ML20247G475
| ML20247G475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1989 |
| From: | Mcloughlin D Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| FRN-52FR6980 OL-I-MAG-061, OL-I-MAG-61, NUDOCS 8905300411 | |
| Download: ML20247G475 (6) | |
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CS2.FK G%O)f439 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20,5.55 Re: Comments on Proposed Rule on Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and Local Governments Decline to Participate in Offsite Emergency Planning Oear Mr. Chilk:
This letter provides the cot <nents of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) proposed rule. " Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and Local Governments Decline to Participate in Offsite Emergency Planning." This proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on March 6, 1987 (52 FR 6980).
D The NRC has proposed a change in its regulations which would persit the
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licensing of nuclear power plants where State and local governments decline to participate in the design, exercise, or implementation of offstte emergency preparedness planning. Under those circumstances, the proposed rule change would permit the appilcant to be licensed upon showing that (1) Its. inability to comply wt th the normal emergency planning requirements could be remedied or adequately compensated for by reasonable cooperation by the State and local governments, (2) the applicant has made a good faith and sustalnad effort to obtain this cooperation, (3) the plans dev91oped by the applicant include all effective measures to compensate for the lack of cooperation wntch are reasonable and feasible under the circumstances and which take into account a possible State or local response to an actual emergency, and (a) the applicant e
e has provl< led copies of the plan to all governments which would have otherwtse n
have participate and has assured them that it stands ready to cooperate with p
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&n FEMA notes, as a f trst premise to its comments, that, under the Atomic Energy "O
Act, legal responsibility for the licensing of nuclear power plants is vestec g
exclusively in the NRC.
In setting standards for licensure, the Commission eo defines the threat to be prepared against, and it is the Comission wntch determines what level of preparation is necessary to meet the defined threat.
n Prior to the incident at the Three Mlle Island Nuclear Power Plant in Maren
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1979, there was no licensing requirement for offsite emergency planning and
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&c preparedness.
Following that incident and the report of the Kemeny Comissicn in the same year, the NRC strengthened its regulatory requirement that offstte
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk. Page 2.
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emergency response planning and preparedness be instituted and tt' demonstrated adequate to protect the public before new licenses would be issLed.
- t also adopted the Kemeny Commission recommendation that FEM should take the lead responsibility for offsite emergency plan evaluation. Additional requirements were established to insure such planning and preparation would De accompitsnea at previously licensed plants.
As a second premise, FEM acknowledges that decisions by the NRC on obtaining and maintaining operating licenses are based in part on a composite review of offsite emergency capabilities and those provided by the utility within the plant. The NRC has the authority to determine the relative importance of l
offstte emergency preparedness in the licensing decision. This statement of
'l FEM's views on the proposed rule ts made on the assumption that adecuate i
offstte emergency pfanning and preparedness are still considered essential to l
obtaining and maintaining an operating license, l
The proposed. rule change is evidently intended to address the preemption iss.;e
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which is at the center of the litigation over licensing of the Shoreham I
Nuclear Power Plant and the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant.
The particular
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issue is whether State and local governments should be able to do indirectly, by declining to participate in offstte emergency planning, what they may not do directly, that is, effectively veto the regulatory decisions of the NRC as to the siting and licensing of nuclear power plants. FEM believes that this i
issue of the Indirect veto of NRC decisions by state and local governments D
involves matters of significant public policy which may ultimately have to be resolved by the Congress.
While FEM has no view as to the validity of any position the NRC may take on the preemption issue per se, the agency does note that the effect of the proposed change is to require a showing that the applicant nas taken all reasonacle and feasible steps to develop an offsite emergency plan and response capability rather than a showing that the emergency response plans offer reasonable assurar.ce that adequate measures to protect the public can :e taken in the event of an emergency.
On 1ts face, the proposed rule incorporates a fundamental change in the way that offstte emergency planning would be evaluated by FEM If the NRC requests findings and determinations as to whether offsite emergency plans are adecuate and can be impioe07,ted.
It would eliminate the need for full-participation esercises (those tu ting the capactty of State and local governments) both before and after licensing.
Even if exercises are conducted, their value is I
seriously diminished without the participation of State and local l
governments. Full-participation exercises serve several important purposes.
They are not only tools for evaluating written plans, they are also a means for theti refinement and a training ventcle for the emergency personnel eno j
will be called on to respond to an actual emergency. FEM is of the d ew inat
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'M 1ed n-t i d ge t h.ni,
- h. Ge ;;:::-! 'Sema offers all u
concerned with offsite emergency planning and preparedness a wealth of experience as aenu tivity to local c i rcums un cui, W '? ' d which could
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. Mr. Samuel'J,. Chilk, Page 3.
O have serious adverse consequences for such activltles at existing and future p i t.n t s.
4 In February,1986. FEM participated in an exercise that did not include State and local governments.
The roles of key government officials were playee by From this experience, FEM concludes that the practtee o FEM employees.
s simulating governmental participation has several important consequences.
First,;the real-time interaction between officials and other emergency responders is not realistically tested.
That compromises the quality of tr.e findings which FEM is able to make about the preparedness of those other responders. Secondly, the preparedness of the State and local governments is not demonstrated in any meaningful sense. Al a result. the conclusions tnat FEM po. ld be calleifeon-to make-about--thC a*^*
- ra w a<a M Oate and local u
governments would be based largely.on_confecture. FEM is very reluctant to
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i:ertify thet--adettists protective measures can be taken iiMyrv-my. finding woulc be based on 1EJZLoegfR eT cs@cu.
The refinement of emergency plans which is the natural outcome of an exercise could also De compromised.
The observations on unich such refinements would be made are less valid without the participation of State and local governments. Furthermore, these governments may not be committed to changes,,
in their usual ways of operating in emergencies.
They are certainly not likely to change their routines during an actual emergency, even it they are,-
convinced of the wisdom of the changes. Thelackoftrainingwhichwould,id all probability, follow from holding exeret tes without State and local D
government participation would also increase the risk to the population of tne) affected emergency planning zones.
The existing regulatory Scheme anticipates that there will be detailed.
documented, provisions in advance of an emergency for the plume exposure emergency planning zone (10 miles out from the plant) and that ag, hgc
_c responses will be undertaken as necessary to supolement preplanned actions.
This proposed rule would, in effect, sanction extensive across-the-board ad,,
hj;tg responses.
The proposed rule incorporates as a basic premise the assumption that State and local governments are likely to respond in an actual emergency because state law requires them to do so and also because that would presumably be the natural reaction of government officials in time of gency. Even if the premise is valid, the _ag,h,,gti nature of their response could have unfortunate consequences.
It does not assure that the full range of necessary actions will be taken.
It does make it highly likely that any response will be uncoordinated.
To the extent that utility company officials step into the roles of government officials, such as by recommending specific protective actions, there is a high probability that the puolle and emergency i
responders will receive conflicting instructions. FEM also notes tnat, wnt le the legal issue of the authority of utility officials to perform critical j.
emergency functions in place of State and local officials has been consicered by the courts of New York State, in has not been resolved throughout the country.
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The concerns identiffed above relate to communities which nave declarec or demonstrated an unwillingness to take part in emergency responts planning.
FEMA is equally concerned that the incentive for cooperative State and local governments to continue their efforts could be diminished should the proposed rule be adopted.
In addition to the major con.: erns expressed above FEMA questions several~
assumptions made expliettly or implicitly in the proposal:
1.
The belief expressed by the NRC that State and local governments which have not been involved in emergency planning would nonetheless respond to an actual emergency and follow a comprehensive utility plan is open to question. FEMe Aas_atdata that would-indicate what State ant local government reactions miehe be in such etrevitrtTances.
2.
The assumption that the proposed rule change will lessen the burden of litigation is debatable.
The phase of the licensing hearings having to do wtth emergency planning will be no less intense than before and can be expected to be more complex because of the uncertainties introduced into the issue of the adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness.
It follows that the potential litigation costs related to the proposed rule would procaely be no less than j
under current regulations.
D local governments by Title III of the Superfund Amendments and 3.
The claim that the requirement for. planning placed on State and i
Reauthorization Act of 1986 would prompt more State cooperation regarding nuclear power plant emergency planning is not supported by facts.
The State and local organizational
- structures for carrying out the provisions of Title III are mandated by law and, in most cases, existing structures will be used.
It is not the presence of emergency management structures such as provided under iltle III that is at issue.
Rather, the question is whether those organizations are willing to participate in nuclear power emergency preparedness.
The adoption of proposed rule would not, in an of itself, resolve FEMA's difficulties in providing findings regarding reasonaele assurance for offsite preparedness if state and local governments do not participate.
The current Memorandue of Understanding between FEMA and tne NRC charges FEMA with N
evaluating offsite emergency response plans against the criteria set out in the jointly developed guidance document. NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1.
This; guidance document assumes that there will be axtensiv6 involvement of state and locai governments in the development and implementation of these plans.
41.tfLout such involvement, many of the evaluation criteria cannot be satisrteo.
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., ocess a Wasiuston. It cannot offer the NRC the findings it requests. As the NRC
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Chilk. Page 5. '
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staff seems to have recognized in its cresentat!cn of the proposed rule :: :ne Commission, new guidance and standards for evaluation of such an emergency preparedness structure would have'to be develeDed. As staff has recognized.
this task is not insignificant and when considered in-the light of requisite litigation bears major resource ramifications for this agency.
The NRC statements on this rule and our comments above make It clear that we share a common.vtew that off-site emergency preparedness is best served by active state and local government participation. Should the NRC find tne proposed rule Appropriate and necessary, we would expect to continue our productive relationship.. e would also hope that the NRC would carefully W
montter the participation of state and local governments in order to adjust requirements that might discourage such participation.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule.
Sincerely, 11 Dave McLoughlin Deputy Associate Otractor State and Local Programs and Support D
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