ML20248C331
| ML20248C331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/26/1989 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1758, NUDOCS 8910030425 | |
| Download: ML20248C331 (56) | |
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a UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RE, ACTOR SAFEGUARDS In the Matter of:
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFETY PHILOSPHY, )
TECHNOLOGY, AND CRITERIA
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1 through 51 Place:
Bethesda, Maryland Date:
September 26, 1989
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~PUBLIC-NOTICE:BY THE 2:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S' 3
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR. SAFEGUARDS.
'4-5 6
7 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the 8
proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 9-Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS),.
10 as. reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions 11 recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
12 No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at 13 this meeting accepts _any responsibility for errors or
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O 14 inaccuracies of statement or data e ntained in this' transcript.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS.
In the Matter of:
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON. SAFETY PHILOSPHY, )
TECHNOLOGY, AND CRITERIA
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- Tuesday, September 26, 1989 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland-The meeting convened, pursuant to notice, at 1:35 p.m.
BEFORE:
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MR. DAVID A.
WARD Research Manager on Special Assignment E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Company Savannah River Laboratory Aiken, South Carolina ACRS COGNIZANT STAFF MEMBER:
DEAN HOUSTON, NRC Cognizant Staff Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1 P B Q'C E E D I H G S i
2 MR. WARD:
The meeting will now come to order.
3 This is a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor 4
Safeguards, the Subcommittee on Safety Philosophy, 5
Technology, and Criteria.
I am David Ward, the Subcommittee 6
Chairman.
Other ACRS members who we expect later in the 7
afternoon are Dr. Lewis and Dr. Remick.
8 The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the 9
preparation of a joint paper which gives the ACRS and NRC 10 staff positions on the concept of adequate protection as it 11 relates to the safety goals.
Dean Houston is the cognizant 12 ACRS staff member for the, meeting.
13 The rules for participation were announced as
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14 part of the notice of the meeting published in the Federal 15 Register on September 18th.
A transcript is being kept and 16 will be made available as stated in that notice.
I request 17 that each speaker identify herself or himself and speak with 18 sufficient clarity and volume so that he or she can be 19 readily heard.
We have received no written comments or 20 requests to make oral statements from members of the public.
21 Before I ask Wayne Houston to make whatever 22 comments he has prepared, I would like to make a couple of 23 comments.
First, this meeting may not have to run very 24 long.
Second, we do have a couple of hours for this subject 25 scheduled at the full committee meeting next week when Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 presumably I will be thd only member there.
Because_I think 2
'that there are some. issues here that we want to get before 3
more of the membership.
Some:of the people have expressed 4
concern, or interest, or' ideas about some of these things.
5 I think that the topic in addition to the 6
question about adequate protection, I think that the staff 7
and the ACRS still have some other differences on the safety 8
goal policy, or the next stage or whatever.
We can perhaps 9
discuss these a little bit today, or it might be more 10 suitable to hold some of the discussion until next week at 11 the full committee.
12 But Wayne, as I see these, the remaining 13 questions are that of whether or not there should be a
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14 containment performance guideline of some so);t.
We still 15 differ on the definition of a large release.
We still see 16 the need for an acknowledgement that PRA, which is the only 17 tool that we have to measure even on a sampling basis the
'18 performance of plants and hence the performance of 19 regulations with a safety goal, has some major gaps in it.
20 Particularly it does not really provide any real 21 quantitative estimate of the human and organizational 22 performance in a plant.
We think somehow that the safety 23 goal policy or the imp' lamentation work after the policy 24 should acknowledge that explicitly.
25 And then finally we have a problem with the word Heritage Reporting Corporation O
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description'of this'as i' implementation of the safety goal 2
policy, and.we have talked about that before.
We see it as 3
really what you are doing is a fleshing out of the policy, 4
Not that it is inappropriate to have some sort of agreed 5
upon fleshing out and document it, but whether it should be 6
called implementation if questionable.
It is just a 7
semantic question, but it remains a question.
l 8
So with that, I would like to listen to what you 1
9 have to say about it.
Oh, I guess also although the 10 Commission has asked us to prepare a joint paper, that does-11 not seem to necessarily be a workable way to go about this, 12 but I would like to hear your opinions on that.
13 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Thank you, Dave.
My name is 14 Wayne Houston from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory
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15 Research.
And I appreciate the opportunity to appear here 16 this afternoon and talk with your subcommittee in absentia 17 to a large extent at the moment.
18 There is time available this afternoon to address 19 each of the other issues on which there is either apparent 20 disagreement, or a real disagreement, or a misunderstanding 21 with respect to other aspects of safety goal policy and/or 22 implementation thereof which is a semantics question.
23 In preparation for this afternoon's meeting, 1 24 did not really have a presentation to make.
You have before 25 you I believe copies of the SECY-89-102 entitled Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1 Implementation of Safetf Goal Policy dated March 30, 1988, 2
which incidentally toLthe best of my understanding has not 3c been made public, and it is not I think available in the
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4 document room.
5 But in that document among other things there are 6
a couple of pages I thi.A particularly in the text of the 7
Commission paper in which we attempted to describe 8
particularly the ACRS view that relates-to the question or 9
the issue of adequate protection.
I did prepare three 10 questions that I thought might be fruitful for discussion 11 possibly in the order that I will read them, and I do have a 12 little handout of them.
13 I have always assumed that our starting point
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14 both from the ACRS point of view and the staff's point of 15 view, although I have a residual question on this point, and 16 that is the safety goal policy statement itself which was 17 published in 1986.
And the question here is the policy l
18 statement itself.
It is quite clear on the meaning of 19 aafety goals as they may relate to the adequate protection l
20 issue.
1 21 And I am prepared to cite some portions of that 22 policy statement which while the staff's reading of it on 23 balance we think that 'it is clear that there are statements 24 in it which could be regarded as somewhat ambiguous on this l
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to discuss.
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2 The second one and from our vantage point perhaps 3
the most important one is our characterization of the ACRS 4
view relating to the adequate protection issue essentially 5
correctly characterized in SECY-89-102.
6 And the third is should there be a relationship 1
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between safety goal policy in the Commission's backfit 1^
8 policy as set forth in the backtit rule 10 CFR 50.109.
In 9
the staff's paper, as you are aware, we did make.the point 10
'of making a distinct relationship between the concept of implementing the safety goal policy and its relationship to 11 1
12 and its utilization in the process of applying certain 13 elements of not the entire backfit rule but certain elements
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14 of it.
15 And one might add parenthetically at this point 16 that to the best of my knowledge it is the only place that I 17 think that you will find reference to the term adequate 18 protection in the Commission's regulations, that is in 19 50.109 which is the backfit rule.
There may be others on 20 the staff if they were here who might recognize that there 21 are other parts of the regulations where that phraseology 22 which comes right out of the Atomic Energy Act is used, but 23 I am not aware of it.'
24 MR. WARD:
So it is in the Atomic Energy Act, but 25 it is not in the regulations except in this?
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1 MR. W. HOUSTdN:
To the best of my knowledge, 2
this is the only' place it is in the regulations.
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MR. WARD:
Okay.
4 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Which causes me parenthetically 5
to remark that I hed asked or had tried to get somebody from 6
our Office of General Counsel to come down this afternoon, 7
particularly the attorney who is most familiar with and most 8
involved with the creation of the most recent revision to 9
the backfit rule, Steve Crockett.
Unfortunately he is in 10 Tokyo.
The second choice unfortunately is in France or in 11 Germany I think today.
12 And although I,think that some others in the 13 office would hava liked to have come down, I do not think
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14 that we are going to have anybody from the Office of General 15 Counsel.
16 MR. WARD:
Do you think that Steve for example 17 might be available next week?
18 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
He said that he would be and i
19 that he was planning to be present at the full committee 20 meeting.
21 MR. WARD:
Okay.
22 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
So if we might go to the first 23 question, if you think that would be productive.
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24 MR. WARD:
I think that is a good way to go about 25 it.
That is fine.
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1 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
What I propose to do is just to 2
sort of read some words that appear at various places in the 3
safety goal policy statement.
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4 MR. WARD:
Co'uld you tell me where those are.
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5 have got a copy like this.
6 MR. W. HOUSTON:
I will identify the location.
I 7
The second sentence in the beginning summary statement.
8 "Its objective," that is the objective of that policy 9
statement, "is to establish goals that broadly define an 10 acceptable level of radiological risk."
11 My point in mentioning it is that it uses the 12 word " acceptable".
That is one input.
That statement is 13 repeated again Icnar on in the introduction under purpose lll 14 and scope.
15 Another sentence though that I would quote under 16 the purpose and scope in the first paragraph that the NRC 17 stated in response to the recommendations of the President's 18 Commission on the accident at Three Mile Island that it was 19
- prepared to move forward with an explicit policy statement 20 on safety philosophy and the role of safety-cost tradeoffs 21 in the NRC safety decisions."
22 That really was the origin of, I think that it is 23 fair to say, the origin of the concept of developing safety 24 goals, and it was intended to be responsive at least in 25 large measure to recommendations made by that Commission.
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1 And it does in that sentence link safety philosophy and the 2
role of safety / cost tradeoffs.
3 Now that does not necessarily mean however that 4
one cannot necessarily I'think infer from that language that 5
they can be related in such a way that the sa'fety goal 6
policy applies only to situations in which there are 7
safety / cost tradeoffs.
It does not need to be interpreted 8
that way.
I think that this was the intent.
9 MR. WARD:
You are saying that the safety goal 10 policy, you would infer from this statement, was intended to 11 apply or could be interpreted of this statement applying 12 only in situations where there is explicit safety / cost 13 tradeoff and that that is the only place ~r 14 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
I think that it is a piece of
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15 evidence that could be interpreted that way, yes.
16 MR. WARD:
Okay.
17 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
And again parenthetically if we 18 were to recall the earlier proposed policy statement, it did 19 explicitly incorporate for example the criterion or 20 guideline that has been in use by the staff for some time in 21 carrying out cost / benefit analyses on potential risk 22 reduction requirements of $1000 per person rem.
But that 23 was deleted from the final version of the policy statement..
24 And. Nelieve that I am correct in saying that this is the 25 only place in this final policy statement which safety / cost Heritage Reporting Corporation O
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2 MR. WARD:
It is clearly used here, but the grand 3
purpose of the safety goal seems to be --
4 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
It is not definitive.
5 MR. WARD:
Yes.
6 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
In the next paragraph, " Current 7
regulatory practicea are believed to ensure that the basic 8
statutory requirement, adequate protection of the public, is.
9 met.
Nevertheless, current practices could be improved to 10 provide a better means for testing the adequacy of and need 11 for current and proposed roqulatory requirements."
12 I think that that statement is one that from my 13 vantage point that the ACRS perhaps picked up on.
And from
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14 that statement you might get the point of view or the 15 opposite point of view that the purpose here is, although 16 the current regulatory practices are believed to assure that 17 the statutory requirement is met, that they could be 18 improved and "particularly testing the adequacy of," using a 19 word closely related to adequate protection.
20 One would draw a different kind of inference from 21 this that the intent of the safety goals is to give a 22 confirmatory feeling that the regulations do in fact assure 23 that the basic statutory requirement is met.
24 Towards the end of that paragraph they go on to 25 say, "This statement of NRC safety policy expresses the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
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1 Commission's views on th'e level of risks to public health 2
and safety that the industry should strive for in its 3
nuclear power plants."
4 Now this one could be taken to mean that there is 5
not any intent on the part of the Commission to do something 6
called implementing safety goals, but merely to set goals 7
that it expects licensees and applicants for licenses to 8
strive for and leave the matter at that.
That is one 9
possible interpretation of that statement.
10 Under purpose and scope in the introduction but 11 going on is the last paragraph in that section.
Again there 12 is a restatement of the objective in words that are very 13 similar and essentially identical to that which is in the
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14 summary statement.
"The objective of the Commission's 15 policy statement is to establish goals that broadly define 16 an acceptable level of radiological risk that might be 17 imposed on the public as a result of nuclear power plant 18 operation."
Again the word acceptable.
19 MR. WARD:
Where is this?
20 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
This is the last paragraph under 21 purpose and scope.
22 MR. WARD:
I have found it.
l 23 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
The beginning sentence.
24 MR. WARD:
Okay.
25 MR.
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HOUSTON:
The next one that I would point Heritage Reporting Corporation O
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-1 out falls under III in which are discussed the quantitative 2
objectives used to achieve the safety goals, that is the two 3
quantitative health objectives.
There is a general 4
consideration section and the classification of quantitative 5
risk objectives.
Then Part C,-the health affects, deals 6
with the prompt and latent cancer mortality risks.
7 If we start from the beginning of that Part C, 8
the first paragraph incorporates the two statements of the 9
quantitative health objectives.
And the paragraph 10 immediately following that, "The Commission believes that 11 this ratio of 0.1 percent appropriately reflects both of the 12 qualitative goals," et cetera.
13 And then the next sentence, "However, this does 14 not necessarily mean that an additional risk that exceeds 15 0.1 percent would by itself constitute a significant 16 additional risk."
17 The staff has looked at that among other things 18 here I think as a key sentence in the policy statement, 19 which would imply I think that it was not intended by the 20 Commission that the 0.1 percent quantitative health 21 objectives be inferred in some sense as statements such as 22 if a finding could be made or were made at a particular 23 plant that the risk would exceed the 0.1 percent for either 24 the prompt and latent cancer mortality risk, that that in 25 and of itself should be considered undue risk which legally Heritage Reporting Corporation
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equates to the term adequate protection.
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Finally I think that there was just one more 3
really that is pertinent to the point here.
Under 4
Part IV, the treatment o'f uncertainties, in the second 5
paragraph there is the discussion of the use of mean versus 6
median values which was of course a debate of some length a 7
number of years ago.
8 The Commission explains that it "has adopted the 9
use of mean estimates for purposes of implementing the 10 quantitative objectives of this safety goal policy."
Then 11 it says, "Use of the mean estimates comports with the 12 customary practices for cgst/ benefit analyses."
And it 13-seems to me that that is a key sentence.
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14 So it is on the basis of taking of all of those 15 statements into account that in the staff's proposed further 16 implementation if you will of the safoty goal policy that it 17 was taken as a given from this statement that what the 18 Commission had in mind was not safety goals that would in 19 some fashion define undue risk, or no undue risk, or 20 adequate protection, but rather couple it to the use of 21 cost / benefit methods for dealing with what could be 22 significant safety improvements in plants based upon new 23 knowledge, new operating experience or whatever, and we went l
24 from there.
25 From the ACRS letters which we read very l
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2 either a different interpretation of the policy statement 3
was made cn that the ACRS approached this matter and did not 4
necessarily take it as a'given that this policy statement 5
was not going to be changed, or modified, or edited, or 6
revised in some sense.
That is another way that I can ask a 7
question.
Maybe I will stop there for.a moment.
8 MR. WARD:
Okay.
9
.MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Mat Taylor has pointed out that 10 there is another place in here, I think that it is under 11 the statement about the health effects and quantitative 12 objectives.
And from the,same paragraph that I quoted 13 before to the effect that an additional risk that exceeds
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0.1 percent does not necessarily mean that exceeding that 14 15 would constitute a significant additional risk.
The next 16 sentenen says that, "The 0.1 percent ratio to other risks is 17 low enough to support an expectation that people living or 18 working near nuclear power plants would have no speclal 19 concern due to the plant's proximity."
20 I guess that this could be taken to mean that 21 this is not a cliff hanger and that this is not a sharp 22 threshold between something that one side of which is safe 23 and the other side of which is unsafe.
24 MR. WARD:
Well, to answer your questions about 25 the ACRS meant, starting from the back and from the last Heritage Reporting Corporation
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one, I think we were not necessarily setting out to insist 2
that the policy statement be revised or reworded, but we did 3
not think that would be entirely appropriate if it seemed to
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4-be necessary.
5 You know, we did think that the policy statement, 6
as you pointed out, is not completely unambiguous.
I think 7
that our hope or our intent was to see this implementation 8
or this fleshing out of the policy statement clear up the 9
' ambiguity by going in one direction or another, and we 10 suggested.a direction.
11 And I think that our direction as you pointed out 12 is more clearly related tg the second paragraph under the 13 purpose and scope in the introduction.
I guess that we took
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14 that as the one that we liked, and just suggested that the 15 further development and application of policy take off from 16 that one.
17 Our philosophy I guess for the safety goal 18 strategy would be to take off from something more like the 19 words that are in that second paragraph under the 20 introduction, Section A, purpose and scope.
21 Whether that would leave one with the need to go 22 back and change the other words in the introduction or not, 23 I do not think we nece'ssarily had an opinion on that.
Most I
24 written documents have ambiguity in it, and as long as the I
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-implementing work is clear.
It is a big problem.
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1 MR.
W.
HOUSTdN:
I guess that I might add if I 2
may perhaps for the record that at the time of the 3
preparation of the safety goal policy statement, the number 4
of years that passed between its initial conceptualization 5
and'the final issuance of it, at no time to the best of my 6
knowledge or recollection was this so-called issue of 7
adequate protection foremost in the minds of the Commission, 8
or the staff, or perhaps anybody.
9 The words adequate protection of the safety and 10-health of the public come right out of the Atomic Energy 11 Act.
And in each case in which the Commission has issued a 12 license and both a construction permit and particularly a-13 license to operate a plant, there has been a finding that
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But it has been a finding
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And it has never been 16 regarded as what is sometimes now being referred to as a 17 standard, a statutory standard.
18 I gather from a legal point of view that that is 19 reasonable language, that it is an adequate protection l
20 standard that is set by statute.
It was not until the i
21 modification of the backfit rule, 50.109, from that which 22 had been on the books for some twelve or fifteen years, I do 23 not know the exact number, but starting in I think 1985 that 24 a revision was made which the NRC was taken to court because l
25 of some ambiguous language I believe primarily in the Heritage Reporting Corporation
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was republished in accordance with the court decision on the 3
matter in final form in 1988.
4 But there is why I made the statement early on 5
that I'think that is the only place in the regulations that 6
the term adequate protection is in fact used.
And the fact 7
that it has been used there and in the context of the 8
backfit rule it has heightened the awareness on the part of-9 the staff and the Commission on the legal significance of 10 the term.
11 And of course from the court's point of view and 12 I think quite properly that the primary, I would say, the 13 primary legal significance of the term is that requirements 14 that are imposed by the Commission in order to establish
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15 adequate protection of the health and safety of the public 16 cannot be established on the basis of cost or cost / benefit 17 tradeoffs.
That is that they must be imposed as 18 requirements without regard to cost.
19 The only exception to that being what might call 20 the relatively minor exception that if there is more than 21 one way to satisfy a particular requirement that is needed 22 for adequate protection that the relative costs of the 23 different alternative ways can be a consideration.
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I for adequate protection.
2 So the legal aspect of it seems to focus more on l
3 the question of its association with or disassociation from 4'
cost considerations rather than its definition either 5
qualitative terms or quantitative terms.
But its 6
prospective use in the backfit rule at least to the Union of 7
Concerned Scientists seems to call for and they petitioned 8
the court to try to get the court to force the Commission as 9
it were to issue some kind of an objective standard or a set 10 of objective criteria so that the staff and the public would 11 know what that term means in a somewhat more concrete 12 fashion, and the court declined to do that.
13 MR. WARD:
Well, I guess that the ACRS did not
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14 very explicitly consider the concept of adequate protection 15 relative to the safety goal in its thinking and 16 deliberations over the last few years either.
17 In fact this connection I think in a way we came 18 kind of by the back door in that I think that our central 19 theme in the advice that we have given the Commissioners 20 about the safety goal has been that the goal should be the e
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criteria by which regulations are judged to be adequate, or 22 not or judged to be appropriate or not to get away from the 23 word adequate.
24 In fact that is sort of the grand scheme that we 25 see.
That the Commission is facing its constituency and Heritage Reporting Corporation O
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saying look, we are going to regulate.
By our regulations s
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we are going to do what we can to make sure that nuclear 3
power plants are this safe, and by this safe they mean the 4
level that is defined in'the safety goal.
And then they 5
turn around and they f ace the staf f and say staf f, vna want 6
you to provide a body of regulations that will carry out 7
this promise that we have made.
8 So therefore the test of the regulations is 9
whether or not they contribute to providing a population of 10 plants that meets the safety goal.
When legal arguments 11 come in about the term adequate protection and the much used 12 definition of adequate prgtection is something that meets 13 the regulations, you come up with a logical equivalency.
14 But I guess that I have some trouble with that 15 logical equivalency in making an algebraic equivalency.
You 16 know, the ACRS has tried to express its view all along that 17 we do not think that the safety goal and the quantitative 18 measure of using the PRA should be used as an absolute test 19 for an individual plant, and whether that plant is regulated 20 in a way that provides adequate protection.
21 But it is more the body of regulation and the 22 population of plants, and that indirectness is an important 23 part of'the relationship between the safety goal and what we 24 see as the definition of adequate protection.
25 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
From your remarks, I just wonder Heritage Reporting Corporation l
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.3 MR.~ WARD:
And--I'think that the answer is no,-~I' 4
.do not'think so.
Let me'see,.wherefis.that?
5 MR. W.
HOUSTON:.
It begins'on page four of the 6
SECY paper.
7 MR. WARD:- Okay.
8-MR' W.~ HOUSTON:
The last sentence in the middle 9
paragraph says, "However, ACRS comments ra*is'e the-issue of 10-whether safety goals should.be used to' define adequate
'11 protection in the: statutory licensing standardLwhich:must be 12
. applied without considering economic costs."
13 Then we make reference to the ACRS letter dated 14 May 27, 1988.
I am sorry, the ACRS letter dated
{y 115-April 12, 1988.
In which we'had responded to a question 16 from the Chairman in May that the ACRS view appeared to be-17-directed toward a different purpose'thanLthat expressed in 18 the Commission policy. statement on safety goals.
That is of course as we read the policy statement..
20 MR. WARD:-
This is a quote from the May 27th.
21 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
That is correct.
22 MR. WARD:
The staff's memo referring to the ACRS 23 letter..
The different' purposes as you went over the policy 24 statement, you could pick out a number of purposes if you 25 narrowly interpret each paragraph.
As I said before, I
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1 think that the purpose-t' hat the ACRS sees as most useful for
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introduction.
4 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
If I may, let me continue to 5
read from this.
"The staff understands that the ACRS view 6
expressed is a top-down approach to regulation," in which I 7
think that I borrowed the words " top-down" from the ACRS 8
letter.
9 MR. WARD:
Yes.
10 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
-- and would associate 11 quantitative objectives in a hierarchy as targets for 12 defining adequate protection of public health and safety."
13 Now that is a staff statement, and the ACRS letter did not
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14 say that.
But then it goes on --
15 MR. WARD:
I think that that is a pretty good 16 interpretation.
17 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
"The process of implementation 18 would thus be directed toward the ultimate establishment of 19 a body of regulations and practices that are derived from 20
.the safety goals and objectives and would then constitute a 21 complete statement or definition of adequate protection."
22 MR. WARD:
Yes.
I think that you have captured 23 very well what we are trying to say.
It is just that you 24 introduce that statement by saying that this is something 25 different from what the Commission's policy statement says.
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MR.
W.
HOUSTdN:
And you disagree with that?
l 2
MR. WARD:
Yes, I disagree with that.
3 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Okay.
4 MR. WARD:
I think that the last couple sentences 5
of that paragraph expresses very well what we were trying to 6
say.
7 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
I go on.
I think that I have 8
cited at least one other.
I thought that maybe there were 9
two others.
It is still in the April 12th letter.
"They 10 expressed a view that regulations should be revised without 11 recourse to cost / benefit arguments when the purpose of 12 revision is directed toward achieving safety performance 13 based upon safety goal guidance."
I think that is a direct 14 quote, although I did not put it in quotation marks.
15 MR. WARD:
Well, I do not know if it is, but it 16' is close.
I think that it captures what we said.
To my 17 mind it just follows logically and inevitably from what'you 18 said before.
19 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
The next sentence gets into the 20-question of how safe is safe enough.
And for this one, we 21 went to an ACRS letter dated July 20, 1988 on the subject of 22 key licensing issues associated with DOE sponsored reactor 23 designs.
And here reference is made again in that letter to 24 the use of safety goal policy.
And the statement here that 25 we have made is, "The ACRS associates the safety goal policy Heritage Reporting Corporation
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with a resolution of thd question how safe is safe enough."
2 And then we point out that the Commission's 1
3 backfit policy as set forth in 50.109 recognizes that there 4
are circumstances in which substantial increases in the 5
overall protection of the public health and safety over and l
l 6
above the minimum needed for adequate protection can be 1
7 achieved by justifiable regulatory action in which economic 8
costs are a consideration.
9 Then we say, "The staff believes that the 10 Commission intended that the safety goals and objectives 11 should be directed toward these latter circumstance."
Now 12 that is a statement of whqt the staff thought that the 13 Commission intended.
14 MR. WARD:
But you seem to be saying, and this is
(-)S 15 the first thing that you pointed out in the policy 16 statement, you seem to be saying that you think that the 17 safety goals should be directed only toward that.
18 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Yes, that is a fair statement.
19 MR. WARD:
You have drawn that pretty narrowly 20 from the words in the policy statement it seems to me.
21 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
That would not follow from the 22 policy statement per se, that is correct.
What it does is 23 that 1 perceive that it follows from attempting to combine 24 if you will or relate the safety goal policy statement to 25 the backfit rule coupled with I guess some common sense and Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1 logic that there is no such thing as zero risk.
2 And eventually if you keep imposing requirements 3
on operating plants and if you keep proper track of what 4
happens to the risk profile if you will of plants as these 5
-things are done step by step, and if in fact you are 6
achieving a gradual step by step reduction in risk, you are 7
gradually getting to the point where you can no longer 8
justify any additional requirements or any additional 9
And that is when the question of how safe is safe 10 enough is answered.
11 So we really differ I think on the meaning or we 12 may differ on the meaning,or significance of that simple 13 question which has been around for a couple of decades on
(])
14 how safe is safe enough.
Because if you think about it, it 15 is a question which can lead to ambiguity in answers.
Safe 16 enough for the public or safe enough for the NRC to back 17 away and say we cannot improve the safety of the plant 18 anymore.
19 MR. WARD:
It seems to me the safety goal has to 20 have something to do with the question of how safe is safe 21 enough.
22 I mean, if anyone, any layman, I guess, or person 23 who hasn't been paying much attention, hears about the 24 safety goal and is aware of the concept of how safe is safe 25 enough, that must be, it is almost sort of an obvious truism Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 or something that there'is a re'lationship between those two 2
things.
3 So the safety goal policy, saying that.the safety 4
goal policy is associated with the resolution or.is a 5
resolution of how safe is safe enough, seems to be a' pretty 6
widely held concept.
7 Now, okay.
Then you get the cost-benefit thing.
8 You know, one problem with.anything like the safety goal, 9
any sort of a standard goel, is the threshold problem.
10 Conceivably, the cost-benefit, the backfit rule 11 and the cost-benefit argument, could be a tool for dealing 12 with the threshold problem.
13 But it doesn't provide the total -- I mean, there
()
14 are certain requirements now in the body of regulations 15 which would probably fail a cost-benefit analysis.
I don't 16 know that the ACRS, for example, would therefore suggest 17 that those regulations be eliminated.
18 But I think that if certain regulations are found 39 not to contribute to plants conforming to the safety goal, 20 you know, I think there would be an argument coming from, 21 for example, the ACRS, that those regulations should be 22 eliminated or changed, as unnecessary.
23 I guess wha't I'm getting at is I sort of see the 24' safety goal as a macro tool and the cost-benefit as a micro 25 tool for massaging the inevitable problems you are going to Heritage Reporting Corporation
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- have
- with the interf5ce'with any fixed standard. ~ That's one
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way of looking'at it'.
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- 2' 3-MR. W.
HOUSTON:
I'm not sure whether' reference
.4:
is madeito itain this pa'er.
I think probably.not.
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But in one of the ACRS letters -- I!think it was L
'6
'probably in the April: 12' letter -- the sentence that-I read 7
a moment'ago, about regulations, the ACRS expressed the view:
H l
8.
'that regulations should be revised without recourse to cost-:
1 9
benefit arguments.when the~ purpose is to establish.
10 achievement. performance based upon safety goal' guidance.
11' The words seem to suggest there may be other uses 12-of cost-benefit arguments.
But then it sort of left me 13 hanging as to what those other uses might be.
14 MR. WARD:
It did, I agree.
And we didn't --
15 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
I: recognize that you, like we,'l 16
. suppose in a sense, grapple with the fact that the backfit 17
-rule is there.
18 MR. WARD:
Right.
19 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Whether you or we like it or 20 not.
21 MR. WARD: 'Right.
22 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
And it is there and it is 23' something we have to l'ive with and it is something the staff 24 really,.it is guidance to the staff, basically, or direction 25 to the staff.
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2 1
And what we are trying to do is orient the thrust 2
of dealing with safety goals, or as we called it, the r
3 implementation of, to be consistent with the backfit policy, 4
and to provide a kind of'an answer of how safe is safe
-5 enough.
6 But in the context in which I personally 7
understood that question many, many years ago to be not so 8
much in the context of what does the public think is safe 9
enough, but when will the NRC or then the AEC get off our 10 backs, so to speak, we've done enough, our plants are safe 11 enough.
I 12 That to me was the original context of the s
13 question.
()
14 MR. WARD:
Yes, I agree.
I think the Commission 15 has the responsibility as the agent of the public or agent 16 of society or whatever, to, as expert, to establish the 17 standard for how safe it safe enough.
18 I think that is what is done with the safety 19 goal.
20 MR. WARD:
Yes.
21 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
We just haven't learned to use 22 it very well yet.
23 MR. WARD:
'No.
We're struggling with it.
Yes.
24 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
But another way to phrase it, I 3
25 guess -- the phraseology isn't in here, and it might be Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1 unwise in a sense to usd it to extrapolate from a different 2
kind of a situation, but thinking of, you used the word 3
" threshold" -- thinking of safety goal objectives as 4
threshold numbers, one ebuld, the interpretation that the 5
staff has placed upon it is that the thrust of implementing 6
the safety goals is such that when there exists reasonable 7
assurance that the regulations are sufficiently effective, 8
or the regulatory process, practices and regulations are 9
carrying their weight, in a both plus and minus sense, the 10 results should be that nothing more, anything more than that 11 becomes below regulatory concern.
12 And although wg haven't used the BRC terminology 13 in this context, I think that is still an apt term for what
(])
14 we are talking about.
15 So it seemed to us that what we had was a 16 threshold using safety goals as a threshold beyond which 17 there need be no regulatory concern.
And that was the 18 answer to the question "how safe is safe enough."
19 But an alternative view on the answer to the 20 question is, could be, that the safety goal, the l
21 quantitative health objectives, for example, could be taken 22 to represent that which the public need have no concern 23 about, but is also equivalent to a definition of adequate l
24 protection and no undue risk.
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In other words, l't is safe enough for the public.
2-And I see a band in between those two, you see.
3 MR. WARD:
I'm sorry.
I'm missing the 4
distinction.
They sound'11ke the same thing to me.
5 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Well, if we can imagine a plot, 6
for example, with a risk scale as the ordinate, so that 7-increasing risk is going upwards, at some level, let's say, 8
on this plot, near the upper portion of the plot, one might 9
draw a line and call that the line between adequate 10 protection and inadequate protection, or no undue risk on 11 the lower side and undue risk on the upper side.
12 MR. WARD:
Okay.
13 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
'You can think of it as a line, 14 if it is a threshold thing, or a fuzzy band, if you like.
15 Down near the bottom of the thing, this plot, 16 there is another line or a fuzzy band below which you are in 17 a region of below regulatory concern.
18 And in between those two bands is the realm in 19 which the backfit policy, backfit rule, can function.
20 That's another way of looking at that.
21 MR. WARD:
Okay.
And you are saying that is 22 where the backfit rule operates.
23 Let's see.
Is that a lot different from -- okay.
24 I guess the structure I was seeing was that fuzzy line, 25 there is only one fuzzy line.
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But I recognize that there is a problem with 2
interpretation and what I call the threshold problem, and l
3 that you need something like the backfit rule or a cost-4 benefit concept, to deal' with that.
l 5
So maybe we are really talking about kind of the 6
same thing.
7 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Yes.
I guess, hearing what you 8
say, it sounds to me like if we take the same plot, rather l
9 than putting the two lines on them as.I've done, you've got 10 a fuzzy band somewhere in the middle of this.
11 MR. WARD:
Yes.
12 MR.
W. HOUSTON (
And that sort of below this band 4 13 it is acceptable and above this band it is not acceptable.
14 MR. WARD:
Yes.
{}
15 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
And that because it is a band 16 rather than a sharp line or a threshold, you've got a little 17 maneuvering room in there in terms of cost-benefit perhaps 18 or judgment questions in dealing with the uncertainties of 19 the PRA.
20 MR. WARD:
I guess it is not so much that you 21 have maneuvering room, that sort of implies you want that, 22 but I see it more that there is going to be --
23 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
An uncertainty.
24 MR. WARD:
-- arguing rocm in there or something.
25 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Okay.
Arguing room.
Fine.
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MR. WARD:
Add you want to have a tool for 2
dealing with that, you know, systematic way of dealing with' 3
those inevitable arguments.
4 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
And that tool would be?
5 MR. WARD:
Maybe something like the backfit rule.
.R.
W. HOUSTON:
Or cost-benefit.
6 M
-7 MR. WARD:
Tes, or cost-benefit.
8 MR. W. HOUSTON:
All right.
Yes.
9 MR. WARD:
So maybe we're talking about the same 10 thing.
11 See, because in your definition, you've got this 12 area called no undue risk, Then below that, another area 13 called no regulatory concern.
(])-
14 But that means that in the area of no undue risk, 15 you do have regulatory concern.
16 And I guess, what authority does the agency have 17 for having regulatory concern in an area where there is no 18 undue risk?
It's just kind of a logical -- or maybe that l
19 his just semantics.
20 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
If I used those words, I 21 misspoke.
22 MR. WARD:
That's what you said.
Well, I didn't 23 understand, I guess, then.
24 Yes?
Why don't you come up here and participate.
25 Glad to have you participate.
g-Heritage Reporting Corporation I
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This is Matt ' Taylor.
2 MR. TAYLOR:
I just wanted to add that there is a 3
two-tier philosophy that was established in the court test, 4
the initial court test oh the backfit' rule, when it 5
interpreted the statutes for the Atomic Energy Act.
6 So there is a two-tier philosophy.
One of which, 7
the threshold line would be called the adequate protection B
line.
And to achieve that, no costs would be allowed.
9 Below that level, would be certainly improvements that could 10 be made in safety but one was permitted to make a cost-11 benefit test.
12 So that two-tigr philosophy is not that much 13 different than what I believe Wayne is talking about, and it 14 does have a statutory basis.
15-MR. WARD:
Yes.
Okay.
It's a line and a region, 16 I guess.
Well, same thing.
Okay.
17 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Would I be correct in -- let's 18 see if we can figure out whether we're making any progress 19 here.
20 MR. WARD:
Yes.
21 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Would I be correct in 22 understanding that that ACRS didn't really set out with its 23 proposed plan for safety goal policy implementation to 24 define in a legal sense the term " adequate protection"?
25 THE WITNESS:
No.
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1 MR. W.
HOUSTdN:
Is that a fair statement?
2 MR. WARD:
That's right.
As I say, I think we l-3 backed into it.
4 MR.
W.
HOUSTOli:
Sort of backed into it.
5 MR. WARD:
-Yes.
6 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
And sort of like getting a l
7 buzzsaw as you're backing in.
8 Although I recall very clearly back in early l
9 1987, the first people that you brought in af ter vna had some 10 problems with an earlier version of staff's plans, that you 11 brought in the lawyers.
And so that's a piece of evidence 1
12 of concern that there was,something sort of lingering there l
13 that you wanted to get a better grasp on.
l
()
14 MR. WARD:
Yes.
I think that's right.
Yes, I 15 don't know that I'm really, when I say -- Yes, I'm not 16 really speaking for th? committee.
17 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
My third question, and I don't 18 know whether we've really exhausted this, and I'm not sure 19 what the answer is, I again raise the question, has the 20 staff correctly characterized the ACRS view?
I guess it is 21 partly yes and partly no.
22 MR. WARD:
Yes.
I think most of the text on Page 23 4 and 5 I think you did, where you described the ACRS view.
24 But then you just, you led off by saying that you sort of 25 implied, well, that may be a nice logical view.
It doesn't
'(~~
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I derive from the safety goa1' policy.
-2 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Okay.
1 3
MR. WARD:
That's kind of what you said.
4 MR.
W.
HOUSTOil:
Right.
5 MR. WARD:
And that is where we differ with you.
l 6
I think we think that it can, it does derive from 7
the safety goal policy.
8 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
We've talked enough about the 9
backfit policy.
I guess my question was, should there be a 10 relationship between the two?
11 MR. WARD:
Yes.
And I acknowledge we, the ACRS, l
12 didn't really come to grips with that in our April whatever 13 it was, 12th, 1988 letter.
We kind of left that for a
()
14 future time which is now, I guess.
15 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
How is the future.
16 MR. WARD:
Yee.
17 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Maybe before -- I sense we may 18 be coming to some sort of a conclusion here.
A couple of 19 things.
This again is just sort of for the record.
That l
20 in any future work, either on the part of the ACRS or the l
l 21 staff, I think it might be of use to bear in mind, to the 22 best of my knowledge and experience, very few -- and Matt, I 23 am sure you will correct me if I am wrong on this --
24 certainly in the recent past there is a real paucity ci 25 examples of instances in which new regulatory requirements l
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1 have been imposed as hadkfits that utilized, or that were 2
justified on the basis of needed for adequate protection.
3 Most everything that comes through provides a I
4 regulatory analysis which incorporates cost benefit 5
considerations.
6 MR. WARD:
Yes.
7 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
There is currently in process 8
one that departs from that.
The current change to the PTS 9
rule, Part 50.61, where there are some changes I think in 10 the formulas that are identified there for calculating the 11 reference temperature for a nil ductility transition, that l
-12 has gone through the CRGR, it has gone I think through the 13 ACRS.
l ()
14 I am not sure the ACRS focused on that element of 15 the justification, or the rule change.
But there is, to the 16 best of my knowledge, one of the first examples of the use 17 of the current backfit rule and an appeal to that part of 18 the backfit rule dealing with adequate protection, i
19 MR. TAYLOR:
I would just point out one example, l
20 I believe -- the station blackout rule.
That was very 21 clearly stated to be resolution of a USI aimed towards 22 accident prevention, enhanced safety, not mandatory for 23 adequate protection, but certainly cost beneficial and 24 justified through the backfit rule.
25 So that was in that second tier, if you will, of Heritage Reporting Corporation O
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1 the statute.
2 The Commission has passed standards in that two-3 tier, that are not mandated by the adequate protection
~
4 standard.
And I believe that there has been a fairly 5
obvious practice by the Commission to impc se upon itself a 6
test of all new rules against the backfit rule, suggesting
~7
'that all new rules are in fact in that second tier.
1 MR. WARD:
Well, I guess what we have been 9
stumbling around here with is that that may not be, that 10 there first should be a test against, I mean, you know one 11 concept would be a test against the safety goal, and if it 12 is a close call or you seem to be muddling around in the 13 area of the threshold, then you call on cost-benefit 14 analysis, which the backfit rule provides for, to help with 15 the decision there.
16 But I think so far the staff hasn't been 17 explicitly using the safety goal in its resolution of USIs.
18 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
That is correct.
19 MR. WARD:
I think that is sort of, it is out 20 there and I am sure it is in everybody's mind, but there 21 hasn't been explicit use of it.
22 I don't know if this comes together as a -- what 23 happens if you have a' proposed new rule that let's say, that 24 is clearly shown to -- or you reach a conclusion from the 25 risk studies that have been made and from staring at the Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1 safety' goal, you reach d. conclusion that it really doesn't, 2
isn't_ going'to do much to bring plants into conformance with 3
the safety goal.
But you can develop an argument for 4
spending a certain amount of money. based on the cost-benefit 5
rule.
6 What do you do then?
7 Marren Minners.
8 MR. MINNERS:
Warren Minners of the Office of 9
Research.
10 I don't think that can occur, because the backfit 11 rule requires you to not only do a cost-benefit balancing 12 but you have to make a finding of substantial safety 13 improvement.
r
(
14 So I think what you postulate is pretty hard to 15 come by.
16 MR. WARD:
So I guess in making a finding of 17 substantial safety improvement, what do you use for a gauge?
10 I mean, that is where, I guess that is where the safety goal 19 would logically fit in.
There is another term, substantial 20 safety improvement.
Where does that fit into the glossary 21 of definitions?
22 MR. MINNERS:
Even as a practical matter, you 23 don't have to pay too'much attention to substantial safety 24 improvement, because when you do a cost-benefit balancing, 25 unless you have a substantial safety improvement, you are
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1 not going to be able to"make a cost-effective balance.
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2 101. W. HOUSTON:
Let me supplement that, if I 3
may.
4 In many insta'nces, the staff has in fact used two 5
entirely different gauges for substantial safety 6
improvement, although it may not have thought of them as two 7
different ways of gauging something as similar as a safety 8
improvement.
9
,0ne of them is, as Warren has said, is on the 10
. benefit side of the ratio or the equation, if you will, of 11 the cost-benefit analysis.
12 The benefit is, a safety improvement expressed in 13 terms of a lessened, incrementally lessened impact, 14 potential impact on the public, 15 But it is quite common in resolving safety issues 16 also to deal with, to try to quantify the effects on
.17 preventing accidents from happening in the first place, 18 which is done in terms of calculating core damage 19 frequencies.
And if the nature of the issue is such that l
20 there is a potential for a reduction in core damage 21 frequency, this also is specified and can be thought of as 22 another way of measuring just how safety significant the 23 proposed reduction is.
You know, a factor of 2, a factor of 24 10, or whatever it happens to be.
25 We don't have strict guidelines that a factor of l
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1 2 is significant and anything less is not..
But comparisons 1
2 are made on a before and after sense with and without the i
3
'fix of the effects on core damage frequency or core melt
)
4 frequency.
5 But although I don't think you will find any 6
regulatory analysis that associates these with safety goals, 7
quote unquote, they are nevertheless results of PRA analyses i
8 which have been used in that fashion.
9 MR. WARD:
Yes.
10 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
And can be represented as one of 11 the measures of safety improvement.
12 MR. WARD:
Yes It seems to me there is in fact
]
t 1
13 use of the safety goal there, because maybe there is not an R
14 explicit policy yet.
That is because you have taken so long 15 to get this implementation out.
)
16 Dut I mean it seems to me the staff is all aware 17 of the numbers that are being considered as part of the 18 safety goal policy.
19 And I think no one has ever pretended that these 20 judgments are going to fall out of the analysis 21 automatically fron
.ae numbers, or that the decisions are 22 going to fall off.
23 But the staff, whoever is making the decision, is 24 going to look at the numbers they generate and they are 25 going to look at the safety goal policy, or some sort of a Heritage Reporting Corporation
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K-1 standard, whether it has been real explicit or not, and 2
reach a judgment.
And that is the process that goes on.
3 I think here we are just talking about let's get 4
a little more explicit and firm up and get everybody to 5
agree on using the same standard over here when they are 6
staring at something to reach a judgment.
7 MR. TAYLOR:
Just one thought again.
Going back 8
to the station blackout rule, I believe you will find a 9
regulatory analysis did address the degree to which that 10 rule might be expected to conform with the safety goal 11 policy and a 10 to the minus 6 large release, and the 12 analysis supporting that rule.
13 So there was an attempt to address regulatory b'"/)
14 analysis in that rule, supporting analysis.
NUREG 1032 I 15 believe.
16 MR. MINNERS:
I know in A-45 there was a direct 17 comparison.
18 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Actually, in A-45, let's see, 19 there was, I think there was some inconsistency with what 20 the staff was staring at over here and what is the most 21 probable set of safety goal numbers that is going to 22 develop, as I recall.
23 MR. MINNERS:
I think we said we were ta] king 24 about we had set a goal of 10 to the minus 5.
25 MR. WARD:
Yes.
That's right.
What does the Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1.
safety goal say in its present incarnation?
2 MR. W. HOUSTON:
10 to the minus 5 just for the 3
contribution from decay heat.
4 MR. WARD:
Oh', maybe that was it.
Okay.
5 MR. W. HOUSTON:
Sort of a partitioned safety 6
goal, if you will.
7 MR. WARD:
Okay.
All right.
I'm wrong about 8
that I guess.
9 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
I wonder if we are at the point 10 where we can talk about how we deal with the joint letter?
11 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Yes.
That's what I was going to 12 suggest.
Because we are going to be having the same 13 discussion next week.
And so let's talk about that.
14 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
It seems to me that the only 15 practical way for this to happen is the customary way in 16 which the staff prepares a response for the EDO to share its 17 comment on it.
18 Hopefully, it could be the kind of thing where 19 the staff paper or the ACRS could agree with.
But you know, 20 it depends on what it says.
21 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Well, let's anticipate that as a 22 possibility, anyway.
23 But if not, at least we could try to be perhaps r
24 ACRS can try to be a little more complete and a little more, 25 well, just be a little clear about where it actually Heritage Reporting Corporation
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. disagrees or something. '
2 4U1. W.
HOUSTON:
What I think we propose to do 3
would be to draft such a paper.
While I conceivably could 4
have such a draft next week, it is not one that could get 5
through the EDO's office.
6 MR. WARD:
Yes.
7 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
The Commission requested.a l
8 response by mid-October.
l
'9 MR. WARD:
Yes.
10 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
And right now I guess I would 11 say that it may be a little bit difficult to put this-12 together, both things, to go to the Commission prior to 13 October 15.
14 MR. WARD:
Yes.
15 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
What I could have is some draft 16 language to discuss at the full committee meeting, making l
17 use of our discussion today, and some changes I think in the l
l 18 way it was described in the Commission paper, sort of 19 highlighting, I think the differences.
There are not very 20 many differences, I think.
It boils down to the overall 21 objective in which the staff tied its position pretty much 22 to the integration, if you will, with the backfit rule, 23 which the ACRS view did not.
24 Mo. WARD:
I see.
s.
W.
HOUSTON:
But at the same time did not 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation
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intentionally-set out td try to define the definition of 2
statutory, the statutory definition of adequate protection.
1 3
MR. WARD:
Yes.
4 MR. W. HOUSTOh:
I think that is the key right 5
there.
l 6
MR. WARD:
Yes.
I think that is a workable l'
7 approach.
8 I mean, this paper you had proposed to write, 9
what are we talking about?
It would be a, you know, how 10 long a paper?
I mean, if you'are going to get the --
11 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Two pages.
12 MR. WARD:
Okay.
Yes.
Well, I think --
13 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
I don't think it would take more
'( )
14 than that.
15 MR. WARD:
Yes.
I don't see why it should, 16 either.
But I think something --
17 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
It may be done in one page.
l 18 MR. WARD:
Okay.
But I think something like 19 that, you know, within the scope of a meeting next week, the j
20 ACRS may be able to get its hands around, its mind around, l
21 or something, enough to have an opinion that is clear and 22 can be stated clearly, as to agreeing, or we agree except 23 for this point, or something.
1 24 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
I mean, it is clear that you 25 can't really formally comment on or write a letter on Heritage Reporting Corporation O
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something until you see'something has been presented to the 2
Commission.
Correct?
3 MR. WARD:
Sure.
No, we can comment on l
l 4
something. We could even' attach the draft to the letter, I L
5 guess.
6 I mean, you can't present it to the Commission l
7 unti1~you get it through the EDO's office, right?
l 8
MR. W. HOUSTON:
Correct.
l 9
MR. WARD:
I don't know, Dean.
When we've got 10 this October 15 deadline, which is sort of so what, I guess.
11 We are just trying to do it by the usual means.
12 But we would comment on sQmething the staff has written.
13 The problem is that if we comment on something
()
14 that is in draft form and then by the time the Commission 15 sees it, it is different, our comments may make even less 16 sense than they did the first time around.
And I think that 17 is what we're trying to deal with.
18 Would it do any good to postpone it by a month?
19 MR. W. HOUSTON:
It would make it easier.
20 MR. WARD:
Yes. But would we just have the same, 21 let's see -- well, we have commented on drafts of things 22 before.
23 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
That is true.
24 MR. WARD:
We've just stated that this is the 25 draft of such and such a date, and that's it.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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MR. W.
HOUSTdN:
That is true.
2 MR. WARD:
Why can't we do that7 I mean, that
.3
-draft is documented within the agency, right?
4 MR. W. HOUSTON:
Yes.
l 5
MR. WARD:
I mean, if we define a title and a 6
draft dated such and such, doesn't that refer to a fixed 7
piece of paper, more or less?
8 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
It.should.
Sometimes you see 9
two different drafts having the same date on it.
10 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Yes.
Okay.
11 Well, why don't we do that?
I don't know, 12 that's not so far out.
i 13 MR. W. HOUSTON:
Very good, f) 14 MR. WARD:
Okay.
Do you want to talk about these 15 other items now or do you want to wait and take about those 16 at the full committee meeting?
That might be more -- what 17 do we have, two hours at the full committee?
18 MR.
D. HOUSTON:
Yes.
Right now it is the first l
19 thing on the agenda Thursday morning, 8:35 to 10:35.
20 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
I guess I'm inclined to say it 21 probably would be better to wait and do it with the full 22 committee.
23 MR. WARD:
Yes.
24 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
And I will prepare some 25 viewgraphs.
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MR. WARD:
Okay.
I' 2.
MR. W.
HOUSTON:
And identify the uses.
3 MR. WARD:
All right.
L 4
MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
I think you have identified 5
everything.
I just reread recently the transcript of your 1
6 meeting with the Commission.
7 MR. WARD:
Yes.
8 MR..W.
HOUSTON:
Back in April or whenever it 9
was, where you sort of outline some of the differences 10 there.
11 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Okay.
Well, I think, you know, 12 two hours -- well, then the question comes up, how can we 13 come to closure on these additional points?
r3 14 MR '.
W.
HOUSTON:
I don't know.
(J 15 MR. WARD:
I'm talking more just about the 16 procass.
17 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Yes.
It's been some five months 18 I think that the Commission has had before it --
19 MR. WARD:
Yes.
20 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
-- our request to authorize us 21 to proceed.
22 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Well, the only difference they 23 seem to pick up on is this one, on the adequate protection.
24 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
I think that was a key one, yes.
25 MR. WARD:
Yes.
I think frankly, the committee I Heritage Reporting Corporation
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'l think~ thinks a couple of these others are more important.
2 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
I understand that.-
3 3
MR. WARD:
Okay.
1 4
MR. W.
HOUSTOli:
Additional containment failure 5
probably.
6 MR. WARD:
Yes.
And you know, what we mean there 7
is, you know, containment failure probability may be too 8
restrictive of a definition of what we are groping for or 9
asking for.
But some floor on the mitigative capacity sort i
10 of is what we really want.
11 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Yes.
12 MR. WARD:
Whether that is a containment or a 13 process or something.
(])
14 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Something you are struggling 15 with with a different hat on in the future.
16 MR. WARD:
Yes. That's right.
17 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Oh. On the large release 18 question.
I guess what we wrote in a paper as a definition 19 was really intended as a criterion.
And I'm not quite clear 20 for example, the comments that ACRS has made on that is that 21 it is ten times more conservative than the quantitative 22 health objective for early fatality.
23 I don't know where that comes from.
I'd be 24 curious.
I think it may be that the early draft of 11.50 25 may have, simply because they presented results of some Heritage Reporting Corporation s
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1 calculations which may have shown something of that order of L
2 magnitude.
I don't think that same comparison is in the 3
revised draft of 11.50.
4 It certainly was not intended to'be something L
5 that was definitively more conservative.
As a matter of 6-fact, the very reason that it is there was the fact of the 7
fair amount of time that we spent discussing the potential 8
definitions of large release.
9 ACRS members made it-very. clear that it is 10 something that should be' big enough to at least have the 11 potential for outside fatality because that was inherent in 12 the quantitative health objectives.
13 That's the only reason it was there.
But it was 14 probably a mischaracterization of it to state it as a 15 definition.
16 It was done that way by analogy to a problem with 17 core damage or core melt frequency where people blithely 18 talk about 10 to the minus 3, minus 4, minus 5, minus 6 core 19 melt frequencies and don't concern themselves particularly 20 with what core melt is.
21 MR.
L'.. t0 :
~a s.
22 MR.
W.
HOUSTJN:
And you've faced up to that 23 issue.
24 MR. WARD:
Right.
25 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
And yet I haven't heard anybody Heritage Reporting Corporation
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(202) 628-4888
49 m-1 insist on a precise definition of core melt.
And what we 2
are trying to is leave it flexible for the time being in 3
terms of the large release.
4 And there is ha discussion in the paper of the i
5 problems associated with -- admittedly they are perceived i
6 problems associated with -- a release'as-a release kind of 7
thing, by number at curies.
8 BaFIC s.l }y I don't think we are in disagreement on 9
- what we are try ;.3 to achieve there.
But the words probably 10 didn't come out quite right.
11 I think we can resolve that one.
12 MR. WARD:
Okay.
Yes.
i 13 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
We will be trying to quantify or 1
i
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14 come to grips more with the containment performance 15 objective.
16 MR. WARD:
Yes.
l 17 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
That is one that the staff has 18 wrestled with on and off I think for a number of years, and I
19 is not yet successfully dealing with it.
20 MR. WARD:
Yes.
21 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
Okay.
We will be prepared to do 22 that next week.
l l
23 MR. WARD:
'Okay.
And the other one is this 1
24 acknowledgement of the inability of the present art of PRA J
i 25 to meaningfully quantify the risk that comes from --
)
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1 MR. W.
HOUST6N:
We have no_ disagreement tliere.
2 I think it just highlighted the fact that the ACRS said 3
that.
I. guess what I didn't say is that if we were to 4
revise the policy statem'ent as we recommended, we would 5
incorporate that in there.
But I don't think it said that.
6 MR. WARD:
Yes.
7 MR.
W.
HOUSTON:
That was not intentional.
8 MR. WARD:
Okay.
Well, revising the policy 9
statement or what I keep calling " fleshing it out," I mean 10 it seems it would be appropriate, well, you agree it might-11 be appropriate to say something like that in this document, 12 89-1027 13 Oh.
Okay.
All right.
Okay.
(}
14 And we will probably spend 30 minutes talking 15 about using the word " implementation" here.
See if you can 16 think of something clever to get out from that.
That would 17 be a' good idea.
18 MR. W.
HOUSTON:
Okay.
19 MR. WARD:
All right.
Well, thank you very much.
20 Any other comments?
Dean, do you know anything 21 else we ought to talk about?
22 MR. D.
HOUSTON:
No.
23 MR. WARD:
'Okay.
Thank you very much for coming 24 down.
I apologize that my colleagues couldn't make it.
25 But we will be here in force next week.
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1 Thank you very much.
2 (Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m.,.the meeting was 3'
adjourned.)
^
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'6 '
l 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
.17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation
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1 CERTIFICATE 2
3 This is to certify that the. attached proceedings before the i
(
4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter 5
of:
6 Name:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFETY PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY, AND CRITERIA 7
8 Docket Number:
9 Place:
Bethesda, Maryland 10 Date:
September 26, 1989 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 13 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and,
(])
14 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the 15 direction of the court reporting company, and that the 16 transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing 17 proceedings.
18
/s/
Ok W
19 (Signature typed) :
Joan Rose 20 official Reporter 21 Heritage Reporting Corporation 22 23 24 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY THE SAFETY PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY, AND (oJ CRITERIA SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S REPORT SEPTEMBER 26, 1989 The meeting will now come to order. This is a meeting of the Advisory Consnittee on Recctor Safeguards Subcommittee on Safety Philosophy, Technolocy, and Criteria.
I am D. Verd, Subcommittee Chairman.
Other ACRS Members in attendence are:
H. Lewis and F. Remick.
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the preparation of a joint paper which gives the ACRS and fEC staff positions on the concept of adequate protectict., as it relates to the safety goals.
D. Houston is the cognizant ACRS Staff Member for this meeting.
O The rules for participation in today's meeting have been announced as part of the notice of this nieeting previously published in the Federal Register on September 18, 1969 (FR 38466).
A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available as stated in the Federal Register Notice.
It is requested that each specker first identify himself or herself and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that he or she can be readily heard.
We have received no written comments or requests to make oral statements from members of the public.
(Chairmens' Conraents - if any)
We will proceed with the meeting, and I call upon W. Houston to begin.
i r
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ADE0VATE PROTECTION AND SAFETY GOAL POLICY
- 1.
Is the Safety Goal Policy Statement itself clear on the meaning of safety goals as they may relate to the adequate protection issue?
2.
.In SECY-89-102, Implementation of Safety Goal Policy, dated March 30,1989, has the staff correctly characterized the ACRS view?
O 3.
Should there be a relationship between Safety Goal Policy and f
the Commission's Backfit Policy as set forth in the Backfit Rule, 10 CFR 50.109?
l l
l Questions for discussion with ACRS Sub-Committee, Sept. 26, 1989 i
O l
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