ML20248B208

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Forwards marked-up FSAR Pages,Incorporating Extended Load Line Region,Increased Core Flow,Partial Feedwater Heating & Proprietary GE Repts NEDC-31577P & NEDC-31578P.Repts Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)
ML20248B208
Person / Time
Site: Limerick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/1989
From: Hunger G
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML19312B218 List:
References
NUDOCS 8906080289
Download: ML20248B208 (41)
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{{#Wiki_filter:. K, I f:. l e 1. L i PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY l 2301 MARKET STREET ? -] P.O. BOX 8699 L PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 l I\\ ' 2isi e41-4ooo i May 31, 1989 ' Docket Nos.:.50-352 1 50-353 i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Attn: Document Control Desk -Washington, DC: 20555 SUBJECT.: Draft Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 FSAR Revisions to Incorporate the Extended Load Line Region, Increased Core Flow, and Partial. Feedwater Heating .l l ' Gentlemen: 1 i .This letter provides markup of current FSAR.pages (Enclosure 1) I which are made to incorporate the extended load'line region (ELLR), increased core flow (ICF), and partial feedwater heating (PFH) Into the Limerick FSAR. These changes were discussed with NRC staff on. .l i l' May.11, 1989 and are consistent with the Final Draft version of the Unit 2, Technical Specifications transmitted by NRC letter dated May 19, 1989. The analyses supporting these operational conditions for -Unit 2 are included as Enclosures 2 and 3. Enclosures 4 and 5 contain the corresponding General Electric affidavits to support a proprietary finding in accordance with.10CFR2.790 for the reports of Enclosures 2 and 3. The Unit 2 analyses tre identical to the Unit I analyses which the NRC has previously accepted by safety evaluations dated February 17, 1987 (ICF and PFH), and Augurt 14, 1987 (ELLR). The attached FSAR markup also updates the power flow map of Section 14. These proposed revisions will be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment. j If any additional information is required, please let me know. 'I i Sincerely, f. G. A. Hunger, Jr. Director, Licensing Section Erclosures MAM/mv/05128901-A cc: W. T. Russell, USNRC, Administrator - Region I N/ OCd T. J. rsenny, USNRC, Senior Resident Inspector - LGS ltJ8[r[on R. J. Clark, USNRC, LGS - Project Manager / yu v ffp/f 8906080209 B90531 gi l PDR ADDCK 05000353 4 A PDR v 1

. _, e. bec: C. A. McNeill, Jr. S26 J. S. Kemper S25-1 S. J. Kowalski S25-1 E. J. Bradley 523-1 E. P. Fogarty S7-1 J. M. Madara, Jr. S7-1 G. A. Hunger, Jr. S7-1 D. P. Helker-S7-1 R. M. Krich S7-1 D. B. Fetters N4-1 L. B. Pyrlh N2-1 i A. J. Marie N2-1 H. D. Honan N2-1 G. M. Leitch LGS MC 200 P. J. Duca, Jr. LGS MC AS-1 C. R. Endriss LGS MC A2-1 i A. S. MacAinsh LGS MC SB3-4 M. S. Iyer BPC/SF DAC NG-8 I l i j I 1 l ) I i j I i l. __._______________.._.______________.__________________a

t ENCLOSURE 4 GENERAL ELECTRIC C0MPANY AFFIDAVIT I, Robert C. Mitchell, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 1. I am Manager, Nuclear Products Licensing, General Electric Company, and have been delegated the function of reviewing the information described in paragraph 2 which is sought to be withheld and have been authorized to apply for its withholding. 2. The information sought to be withheld is contained in NEDC-31577P (Class III), " General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Load Line Limit Analysis for Limerick Generating Station Unit 2, Cycle 1," GE Nuclear Energy, March 1989. 3. In designating material as proprietary, General Electric utilizes the definition of proprietary information and trade secrets set forth in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Section 757. This definition provides: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.... A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper

means, there would be difficulty in acquiring information....

Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expanded by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with the which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated b; others." 4. Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are: a. Information that discloses a process, method or apparatus where prevention of its use by General Electric's competitors without license from General Electric constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies; 1 1 j

[ .a :. [ I Information consisting of supporting data and analyses, including b. test data, relative to a process, method or apparatus, the appli-cation of which provide a competitive economic advantage, e.g.,. by optimization or improved marketability; c. Information which; if. used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in, the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance.. of quality or licensing of a similar product; d. Information which reveals cost or price 'information, production capacities, budget levels or commercial strategies of General Electric, its customers or suppliers; j e. Information which reveals aspects of past, present or future General Electric customer-funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to General Electric: f. Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it'may be desirable to obtain patent protection; g. Information which General Electric must treat as proprietary. according to agreements with other parties. 5. Initial approval of proprietary treatment of presentation information 'l is. typically made by the Subsection manager of.the originating compo - nent, the person who is most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge. Access to such documents within the Company is limited on a'"need to 1 know" basis and such documents are clearly identified as proprietary. 6. The procedure for approval of external release of such presentation information typically requires review by the Subsection Manager, Project Manager, Principal Scientist or other equivalent authority, by l the Subsection Manager of the cognizant Marketing function (or dele- ? gate) and by the Legal Operation for. technical content, competitive effect and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designa-p tion in accordance with the standards enumerated above. Disclosures o outside General Electric are generally limited to regulatory bodies, customers and potential customers and their agents, suppliers and licensees then only with appropriate protection by applicable regu-latory provisions or proprietary agreements. 7. The presentation information mentioned in paragraph 2 above has.been 1 evaluated in accordance with the above criteria and procedures and has i been found to contain information which is proprietary and which is customarily held in confidence by General Electric. i l

8. The information to the best of my knowledge and belief has consis-tently been held in confidence by the General Electric Company, no public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public ' sources. All disclosures to third parties have been made pursuant to regulatory provisions of proprietary agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence. 9. Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the General Electric Company and deprive or reduce the availability of profit making opportunities because it would provide other parties, including competitors, with valuable information STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ) ss: Robert C. Mitchell, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. Executed at San Jose, California, this D day of M4V , 1989. W c.%dd.oo Robert C. Mitchell \\ General Electric Company i Subscribed and sworn before me this# y of Af w 198f_. O f% d A/I L NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 OFFICIAL SM i MAR (L KENDALL f Notsy PutdioCaWomia ( SANTA CLARA COUNTY My Comm. Exp. Mar. 26,1993 l

kl ENCLOSURE 5 l-L,. G E N E'R A L 'E L E C T R I C C'OMPANY AFFIDAVIT I, Robert C. Mitchell, being duly sworn, depose and state _as follows: 1. I am' Manager, Nuclear Products, General Electric Company, and have-been delegated the function of reviewing the information described in ' paragraph 2 which is sought to ' be withheld and have ' been. authorized to apply for its withholding. I 2. The information sought to be withheld is contained in'NEDC-31578P (Class III), "Increa' sed Core Flow and Partial Feedwater Heating-Analysis for Limerick -Generating Station.' Unit 2, Cycle 1," GE Nuclear Energy, March 1989. 3. In designating material as proprietary, General. Electric utilizes the definition of proprietary information and trade - secrets set forth in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Section 757. This definition provides: "A ' trade secret may consist of any formula,. pattern, device ' or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity -to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.... A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by-the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring information.... Some factors to be considered in determining whether-given information-is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of - his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others-involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information ro him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expanded by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with the which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others." 4. Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are: a. Information that discloses a process, method or apparatus where prevention of its use by General Electric's competitors without license from General Electric constitutes a competitive econom-ic advantage over other companies;

i 8 j l b. Information consisting of supporting' data and analyses,'includ-ing test. data,Lrelative to a process, method or apparatus, the-application of which provide a competitive economic advantage, l e.g.. by optimization or improved marketability; c. Information which if. used by a competitor, would - reduce his i expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in I the design, manufacture, -: shipment, ~ installation, assurance 'of . quality or licensing of a similar product; d. Information which reveals cost or price-information, production' capacities, budget levels or commercial strategies of General Electric, its customers or suppliers; e. Information.which reveals aspects of past, present or future General Electric customer-funded development plans and programs. .of potential commercial value to General Electric; f. Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may be desirable to obtain patent protection; _j g. Information which General Electric must treat as proprietary according to agreements with other parties. 5. Initial approval _of. proprietary treatment of a' document is typically J made by the. Subsection manager of the originating component, the person who is most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge. Access to such documents within the Company is limited on a "need to l know" basis and such documents are clearly identified as ' proprie-l tary. l ) 6. The procedure for approval of external release of such a document I typically requires review by the Subsection Manager, Project Manag-er, Principal Scientist or other equivalent authority, by the Subsection Manager of the cognizant Marketing function (or delegate) J and by the Legal Operation for technical content, competitive effect j and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation in j accordance with the standards enumerated abcve. Disclosures outside General Electric are generally limited to regulatory bodies, custom-ers and potential customers and their agents, suppliers and licensees then only with appropriate protection by applicable regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements. i 7. The document mentioned in paragraph 2 above has been evaluated in accordance with the above criteria and procedures and has been found i to contain information which'is proprietary and which is customarily held in confidence by General Electric. J

l 8. The information to the best of my knowledge and belief has consis-tently been held in confidence by the General Electric Company, no public disclosure has.been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties have been made pursuant to regulatory provisions of proprietary agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence. 9. Public disclosure of tne information sought to be withheld is likely-to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the Ceneral Electric Company and deprive or reduce the availability of profit making opportunities because it would provide other parties, includ-ing competitors, with. valuable information. STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) #8 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ) Robert C. Mitchell, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and ' belief. -Executed at San Jose, California, this [ day of M A */ 19%. Ge6ui C - Robert C. Mitchell General Electric Company Subscribed and sworn before me thisI y of MA4 1981 U ll1m k w!& NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF CALIFORNIA l g. OFFICIAL SEAL l .y MARY L KENDALL t Notary Public-Califomie ( l { SANTA CLARA COUNTY My Comm. Exp. Mar. 26,1993 I

@C[ E$"l ENCLOSURE 1 LGS'FSAR A p [* g4tb TABLE ~4.3-7 CALCULA RE: EFFECTIVE MULTIPLICATION AND CONTRO -SYSTEM WORTH - NO VOIDS, 200C ibdI N Beginning of Cycle-1, K-effective [* I / Uncontrolled 1.1047 Fully Controlled. O.9230-( o 933o Strongest' Control Rod Out (26-55) 0.9826 .'O.3 ff. [ .R, Maximum Increase'in Cold Core Reactivity with Exposure-Cycle-1, Ak 0.0 gj m_ I.: l l l.. Rev. 40, 01/85 i .) __-_____-_-_____A

/ N.i - e _, W_ yvv-r a se~ 200 (. 180 A.' NATURALCIRCULATION B. 20% RECIRCULATION PUMP SPEED C. TYPICAL CONSTANT RECIRCULATION PUMP SPEED '60 D. 100% CORE FLOW 140 120 90 5 c E O O 2 100 ( ggt-w o** os l q%0 f 80 $go V 00 0 3 6 ( y _e ,/ / REGION 11 -- -- -- -- e j f _- B ~ l

P-A 5

) 0 " d 1 60' 30 g q ~_ \\ M.#2 -\\ \\$s2 3 \\h MtNtMUM POWER LINE ~ REGION 111 TYPICAL ST ARTUP PATH /// ION .,i / / // / / / / / / REGION 4 \\' s I t t o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 PERCENT CORE FLOW LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT POWER-FLOW OPERATING MAP f i FIGURE 4.4 2 REV. 54,1DS8

g --.-_ b D $ lY r3 7 C e i LGS FSAR TABLE 6.3 (Page 1 of 3) MAPLHGR, MAXIMUM LOCAL OXIDATION &. PEAK CLAD TEMPERATURE. I VS. EXPOSURE (2,2 ,,s_4 Exposure Exposure MAPLHGR(*> P.C.T. Oxice I MWD /ST HWD/MT KW/FT DEG F Fraction PBCIB071-No Gd-150 -Q mC::.JP8CRB071)(s) A. Fuel Tvoe: -s_ 200 220.5 11.5 1960 .011 i 1,000 1,102.3 11.4 1921 .009-5,000-5,511.5 11.4 1854 .007 10,000 11,023.0 11.5 1838 .007 15,000 16,534.5 11.5 1835 .007 20,000 22,046.0 11.1 1787 .006 P 25,000 27,557.5 10.4 1720 .004 30,000 33,069.0 9.8 1649 .003 i 35,000 38,580.5 9.1 1575 .002-

l 40,000 44,092.0 8.5 1500

.002 45,000 49,603.5 7.8 1421- .001 B. Fuel Tvpe BCIB094 - No Gd - 150 -( iPB RB094)(s) + 200-220.5 10.7 1954 .011 1,000 1,102.3 11.0 1952 .011 -j 5,000 5,511.5 11.6 1925 .009 l 10,000 11,023.0 11.9 1905 .009 l 20,000 22,046.0 11.3 1815 .006 25,000 27,557.5 10.5 1725 .005 i 30,000 33,069.0 9.8 1645 .003 35,000 38,580.5 9.2 1575 .002 l 40,000 44,092.0 8.5 1505 .002 l 45eRSQ 49,603.5 7.9 p&S2 .001 l l C. Fuel Tvoei 8CIB163 - 2G2 - 150 - t CRB163)(s) 200 220.5 11.8 2031 .014 1,000 1,102.3 11.8 2031 .014 i 5,000 5,511.5 12.4 2047 .014 l 10,000 11,023.0 12.8 2042 .013 i 15,000 16,534.5 12.9 2067 .015 20,000 22,046.0 12.9 2067 .015 25,000 27,557.5 12.2 1970 .011 l 30,000 33,069.0-11.2 1829 .007 l 35,000 38,580.5 10.6 1748 .005 j 40,000 44,092.0 10.1 1686 .004 45,000 49,603.5 9.4 1626 .003 I l Rev. 45, 12/85

1 [g)cM ps jsoc i LGS FSAR i TABLE 6.3-4 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 3) l Oxidef f Exposure Exposure .MAPLHGR(') P.C.T.. Frartion' l l MWD 4ST MWD /MT: KW/FT DEG-R e D. Fuel Tvos t? CIB248 - 2 - 150 - ( 248)C5) .l. i w r 200 220.5 12.1 2090 .017 1,000 11,102.3 12.1 2080 .017 L 5,000 5,511.5 12.3 2028 .013 ] 10,000 11,023.0-12.2 1987 .012 15,000 16,534.5 12.1 1998 .012 20,000 22,046.0 11.9 1985 .012 25,000 27,557.5 11.2 1911 .009 30,000 33,069.0 10.7 1822 .007 35,000 38,580.5' 10.0 1743 .005 40,000-44,092.0 9.4 1674 .004 45, 49,603.5 8.7 161 .003 -E. Fuel Tvoe: P8CIB278-3G3.0-150-{};nT( RB278)<5) l 200 220.5 11.7 1998 .013 1,000 1,102.3 11.8 1997 .013 5,000 5,511.5 12.4 2010 .012 10,000 11,023.0 12.5 2002 .012. 15,000 16,534.5 12.4 1996 .012 20,000 22,046.0 12.2 1983 .011 25,000 27,557.5 11.5 1903 .009 30,000 33,069.0 10.8 1817 .006 35,000 38,580.5 10.2 1732 .005 .40,000 44,092.0 9.5 1661 .004 45,000 49,603.5 8.9 1596 .003 I The analyses contained herein were performed with the (1) assumption that all lower tie plates are fully dril2Nf. (23 This analysis is valid for operation at all points on the power-flow map bounded by the most restrictive of the following: a) Less than the 100% rated power line b) Less than the APRM rod block line c) Less than the 100% rated core flow line The corewide metal-water reaction has been calculated using (3) method 1 described in NEDO-20566. The calculation was done using the standard model power distribution. The value is as follows: Corewide metal-water reaction % = 0.11 l Rev. 30, 03/84

c: w-- N[S"(N4 LGS TSAR-TABLE 6.3-4IICont'd) Page 3'of 3) { (*) Maximum average; planar linear heat generation rate j h ( -\\ i r, + r is' SO rml.. M, ) ~- ~ - _ i ( CJh r G. YJ $Maxa. 4 wsuu \\ \\ Rev. 30, c3fg4

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/ /ff-'C, ,i// i CAvliATlON ,[ ////f' // REGION ..////. ////f t r s t 0 30 40 50 60 70 ED 90 100 31 0 D 10 20 '$[. s A eTATION PERCENT CORE F LOW LIME RI NIT 1 f= G H?- FINAL SAF OT KrmL 15 REPORT POWER-FLOW OPERA ING MAP (SHEET 1 oI[ FIGURE 14.2 9 =. _ -. - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

TEST CONDITION (TC) REGION DEFINITIONS. TEST CONDITION NO! POWER-FLOW MAP REGION AND NOTES 1 BEFORE OR AFTER MAIN GENERATOR. OYNOHRON!IAllON BEIWEEN L AND 20% THERMAL POWER WITHIN *10. -D% OF M.G SET MINIMUM OPER ATING SPEED LINE IN LOCAL MANUAL MODE. 2 AFTER MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN THE 45 AND 75% POWER ROD LINES BETWEEN M-G SET MINIMUM SPEEDS FOR LOCAL MANUAL AND MASTER MANUAL MODES. 3 FROM 45 TO 75% CONTROL ROD LINES-CORE ' FLOW BETWEEN 80 AND 1006 OF ITS RATED VALUE. 4 DN THE NATURAL CIRCULATION CORE FLOW '. LINE--WITHIN +0,~5% OF THE INTERSECTION WITH THE 100% POWER ROD LINE. 5 WITHIN +0, ~5% OF THE 100% CONTROL ROD 1 LINE-WITHIN 0,+5% OF THE ANALYTICAL LOWER LIMIT OF MASTER FLOW CONTROL. 6 WITHIN +0, ~5% OF RAT ED 100% POWER - WITHIN +0,-5% OF RATED 100% CORE FLOW RATE. N' LIMERICJLG TATION LUNI ANOT FINAL SAY( REPORT POWER-FLOW OPE NG MAP (SHEET 2 04/) g + hY FIGURE 14.2-9 REV. 28. 01/84

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7_._----_-__ L D c. A F S -l 3 D Y x r i TEST CONDITION (TC) REGION DEFINITIONS TEST CONDITION NO. POWER-FLOW MAP REGION AND NOTES 1 BEFORE OR AFTER MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHRONIZAllON BETWEEN 5 AND 20% ' THERMAL POWER-WITHIN +10,-0% OF M-G SET MINIMUM OPERATING SPEED LINE IN - LOCAL MANUAL MODE. .2 AFTER MAIN GENERATOR SYNCHRONIZATION. BETWEEN THE A5 AND 75% POWER ROD LINES BETWEEN M-G SET MINIMUM SPEEDS FOR LOCAL MANUAL AND MASTER MANUAL MODES. 3 . FROM 45 TO 75% CONTROL ROD LINES-CORE FLOW BETWEEN 8 100% OF ITS RATED VALUE. 4 ON THE NATURAL 1RCULATION CORE FLOW LINE-WITHIN +0,-f4 OF THE INTERSECTION ,j WITH THE 100% POWER ROD LINE. 5 WITHIN +0,-5% OF THE 100% CONTROL ROD LINE-WITHIN 4, +5% OF THE ANALYTICAL LOWER LIMIT OF MASTER FLOW CONTROL. 6 WITHIN +0,-5% OF RAT ED 100% POWER -WITHIN +0,-S% OF RATED 100% CORE FLOW RATE. l i-FINAL SAMA'ETSIS REPORT POWER-FLOW OPE)WTING MAP (SHEET)/ofy % FIGURE 14.2-9 REV. 28. 01/84 l i L

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n ..e I procedure had the initial decision been correct Those actions that are subsequent to the initial operator error and have an effect en the desicned pe.c-4on.a.. '.h e -1. aa..~., " ". '. a. e n. n e. e.e.s u' .4.' )'. #.4. e.-*..' )' ..,u..ec.o 'he o..... e..~.. ~ c ..c. I a ples of single operator errors are as follows: An increase in power above the established flow contr:1 a. e3g,.. .4 4..e e..-... --..,. -.a. w.d ~ 7.d. a w a ' i. n ~ 5 a. s-. specified sequences

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l LGS FSAR i iTIAb O E k TABLE 15.0-5 ....~.. s.. c. REQUIRED.OPERATitJ&;LtMILCPR VALUES Fort.[T gANJ: ENTs. x Pressurization Events: { CPR (Oction A)(2) CPR (Oction B)(2) Load Rejection Without Bypass 1.19 1.11 Turoine Trip Without Bypass 1.17 1.10 Feedwater Controller Failure 1.17 1.14 ~(127% Flow) 1.14 1.07 Load Rejection onpressurization Events: CPR-Rod Withdrawal Error (2) 1.21 1.22W i. Loss of Feedwater Heater Includes, adjustment' factors as specified in Reference 15.0-5. (2) w, C r= m, -,,..... a stsent Requ Ai Q G n (? (*> 1mtor,_fegardless of treguencv cateoory of tne nuroin -, .ttrenerator trip eventsf5Titrhe ypass 1;...x -a 7,a o .... ( 3 ) OLCPR value.is obtained for the.101%' Rod Block setpoint,

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Lbcd rwi.xs. LGS FSAR Consequently, the nuclear system process barrier pressure limit is not endangered. The bypass valves subsequently close to re-establish pressure control in the vessel during shutdown. The level would gradually drop to the low level isolation reference point, activating the RCIC/HPCI systems for long-term level control. 15.1.2.3.4 Consideration of Uncertainties All systems utilized for protection in this transient were assumed to have the most conservative allowable response (e.g., relief setpoints, scram stroke time, and reactivity characteristics). Expected plant behavior is, therefore, expected to lead to a less severe transient. 15.1.2.4 Barrier Performance As noted above, the. consequences of.this transient do not result in any temperature or pressure transient in excess of the criteria for which the fuel, pressure vessel, or containment are l designed; therefore, these barriers maintain their integrity and function as designed. [gg 15.1.2.5 Radiological Consequences While the consequence of this transient does not result in fuel failure, it does result in the discharge of normal coolant activity to the suppression pool via-MSRV operation. Because this activity is contained in the primary containment, there is no exposure to operating personnel. This transient does not result in an uncontrolled release to the environment, so the plant operator can choose to leave the activity bottled up in the containment or discharge it to the environment under controlled release condit. ions. If purging of the containment is chosen, the release will be in accordance with established technical specifications and, at the worst, would only result in a small increase in the yearly integrated exposure level. % \\0,Autt b -- / 15.1.3 PRzSSURE REGULATOR FAILURE - OPEN 15.1.3.1 Identification of Causes and Frecuencv Classification 15.1.3.1.1 Identification of Causes The total steam flow rate to the main turbine resulting from a pressure regulator malf unction is limited by a maximum flow limiter imposed at the turbine controls. This limiter is set to limit maximum steam flow to approximately 115% NBR. If either the controlling pressure regulator or the backup s ; regulator fails to the open position, the turbine control valves 15.1-7 -__-_a

Loc # FS-606 g }} 15.1.2.6 Additional Transients Evaluated An additional transient has been considered for Limerick. The effects of an inoperative turbine bypass system in corrbination with the Feedwater Controller Failure, Maximum Demand transient described above were determined with an ODYN code analysis. The tredel, the initial conditions, and the operation of other systems is as described above, except that the operability of the turbine bypass is not taken credit f ar. The sequence of events with an inoperative bypass system is shown on Table 15.1-3A and the transient parameters are on Fig. 15.1-3A. The MCPR values for this transient are shown in Table 15.0-5

LDU) F5-/3% i \\ l -~ NUChiAR ENERp ENERA1 4.E M "Ev :: h##' 3~ _s m 1 BUSINESS,_DPERATIONS V M.r 4,F r. 2 :i n (TABLE 2 ._ > -3EQUENCE OF EVEN'TS FOR FEC,0.:.0 0 GM-IL %M V ~j R '~ y / = = ;;3 = ' :+ i @ :.A d - gg n_ - Event h p U; Time-s e e Initiated sinslated f ailure of 127 percent upper limit on O f eedwater flow. LB vessel level setpoint trips main turbine and f eedwater pumps. 27.2 Reactor scram trip actuated from main turbine stop valve 27.2(est) position switches. Recirenistion Pump Trip (RPT) actuated by stop valve position 27.2 evitches. Turbine bypass valves f ail to open. 27.3 Main turbine stop valves closed. 27.3 Recirenistion pump motor circuit breakers open causing 27.4 reciresistion drive flow to coast-down. ~ m 28.6 to Relief groups 1 to 3 actuated due to high pressure. 28.8 Q e .e a. f a - tw.agleps inwen.1 -. A, veso sota terev. eersti

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k Lp cA F5- \\>' l d l l i APPEf01X 15.A EXTENDED OPERATING DO@lN AND PAP.TIAL FEEDWATER HEATING ANALYSES 15.A.1 Introduction 15.A.1.1 Extended Load Line Region 15.A.I.? 1rc-c.tred Ccn " lor: P,+;lon 15.A.I.3 Partial Feeawater heating Condition 15.A.1.6 Cortined Operating Cendition 15.A.2 Sumary l 15.A.? Transient Responses 15.A.4 Overpressure Protection 15.A.5 Emergency Core coc11ng System Performance 15.A.6 Contairrrent Responses 15.A.7 Therml-Hydrcul ic Stabil ity 15.A.E Fuel and Reactor System Performance 15.A.o Conclusion 15.A.10 References 13.&-i

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15.A.I In* rodo-t l on X - This appendix presents. the results of a safety trroact evaluation to ,' Justify the operation of Limerick Units 1.and 2 in an extended c'J operating domain and with partial feedwater heating for the initial fuel cycle. The extended operating domain consist s of two separate regions: the extended load line region and the. Increased core flow region...The definition and benefits of these modes of operation are-H described below. 15.A.I.1 Ertended Load Line Recion ? )The extended load line region' CELLR) is defined as a power flow y operating doma.in bounded by: u -a). 100% rated power, ' b> 108% Average Power ' Range Monitor (APPJO rod block Iced line which intercepts 100% rated power at 87% core ~ #10w, and c) 100% rated load line. This ELLR is shown in Figure 15.A-1. i The ELLR 1mproves operational flexibility during power ascension by providing additional operating room above the rated load line. It also provides a lower core flow condition' at rated power to allow for flow control reactivitv compensation due to fuel burnup-during an operating. cycle and for fuel cycle economic purposes. 15.A.I.2 increased Core Flow Realon The increased core' flow region (ICFR) is defined as e power flow l-operating domain bcunded bv: a) 1004 rated power, b) 105% rated core ficw, and c) 1005 rated core flow. The ICFR is shovn in Figure 15.A-1. Similar to the ELLR, the ICFR also Irroroves operational 'icnibility during' power ascension by providinc.dditional flow range at rated power to comper. sate for xenon variations curing power changes. The incre,esed flow capability provides reactivity compensation due to fuel burnuo during an operating cvele and for providing additional recctivity to extend an operating cycle to improve #uel cycle economics. 15.A.I.3 Partial Feedwater Heatino Condition Partial feedwater heating (PFH) is defined as: a) Operation with a reduced feedwater heating condition that is 60"F less than the nonnal feedweter heating temperature at any given power condition. 7F.A-1

Lb u) PS-t u b) Partial feedwater heating applies to conditions during an operating cycle when some feedwater heaters are out of service due to equipment malfunctions and to conditions after the end of an operating cycle when some feedwater heaters are Inten-tionally valved out of service to extend an operating cycle. PFH provides potential operatirig availability by allowing continued plant operation at rated power with out-of-service feedwater heaters. It also provides fuel cycle economic benefits bv cycle extension through reactivity gain f rom reduced feedwater heating. 15.A.1.4 Cmbined Operatina Condition I The combined ELLPd1CFR extended operating domain is 111ustrated in Flpure 15.A-1. The entire power flow operating map for the Limerick units is therefore bounded by the following: a) 100% rated power, b) 105% core flow, c) 1089, APRM rod block load line which Intercepts rated power at 87% core flow, and d) low power and flow recirculation pump and cevitation limitations. In addition to the benefits described above for each of the Individual operating nodes, e combined ELLPdICFR/PFH node of operation enables the Liturick units to take advantage of the flow control " spectral shift" operation benefit to extend the operating cycle further to improve fuel cycle economics. The " spectral shift" rode of operation involves initial power operation at rated pcwer at a reduced core flow (ELLR) to build up Pu-239 production and better utilize the U-238 fuel followed by subsecuent increases of core flow (ICFR) et the end of the fuel cycle to take advan-tage of the Pu-239 and U-238 fuel reactivity and extend the operating cycle. This, combined with the additional reactivity from the lower feedwater temperature (PFH), provides further improved fuel cycle economics. 15.A.2 Sumarv 1 A safety impact evaluation has been performed to investigate the impact of Lirerick plant cperation ulth the extended operatino domain and PFH on plant safety for the initial fuel cycle. The evaluations included in this appendix are: a) Transient responses, b) Overpressure protection, c) Less of coolant accident peak cladding temperature, d) Containment pressure, temperature and hydrodynamic loads, and e) Thermal-hydraulic stability. The results of this evaluation show that the previous analyses (prior to the consideration of the extended operating domain and PFH) ere bounding for the additional nodes of cperation defined in Section 15. A.1, except that certain limiting transient responses of Chapter 15 have 15.A-2

l.bul FS-l30G become core severe. The results of the evaluations including the limiting transient responses are provioed in this appendix. 15.A.3 Transient Responses All transient events analvzed In Chapter 15 have been reexamined for the Impact of ELLR/ICFR/PFH for the inittel fuel cycle. Limiting events have been identified and reanelyzed. The evaluations were performed at 104.5% power, 105% core flow for ICFR; 100S power, E7L core flow for ELLR; and 3600F feeowater temperature (600F reduction from 420rF), 100% power for FFH. In addition, the rest limiting combination of ELLR/ICFR/PFH was evaluated for the limiting transients. The limiting combination was detenmined by sensitivity studies of these conditions n#fecting the tran-sient perfomance. The limiting transients considered the turbine bypass (BP) system to be Inoperable and also considered the end-of-cycle reci rcu-latinn pum trip (RPT) system to be out of service. Plant heat balance, core coolant hydraulics, and nuclear parameter data were developed and used in the transient analyses. ELLR/lCFR/PFH result in variations in the plant's initial steam void, power distribution, coolant flow rates, and feedwater temperatures which affect the scram, vold and doppler reactivity characteristics of the plant during rapid pressurization and coolant temperature / Inventory perturbation transient events. The 100oF loss of feedwater heating (LFWH) event is a relatively slow subcooling perturbation transient that has been shown to be insignifi-cantly affected by these initial condition changes. The control P.od h*1th-drawal Error (RWE) event is mitigated by the Rod Block bbnitor (RBM) system. This transient has also been shown to be insign1#1cantly a##ected b) ELLP./ ICFR/PFH. The flow-dependent transients have also been shown to be instent-

  1. 1cantiv affected.

The limiting transient is determined te be the feedwater controller fallure without turbine bypass for both the RPT system in and out-of-service cases. These events were analyzed using the computer tredel of Reference 15.A.10-1. The results of the limiting transients and their assoc!ated minimum eritical power ratto (MCPP) 1Im1ts for the Initial fuel cycle are presented in Tables 15.A-1 and 15.A-2. The translent performance responses are shown in Figures 15.A-2 to 15.A-5. The details l of all the analyzed transients are documented in References 15.A.10-2 to 15.A.10-5. 15.A.4 Overpressure Protection The limiting transient to satis #y the ASME Code overpressure protection criteria (FSAR Chapter 5) is the main steam Isolation valve (MSIV) i closure event with secondary (flux) scram. PFH and ELLR result in l 1cwer initial steam flow and operating pressure that enables the peak vessel pressure to be lower than the values reported in Chapter 5 for this limiting transient. The ICF analysis procuces a higher peak vessel pressure. Its peak pressure of 1273 psig is still well below the ASME l Code limit of 1575 psig. The peak pressure results for the inttlal fuel cycle analvred cases are presented in Table 15.A-3. The transient responses for the ICF case are shown in Figure 15.A-6. 15.A-3 {

Lbcd F515% 15.A.5 Erreroencv Core Coolino System Performance The effect of the ELLR, ICFR, and PFH on the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) Peak cladding temperature (PCT) calculation discussed in Chap-ter 6.3 (Erergency Core Cooling System Performance) hes been examined for the initial fuel cycle. When operating in the ELLR, a LOCA initiated from 87% core flow produces a silphtly earlier (0.1 second) loss of nuclerte bolling in the top por-tion of the limiting bundle when compared to the 100% core flow condition. However, it c'oes not a#fect the drvout tirre of the high power node sig-nificantly where the PCT occurs. The reduced initial core flow also has little effect on the reflood phase following the LOCA. This period is dominated by the effect o# counter current flow limit (CCFL) at the top I of the bundles. Since the core power is not changed, the steam generation rate in the core and the liculd down flow rate through the fuel bundles will be similar. Therefore, the effect of the reduced initial core flow on reflooding time is small. It is concluded that the operation in tie ELLR is bounded by the cu-rent Chapter 6.3 PCT calculations to satisfy the reaut rerrents of 10CFR50.45. L'han operating Ir the ICFR, the LOCA PCT will not be significantly affected. This is because the parameters which most stronaly effect the PCT, i.e., high power node bolling transition time and core refloodinc time, have been shown to be not significantly affected. Results of the LOCA analysis performed for Limerick show a negligible impact on PCT at the ICF condition for the 1imitIng break when compared to the rated flow condition. PCT changes throughout the remainder of the break spectrum are also necligible end thus will not alter the limiting break. Therefore, operation in ICFR is bounded bv the current Chapter 6.3 PCT results. For operation with PFH, the increased subcooling increases the total system rrass anc' the mass flow rate during a LOCA break at e given vessel pressure. However, the lower initial steam flow with PFH recuces the vessel pressure which results ir a net decrease in break flow rate at rrost tires during the accident. The increased total system mass delays the time of 1cwer plenum fleshing. The increased system mass and the decreased break flow act tocether to result in later. Jet pump, break, and core uncovery times. These combined effects result in a lower PCT for the PFH condition compared to the normal feedwater heating condition. Therefore, the calculated PCT reported in Chapter 6.3 is bounding for the extended operating domain and partial feedwater heating condition. 15.A.6 Containment Pesponses The impact of operat ton with ELLR. ICFR, and PFH on the containment prersure, temperature and hydrodynamic loads of Chapter 6.2 has been evaluated for the initial fuel cycle. l u.-

1 Operation in the ELLR results in increased subcooling which may lead to higher LOCA blowdown flow rates for certain time periods following the line break. An analysis has been perforned to show that the calculated peak drywell and wetwell pressures are bounded by the corresponding values in Chapter 6.2. The peak drywell flow differential pressure (28.6 psid) (down load) is bounded by the design value. A qualitative evaluation shows that all other containment parameters (e.g., drywell and suppression chamber temperatures and maxinun allowable leak rates) are bounded by results reported in Chapter 6.2. Operation with ICF results in lower subcooling that provides improved containment pressure / temperature responses. Operation with PFH results in increased subcooling that ney result in a higher LOCA blowdown rate for certain tine periods following the line break. Similar to the evalu-ation for ELLR, an evaluation for ICF and PFH has shown that the calculated l peak drywell and wetwell pressures are bounded by the corresponding values reported in Chapter 6.2. The peak drywell flow differential pressure is bounded by the design values. All other containment paraneters are bounded by those reported in Chapter 6.2. All LOCA-related pool swell, condensation oscillation, and chugging I loads for the ELLR, ICFR, and PFH are shown to be bour.ded by the corresponding design loads. l 15.A.7 Therral-Hydraulic Stability Operation in the ELLR results in operating on a higher control rod line l- . which could potentially reduce stability nargin. Operation with PFH results in increased subcooling and power distribution changes that also can potentially reduce stability nargin. ICF operation will improve stability margin. In all these conditions, the NRC has completed the generic review of thermal-hydraulic stability of BWR cores and fuel designs contained in General Electric standard application for reactor fuel (GESTAR) (Reference 15. A.10-6). In NRC evaluation reports (References 15. A.10-7 and 15. A.10-8), the NRC concluded that GE fuel design neets stability criteria set forth in General Design Criteria 10 and 12 of 10CFR50, Appendix A, provided that the plant has in place operating procedures and Technical Specifications which are consistent with the recannendation of Reference 15.A.10-9. The NRC approval reports considered operation with ELLR, ICFR, and PFH. Therefore, thennal-hydraulic stability canpliance is satisfied for the initial fuel cycle. PECo will remain apprised of any new NRC laprovenents established in this area. 15.A.8 Fuel and Reactor System Perfonnance The fuel systen performance and reactor Internals described in Chapter 4 were examined to detennine the impact of the extended operating domain and PFH operation for the initial fuel cycle. It is shown that the fuel design criterla as described in the generic GE fuel licensing report, GESTAR 11 (Reference 15.A.10-6), are appilcable to the ELLR, the ICFR, and PFH. It is also shown that the reactor Internals nest affected by ELLR, ICFR, and PFH operation are the core plate, shroud, shroud support, shrnud head, 15.A-5 _ _____ ____ _______J

eW 1 steam dryer, control, rod guide tube, control rod drive housing, and.iet ptsup. The impact of these operating condit lens on these camponents was evaluated. The analysir, concluded that the design 'of these components contains enough margin to handle the. Increased loading. 1 35.A.9.f.onciusion The safety. Impact evaluation has demonstrated that the overpressure protection, LOCA and containment responses, thermal-hydraulle stabt.11ty, and the fuel and reactor system performance as described in: FSAR Chap-ters 4, 5, and 6 are acceptcMe in the extended operattnr c'cr71r cnd l _ partial feedwater heating condition for the initial fuel cycle. For transient performance discussed in Chapter 15, new MCPR results have been l determined for this first cycle. Additional details of the extended l operating comain and partial feedwater heating evaluations are included In References 15 A.10-2 to 15.A.10-5 15.A.10 References - 15.A.10-1 t#DD-24154A, " Qualification of the One-Dimensional Core Transient Model for Bolling Water Reactors," August 1976. 15.A.10-2 NEDC-31139, " General Electric Bolling Water Reactor Extended Load Line Limit Analysis for Limerick Generating Station Unit 1, Cycle 1," April 1986. 15.A.10-3 .NEDC-31323, " Increased Core Flow and Partial Feedwater -Heating Analysis for L1merick Generating Station Unit 1, l Cvele 1," October 1986, 15.A.10-4 NEDC-31577-P, " General Electric Bolling Water Reactor L Extended Load Line Limit Analysis for Limerick Generating Station Unit 2, Cycle 1," March 1989. 15.A.10-5 NEDC-31578-P, " Increased Core Flow and Partial Feedwater - l Heating Analysis for Limerick Generating'Stetlon Unit 2, Cycle 1," March 1989. 15.A.10-6 NEDE-24011-P-A-9-US, "Generel Electric Standard App 11-cation for Reactor Fuel," Supplement for United States, September 1988. 15.A.10-7 NRC letter from L. S. Rubenstein to D. Crutchfleid, " Safety Evaluation of GE Topical Report NEDE-24011 (GESTAR) Amend-ment 8," April 17, 1985. 15.A.10-8 C. O. Thomas (NRC) to H. C. Pfefferien (GE), " Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011, Revision 0, Amendment 8, 'Thenrel Hydraulle Stability Anendrrent to GESTAR II'," April 24, 1985.

15. A.'10-9 "BWR Core Thermal Hydraulle Stability," SIL No. 380 Revi-sinn 1, February 10, 1084.

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