ML20248C196
| ML20248C196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/15/1989 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Bowsher C, Darman R GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906090298 | |
| Download: ML20248C196 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES E8*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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May 15, 1989 CHAIRMAN -
The Honorable Charles A. Bowsher Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C.
20548
Dear Mr. Bowsher:
In accordance with the statutory obligation to respond to General Accounting Office (GA0) recommendations within 60 days of publica-tion, we are responding to the recommendations made by GA0 in their report entitled "NRC's Security Clearance Program Can Be Strengthened."
The-Commission agrees with all three recommendations contained in the report and.is taking appropriate action to implement them.
We believe that these. agency actions will enhance security and improve the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Security Clearance. Program.
Although no formal recommendation was made, the GAO commented extensively in its report on NRC's use of pre-appointment investigative waivers.
We recognize that this procedure, originally intended to-be utilized on an exceptional basis, has become relatively routine.
We believe, however, that the length
.of time required to complete background investigations and the difficulties we are experiencing in recruiting high quality employees leave us no practical alternative at this time to continued reliance on the section 145(b) waiver approach.
Our specific comments on the GA0 recommendations and on our use of pre-appointment investigative waivers are presented in the enclosure.
Sincerely, DV, Lando W.
Ze
, Jr
Enclosure:
Responses to GA0 Recommendations 8906090298 890515 lI PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDC L
ct:
'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 May 15, 1989 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Richard G. Darman Director Office of Management and Budget Washington, D. C.
20503 i
Dear Mr. Darman:
In accordance with the statutory obligation to respond to General Accounting Office (GA0) recommendations within 60 days of publica-tion, we are responding to the recommendations made by GA0 in their report entitled "NRC's Security Clearance Program Can Be Strengthened."
i The Commission agrees with all three recommendations contained in t
the report and is taking appropriate action to implement them.
We believe that these agency actions will enhance security and improve the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Security Clearance Program.
Although no formal recommendation was made, the GA0 commented extensively in its report on NRC's use.of pre-appointment investigative waivers.
We recognize that this procedure, originally intended to be utilized on an exceptional basis, has become relatively routine.
We believe, however, that the length of time required to complete background investigations and the difficulties we are experiencing in recruiting high quality employees leave us no practical alternative at this time to continued reliance on the section 145(b) waiver approach.
Our specific comments on the GA0 recommendations and on our use of pre-appointment investigative waivers are presented in the enclosure.
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Sincerely, o Vv.
Lando W. Zc
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Enclosure:
Responses to GA0 Recommendations l
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_______m
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S (NRC'S) RESPONSE TO THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE'S RECOMMENDATIONS GA0 Recommendation 1:
(Executive Sumary, page 5)
NRC require periodic reinvestigations for all employees.
NRC Response While NRC has had a reinvestigation program for all "Q" cleared employees since 1983, we did not routinely reinvestigate "L" cleared employees.
Based on GA0's report and the recommendation of the Director of Security, NRC's Executive Director for Operations, on April 28, 1989, formally implemented the reinvestigation program for "L" cleared employees, licensees, and contractors.
A copy of his memorandum to the Comission on these matters is attached.
GA0 Recommendation 2:
(Executive Summary, page 5)
NRC validate and update the security clearance database.
NRC Response NRC agrees with the GA0 recommendation that the automated Central Personnel Clearance Index (CPCI) database needs to be revalidated and updated and has already initiated such action. We have corrected the 69 incorrect social security records that were found by GAO, and the records on the 22 individuals who are no longer employed by NRC--many of whom were sumer hires and coopera-tive students--have been revised to reflect a terminated clearance status.
Procedures have been instituted to require that our CPCI records be compared on a quarterly basis against NRC Personnel and Payroll records. To further enhance the accuracy of the database, we now require all employees, con-sultants, summer hires, and cooperative students to be processed through the Division of Security upon termination of their employment so that their records can be promptly updated.
We believe these actions will ensure the overall accuracy and reliability of our system for post-1983 data. As indicated in the GAO report, all pre-1983 data elements for NRC personnel security files may not now be in the database.
We are taking action to update all required data elements as each file is pulled in connection with some other action, such as a visit certification or the expanded reinvestigation program.
Although we are taking action to update our database, it should be noted that the CPCI database is used exclusively as a management tool.
Personnel security actions on individuals, such as certification or reinvestigation of security clearances, are not based solely on CPCI data, but include a full review of the file.
GA0 Recommendation 3:
(Executive Summary, page 5) i NRC expedite a decision to issue either a policy statement or a regulation regarding access to commercial nuclear power plants.
NRC Response After reviewing public comments on access authorization programs, the Commission has decided to proceed with a regulation, rather than a policy statement, regarding access to commercial nuclear power plants. The rule will require all nuclear power reactor licensees to have an unescorted access authorization program and will specify the major attributes required of such a program.
GENERAL COMMENT
ON PRE-APPOINTMENT INVESTIGATIVE WAIVERS The GA0 report notes that NRC routinely waives its pre-appointment background investigation requirements for new employees.
GA0 believes that such a practice could pose a potential security risk.
However, NRC experience to date reflects an effective program with few personnel security-related problem cases and nothing constituting an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. We assure this by means of administrative controls that preclude new employees from having access to classified information until they are granted a security clearance.
In view of the length of time that it has taken for the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to complete a full field investigation (9-12 months) and National Agency Check with Inquiry investigation (3-4 months), we must continue to use the pre-appointment investigation waiver provided in Section 145(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. This practice enables us to attract and promptly employ the highly competent technical and support staff we need to assure continued viability of NRC nuclear regulatory programs protecting the health and safety of the public.
If the OPM completion times significantly improve, we will reevaluate our use of this procedure.
In the interim, in response to GA0 concerns, we are reviewing our pre-appointment investigation waiver procedures with the objective of strengthening this process.
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,M UNITED STATES g-g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7;
- j WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 APR 2 S 1989 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Zech Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Carr.
' Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss FROM:
Victor Stello, Jr.
1 Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
CREDIT CHECKS - EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE As a follow-up to the General Accounting Office report entitled "NRC's Security Clearance Program Can be Strengthened," and the subsequent Synar Comittee hearing held March 15,1989, I have (1) approved adding a credit check, effective imediately, to the scope of the initial personnel security investigation required for an "L" clearance for NRC applicants, contractors, and other non-licensee personnel; (2) signed the enclosed bulletin implementing the reinvestigation program for "L" cleared empicyees which will also contain a credit check; and (3) authorized the Office of Administration to initiate rulemaking to amend 10 CFR Parts 11 and 25, in order to implement the same initial investigative scope change for "P" and "L" licensee applicants and to revise the current fee schedule under the authority of 31 USC 59701196 Stat.
1051 to recover the additional cost of each initial credit check.
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d V ctor S lo, r Executive Direct r for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated i
I cc: SECY GPA OGC
Contact:
i James J. Dunleavy, PSB X27343 giddP@O M O
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( 0 75)
Published in advance of incorporadon in NRC Manual File and retain in Manual until superseded.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC MANUAL BULLETIN NO.
DATE:
SUBJECT:
NRC REINVESTIGATION PROGRAM REVISIONS At the present time, the NRC Reinvestigation Program requires that.NRC employees, consultants, experts and panel members possessing "Q" access authorizations be i
reinvestigated every five years.
These program requirements are set forth in NRC Appendix 2IDI, Part VI, " Personnel Security Program."
This bulletin sets forth changes in the NRC Reinvestigation Program to include reinvestigation requirements for NRC employees, consultants, experts, and panel members possessing "L" access authorizations. These Reinvestigation Program revisions will be incorporated in NRC Appendix 2IDI, Part VI, " Personnel Security Program."
NRC Reinvestigation Program for NRC Employees, Consultants, Expertr, and Panel Nembers Possessing *L" Access Authorizations I.
Individuals Affected A.
The incumbents of NRC non-critical sensitive positions possessing "L" access authorizations shall be subject to reinvestigations as set forth in II through Y below.
l-II. Timing Reinvestigations shall be performed every five years.
III. Security Forms Packet Submission of a ne'w " Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions" (SF 86) and related forms (Security Forms Packet), including new fingerprint cards, is required every five years.
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-2 IV. Type of Investigation Performed A.
After first 5 years - Review of SF 86, plus National Agency Check with Credit (NACC).
l B.
After 10 and 15 years - Review of completed SF 86, plus FBI file i
and fingerprint check.
C.
After 20 years.- Review of SF 86, plus NACC.
D.- Each 5 years thereafter - F<eview of SF 86, plus FBI file and finger-print check.
E.
Further investigative coverage may be undertaken on a case-by-case basis if more comprehensive or detailed information is deemed necessary by the Division of ~ Security (SEC).
F.
As part of the reinvestigation, the incumbent's Official Personnel File (OPF) may be reviewed by a member of SEC.
V.
Responsibility A.
By March 1 of each year, SEC will provide each individual to be reinvestigated a Security Forms Packet and advise the individual of the date by which the Security Forms Packet is to be completed. SEC shall provide NRC Office Directors / Regional Administrators, or their designees, the names of the individuals in their respective offices who are to be reinvestigated, and the date(s) by which the individuals are required to complete the Security Forms Packet.
B.
It is the responsibility of each individual to complete the Security Forms Packet and return it to his/her Office or Regional contact in a sealed envelope by the date specified.
It is the responsibility of the Office Director / Regional Administrator, or their designees, to assure (1) that individuals complete and return Security Forr; Packets to them and (2) that all completed and sealed Security Forms Packets are returned to SEC by the date specified in order that SEC may initiate the investigation.
C.
SEC will provide certification to the cognizant Personnel Office upon l
completion of the investigative processing for inclusion in the OPF.
ictor ell,
Executive Dire tor for Operations
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