ML20247N446

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37,respectively
ML20247N446
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/18/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20247N443 List:
References
NUDOCS 8906050358
Download: ML20247N446 (2)


Text

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.wm UNITED STATES y ~

g, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r.

8 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20585 x...../

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION j

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 126 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32 L

AND AMENDMENT NO.126 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT N05. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281 INTRODUCTION By letter dated April 26. 1988, as supplemented by letter dated July 18, 1988, the Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Surry Power Station, Units Nos. I and 2.

The aroposed anandments would revise the Surry, Units 1 and 2 TS to allow entry into tie containment personnel airlock during power operations to make repairs on the inner door of the personnel airlock.

In addition, the definition of containment integrit/ would be revised to clarify the actions to be taken for inoperable automatic containment isolation valve (s).

EVALUATION During power operation, there is an occasional need to enter the containment while it is in a subatmospheric condition to identify sources of leakage, perform immediate repairs or to support other operational activities. Entry into the containment while in a subatmospheric condition is performed by equalizing the pressure, if necessary, and opening the airlock-outer door and then closing and sealing the airlock outer door. The pressure in the personnel airlock is then equalized with the containment pressure and the inner door is opened for the final access. This method assures that at least one personnel airlock door is properly closed and sealed whenever the containment is in a subatmospheric condition.

Interlocks provide additional assurance that the personnel airlock doors cannot be opened simultaneously while in a subatmospheric condition.

However, if the inner door seal fails, the only acceptable method available for repair and retesting of the inner seal is by opening the outer door to gain access to the inner seal. During this brief period, containment integrity as defined in TS Section 1.H.4 is not met since the inner door, while closed, may not be properly sealed.

The licensee has proposed to add a footnote to Section 3.8.A of the TS to clarify that entry into the personnel airlock is permitted for the repair of an inoperable inner personnel airlock door.

Specifically, the licensee requested that in the event of an inoperable inner airlock door, the outer personnel airlock door may be opened for a period of time not to exceed 15 minutes with an annual cumulative time not to exceed I hour per year to allow access for the repair and retest of the inner door. This clarification has been accepted by the NRC staff on previous occasions for other facilities.

8906050358 890518 PDR ADOCK 05000280 P

PDC

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2-The second licensee proposal would clarify which of the inoperable automatic containment isolation valves need to be locked closed under administrative controls. Section 1.H.5 of the TS, " Containment Integrity" requires that automatic containment isolation valves be operable or be locked closed under administrothe control. At Surry, Units 1 and 2, many of the automatic containment isolation valves are air-operated or are directly actuated solenoid operated valves and cannot be locked in the same manner as motor-operated containment isolation valves. The proposed amendment clarifies the requirement for those automatic containment isolation valves, which are not amenable to being locked closed, by requiring that they be deactivated (power removed) and secured in their closed position and placed under administrative control.

SUMMARY

Based on the staff's review of the licensee's submittal, we conclude that containment integrity would not be compromised by the proposed changes and therefore the, proposed changes to the containment personnel airlock and the inoperable automatic containment isolation valves are acceptable.

ENVIR0hMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously published a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.

Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 551.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Cated:

Principal Contributor:

B. Buckley l

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