ML20247L270
| ML20247L270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1989 |
| From: | Creel G BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909220170 | |
| Download: ML20247L270 (2) | |
Text
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.o BALTI M ORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER. P. O. BOX 1475. BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 GEORGE C. CREEL Vice Patsiornv Nucac An Ewenov (300 reo-dess September 14, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Response to NRC Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/89-16; 50-318/89-17 Gentlemen:
This transmits our response to Appendix A of the subject inspection report, which cites a violation of NRC requirements concerning adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition. Enclosure (1) details our response.
Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours,
/
GCC/DLS/dtm Enclosure cc:
D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E.
Silberg, Esquire R. A.Capra, NRC S. A.McNeil.NRC W. T. Russell, NRC V. L. Pritchett, NRC T. Magette, DNR fgOb
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w f r-ENCLOSURE (1)
REPLY *IO NRC INSPECTION REPORT L
50-317/89-16; 50-318/89-17 VIOLATION "10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) requires that ' Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.'
Contrary to the above, the Interim Radiological Assessment Director in the Control Room was not able. to perform dose assessment from radiological releases which may result from steam generator tube rupture due to lack of a procedure or training."
REASON FOR TIIE VIOLATION This violation occurred because the development of our Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedures did not consider the radiological assessment of the postulated walk-through scenario to be an Interim Radiological Assessment Director function.- A fuel failure of the magnitude given by the scenario, plus a simultaneous Steam Generator tube rupture and loss of the condenser (causing all activity to be released through atmospheric dump valves), was not postulated within the interim response phase.
Hence, it was assumed that adequate time would be available to augment the interim staff and to implement Main Steam Radioactivity Release Estimate Procedure (ERPIP
'4.1.3.6) in the Technical Support Center.
. CORRECTIVE STEPS Both of our Units are shut down. We have initiated development of an interim response phase methodology for implementation in the Control Room for an unmonitored release of radioactivity from the steam system. If either Unit operates in MODE I (Power Operation) before development of this methodology is complete, a Radiological Assessment Director will be staffed on a 24-hour basis until development is complete.
FULL COMPL.IANCE Witt, the action plan discussed above, we are in full compliance now.
L
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