ML20248H056

Expresses Concerns Re Recirculating Spray Sys at Plant, Unit 3.Issues That Continue to Be Very Troubling Submitted

ML20248H056
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/12/1998
From:	Del Core D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20248H053	List: ML20248H050 ML20248H056
References
NUDOCS 9806080042
Download: ML20248H056 (19)

Text

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.e DonabMl Del' Core, Sr.

' 4;Drisco(Drive ll 4

Uncasville,CT: 06382-1808 c

z Dr, Shir$Iyhnn Jackson

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WashinidmC D. C.>20555-0001 R

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April 11,1998 -

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Dear'l Naclison:

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..a 3 wrote to you regarding very serious problemasssociated with the Recirculating '

Sprayy% ( RSS ) at Millstone Unit # 3. Once on Miirch 26,1M8, and again on April

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2l1998N3ttended a number of update meetings held'diis past weellat the Millstone y

StationQ f16ust say that they did not make me feel any.lietter about the current RSS situation, lor the previous issues I raised in those letters, l c

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_ hJwo, f the many update meetings I attended,f rpised the level of my concern.

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first ms$tingKeld on April 7,1998. was " open fgf juhlic observation only " on the tsdeNnt Corrective. Action verification Program (ICAVP ). The second,~also a meetios "$ pen for public observation only ", was;beidit day later, on April 8i 1998, on

. the R$8 h(modification DCR M397045. NRC staff, Millstone representatives, and Sargent 3

$ L' 1(S A L ) were in attendance at both meetings!;Please allos me.to discuss the meet'

' in reverse order.

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' 3; 4 kthe'RSS Modification meeting, Millstone regiS:sentatives opened the meeting (with' a'%n of the purposh of the modificatiori}asi options thy considercd in sohing

the exc$ serve flow problems. They apparently chose-the easiest ( fhstest ) method, 3

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ainstalling anorifice plate. In order to accomplish thell6w restr ct on necessary, approx *nstely 4000 GPM to 2200 GPM. an onfice plate 1.25 in. thick, with a reduction.

ifrom a 10" daneter opening to an approximately 376pening. Other options such as:

' increag the sucten piping size, using two suctioil IEss for one pump ( cross,-connect ).

(reducing the output of the " too large of a pump P bispnoving stages, or just changing -

lthe.purpp o a smaller one, or install a Motor Operat6d Valve ( MOV ), and bypass 3.orifickm)ere not utilized, most probably due to fmandiM, and

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h you are aware, the single orifice was p, laced immediately upstream of the dua C

'expansidhjoint. ' Oversight inspectors reviewing the$6 deifications, soled the onfice locationi andIobjected to its closeness to the expannkinEjoint, and on December. 23,1997 wrote i Corrective Action document addreniaq tlaissue, noting probable thtigue failure to said' expansion joints due to high velocities resultag from the location of the orifice in j

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slociti[ arid vi' oration probicms that would most hkely be created.

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, Nas'ed on an earlier ( Summer 97' ) discussion $ith Stone.& Webster Engineering -

E' Co. ( SWEC:),'and a November,97', Plant Operations Review Committee ( PORC )

discussisti, westinghouse ( NSSS supplier ) was cotiracied to do a Cevitation -

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' Assesem'entEbut was supplied only the 2200 GPM @'240 degrees flow rate. On:

DecemNr 1.7,1998, Westinghouse concludes that'ininld. avitation ekists in the system, t

at the mnabers,provided. Millstone Engineering usWI RSS Flow Calediation US ( B )-

361, ReW O to help in supporting the case for the modification. On January 9,1998, NU Millstone %d SWEC concluded cavitation was not a jiroblem, and the expansionjoint- )

manufacturer viewed the' orifice bolted to the expansinojoint to be acceptable, with no i'

l cavationd :

$he CQN3'.97-4815 ) was dispositioned to test the r'nddification with vibration monitoi@

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L.9 l-J{he sequence for testing was 1/14 / 98 initial RSS Testing conducted to determine Ltest lodp flows and range of test flows; On 2 /.10 /.98 Rev # 1 to RSS Flow Calculatio S'( B )-361:is finalized documenting increased flowfot. Direct Injection : 2510 GPM at

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liess than 125 degnes. Flow testing to verify orifice:s'.5d costectly.) Vibration tests for t

' pump / isotar assembly, vent line, and expansionjointJump/ Motor fbund within limits,

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- ventM End unacceptable, and expansion joints" accepted based on! communicatio vendorgilistone vibration testing on expansionjoisiissvas detenniped to be inadequate,

'as it was only:looking at axial vibration. The first three pumps, " B, LC, and D passed testingN'Ibe. " A " train always exhibited the most vibustion, and was s' lected to look at e

the p. vibration. after discussions with NucleaQiaterials Engineeringfand the expansaptsjoint vendor calculation. Ihe combinarios of axial and transverse vibratior

. exce6 dad the vendor limit. When the transver'se vibration number was added to three j6)nts, alljoints exceeded the vendor's limit., j j

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$T&nporary Modification was developed tb swap the location of the orifice to -

finsnediately.after the expansion joint, whereby tlw'dansge was discovered about mid Marc @H$8. The large liners, and some broken pieces were recovered. The Event

Reviewrc6ncluded by Millstone on March 23l 1998 suggested about nine ( 9 ) small

, pieces % called slivers ) remained in the system Sizes; varied from 1 /16 " x 3 /16 " x s

i.050 Qo.i5 / 32 " x l-1/ 2 " x.050 ". Atter remesing the second downstream expansion

[ joints,! aid inspecting Millstone has concluded that 'the ' pieces now do not exist! If they

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Idid exid,3 Millstone also postulates they present no sigmficant safety hazard, and is not an

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9 stone ultimately replaced the upstream (siesst to the punps ) expansionjoints

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{with spool pieces, and changed the piping hangeferrangements to accommodate.

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' and connaction chanacs in the systenti'WhBt the system Still has lots of' expaa vibrati6n,:and high velocities immediately downstre'amjf the orifice',' Millstone has viewed

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l that todacAeptable, and termed the system operablefN' indication was provided as to o

whetheNrosion possibilities exist with the new highuelocity conditions in the spool-piece.

TNsecond meeting was also troubling, in tist it identified a substantial number of u:

deficiencle's' associated with calculations, and the conEofof calculations associated with safetparip.$sk significant systems: Furthermore, S & Iijndicated in the meeting, that it

'would.tM Withng to complete the final report on thelIC4VP, without the' resolution to all deficietkic$hotopleted. Agam, an issue of scheduleJconsideration insicad of.teq'uired E

completaines of the work.

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IheNINwing' issues continue to be very troubliagf

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,L, r,~y S E t/ reviewed the modifications at the request $f tiie NRC staf(and made'no major c:..

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j fl5;%g's;;y Reports ( DR) identified by S & Nd/aling with neO R moss are associated with calculations ( See Unionlof Concerned Scientists'( UCS J

menkto me dated April 8,1998, attached as Engl6ste ( 1 ) 10 pages: ) Some are assotim$d with the Flow Orifice Modification!!((.See S & L Rep' rt selected pages

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from$ %d: April 7,1998 meeting. Enclosure ( 2 ) 4 pages )

l$81idel)V, and 5 level'III deficiencies have bEerddentified with Calcula'tions,'or s

Caldilation Control. How many'more do yodthinilharrant an expanded review t-o

?

s Ho[4ther 8,4 safety and risk significant systems l 5$,could S &

the an Ad%rse Condition Report ( CR ), as beinti a'n inadequate safety review?'

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HSh61d the Design Change Review Process ^m$dhe inadequ$te cavitatio

'e assessmeras by SWEC and ' Westinghouse?

,9 Je ifohir dould the review by S & L miss the same onitation assessments? /

Hokchuld Plant management, Oversight managem6nt, and PORC all miss so many l

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problems with this design?

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..Wy the schedule, and economics (. bankruptcy.Jdiiving this inadequate modificatio Wai tiie ' Corrective Action document properly disksitioned by inanagement? '

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Le Whk. lies.4 the Oversight Depaitment instituted'and investigation. ?

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4hairft the NRC staffinstit'uted and investigation? -

WhpliilS '& L being asked to review the new m5di$ cation to the RSS, if they couldn't l

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haMfe the first one?

de L9IhkisMillstone being allowed to operate a systeMiith suspected pieces of.stamless d,laige enough to prevent operation of MOy;s'// See the RS'S piping schematic hte

,j - Endlosure ( 3 ) used in the meeting, many' valses'a$d components still need insp

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[*' 'Wiipisn't your agency considering this a contipudi$m of the programmatic issues th gotiMillstone where it is today?.

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! * 'Hokmany more issues ofinadequate, and'oariowl viewed corrective actions does your stidfrequire to take action?

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.i 21 ;am'very disappointed with this whole process, which appears to bear no resemblance to comments rrale by you about the recovery process, at your public meetinkin August of 1996, and February of 1998l The: Corrective Action process is not an effective process. It'we look at the corrective action dispositions associated with the RWST b'ack; flow during a LOC A ( SSFI finding ), RSS ' orifice placement ( Oversight finding')',Eoric Acid Pump Air Binding ( 40500 Inspection finding ), RIIR bypass vahe deferral ( NRC Deferred 1 tem Inspection ), and the RSS-solenoids. How can your agency be mo'virig on with the schedule to OSTI, with these programmatic issues still before us?

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Enclosures:

-( 1 ) UCS to D. Del Core Memo 10 pages.

( 2 ) S & L Report April 7.1998, selected pages (4 )

., " '( 3 ) RSS Piping Schematic Handout ( l Me )

1 e/c i Mh. Gkrge Mulley, OlG Susm Perry Luxton. CRC Na4cy'. Burton, Esq.

. Mri David Lochbaum, UCS p

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FROM: H l hpave Lochbaum J

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. April 8,1998 SUBJECT 2' f Millstone Colt 3 ~

y D.__i6crepancy Reporb or 3

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b 31' Late;yesesrddy'and this rnorning, I accened the Sargent &Lundy ws bsite and reviewed a the level 3;distiopancy repons on Millstone Unit 3. NU's problens with corrective actions are still cvident and I dfd not see any reason to change the conclusion triour March 17* 1erter to the NRC: N an incil'ectivf.'conective action proccas n

Per your suggest%n, I reviewed several DRs invoiting recent r:f! pulations.- A disturbing tlwmc DRs is NU',$ inattention to detall. For e Anmpfe-DR MP b781 reported that NU calculated maximten ditYerential pressures for several RSS valses f

which eicebded their design me.timum differential presourcs. NU concluded that S&L identified a conditloer~not previously discovered by NU which requires contchon."

DR MPNn94 seported that NU calculated maximurrittrnperatures for seura1 RSS valves which escerded. their design maximum temperatures NU has'yet to evaluate this DR.

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DR mph 0806 seponed that NU made sesenal errors in bericry and DC distribution system

calculdionsl NU conceded that two of the identified c~nors had nist been pieviously identified by NU and redited correcuon.

OR MP3 0997 questioned the flow resistance coefficient an?d the effect on sy!, tern'llow due to the Imall R.$S/e'xpensionjoint liners as dermnined in the caletdetion to suppon DCR M3-9706) the RSS

' expanside joint / support inodificotton NU's re6ponse dited that the original calculatiori was correct and v31issted by " post installation testing for the RSS%ifices.

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• . DR MP3-1021 reponed several non conservatiu assum{itats m the calettlation perfortnod in suppon

of DUR MH97045, wbich installed the RS$ orifices.

' DR-MPp1078 reported seven t7) problems wnh a calctdem>n perforrned in support of DCR M3

.i 097645,;which installed the RSS onfices. This calculatfor) deterrnined it the RSS pumps had adequate 4

water siipply and NPSH for conditions including debrisylogi:ing and vonermg 1

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Apnl 8.1998 Pqe 2 of 2 DR MP3 1037 reported several problems with the hydraubcialculation pnepared in suppon of DCR M3-097945,1which installed the RSS orifices. In paracularlS&L quescioned whether BTU had

(.orrectlgmodeled the RSS piping configuration.

DR MPj-1038 reported that a calculation prepared in suppoit of DCR h!3,097045 which instalt RSS ortneedsited to consider four other related calcutefioni For example, the addition of the orifices Altered the pressure drop in the RSS piping, thus potentially affecting the hydraulic ana for the p'ont accident sampling system. But the affect on the post accident samphng system was no considered.

Please note that the consequences of these problems may not directly_ affect the safety function orthe equipment. For cumple, in the first two DRs ened above. the valves probably will still open/clo needed despito' differential pressure and'or temperature condinons e.sceeding design limits.

Hoivever, il$se problems, identified by S&L, not NU, in recent NU work is a scry bad sign. As you know. calcu}ations and modifications receive independent reWews. The purpose of these independent reviews is not busywork but rather to catch precisely the probteress which S&L is identifying. NU's calculation pr'ocess, particularly its technical review function, is deficient. This defletent process has the potential forcorrupting everything product it produces. Thus, every calculation performed by NU is j

suspect.

i In conclusion, my review of the latest S&L disentpancy rep'otts concludes:

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l. NU still.;has a deficient corrective action program.

I NU hakdeficient calculation contial process; in parti:blarithe technical review function for J

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calculations is ineffective.

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4 ICAVP Discrepancy Report DR-Mp3-0761 Di serecanov

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Inconsister.cy between design specificiatica & calculation for maximum r

dif f erencial precsure for R55 motor cparated valves DJ seract.ncyf cemggj,p3h Revision 1 shwe.tne maximum design diff arential 5 specification 2362.200-144 pressure feb valves 3RS$*MOV20A,B,C,D to De 275 p' aid, However, calculation CR r to be.!95 MOV'1302.M3lRevieion 0 identifies the maximum differential pressu recirculation sp psid. based'on'the containmnt de maximum desigr, differential Speelficat n 2202.050-676 Revision i shows pressure f0,r valves 3FSS* Moves 37A,8

!PSS*MQ7693BA,B to be 600 paid However, calculation; CRS-MCV-1382-M3 Fevision o identifies.tn'e reaximum dif ferentialremov preGWure tej h 624 psid. based on the residual heat t!U Renelutdonf Descr intirm ;

NU has concluded that Discrepancy Report, DR MP3-078)[ has ident,1fied a condition not.previously discovered by IN which IJortheast Octlities' First Responses Approved corrective action plan for CR F3-90 Or.39 has been to snow the requltes'ccrrection.

2362,200'-164'and 2202.050 616 issued co. revise valve specification maximum differential premeures from calculation:CRS MOV-1382-M3. This will be einee completed poet'startup. The' significance Level is-ecncluded to be Level 4 on DB or L.D analyess or plant equipment.

there is n impact Second Response s Nt' concluded that Discrepancy Report DR -

Herrheas4 Itilities' previcualy discovered by NU wnich requiree MP3 oist 44*ndfied a condicion not rev :;, determined maximum dif ferential correction' Calculation CAS MOV 1382-M), 3RSB*MCV3SA,D; 3fsS$*MOV6037A,B; and preerurno'fer valves 3RSS*MOV20A,B,C,Dr 1 and 22a2,050-676, 3RSS*HOVau)A4 h. However, specifications 2362/200,164, rev reV 1. wirej not' revised to show tihe new differential pressures. The approved has' t>een issued to revise valve corrective; action plan for CD M3-99-0439 the rnaximum differential to-show specific 4tions-3362.200-1G4 and 2262.050 676This will be completed post startup.

pressures',from calculation CRs MOV-1)F2-M).

there Wae no impact on The Signa 6 cance Level wan. concluded (c be Lever 4,eince DB o'r LB. alnalyses or plant ecruipment.

In their rpspcinse to P3 IRF-0144e, tid hos requested additional justification ts.,

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the valves can operate against the maximw dif f erential The following demonstrat,e that in eniculacion CRs-Mov is32-m, rev'0.

pressure identifiedirformation ip provided an justification that the. valves will operate as required.*

identified in' cmiculation CRS f tov 1382 M1 f or The maximum differential precouras have been incluced as design which thefooi,or c,perated valveti_can operate against inputs. in itne Milletone Motor Operated Valve' Pr6 gram analysis of the perf ormance Mov program calculation for each group of valves of'ench'MdV. The appropriate arethe,fpilowine 3RS$*MOV20A',B.C.D Calculation 894094 2030ES Rev 2 3RS$'MOV39A,U' calculatirm 69-094-0947Es rev.3 calculation sp.094-oeD9th ne* 5 3R55*MOV8637A,e 6

3RSS*MOV8830k B Calculation 189 094-0899ES Re assure that tLv enmaasias the purchase / design specificati:r. for%he valves dees not ldentified in Changin9J

. the; valves;will operare against _the maximuin dif,f erential pressures d t,o calculation CAS-MOV-1382 N3 Revleicn 0,1 Ade.titieriaj jt.stification is neede demonstrate. the valves can eparato' agains, Jhefdif ferential pressures in calculation'CAS MOO 1362-Hi Pevision 6.

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Li" ICAVP Discrepancy Report DR-NP3-079ti Di s c r eoaric-Title.

Inconsistency.between erecification 2362.2c01643 caleuiation US(B)-322 with respect toI'3RS5*MOV20A,B,C,0 design. temp 21.gsreparicY Descriorion i Revision 1'identifiesthejdesignztemperature 2362.200 164 Design spec.ification Calculation USIB) "322 for valves')RSS*HOV2CA,B,C.D as 150 degrees Fahrehheit.

P4 Vision. 2l,;,(CCN 1) and P (R)

• 1186 Revielen 1 (CCd?2) show that the maximum recirculation fluid'is 260 degrees possible tetnperature of the containttient rahrt'ohdt.YThis maximum temperature is bacedIorila postulated Joss Of one train recirculayf ort coolers..The design of servicef water to the containment temperature in the specification,it not conservat'ive, co rparsd to the temperature d6termined.Iin{the calculation.

' flu Resolut5arr Descrie.. lon.

Discrepancy Report, DH;MP34. 794, hasaidentitled a 1Rt has concluded that ACR 25),

condition previously discovered by tru which requires correction.

2/ 3 / 9'5, idehtified. this problem and closure is..being tracked by A/R 95000500.

Specifica1'1y'r1DcR M3-96054/DCN D43-9-0517 96'have-been issued to upgrade the design temperature of valves. 3RSS*PtOV20A,8,C,D to-260 degrees Fahrenhole.

Completion.,4,ill.be before staytop. The Signif.itance Level is concluded to be Level 3.

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ICAVP Discrepancy Report DR-MP3-0800 DjscrecaneQIl-le Battery and'DC System Calculation Discrepancies Di s ermennevi' Des e rj r>t ion :

3 BAT 3 96j-1241E3 ( P.av.. 1) & BAT 2 96 1243E3-(Pey.* 1) states that, the inrush current of a Gould 3.

Calculatiori SP M3-5E 011 Tab 4 J131TE relayfis 160 volt-amperes, but Calculations PAT 1-96 1241g) and BAT 2 96-amps for inruch in.the> Load Tabulation sheets, 1243t3 use a Value of 160 Calculations" BAT 1-96 1241E3 and BAT 2 96-1243E3: should be revised to agree with Thir. discrepancy'does'not have an affect on

':alculation; SP-;M3 EE-011.

is not Calcul'acicn's : BAT 1 96-1241E3 and BAT 2-96 1243E3 b4i.:ause the inrush' current used dhrirgL the. battery load profile.

Appendik A.ineladee a one line diagram for' the battery,[ charger. and battery 5.

35NSBPK6c5, panels andjoads.

.In Calculation BAT 1-96-1241E3), Cables 3EGFBPK600, 3EGESPK600? 3EGSBPKdOO. and )EOSBPK601 have' lengths, which are twice sa long as other cables shown in che one line, as shown iri )y, Cable Database M3CBLRWY, well as alL eables shown ir,the one lir.e of Calculation BAT 2-96-1243E3,. agree Cable with M3CBLRidY. In the one line diagram,in' Calculation BAT 3-76-1243E3, 3ENSA0V.605 )$ shown as a #12 AWO cable, but M303LAWY shows this cable with a Mark Humberi HHT-93.which is a #6 AWG cable. In tfie one line. diagrafn in but Calculation' SAT 2-96-124 3E3,. Cable 3CESBOC110.is 'shown as a #14 AWG cable, M3CBLRWY sh'ows this cable with a Mark Number 'NNo-41 which is a 24/C #16 AWG cable.

NUResolu\\;{'h~Deseriotion+

th trJ has cone:1dded cha: Diacrepe.ney Report DR-M3 oe06 has identified two previously discovered.by NU which require correction.

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ICAVP Discrepancy Report DR-MP3-0997 EtJfgepanbii Tit).n

,o Safety evalention S1-EV-97-035 in DCP P!3-37063.1s inconsistent with LCfJ Cf43 00-1463'-97. E,' 'calectat ion US (3, 161-h renancy Deggr_lEli2ai The, safety! evaluation for DCP H3 97063, RSS D pansion Joine./ Support Modificatibd,'Jo S3-EV-97-C35 Page 3 of safety. evaluation 53-EV-97-035 states, US (B) - 3 61 dassed on,the existence of the orifices and based on calculation 03705-(RevlOr,2the effect on system flow due to the utilization of a smaller OD expansion joint liner is considernd insignificant". A change in expansion joint linerCD(ifnot shown in DCN DMb 00-1463-97 which provides'the updated vendor informat.ionJfor expansion joints 3R55"EJ1A D2and 3RSS*EJ2 Ad.

Furthermore, calculation US(B)-361 Revision 0 does not provide ~ a basis for the flow resistanco c' efficient, (i.e., F.- f actor). used lin the analysis for the expansion o

joints.;,Thgrefore, the conclusaon in the e6fett evaluation, (i.e.,

the effect n

on sys tem -t'iov ' due to the smaller expansionf3oint liners is insignificant).

cannct beponfirmed.

tJti immol di'i on D s,qriocioa; l'

ITU has concluded that Discrepancy Peport, DR Mf3:0997, does r.or represent a discrepanft condition. CR-MP3-0097 st.ates that " inadequate de. tail was provided to reach the ionclusion that the effect on system flev due co the installation of l

the. reduceA. diameter expansion joint liners was' negligible. afnee sufficient detail is.Provided within the DCR, the safet'y: evaluation, nr.d their mosociated references!-(specifically based on the relative 3nner diametersi che orifice diametertim 9',28 inches and the 11nte diameter is 7.75 inchen!, the safety evaluatioid io considered to addrene the iseu, in! adequate detail and revision of the'eafet'y evaluation is not considered wartanted. Post installation testing i

pe r ' Ut (B) 346.Sev.0, has confirmad the adequacy <of the associated calculation.

Significa e:. Level Criteria does not apply ass', thip is not a discrepant condi C i ott,

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' Discrepancy Titlee Typographical error and an unsubstantiated assumphien in CAIe NPIB) -163-FA i'

DiscrepanevfDascriotion-In the process of reviewing the followirig doodnents.

(1)

NP( )[163iFA Rev 3 we noted the following' discrepancies's:

.. r; e.(3 The. equetion: for' the calcu'lat ion. of stress 'i A' the orifice place, page ';E, has 1.

a-typographical error. The term a on the right; hand should be a*2.

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2. Units foe M; the r.aximum moment, should be"Cb): not (2b/ft)

3. On pagey27E,.the shutoff pump TrH is esicen'an.~54Dft, and on page 27F, the shutoff..:Tmi is $80fC. The discrepancy should: he corrected. Also, proper undto shouldibe 'shown in the delta P calculation.

r 3

4. Assumpti'on 8 on page SA; "It le assumed that'.segvent forces are proportional to the s'egment lengths of the same branch.'.of.i WATHAM dyna'mic model, i.e. at fluid' dynamically similar locations". The 'a'anumption is used in Sec. 7.8 to

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deterinin* the. unknown segment forces for Looris'B. C and D based on Loop A loads,. nich.are corrputed using WATHAM, and the segment length ratios.

InsNmeca s',b the segment lengths for l.,oopo Bi 5 and' D are significantly based on this sinaller thati.the corresponding 1. cop A segment' 1chstn. Therefore, essumption',; the corresponding segment force is?cA1culated to be significantly

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smaller,2 endr is'unconservative. No justificatteriifor the assumption ic provided.

y.

.,. m Noter The : calculation has been revised as past of, modification M3-097045.

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Discrecanev'Yitle:

Revision to Calculation.Usjs) 362 for DCR H3-97045 c

Os a cre'r anev%sda e t4 en.

The purpoteAf: Calculation Us:s).362 is to detstrdine. if the RSS pumps have an f

includitd,the ef fects of ir.aulation adequate wh$r supply and adequate NPSH, debris and ver.t.esing.

4 3..

Seven discrepancies were identified in calculatidipuS(B)-362 explains how the LOCTIC' model f or; the mass of water

^

1. Section d.'2, pp 19-21, floor is altered to"46 count f or holdup and holdup rea'chingft'he containmentthe LOCTIC model for, computing the temperature of water tibe deleys) However, on lthe ', containment flocr is net altered to.secount for holdup ar.d holdup time p cond(tions for RSS

. delays u.' Ibis creates a discrepancy lu the worst-case sumfor Rss pump Water supply and NpS operation.3The limiting event inch LOCALin, Cubicle D with failure of one Qss_ pump. In this scenario a large n

water released"from/the breaR makes its way into tracti'on it the mass of hot of the heiddp:of this LOCA spillage would the instiume'nt tunnel. The etfect be' to dediease the sump water temperature :tc,less than the value computed in LOCTIC.'This:has a non-conservative'effectO Thi bead less through debris on thE finci@ssh' screens with the unmodified LOCTIC terr.perature is. coo. low (due Section 7.7, to;tne use(of 7 n temperature which.ls too highj$n equation (27),

significantly< change the computed NPSH p.27..this[ die repancy may.notictue should have been ideneffled in the assumptions and marginsyibut the 1

methodol<pgy section et the calculation.

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T. elee le selecte1 as the small break l10CA Which' produces the worst-

2. A '4 " bre4kr However, no case RSS;9ater supply based on preliminary Ana' lysis (p. 16),

the small break site documeritatiotF la included, or referenced, ;to s'upport sele:tedL d

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3. The valu,9es,j f or MIT. In Tabic 46, page 30,on page'20. The' smaller values L

arou' lees than the values calculated when using; equation (2b) conservative cicee ~ they resuli in rnore water on the analysisfare'not containment-floor than actual,

+;

4.Thecalcklai:lonstatesthat the-requiredNPSHjat the cer.terline of the I st (includj r.9(can[los s ) at 3000 gpm is 4.0 feet stbge jmpeller of the RSS pump, Rev. 5). However, (page 2 sp30). oased on Attachment 3 of Ref /!15S f US (B) -253, per Attachment 3 of US(9)-253 (upper curve)Lehe: required;NPSR at 3000 gpm is feet (Table 13. p.72).

11 f eet'.* Tlie available NPSH is still in er.ceseof 11 n..

5. The valbes for (mdetspill-30) inTable6d(1pf,5b57) for the 4" LOCA.in (p. 45)

The values in

.a cupiele;b: Wore not properly transposed f rom Table 5eappear to be theQarger valu Tab)e 4dl.for (mdctspill-30) the termH areak Spillage Rate), As'a result,fthe region ] Inflows).,should be This effects the smalletyn. Table 64 than the -values listed?lnf able 6d.

distances y

region % velocities calculated in Tacle-9d.fp.64). and the transport and timesi calculated in Table lod -lp.68).tThe rsmaller velocit!es sould reduce for a - given i % period. and therefore reduce t

t t he.. dan,rs'sht ransport distance Therefore, this-the quantity of debris en the ' fine screens tatwa given time.

discreps'ney does net appear to hsve an adforcetaffect onLehe calculated

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04/12/1998 - 19:10 B609482020 ORBIT INC PAGE 14

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lo; m W 08 ' 98 09:16 -

+0012023320905 IIS DC 0-l ICAVP. Discrepancy Report DR-MP3 -1028 '.(continued)

I Append $ d.'.daterminee the head loss acrose de coarse and fine mesh screens i

6, (np debris). in order to show that the head 1'Ioss is negli'gible fassumptjon 19, C2 (p. C 3) is pf 33)c.,The calculation for Reyncids. Number iri. Tab 9:

l f ricc#rrect;:,The Reynolds number in' Table C+2 31s.. based on the wire diameter (0.092? lfor the cearee screer.e and o,033"-for" the fine screens). The Raynolds number,fthould be based on the hydraulic diame*er. The resulting higher adv'rsely impact,the. expected head loss-across Peynoldit, numbers should not e

the contae'and fine mesh screens.

7 7 The valdes'for ul (velocity et scree'ns ) in!. Table C-2 do.not agree with the valuesd$n. Tables 8a, Bb, Oc and 8e or the'< valves in Tables lla, lie and lid.

The va'. den in Table 0-2 are higher than actual' and theref ore conservative sincethey result in higher than expected headlloss.

catchiatief.6s m m snould be evaluated cor ti>e i:neace of the above F

discrepan'cies.

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ICAVF. Di 'crepancy Report DR-Mp3-1038

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Discrecan i Iitle; t4odificatlor. DOR 97C45 '

Di met enaMed Descrmtion :

2 I

Modification'DCR 97045 changed the design floWfof! the RSS System to address several. systern deficiencies, The modificationfit(eluded inacalling an orifice at the pump okscharge to limit the design flow tof 3000 gprn. It also included capping alhed half of the RSS spray netzles and control circuic changes for the Mov20 and Mov2s Valves.

.,.t The modification failed to address the followi,ng calculations 4.

g:

p' i.

P(R)'1020 - The hydraulic analysis forsthel. post accident sampling system, The' asided orifice will increase the pre,ssure drop which could af feet the i

flow rste to the sampling syscam. Thir coldulation estimates the flow rate i

throingh ' che sampling systen.

J' f.

ES-I @.- Pump NPSH under Min SI and Max (ESP. The NFSH analysia is performed entirely under US(B)-362. This is an extraneous calculation that r

, should be voided or superseded.

US (Bh 295 - RWST Drawdown Rates. The hydrattlic analys5s (US (B) -3 61) dete'rmines new flow rates for the ECCS function f rom the RWCT.

Thereduced'flobafortheRSSSystemchanges U3 (p),b2f? - Water tield-Up.

the{ time,line for water hold-up in varisusicentainment srese. This calculation 'is the basis for other calculations pertermed for this modification.

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.c M,ILLSTONE UNIT 3 INDEPENDENT CQRRECTIVE

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, ACTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM-1 STATUS REPORT I

APRIL 7,1998 i

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~I Tier 1 - Review Status r

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+ -Tier 1 Inspection corrective actions : remaining items 1,

3 SO reports are swalting response to RFl473 i

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. ERevised MOV / Cable Tray Support Gale Sampling

' y 4: ', Completed review of 9 new thrust / torque celcs Completed review of 2 of 7 new MOV week'tink csics

,. Electim! MOV cale awaitlng response'to Rfh.881 o,i 9 cable tray support cafe awaiHing responsaio RFl 880 9

• New RSS modification (4-7-98).

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04/12/1998 19:16 8608482020 ORBIT INC PAGF. 17

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. Discrepancy Report Summary 4

J:

969 Valid Preliminary DRs issued to NRC/NUINEAC

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' 854 Resolutions submitted by NU-840 NU Resolutions entered intodatabase m

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' 774 NU Resolutions reviewed by.S&L

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- 622 Accepted and Closed 77 g '

- 147 Retumed w/ comments or request for rnore infonnation L Pending review of implementation of NU corrective action T

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..p, 1 ' = Of the 622 Acceptable and Closed' resolutions 388 Confirmod Discrepancies l

82 Previously identified by NU 152 Nonsfiscrepant conditions 4

1 Of the 388 Confirmed Discrepancies

' 5 12 Level 3 -

376 Level 4 l

,f Of the 5 Pending Discrepancies ~"

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' 1. Discrepancy Type W3 Level 4 -

. Calculations

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3

,5. - Corrective Action implementatinr, 0

0.

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