ML20247C777
| ML20247C777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  (NPF-43-A-038, NPF-43-A-38) |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1989 |
| From: | Thoma J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247C781 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909140105 | |
| Download: ML20247C777 (13) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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DETROIT EDISON COMPANY WOLVERINE POWER SUPPLY COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED DOCKET NO. 50-341 FERMI-2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 38 License No. NPF-43 1.
The Nuclear' Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Detroit Edison Company (the licensee)datedMay 11, 1989, complies with-the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;-
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety' of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 is hereby amended to l
read as follows:
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan f
The Technical Sp'ecifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 38. and the Environmental Protection Plan 8909140105 890901 PDR ADOCK 05000341 E
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. contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Deco shall operate the facility in.accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
.3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of its issuance with full implementation within 90 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hn 0. Thoma, Acting Director Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V, and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 1, 1989 O
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F ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.qn FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43 j
DOCKET NO. 50-341
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Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change..The corresponding n
overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE INSERT 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-21 3/4 1-21 3/4 8-26 3/4 8-26 3/4 8-27 3/4 8-27 8 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-5 8 3/4 8-3 B 3/4 8-3 e
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REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEMS
.3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
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- 3. '. 5 The standby liquid control' system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*
ACTION:
a.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:
1.
With one pump and/or one explosive valve inoperable, restore the inoperable pumo and/or explosive valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
2.
With the standby liquid control system otherwise inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
l b.
.In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*:
. 1.
With one pump and/or one explosive valve inoperable, restore the inoperable pump and/or explosive valve to OPERABLE status within 30 days or insert all insertable control rods within the next hour.
2.
With the standby liquid control system otherwise inoperable, insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.5 The standby liquid control system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying that; 1.
The temperature of the sodium pentaborate solution is greater than or equal to 48 F.
l 2.
The available volume of sodium pentaborate solution is within the limits of Figure 3.1.5-1.
3.
The temperature of the pump suction piping is greater than or equal to 48 F.
- With any control rod withdrawn.
Not applicable to control rods removed per,
Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
FERMI.- UNIT 2 3/4 1-19 Amendment No.
38 s
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l b.
.At least once per 31 days by:
1.
Verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.
2.
Determining that the concentration of boron in solution is within the limits of Figure 3.1.5-1 by chemical analysis.*
l 3.
Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
c.
Demonstrating that,'when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, the minimum flow requirement of 41.2 gpm at a pressure of greater than or equal to 1190 psig is met.
d.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
1.
Initiuting one of the standby liquid control system loops, including an explosive' valve, and verifying that a flow path from the pumps to the reactor pressure vessel 1s available by pumping demineralized water into the reactor vessel.
The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having one charge of that batch successfully fired.
Both injection loops shall be tested in 36 months.
2.
Demonstrating that the pump relief valve setpoint is less than or equal to 1400 psig and verifying that the relief valve does not actuate during recirculation to the test tank.
3.
Demonstrating that all piping between the storage tank and the explosive valves is unblocked by pumping from the storage tank to the test tank and then draining and flushing the piping with demineralized water.**
4.
Demonstrating that the storage tank heaters are OPERABLE for mixing by verifying the expected temperature rise of the sodium pentaborate solution in the storage tank after the heaters are energized.
e.
At least once per 18 months sample and analyze the sodium pentaborate solution to verify that the Boron-10 Isotope enrichment exceeds 65 atom percent.
- This test shall'also be performed anytime water or boron is added to the solu-tion or when the solution temperature drops below the 48 F limit.
- This test shall also be performed whenever the solution temperature drops below the 48 F limit and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total flow path steps such that the entire flow path is included.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 1-20
' Amendment No. 38
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i
l REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ELECTRICAL POWER MONITORING l
l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION q
3.8.4.4 Two RPS. electric power monitoring assemblies for each inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply shall be OPERABLE.
-1 APPLICABILITY:.At all times.
ACTION:
a.
With one RPS electric power monitoring assembly for an inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply inoperable, restore the inoperable power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or remove the associated RPS MG set or alternate power supply from
-service.
b.
With both RPS electric power monitoring assemblies for an inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply inoperable, restore at least one electric power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status within 30 minutes or remove the associated RPS MG set or alternate power supply from service.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.4 The above specified RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be determined OPERABLE:
a.
By performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 6 months.
b.
At least once per 18 months by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency protective instrumentation by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION including simulated automatic actuation of the protective relays, tripping logic and output circuit breakers and verifying the following setpoints.
1.
Overvoltage < 132 VAC, 2.
Undervoltage 1 108 VAC, 3.
Underfrequency 1 57 Hz.
1 FERMI -' UNIT 2 3/4 8-25 t
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' ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM ASSOCIATED ISOLATION DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.5 All circuit braakers shown in Table' 3.8.4.5-1 shall be OPERABLE.
l APPLICABILITY: When standby liquid control system (SLCS) is required to be OPERABLE.
. ACTION:
With one or more of the circuit breakers shown in Table 3.8.4.5-1 inoperable either:
a.
Restore the inoperable circuit breaker (s) to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or b.
Trip the inoperable circuit breaker (s), rack out or remove the device from service w'M 'n 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and verify the circuit breaker (s) to be racked out or it ;oved from service at least once per 7 days thereafter,
-and declare the affected SLCS component inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION as required by Specification 3.1.5*.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.5 Each of the above required circuit breaker (s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 18 months by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays and a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each breaker which includes simulation of actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breaker and over-current control circuits functions as designed.
b.
At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.
- The requirement to apply the appropriate ACTION as required by Specification 3.1.5 is not required for inoperable SLC tank heater circuit breaker (s) provided the other requirements of ACTION 3.8.4.5.b are complied with.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 8-26 Amendment No.38
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TABLE 3.8.4.5-1 STANDBY LIQUID CON'90L SYSTEM ASSOCIATED ISOLATION DEVICES 480'TY0 TOR CONTROL CENTERS -
MCC 728-4C-Position 2AR SLC Pump A
=MCC 72C-4A-Position SC-SLC Heater A
- [;
MCC 72E-5B Position 2B SLC Fump B Position 2CR SLC Heater B l
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o FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 8-27 Amendment Noi 22,38
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS J
BASES CONTROL RODS (Continued)
The surveillance requirement to measure and record the time that the accumu-lators maintain pressure above the alarm setpoint is intended to provide infor-mation rather than establish OPERABILITY of the accumulators.
No action is required if the accumulator pressure does not remain above the alarm setpoint for at least 10 minutes.
Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR.
The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have affected the control rod coupling integrity.
The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.
In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and therefore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod position indication system must be OPERABLE.
The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure.
The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system.
The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving fcrce to rapidly eject a drive housing.
The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.
l 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R0D PROGRAM CONTROLS Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to,
result in a peak f uel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop accident.
The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal.
When THERMAL POWER is greater than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which, if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm.
Thus requiring the RSCS and RWM to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control.
The RSCS and RWM provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.
The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15B.4.9 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are pre =ented in a topical report, Reference 1, and two supplements, References 2 and 3.
.The RBM is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power operation..Two channels are provided.
Tripping one of the channels will block erroneous rod withdrawal soon enough to prevent fuel damage.
This system backs up the written sequence used by the operator for withdrawal of. control rods.
FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/41-3
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM The design objective of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System is two fold.
One objective is to provide backup capability 1or bringing the reactor from full power to a cold, Xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the withdrawn control rods remain fixed in the rated power pattern.
The second objective of the SLC System is to meet the requirement of the ATWS Rule, specifically 10 CFR 50.62 paragraph (c)(4) which states that, in part:
"Each boiling water reactor must have standby liquid control system (SLCS) with a minimum flow capacity and boron content equivalent in control capacity to 86 gallons per minute of 13 weight perceat sodium pentaborate solution."
The SLC System uses enriched Boron-10 (contained in the sodium pentaborate solution) to comply with 10 CFR 50.62 paragraph (c)(4).
The methods used to determine compliance with ATWS Rule are in accordance with Reference 4.
To meet both objectives, it is necessary to inject a minimum quantity of 2350 net gallons of 65 atom percent Boron-10 enriched sodium pentaborate in a solution having a concentration of no less than 9.0 weight percent (see Figure 3.1.5-1 for equivalent volumes and concentration ranges).
The equivalent concentration of natural boron required to shutdown the reactor is 660 parts per million (ppm) in the 70 F moderator, including the Recirculation loops and with the RHR Shutdown Cooling Subsystems in operation.
In addition to this, a 25 percent margin is provided to allow for leakage and imperfect mixing (825 ppm).
The pumping rate of 41.2 gpm provides a negative reactivity insertion rate over the permissible sodium pentaborate solution volume range, which adequately compensates for the positive reactivity effects due to moderator temperature reduction and xenon decay during shutdown.
The temperature requirement is necessary to ensure that the sodium pentaborate remains in solution.
With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperator or for longer periods of time with one of the redundant components inoperable.
The SLC tank heaters are only required when mixing sodium pentaborate and/or water to establish the required solution operating parameters during additions to the SLC tank.
Normal operation of the SLCS does not depend on these tank heaters to maintain the solution above its saturation temperature.
Technical require-ments have been placed on the tank heater circuit breakers to ensure that their failure will not degrade other SLC components (see Specification 3/4.8.4.5).
Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high reliability of the system.
Once the solution is established, boron concentration will not vary unless more boron or water is added, thus a check on the temperature and volume once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures that the solution is available for use.
Analysis of Boron-10 enrichment each 18 months provides sufficient assurance that the minimum enrichment of Boron-10 will be maintained.
I FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 38 i
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4
BASES
. 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (Continued) i Replacement of the explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals will assure that these valves will not fail because of deterioration of the charges.
1.
C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn and J. A. Woolley, " Rod Drop Accident Analysis for Large BWR's", G. E. Topical Report NED0-10527, March 1972.
1 2.
C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn and R. M. Young, Supplement 1 to NED0-10527, July 1972.
3.
J. M. Haun, C. J. Paone and R. C. Stirn, Addendum 2, " Exposed Cores",
supplement 2.to NED0-10527, January 1973.
4.
General Electric Co., Licensing Topical Report " Anticipated Transient Without Scram; Response to the NRC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62" NEDE-31096-P-A dated February 1987.
FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-5 Amendment No.
38
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f ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
. BASES 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Primary containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either de energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance.
The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provide' assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse.
Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested.
If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit-breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuse for surveillance purposes.
The OPERABILITY of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the thermal overload protection are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.
Circuit breakers actuated by fault currents are used as isolation devices to protect equipment associated with the Standby Liquid Control System.
The
.0PERABILITY of these circuit breakers will ensure that the SLCS equipment is protected in the event of faults in the loads powered by these circuit breakers.
The SLC tank heaters are only required when mixing sodium pentaborate and/or water to establish the required solution operating parameters.
Normal i
operation of the SLCS does not depend on these tank heaters to maintain the solution above its saturation temperature.
Technical Specification requirements have been placed on the tank heater circuit breakers to ensure that their failure will not degrade other SLC components.
FERMI - UNIT 2 8 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 38'
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