ML20247L031

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Forwards Comments & Recommendations from Sequoyah Training Staff Re NRC License Exam,Section 4,given to Lw Chandler on 890512.Pre-exam Agreement Encl
ML20247L031
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 05/18/1989
From: Michael Ray
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: Brockman K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20247L015 List:
References
NUDOCS 8908010128
Download: ML20247L031 (7)


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s ENCLOSURE'3-TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 SN!157B Lookout Place L

MAY 181988 Mr. Ken'Brockman.-

Operator Licensing Section--

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region _II, Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Atlanta' Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. Brockman:

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO NRC LICENSE EXAM Enclosed are the cou ats and recommendations (enclosure 1) from the Sequoyah Training Staff concerning the SQh NRC License Exam, Section 4, given to-

-L. W. Chandler on.May 12, 1989. Also enclosed is a pre-examination agreement.

(enclosure 2) as NRC requested.

If you have any. questions, please telephone Clyde T. Benton at (615) 874-1304.

Very truly yours, i

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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4 Manager, Nucle r Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosures 8908010128 890717 PDR ADOCK 05000327 y

PDC An Equal Opportunity Employer 1

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Enclocura l'

' Question 4.01

s.. State the parameter (s), including associated value(s), which indicate adverse containment conditions.

(1.00)'

Answer 4.01 a'

1.

' Containment pressure (0.25) = or > 2.80 psig (0.25) (accept " phase B"

-for full credit) 2.

Containment'high' radiation (0.25) = E5 R/hr (0.25)

Reierence

.ECCS Lesson Plan 4.5, 4.2, 4.4 000040K304 000009K321.000011K312 -

...(KA'S)

TVA Comment.

As 'iscussed during the pre-examination review, we commented that high d

containment radiation was not taught to trainees as an adverse containment condition and that for Sequoyah, adverse containment was containment Hi-Hi pressure (2.81 psig) or 4B.

Our current training materials do not reflect this; however, this was the criteria established when the first site specific

- WOG Emergency Procedures were developed and taught; See attached copy of Requalification material.

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Please accept full credit if Answer Key 4.01 a.1 Containment press = or > 2.80 psis or 4B is given by candidate.

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3 SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT l

LESSON PLAN 1

I i WEEK #3 & #4 REQUAL TRAINING - 1983 l

l DAY 7 I.

PROGRAM: WEEK 3 AND 4, DAY 7, LESSON PLAN 1 II.

SUBJECT:

RCP TRIP AND RESTART CRITERIA III.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

The student must be able to:

A.

S' ate the. criteria for tripping the RCPs in the EOI.

B.

Determine if RCP trip is required during a controlled RCS cooldown.

C.

Determine if RCP trip is required when no ECCS pumps are running.

D.

State the three major factors used for calculating the RCP pressure trip criteria.

(S/G safety valve i

setpoint,100 psi relating safety valve setpoint to RCS press, and RCS press instrument uncertainty).

E.

Explain why the S/G safety valve setpoint is used in the RCP trip criteria.

F.

State the consequences of the RCPs being tripped after RCS inventory is reduced below break elevation.

G.

State the justification for reducing the RCP pressure trip criteria from 1600 psig u,1250 psig.

II. State the symptom for adverse containment. ]

I.

RCPs may be restarted during adverse conditions.

State restart criteria.

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Enclo2ura 1 i Pass 3 of 5

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT LESSON PLAN WEEK #3 & #4 REQUAL ThAINING - 1983_

. _,i DAY 7

' LESSON BODY INSTRUCTOR NOTES D.

Bases for RCP Trip Setpoint '

1.

Trip prior to break uncovery 2.

Prior-to SG tubes idrain 3.

Tubes cannot drain until top of'SG at saturation cetaled 4.

Ilighest RCS pressure and temperature-:!c;'ed-to SG pressure (uncontrolled RCS press) 5.

SG safety valve setpoint 6.

Relate safety valvt setpoint to RCS pressure 7.

Instrument uncertainty-II.

GINNA EVENT d

A. 'RCP during SGTR - immediate operator action on low pressure SI B.

PORV open C.

RCS void D. 'Now Ginna has 3 criteria - Nonnal and abnormal containment f E.

Criteria for abnormal containment at-SNP is phase B.

III.

ALTERNATE TRIP CRITERIA A.

RCS Pressure (uncontrolled)

B.

RCS Subcooling C.

SG and RCS Differential Pressure D.

Ulil Injection IV

'.tCP RESTART ON SUBCOOLING

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Peg 2 4 of 5 Enclosura 1 I

I Question 4.16 (1.50)

List 3 conditions that require emergency boration.

a.

Answer 4.16 (1.50) 1.

Failure of rod control cluster to fully insert following reactor trip (350 gal / rod per ES-0.1)

(0.50) 2.

Uncontrolled increase in re.Stor power (as indicated by Nuclear Instrumentation)

(AOI-34)

(0.50) 3.

ATWS (FR-S.1)

(0.50)

Reference CVCS Lesson Plan, Enabling Objective 5 3.8 000024G011

...(KA'S)

TVA Comment In addition to the above conditions, two additional conditions have been recently established. See Attachment 1 Page 5 of 5 There are two conditions and one basis for the emergency boration.

1.

If RCS T ve drops to < 540*F following a Rx trip with no SI, then a

Emergency boration must be initialed.

2.

If RCS T ve < 500'F, then emergency boration must again be initiated a

even if original boration was completed.

bases-To ensure required shutdown margin is maintained following a Rx trip during excessive cooldown of RCS.

Please accept any 3 of the 5 conditions as full credit answers by candidate.

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: g ' g3 Enclorura 1

' Pass 5'of 5 SQN ES-0.1 Page 3 Revision 8 Question'4.16 HEACTOR TRIP RESPONSE STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1

Check T-ava (Co.ntinued)

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T-avg ) 540*F c.

.IF T-avg 1 540*F,*

THEN emergency borate.360 gal. at 2 75 'gpm of 2 20,000 ppm boron using-FCV-62-138-per A01-34.

IF coolt'own continues DOE TO STEAM LEAKAGE AND T-avg < 530*F.

THEN close HSIVs AND MSIV Eipassvalves.

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.IF T-avg > 540*F 0R shutdown margin verifled with RCS temperature increasing, THEN boration can be terminated--

e d.

T-avg > 500*F d.

IF T-avg < 500*F,

_1 HEN emergency borate 2 75 gpm of 2 20,000 ppm boron I

using FCV-62-138-per A01-34 until one of the following-

-criteria met w

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1) Shutdown margin verlfled' J

per 51-38

2) T-avg stable or increasing
3) Total boration > 2500 gal of 2 20,000 ppm boron.

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G 948 pp ENCLOSURE 4 NRC Resolution of Facility Comments R0 Examination Question 4.01:

NRC Resolution:

Facility comment accepted.

Additional material not originally supplied for examination development states 2.80 psig or Phase B isolation is the full credit answer.

The answer key will be changed to reflect this and the question point value reduced by 0.50 points.

Question 4.16:

NRC Resolution:

Facility comment accepted.

The two (2) additional emergency boration conditions will be added to answer key. Three(3) of the five (5) will be required for full credit.

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