ML20248E804
| ML20248E804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1998 |
| From: | Williams J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | James Knubel POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, TAC-M95588, NUDOCS 9806030458 | |
| Download: ML20248E804 (12) | |
Text
Y 57L-333 f m e:u a
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t UNITED STATES g
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
f WASHINGTON, D.C. 2%%4001 8
k.....,o June 1, 1998 Mr. James Knubel Chief Nuclear Officer Power Authority of the State of New York 123 Main Street White Plains, NY 10601
SUBJECT:
COMPLETION OF LICENSING ACTION FOR NRC BULLETIN 96-02, " MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL, OVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR CORE, OR OVER SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT," FOR THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. M95588)
Dear Mr. Knubel:
On April 11,1996, the U.S. Nuclear Reginatory Commission (NRC) issued NRC Bulletin (B) 96-02, " Movement of Hervy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," to all holders of operating licenses. The NRC issued B 96-02 for three principal reases:
1.
Aled addresseas to the importance of compiying with existing regulatory guidelines associated uh i.no control and handling of heavy loads at nuclear power plants, 2.
Request that all addressees review their plans and capabilities for handling heavy loads in accordance with existing regulatory guiJelines and within their !! censing basis as previously analyzed in the final safety ana!ysis report, and 3.
Require addressees to report to the NRC whather and to what extent they have complied with the actions requested in this bulletin.
Also the bulletin requestad that licensee's determine whether current activities were within the licensing basis and to submit a license amendment request as necessary.
In a:Idition, on January 9,1997, the NRC staff requested that the New York Power Authority pmpare an:' submit an evaluation of the plant's heavy-load activities in the rnoving of dry storage casks. This evaluation was to determine if a tipping-over hazard exists while dry storage casks are being moved by plant cranes.
In response to B 96-02, you provided letters dated May 10,1996, August 30,1996, and March 5, i
1997 for the Jamas A. FitrPatrick Nuclear power plant. Tiiese submitids provkled part of the reque'sted information, and the staff has determined that no further information is required; therefore, TAC No M955BS is closed.
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A summary of the NRC staff review of licensoe responses to B 96-02 6 enclosed. The NRC will continue to review the issue of heavy loads through an ongoing Task Action Plan for heavy -
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. loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be
'j obtained on a plant-specific Dosis.
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- If you have any que Sons regarding this matter, please contact me at (301)415-1470.
j Sincerely, Original Signed by:
Joseph F. Williams, Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 i
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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i Docket No. 50-333
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl:~ See next page DISTRIBUTION:
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'ACRS PD l-1 Reading File B. Thomas J. Zwolinski C. Hehl, Region 1 OGC 1
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A summary of the NRC staff review of licensee responses to B 96-02 is onclosed. The NRC will continue to review the issue of heavy loads through an ongomg Task Action Plan for heavy loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be obtained on a plant-specific basis.
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If you have any questions regarding this rnatter, please contact me at (301)4151470.
i Sincerety, Original Signed by:
Joseph F. Williams, Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 l
Division of Reactor Projecc - 1/11 j
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j
1 Docket No. 50-333
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next pago plSTRIBUTION-Docket File P. Ray PUBLIC ACRS PD l-1 Reading File B. Thomas J. Zwolinski C. Hehl, Region 1 l
OGC DOCUMENT NAME:G:\\FITZ\\M95538.LTR T3 receive a copy of this docurnent, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E"
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. A summary of the NRC staff review cflicensee responses to B 96-02 is enclosed. The NRC will
- continue to review the issue of heavy loads through an ongoing Task Action Plan for heavy loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be obtained on a plant specific basis.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (301)415-1470.
Sincerely, Y
/
Joseph F. Williams, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Cffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-333
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next page
t James Knubel James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Authority of the State Power Plant of New York cc:
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Mr. Gerald C. Goldstein Regional Administrator, Region 1 Assistant G $neral Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Power Authority of the State 475 Allendale Road of New York King of Prussia, PA 19406 1633 Broadway New York, NY 10019 Mr. F. William Valentino, President New York State Energy, Research, Resident inspector's Office and Development Authority U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Corporate Plaza West P.O. Box 136 286 Washington Avenue Extension Lycoming, NY 13093 Albany, NY 12203-6399 j
Mr. Harry P. Salmon, Jr.
Mr. Richard L. Patch, Director Vice President-Engineering Quality Assurance Power Authority of the State Power Authority of the State of New York of New York 123 Main Street 123 Main Street White Plains, NY 10601 White Plains, NY 10601 Ms. Charlene D. Faison Mr. Gerard Goering Director Nuclear Licensing 28112 Bayview Drive Power Authority of the State Red Wing, MN 55066 of New York 123 Main Street Mr. James Gagliardo
{
White Plains, NY 10601 Safety Review Committee 708 Castlewood Avenue
' Supervisor Arlington, TX 76012 Town of Scriba Route 8, Box 382 Mr. Arthur Zaremba, Licensing Manager Oswego, NY 13126 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Mr. Eugene W Zeitmann P.O. Box 41
. President and Chief Operating Lycoming, NY 13093 Officer Power Authority of the State Mr. Paul Eddy of New York -
New York State Dept. of
' 99 Washington Ave., Suite No. 2005 Public Service Albany, NY 12210-2820 3 Empire State Plaza,10th Floor Albany, NY 12223 Charles Donaldson, Esquire Assistant Attomey General New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271
SUMMARY
OF THE STAFF'S REVIEW OF LICENSEE RESPONSES TO NRC BULLFTIN 96-02 Introduction The following summarizes the results of the staff's review of licensees' responses to NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 96-02, " Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated April 11,1996, and its associated Requests for Additional Information (RAI). The bulletin reminded licensees of their responsibilities for ensuring that heavy load-handling operations are perfomied safely. It also requested that licensees review their plans and capabilities for handling heavy loads, and ensure that their load-handling operations are in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines and the plant's licensing basis.
Also requested was that licenseer identify and present schedules for licensing actions needed to support implementation of their heavy load-handling operations involving spent fuel dry storage casks. The licensees also were to provide schedules for moving dry storage casks. The RAI requested that selected licensees evaluate the hazards associated with an in-plant tip-over of spent fuel dry storage casks that could dislodge the cask lid and spent fuel elements.
This summary closes the staff's review of licensee responses to both the bulletin and the associated RAl. Future issues regarding the handling of heavy loads will be addressed generically under the Heavy Loads and Crane issues Task Action Plan (TAP) and on a plant-specific basis as needed. Plant-specific reviews needed in the future may require the stiiff to obtain additional information from individual licensees, gagkaround NRCB 96-02 was issued as an urgent generic communication that requested licensees
- responses to the following:
(1) For licensees planning to carry out activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or safety-related equipment within the next 2 years from i
the date of the bulletin, provide the following: A report within 30 days of the date of the bulletin that addresses the licensee's review of its plans and capabilities to handle heavy loads while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines. State whether the activities are within the licensing basis and, if necessary, submit a schedule for requesting a license l
amendment. Additionally, indica,ta whether changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) are 4
required.
(2) For licensees planning to perform activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refutiling, and defueled) that involve a potential load drop accident that was not previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), submit a license amendment request 6-9 months in advance of the planned movement of the loads to give the staff sufficient time to perform an appropriate review.
(3) For licensees planning to move dry storage casks over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than Enclosure
. cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) include, in item 2 above, a statement of the capability of performing the actions necessary for a safe plant shutdown in the presence of a radiological source term that may result from a breach of the dry storage cask, damage to the fuel, or damage to safety related equipment due to a load drop inside the facility.
(4) For licensees planning to perform activities involving the handling of heavyloads over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), determine whether changes to the TSs will be required to allow the handling of heavy loads (e.g., the dry storage canister shield plug) over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool and submit the appropriate information 6-9 months in advance of the planned movement of the loads for NRC review and approval.
Discussion The levels of detailin the licensees' responses to NRCB 96-02 varied significantly. Although some licensees presented detailed information about their heavy lead-handling operations, some licensees (Catawba, Crystal River, Farley, Indian Point 2, Salem, St. Lucie, Summer, Dresden, i
Fitzpatrick, Hope Creek, LaSalle, Quad Cities, and WNP-2), either omitted information pertinent to the staff's review in their submittal or referenced previous submittals associated with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." However, all of the licensees responded to the bulletin.
In response to the bulletin, all the licensees reviewed their plans and capabilities to handle heavy loads and indicated that their plans and capabilities are adequate. Some discussions about licensees' plans and capabilities to move heavy loads addressed the plant mode of operation (at power or during shutdowns), the type of crane used (non-single-failure-proof, single-failure-proof, or upgraded cranes), and the methods and procedures for implementing the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Phase 1. All the licensees indicated that their load-handling operations are in accordance with the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Phase 1.
The bulletin requested that licensees determine whether theirload-handling operations are within the licensing basis of the plant. Some licensees stated that their operations are within the licensing basis; other licensees committed to evaluate their licensing basis. Some licensees identified issues to be addressed with the NRC through licensing actions (amendment requests or 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations), and projected schedules for submitting the actions for NRC review. Following the responses to the bulletin, a few licensing actions have been reviewed and approved by the NRC conceming the bulletin. The issues involve proposed changes to TSs, scope changes to accident analyses, changes in loads and load paths, and updates to UFSAR requirements.
The bulletin also asked licensees to determine if their movement of heavy loads involves potentialload drop accidents that were not evaluated previously in the FSAR and, if needed, submit a license amendment request. Most licensees stated that they move only analyzed loads.
Some licensees indicated that they performed load drop or consequence analyses or both though the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 85-11 canceled the need to perform any analyses. Some licensees committed to evaluate the heavy loads identified previously when they responded to NUREG-0612. Despite the analyses performed, all the licensees stated that they satisfy the recommended guidelines in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612.
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Licensees moving heavy loads at power and using load drops and consequence analyses indicated that they have adequato capabilities to safely shutdown the plant if a heavy load drop occurs causing a release of radiation or damagu to safety-related equipment, j
. The bulletin also requested that licensees identify plans and schedules for moving spent fuel dry storage casks. Some licensees stated that they planned to move casks in the near future; other i
licensees indicated that they had not yet considered onsite dry cask storage.
Based on requests in the bulletin, the staff reviewed the licensee responses to identify:
(1) plant mode during the handling of heavy loads (at power or during plant shutdowns);
. (2) type of crane used to lift heavy loads; (3) evaluation of the licensing basis for handling heavy.
loads, including planned licensing actions associated with heavy loads (i.e., license amendment requests); (4) plans and schedules for moving heavy loads (particularly spent fuel dry storags j
and transportation casks); and (5) the type of analysis performed (load drop analysis or I
consequence analysis or both). Although the bulletin did not specifically request this informa lon, the staff believes that this type of information covers the areas of concem about the licensees' heavy load-handling operst;ons. On the basis of its review, the staff noted the following points.
(1) Plant Mode Duina I.oad-Handlino Ooerations Review of the responses to the bulletin revealed that approximately 38 percent of the plants (21 PWRs and 20 BWRs) plan to move' heavy loads at power. Some of these plants indicated that they move analyzed heavy loads at power and unanalyzed heavy loads during plant shutdowns. These plants also indicated that heavy load movements over safety-related equipment are minimized to the extent practicable, and their procedures do not allow 1
movements of heavy loads over fuel or over the reactor core in accordance with NUREG-0612. Some PWR licensees (i.e., Callaway, Shearon Harris, and Calvert Cliffs) indicated that their heavy load movements involve casks moved within a separate fuel building. As indicated by the licensees, the movement of casks in PWRs that have a separate fuel building involves little or no cask travel over systems needed for safe shutdown functions.
As a result, a dropped cask would not cause significant damage to safe shutdown equipment and, therefore, would have negligible effect on the licensees' ability to shut down the plant safely.
l Approximately 3g ercent of the plants (26 PWRs and 15 BWRs) indicated that they move p
l heavy loads at plant shutdowns, and about 23 percent of the plants (23 PWRs and 2 BWRs) did not clearly indicate the plant status when heavy loads are moved. A few cf these licensees (e.g., Oyster Creek) that plan to move heavy loads during plant shutdowns also indicated that they plan to perform dry runs at power, before initially loading the cask.
The staff finds that although some licensees have committed to move only analyzed loads at power, they may not adequately consider the adverse safety consequences of a load drop l
during the movement of heavy loads. Some licensees
- analyses consider methods that may be used to preclude a load drop (e.g., enhancements to the load handling system, including upgrades to brakes, instrumentation, and controls, and the use of energy-absorbing structures throughout the load path). However, they may not consider.the adequacy of their capabilities needed to mitigate or manage the adverse consequences of a load drop. Some examples of such capabilities are tite atsisities to shut down the plant safely, continue normal 1
operation, maintain personnel access to various areas in the plant, and mitigate potential accidents that could expose individuals to releases.
. Tha staff is also concemed that some licensees may not adequately address the potential consequences of a iced drop during practice runs of cask movemsnts while the reactor is at -
power. A drop of an empty cask during practice movements could result in similar adverse consequences to the operation of the plant as does the actual movement of a fully leaded spent fuel cask. Thereforo, it is the staffs view that activities involving actual heavy load movements or practice runs of moving spent fuel dry storage casks are to be evaluated by the licensee for potential accidents and consequences.
In addition, the staff is concemed with BWR licensees that move heavy loads while the reactor is at power because, in ganeral, the safety-related systems required for safe shutdowns are susceptible to damage from a dropped heavy load. These licensees should exhaust all options of establishing safe load paths to minimize the risk of affecting safe i
shutdown equipmertt in the event a heavy load is dropped.
(2) Tvoes of Cranes Used in the responses to the bulletin, approximately 27 percent of the plants (6 PWRs and 23 BWRs) indicated that they use single-failure-proof cranes to lift heavy loads; 14 percent of the plants (12 PWRs and 3 BWRs) indicated that they have upgraded the reliability of their load-handling system in accordance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 (see explanation below); and about 8 percent of the plants (5 PWRs and 4 SWRs) indicated that their crane is non-single-failure-proof. However, almost half the plants (49 PWRs and 7 BWRs) did not clearly indicate the type of crane they use.
NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, "S5gle Failure Handling System," provides the altemative of J
upgrading an exieting crane in lieu of complying witn certain recommendations of NUREG-
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0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," to achieve improved reliability l
in load-handling systems. Accordingly,'severallicensees have upgraded their overhead load-handling crane to single-failure-proof status, or they have improved reliability by increasing the factors of safety nr by providing redundancy in certain active components of the cranes.- A few licensees (i.e., Oyster Creek, Dresden, Yankee Rowe) have indicated that they are considering upgrading their cranes or installing new cranes to achieve single-failure-proof capability.
Licensee information regarding the types of overhead cranes used at the plants indicates that many plants have either single-failure-proof cranes in accordance with NUREG-0554,
" Single-Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants,' or cranes upgraded in accordance
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with guidelines in NUREG-0612 (Section 5.1.6, and Appendix C, " Modification of Existing l
Cranes)." Although several plants were not clear about the type of crane they possess, none of the plants indicated that they have crares and lifting systems that ware inadequately designed, installed, and tested.
The staff concludes that many licensees prevbusly performed adequate evalu.stions of their crane design for lifting heavy losos and the evaluations were accepted by the staff.
However, the stsff is concemed that some facilities could have weaknesses in their loa $
handling operations. These weai.nesses may include lasufficient training of personnel involved in the lifting and rigging procedures, procedures lacking in requirements for evaluating loads and ensusing that the design limitations of the hoisting system are not l
exceeded, insufficient inspection and proventive maintenance of cranes and lifting devices, i
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t l and inadequate review of loading capacities. The stairs view is that the potential exists for any of these weaknesses to resu!t in a single failure involving heavy loads being dropped and caecin0 advarse consequences. As a result, future staff reviews will be focused on licensees
- evaluations of their cranes und lifting devices, and related methods and procedures used for complying with the requirements of NUREG-0612.
(3) Evaluation of Licensina Basis for Handlina Heaw Lands i
Rev:ew of the responses to the bulletin indicated that all of Ow licensees believe that their heavy load-handling operations are in accordance with the licensing basis of the facility.
Approximately 24 percent of the plante (10 BWRs and 16 PWRs) did not addresF the licensing basis in their responses, The staff is concemed that some plants that believe their load-handling operation is within the plant's licensing basis may, in fact, be outside the licensing basis. For example, the staffs reviews of Oyster Creek's (OC's) load-handling operations determined that OC would have operated beyond its licensing basis. This is because OC was planning to move loads that exceeded the size of the loads previously evaluated in the FSAR. Approximately 10 percent of the licensees indicated that they will review and modify their licensing basis as needed. As indicated in the submittals, licensees' reviews of the licensing basis resulted in one or more of the fo!!owing:
Identification and analysis of new heavy loads beyor.d the loads previously addressed in the licensing basis, i
l commitments to only move heavy loads that were previously analyzed, determinations that heavy load-handiing operations deviated from previous commitments and the licensing bases, and determinations that change the TSs are needed.
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Licensees' reviews of their plans and capabilities to hancie and control heavy loads have l
resulted in some licensees undertaking licensing actions to implement their load handling L
operations. The following are examples of planned licensing actions noted in the responses to NRCB 96-02:
Mq,s.nagg E!an, rad Licensina Actigm 1
Brunswick:
License amendment request to make tha FSAR consistent with actual plant operations (completed).
Fitzpat ick:
Changes to the TSs to allow the movement of spent fuel dry storage casks at power (schedule TBD).
Nine Mile Point: Design change involving reracking of the spent fuel pool. (Schedule TBD).
l North Anna:
Various license amendments regarding heavy load-hendling issues I
(schedule TBD).
Oyster Creek:
TS changes to remove the weight restriction inr lifting the dry storage l
canister (DSC) shield plu2$ over fuelin the DSC. (completed).
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.. Watts Bar:
Design change for reracking of the spent fuel pool (currently under review).
The staffs review of the information submitted indicates that some licensees' load-handling operations may have been implemented inconsistently with the licensing basis of the facility.
Some plants either have inadvertently deviated from their load-handling procedures, implemented procedures that are inconsistent with the licensing basis, or misinterpreted the design features of their load. handling system. The staff also believes that since the issuance of NUREG-0612, many changes have evolved in licensees' plans to handle heavy loads. As a result, several licensees have identified changes in their load-handling
. operations that were not previously addressed in their licensing basis. Therefore, on an *as needed" basis, the staff will continue to perform audits and inspections in order to evaluate
' licensees' movement of heavy loads.
(4) Plans for Movina Soent Fuel Drv Storane Casks Approximately 17 percent of the plants (10 PWRs and g BWRs) indicated that they plan to store spent fuel dry storage casks. Most of these plants plan to move casks within 2 years from the date of the bulletin. The remainder of the licensees either did not address the issue or have not yet begun planning for the storage of spent fuel.
(5) Load Droo and Consequence Analysis Performed
. Approximately 33 percent of the plants indicated that they have performed load drop and consequence analyses in support of their plans to move heavy loads. The remaining plants did not show that any analysis exists. ' in the future, the staff will review the load drop and consequence analyses on an as-needed plant-specific basis. The staff has found that severallicensees have done load drop and consequence analyses though Generic Letter 8511 canceled Phase 11 of NUREG-0612, and dismissed the need for licensees to perform these analyses. The results of the analyses have led some licensees to modify their load-handling operations, including upgrading the crane and associated components of the lifting system, and modifying the load paths, fr20A!Hl211 The staff finds that NRC Bulletin g6-02 achieved its objective of getting licensees to evaluate their load-handling activities to ensure that they are performed safely and in the best interest cf protecting the health and safety of the public. The bulletin was very effective in getting licensees l
to review their plans and capabilities, licensing bases, and regulatory guidelines for carrying out L
activities involving the movement of heavy loads. Although the licensee responses to the p
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. bulletin contained various levels of detail regarding load-handling operations at their plants, l
. sufficient nformation was available to enable the staff to reach the conclusions noted below.
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Although several licensees have increased the reliability of their load-handling systems, the staff will continue to review load-handling operations, on an as-nreded basis, to ensure that licensees adequately address their ability to preclude load drop accidents. As determined through earlier NRC reviews, licensees have reliable lifting systems as required by NUREG-0612. However, licensees need to continue to address other activities surrounding the crane operation that could help to minimize weaknesses in their load-handling operations that may contribute to load drop accidents. Such weaknesses could include insufficient training of personnel involved in applying l~
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. the lifting and rigging procedures, procedures lacidng in requirements for evaluating loads and for ensuring that the design limitations of the load-lifting system are not exceeded, insufficient
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inspection and preventive maintenance of cranes and lifting devices, and inadequate review of loading capacities.
Also, the staff finds that because some licensees plan to move heavy loads at power, they may need to assess their capabilities to both mitigate and manage the adverse consequences of a heavy load drop. Licensees should consider, among other things, possible plant shutdowns
. during the movement of heavy loads, limiting personnel exposure from required entry into coritaminated plant areas following an accident, and recovering from the adverse conditions caused by an accident. Accordingly, the staff k particularly interested in future evaluations of load drops and consequences associated with the load-handling operations of the licensees.
The staff also finds that severallicensees have determined, after reviewing theirlicensing basis, thtt their load-handling operations may be inconsistent with their licensing bar,is. Consequently, several licensees have undertaken actions to correct or resolve this condition, including reviewing the FSAR, TS requirements, and procedures goveming the conduct of operations involving the movement of heavy loads. The staff will pursue enforcement actions for matters involving a noncompliance with regulatory requiremoats as appropriate.
On the basis of the preceding discussion, the staff will continue to reviewissues regarding the handling of heavy loads on a plant-specific basis as needed. Generic issues regarding this subject will be addressed through an ongoing Task Action Plan (TAP) for Heavy Loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the TAP will be obtained on a plant-specific basis.
Principal Contributor: Brian E. Thomas l
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