ML20247G500
| ML20247G500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1989 |
| From: | Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RAR-89-61, NUDOCS 8909190085 | |
| Download: ML20247G500 (9) | |
Text
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- [?'t Commonwealth Edison j ty #) 22710 206 Avenue North O
ourd Cities Nucitar Power Station - -{ . Cordova, Illinois 61242-9740 ~ Telephone 309/654-2241 RAR-89 X Septemberil,'1989 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations ~ U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station Pl-137: Washington, D. C. 20555 - ).. Enclosed please. find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of August, 1989, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1: and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluations are being reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e). Thirty-nine copies-are provided for your use. Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH ~ EDISON COMPANY QIJAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION b. D R. A. Robey Technical Superintendent RAR/LFD/djb r.nclosure cc: R. Stols T. Watts /J. Galligan [f kDOh f i } q 0027H/0061Z
i Modification M-4-1/2-86-6 Description This modification installed a remote radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring system and constructed a facility to house the system for the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety. This independent station run facility monitors the radioactive gases released from the chimney and relays this information to the IONS Office in Springfield. This facility is required by the Illinois Safety Preparedness 'Act No. 83-1342 dated September.4, 1984. 1 This modification provided such a facility and installed the state-owned equipment for the state. Evaluation 1. The probability of an. occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increasel because the modifi-cation does not degrade systems or structure important to safety and does not result in new or increased radiological consequences from previously evaluated accidents. Dose estimates, as a result of a tubing rupture at ground level, have been shown by calculation to be within 10CFR20 limits. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new accidents or malfunction of a type necessary to be evaluated in the FSAR are postulated to occur. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the modification does not involve any safety-related system or structure or its associated basis, as ) defined in Tech. Specs. Tubing loading on the safety-related chimney is insignificant. Doses resulting from a postulated rupture are only fractional percentages of allowable limits and do not significantly ] affect the RETS or their associated bases. j )
Modification M-4-1/2-87-OlD Description Installation of Control Room conduit, cable, lighting fixtures, fire detectors and dimming control cabinets; and relocation of CRTs, existing battery pack lighting, fire detectors and PA speakers are associated with this partial of the DCRDR HED resolution project. These activities will improve the Control Room lighting to meet NUREG 0700 guidelines. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the replace-ment standby lighting load has N en verified to be no greater than the existing load. Therefore, no single failure event or design basis accident, as evaluated in the FSAR, is affected by this partial modification. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because interactions created by new equipment near safety-related equipment are mitigated by seismically designed or restrained supports. Interactions of the new standby. lighting load cn the auxiliary power system is mitigated by ensuring this load is no greater than the existing load. And the interaction of the new ceiling with existing fire detection is mitigated by the addition and relocation of fire detection to ensure detection capabilities equivalent to the original design. Therefore, no accident or mal-functions different than those previously evaluated in the FSAR have been created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the relocation and addition of new fire detectors have been located in accordance with the original design criteria. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specification 3.12.A is not reduced. No other Technical Specifications are affected by this modification. t_____________________
Modification M4-2-88-043 Description - Partial A This partial of the modification was initiated because of degraded capacity on the Unit 2 125V battery. This partial modification installed a temporary l battery on the Unit 2 mezzanine level. Alarms and metering were transferred to the temporary battery when in use. The #2A battery charger (spare) was used to charge the battery and carry the bus. The battery was seismically installed and electrically connected to turbine building bus #2A compartment B04. Description - Partial B This partial of the modification was to replace the U-2 125V battery with a new one. The old battery was found to be degrading in capacity and needed to be replaced. The modification was accomplished by removing the old battery and installing the new permanent battery and associated equipment. Parallel the new permanent and the temporary batteries, then disconnect the temporary battery. Description - Partical C This partial of the modification was to disconnect and remove electrical connections and associated equipment. The connections that were rewired at 125 Vdc distribution nanel 2A compartment B04 (reserve feed to the turbine building 125 Vdc reserve bus 2B-1) and compartment C03 (fead from battery charger #2A) were tested. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is uat increased because the new l permanent battery differs only in plate spacing and number from the ) old permanent battery. The new battery also has a higher ampere-hour l rating than the old battery. The chemical process and construction j are identical in each battery. Failure of this battery is analyzed in the FSAR. The probability of an occurrence of a previously evaluated accident or malfunction has not increased because the function of the new battery is identical to that of the old battery. The consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety have not increased either. Although the new battery has a higher capacity rating, its associated switchgear, cabling, and breaker coordination have been evaluated and are found to be adequate to mitigate an accident involving the battery. The removal of the temporary battery does not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety, because during the time of removal the temporary battery is not electrically or physically connected to any safety related equipment.
L c' '.= 9 Modification M4-2-88-043 (continued) 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the failure of one, 125 volt battery with a loss of normal source of power is evaluated in the FSAR. The installation of the new permanent battery represents the replacement of a component and does not introduce a different type of accident or malfunction than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. Removing the temporary battery does not introduce a different type of accident or malfunction either because as soon as the permanent is installed, the temporary battery is isolated from the battery bus and system. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the new permanent battery is adequate for supplying the load profile for four (4) hours, with an end of dis-charge terminal voltage of 105 volts. Therefore, the basis for Techni-col Specification 3.9 is not affected and consequently the margin of safety has not been reduced. Removal of the temporary battery does not affect any Technical Specification and does not reduce any margin of safety. The temporary battery is not connected to the 125 Vdc supply system in any manner when it is being removed.
( Safety Evaluation #89-334 Condensate Demineralized Filter Element Comparison Test Special Test 1-135 Replace original Graver filter elements with alternate filter elements manufactured by Filterite. Inc. and Pall Corp. in order to compare filter per-formance. The alternate filter elements are dimensionally similar to the Graver elements and are mounted on Standard Graver hardware. 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the condensate demineralized filter elements are not specifically mentioned in Sections 7.8.2 and 11.3 in the FSAR. The function of the demineralizers is not being changed, and they will not be operated any differently than de-mineralizes with original Graver elements. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the configuration, function and operation of the condensate demineralized system will not be changed by the filter replace-ment. Therefore, no new possibilities for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR are created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the condensate demineralizers are not referenced in the Technical Specifications. Replacement of the Graver filter elements with alternate elements will not reduce the margin of safety.
i Safety Evaluation #89-342 SPDS Program Changes The changes to SPDS implement logic to determine parameter direction which will be displayed using arrows and replace the rate of change value. The arrows will indicate the direction that the parameter is heading in: up, down, or level. Those directions will be indicated with up and down arrows for up and down, and no arrows will indicate level. (Both up and down cyan arrows will indicate invalid.) i The basic logic will be for the direction to be level until either a large incre-mental change in value occurs or the value has crept up or down a significant amount over a period of time. 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated i l in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the enhance-ment to SPDS will improve data reliability and reduce the number of misleading indications to operators and ERF personnel. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the purpose and intent of SPDS have not been changed. Improvements involve correcting original design deficiencies and will provide enhanced performance. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced-because SPDS is not discussed in the Technical Specifications. i i l 1 i
Safety Evaluation //89-367 Feedwater Check Velve Machine an 'O' ring groove on the bottom of the seat ring on the 2-3208A, B, C and 2-220-59A, B feedwater check valves (only the 2-220-59B portion of this modification is safety related). A Kalrez type 'O' ring will be installed. This Kalrez material has a high resistance to chemicals and heat. 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because installing a Kalrez 'O' ring will provide a durable seal, and will assure improved sealing and valve performance. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the basic design and operation of the check valve is not changed.. The 'O' ring seal will only improve valve performance, therefore, no new mode of failure is created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the operation and intent of the check valve is not being changed. Only improved sealing will result from this modification. 1
+; Safety Evaluation #89-398 RHRSW Pumps on the B Loop Installing a pipe cap on the Unit 2 RHRSW discharge pipe, 2-1005B-16"-D upstream of the U-1/U-2 B loop crosstie. 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the kHR S2rvice Water System is designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident by removing decay heat from the containment, the probability of occurrence of an accident is not increased by failure of any components in this system. As described in Section 6, Amendments 16 and 17 to the Quad Cities Safety Analysis Report (SAR), one RHR pump and one RHR Service Water pump provide adequate containment cooling fol.owing a loss of coolant accident. A similar combination of equipment is adequate on a non-accident unit to place and maintain the reactor in the cold shutdown condition. This minimum combination of equipment is only experienced in the degraded conditions of loss of offsite power, loss of coolant accident on one unit, and failure of one diesel generator to start. Since this modification does not reduce the minimum RHR Service Water System availability as described in the SAR, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not increased. As will be discussed in detail later, radundancy of RHRSW pumps remains consistent with the original design. 2. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluateo previously in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this crosstie modification merely shares two RHR Service Water Pumps between Untis 1 and 2 in the same manner that one of the emergency power supplies, the 1/2 diesel generator, is sharol between the two units. The crosstie does not involve the addition of any active ccmponents, electricci interlocks, etc. The crosstie piping and manual valve are existing safety related parts of the RHRSW System. The new pipe cap will maintain the pressure boundary of the RHRSW System, and will be designed to equivalent standards to th2 original piping. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because one containment cooling loop, comprised of one RHR and one RHR Service Water Pump, has been previously analyzed as adequate, the reduction from eight pumps to six has no effect on the margin of safety. This is evident by examining the piping and electrical diagrams. The Unit I diesel generator supplies the Unit 1 "C" and "D" pumps. The Unit 2 diesel generator supplies the Unit 2 "C" and "D" pumps. The 1/2 diesel generator supplies the "A" and "B" pumps on the unit which is postulated to have a loss of coo 2 ant accident. Therefore, only six of the eight pumps are truly available, and only three are normally in operation if all the diesels are available. Identical redundancy is present under the crosstied scheme; six pumps are available but a maximum of three would be operated if all the diesels are available. s i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -}}