ML20247J242
| ML20247J242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1989 |
| From: | Miltenberger S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247J248 | List: |
| References | |
| NLR-N89102, NUDOCS 8907310271 | |
| Download: ML20247J242 (4) | |
Text
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4 Public Service Electric and Gas Company I-St;ven E. Mittenberger Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bndge, NJ 08038 609-339-4199 i
Vice Psemdent and Chief Nuclear Officer July 21, 1989 NLR-N89102 l
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REQUEST FOR AMENDMENT - CIV POSITION INDICATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) submitted a Request for Amendment (LCR 88-02) on September 28, 1988 (NLR-N88018) to resolve Technical Specification inconsistencies regarding allowable out-of-service times for inoperable primary containment isolation valves and their associated position indication instrumentation.
As a rest 1t of the NRC staff review of LCR 88-02, a telephone conference 1 s held on March 14, 1989 to discuss the proposed change.
From hat discussion, PSE&G committed to revise LCR 88-02.
This 1
.nsmittal provides the necessary revisions to address the NR
, att's concern.
i to this transmittal summt ucc the NRC staff's concern and provides the PSE&G responsi
"*lle Attachment 2 contains the appropriately revised Techarcal Specification.
From the discussions provided, PSE&G has concluded that these TS changes do not affect the evaluation or conclusions contained in the 9/28/88 transmittal and therefore, do not affect the No Significant Hazards Consideration determination.
Should you have any additional questions or comments, do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, e
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Attachment al syns WhBa hp P
d Document Control Desk 2
07-21-89 NLR-N89102 C
Mr.
C.
Y.
Shiraki USNRC Licensing Project Manager Mr.
G.
W. Meyer USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr.
W. T.
Russell, Administrator USNRC Region I Mr.
K. Tosch, Chief Bureau of Nuclear Engineering New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 1
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Ref:
NLR-N89102 LCR 88-02
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i STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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1 S. Miltenberger, being duly sworn according to law deposes and
.j says:
l I am Vice President and Chief Nuclear' Officer of Public Service f
Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters' set forth in our letter dated July 21, 1989
, concerning the-Hope Creek Generating Station, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
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Subscribed-nd Sworn to before me i
this J./5 day of UtNM 1989 V
AAn]?9 M/&D l
Notary Public of New Jersey 1
1 EfLEEN n. DCHS i
My Commission expires on
. N0TARY PUBLIC 0F NEW JERSEY my amanssh Expires July 16,1992 I
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e ATTACHMENT l-TO NLR-N89102
SUMMARY
OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL CHANGES TO H
LICENSE CHANGE REQUEST (LCR) 88 CONTAINMENT-ISOLATION VALVE POSITION INDICATION INSTRUMENTATION The proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TS) would permit continued plant operation if. position indication is lost for a primary containment isolation valve as long as the l
penetration is isolated-in accordance with TS 3.6.3, Action a.2 or a.3.
Otherwise, the requirements of Action 82 of TS Table
'3.3.7.5-1 apply and a plant shutdown is required within 30 or 7 days (if either or both instruments are lost, respectively) assuming that the indication cannot be restored to operability.
This change is justified on'the basis that if a primary containment' isolation valve becomes inoperable and the penetration can be isolated (by the use.of a deactivated automatic valve,'a closed manual valve, or a. blind flange) a change in the position of the inoperable valve is precluded; thus, position indication serves no function as the penetration is isolated and secured.
On March 14, 1989, Mr Clyde Shiraki, Licensing Project Manager, called tv discuse the proposed change.
He indicated that, in the event that an inboard primary containment isolation valve is deactivated to isolate the subject penetration and its' position indication-instrumentation is lost, if the valve is stroked open to meet Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b and fails to shut, the i
penetration would no longer be isolated as assumed.
In order to 1
avert this potential problem, Mr. Shiraki suggested revising the proposed change to restrict the ability to isolate the affected penetration by deactivating an inboard containment isolation valve.
PSE&G concurs with the identified interpretation and suggested resolution and has accordingly revised TS Table 3.3.7.5-1, Action 82.a and 82.b as shown in Attachment 2.
This change replaces TS page 3/4 3-86 previously provided in the 9/28/88 transmittal.
l PSE&G has concluded that since the identified revision is simply an additional restriction (namely, that credit cannot be taken for penetration isolation by the use of a deactivated inboard l
isolation valve when the valve's position indication is lost) the conclusions reached in the No Significant Hazards Consideration determination and the associated justifications provided in the original submittal are still valid.
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