ML20247M064
| ML20247M064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1989 |
| From: | Leitch G PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906020345 | |
| Download: ML20247M064 (3) | |
Text
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY-L,lMERICK GENER ATING STATION P. O. BOX A SANATOGA PENNSYLVANIA A 19464 l'
(215) 327-1100. EXT. 3000 L
May 26, 1989 9"EaE='7 "
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Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353 License No. NPF-39 Construction Permit No. CPPR-107
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk
= Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection Response to-Immediate Concerns Gentlemen:
'An inspection of the implementation of selected emergency j
preparedness elements at our Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Units 1 and
~2, was conducted by NRC Region I inspectors during the period May 22, 1989 through'May 25, 1989. During the exit interview held on May 25, 1989, the
-t inspection team. leader identified a number of deficiencies which indicated 3
weaknesses-in the ability of emergency response' personnel to understand and l
properly utilize ~the Emergency Plan Procedures (EPPs). Specific weaknesses
~
include the difficulty experienced by some Emergency Directors in recognizing the proper Emergency Action Levels (EALs) indicative of emergency conditions during the course of a rapidly escalating emergency, inappropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) by certain dose assessment personnel, and a general lack of understanding of the l
correlation between EALs and PARS.
I i
Accordingly, we are implementing the following corrective actions to ensure that the adequacy of the emergency response capabilities of LGS i
personnel will be immediately re-established and maintained.
These actions I
were discussed with the NRC inspection team and other NRC Region ~I
- representatives during the May 25, 1989 exit interview and found to be acceptable.
o Beginning on May 25, 1989, remedial emergency response training is being conducted for each on-shift Emergency Director and on-site individual responsible for performing I
dose assessments. These individuals will not assume their j
shift responsibilities before successfully completing this t
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May 26, 1989 Page 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission remedial training and demonstrating their ability to recognize the proper EALs, make appropriate PARS and understand the correlations between the EALs and PARS. For the one shift on May 25, 1989 that was manning the Main Control Room, we ensured that individuals demonstrating acceptable proficiency in performing,the responsibilities of the Emergency Director and the dose assessment coordinator were on shift. The content of this remedial training has been reviewed prior to conducting the first session to ensure that the weaknesses identified by the NRC inspection team are fully addressed.
In addition, an independent evaluation of these remedial sessions is being performed to verify their effectiveness, and observations will be fed back to the training instructors as appropriate.
o Within two weeks from the date of this letter, performance-based " table-top" training sessions will be conducted for Emergency Directors and on-shift individuals who are assigned the responsibility for performing dose assessments. This training will focus on the proper determination of EALs during escalating emergency conditions, and the relationship between PARS and EALs. All of these individuals, other than those who are unavailable (e.g.
vacation), will complete this training within the next two weeks. This training will include an evaluation of their demonstrated emergency response abilities. The remaining individuals will receive this training prior to resumption of their normal duties.
The NRC inspection team also raised a concern regarding the results of a recently conducted Protected Area Boundary (PAB) evacuation / accountability drill. To address this concern, we have performed a test of the security computer that controls the PAB personnel ingress and egress. This test successfully demonstrated the capability of the security computer to account for a large number of individuals exiting the PAB over a short time period, thereby simulating the conditions during the evacuation of non-essential personnel from the site during an emergency. Since this test was successful, we will perform another site evacuation drill within the next two weeks to verify that personnel accountability can be accomplished and satisfy the LGS Emergency Plan requirements.
We consider that the short-term implementation of the corrective i-actions specified above will be effective in ensuring the adequacy of our l-I-
ability to respond to an emergency situation. We recognize, however, that the weaknesses identified as a result of this inspection require a more thorough evaluation and subsequent implementation of comprehensive corrective actions that address the deficiencies and prevent their recurrence.
These efforts have been initiated, and we will provide a complete description of our findings and corrective actions upon completion of our investigation.
F
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Nuclear Regulatory May 26, 1989 Page 3 Commission Because of the number of problens outstanding, we have today designated a senior engineer whose.only responsibility will be site emergency planning at Limerick. He will assume these duties on June 5 and will be a direct report to the Support Manager. He will remain in that position until known outstanding problems have been addressed and during
-this time, we will continue to evaluate the permanent staffing needs of site emergency planning.
If you have any further questions, or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very
- uly y urs, l'-
RMK: kap cc:
W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. J. Kenny, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector I
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