ML20247J123

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Forwards Escalated Enforcement Items Subject to Enforcement Discretion,Per 971210 NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties
ML20247J123
Person / Time
Site: Millstone  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/16/1998
From: Travers W
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Bowling M, Miller H
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
References
EA-96-146, EA-96-183, EA-96-198, EA-96-352, EA-97-141, EA-97-304, EA-97-377, EA-97-561, NUDOCS 9805210343
Download: ML20247J123 (9)


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FUSUC DOCUMDR RUOM EA 96-146, EA 96-183 EA 96-198, EA-96-352 l

EA 97-141, EA 97-304 EA 97-377, EA 97-561 Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer, Urnt 2

% Harry L. Miller, Director - Regulatory Affairs for Millstone Station Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385

Subject:

EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Bowling:

On December 10,1997, the NRC sent to you a Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties - $2.1 million for many violations identified in NRC inspections performed during 1995 and 1996, at the Millstone facility. The majority of the violations were the subject of enforcement conferences held on March 11 and December 5,1996. However, the NRC identified other potential escalated enforcement items (Eels) in inspection reports issued between 1995 and 1997 that were not part of that sanction, or part of other Notices of Violation issued during that period. These items are listed in the enclosures to this letter.

The NRC has evaluated the Eels in Enclosure 1, and has determined that they involved violations of NRC requirements. These violations could be considered for escalated enforcement and subject to civil penalties. However, I have decided, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion pursuant to Section Vll.B.2 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy, and not issue a formal Notice of Violation or Civil Penalties, because your facility has been in an extended shutdown and the NRC has taken significant enforcement action for the performance issues that led to the shutdown. The decision to exercise discretion was made considering the violations (with the exception of eel 423/96-006-13 (discussed below) were (1) based on licensee practices prior to the shutdown, (2) not classified higher than a Severity Level 11, and (3) not willful. Additionally, plant restart requires NRC concurrence. Although come of the items in Enclosure 1 were NRC identified, discretion is appropriate because the NRC has in place a formal restart plan that is currently providing a broad-based evaluation of Millstone readiness for restart that will confirm that you are taking corrective actions for these issues; therefore, further enforcement action is not necessary to achieve remedial action. The fundamental performance issues related to these violations appear to be similar to the performance issues that resulted in the many violations cited with the

$2.1 mit! ion civil penalties.

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r Mr. M.L. Bowling Enforcement discretion for eel 423/96-006-13, which involved structural supports in the recirculation spray and quench spray systems not being within the design basis of the plant, is being exercised pursuant to Section Vll.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy. Although the violation may have been willful, discretion for this issue is being exercised due to the age of the event which occurred prior to licensing of Unit 3 and the fact that the responsible person is no longer with the company. Further, the NRC is satisfied that the corrective actions to resolve these spray systems issues has been adequate. Nonetheless, you are charged with ensuring that conditions and processes are in place to preclude similar events from occurring in the future.

Management must remain vigilant and waten for pressures on employees that could prompt willful violations.

For those items in Et closure 1, for which the NRC exercised enforcement discretion, no response is required; i.owever, corrective actions must be taken by the applicable phase of the restart process. Based on additional NRC evaluation, the items listed in Enclosure 2 were found not to be violations of NRC requirements. Lastly, Enclosure 3 lists Eels still under evaluation by the NRC.

No response to this lettei is required. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Wayne D.

Lanning at 610-337-5126 or Mr. Jacque P. Durr at 610-337-5224.

Sincerely, fwh/

William D. Travers, Director Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

(1)

Escalated Enforcement items Subject to Enforcement Discretion (2)

Escalated Enforcement items Not Constituting Violations (3)

Escalated Enforcement items Still Under Evaluation by the NRC

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Letter to Mr. M.L. Bowling - Re: Exercise of Enforcement Discretion cc w/ encl:

i B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer i

M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Operations J. McElwain, Unit 1 Recovery Officer J. Streeter, Recovery Officer, Nuclear Oversight G. D. Hicks, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 3 i

J. A. Price, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 2 D. Amerine, Vice President for Engineering and Support Services P. D. Hinnenkamp, Director, Unit 1 Operations F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training S. J. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation L. M. Cuoco, Esquire J. R. Egan, Esquire V. Juliano, Waterford Library J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control S. B. Comley, We The People -

State of Connecticut SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)

R. Bassilakis, CAN J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)

Representative T. Concannon E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC

r-4 Mr. M.L. Bowling Enforcement discretion for eel 423/96-006-13, which involved structural supports in the recirculation spray and quench spray systems not being within the design basis of the plant, is being exercised pursuant to Section Vll.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy. Although the violation may have been willful, discretion for this issue is being exercised due to the age of the event which occurred prior to licensing of Unit 3 and the fact that the responsible person is no longer with the company. Further, the NRC is satisfied that the corrective actions to resolve these spray systems issues has been adequate. Nonetheless, you are charged with ensuring that I

conditions and processes are in place to preclude similar events from occurring in the future.

Management must remain vigilant and watch for pressures on employees that could prompt willful violations.

For those items in Enclosure 1, for which the NRC exercised enforcement discretion, no response is required; however, corrective actions must be taken by the applicable phase of the restart process. Based on additional NRC evaluation, the items listed in Enclosure 2 were found not to be violations of NRC requirements. Lastly, Enclosure 3 lists Eels still under evaluation by the NRC.

No response to this letter is required. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Wayne D.

Lanning at 610-337-5126 or Mr. Jacque P. Durr at 610-337-5224.

Sincerely,

,priginal Si6 nod b/J William D. Travers, Director Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

(1)

Escalated Enforcement items Subject to Enforcement Discretion (2)

Escalated Enforcement items Not Constituting Violations (3)

Escalated Enforcement items Still Under Evaluation by the NRC Distribution: see next page DOCUMENT NAME: P:96146r2.dn (*see previous concurrence)

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachmentlenclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE Rl/SPO C

Rl/SPO C

Rl/SPO lC RllORA C OE l

NAME NJBLUMBERG/db JPDURR WDLANNING DJHOLODY JLIEBERMAN DATE 3/13/98*

3/23/98*

3/23/98*

3!30/98*

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l NAME BFEWELL BLETTS WDTAAVi!RS DATE 3/30/98*

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4//@98/sJr OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

r Letter to Mr. M.L. Bowling - Re: Exercise of Enforcement Discretion Distribution w/enct Region l Docket Room (with copy of cor.currences)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC FILE CENTER, NRR (with Oriainal concurrences)

SPO Secretarial File, Region 1 NRC Resident inspector OE (2)

B. Letts,01, RI Distribution w/enci(VIA E-MAIL):

J. Andersen, PM, SPO, NRR M. Callahan, OCA R. Correia, NRR B. McCabe, OEDO S. Dembek, PM, SPO, NRR G. Imbro, DD, ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR D. Mcdonald, PM, SPO, NRR P. McKee, DD, Licensing, SPO, NRR D. Screnci, PAO K. Greene, PIMS/ DISP l

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ENCLOSURE 1 Escalated Enforcement items Subiect To Enforcement Discretion UNIT 1 eel 245/96-008-01 m EA 96-352 Failure to provide troubleshooting plan guidelines eel 245/96-008-03 m EA 96-352 CRD system was not brought into design requirements within I

the required time period eel 245/97-002-01 ") EA 97-561 Failure to identify and analyze trends MD eel 336/96-005-11 ") EA 96-183 Inaccurate information given to the NRC conceming the design basis capability of certain MOVs eel 336/96-008-06 m EA 96-352 Procedure OP 2305 was inadequate in that it failed to lock open the refueling drain valves during an operating cycle as required by the FSAR eel 336/96-008-08

  • EA 96-352 Failure to implement an LER corrective action by failing to review other TS surveillance that contain requirements to i

verify valve position to identify any valves that are potentially not included eel 336/96-008-10 m EA 96-352 Inadequate LER corrective actions (lifting heavy loads over Unit 2 turbine deck 480 V switchgear

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eel 336/97-002-12 m EA 97-304 Many procedures used for TS surveillance were identified to be technically inadequate i

UNIT 3 eel 423/96-006-13

  • EA 96-146 RSS and QSS systems are outside the design basis eel 423/97-202-09
  • EA 97-561 Functional deficiency in the setting of the ECCS throttle valve positions which could result in the loss of safety functions in the recirculation phase Notes:(1)

NRC identified issue (2)

Licensee identified technical issue; NRC identified regulatory issue (3)

Licensee identified issue l

ENCLOSURE 2 Escalated Enforcement items Not Constituting Violations UNIT 1 eel 245/96-009-01 EA 97-141 Five separate instances in which the NRC was apparently not notified of reportable events in a timely manner UNIT 2 eel 336/96-201-12 EA 96-198 Potential failure to establish measures and design controls to ensure the design basis for the wide range logarithmic NI channels are as described in the FSAR UNIT 3 eel 423/96-201-19 EA 96-198 Potential failure to establish instructions or procedures to ensure Rosemount transmitters were properly installed or inspected 1

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ENCLOSURE 3 Eme-'-ted EiJ.,rce.T.ent ::;.T.; Still Under Evaluation By The NRC 11NII_1 eel 245/95-082-03 EA 96-151")

Failure to evaluate SFP impact on SBGT system eel 245/95-082-08 EA 96-1510)

SFP was modified for re-racking to hold more control rods and the FSAR was not changed eel 245/95-082-19 EA 96-151")

The switch from 1/4 to 1/3 fuel core off loads did not receive any safety evaluation I

eel 245/95-082-20 EA 96-1510)

Failure to change core off-load status as reflected in License Amendment No. 40 eel 245/96-009-02 EA 97-026 Former director of Unit 1 was not qualified for that unit eel 245/96-009-08 EA 97-025 Letter to the NRC closing GL 89-13 was inaccurate in that several issues in the GL had not been addressed I

eel 245/97-002-05 EA 97-206 Containment isolation valve 1-MS-5 not tested in both directions j

l eel 245/97-002-06 EA 97-206 Failure to properly implement the Appendix J containment leak rate test program i

eel 245/97-002-08 EA 97-205 Unit 1 operated with peak torus water temperature in 1

l excess of design basis from September 1990 to July 1995 l

eel 245/97-002-09 EA 97 205 Partial clogging of LPCI heat exchanger tubes was not properly evaluated, which may have reduced heat l

exchanger capacity i

eel 245/97-002-10 EA 97-205 Description of the LPCI heat exchanger was not consistent with description in the FSAR eel 245/97-002-11 EA 97-206 Failure of CU-29 local leak rate testing as found condition eel 245/97-202-06 EA 97-376 Non-licensed training did not use a systems approach to training UNIT 2 i

eel 336/97-202-06 EA 97-376 Non-licensed training did not use systems approach to training

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UNIT 3 l

eel 423/97-202-06 EA 97-376 Non-licensed training did not use a systems approach to training Note: (1)

Items were originally assigned EA No.96-145 in the NRC Escalated Enforcement Action tracking system. EA 96-145 was closed on issuance of the Enforcement l

Package. Since these items are still under evaluation, they have been assigned to tracking number EA 96-151.

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