ML20248E196
| ML20248E196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/27/1989 |
| From: | Israel S NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Rosenthal J NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248E198 | List: |
| References | |
| AEOD-T914, NUDOCS 8910050097 | |
| Download: ML20248E196 (2) | |
Text
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e SEP 171999 4
4 l
. MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack E. Rosenthal, Chief Reactor Operations Analysis Branch AE00/T914 Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data 1
THRU:
Peter S. Lam, Chief Reactor Systems Section W and B&W Reactor Operations Analyiis Branch Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data FROM:
Sanford Israel Reactor Systems Section W and B&W Reactor Operations Analyiis Branch Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
OVERVIEW 0F DESIGN / INSTALLATION / FABRICATION ERRORS IN 1988 Enclosed for your consideration is a Technical Review Report on design / fabrication / installation deficiencies reported in category 2 LERs in i
1988.
About 50 percent of the category 2 LERs reflected these types of flaws i
which is consistent with our review of LERs in previous years. Previous i
generic communications, such as information notices, bulletins, and generic letters, appear to cover about 60 percent of the issues in these LERs.
A breakdown of the manner of discovery indicates that about 40 percent were j
the result of a directly related task such as a review of a plant modification d
y involving the flawed component / system. Discovery during general or routine plant activities, tests, or operational occurrences accounted for about 16 percent each. About 13 percent were discovered as a result of a component i
failure while the plant was operating or because of an unexpected plant response l
during operation. The diverse ways that led to the discovery of these flaws dces not point to a simple programmatic approach to improve the effectiveness
)
of. capturing similar latent problems.
j l
Seismic design errors and inadequate equipment qualification each accounted for about 10 percent of the LERs. Flaws in the emergency power system were discovered in approximately 10 percent of the reports. The seismic and Il' emergency power issues may reflect heightened interest in these topics in the recent past.
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NRC FILE CENTER COPY go 8910050097 890927 PDR ORG NEXD M
PNU l0 j
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_.o i4-l This study does not suggest any additional action at this time. Existing.
.i licensee and NRC review and inspection processes continue to be effective in uncovering these types of issues ~as noted by the small fraction (13%) discovered because'of.some aberration.during plant operation.
Sanford Israel' l
Reactor Systems Section W and B&W L
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Division of. Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluat u a of Operational Data Enclosure-As stated:
Distribution:
POR Central. FileV 4
- ROAB'R/F DSP R/F SIsrael
'Plam.
.JRosenthal
- VBenaroya KBlack MWilliams TNovak BBrady WLanning
. HFaulkner CHeltemes EJordan LSpessard MTaylor dv')O
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ROAB:DSP:AEOD R0. SP:AEOD R'
B:DSP:AEOD Sisrael:si:as Plam J osenthal 9/1l/89 9/q/89 9 $ 89
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