ML20247D819

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-317/89-80 & 50-318/89-80.Corrective Action:Training for Operating Crews on Revised EOP-0 Diagnostic Flow Chart Scheduled to Commence on 890913

ML20247D819
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	09/07/1989
From:	Creel G BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 8909150096
Download: ML20247D819 (5)

Text

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BALTI M O RE GAS AND CHARLES CENTER P. O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 GEORGE C. CREEL vict Patsiormt NucLEAn Ewenov (301)260-4455 September 7,1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. I & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Resoonse to insoection Report 50-317/89-8f): 50-318/89-80

REFERENCE:

(a) Letter from Mr. R. M. Gallo (NRC) to Mr. G. C. Creel (BG&E),

dated August 2, 1989, Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/89-80; 50-318/89-80 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is our response to the two major concerns identified in Inspection Report 50-317/89-80; 50-318/89-80 (Reference a). Our response to other weaknesses identified in the Inspection Report will be provided by October 9,1989.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

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GCC/MDM/dtm Enclosure ec- D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A.Capra, NRC S. A. McNeil, NRC W. T. Russell, NRC V. L. Pritchett, NRC T. Magette, DNR fj 8909150096 890907 I\

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, ENCLOSURE (1) l

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REPLY . TO INSPECTION REPORT 50-317/89-80; 50-318/89-80

.We 'have reviewed the two concerns identified within the Inspection Report, the use of Emergency Operating ' _ Procedures - (EOP) ' as guidelines instead of procedures and the inadequacy of . the 1 diagnostic flowchart in EOP-0. At the inspection exit meeting -we agreed to ' make improvements in both areas. ' Our corrective measures are described below.

1. . Ira response to the first concern, the philosophy that the EOPs were to be used as guidelines instead of procedures requiring verbatim compliance, we have revised our policy on procedure - usage. Although the intent of our EOP usage policy was to provide operators with a certain degree of . flexibility when implementing - EOPs under real circumstances, we agree the perception of' E ops as guidelines rather than strict compliance procedures has been fostered.

To address this concern, we have revised General Supervisor -

Nuclear Operations (GS-NO) Standing Instruction 85-1 to define and require " verbatim compliance" with all operational procedures.

- Verbatim compliance requires that procedures are followed step-by-step, word-for-word, with no exceptions. Verbatim compliance applies to all portions of~ the procedure (i.e., action steps, initial conditions, genere precautions, verifications, etc.)

In the course of using ' verbatim compliance when following Emergency Operating Procedures and Abnormal Operating Procedures it is permissible to conduct two or more boxed functional steps concurrently provided they are not dependent upon the actions of the other steps being performed. To conduct procedure steps concurrently requires permission of the Control Room Supervisor or Shift Supervisor.

Since procedures cannot be written to foresee all porsible conditions that may arise, it may be necessary to deviate from procedures in emergency conditions for personnel safety or plant protection.' Procedure deviations shall have the approval of the Shift Supervisor or if immediate action is required and the Shift Supervisor is not available, the Control Room Supervisor may approve the deviation.

If a procedure is incorrect, unclear, cannot be followed or will yield an undesirable result, the evolution must be terminated. The Shift Supervisor shall be contacted and will decide what steps are to be taken to return the plant to a stable condition.

If the plant is in a condition not addressed by a procedure, then the Shift

- Supervisor or Control Room Supervisor shall provide the necessary direction to place' the plant in the safe and stable condition.

The revised Administrative Policy was issued on July 31, 1989. Training on the revised Administrative Policy was given to Operations pe-sonnel on August 14-16, 1989. The policy was assigned as required reading for those operators unable to attend the training.

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[',. 5 ENCLOSURE (1)-

REPLY TO INSPECrlON REPORT. 50-317/89-80; 50-318/89-80 i

2.' The second concern, the adequacy of the diagnostic flowchart in EOP-0, has. been j corrected.' The new flowchart (Attachment - 1) is designed to. permit . event i diagnosis based on event symptoms. The flowchart is in the. form. of questions and '

. answers based on the critical safety functions. All answers are either "YES" or . NO" with the answer boxes containing the word " CONSIDER". ' Event

' diagnosis is determined .by reviewing the " CONSIDER" ~ boxes encountered --as the -

operator goes through the chart.

Training for operating crews on the revised EOP-0 diagnostic- flow chart is scheduled to commence on September 13, 1989, and conclude on October 12, 1989.

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