokai decision and our efforts to restrain reprocessing in 7
the U.K.,
France, and the F.R.G.
The relative attractiveness of the various Tokai options depends importantly on how we plan to deal with Western Europe.
Tokai is the initial test of our anti-reprocessing poliev. which takes place in a context where -.unlike the European setting -- the U.Sr-
~
possesses the requisite legal authority to obtain a more favorable outcome.
Put directlyi we cannot hope to achieve
~
more with Europe than we do in Japan.
It should be noted that"any, discrimination against Japan which might result initially may be revercible if'our negotiations with the U.K.,
France, and Germany succeed.
Better to' work towards this result than, in the name of avoiding discrimination, ende to the Japanese what the Europeans already have obtai,ed.
As an additionL1 matter, the paper on page 4 dismisses too lightly the pressures that will be created to get Barnwell moving after Tokai operates.
Both plants are at the same stage of development, though Barnwell is several times larger.
Both need to build plutonium oxid6 facilities.
Both require government support and the argument will be made here that the whole point of holding up U.S. develop-ment was to make it possible to convince others to hold off.
If they are not holding off, it will be argued it makes no sense for us to hold off.
We may then find our whole inter-national plutonium policy unraveling.
s J :,
s s
e e
e m
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _