ML20247G372
| ML20247G372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1998 |
| From: | Curry D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUM2-PPNR-1487, NUDOCS 9805200235 | |
| Download: ML20247G372 (21) | |
Text
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i PARSONS Daniel L. Curry, Vice President, Noctear Semces Parsons Energy & Chemicals Group inc.
2676 hiorgantown Road + Reading, Pennsylvania 19607 * (610) 855-2366 + Fax; (610) 855-2602 May 14,1998 Docket No. 50-336 Parsons NUM2-PPNR-1487-L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention. Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP)
Gentlemen:
This letter transmits summaries of telephone conferences between Parsons Power Group Inc., the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NNECo and NEAC on 4/16/98,4/21/98,4/23/98,4/28/98 and 4/30/98.
Please call me at (610) 855-2366 if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Daniel L. Curry Parsons ICAVP Project Director
(
DLC:djv Attachments 1.
Telephone Conference Notes from April 16,1998 2.
Telephone Conference Notes from April 21,1998 b
3.
Telephone Conference Notes from April,23,190':
/lg 4.
Telephone Conference Notes from April 28,19sd 5.
Telephone Conference Notes from April 30,1998 cc:
E. Imbro (2)- USNRC J. Fougere - NNECo H. Eichenholz - USNRC Rep. Terry Concannon - NEAC R. Laudenat - NNECo Project Files
-,. v v.g.]
9805200235 980514 l
PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
PDR i
PPNR1487. doc
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F' CONFERENCE NOTES April 16,1998 DATE:
4/16/98 PU,RPOSik Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
- 1. EBFS Calculation No 97-DES-1745-M2,5/17/97 l
2.
PDCR 2-100-86 Replacement of EDG Differential Relays
- 3. Outlet Flange Studs on Pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-201 4.
PDCR 2-17-83 l
S. Administrative Approach to improved Support to the Inspection 6.
NNECo Response to DR-0312 - Water in Diesel Oil Storage Tank (T47A) 7.
Control Loops LT-1113 A/B/C/D and LT 1123 A/B/C/D 8.
Clarification of the term " Vital Bus" i
LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Panons Joe Fougere John Nakoski Wayne Dobson Don Marks Ed Smith Larry Colher Dom Ramos Rich Glaviano Mike Akins Jolm Archer Dan Wooddell Bob Moyer John Ihlbish Fletch Downey 1.
Topic: EBFS Calculation No 97-DES-1745-M2,5/17/97 (Dom Ramos) l
Background:
Under the " References / Design Inputs" Section of Calculation No 97-DES-1745-M2 the following calculations l
were included:
I 1,
Calculation No. 97-DES-1537-5lMl2, Rev 0, dated 1/13/97, "AES Relative Humidity and Exhaust Air l
Temperature" l
2.
Calculation No. 97-DES-1536-M2, Rev 0, dated 1/13/97," Impact on AES due to SFP Bulk Temp Upgrade to l40"F" Acenrding to EWR # 96-0105, Phase 3 Progress and Status Report, 2/12/98 as provided by NU, the above referenced calculations are " VOID" and annotated with Note 4. This note states: " These temporary calculations i
were prepared but never issued and numbers should be deleted."
Question:
l a) is thcre a later revision to timubject calculation that resolves the discrepancy?
Response: There is no later revision to the calculation. 7he two referenced calculations were advertently annotated as being *TO1D " by the Status Report. 7he two referenced calculations are active.
Background Continued: The subject calculation result indicates that 50 KW EBFS heaters are required to maintain the air entering the charcoal filters to less than 70% relative humidity in order to maintain the 95%
charcoal filter efliciency. DCR No. M2-97004 would l' ave replaced the existing 25 KW to 50 KW heaters. The DCR was canceled 1-18-98 as a result of Engineering Evaluation M2-EV-970042 dated 7-28 97. The Evaluation justified the acceptability of retaining the existing 25 KW EBFS heaters. The existing heaters can maintain the air entering the filters to less 90 % relative humidity. According to the Evaluation, the 90% relative humidity is PAGE1 j
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CONFERENCE NOTES April 16,1998 l
acceptable since it meets the safety analysis as described in the FSAR. MP2 testing methodology ensures 95%
filter efTiciency at higher humidity. FSARCR 97-MP2-65 changed th-FSAR page 6.7-4 to add a sentence stating
'ihat the* cxisting heaters maintain the entering air relative humidity to the filters below 90%
Question:
b) According to the subject calculation the air entering the charcoal filters must be limited to 70% relative humidity in order to ensure a filter efliciency of 95% The Evaluation and the FSAR state 90% relative humidity is acceptable. Is there a later revision to the subject calculation that resolves the discrepancy?
Response: Calculation 97-DES-1745-M2 will be voided Calculation 97-ENG-lh05-M2 will be revised to reflect the acceptabihty of 90% air relative humidity entering thefilters asjustified by Af2-El'-97042.
Since EllR 96-0105 was not specific in resolving the discrepancy, a DR will be prepared by Parsons to track the corrertive action as described in the above.
2.
Topic: PDCR 2 100-86 Replacement of EDG Differential Relays (Ed Smitb)
Background:
The dicsci generator differential relays were replaced by PDCR 2-100-86. The original relays -
type CFD-were replaced by type IJD relays because the CFD relays were not seismically qualified for the location of the 4160 switchgear in which they were mounted. Per G.E. (the relay manufacturer) recommendation, the CFDs were replaced by the IJDs - G.E. had stated that the relay model 1211D52AlI A (type IJD) was a one to one l
replacement for the model 12CFD22BI A (type CFD). However, though the two models might have the same l
wiring configuration, IJD relays are typically slower than CFD relays and have a higher burden. The PDCR documents do not appear to address whether these differences have any impact on this application.
Questions:
a) lias the speed and burden of the replacement IJD relays been analyzed and determined acceptable for use in the EDG differential relay loop?
Response: NNEco responded that the speed and burden of the relays u as analped by their South Board Street Engineering department and was mentioned in memo GEE-86-244. However, there is noJbrmal documentation that the relay speed and burden characteristics u ere analped and determined to be acceptable 3.
Topic: Outlet Flange Studs on Pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-201 (Larry Collier)
Background:
M2-RAI-01234 and the responding M2-IRF-01447 provide records that show the Pressurizer Safety Valve, 2-RC-201, inlet flange stwls and nuts were replaced and torqued under the jurisdiction of work order M2-94-10873 and torquing program MF-715Al-4 &5.
Questions:
a) llave the outlet flange studs on Pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-201 been removed, replaced, or torqued since the initial operation began using an approved torque program? If so, what are the work document number (s) arid torque program that was used?
Response: 1he outletflange studs are at the present time removedfrom the valve and wal not be replaced upon valve reinstallation but will be torqued
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7 CONFERENCE NOTES April 16,1998
- 4. -
Topic: PDCR 2-17 83 (Robert Moyer) l-
Background:
RAl-0979 requested various PDCR's and PDCE's. The RAI response for PDCR 2-17-83 was a single page database printout indicating that PDCR 2-17-83 was canceled, however the modification report sent as l
item 20 of the original document request lists PDCR 2-17-83 as completed.
Questions:
a) What is the status of PDCR 2 17-837 i.e. is it canceled or complete?
Response: PDCR 2-17-83 was completed andinstalled.
l b) Arc any of the mod documents (i.e., calc's. SE, DI, DCN's, resiew checklists) available for review?
Response: Mod documents are available and NNECo will send them via a revised response to RAl-0979.
5.
Topic: Administrative Approach to Improved Support to the inspection. (NNECo Topic of Discussion)
Response: NNECo proposedpossible ways to speed up handling of Tier 2 Safety Analysis issues and Tier 1 DRs related to structuralissues.
6.
Tcpic: NNECo Response to DR-0312 - Water in Diesel Oil Storage Tank (T47A). (NNECo Topic of Discussion)
Response: PostponedbyNNECo untilP21/98.
i 7.
Topic: Control Loops LT-Ill3 A/B/C/D and LT-ll23 A/B/C/D (John Archer and Dom Vassallo)
Background:
We have requested procurement specification documents for the Foxboro Spec 200 cabinets (ie rack structure and instrument components) that contain AFW level control components. The cabinets are identified as RC30A thru D and RC30A-l and RC30B-1. Because oflack of original plant specif ations and purchase orders, we are unable to piece together the overall p:rspective of how the racks and their Foxboro Spec
. 200 components were procured, to what standards and criteria, if they were procured as Class IE devices and what tag numbers apply to specific purcliase orders.
We know the followinc: The M2 response to RAl-1194 provided SP-GEE specifications that were related to I
seismic installation, not procurement. The SP-GEE specifications received to date include: SP-GEE 130, Rev 2; SP-GEE-130, Rev,1; SP-GEE-130, Rev 0; and SP-GEE-58, dated 8/14/80.
RAl-00608 provided Procurement Specification SP-M2-EE-0001 which procured the Foxboro Spec 200 equipment associated with PDCR 2-039-94 Microprocessor modification.
I PAGE 3
l CONFERENCE NOTES April 16,1998 PO 805384, provided by RAI 0391, procured Foxboro Spec 200 instruments for the TMI upgrade to the AFW automat c initiation system in 1981. It did not include specifications for the racks themselves or other instruments
- in comp {onent loops LT-1113 and LT-1123 that were provided with the original pla Topic of Discussion:
We need to discuss details related to which procurement specification furnished the original plant Foxboro Spec 200 control room fa_ck structures as well as their respective instruments and power sources. and terminal boards.
a This will define how the racks and their instruments and componems were procured, to what standards and criteria, and if they were procured as Class IE devices with appropriate qualifications.
Response: Parsons will K11 Purchase Order (and supplements) #531966 dated 6/3/1980.
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8.
Topic: Clarification of the term " Vital Bus" (Paul Shipper)
Background:
ABB calculation 006-AS92-C-012 Rev. 00, page 17, Item #9 under section B-Single Failures (Feedwater Systems) identifies " Failure of the Vital Bus Fast Transfer Mechanism" Questions:
a) Please identify wnich vital buses are affected by this failure. We think this actually refers to buscs 24C,24D, and 24E. Is this assumption correct?
Response: Parsons willinitiate an %Il to clari[v the requested information needs.
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CONFERENCE NOTES April 21,1998 DATE:
4/21/98 PURPOSF, ;
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
- 1. NNECo Response to DR-0312 - Water in Diesci Oil Storage Tank (T47A) l 2.
Amperage Design for Aux. Feedwater Valve Position Detection Devices l
LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parnons Joe Fougere Steve Reynolds Wayne Dobson Ray 'Necci Don Marks Steve Stadnick Dan Wooddell l
Steve Wainio Thomas Flemming Mike Champagne Jon Winterhalter George Pitman Dale Pruitt Bob Skwirz Mike Akins Fred Mattioli John 1hlbish Charlie Dempsey Greg Tardif 1.
Topic: NNECo. Response to DR-0312 - Water in Diesel Oil Storage Tank (T47A). (NNECo Topic of l
Discussion) (Continued from 4/16/98)
Response: NNECo discussed the draft of their response to DR-0312. 7hree bounding scenarios were covered.
Under all scenarios, NNECo believes it meets the design and licensing basis NNECo will correct the elevation ofthe Diesel OilStorage Tank to 2 '7" on all affected documents.
l 2.
Topic: Amperage design for Aux. Feedwater valve position detection devices (Dale Pruitt)
Background:
PDCR l-123-82 installed position detection switches for various AFW system valves. The modification states the annunciator maximum current and voltage is less than 0.5 Amps @ 125 Vdc. The position detection devices stated in the modification are rated (low voltage) Vdc and 0.250 Amps (New switches per Johnson Controls 215-613-1767 are rated low voltage and 0.100 Amps).
Questions:
a) What is program, procedure, document etc. justifies this higher design current over the vendor rating as acceptable?
Response: None, CR M2-981091 was written to address the condition.
i b) ARP 2590D, Resision 0, for D-15 states that for an alarm verified not to be correct that the equipment monitored by the alarm circuit be verified twice a shift until the circuit can be repaired. This circuit mainly only detects open circuit problems. What addresses if a short should occur to maintain an un-alarmed condition but render the detection devices for both trains inoperable (e.g., a short across the field cable connecting wires to the card, or contacts uclded together)?
Response: Shorted conditions were not taken into consideration.
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a CONFERENCE NOTES April 21,1998 c) Where is the maximum voltage limits of the switches addressed?
l Response: CR M2 98109) addresses the condition.
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l CONFERENCE NOTES April 23.1998 i
DATE:
4/23/98 l
l PURPOSE,:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
l.
Post Modification Testing of DCR M2-97005, A&B EDG Ventilation System Damper Replacement
- 2. Charging System HELB 3.
NCR 2-9-80 4.
UIR 2888 5.
PDCR 2-008-95 6.
Quality Assurance Work on Class i Structures 7.
Clarification of DR -0150 - Channel color code identifications 8.
DR-0312 9.
Revision 5 of RP 4," Corrective Action Program"
- 11. FSAR Chapter 14 Accident Analyses i
LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Joe Fougere Jchn Nakoski Wayne Dobson Fred Mattioli Don Marks Jay Wells Bill Clemenson Bob Skwirz Lou Mscichowski Roy Terry Jim Giova Jim Nicholson Gary Jackson Bob Carritte Larry Collier Marcel Ranieri Jack Lawton Gerald Ward Dan Cardinale Steve Heard Ken Mayers Kun Fox John liilbish Gregg Tardif Clark Tracy Dick Cronk Rich Glaviano Mike Akins 1.
Topic: Post Modification Testing of DCR M2-97005, A&B EDG Ventilation System Damper Replacement (Bill Clemenson)
References 1
1.
Calculation 97ENG-01767-M2, EDG Room Temp. Analysis After Removal OfOutside Air intake Damper 2.
DCR M2 97005, A&B EDG OA Ventilation System Damper Replacement.
l
Background:
Reference I was issued to calculate the minimum required percentage of recirculation air flow to maintain a minimum EDG design temperature during winter operation. Reference 2 8tates in section 7.0, Test Plan, that the ratio of recirculation air flow rate to the total air flow rate for winter mode operation shall be greater than 65% Reference 3 contains the TAB results which were taken credit for fulfilling the DCR post modification test (PMT) requirements.
TAB data sheets, Form 21063A-8, Summer Mode, for F-38A and F-38B, contain a summary of the PMT supply air and exhaust air flow measurements. The measured supply air cfm for these two fans (Recorded on data sheet 21063A-16 and measured via a 56 point traverse) was 32.288 cfm for Train A and 31,744 cfm for Train B. The total exhaust air flow rate from the DG buildings is recorded on these same data sheets to be 32,288 cfm for Train A and 31,744 cfm for Train B. For a pressurized system such as the Vital Diesel Generator Ventilation System (See Precaution 3.2 of EN21063G), having identical supply air and exhaust air flow rates for Both Train A and Train B is highly unlikely.
PAGE 1
L.
CONFERENCE NOTES April 23 1998 0
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l uestipns:
Q a) How were the exhaust air flow rates calculated for the Vital Diesel Generator Ventilation system on TAB data sheets 21063A-87 What type of test equipment was used?
b) With regard to reference 3, ENG Form 21063A-8, Winter, F-38A and F38B. How are the return air flow l
rates measured and with what type of M&TE (33,479 cfm Train A and 29,295 cfm Train B)?
c) With regard to reference 3, ENG Form 2l063A-8, Winter, F-38A and F38B. How was the Ak fac'or of 20 established for this OBD Grille?
d) Where is the minimum 65% recirculation rate verified in the TAB results?
I
Response
a) Test equipment included the use of a shortridge velgrid. The actual measured exhaustpow rates wers adjusted to equalthe supplyflow rate. Thefactor used to make this adjustment is not included in the TAB data sheets.
I b) Test equipment was Velgrid. Flow rates nere modified with adjustmentfactors so that supplyflow uvuld equal exhaustflow.
c) This is not an Ak. This is the actud area.
d) No responsefrom NNECo l
2.
Topic: Charging System HELB (Larry Collier)
Questions:
a) Has a HELB been postulated for the Charging System?
b) If no, what criteria allows for a HELB not to be postulated?
j c) If yes, where specifically are the postulated breaks?
d) What is the plant response to each of the breaks? (i.e. how is the break isolated, and w here is the response documented) e) What single active failure scenario (s) have been analyzed for this HELB7
Response
l a) Yes 1
b) N/A e) Outside containment to Charging Pumps, inside containment to Reactor Coolant Loops.
l d) Deferred to 4/28'98.
[
c) Deferred to 4/28/98.
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CONFERENCE NOTES April 23,1998 3.
Topic: NCR 2-9-80 (Lou Mscichowski)
Background:
Tier 3 is reviewing an NCR that deals with three 18" cast iron butterfly valves being purchased for the RBCCW system. The valves were being purchased from Kieley and Mueller Inc. with NNECo purchase order 481544. Two of the valves leaked during hydrostatic testing at the factory and were weld repaired and accepted with the NCR being dispositioned "use as is" The valves were not identified by component ID.
Questions:
a) Please provide the component ID for these valves.
b) Were the valves ever installed? If so, what mechanism was used to have them installed?
c) Are the valves still in service? If so, please identify by component ID the two that undenvent the weld repair, i
l Response: Deferred to 4/28/98.
4.
Topic: UIR 2888 (Larry Collier)
Background:
UIR 2888 provides a Description of Unresolved item as follows: "U2 PI-7, Rev. 2, step 1.10.9, requires resiew of maintenance history files (MHF) pertaining to the system. A resiew has not been performed l
since these files are not available. To determine the potential that the MHF could have on design basis, a review is required. This is per the recommendation of the Multi-Discipline Review Team (MDRT) review held on 4/19/97, for system 2345C."
According to the UIR: the SYSTEM number is 2322 (Auxiliary Feedwater); the PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENT to be reviewed is PM; and the DISCUSSION indicates that no files exist for electrical or mechanical maintenance.
Questions:
a) Relative to the non-existence of electrical and mechanical maintenance files, does the term maintenance history file have the same meaning as: (1) maintenance history, (2) completed maintenance work order, (3) completed preventative maintenance work sheet, or (4) other similar historical maintenance record?
b) If the term maintenance history file has a different meaning than that of those 4 items described in question (a): what is its definition?; in what document is it defined?; and w hat was the inception date of the definition?
c) Did other electrical and mechanical maintenance history records exist for the auxiliary feedwater system that could have been used to perform the resiew to determine the impact on design basis of the system?
d) What electrical and mechanical maintenance history records do exist relative to the AFW system?
Response
a) NotAnswered.
b) Not Answered.
c) No.
d) NotAnswered.
PAGE 3
CONFERENCE NOTES f
April 23,1998 5.
Topic: PDCR 2-008-95 (Jack Lawton)
Background:
This PDCR was developed in accordance with the Design Control Manual. The manual lists a i
series of forms (A thru J) that are to be completed as part of the PDCR process. Form E was not included in the package submittal.
Questions:
l a) is there a Form E for this mod?
b) If not, is one required?
c) Ifit is not required, how was the requirement waived?
Response: Fonn Efor this mod was not required because the answers to the questions in Fonn C, Section O (Mechanical Design Review) were NO, which waived the needfor Form E.
6.
Topic: Quality Assurance Work on Class I Structures (Jim Glova)
Background:
Design Change Notice (DCN) DM2-S-0378-% was written to provide a repair to seal an opening which connects the spent fuel pool compartment at Elev. 38'-6" with the Health Physics area at Elev.14'-6" in l
i the Auxiliary Building. The opening is located between the flanges of the cask crane steel column at column line N.3-17.2 in the Elev. 38'-6" floor slab. The DCN requires scaling the opening by welding a horizontal %" steel i
l plate between the flanges of column N.3-17.2. The DCN is marked "Non-QA" in box 11, Nuclear Indicator.
l AWO M2 96 03567 which implemented the repair is marked " CATI: Y".'
l FSAR Section 5.1.1, identifies Class 1 Structures as structures whose loss of function could:
a.
Cause or increase the severity of an accident.
b.
Preclude establishing and maintaining safe shutdown.
Result in a release of radioactivity to the site boundary in excess of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines.
c.
The following are Class I structures:
i a.
The containment shell and internals.
b.
The Enclosure Bldg.
c.
The Auxiliary Bldg.
d.
The Warehouse ( the eastern portion of the Auxiliary B!dg.)
c.
The Turbine Bldg.
f.
The intake Structure l
PMMS was queried to determine the Nuclear Indicators for the Auxiliary Building, system number,2390A in an identified in PMMS for the Auxiliary Building attempt to resolve the disparity between the "Non-QA" on the DCN form and the " CATI: Y" on the AWO. This query identified xmponents BW-CI.2.1 through BW-CI.2.6, j
Structural Concrete, Foundations / Walls / Slabs, Missile Resistant Metal Siding, Spent Fuel Pool Liner Plate, Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks, and New Fuel Store Racks, as " CATI: Y". Structural steel was not.
l In order to determine whether or not structural steel was uniformly disregarded in PMMS for other Class I Structures, PMMS was queried for the Containment Building, Intake Structure, Enclosure Building,and the Turbine Building. The query provided the following:
PAGE 4
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l, CONFERENCE NOTES April 23g 1998 l
Class 1 Structure System No.
Steel included Concrete included
^
Auxiliary Bldg.
2390A No Yes Contaimnent 2312 Yes Yes Enclosure Bldg.
2390C Yes Yes Ittake Structure 2390B NA, has no steel Yes Turbine Bldg.
2390D No Yes Consequently, structural steel is not uniformly included in PMMS for Class 1 Structures.
Questions:
a) When work is planned on structures, especially structural steel, how does Millstone determine if the work should meet QA Cat I requirements?
Response: Unit 2 II'ork Planning uses afour tiered assessment to define the QA requirementsfor work on
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structures. The tiers are: 1.) Review the QA Indicators in PAfMSfor the subject component: 2.) Review the associated design paper workfor the repair / mod; 3.) Use the guidelines presented in the new generic procedure 28001; 4.) ll* hen thefirst three tiers do not provide suficient guidance, the QA indicatorfor the building will be used.
f 7.
Topict Clarification of DR -0150 - Channel color code identifications (Ken Mayers) l t
l
Background:
NNECo has requested clarification of the plant location where the channel color code identifications on cables do not satisfy NNECo FSAR requirements of Table 8.7 4 or the duplicate table in
}
i Specification Separation Criteria 33001, Spec SP-EE-0016 Rev 0.
Question:
a) N/A Parsons will provide clarifying information.
l Response: N/A.
8.
Topic: DR-0312 (Jon Winterhalter) l
states, "There is one underground 25,000-gallon emergency diesel fuel tank at invert elevation = 1'-8" located
Background:
Please address another tank elevation discrepancy with your response to item 2. FS AR 2.5.4.2.5 approximately 200 feet cast of Millstone Unit 2 containment."
Question:
l a) N/A Response: N/A.
9.
Topic: Revision 5 of RP 4," Corrective Action Program" (Cliff Marks)
Background:
RP 4, Rev 4, defines the process for addressing ACR's initiated under Rev 2 of RP 4, that have not been closed out (pages 8 through 10 of RP 4, Rev 10). Rev 5 of RP 4 states that the procedure applies to ACR's; however, all guidance that existed in Revision 4 of RP 4 has been deleted.
PAGE5 i
- e CONFERENCE NOTES April 23,1998 Questions
.a) Why does the " Summary of Changes" in Revision 5 of RP 4 not address deletion of this guidance?
b) How does Millstone 2 address ACR's initiated under Rev 2 ot'RP 4, s here evaluation is not yet complete (i.e. Form RP 4-7 of Rev 2 not completed)?
c) How does MP 2 address ACR's initiated under Rev 2 of RP 4 with an approved corrective action plan (i.e. Form RP 4-7 of Rev 2 has been completed), but where all corrective actions are not yet implemented?
Response
a) Only important changes related to doing work are includedin the " Summary ofChanges" b) and c) Because theforms in the new revision ofRP 4 are selfexplanatory, NNECo decided the guidance section was unnecessary and deleted it, 10, Topic: Function of the UV Sequencer with Subsequent SIAS (Cliff Marks)
Hackground: During the review of the Sequencer and Dwg 25203-28150 sht 3 Rev 3, the following was noted:
Due to the location of the UV " scal-in" circuit, it appears that when a SIAS is received after a UV, the sequencer would " hang-up" and not load the bus as desired.
Purchase Specification No. 7604-M-480, Section 6.6, states that, "Should a SIAS Signal occur at any time after the Sequencer has begun to operate, due to a loss of power only, the sequencer shall reset to zero and begin to sequence equipment actuated by the 'B' modules".
Questions:
a) What signals the Sequencer, that a UV condition was present, prior to the subsequent SIAS?
Response: Sequencer logic shown on drawing 25203-28150 sht 3 Rev 3 was discussed. NNECo indicated that the under-voltage signal to start the sequencer timers is a " latched" signal and that a subsequent SIAS would cause the timers to reset and re-sequence vital SIS loads per design.
Thefollowing two continuation questions were asked, but response was deferred to 5/5/98:
If the under-voltage signal to start the sequencer timers is " latched", why does the circuit use a " seal-in" to 1
maintain a " logic 1" output?
II' hat is the Millstone Unit 2 test and'orprocedure that demonstrates a SIAS signal that occurs at any time after
[
the Sequencer has begun to operate, due to a loss ofpower only (under-voltage), will reset the sequencer to zero
}
andbegin to sequence equipment actuated by the B modules in accordance with SpecJIcation 7604-M-480 l
Section 6.67 f
11.
Topic: FSAR Chapter 14 Accident Analyses (Rich Glaviano) j
Background:
N/A Questions:
)
a) Please update the schedule for NNECo acceptance of the re-analyses of Chapter 14 events.
Response: NNECo willfax schedule update information to Parsons.
PAGE 6
CONFERENCE NOTES April 23 1998 0
. b) Praide background and status of the USQ associated with the MSLB cvent.
Response: Deferredto 4/30'98.
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CONFERENCE NOTES April 28,1998 DATE:
4/28/98 PORPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
Isolation Relays in 125 VDC Control Circuits 2.
Post Modification Testing of DCR M2-97005, A&B EDG Ventilation System Damper Replacement 3.
NCR 2-9-80 4.
Charging System HELB 5.
DR-27 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Fred Mattioli Ralph Architzel Wayne Dobson Nathan Jaycox Don Marks Chris Scully Kent Russell Ray Necci Mike Akins George Pitman Dan Wooddell Rich Ewing Dom Ramos Gerry Ward Lou Mscichowski Roy Terry Lany Collier Yonie Tamayo Amrit Kaplish Larry Wigley Gar Jackson Frank Cobb Bill Clemenson 1.
Topic: Isolation Relays in 125 VDC Control Circuits (Kent Russell)
Background:
Alarm (74) relays in 4.16 KV breaker control circuits typically have the relay coil wired into the vital 125 VDC control circuit and the contact (s) wired into the non-sital annunciator circuit, creating a vital /nor-i vital interface internal to the relay.
Questions:
a) Are relays used in these applications considered by NNECo to fall within the scope of" isolation devices" as defined in Section 4.7.2 ofIEEE 279-19717 If so, is there documentation to demonstrate that these relays meet the requirements ofisolation devices required by this standard?
b) If relays in 125 VDC control circuits that constitute a vital /non-vital interface are not considered within the scope of IEEE 279-1971, has the independence of the vital from the non-vital portions of the circuit been considered in the design and application of these relays?
Response
a) Yes. Manufacturer certification oftesting would be the documentation, but AWECo doesn 't have the certs.
b) N/A.
I l
PAGE 1
CONFERENCE NOTES April 28,1998 2.
Topic: Post Modification Testing of DCR M2-97005, A&B EDG Ventilation System Damper Replacement l
(Bill Clemenson) i l
References:
l 1.
Calculation 97ENG41767-M2, EDG Room Temp. Analysis After Removal Of Outside Air Intake Damper 2.
DCR M2 97005, A&B EDG OA Ventilation System Damper Replacement.
3.
Test and Balance (TAB) results, WO M2 % 05051, WO M2 % 05052
Background:
l Per telecon discussion on 4/23/98 with NNECo, it was determined that field measurements of recirculation and l
exhaust grilles was based on applying a " factor" to the actual flow measured.
Questions:
a) How were the summer and winter factors created. i.e., what mathematical manipulations were used to establish the factors for summer and winter mode operation?
Response:. Irinter and summerfactors are the same. They are Ifor all the grilles except the #2 exhaust grille which is 0.75.
b) What were the values for the factor for the following grilles and did they change from winter to summer mode:
Train A recirc grille i
Train A exhaust main grille (#1)
Train A exhaust aux grille (#2)
Train B recirc grille Train B exhaust main grille (#1) l Train B exhaust aux grille (#2) l
[
Response: See response to question #l.
c) Were the air flow measurements taken with the Vel-grid corrected for temperature and pressure?
1 i
Response: Correctedforpressure only.
i 3.
Topic: NCR 2-9-80 (Lou Mscichowski)(Topic #3 continued from 4/23/98) i
Background:
Tier 3 is reviewing an NCR that deals with three 18" cast iron butterfly valves being purchased for the RBCCW system. The valves were being purchased from Kieley and Mueller Inc. with NNECo purchase order 481544. Two of the valves leaked during hydrostatic testing at the factory and were weld repaired and j
accepted with the NCR being dispositioned "use as is". The valves were not identified by component ID.
l l
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CONFERENCE NOTES April 28,1998 Questions:
. e). Flese provide the component ID for these valves.
- 1) Were the valves ever installed? If so, what mechanism was used to have them insthiled?
L c) Are the valves still in service? If so, please identify by component ID the two that underwent the weld repair.
Response: The valves were not beingpurchasedfor the RBCCWsystem as indicted in the NCR. The were being purchasedfor the service water system. They were being purchased as sparesfor valves located at the outlet of the RBCCWheat exchangers on the service water side.
a) The component ID 'sfor these valves are 2-SW-8.1A, 2-SW-8.1B, 2-SW-8.1C.
b) Each valve was installed at a dferent time during the 1980's. They were installed with work orders.
c) The valves are no longer in service, they were replaced with PL 12-93.
l 4.
Topic: Charging System HELB (Larry Collier) (Topic #2 continued from 4/23/98)
Background:
N/A l
. Questions:
I a) Has a HELB been postulated for the Charging System? (N/A: Answered on 4/23/98) b) If no, what criteria allows for a HELB not to be postulated? (N/A: Answered on 4/23/98) c) If yes, where specifically are the postulated breaks? (N/A: Answered on 4/23/98) l-d) What is the plant terponse to each of the breaks? (i.e. how is the break isolated, and where is the response l
documented) c) What single active failure scenario (s) have been analyzed for this HELB7 l
t i
Response
i d) 7his question was not answered.
e) 7he HELBprogram considers check valves passive.
5.
Topic: DR-27 (Requested by NNECo)
Background:
N/A Questions: N/A Response:. NNECo discussed their updated response to DR-27, which was organt:ed around.I topical areas, andincluded the announcement ofthe initiation ofseveralnew CRs.
PAGE 3
4 CONFERENCE NOTES April 30,1998 DATE:
4/30/98 PlJRPOSE; Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
1.
FSAR Chapter 14 Accident Analyses 2.
RBCCW / Service Water Test Acceptance Criteria 3.
Isolation Between Q and Non-Q electrical Components 4.
CR M2-97-2320 5.
Background:
Station Blackout Program 6.
Charging System IIELB LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons l
Fred Mattioli Ralph Architzel Wayne Dobson l
Bo Pokota Don Marks Pete Lessard Larry Collier f
Rich Ewing Rich Glaviano Dave Bajumpaa Andy O'Connor Bob Skwirz John Ililbish Mike Binkowski Ed Smith Steve Unikewicz Rick Kasuga Roy Terry Tom Moore Briggs Alan 1.
Topic: FSAR Chapter 14 Accident Analyses (Rich Glaviano)(Continued from 4/23/98)
Background:
N/A Questions:
a) Provide background and status of the USQ associated with the MSLB event.
Response: The AfSLB-RCS analysis shows the peak Linear Heat Generation Rate is greater than 21 Kwfl during the re-criticality phase ofthe event. This is due to the higher radialpeakingfactor associated with the jhet loadpatternfor the current cycle (compared with thefuelloadpatternfor cycle 10). 7he AISLB-Containment analysis is not affected.
Revised NNECo accept datesfor the remaining Chapter 14 re-analyses were provided.
2.
Topic: RBCCW / Senice Water Test Acceptance Criteria (Randy Faust)
Background:
Our revit:w of the existing NNECo data bases have not identified procedures that define some of the parameters needed to validate the performance of the RBCCW and Senice Water systems. Also, the NNECo response to RAl-1257. Item 3, has not prmided additional information requested for use in these validations.
Questions:
a) What is the status of procedure EN 212037 [ Note: SW system operating procedure OP-2326A references EN-21203 "SW Flow Through RBCCW HX's." EN 21203 is not in the computer data base. Revision 4 of this procedure is listed in OSCAR as "Do Not Use" and revision 5 is listed in OSCAR without an effective date.]
PAGE 1 i
)
CONFERENCE NOTES April 30,1998
. RESPON5E: Revision 5 is in drap status and will be issued before entering Mode J. ifwe need to see :he content ofthisprocedure we should use revision 4 (eitherfrom the data base or via an RAI). Revision 5 may contain sigmficant changes related to the LOCA pow requirements based on the new analysis.
b) What procedure defines the acceptance criteria for the run-up time of the SW and RBCCW pumps? [ Note; j
The SW System Procedures, Component Procedures and Integrated Test Procedures in the Millstone l
computer data base do not include an acceptance criteria for the nm-up time of the SW and RBCCW pumps.l RESPONSE: Procedures do not exist to test the run up time of these pumps. 7he run up time ofthese pumps is l
included in the Diesel Loading and the Transient Loading Calculations.
l c) What procedures define the acceptance criteria for flow balancing of the RBCCW and the Service Water systems? [ Note: Existing SW System Procedures do not validate the system and individual component flow rates that are required following an SIAS event.]
RESPONSE: Procedures do not exist to test thepow balancefor these systems. II* hen it is issued, procedure EN-21203, rev. 5 will be used to establish the LOCA paw requirementsfor Sil' pow to the RBCCll' heat exchanger. SPROC 97-2-19 defnes thepow requirementsfor the RBCCll' system.
d) What procedure defines the thermal performance / fouling factor evaluation acceptance criteria for the RBCCW, SDC HX's, and the CARC's?
RESPONSE: Procedures do not exist to test the thermalperformance ofthese heat exchangers. There is a commitment associated with the 89-13 program to test the RBCCll' heat exchanger capacity at the next Unit 2 shutdown, however the procedurefor this test has not been developed. 7he thermalperformance ofthe SDC llX s and the CARC's is based on the calculation ofrecord.
e) What procedure defines the tube plugging acceptance criteria for the RBCCW HX's. SDC HX's, and the CARC's? What is the maximum number of tubes that may be plugged?
RESPONSE: Procedures do not exist to define the tube plugging acceptance criteria for these components. If tubes need to be plugged NNECO Engineering evaluates acceptability against the calculation of record. The analysis defines the number of tubes that may be plugged in the RBCCll'ILY and also assumes that no tubes are plugged in the SDC llX and the CARC's. The actual number of tubes plugged in the RBCCll'ilX is known and can be requestedin an RA1.
PAGE 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
CONFERENCE NOTES April 30,1998 3.
Topic: Isolation between Q and non-Q clectrical components (Ed Smith)
Backgtound: The diesel generator relay and metering circuits (both potential and current) contain a mixture of Q and non-Q components. For example, the circuit fed from potential transformer Irr 12U-lH (ref. Drawing 25203-30006 sh. I and MEPL Determination MP2-CD-1494) has 27 (RA057 and RA058),27/59 (RA059 and RA060), 81 (RA068), 32 (RA067), 49 (RA073), and 51V (RA062, RA063, and RA064) desices fed from a 3
common fuse. The 81 and SIV desices are Q, and the rest are all non-Q. A failure of ore of the non-Q desices j
could blow the fuse making the 81 desice inoperable and creating the risk of the SIV desices tripping earlier.
l Also, the 27 desice is to short the current coils of the 51V desice, to prevent the 51V from tripping prematurely
{
from a blown fuse. However, since the 27 device is non-Q it cannot be relied upon.
J Questions:
a) What is the MP2 criteria for isolating non-Q and Q electrical components, to protect the Q components, and their safety functions, from adverse effects of a failure of a non-Q component?
b) Should components, such as the dicsci 27 desice, whose failure could adversely affect the fimction of Q components, also be Q7 kesponse:
a) LEEE 279-1971 and1%1R 7.1.2 b) Yes, it is unacceptable to have these components as non-quahfied The components were ermneously doungraded to non-QA status. Corrective Action Report - M2-98-1194 was written to address this.
4.
Topic: CR M2-97-2320 (Andy O'Connor)
Background:
Condition Report M2-97-2320 Section 5 Evaluation Summay + CR owner page 3 of 7 paragraph 4 states, "DCR No. M2-97034 (EWR M2-97-118A) 'Thermo-Lag Upgrades for Fire Protection' will remove the Thermo-Lag associated with the cross-tie cables from Unit I to Unit 2 (Cables 5A505/A and SA505/P) prior to mode 4.
The Thermo-Lag on these cab!cs will no longer be required after senice water is provided to the Emergency Diesel Generator fire water connection and emergency lighting is installed."
Questions:
a) What is the background and reasoning for the above decision and where can the documentation for the justification be found?
Response: 7he other scenarios wherefire may impact the operation of the diesels are not within thisfire area.
7herefore once the cross tie is made, it is no longer necessary to maintain the 7hermo-lag barrier and de rate the cables. The work orders listed in the above condition report are accurate.
5.
Topic:
Background:
Station Blackout Program (Larry Collier) 1 Backgrnund: Station Blackout program, 5.2.5.1, states " Demonstrate, by initial test, to be capable of powering required shutdown equipment within one hour of the onset of a station blackout event; unless otherwisc governed by existing technical specifications (as is the case for the Millstone 1 and Millstone 2 AAC sources). This test shall include the SBO modified configur ion".
a I
PAGE 3
CONFERENCE NOTES April 30,1998 Questions:
- 3) Mere in the MP2 Technical Specification is the otherwise governed capability?
Response: Section 6.8; however, it was subsequently learned that nothing containedin section 6.8 ofthe technical specifications addressed the otherwise governed capability.
b) What is the otherwise governed Technical Specification capability for MP27 Response: Unit One Emergency power supply; however, 6.8 of the technical specification does not address testing the AAC supply.
6.
Topie: Charging System HELB (Larry Collier)
Background:
As part of the 4/28/98 discussion on Topic #4 the 2 fc!!ow-up questions listed below were asked.
Questions:
a) What automatic closure signals are received by 2-CH-518 and 2-CH-5197 Response: No automatic signals are received b) What is the calculation number for radioactivity escaping to the Auxiliary Building as a result of either 2-CH-432 or 2-CH-433 failing to close?
Response: Calculation is not available. And, MP2 considers these valves Passive although the valves perform a closing safetyfunction.
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