ML20248H269
| ML20248H269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1989 |
| From: | Brock M MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#289-8427 OL, NUDOCS 8904140137 | |
| Download: ML20248H269 (46) | |
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l 4.t CCLKEIED V5Nkr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 89 APR 11 PS :40 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 6iti.
-t.
DOCM iltv:
!; t-Before the Administrative Judges:
Ivan W; Smith, Chairman Dr.' Richard F.
Colo Kenneth A. McCollom L
)
In the Matter of
).
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
)
50-444-OL PIJBLIC SERVICE COMPANY.
)
(Off-Site EP)
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, EI AL.
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
April 10, 1989
)
I L
TRIAL BRIEF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS JAMES M.
SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL i
John Traficonte.
I l
Allan. Fierce Pamela Talbot Matthew Brock Leslie Greer e904140137B{$ook43l PDR ADOCK O PDR ;
4 i
l TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.
SCOPE 1
MAG Ex-2E, 218 2
II. PARS AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS JI 13c, 18 F ', 20, 23, MAG Ex-11, 19, SAPL Ex-14 6
III.
SPMC - MODES OF IMPLEMENTATION JI 27, 61, 62 10 IV. SCOPE OF EXERCISE INVOL"ING SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN THE 11 NEW HAMPSHIRE EPZ TOH/NECNP Ex 1(a) and (b) 1 V.
PERFORMANCE OF PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION PROCESS FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE SCHOOLS 14 TOH/NECNP EX 2 14 VI. INADEQUATE SAMPLE OF STATE POLICS AND TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES PARTICIPATED IN THE EXERCISE 17 TOH/NECNP Ex. 1(d) (f) and (g) 17 VII.
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK JI 31, MAG Ex-8b 19 VIII.
PUBLIC INFORMATION JI 13B, 27G, 35, 36, MAG Ex-9 23 IX. TRAINING JI 13, MAG Ex-11 27 X.
MONITORING RATE JI 56 30 XI. INADEQUACY OF STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES JI 63 33 l
XII.
INADEQUACIES IN SPMC PLANNING FOR A NHY ORO l
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARS FOR SCHOOLS JI 45, MAG Ex-10 34 XIII.
INAk!LITY OF HOSPITAL PERSONNEL TO TREAT CONTAMINATED, INJURED OR EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL MAG Ex-14C 37 1
XIV.
AVAILABILITY OF MANNED VEHICLES l
JI 55 39
e-A I.
SCOEE MAG-Ex. 2E. MAG-Ex. 21B A.
Identify Contentions and State Issues MAG-Ex Contentions 2E and 21B concern the scope of the exercise.
Allegations in 2E include the fact that ORO failed to demonstrate that it could muster appropriate vehicles and personnel to special facilities and hospitals in the EpZ.
In addition, the exercise did not test the preparedness of the bus and special transportation vehicles.
MAG-Ex 218 specifically i
deals with the limited mobilization of ambulances and the l
limited testing of ambulance personnel with respect to the transport of contaminated injured.
l
)
In sum, the issue posed by the above described contentions is whether the June 28-29, 1988 exercise (" Exercise") of NHY-ORO's offsite emergency response plan for Massachusetts communities (the "SpMC")'was too limited in scope to comply with NRC regulatory requirements, particularly 10 C.F.R.
50, App.
E, SIV.F.1. which defines a " full participation exercise" as one which " includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of state, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario".
B.
EEMA_Eind.inga l
Object ive 18 of the December, 1988, FEMA Exercise Report
(" FEMA Report") states, in the narrative summary that, inter l
l l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
]
.V r
a Alia, ORO demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted population, including those in hospitels and special facilities (see p.
122-123, FEMA Report).
Objective 23 of-the FEMA Report, in the narrative summary section, states, inter'alia, that ORO has " demonstrated that arrangements have been made to provide. adequate vehicles, equipment, and procedures for transporting injured-individuals who may be contaminated or exposed".
Id.at 229.
The extent of play, upon which the FEMA finding as to MAG-Ex 2E and 21B was based, restricted participation of special vehicles to the following:
three (3) wheelchair vans dispatched to simulated special facilities, and one (1) ambulance dispatched to a simulated hospital.
(This same ambulance in a separate part of the exercise, transported a simulated contaminated individual.)
C.
Eurpose of Testimony The Mass AG will show, through cross examination, that the scope of the June 1988 exercise was not comprehensive enough to l
permit a meaningful evaluation.
Specifically, ambulance support for the evacuation of special facilities and for the transportation of contaminated injured was not mobilized in numbers sufficient to permit verification of an integrated capability to respond to an accident atLSeabrook.
Mass AG alao relics on the law set forth in Lona Island Lightina comnany_ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
v ISholeham_ Unit 1), 28 NRC 275 (ALAB-900) (1988).
That case,
. discussed below, makes clear that major observable portions of i
an exercise, such:as the evacuation of special facilities, are-
.not deemed adequately tested where FEMA evaluates performance of too small a number of special vehicles and where special facilities play a virtually non-existent roles.
D.
DiscLuign_pLlana Island-Lichtina comoapy (Shoreham.
I N11 clear Power Station Unit 1). 28 NRC 275 (1988)
(hereinafter "LILCO")-
I
.In the LILCO case cited above, the Appeal Board affirmed the Licensing Board's conclusion that the scope of the February 13, 1986 exercise of the offsite emergency plan.for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station was insufficient to comply with'NRC regulatory planning requirements.
Id at 281.
In general, the exercise did not. satisfy 10 C.F.R.
50, App. E IV F, a pertinent i
portion of which has been set forth in section A (EupIA) of1this segment of the trial brief.
In particular, the failure to evaluate the performance of a sufficient number of ambulances /
I ambulettes, and the failure to include'in the exercise a sufficient number of special facilities were considered serious.
i omissions.
As such, absent observations of these major portions of the plan, there could be no meaningful test.and evaluation to
\\
determine whether there existed a fundamental flaw or flaws in I
the emergency plan.
With respect to these matters, there are similarities between-the facts in the Shoreham exercise and the facts at hand.
In the I
l j
i
_4 I
1 l
L-l
s Shoreham exercise, FEMA evaluated the performance of two ambulance type vehicles - in the Seabrook exercise, FEMA evaluated the performance of one ambulance and three wheelchair vans.
In the Shoreham exercise, LERO made actual contact with only "two or three special facilities".
Id1 at 300.
During the Seablook exercise, ORO made contact with no special care facilities.
Where the former was deemed insufficient, so should the latter.
The extent of play in the Seabrook exercise was designed to include participation from only one special facility.
The Board made clear in the Shoreham case that "[a]ctual contact with only two or three [special] facilities is insufficient to satisfy [section IV F.1]".
Id1 at 300.
While ORO may claim that virtually all of the exercise pertaining to the evacuation of special facilities had to be simulated because facilities "would not participate", the burden to show why greater participation was not reasonably achievable lies with the Applicants.
10 C.F.R.
$2.732.
(Applicant has burden of prrof unless ordered otnerwise.)
Simply relying on the statement in the extent of play that facilities would not participate does not meet that burden.
See, LILCO, 28 NRC at 297.
(" Satisfaction of the burden of proof regarding a factual matter in not just a formality.
It goes to the heart of the legal process and requires evidence - not speculation, regardless of how well founded such specu.lation might appear to be.")
In short, ORO's - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -
s abbreviated demonstration of support for special facilities evacuation and it's efforts to " simulate" evacuation of special facilities in effect have failed to permit a meaningful test and l
l evaluation of major observable portions of the plan.
II. PARS _and_the_Decisinn-MakiDa Process JI 13(n). 18F. 20, 23.
F MAG Ex 11. MAG Ex 19. SAPL Ex-14 A.
Contentions and Issues Presented:
Contention JI 13(c) puts at issue the adequacy of the SPMC training provided to those ORO personnel responsible for formulating protective action recommendations.
Contention JI 18F asserts that the decision criteria set forth in the SPMC are not adequate and will not result in the appropriate choice of protective action.
JI 20 also puts at issue the adequacy of procedures for using the SPMC's ETEs in protective action decision-making.
JI 23 asserts that the decision criteria set forth in the SPMC are not sufficiently coordinated with those described in the NHRERP.
MAG Ex-11 and MAG Ex-19 challenge the actual performance of both the utility's onsite protective action decision-making staff and the ORO's PAR staff.
Similarly, SAPL Ex 14 challenges the performance of the NilRERP's protection action decision-making staff.
These exercise contentions generally assert that the exercise revealed that the protective action criteria in the onsite plan, the SPMC, and the NHRERP are deficient and will not (and did not) result in the choice of the most rational protective action in light of the uncertainties at the time a protective - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
a.
s.
action decision was made.
The training for pA decision-makers is also called into question by these contentions, especially MAG Ex-11.
4 B.
The FEMA Finding FEMA evaluated the protective action decision criteria set forth in the SPMC.
Its review and evaluation of these criteria j
l at the plan review stage was essentially limited to a I
determination that the criteria did not clearly contradict established guidelines.
Thus, as a matter of plan review, FEMA made a determination that the decision criteria were not unreasonable.
It left to the exercise a more substantive evaluation of whether the PARS could be formulated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the SpMC (so-called
" implementation issues") and whether the PARS that would be formulated would be appropriate ones in light of the circumstances as viewed by the decision-maker at the time of decision (so-called " decision issues").
However, FEMA made no effort as part of its evaluation and review of the performance during the exercise to determine whether the protective actions actually recommended and implemented were the appropriate ones given the information available to the decision-makers at the time.
Although FEMA generally considers the exercise an opportunity to test whether an emergency plan is an adequate planning vehic'>
ad does in fact provide maximum dose savings in light of the circumstances, in this case FEMA reviewed the - __-______-__
l 1
exercise performance'as.to protective actions recommended a
simply against the_four-corners of.the plan.
.Thus, at the plan' review stage, FEMA expressley deferred until~the exercise its j;udgment as to whether-the protective action criteria would
. maximize dose savings, but'then in; judging the exercise performance FEMA' simply reviewed the protective action.
decisions 1against the criteria: set forth 1n the plans (the SPMC
)
7 and the NHRERP)'.
As'a result,. FEMA.has simply failed'to reach.
1 a finding thatlthe protective actions set-forth in the SPMC or the NHRERP will maximize dose savings.
As to the' protective action decision-making done'during the exercise by the Seabrook Station (onsite) ERO, FEMA has made no finding; so no presumption exists.
C.
Identity of Witnesses The Mass AG will offer the testimony of Dr.' Robert Goble in support of these contentions.
The testimony of Dr. Howard Harris is also relevant to JI-13(C) and MAG Ex-11, which pertain to training the SPMC's protective action-decision-makers.
The Mass AG will also cross-examine FEMA witness (es) to establish that the FEMA review did'not address the issues presented by these contentions.
'In addition,.the Mass AG will offer-the Deposition of Joseph Keller as to.these issues and will also offer certain' answers to interrogatories.
filed by the Applicants concerning these matters.
As to MAG Ex-19, the exercise contention which challenges the adequacy of - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _- -_-- _
J the SS-ERO's protective action decision-making during the exercise, the Mass AG will rely on Dr. Goble's testimony and cross examine Donald Perrotti, an NRC observer during'the-exercise.
The NRC staff has indicated'that it will present Mr.
Perrotti as one of its witnesses on this contention.
D.
Puroose and Summary of Testimony 1.-
Dr. Robert Goble The testimony of Dr. Goble reviews the' protective action decision-making done by the SS-ERO, the ORO, and the State of New Hampshire over the first day of.the' exercise.
It evaluates the likely effect of the decisions made as one input to an evaluation of the adequacy of the' decision reached.
The testimony concludes, based on the information available to the decision makers at the time, that in a number cf respects the decisions were fa!1ty and inadequate in the choices of protective action, in the timing of the decision, and in the implementation of the decision.
Particularly significant were failures to anticipate wind shifts and inadequate comparison of the relative effectiveness of shelter and evacuation in the exercise scenario.
The problems revealed are not unique to the particular accident scenario used in the exercise, but could be anticipated in a wide range of-accident conditions.
The-l sources of these faults and inadequacies include inadequacies in the analysis supporting the development of all three plans i
(onsite, SPMC, NHRERP), faults in the decision structures in I {
?c-
'd..'
t 1
the various plans, problems with METPAC (which serves.as the-primary dose assessment tool), and an inadequate and incomplete training curriculum for protective action decision-makers.
1 2.
Dr. Howard Harris
.q i
Dr. Harris' testimony addresses, inter alia, the training i
for the SPMC's-protective' action decision-makers.
He finds 1
that the overall design of this training is fragmented'and inadequate.
-III. SEMCJ. MODES OF IMPLEMENTATION: JI 27. JI 61. JI 62 A.
Contentions and Issues J
There are a series of contentions all of which relate to
)
the issue of the modes in which the SPMC would be implemented at the time of an emergency.
JI 27/ Basis A asserts that the nine governmental liaison positions are poorly defined and could not function as an effective interface at the time of an emergency.
JI 61 challenges the adequacy of Mode 1 in which the ORO provides resources to supplement the state's response and the state either follows its.own " plan" or attempts to follow the procedures set.forth in the SPMC.
JI 62 challenges the adequacy of Mode 2-partial in which'it is hypothesized that some-form of ad hoc integration of the ORO Responders with the state response could take place.
B.
The FEMA Review and Findinas FEMA essentially reviewed the SPMC as a stand-alone plan and assumed that the requisite legal authority would be (and _ _ _ _ _
_y
.g-
- could'be) delegated to the ORO b _the state government.
FEMA j
l made no effort to review the resources and capabilities of the 1
Commonwealth either to implement an effective' response in Mode 1 or-in any form of Mode 2-partial.
As a resulti, FEMA's finding concerning the implementation capability of the SPMC is limited to Mode 2-full.
1 C.-
Witnesses and Testimony The Mass AG will establish with the cross-examination of the FEMA' witness thats FEMA formed no judgment of the adequacy of the SPMC if implemented'in either Mode 1 or Mode 2-partial.
The Mass AG also will offer the testimony of Charles' Jones, former Director.of the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster l
Agency.
D.
Purpose and Summarv_ of Testimony The purpose of the testimony will be to challenge the i
implementability of the SPMC in either Mode 1 or Mode 2-partial.
IV. SCOPE _0E.EXERG EE_ INVOLVING S.CHOOL PERSONNEL IN THE NEH.
IlMiPERI.EE EPZ.
TOH/NECEP EX. 1(a) AND (b).
A)
Sta_tsment of Issues TOH/NECNp EX. 1(a) and (b) (hereafter Contention) alleges that the Exercise failed "to observe or test necessary personnel or procedures to protect students"; that the scope.of l
the June 28-29, 1988 pre-license Exercise of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results regarding the capability to imp!.ement the plan,. procedures, or
, L w___._._-___________--___-__-_-_-______-____.
s protective actions involving New Hampshire students and school personnel; that the Exercise did not address the availability, training, capability, or adequacy of performance of school personnel; that the Exercise did not evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities and responsibilities involving flew Hampshire schools (as described in the Emergency Response Plan for eacif school); and that the Exercise did not, in the opinion of Mass AG's expert, constitute a " full participation" Exercise, as addressed in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E IV.F.1.
B)
The_ FEMA Finding The evidence presented in support of this Contention rebuts the FEMA finding that the Exercise met Objective 19, which required a demonstration of the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.
The evidence shows that FEMA did not require, contrary to its own Guidance Memorandum and NRC regulations, sufficient participation by school personnel to demonstrate the capabilities required by Objective 19.
As a consequence of these failures, there is not reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency.
As a consequence of these failures, the FEMA finding that the Exercise met Objective 19, and demonstrated the plan to be adequate, is unsupported, and the ptifUa facie case is rebutted. _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
s
)
C)
Identification af Witnesses The Mass AG will offer the testimony of expert witness Geary W.
Sikich'and investigator John Paolillo.
The Mass AG wi'11 also rely upon cross-examination of FEMA to support this Contention.
D)
Purpose and Summary of the Testimony LThe evidence offered by Mass AG willLshow:
1.
with the exception of'2 or 3 schools, none of the 1
113 public, private, day care, or nursery j
schools, their principals or teachers, participated in the Exercise.
2.
the participation of those few school personnel who were involved in the Exercise was I
perfunctory, and did not test or attempt to test j
-1 the understanding or capability of school-personnel to' carry out the emergency plans for schools.
Even this limited " participation" l '
consisted almost exclusively of a phone' call from-
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a State official who neither requested nor
)
l generated a response beyond an acknowledgement 1
that call was received.
3.
the level of participation in the Exercise did-not meet FEMA guidance or t4RC regulatory requirements for a " full participation" Exercise. l t
l
1 l
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.e-4.
until there is.a demonstration of the capabilities of school personnel to adequately respond to an emergency, there is not reasonable assurance that the NHRERP can and will be l
adequately, implemented in a radiological emergency.
{
Certain Attachments to this testimony include discovery-responses prepared by Applicants and the' State of New Hampshire, Attachments 6 and 7, depositions of School' Superintendents,' Attachment 8, and interviews conducted by MAG j
witness Paolillo.
These Attachments are filed as part of Mass AG's direct case, and will be relied upon as substantive evidence to support Interveners' case, including proposed findings.
V.
PERFORMANCE OF PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION PROCESS FOR I
NEW HAMESHIRE SCHOOLS TOH/NECNP EX.2 A)
Statement of Issugg Contention TOH/NECNP EX. 2 alleges that the State of New Hampshire, and responsible local officials, did not demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement protective actions j
i for school children during the June 28 and 29, 1988 Exercise for the Seabrook nuclear power plant; that the failure to adequately demonstrate the protective action recommendation (PAR) process for school children represented a recurring and i
pervasive pattern throughout the Exercise and involved the i
failure of an essential element in the New Hampshire j
L
Radiological Emergency Response Plan-(NHRERP); and that the failure of the PAR process concerns primary procedures-and-emergency organizations, both State and local, that collectively-form a major: portion of the response organization responsibic for protecting students in a radiological emergency.
~
B)
Tlie FEMA FindiD2 In evaluating whether'the Exercise provided reasonable l
assurance that adequate protective measures for students.can l
and.will be taken in a radiological emergency, 'there is no evidence that FEMA considered or evaluated many of the j
fundamental problems in the PAR process which were addressed in the Contention..For example, based upon Intervenor i
observations and exercise logs, the State of New Hampshire simply forgot about hundreds of students sheltering in schools in 5 of 17 New Hampshire towns.
There is no evidence that FEMA L
addressed the confusion or inconsistencies involving-PARS for students which were personally observed by Interveners' or that appear in exercise generated materials.
As a consequence'of these failures, the FEMA finding is unsupported and the p_tbaa facie case of plan adequacy rebutted.
C)
Identificatlan of Witnesses Interveners' will offer the testimony of expert'Geary-W.
Sikich and exercise observer, Sandra Fowler Mitchell to support-their position that the Exercise demonstrated fundamental f l avis in the PAR process involving New Hampshire students. t
-Interveners' will also rely upon' cross-examination of'the FEMA witness.
D)
EuIpnsa and Summary of Evidence Interveners' evidence will'show that:
l '.
based upon personal observation of Ms..Mitchell at the IF0, the process of generating, disseminating, and coordinating information flow and PARS, in instances where students were l
involved, was confused,. incomplete, and apparently contributed toLinaccurate PARS, or a failure to. follow up on PARS.
2.
exercise logs, evaluation forms, and similar.
exercise generated materials indicate basic inconsistencies and misunderstandings-between FEMA, State, and certain local' officials as to what PARS were provided.to students, or what PARS L
were implemented, during the Exercise.
These problems include the fact that students sheltering in schools were forgotten by State and local officials, and were left'without any PAR at all.
3.
as referenced by FEMA, the Exercise logs for both Portsmouth and Brentwood indicate that both communities disregarded the State's PAR to shelter students, and released' children from _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _
i schools.
The FEMA Report'does not address additional, basic miscommunications or-misunderstandings between State and local officials, such as whether 150 " latchkey.
children" nevertheless remained' sheltered'in Portsmouth schools, a point of confusion that-continued throughout'the Exercise.
4.
the evidence demonstrates a. pervasive pattern of the failure'of the PAR Process to protect students, and therefore represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.
Certain logs, evaluation forms, and other exercise generated materials produced by Applicants and the State of New Hampshire in discovery, and included as Attachments to this testimony, are filed as part'of Interveners' direct case, and will be relied upon as substantive evidence to' support Interveners' case, including Interveners' proposed findings.
VI. AN._INAREQUATE._ SAMPLE _QF_SIATE POLICE AND TRANSPORTATLQ11 RESQURCES PARTICIPATED IN THE EXERCISE.
TOH/NECNP E7.
LtdLLO_AND (al A)
S_tittrment of Issues TOH/NECNP EX. 1(d) and-(f) assert that there was not an adequate sample of state police or transportation providers participating in the Exercise to provide reasonable assurance j
that these resources will be available on a timely basis in an emergency. EX. 1(g) alleges that the process by which the
- e availability of transportation resources was determined was 3
perfunctory, and did not meaningfully test the procedures or
]
l personnel to respond to an actual emergency.
]
I B)-
The FEMA Einding l
There is no evidence that the issues raised by the 1
Contention were considered by FEMA, or that FEMA had any legitimate basis to conclude the referenced resources and procedures would be adequate, in view of the small samples and perfunctory testing involved.
As a consequence of these failurer, the FEMA finding of plan adequacy is unsupported and l
the pIlma fa.cle case rebutted.
l C)
WLtnessgu 1
1 i
Mass AG will present evidence of these issues by cross-examination.
l D)
Summary and Purpose of Testimony j
By cross-examination, Mass AG will show:
l 1.
most bus companies relied on in the NHRERP did not participate in the Exercise.
2.
to the extent provided in the Exercise, the drivers and vehicles were pre-contracted, and the 1
l availability of these resources for the Exercise were assured prior to the Exercise date.
3.
only 2 of 28 state police relied on to perform access control, and 2 of 45 relied on to provide 1
traffic control, participated in the Exercise.
l l
1
- o i
av VII.
CQf#il)F1 CATIONS NETWORK JI 31, MAG EX-8b A.
I d en t 11iralloa_QL_t h e Contentions __a n d S t alefoe n t of the Issues The contentions concerned with the availability of NHY ORO to effectively communicate internally to its field workers are i
contentions JI 31 and MAG Ex-8b.
The basic issue is whether the SpMC provides for an adequate horizontal network for communications in its procedures and its ability to implement effective communication through its radio system.
These contentions specifically address irtues concerned with the SPMC's lack of procedures for lateral communication between field workers and the technological. inability to communicate between field workers due to deficiencies in its radio network.
Contention JI 31 raises issues inherent where procedures result in delay, miscommunication, and gaps in the communication network between field workers.
While the issues raised under this contention are concerned primarily with SpMC procedure, those problems are directly related to the technological problems raised in MAG Ex-8b in that the Applicants have proposed to r leviate certain technological problems through the implementation of planning procedures.
The issues raised under MAG Ex-8b directly concern the l
technological ability of NHY ORO field workers to be able to communicate in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
o.
The central issues raised under contention JI.31 and MAG l
Ex-8b are:
1)
Does the SPMC offer reasonable assurance that adequate communication of information can and will take place between NHY ORO field workers in l
the event of a radiological emergency?
Will the lack of procedures in the SPMC for direct l
communication between field workers such as traffic guides result in inordinate delays in the communication of information that will preclude the provision of reasonable assurance that l
l adequate protective actions can and will be j
1mplemented?
2.
Does the limited range of radio communication l
preclude a finding that adequate communication can occur between ORO field workers in the event of a radiological emergency?
3.
Does the overloaded channel used by route guides l
I preclude a finding that adequate communication
~
can take place between ORO field workers in the i
event of a radiological emergency?
4.
Are the procedures that will be implemented to alleviate deficiencies in radio communications sufficient to alleviate those deficiencies?
Will those procedures generate their own negative repercussions? _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
s B.
The FEMA Finding FEMA found that the provisions of the SPMC for the procedures in planning for communication between NHY ORO field workers were adequate under the evaluation criteria that it subjected them to.
With respect to Objective 4 of the Graded Exercise > FEMA found an area requiring corrective action in connection with NHY ORO ability to engage in field communications.
Specifically, under its evaluation, FEMA found that " directives to field workers were not received in the field.
In part, this is due to the ranges of the radios and in part due to heavy radio traffic."
It will be established through direct testimony that FEMA's evaluation.of the SPMC's procedures for communicating between field workers was flawed because it failed to consider or account for a number factors that undermine and preclude the SPMC from meeting those evaluation criteria.
Direct testimony will also show limitations inherent in the two-way radio networks frustrate NHY ORO's ability to communicate with its field workers.
The testimony will demonstrate that the limitations are such that l
there is no reasonable assurance that procedural and training advances will correct the problems.
C.
Identity of the Witnesses The Interveners will offer the testimony of Geary W.
Sikich and Stan Cohn. ________ ________________ _ __ -
D.
The_PJirgome of the_T.estimony The purpose of the testimony being submitted is to rebut the FEMA findings of adequacy with respect to those provisions of the SPMC that pertain to communications planning and to establish that the FEMA graded exercise demonstrated the deficiencies in connection with communication planning and implementation.
E.
SummarLnf_the_T.estimony Geary W.
Sikich will testify as an expert witness in the area of emergency planning.
He will address the issues l
pertaining to the adequacy and effectiveness of SPMC procedures concerning the provision of an effective horizontal or lateral network of communications which would directly link field personnel with each other.
He will also testify to the delay, miscommunication, and gaps in the existing communication network and the negative impact these inadequacies have l
regarding the ability to provide for the health and safety of' l
the general public in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
He will address the limitations of the l
communications procedures that exist and the limitations of those that are to be implemented in connection with communications among field workers under the SPMC.
He will testify on the planning inadequacies that result from limitations inherent in the two-way radio systems used by (1HY ORO. :
j
~
f Stan Cohn will testify on the technical limitations of the emergency radio networks capability for transmitting information to field workers and the limitations of that system for transmitting information in an undelayed manner.
VIII.
PJJBLIC._INE0RMATION JI 12B, JI27G. JI 35, JI 36, MAG-Ex_1 A.
Identify _ Contentions and_ State Issn.cs The testimony of Dr. Michael Carter concerns contentions related to the alleged inadequacies of various aspects of the ORO formulation, coordination and dissemination of emergency warning messages.
Those contentions and the issues related to them are set forth below:
JI 13D (as rewritten in the Stipulation dated February 7,
1989)
Whether the SPMC is adequate where it does not j
I provide for or require the kind of training and i
experience necessary for someone assuming the role of the NHY ORO Public Notification Coordinator ("PNC"), where the PNC is responsible for the timely and coordinated activation of the Public Alert and Notification System, the development of appropriate EBS messages and the coordination of warning messages with the State of New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
to JL21G Whether the SPMC is adequate where it fails to indicate that effective planning has been done to coordinate emergency warning information with the State of New Hampshire.
JI 35 Whether the SPMC is adequate where the EBS messages therein do not contain appropriate or adequate information, where there is no' provision for coordinating them with information disseminated by responding governments, and where alteration or modification may be made by someone unqualified to do so.
J1 %
Whether the SPMC is adequate where it does not adequately provide for coordination with the news media.
MAG Ex-9 Whether the exercise revealed a fundamental flaw where certain emergency warning messages were inaccurate, confusing, inconsistent, untimely, uncoordinated and/or contained conflicting information.
B.
FEMA Findinas FEMA findings related to the formulation, coordination, and dissemination of emergency warning information are the following:
1 - - - --
l C.5 (FEMA Review of SPMC December, 1988, p.
18)
I Public Information Coordinator Advisor ("PIC",
" PIA") is responsible for assisting the Commonwealth and local governments with public information and rumor control.
E.3 (1di at 24)
ORO shall establish a system for disseminating
)
information to the public.
E.5 (Id at 27) l Prescripted messages providing for a combination I
of emergency conditions and choices are adequate.
E.8 (Id at 28)
SPMC has adequate provisions for coordinating emergency messages with participating and non-participating state and local officials.
G.4(a) (ldi at 40)
The PIA coordinates emergency public information
^
activities.
The PIA directs the activities of preparing and issuing news releases for the public and media.
G.4.(b) (Idi at 41)
PIC coordinates approved news releases with media center spokespersons for Seabrook, state media representatives and Federal organizations prior to their release.
Objectiv_e_Jll (FEMA Exercise Report, September,
- 1988, p.
215)
NHY ORO demonstrated abilfty to develop l
appropriate instructions and information during all three phases of the exercise.
Obiestire.JLl4 (Id at 218)
NHY ORO demonstrated the ability to brief the i
media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.
Objact ive #32 (ldt at 240)
NHY ORO demonstrated the capability to interface with non-participating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance.
I w
(
Dr. Carter's direct' testimony bears,in part on each of.the aforementioned matters and will rebut these FEMA findings.: In addition,. cross-examination of FEMA willLfurther rebut these findings where it is shown that FEMA had noLbasis upon which to make such findings.or where facts demonstrated during the exercise. belie findings ascribed to the SpMC plan and procedures.
C.
Iden tity_o LN1.tness.es.-
The Interveners offer the direct testimony:of' Dr.
T.
Michael' Carter in support of their position.regarding the SpMC's failure to adequately plan and provide for effective formulation,' coordination, and. dissemination'of public.
emergency warning information.
Similarly,.Dr. Carter's testimonyLis offered in_ support of the'Intervenor's position regarding the fundamental flaw revealed during the exercise with respect to the NHY ORO's inability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of timely and accurate public emergency warning information and instructions.
D..
Summary and EuIrose of Testimon_v This testimony sets out the basic premises regarding the nature and effect of public response to emergency warnings.
In addition, it discusses in detail the criteria against which the level of detailed information contained I
within a message needs be judged.
The testimony also examines the nature of procedures for the formulation, coordination and I
i
[
1 x
.t.
1 dissemination of emergency information, as set'forth'in the l
SPMC and an exercised in June of'1988.
Dr. Carter's testimony.
L also discusses the effectiveness, or lack.thereof, of NHY.ORO's-Public Notification Coordination in coordinating and drafting o
i emergency messages, j
1 The conclusions reached through this testimony include the l
following:' emergency messages contained in the SPMC and emergency messages. issued during the June exercise are not able to adequately and effectively ~ guide and channel the public's response during an emergency; procedures specified in the.SPMC and utilized-during the exercise cannot adequately ensure the
'f timely dissemination of consistent information from NHY ORO..to I
the public; provisions in the SPMC and performance during the l
I exercise show that there is a lack of coordination of emergency
^
public information between NHY ORO and responding governments; the media cannot be effectively handled given the procedures in the SPMC and the facts elicited through the exercise; the SPMC does not provide for or require that the NHY ORO Public Notification Coordinator have adequate training and experience.
IX. IRAINING JI-13. MAG Ex-11 l
A.
CantantinBS_and Issues _Presantedi Contention JI-13 asserts that prerequisite experience and training provided to the NHY-ORO Traffic Guides, the EBS message. drafters, protective action decision-makers, and bus drivers are inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that the
, i i
v L
l ORO can-and'will implement adequate protective measures in-the
~
l l
event of a radiological emergency.
Contention MAG Ex-ll asserts that the ORO failed'to make appropriate. protective. action decisions during the exercise.
Basis B(3) alleges that the SPMC inappropriately ~ restricts the ORO's flexibility to make appropriate PARS.for-the Massachusetts communities, but in all other respects has been
~
construed by the Board to challenge the adequacy of the SPMC's l-training program for protective action decision-making.
B.
EEMA's Position In its Review and Analysis of the SPMC, FEMA purports to review the SPMC's training program for various personnel, finding the training to be " adequate" in each instance.
In fact, however, as will be established by the cross examination of Richard Donovan, this FEMA review did not go beyond looking to see that a training program existed on paper.
FEMA deferred for the exercise an assessment of the adequacy of the training program.
At the exercise, however, FEMA made no direct effort to assess the adequacy of the training program.
It was'not one of the " objectives" for the exercise.
Nevertheless, FEMA ~found much to be desired with the training program.
Thirteen (13)
ARCAs were found for which trainina was the recommended corrective actionn.
The training for the four positions identified in JI-13 were neither assessed nor faulted by FEMA in its Exercise Report.
Thus, FEMA has never asessed the adequacy of the. training for these positions. l
)
C.
Plitnessas and_.lertimony The Mass AG will be offering the testimony of four of its witneses to address these training contentions:
1.
Dr. Howard Harris, an expert in the field of l
curricular and instructional design, development, and implementation, as well as the evaluation of training, will testify that the overall design'for the SPMC's protective action decision-makers, traffic guides, EBS message drafters is fragmented structurally and'is inadequate.
2.
Dr. Robert Goble will testify, inter.alia, about the inadequacy of-the SPMC's and the onsite plan's training for I
PA decision-makers.
His testimony is described more fully in the section of this brief which concerns protective action decision-making.
3.
Dr. Michael Carter will testify, inter alia, about the inadequacy of the SPMC's testimony for EBS message l
l drafters (the Public Notification Coordinator).
His testimony is also described more fully in another section of this brief I
i
-- the section which conerns public information.
4.
Dr. Thomas Adler will testify about the inadequacy of the SPMC's training for traffic guides.
The Mass AG intends to establish the inadequacy of the SPMC's training for bus drivers through the cross examinaton of the FEMA and Applicants' witnesses,
, 1
1; ',
l i
o.-
L j
D.
EuIpnse.__And_SummaIy of Testimony.-
I Collectively, the t'estimony will establish that the.SPMC's
{
training for protective ~ action decision-makers, EBC message.
]
. drafters,' Traffic Guides,iand' bus drivers:is so inadequate'that itcneeds'to be re-designed and re-delivered.
TheLadequacy of the, newly designed.and delivered training needs to be assessed-i i
through another exercise.
]
1 X.
MONITORING _RATEJ JI-55 cA.
Contention'and Issues-J I
As redrafted by stipulation and the Board's view of the contention,IJI-56' asserts that the SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance of adequate procedures, personnel, l
I equipment and facilities to achieve a monitoring rate that will
.l permit the monitoring of 20% of the total Massachusetts EPZ l
population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
j B.
EEMA's Position In its Review and Evaluation of the SPMC, FEMA assesses the uPMC against evaluation criterion J.12 of NUREG-0654 and deems l
l the plan to be " adequate."
Again, FEMA conducted only a paper assessment.
FEMA notes that "[t]he Plan states that the,NHY ORO monitoring productivity is 16,600 persons in 12 tours (both Recepti'on. Centers)."
FEMA. Review and Evaluation of the SPMC at j
73.
That appears to be all FEMA needed to know in order to find the monitoring plan adequate on its checklist:
the Plan says it can be done.
During the June exercise, FEMA did assess I L
- s
\\
i the ORO against the following " objective" (No. 21):
1 Demonstrate the adequacy of-procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, i
radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
Two 20-minute monitoring drills were conducted at each of the SPMC's reception centers during the exercise, but FEMA makes no finding in its Exercise Report about the monitoring rate achieved or the overall capability of the SPMC to enable 20% of the population to be monitored within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Sag Exercise Report at 227-228.
As to these drills, all FEMA notes is that 1
"all radiological sources were found."
Id at 227.
It l
appears, therefore, that FEMA has not ever evaluated the SPMC to determine whether in fact the appropriate monitoring rate can be achieved to monitor 20% of the total Mass. EPZ residents and transients within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
FEMA-has not even recognized that since the Board's PID on the New Hampshire plans, which finds more people on the Massachusetts beaches than the SPMC assumed were there, the SPMC's statement of a claimed capability to monitor 16,600 persons in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> no longer meets FEMA's "20% standard."
C.
Witness _and_ Ins timo ny 1
The Mass. AG will offer two witnesses on JI-56.
The first, j
l Carol Sneider, was a witness to the ORO's monitoring drills I
during the exercise, and she also had an opportunity at the exercise to inspect one of the SPMC's monitoring trailers.
She will testify that during the two 20-minute monitoring drills I
1 l l l
. c
., y which she observed, the monitors achieved a monitoring rate of-75 and 95 seconds respectively.
She then describes why these drills were not fairly conducted-and do not constitute a fair test of what the ORO monitoring _ capability would be in a real emergency, where monitoring rates would likely be longerLper person than those achie'ted.at the exercise.
She concludes'.with a reasonable. calculation of what a reasonable monitoring' rate' over 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s-would be -- 38.6fpeople per hour, or-6,480 people-per.traler (14 monitoring stations)'in.12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The second' Mass. AG witness is Dr. Colin High, a principal at Resource Systems Group, Inc. in Vermont, and Research Professor of Environmental Studies at Dartmouth College.
In i
his testimony, Dr. High, an expert in air photo' interpretation, q
survey techniques,.and statistical. methods, uses the "20%.
formula" set forth in the Board's NHRERp PID at S5.19 to estimate the number of people who, for planning purposes, can be expected to arrive for_ monitoring at the SPMC's two reception centers.
1 The Mass. AG also intends to cross examine Richard Donovan
]
and the Applicant witnesses to prove JI-56.
D.
EgI.ppse of TestimaBY The testimony will establish that the monitoring rate which the ORO is capable of achieving with the SPMC's existing procedures, equipment, and' facilities, does not even come close to permitting it to monitor 20% of the total resident and' transient population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.,
______.___________________m_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
._.__.___._.-___._____..____m_________.__.____m____m_____.___.__m
's XI. JUADEQUACLDE_HTATX_AND LOCAL RESOURCES JI 63:
A.
Sununigy_nf Evidence This contention asserts that the SpMC lacks procedures to coordinate state and local personnel to adequately respond to an emergency.
Even if the procedures were prepared, state and local governments lack adequate resources to appropriately and adequately implement those procedures in response to an emergency.
The evidence presented will include Town specific
\\
deficiencies in emergency response capabilities.
B.
EEWLRey_ inh There is no evidence that FEMA addressed the issues in JI 63, or considered these issues in its review of the SpMC.
As a consequence of these failures at plan review, the FEMA finding of adequacy is unsupported, and the prima facie case is rebutted.
C.
Hitnesssa Mass AG will present evidence on JI 63 through cross examination of the FEMA witness.
D.
PuEppse_of Testim 0DY The purpose of the testimony is to demonstrate that the SPMC lacks adequate procedures, and there are not state and local resources sufficient to adequately implement the SPMC in a radiological emergency.
l _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _.
W L
XII.
INADEQUACIES _IN SpMC PLAT!NIEG_EQR A NHY ORO IMPLEMEHIATl01LOF PARS FOR_SQiOQLS_. JI 45, MAG-EK_lf A. IdentiflCatino of Contentions and Statement of the IsEnes Contentions concerned with the adequacy and effectiveness of SpMC procedures and planning for the provision of protective
\\
measures for schools and day care centers are JI 45 and MAG Ex-10.
previously prefiled testimony dealing generally with contention JI 45 was submitted in this proceeding.
The testimony that is being submitted at this time deals specifically with those bases of JI 45 that relate to issues raised in connection with the FEMA graded exercise.
Those bases include Bases E, E,
H, I,
M, N,
O.
Under exercise contention MAG Ex-10, issues are raised concerning the ability of NilY ORO to implement SpMC procedures for school and day care children in such a way that reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
The issues presented by the identified portions of JI 45 and MAG Ex-10 in the accompanying testimony include the following:
1)
Do the inherent delays in the SpMC procedures for conveying information to schools and day care centers preclude reasonable assurance of adequate protective measures for those institutions? -
-v 4-
-2)
Did NHY'ORO. demonstrate that it was able to-provide.information'and transportation to the schools in'a timely' manner?.
3)
Did NHY ORO demonstrate that.it was able to
- implement back up procedures if the primary means of communications to'the schools do not work?
4)
Did NHY ORO-demonstrate that it was able to implement PARS for schools in a timely manner?
5)
Did NHY ORO demonstrate that'it was'able to effectively implement PARS for-schools in such;a manner as to provide reasonable. assurance that-adequate measures can and will be taken in the_
event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station?
B.
The FEMA Finding-FEMA found that the provisions for school populations were adequate under the evaluation criteria it subjected them to..
It will be established through' testimony that.the evaluation of FEMA was flawed in that it failed to consider certain factors.
While FEMA found that in the exercise, NHY ORO was able to demonstrate the ability and resources to implement PARS for school children, testimony will show that NHY's implementation of PARS for schools was' confused'and untimely in light of the changing events of'the simulated emergency.
! H
o C.
Identity of Eli1nessas Interveners will offer the testimony of Geary W.
Sikich.
D.
The_Eu rp_ase_of__thft Tes timony The purpose of the testimony being submitted is to establish that the SPMC does not provide an adequate planning basis for the school and day care population.
The testimony is offered to rebut the FEMA finding that the SPMC is adequate in light of the particular evaluation criteria applicable to school populations.
The testimony is also offered to show that NHY ORO was unable to implement appropriate PARS for school children in a coherent and timely manner.
E.
Summary of the Testimony Geary W.
Sikich will testify as an expert witness that he disagrees with the FEMA finding of adequacy on the evaluation criteria that apply to the schools under the SPMC; that the SPMC's procedures for providing information and transportation resources to schools do not give reasonable assurance that protective action for schools can be implemented in a timely manner; that the FEMA graded exercise demonstrated deficiencies in NHY ORO's ability to accur'tely convey information about PARS to schools and implement PARS for schools in a way that affords reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
I - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _.
- 4 l
^
i XIII. 1HAE_RITY OF_ HOSPITAL PERSONNEL LACK' THE ABILITY
!!ECESSARY TO TREAT CONTAMINATED 2 ' INJURED OR EXPOSED IUDIVlDMALS___ MAG-Ex 14C l
A.
IdQDtlfication of the' Contention and Statement of the lasues i
1 The contention concerned with the ability of the. primary 1
MS1 hospital to treat contaminated,- injured or exposed l
individuals is MAG Ex-14C which alleges that the exercise revealed a fundamental flaw.in the SPMC in that-the hospital I
personnel of.the primary MS1 hospital demonstrated an inability to treat contaminated, injured or exposed individuals as required by 10 C.F.R.
S50.47(b)(12) and the guidance'as set-forth in NUREG-0654, Rev.
1, Sup.
1, SII.L.1.
Under this contention, it is argued that ORO failed to satisfy exercise-objective 24, and that such failure precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and-will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook as required by 10 C.F.R. $50.47(c)(1)..
The'-issues presented by MAG Ex-14C are as follows:
1) given the fact that the hospital in question does not normally perform much work in the area of radiological monitoring, decontamination-or i
treatment, is there.any assurance that additional 1
8 training will enable the hospital personnel to provide adequate medical care for the contaminated, injured or exposed individuals? I IE o
4 f
2)
Given t'he fact that the hospital staff does not have the background or training to treat the radiologically injured, did the revelation of that lack of training reveal a fundamental flaw in the SPMC7 3)
Given the limited number of medical and nursing staff who have participated in training to treat i
the contaminated, injured or exposed individuals and the necessary corollary of that linited staff which is the limited number of patients who can be treated, is there any assurance that adequate I
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook?
B.
The FEMA F_i.nding FEMA found that the medical and nursing staff members of the hospitals did not fully understand the biological effects of radiation and the significance of counts per minute, contamination, and milligram per hour dose rates.
As a result of that evaluation, FEMA found that this was an area requiring corrective action.
The real problem is whether additional training will be sufficient to prepare the hospital staff to handle a radiological emergency when the hospital staff does not have the background and training to handle the radiologically injured and their performance is limited by the fact they must rely on one trained radiologist to supervise the decontamination process. _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -
m b
a f
C.
Identity of the Witness i
The Interveners will offer the testimony of Arthur Lonergan.
D.
Eu rpas2_0L_the_lestimonZ The purpose of the testimony is to show through statements obtained by the hospital personnel that the hospital does not have the personnel resources, personnel background and training to treat the contaminated, injured and particularly the radiologically injured in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
XIV.
AVAILABILITY OF MANNED VEHICLES -- JI 51 A.
CRutantions and Issues Addressed In the trial brief that was filed on February 21, 1989, the general content and outlines of contention JI 55 were set forth.
At this time the Mass AG is offering a supplemental piece of testimony in connection with the Applicants proposed use of evacuation bed buses as manned vehicles under the SPMC.
This filing specifically incorporates by reference the issues outlined under JI 55 in the original filing of February 21, 1989.
The specific purpose of the supplemental testimony is to demonstrate that the Applicants will be unable to implement the use of evacuation bed buses under the SPMC.
The testimony also demonstrates that the Applicants have made incorrect assumptions in calculating the number of vehicles that will be needed to evacuate nursing homes in the Massachusetts EPZ. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
r Witnesses who will testify to the above are Gerald St.
Hilaire, Howard Saxner, and Barbara Davis.
Respectfully submitted JAMES M.
SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL By:
dohn Traficonte, Chief Nuclear Safety Unit Allan R.
Fierce Leslie Greer Pamela Talbot Matthew Brock Assistant Attorneys General Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2200
\\
Dated:
April 10, 1989 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
I
'gR E9 f1PR 11 PS:41 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9 '.
i i
@u I
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
)
50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
(Off-Site EP)
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
April 10, 1989
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I,
Alan Fierce, hereby certify that on April 10, 1989, I made service of the within documents:
1.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES D.
JONES ON BEHALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M.
SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 1
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS REGARDING JI 27A, 61 AND I
)
62; I
2.
TESTIMONY OF CAROL SNEIDER ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 1
REGARDING JI-56 (MONITORING RATE);
3.
TESTIMONY OF DR. HOWARD HARRIS ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS CONCERNING JI-13 AND MAG EX-ll (TRAINING);
l
l{'
4.
TESTIMONY OF DR. COLIt1 J.
HIGH ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
S H AtJIJO!J, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMOfJWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS CONCERNItJG CONTENTION JI-56 (MONITORItJG RATE);
5.
TESTIMOtJY OF DR. THOMAS J.
ADLER ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
S H A !J N O N, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS COtJCERNING COtJTENTIONS JI-13 (TRAFFIC GUIDE TRAItJItJG );
6.
TESTIMONY OF GARY SIKICH AND STAN COHN ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
SHANtJON ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS REGARDING COMMUNICATION DEFICIENCIES; i
7.
TESTIMONY OF GEARY W. SIKICH AND JOHN PAOLILLO ON BEHALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M.
SHANNON, TOWN OF HAMPTOtJ, i
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION AND SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGE REGARDING TOH/NECNP 1(a) and (b);
8.
TESTIMONY OF GEARY W.
SIKICH AND SANDRA FOWLER MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, JAMES M.
SHANNON, TOWN OF HAMPTON, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION AND SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE REGARDING TOH/NECNP EX. 2; 9.
TESTIMONY OF GERALD ST. HILAIRE, HOWARD SAXNER AND BARBARA DAVIS ON BEHALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M.
SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON THE PROPOSED USE OF EVACUAITON BED BUSES IN THE SPMC; 10.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR LONEGRAN ON STATEMENTS OBTAINED FROM SISTER PAULA BRADLEY, SISTER DORIS BROUILLETTE AND DR. KENNETH PEELLE 0,F ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL ON THE FEMA GRADED EXERCISE. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l 11.
TESTIMONY OF T. MICHAEL CARTER ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
i i
SHAtJNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF i
MASSACHUSETTS CONCERNIllG CONTEt1TIONS JI-13B; JI 27b; JI j
36; MAG EX-9; 12.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT L.
GOBLE ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
SHANNON, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS REGARDING CONTENTIONS MAG EX-ll, MAG
)
EX-19, SAPL EX-14, JI-13C, JI-18F, JI-20 and JI-23 (EXECISE PARS, TRAINING FOR PAR DECISION-MAKERS METPAC, PAR DECISION CRITERIA, AND COORDINATION OF MASS /NH
)
PARS);
13.
TESTIMONY OF GEARY SIKICH ON BEHALF OF JAMES M.
- SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS j
REGARDING INADEQUACIES IN SPMC PLANNING FOR AND NHY ORO's IMPLEMENTATION OF PARS FOR SCHOOLS, 14.
TRIAL BRIEF OF JAMES M.
SHANNON FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, REGARDING EXERCISE RELATED CONTENTIONS, via Federal Express Mail as indicated by [*] and by First Class 9
Mail on April 11, 1989 to:
Ivan W.
Smith, Chairman
- Kenneth A.
McCollom Atomic Safety & Licensing Board 1107 W.
Knapp St.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Stillwater, OK 74075 Commission East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814
- Dr. Richard F. Cole
- Docketing and Service Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission East West Towers Building Washington, DC 20555 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 _ _ - _ _ _
If
- Robert R.
Pierce, Esq.
- Thomas G.
- Dignan, Jr.,
Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Katherine Selleck, Esq.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ropes & Gray East West Towers Building One International Place 4350 East West Highway Boston, MA 02110 Bethesda, MD 20814 H.
Josepn Flynn, Esq.
- Sherwin E.
Turk, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Office of General Counsel Commission Federal Emergency Management Office of the General Counsel Agency 15th Floor 500 C Street, S.W.
11555 Rockville Pike Washington, DC 20472 Rockville, MD 20852 Atomic Safety & Licensing Robert A.
Backus, Esq.
l Appeal Board Backus, Meyer & Solomon l
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O.
Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03106 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Jane Doughty U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Washington, DC 20555 5 Market Street l
Portsmouth, NH 03801 Charles P.
Graham, Esq.
Barbara St. Andre, Esq.
Murphy & Graham Kopelman & Paige, P.C.
33 Low Street 77 Franklin Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02110 Judith H.
Mizner, Esq.
R.
Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq.
79 State Street Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton l
2nd Floor
& Rotondi l
Newburyport, MA 01950 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Dianne Curran, Esq.
Ashod N.
Amirian, Esq.
I Harmon, Curran, & Towsley 145 South Main Street i
suite 430 P.O.
Box 38 l
2001 S Street, N.W.
Bradford, MA 01835 Washington, DC 20008 Senator Gordon J.
Humphrey Senator Gordon J.
Humphrey l
l U.S.
Senate One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Washington, DC 20510 Concord, NH 03301 (Attn: Tom Burack)
(Attn: Herb Boynton) l
-4
l l
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l I
l George Dana Bisbee, Esq.
Phillip Ahrens, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Department of the Attorney 3
25 Capitol Street General I
Concord, NH 03301 Augusta, ME 04333
)
William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Town Hall - Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 l
JAMES M.
SHANNON 1
ATTORNEY GENERAL COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS l
l W
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John Traficonte l
Allan Fierce Pamela Talbot Matthew Brock Leslie Greer Assistant Attorneys General Nuclear Safety Unit l
Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place i
Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2200 j
DATED:
April 10, 1989 l
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