ML20247B646
| ML20247B646 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/18/1988 |
| From: | NRC - NUCLEAR SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW COMMITTEE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NACNSRRC, NUDOCS 8907240170 | |
| Download: ML20247B646 (221) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NUCLEAR SAFETY RESEARCII RINIEW COMMITTEE In the Matter of:
CENERAL MEETING Paqcs: 1 ihrouqh 205
" lace: Hethesda, Maryland Date: February 18, 1988 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION
( OfficialReporters 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 628-4888 8907240170 eso21e C
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1 b 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 NUCLEAR SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW COMMITTEE 3
In the Matter of: )
4 )
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5 )
GENERAL MEETING )
6 )
7 . Thursday,.
February 18, 1988 8
Room 118 9 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda , Maryland 10 The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, 11 pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m.
12 BEFORE: DR. NEIL E. TODREAS 13 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
( Nuclear Engineering Department 1 14 Building 24-108 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 15 i 16 COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
17 DR. SPENCER H. BUSH 4 18 Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory i P.O. Box 999 19 Richland, Washington 99352 '
20 DR. SALOMON LEVY S. Levy, Inc.
21 3425 S. Bascom Avenue Campbell, California 95008 ;
22 DR. WARREN F. PETE MILLER, JR.
23 Los Alamos National Laboratory P.O. Box 1663 24 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 l
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1 1 COMMITTEE MEMBERS ~ PRESENT:- (Continued)-
2 DR. EARNEST F. GLOYNA Department of Civil Engineering 3- College of Engineering The University of Texas at Austin 4 . Ernest Cockrell, Jr. Hall'4.200 Austin, Texas 78712 DR. DAVID MORRISON, PRESIDENT 6 IIT Research Institute-10 West 35-Street 7 Chicago, Illinois' 60616 8 MR.- CORDELL REED Senior Vice President 9 Commonwealth. Edison Company.
P.O. Box 767-10 Chicago,. Illinois 6bC90-0767 11 PROFESSOR MARY L. SHOAF.
Assistant Director 12 Plasma Physics Laboratory Princeton University 13 James Forrestal Campus P.O. Box 451
(~ 14 Princeton, New Jersey 08544 15 PROFESSOR RICHARD WILSON Harvard University 16 Department of Physics 42 Oxford Street 17 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 l
18 DESIGNATED FEDERAL-OFFICIAL: j 19 DR. ROBERT L. SHEPARD' Technical Assistant 20 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21 Washington, D.C. 20555 I
22 ERIC BECKJORD i CHARLES KELBER 23 24 25 q
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3-t 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 DR. TODREAS: Good morning.
3 DR. HOUSTON: As you can see from this, I am the
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4 Acting Division Director, Division of Reactor Accfdent Analysis 5 and I would like to spend the next several minutes talking a 6 little bit about highlights, I think of the program we have )
j 7 underway in our division, which primarily deals with severe !
8 accidents and severe accident phenomenon, probabilistic risk .
9 analysis and what we sometimes refer to as regulatory closure 10 on severe accident issues.
11 Starting with a sort of a general overview of the 12 content of the program, the raison d'etre is a regulatory 1
13 concern that deals basically with what we like to refer to as j
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14 residual risk in the operation of nuclear licensed nuclear I 15 power plants in the United States whi6h is largely due to whci 16 we now call, severe accidents.
17 Something that many years ago we used to refer to as '
18 Class 9 accidents which were officially declared to be i 19 noncredible. Of course, with the advent of the reactor safety 20 study, and of course, perhaps more particularly, and more 21 importantly, the evidence from the TMI II accident, we have had 22 to rethink questions regarding the adequacy of our rules'and of 23 our regulatory practices -- how much we know and how much we 24 still don't know about severe accidents, which by definition, 25 basically means accidents that are initiated by any of a
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k 1 variety of possible events, that produce degradation of the ,
2 core, the outcomes of which can, of course, cover a broad i
3 spectrum of possibilities.
4 From the budgetary point of view, the Division's
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5 activities fall almost entirely in he area.that is referred to 6 as reactor containment, performance, and protection of the {
7 public. That is somewhatlof a misnomer, or can be slightly; 8 misleading depending upon the interpretation of the word, 9 containment. Although a lot of the emphasis and a lot of the 10 work done in the division does refer to the containment in the i l
11 conventional sense, it actually starts with trying to 12 understand better the progress of a degrading core, and a 13 melting core inside the reactor pressure vessel.
( 14 The residual risk, of course, is the dominant risk i 15 that is residual and the term, residu'la means, in effect, 16 assuming compliance or identifying the fact that operating 17 plants do basically comply with the rules and regulations, ,
t 18 within what we generally refer to as the-design basis or 1 1
19 licensing basis of the plants. There is extremely small risk ;
1 20 from that, some from normal operations due to normal operation 21 of the leases. Of course, I am referring to radiological risk 22 and the potential for exposure, radiological exposures to .
23 people, to the public. -
24 And because of the potential high consequences of 25 severe accidents, even though the likelihood of their j
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1 occurrence may be very low, taking the customary formulation of 2 risk being the product of probability and consequences, the 3 risk can, of course, be finite. )
4 The scope of the work in the divisir e , first of all, 5 I would point out that it is almost exclusively related to )
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6 light-water reactors, essentially as the type of designs that I 7 exist in the United States today. We deal with in-vessel l l
8 phenomena, ex-vessel phenomena, which really means within the )
i 9 containment structure, itself and the analysis of these two in 10 sequence, leads to what can conventionally refer to as source 11 terms, or releases, potential releases to the environment of j 12 radioactivity and finally, to consequences, which of course, 13 can be understood in terms of tne variety of health effects,
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14 mortalities, injuries, and potential for latent cancers, latent ,
. l 15 cancer fatalities as well as early fatalities if the radiation 16 exposure levels ere high enough.
17 The general approach, again in a sort of sequential 18 nature, is a combination of experiment and analysis, generally 19 going hand in hand. By analysis, of course, we typically mean 20 a variety of codes that have been developed and many of which 21 are still under development and further improvement to 22 understand the phenomena of severe accidents on the workers 23 that is the back end, which is the in-vessel and ex-vessel 24 phenomena, leading to the further improvement and applications 25 of probabilistic risk assessment methodology, and ultimately to
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6 1 regulatory application or closure on the issues.
2 By closure there, I do not maan necessarily that we 3 only close on issues when we know everything that there is 4 possible to know about a particular issue. That should be 5 fairly clear and one would expect normally and, in fact, this !
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6 is exactly what happens, is that we are alleays left with 7 certain residual questions of uncertainty which leads to the 8 subject of confirmatory research.
9 In one sense, everything that we do in the division 10 can be regarded as confirmatory research. And I mean that in 11 the following sense. One of the most significant, from a 12 policy point of view, statements that has been made by the 13 Commission in the recent past, that is, in the past several j i )
14 years, in the severe accident policy statement was that there j
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15 was really no undue risk with respect to the operation of 16 nuclear power plants, but there were some caveats placed on I
17 that statement. j 18 So, in a sense, what we are doing is, confirming or 19 conducting research to confirm a decision that is reflected in 20 tnat policy statement. Politely stating it very simply, we 21 have not shut reactors down because of undue risk with respect ,
22 to severe accidents. So, I think that is in the general 23 subject area of confirmatory research and I think there was a 24 little bit of talk about that yesterday. In one sense, could 25 be regarded as the entire program.
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7 1 And any time that a regulatory decision is ma.de, 2 there will always be some residual uncertainty about the 3 validity of the decision, whether we have gone overboard and 4 heen too conservative, or perhaps have failed to recognize the 5 importance of certain items and may need adjustments down the 6- line, in the way of perhaps additional requirements, additional 7 regulations.
8 So, it is a mixed bag and it'can go either way.and of 9 course, confirmatory research can do what the name implies, 10 simply confirm the adequacy of the previous decision.
11 Turning to a little bit of a different point of view, 12 is what I will call the analysis strategy and this is primary, 13 by this, I primarily mean the use of. analytical: tools or codes
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14 of varying degrees of sophistication and complexity. And, 15 although it has often been sait in the past when we have a two-16 tier we actually have a three-t.er strategy, starting with what l
17 we usually refer to as mechanistic or physical codes that
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18 attempt to do the best possible job of modeling severe accident 19 phenomena. l 20 There are a large number of such codes which deal !
21 with individual aspects of severe accident phenomena, such as q 22 hydrogen combustion, one example being core concrete 23 interactions and some others that we will come to shortly.
24 At the next level of the hierarchy are the-faster l
25 running risk codes that are used for probabilistic risk
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1 analysis. As you have heard yesterday and I am sure that some 2 of you are familiar with something called the source term code i
3 package, which represents that level.
4 And we have had in development for some years, the 5 near term successor to the source term code' package, which is I 6 called melt core. And going beyond that, we also have efforts 7 under way and have had for a number of years, in the office,' q 8 what we often refer to as risk management codes. These are 9 personal computer based codes that are further 10 simplifications, empiricists, are contained in both at that 11 level and also in the previous level of the hierarchy. j 12 They require, in order for their use, to have 13 available a full PRA, as the blueprint and a base of j
( i 14 information on a particular plant. But the effort for the risk 15 management codes is primarily directed towards converting from i l
16 the specialist to the non-specialist in the use of PRA f 17 techniques.
I 18 And the objective with the risk management codes is j l
19 to place in the hands of our licensing people and our !
20 inspection people ultimately, the training necessary to use 21 these codes for dealing with some day-to-day decisions which ,
22 come up which provide a risk perspective as distinct from-l ,
[ 23 entering judgment. I l
24 And I want to emphasize at this point, I will 25 probably say it again later, that risk perspective that comes 1
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9 s 1 from probabilistic risk analysis is never really intended to be 2 the panacea for regulatory decisions. It is merely an input, a 3 perspective on the closure process and the decision process.
4 I have reproduced at the bottom of this slide, the 5 rounded figures of what our budget looked like for Fiscal Year 6 1987 in the Division for these areas. And about $25 million in 7 1987 and about the same currently, in Fiscal Year 1988.
8 We anticipate at the present time, the possibility of 9 somewhat more in Fiscal Year 1989 and strongly suspect that 10 when the Fiscal Year 1989 budget is finally approved, that it 11 may be some number that is different than that, but perhaps not 12 very different.
13 DR. MILLER: Wayne, when you talk about -- now, this i
14 I assume was your division budget?
15 DR. HOUSTON: That is correct.
16 DR. MILLER: And I assume therefore, I could map that 17 on to these, several of these five big program elements. Which 18 program elements do they --
19 DR. HOUSTON: The program element that is headed,-
20 teactor containment performance, protection of the --
21 DR. MILLER: All of it comes from that program only?
22 DR. HOUSTON: Essentially all of it is within that 23 program category of the budget, yes.
24 The other part that is within.that program category 25 that is not part of this is called the health physics. .)
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10 L 1 Turning now to some of the highlights of some of the 2 major programs underway, I have picked a few which I think can i
3 try to highlight, there are others. j 4 Put this under the category of severe accident i l
5 research and they will have three categories of major programs. j i
6 As you see, this is the first one and the second one has to do )
7 with PRA and the third one has to .o with regulatory 8 applications.
9 As far as severe accident research is concerned, or 10 what we often refer to as our severe accident research program, 11 which was initiated basically post-TMI II, and at the start it 12 was generally referred to as a source term research program.
13 It has been somewhat generalized because the content
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14 of it actually is a little bit broader than just source term 15 focus.
16 For Fiscal Year 1988 the level of expenditure in this q I
17 particular research category is about $15 million. And some of 18 the elements of that program are listed here.
19 DR. TODREAS: Excuse me, let me just understand then 20 what your answer to Pete's question. On this chart that we 21 got, for containment integrity of radiation protection, you are 22 saying $15 million, have you seen this chart?
23 DR. HOUSTON: Let me make sure I am looking at the 24 same thing. No, I have not.
25 L9. TODREAS: Okay, the entry is severe accident i
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1 11 i i loads. j 2 DR. HOUSTON: Right. q 3 DR. TODREAS: Wel , let's start off, where is the $15 4 million on this chart? I thought'it was --
5 DR. HOUSTON: It is within that category of severe 1
6 accident loads. l 7 DR. TODREAS: Okay, and then the $25 million that 8 Pete asked you so that there is $10 more million. l l
9 DR. HOUSTON: All right, it sums up. What is not 10 really shown in here although it can be -- what you don't-see 11 on this chart, explicitly is the probabilistic risk assessment ;
12 effort. But it falls, I think that the intent here is that !
13 this is part of what is called severe accident loads but it-is
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14 -- or one might think of that as part of the generic safety j j
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l 15 issue, the technical basis.
16 As I said, I have not.seen this before. But as I 17 look at it, what is missing from the program and that 18 constitutes some about $8 million I have is our efforts in the i
19 area of PRA.
20 DR. TODREAS: And let me just press you to find out 21 where, because this seems to me to be the logical breakdown l
l 22 that the division is really operating under. You have got five 23 functions and four divisions.
24 And so we have got 15 in the -- under the severe 25 accident loads an'd then where is the other $20?
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l 12 1 DR. HOUSTON: About,$8 million is in probabilistic 2 risk assessment, eight and a fraction, and the. balance is in 3 the safety issue resolution, the severe accident issue ,
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4 resolution.
5 DR. TODREAS: Okay, but where is the probabilistic 6 risk assessment in this matrix?
l l 7 DR. HOUSTON: I can't tell you. I say I have not seen j l 8 this and as I look at it, I say it is missing from this. But 9 you can regard it as part of the -- looking across, you can 10 regard it as part of the containment integrity in radiation 11 protection. That is the program category in the budget.
12 And it falls under the division, reactor accident 13 analysis, and you can think of it perhaps.for your purposes, as 14 a part of the severe accicent loads question. But it wruld be .
i 15 helpful, I think,'if it had been identified separately because 16 this is something that Neil asked for yesterday and I just drew 17 it up sitting there.
18 And there are a couple of other things that are left 19 out. The 1150 effort would be part of that in there, which is 20 part of the PRA effort.
21 DR. TODREAS: Yes, but I don't think that it is just 22 a paper kind of issue, because those are the five functions 23 that the program is made up of. If you are not organized 24 around those five functions, the five-year plan, the logic of 25 it starts to fall. That is my view.
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i 13 1 DR. MORRISON: Excuse'me, the $25.million that you 2 talked about on your previous view graph there for fiscal year 3 '88, the sum reading across containment integrity and radiation 4 protection or is it reading down on reactor --
5 DR. HOUSTON: Read down.
6 DR. MORRISON: Read down, okay.
7 DR. HOUSTON: And the one thing that is missing is i
8 the PRA part there, which falls-in the budget category of 9 containment integrity of radiation protection. That-is, it is 10 included in there, it is just not explicit on this matrix.
11 Does that --
12 DR. MILLER: Clearly at some point, Mr. Chairman, we 13 are going to have to get a common understanding of'what the
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14 budget categories are and the sub-categories. l 15 DR. TODREAS: I think that we have got it registered
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16 there. We are sort of halfway there. j i
17 DR. HOUSTON: What you need, I think, is the budget i i
18 description. You have it if you have copies of the five year 19 plan, I think. It is in there. The program category level and ;
1 20 program level and then activity level.
21 DR. MILLER: Yes, but we are trying to map it into 22 the organization.
23 DR. HOUSTON: I understand and that is not easy.
24 DR. TODREAS: I think that we can carry on. I think 25 the point has registered. I think that Eric understands it and
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l 14 1 we can get an update in the order of weeks. q 2 DR. HOUSTON: Turning now to some of the major 3 elements of major programs within this-budget category, some of
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4 the most expensive work that we do is'in the srsa of trying to S. understand better what we typically refer to as melt j
6 progression phenomena, which go hand in hand with hydrogen j 7 generation, because of a legitimate concern forf the generation 8 of hydroger, as a safety consideration in severe accidents, in- q l
9 vessel.
10 And we hsve basically two different kinds of test 11 programs which have been underway for a number of years. One, 12 which consists of full-length tests in the NRU reactor in j 13 Canada and the ?.ORR tests in Sandia. That is the angular core
( research reactor tests which are shorter, they are just a 14 i
15 couple of minutes and it is the fuel 5ssemblies that are the 16 test specimens in the ACRR, are short length, they are not full i
17 length fuel assemblies.
18 The NRU tests are particularly expensive. They tend 19 to run on the order of $3 to $5 million per. test, so that 20 naturally there is some finite limit as to the number of such l 21 tests that one can perform in this. l 22 So we have proposed, for example, in the current 23 year, to begin to phase out these tests. Funding initially or 24 expecting to fund initially only the follow-up work on analysis 25 of previous tests that have been done, and we have had restored f
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15 1 to our budget, funds that will allow us to do, I:think, at 2 least one more test, which should turn out to be, possibly a 3 very significant one.
4 This one, as a matter of fact, will -- which may not 5 occur actually until some time in fiscal year '89, hopefully in 6 fiscal year '89, and these take a long time for preparation and 7 just the safety' analysis of the test, itself, actually is not a 8 trivial matter.
9 One of the things that'the next test planned for the 10 NRU deals with melt progression phenomena that typically occurs-11 in a BWR. And one of the points of understanding and in a 12 sense, there is some lack of agreement between the staff and 13 the industry on this point, which bears very much on the -- is i
14 very significant with respect to the matter of how much and at 15 what rates hydrogen might be generated by no water, no steam 16 reaction, in a melt progression situation, deals with an 17 understanding of what is sometimes referred to as the candling ,
18 effect. That is the potential for fuel as it melts to fall by 19 gravity to lower parts of the core, and then refreeze.
20 And there is the possibility that if'it can refreeze 21 in such a matter as to block passage of steam through the core, 22 and if it does that, there is very little or no steam to react 23 with unreacted metal above, which would be the source of l
24 hydrogen.
25 On the other hand, if it possible for a bypass pass
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- 1. to occur, that'is, if the blockage.is not complete and.there'
'are paths for steam to proceed up the core'and~ react;with'
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2 3 unreacted metal.above, then;you'will get some hydrogen 4 generation.
5 'In general, the staff'of.the staff contractor-6- analyses modeled this as having bypassJso that.there is 7 hydrogen generation there, and the analysis that we have seen-8 from industry, INCOR particularly," tend to assume that blockage.
9- occurs so'that there is no steam to reactLand therefore,.the-10 hydrogen generation is very much smaller.
11 This experiment should.shed some light on that.
12 DR. BUSHr Wayne, it is not very. obvious from what 13 you said, but I think one of the reasons it will' stand is the
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14 degree of instrumentation. If this is the-ones I am thinking-15 about these is extremely elaborately instrumented.
1 16 DR. IlOUSTON: That is correct, yes'.
I 17 We.try to get as much as possible, information out of 18 such expensive experiments and it certainly does involve,a lot 19 of instrumentation and, of course, like any other_ major 20 experiment, often they don't work out exactly the-way that they 21 are planned, and yet, for the most part, we have been-able:to j 22 get some very useful results out of them, but'it is not a l 23 simple undertaking.
l 24 DR. TODREAS: Can that question be answered with a 'l, 25 scale of experiment? Is it like a bundle, the-NRU?
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17 1 DR. HOUSTON: Yes, there is a single test element in 2 the core of the NRU reactor. I can't tell you whether this is 3 a bundle involving more than one rod, I am not clear on the 4 details of that.
6 DR. HOUSTON: Yes.
7 MR. KELBER: I think that it is four-by-four, if I 8 recall correctly.
9 DR. HOUSTON: Is it four-by-four? I am just --
10 DR. TODREAS: Okay, then we won't pursue it.
11 The question, the fundamental question I get in mind, l
l 12 is bypass flow or not is a function of, I think, scale because 13 it is a function of the boundary conditions and if you have too 14 small a test and you have to put on the boundary conditions.
15 DR. HOUSTON: That is correc't.
16 DR. TODREAS: And the ones that you put on may be 17 realistic or may not be. !
18 DR. HOUSTON: Correct.
19 DR. TODREAS: So, okay, let's leave that and we can i
20 pursue that later.
21 DR. HOUSTON: With respect to the question of scale 22 though, because the ACRR experiments are shorter in length, 23 there is a question of whether the results of the short length 24 would be reproduced for a longer tube.
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25 DR. TODREAS: I was thinking of radius.
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, 1 DR. HOUSTON: I realize that, yes.
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2 DR. WILSON: I have a question that I am -- when the 3 APS study was looking at this four years,ago, we probably out 4 of our ignorance had the view that you could not understand ;
5 anything from the time that you started melt until the time j j
6 that it went to the reactor vessel. And you had best better l 1
7 take that and bound it.
8 And it would have been easy for us to make the 9 recommendation that you do lots of experiments in this thing.
10 We definitely said that you should not do lots of experiments 11 in this thing, unless you saw what they were going to do.
i 12 And now, my question comes, how are these going to 1
13 help you in that particular question of understanding that very 14 tricky thing? !
15 They can help you draw or they can help you bound it 16 or what? .
17 DR. HOUSTON: I think in two ways. One is the direct
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18 result of the experiment with respect to the, what was spoken 19 of as the candling effect, whether it occurs or not. Of ;
20 course, even with one test, it cannot be regarded as ultimate l
21 proof of the pudding so to speak. I 22 But at least it would be one more piece of evidence 23 on that particular point. But more importantly, in principle, 24 we have had under development for some . kind, a mechanistic code ;
25 that happens to be called Melt Prog, melt progression, in which i
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. I we attempt to model certain of the phenomena in-vessel. l 2 This, I_am not sure the code existed or had been 3 initiated --
4 DR. WILSON: It was there and none of us believed it.
5 DR. HOUSTON: Yes, and now, it is true. What you say 6 is quite true and still, to a large extent today, our 7 understanding of melt progression phenomena is such that we 8 don't have what we call a very good handle on it.
9 And typically, for example, in a probabilistic risk 10 analysis, it is not uncommon to make the assumption, if you 11 will, that once you start to get significant core degradation- ;
12 of a certain plant damage state of where it does proceed to
~13 core melt through.
14 Obviously, it cannot be instantaneous, but in 15 general, the assumption is made that once you get to the plant I
16 damage state, you have virtual certainty of getting core melt j l
I 17 through the pressure vessel.
18 And it is largely done that way in risk assessment.
19 DR. WILSON: Yes, exactly.
l 20 DR. HOUSTON: On the other hand, there does seem to 1
21 be a body of opinion, the ACRS has spoken on this recently,'to 22 the effect that there is a general judgment that the likelihood q 23 of the' pressure vessel melt-through is really less than the 24 likelihood of the initiation of core damage. That could be of !
i 25 an order of magnitude.
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1 And it is that kind of judgment which is driving the {
2 emphasis on accident management, which is primarily, I think f 3 the most important in my mind, the most important aspect of i
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4 accident management is in-vessel management -- that is, to try 5 to ,oreaerve what I will refer to as the second barrier of 6 containment, namely the reactor primary system integrity, l 7 particularly the pressure vessel.
8 DR. WILSON: We are in agreement with that.
l 9 DR. HOUSTON: We don't know a let about them.
10 DR. WILSON: I am in agreement with that, but the 11 questlan is, what bothers me is every time I try to think what 12 these experiments would do to help me in understanding or 13 changing my ballef or firming up my belief of what is going to 14 happen, in that region, I have not found any of these 15 experiments actually helps me very much.
16 And the question is, I just want to try to 17 understand, do you have a strong belief that this particular l
18 set is really going to help you and how?
19 DR. HOUSTON: We would not do it, if we did not l 1
20 believe that we were going to get some useful information out l 1
21 of them. l l
22 Another example - i i
23 DR. WILSON: That is not true. J l 24 DR. HOUSTON: Well, I will say that that is true. I l \
! 25 will assert that is true, but other people may disbelieve it. I 1
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21 1 Another example, I think of the kind of piece of 2 information that one might get from it, again, how well you can 3 . extrapolate the information to other situations is a very 4 legitimate question. Because of the complexity of the 5 different types of materials in the reactor core, of course, 6 one can get various eutectics occurring in melt phenomena.
7 And one would hope with post-examination process, one i
8 might get from this NRU experiment, some indication of 9 different kinds of eutectics that may or may not be formed in 10 the progression of the melt. And this would be useful J 11 information in terms of understanding the modeling phenomena. ;
i 12 MR. BECKJORD: I think that there may be something to 13 add to that. There was a meeting last, we had t meeting in )
14 mid-summer on this aspect of severe accident work and several 15 others, and I think there is a lot of" concern among the people 16 who were working on it, about the expense of these tests.
17 And the difficulty of using the results to validate J 18 computer codes, such as melt prog, and the feeling was that 19 there s ,uld be more attention focused on separate effects l 20 testing and that for the amount of money that the in-file tests 21 we':e costing, we could make some very useful advances by going 22 the other route.
23 And that is, in fact, what we are doing. Since then 24 the plan has changed and there is less money going in to the 25 in-file tests than normally going into other types of non-fuel Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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- s. I testing or non-nuclear fuel testing.
2 DR. HOUSTON: Yes, I did not mean to imply, you know, 3 all the eggs are in this basket.
4 MR. REED: There are three or four issues in which 5 the industry and the NRC are at odds. This is a tery important 6 one and I want to know what schedule you are planni.j on doing 7 these tests.
8 DR. HOUSTON: Well, the NRU tests that I talked 9 about, as I said earlier, hopefully towards the end of fiscal 10 year '89 we will be ready for that test.
11 We can only do these experiments -- if you have a 12 mind to do them at all -- it takes about two years, and you can 13 only do about one test every two years.
14 My own guess is that if, in fact, this test does 15 proceed, and I will still say that there is a little 16 uncertainty about it, it probably will be the last one that we 17 will do.
18 That is speculation on my part, but it is a year and 19 a half away at best.
20 MR. REED: I think that what makes this important is l l \
21 it is sort of the foundation of this Mark I question and 22 whether or not utilities should spend $5 or $10 million a unit, 23 maybe 24 Mark I's out there to do modifications, that is one.
24 But even more important to me, that as we talk about 25 severe accident procedures, accident management procedures, it
(
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-- 1 is more important to have realism than conservatism, if you are ]
2 teaching an operator what to recognize and when to recognize 3 it.
4 And, if indeed, this adds light on that question, it I
5 is, to me, would be worth the dollars.
6 DR HOUSTON: Our present thinking is that it'should i
7 and we have yet to create and see all the details'of how it ]
8 will be planned and how well it would be instrumented. Of 9 course, you have to recognize that even after the test is run, 10 it is going to take quite a while to analyze the data and j 1
11 reduce the data and so forth.
12 DR. LEVY: If I could make a comment, I think that 13 you ought to be very careful. The NRU tests would only deal 14 with the early melt progression. If you are --
1 15 DR. HOUSTON: It is a question of how'far we would be l 16 able to go.
17 DR. LEVY: It won't go, I think the issue of the Mark l 18 I is getting the thing to get. through the vessel and actually 19 to date, you have made zero tests to simulate a boiling water 20 reactor and its bottom and how the stuff gets there, and what 21 happens down there.
22 OR. HOUSTON: True.
23 DR. LEVY: And all that we are talking about is j
24 imaginary models. J 25 DR. BUSH: I would comment that whereas I think ]
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24 {
1 I separate effect tests are good, they also can be subject to 2 major misinterpretations so that one has to be extremely 1 3 careful in the selection and interpretation of same.
4 DR. TODREAS: We have just covered all points on the 5 spectrum, f l
6 (Continued on next page.) I 7 1 4'
8 9
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25 J 1 DR. LEVY: I am reinforcing Cordell's point. You 2 know, there is a great-debate about people trying to try.'to 3- sell.something,-and we do not'even have.the facts of how we'get' 4 there.
5 DR. HOUSTON: That's! correct;.we understand that. It '{
6 is called. decision making in the face of uncertainty.
7 (Laughter) 8 DR. LEVY: Decision making without facts.
9 DR. HOUSTON: But you haven't. heard the decision yet?
10 .Let me move to the next item. .
j 11 DR. TODREAS: All I would say,'I guess, to everybody.
k 12 on the panel is that this is just the opening ~ shot;trying to .]
13 get you oriented if you haven't been working on the program l
14 like I haven't, but you guys have. Bring'.us'up to'a. level, and 15 then on round two we will get into ths technical issues and I 16 make some comments.
17 DR. HOUSTON: One of the regulatory concerns for 18 severe accidents, of course, is.the fact that. physically it
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19 appears to be possible to have what we sometimes refer to as 20 " accident scenarios," which' lead to early-containment failure.
i 21 By "early" we mean within a matter of hours from the time of l l
22 the initiating event.
l 23 Early failures of containment create the opportunity.
24 for somewhat larger' releases to the environment because'.you 25 don't have enough time for natural phenomena. And if you are j I
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' 1 able to have spray s.rstems or something that can function 2 inside a containment to retain fission products within the 3 containment building, the release is going to be somewhat 4 larger.
5 So we have a greater regulatory concern for early 6 containment failures, a phenomena as distinct from late. There 7 are scenarios, and so forth, where the' system continues to 8 maintain its intea;ity, essentially, for a day or more, and 9 then, perhaps, open up in some fashion, perhaps by cracking.
10 from over-pressure, what have you.
11 One of the particular scenarios which has gotten 12 everybody's attention in recent years is the phenomena which 13 has come to be known as rapid containment heating. There was a l
14 little bit of mention of it yesterday, and I am sure that many 15 of you are familiar with the phenomena. It is just a 16 high-pressure ejection of moved material from the reactor 17 pressure vessel under circumstances where the jet can break up 18 and form a finely-divided aerosol.
i 19 In principal, this can cause very rapid heating of l
20 the containment atmosphere, both by direct heat transfer, j 21 because the molten material is hot, the droplets are hot, but 22 also because the enhanced surface area in the material -- if 23 you have unreactive metal, for example,.in the droplets, of-24 course they can oxidize and steam into the atmosphere.. They 25 can oxidize very rapidly, and therefore further contribute to
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i 28 1 DR. BUSH: You have a series of probability 2 sequences. You have the accident 3 DR. HOUSTON: Yes.
1 4 DR. BUSH: All right. Now you have to get the 5 material. First yca have to melt the material.
6 DR. HOUSTON: Right.
7 DR. BUSH. Then, somehow, you have to fragment the 8 material. What I am asking is that someone must have gone l
9 through a logic sequence to establish what the probability is, 10 once you have the melt, whether it is tun to the minus two, ten 11 to the minus five, ten to the minus ten, or something like 12 that.
13 DR. WILSON: That's quite high. The TM/LP system 14 does this, and that is extremely common.
15 DR. BUSH: All I am asking is for numbers.
4 16 DR. HOUSTON: I can't give you a number. But any l 17 sequence which could lead to a lot of molten material on the
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l 18 bottom of a pressure vessel where the pressure is still high, 19 say, in the order of a couple thousand pounds, as you open up a 20 hole in the pressure vessel, it has potential for this jet.
21 So I am still not quite clear as to the nature of 22 your question. I will state your black-out scenario as a good 23 example. If you are unable to restore power, you can't restore 24 cooling, of course. The likelihood of such events is on the 25 order of ten to the minus three, four, five, something in that Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
I 27 1 the heat generation inside the containment and very rapidly 2 build up the pressure in the containment.
3 So we are doing work in this area, and in several l
4 different ways. We have some tests at Sandia to try to shed 5 light on the phenomenon of high-pressure melt ejection. We 6 have work underway to try to determine, for example, if one 7 could depressurize fairly rapidly in a PWR, for example. What 8 pressure do you have to get down to -- something above 9 atmospheric pressure -- in order to avoid the kind of jet 10 impingement and breakup that would produce the final divided 11 aerosol?
12 Current conjecture is that that might be on the order 13 of a couple hundred pounds per square inch. But it is 14 basically the direct heating phenomena, which is a 15 high-pressure scenario, one that can lead to very early 16 containment failure. The principle is relatively more 17 important, apparently, for PWRs than it is for BWRs, because of 18 the reliability of the depressurization systems on more than 19 one reactors, which is a pretty highly-reliable system.
20 DR. BUSH: Wayne, what has been done on the 21 probability of initiators? It seems that that would control 22 the thing pretty much. After all, you have to initiate the 23 reaction in the first place.
24 DR. HOUSTON: I am not quite sure I understand.
25 Initiate --
1 l
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29 1 range, for the-station black-out.
2 Charlie?
Or.
3 ggR. KELBER: -The dominant sequences that involve 4 th.., and they happen to'be for.many examples of the PWRs that 5- have been looked at, also dominant sequences in the-risk 6 profile are the T , p ects that have been mentioned where 7 it is just transient wear, you lose the secondary flat balance 8 of the plant. It has certain resemblances, for example, toLthe 9 accident at TMI II.
10 The S2D, the small break, where you depressurize 11 very, very slowly, you loose ECCS capability, or the: station 12 black-out. I think in the 1150, isn't station black-out, as I 13 recall --
14 DR.-BUSH: It is the predominant --
1 E.:r - .
I 15 $RT KELBER: It is the predominant significance, yes.
l 16 So these are all pressurized.
l 17 DR. BUSH: Well, that's good. Of course, on a 1
18 sequence, that means that you are apt to have lost your diesels l
19 and a few other things in the process, by the probability.
Dr .
21 gn. KELBER: You asked what are the-dominant l
21 sequences --
22 DR. BUSH: Yes, that's right. No,'I didn't ask that.
23 I asked what the probability was to get there in the first 24 place.
25 DR. TObREAS: Okay, let's go.
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30 1 DR. HOUSTON: Next is the-natural circulation 2 phenomena, by which we mean in~this case, if you are not 3 familiar with it, it has a special meaning in this context.
4 This is natural circulation of fluid inside the primary-system, 5 which gives rise to the possibility of very hot gasses through 6 a natural circulation phenomena and the possible rupture, if 7 you will, of the hot leg, or even passing to the steam 8 generator in a PWR, and possibly causing rupture and melting of 9 the steam generator, too, and'therefore, opening up a path that s 10 may bypass the containment.
l 11 Work that has been done in this area: We have done 12 some analysis work, and we have some on-going work-there. EPRI l
13 has sponsored some test programs at Westinghouse.
14 Unfortunately, they have declined.to fund any further. We 15 think that there is a reasonable test'that can be done to 1
16 assist in confirmations or modifications of analysis techniques 17 that we have, as I am sure many of you are aware.
18 The natural circulation phenomena is very difficult I l
19 to model analytically. It has a potential application to l 20 direct containment heating phenomena in the sense that if 21 natural circulation phenomena were to occur in such as fashion 22 to create a break or an opening in the primary system, that 23 would be sort of an automatic depressurization technique.
24 We have had a number of discussion with EPRI regarding 25 cooperative measures in terms of making sure that our research Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
31-
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programs are complimentary, and this~is one area that we are 1
2 still taking about. We would'like to see some of our test-3 programs continue.
4 The.next item has already been discussed' earlier. I 5 think.Eric' mentioned yesterday the work we were doing to 6 attempt to recover samples from the bottom head at TMI II. We _.
7 have in mind something of four to eight different samples, 8 which will.be transported, possibly, to11NEL and turned into f 9 metallurg. cal specimens, which then can be examine-d. We want 10 to try to get a better understanding of why the pressure-vessel 1 11 at TMI II retained a sufficient amount of integrity, so that' 12 apparently it didn't fill up. The current' calculations that' 13 one might do on this -- the estimates would be that it should' 14 have ruptured.
l 15 DR. BUSH: Let me ask a question, because I have 16 heard different sequences on this. One sequence which'I have 17 grave doubts for is that you only wanted to take a partial core 18 sample. In other words, what you will do is only go part way .;
l 19 through the wall.
20 DR. HOUSTON: That's correct, i 21 DR. BUSH: You are spending an awful lot of money on 22 a very faint hope in that case, it seems to me.
23 DR. HOUSTON: . Well, there are people that share that 24 opinion, very strongly. Again, it is to get the best possible 25 picture -- what happened -- clearly, we would.like to have i
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32 1 samples all the way through.
2 DR. BUSH: What you're going to have tc do is to make 3 some a priori assumptions on how that metal occurred, and what 4 the duration was as it lay down there. The critical thing is 5 going to be the eutectic formation, and the degree of eutectic 6 formation in there. Quite frankly, a part of a sample won't 7 tell you a bit of inforraation about that.
or 8 MR. BECKJAR - I missed what you said first.
9 DR. BUSH: You have a whole sequence. You coula have I
10 the whole thing melt at once as go down as a 11 glob -- baloom -- which means that you now have a maximization. I 1
12 The other one is that you could have a dripping down of the 13 thing with a chill effect on there, because you have removed 14 all the water. And it fills up there, which means that you get j
- l 15 minimal penetration. !
16 It is someplace in between, I would anticipate. If 17 you take a sample -- let's say you take it two-thirds of the 18 way through the wall -- now what you're going to try to do is 19 to try to assess on the basis of the structure on there, and 20 make some assumptions on the chill effects on there -- what the 21 rate of heat-up and cool-down was. You will have never gotten 22 in to what I would call the actual melt regime at all.
23 DR. TODREAS: What does the other third material tell 24 you relative to that question?
25 DR. BUSH: It tells you how far you have gone through 3 .
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33 1 the wall, and whether you have formed a eutectic or not. And 1 2 you can't tell that.
3 DR. TODREAS: If, in fact, you don't go.all the way j 4 through the heat-affected zone, that's the point?
5 DR. BUSH: Through the wall. Not the heat-affected 6 zone, through the wall.
7 DR. TODREAS: Yes, but I am just trying to 1
8 understand. You've got a third of the wall you haven't, j l
9 sampled. I 10 DR. BUSH: That's right.
11 DR. TODREAS: All right. Suppose that's still at'the a 12 base-metal condition.
13 DR. BUSH: Then you haven't had any reaction 14 whatsoever with the core, which is on of the things that you 15 are trying to establish. After all, one of the first things.
16 that you have up there is a very critical. item on that, because 17 you are ass wing. I presume that.is the reason you are trying i
18 to do it -- to lend some credence to what you are doing up. j i
19 above on the extreme exit. ]
20 You have several tons --
21 DR. TODREAS: No, I know - -
22 DR. LEVY: Well, there is a little more background, I-23 think. They know that the fuel that's there -- they at least -l 24 know from looking at it that there is some attack on the bottom 1 25 of the vessel. They don't know how deep it is, but they Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
34 1 believe there is some attack.
2 They also believe there may be a penetration full of 3 molten fuel. They are going after those two possibilities.
4 Now, consideration was given to a through sample, but a through 5 eample puts a hole in that vessel which you still have to 6 decontaminate. So you ha'e to look at it from the utility 7 viewpoint that sayr. " Hey, I'm just going to keep my vessel 8 together."
9 So you have to weigh these two issues, versus trying i
10 to do what you were --
a J
11 DR. BUSH: All I'm saying is.that you are going to 32 dispose several millions dollars for something, and you may l 13 not end up with much of anything --
14 DR. LEVY: It is possible that you may not get much
. )
15 information.
16 DR. BUSH: Quite frankly, I would classify it as 17 somewhat of a waste of money.
18 DR. WILSON: Getting back to what we discussed three 19 years ago in the UPS study, one of our members thought that we 20 must spend all the money we could when we were to study TMI II 21 in great detail. But when we discussed this at several 22 meetings, when we were getting briefings and goodness knows 23 what, I don't think anyone except this one had any idea of what 24 any of the information with TMI II was going to really tell us.
25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
35 1 So I am a little -- from general principles, one 2 feels that one has to do something about understanding the one 3 act that one's ever had. On'the other hand,'TMI II was' 4 certainly not a controlled experiment. So.the initial 5 conditions are unknown, and.the computer-programs are awful.
6 The-fact that you might know the final conditions doesn't help 7 you much. .
or 8 MR. BECKJAR6+- I.think this is something we would' 9 like to pursue. Maybe this morning isn't quite the right-time 10 to do it, because we don't have the people here who have worked 11 on it. But I am interehted in your views on this, because 12 your's is the first domment that suggests that the work is not 13 worth doing. The advice that I have had has been unanimous 14 that it is worth doing. And the main objective has been 15 described as one of determining, if possible, what the 16 temperature of the vessel wall was.
I 17 The feeling is that knowing the pressures of the 18 weight loads on the bottom heads, that if the temperature had l l
19 been at 1,600 Fahrenheit or higher than that, there would have ]
i 20 been a complete failure. Since it's pretty clear that that j 21 didn't happen, there is some question -- that is an important 22 question as to what the temperature was. I think that's the l
23 main focus of the work that's been set under way.
I 24 IM1. BUSH: All I am saying is that I think they are 25 throwing away an' awful lot of information.
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' /
Orf. .
1 MR. BECKJARBJ .Well, that might be.' That's really 2 another question. That's a question of how much is available, 3 how many resources can'be devoted to that. I think the details 4 of that decision we can make available'to you. It would take-5 some time to describe that now, but there.was a l
6 comn ittee -- this was reviewed by a committee' that Neil was 7 chairman of last fall. We spent probably the better part of a l 8 day on this question.
1 9 We have had other advice; we have gone to the people 10 who are working on our pressure vessel material questions at 11 Oak Ridge. So far, the view I've had is that_.what we propose 12 to do is worth doing. So I am interested to test that.
13 DR. TODREAS: Well, we'll keep this one on the.
14 agenda. We have to get into this technical --
15 DR. LEVY: I think there is'a major purpose to this.
16 This is the only core melt we have arrested in the vessel. I 17 think there is a lot of merit to try to understand how we did 18 it, and why. Those samples may not tell us everything we need 19 to know, or would like to know.
20 Ideally, you like to cut through, but there are some 21 limitations.
b/
22 MR. BECKJAR Y Well, the view that we got -- Chuck 23 Cerpan went to the people at Oak Ridge and elsewhere and talked 24 to quite a number of them. Their feeling was pretty high 25 confidence that we would be able, through this set of seven to Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
37 1 nine samples, wh'at the temperature of the wall was. 'And I 2 think-nobody can guarantee that, butLthat was the view they 3 expressed.
4 DR. BUSH: Eric, you can get the temperature of-the 5 wall over a matter of several hours. Or, you can get the 6 temperature of-the wall over a fairly short time., depending on 7 your-heat source that you put against the wall. The gradients 8 will be different, I will grant you. But it won't tell.you 9 much about creep if you have a short time, one, that you get-10 the gradient on there -- creep was not going to be a. factor.-
11 DR. TODREAS: I think that the distinction here that 12 we have to bring out is how much other information relative:to 13 what was going on down there we get from other means, like 14 scenario calculations, holes through the bottom plate,' relative 15 to the depth position to the melt'down there, and the timing.
16 If you think that you are trying to get everything through the 4 l
17 temperature in that sample or through the metallurgy of that l 18 sample, then you come out with one conclusion. !
19 If you think it's a piece in the total picture, then 20 you have another. I think that's how the discussion really 21 ougnt to be carried out. We'll-get it on the agenda, Spencer.
22 DR. BUSH: Well, we did work on.this twenty years 23 ago, but of couree it has never been declassified, as far as I 24 know. ,
25 DR. TODREAS: All right. Why don't we move on?
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38 1 DR. HOUSTON: Moving righ:. along, another major area 2 is in the area of core concrete int (sractions. The main point I 3 want to make here is that -- of course, once one has core on 4 the floor, there is a distinct possibility of erosion of the i
5 concrete base-mat material, and this has been fairly well 6 modelled. It makes a big difference, of course, in a plant 7 whether it is limestone or basaltic concrete as to exactly what 8 happens.
9 And, of course to the extent that there.is unreactive 10 metal in the core material reacting with the concrete, there is 11 the further evolution of heat from oxidation processes. So it 12 is an important phenomena to understand in terms of containment I matters. We are currently engaging, particularly, with EPRI 14 with respect to their proposed Ace Program, of which a major 15 component part is core-concrete interaction.
16 And we want to be participants in that program, at 17 least to the extent that what we're doing in this area versus 18 what the Ace Program will do will really compliment one )
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19 another. i 20 DR. WILSON: Is that an experimental program?
21 DR. HOUSTON: Experimental, yes. It is a combination ,
i 22 of experimental and -- i 23 DR. WILSON: You said they had been well-mode.11ed.
24 As of three years ago, one could say there were models, and ;
I 25 there was a strong difference of opinion as to whether they !
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39 1 were any good. The Sandia model, for example, was referred to )
2 by Jeff Greene after he had had a drink or two in rather rude ]
3 terms, and so on. i 1
4 I ask you, has that settled down?
5 DR. HOUSTON: Undoubtedly, not completely. The 6 nature of the subject is that there will always be arguments I l
7 about the validity and the accuracy -- some people will have J 8 their favorite ways of modelling things. What I really meant i
9 by that was that I think we have a substantially better j i
10 understanding of the phenomena of core-concrete interactions {
today as compared to our understanding of melt-progression f 11 q l
12 phenomena in-vessel. l 13 So the ultimate effect and uncertainties in source 1
l 14 terms and risk calculations that are done really stem more, in j
- l 15 terms of containment loads, from the initial conditions coming i 16 from the vessel, as distinct from the modelling of core on the ;
1 17 floor and concrete interactions.
18 DR. WILSON: But three years ago there was certainly 19 a question of possible radioactivity release --
20 DR. HOUSTON: Right.
21 DR. WILSON: -- which is going to be very much 22 concerned with that model. If you take that Jeff Greene's 23 approach, it would be far less than if you took the Sandia 24 approach.
25 DR. HOUSTON: And that is part and parcel not only Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 for the conta'inment loads, but for the chemistry of the' I 2 deficient products once they are getting transported,.and so 3 forth. j
. .1 4 Charlie, did you have a question?
4r .
5 I want to say..that, recognizing theR. KELBER: 6 difficulties of extrapolating the: chemical kinetics;to these 7 temperatures, a lot of attention was paid to.a.recent NAS 8 workshop. I-think that -- 9 DR. HOUSTON: You.see'that at the-bottom of my slide. 9v- 1 10 gK. KELBER: -- the feeling'is that the Sandia'models .j i 11 are in the right part of the ball-field. Not'only the'right i 1 12 ball-field, but the right part of itI 13 However, as I understand it,'the next series of tests 14 that you are sponsoring in this area have nothing that 15 simulates the chemistry of the more important fission products 16 in there. These should be an important step in the-17 confirmation of the model. I 18 DR. HOUSTON: The next item, hydrogen combustion. We 19 have had an NAS -- National Academy of. Sciences --. analysis, if 20 you will, about what we know about hydrogen. combustion, vis a 21 vis the potential for hydrogen combustion in site containments. 22 We have had a number of. recommendations from the report 23 prepared by them, many of which we were able to carry out, but 24 not all of them. . 25 There are some residual interesting and very 1 l 1 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 u
l I I 41
< 1 important concerns for hydrogen combustion and detonation. ]
l 2 Although we feel that generally speaking we have a fairly good { j 3 handle on understanding hydrogen-combustion phenomena, the one 4 thing that has appeared most recently that was a subject of 5 initial research which will continue for some time is the 6 apparent finding that both in the lean and the rich mixture i 7 region of a hydrogen steam-air mixture at high temperatures, l 8 the range between the lean and the rich mixtures enlarges as j 9 you go to a higher temperature. I 10 So the possibility of either extreme for creating
)
11 possibly detonations at, for example, lower concentrations of 1 I 12 hydrogen in a hydrogen steam-air atmosphere at elevated ; l l 13 temperatures becomes a theoretical and potential possibility.
, J 14 That is simply the extrapolation of deflagration and detonation j 15 concentration limits for the system at low-temperature to 16 higher temperatures. It may be an invalid extrapolation, and 17 this is something that we are exploring.
18 Finally, as Charlie mentioned a moment ago, we do 19 have a program in fission product chemistry, and we have l 20 recently supported a grant to the National Academy for a l l 21 workshop down in Florida, and we are expecting their final l 22 report in May of this year. I 23 This is an area in which the amount of current l 1 24 activity in fission product chemistry, I would say, is perhaps l i 25 not minimal, but in the long run is probably inadequate. My l i' ( Heritage Reporting Corporation i (202) 628-4888 ; 1 1 l
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- 1- own conjecture in the future is that we need'to probably do a 2 lot more fundamental work in fission product' chemistry in the 3 future.
4 The difficulties in thermodynamic properties, for 5 example, of a variety of species that occur -- in some 6 quarters, this becomes somewhat more difficult to justify. 7 It's basically source-term research in a sure sense. We 8 probably are not doing enough in this area right_at the present 9 time. 10 DR. TODREAS: What do you mean,'"In some quarters?"- 11 Are you talking about outside the office? 12 DR. HOUSTON: Within the agency. 4 4 13 I can amplify.that a little bit. There are very_few I ( 14 chemists and chemical engineers in this agency. This is 15 something that was supposed to be a lesson learned from TMI II. 16 There are still very few chemists and-chemical engineers in the 17 agency. People tend to think of fission products-as l 18 radionuclides, and they don't clearly recognize that they 19 behave chemically and not in accordance with the nuclear 20 properties. 21 Of course, that is very important with respect to 22 their evolution and transport and what happens to them and what 23 gets out. A lot of people just' don't recognize this; I am very 24 clearly -- 25 DR. WILSON: Again, let me say that I agree with you 1 i i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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i l 43 i [ 1 that that's an important subject. At the same time, it's an ) 1 2 enormous fact in the sense that the time one's interested in is ! 1 3 at the tail end of an accident sequence when one knows the 1 4 least about what the hell's going to happen. All the ! 1 5 uncertainty.of what has happened up until now is now huge. I 6 You are asking to solve about ninety chemical (
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'l species, all being evaporated. It is a task that no one has )
)
8 ever managed to do in the.whole of chemistry so far, and no one 9 else is attempting it. Now, that's the sort of' problem when 10 you get into this whole core-concrete interactions the i 11 maelstrom inferno going on in there. 12 I can't imagine that you will get any short-term j 13 results out from it at all. This can be very much something ( ; 14 when you do something, go back and forward and talk to the 15 Europeans, talk to the Russians, talk to the Japanese, come 16 back a couple of years later, and you have just moved a little 17 step forward. 18 DR. SHEPAP.D : Let me make a comment here, Wayne. 19 That's a true statement. However, this piece of research is in e NAS 20 agreement with PimmentpWl's4reportthathchendedou9*that 21 talked about opportunities in chemistry from now until the year 22 2,000. 23 DR. HOUSTON: Right. l l 24 DR. SHEPARD: And in that report one of the things he j 1 25 said was one of the critical issues that needed to be addressed 1 ( l l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i I
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i 44 i 1 was the understanding and control of complex reactions. I 2 think what you're describing is in the context of what he said. j 3 DR. HOUSTON: Moving now to the area of probabilistic 4 risk analysis, you have already heard primarily from Denny Ross 5 yesterday a discussion of our work on 1150 and the immediate l l 6 follow-on, in his words, not enough resources to do six plants ) 7 all at once. It's not clear in that respect as to whether we 8 should have attempted five plants all at once. 9 But in any event, the BWR Mark II is a follow-on l l 10 perhaps six months later, or something like that. We also have l l 11 current plans to follow that with probably a two other plants l 12 which have not been selected at all yet. It is not certain 13 that they are going to do it. 14 MR. REED: Wayne, this is tile wrong place to find out 15 where you stand. In your mind, if you think you are finished l 16 with the South -- 17 DR. HOUSTON: Today? 18 MR. REED: Yes. 19 DR. HOUSTON: No. We are well along in the South, 20 but we're not finished with it. There have been interactions. 21 MR. REED: That was a free PRA they promised to do, 22 and I spent a half-million dollars to get the right inputs sc 23 the answer will come out. But realistically -- 24 DR. HOUSTON: It should be clear doing these PRAs, 25 and if you hope to do them properly and be as realistic, at ( Heritage Reps ~rt5ng Corporation (202) 628-4888
45
< 1 least with respect to representing the plant as is, you have to i 2 have a lot of cooperation from the owner of the plant.
3 (Continued on next page) 4 5 . 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 12 l 13 , l l 14 , l J 15 1 1 16 17 1 i 19 l 19 l l 20 l i 21 1 22 l 23 24 25 t
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46 1 DR. HOUSTON: We're doing a lot of work in 2 methodology development. One of the key parts of the course is 3 uncertainty analysis, not only as it is being used in'1150, but 4 other treating uncertainties in doing PRA's. Another smaller 5 part from a budgetary point of view, .but not unimportant is the 6 methodology development at the extreme back end of the 7 consequence mcdeling we do, particularly with respect to so-8 called max code, with respect to updating soms-of the health 9 effects models and improve treatment. 10 A major effort, a significant effort, not major, a 11 significant effort in the division in the different branch 12 which in view of the PRA's -- review of PRA's submitted by 13 licensees and also a number of the vendors are now engaged in 14 submitting piece by piece, I should say, their application of 15 materials for advanced light-water reactors of so-called 16 standardized design. 17 And eventually we have one'in-house of PRA and the 18 Westinghouse has a plan, and we expect others on the GE ABWR, 19 the Combustion Engineering system 80 plus. And in addition to 20 that there is severe accident PRA material in the EPRI line one 21 reactor. 22 DR. TODREAS: Which of those four bullets does that 23 apply to of the three, the advanced reactor, the material you 24 just mentioned? 25 DR. HOUSTON: Which of the four? This is our doing [ Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
47 e 1 PRA's. This is our fueling methodology and this is our 2 reviewing PRA's submitted. This is really a service function 3 which we do to NRR. 4 MR. BUSH: May I ask a question on that, Wayne. In a 5 few instances that we were PRA existent, it was funded-by the 6 utility and done by organization X, you people did what I would 7 call a complete review and almost an independent PRA of the 8 same thing. When I say, you, I'm talking the NRC or somebody 9 requested by the NIC, usually ASIC. Is this what you're 10 talking about in this one or is it something different? 11 DR. HOUSTON: That's part of what I'm talking about. 12 In this sense that, PRA being submitted generally have some 13 particular purpose. You see, there are no requirements that 14 licensees submit PRA, at least at the present time there are 15 none. But some licensees on their own initiative have 16 submitted PRA's or partial PRA's, if you will, basically to 17 support something like an amendment to their license. 18 In general, one of the things we're still trying in 19 the process of coming to grips with is, procedures and criteria 20 we should be using in reviewing such PRA's. In general we 21 would not wish to expend the resources to completely redo a PRA 22 independently in the same area. But we do not have at,the l 23 present time, and some of this is in the process still of 24 development of instructions, if you will, to our reviewers of 25 these PRA's and criteria they should look for in terms of ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202} 628-4888 l
l 48 1 producing an evaluation of PRA, it's validity and so.forth. 2 101. BUSH: The reason I asked the question is,'when.
.o 3 you examine some of the numbers that go into the cut setsj 4 between the original PRA and the others there are'rather- {
1 5 pronounced differences which you then follow through the cut 6 sets and you find rather substantial differences in the 7 scenarios. 3 8 DR. HOUSTON: That's right. ) 9 MR. REED: Wayni, do you imagine, at least I think 10 you should expect, a lot of PRA's Coming in soon. The NRC is 13 promoting ISAP, people who will do individual plant 12 evaluations, many will choose to do a PRA rather than the short 13 cut back. Ir your funding directed towards supporting.that i 14 effort. 15 DR. HOUSTON: That's a good question and a tough 16 question to answer. What I've been talking about so far are 17 those that have been submit ted voluntarily usually for a : 18 specific purpose. 19 We recognize the possibility down the line, we say in 20 the near term, I wouldn't expect we have a flood, if you vill, 21 of PRA's being submitted in the next two years. And I think 22 it's not -- we haven't, I think,. fully settled on the question 1 23 of if -- either if we were to require PRA's to be done or 24 voluntarily under whatever provisions of the IJ E generic 25 letter, maybe. Just what we would do in terms of review; this i ( Heritage Reporting Corporation , (202) 628-4088
49 ' I is not at all crystallized yet at this point in time. 2 One thing is clear, that it would be a very resource 3 intensive project on our part, and it's just not clear, you 4 know, do we have funds or. justify the funds to do it. And that 5 clearly depends on the purpose of why this is all being.done. 6 And that's why I say, we need to come to grips, 7 better grips than we have. A lot of work has been done, but it 8 just hasn't quite crystallized yet at this point in time. 9 I would say over a span of 10 to 15 years in the 10 future, it would not surprise me looking back that a lot of 11 PRA's will come.in and more PRA results, PRA findings,.in any 12 rate. I'll go into detail on it. 13 And one of the things we -- our thought process is 14 being able to audit these. And one of the -- for example, 15 developing the melt core code, one of the possible. outcomes of 16 this is just an audit that is taking a particular scenario with 17 regards to particular sequence and just running one sequence 18 and checking against the findings of PRA-submitted, that type 19 of thing. 20 MR. REED: I'm predicting a flood by the end of '89, 21 the problem is that we will not have agreed on the methodology, 22 so it won't be just checking what they did it will be what 23 Spence is talking about, redoing it, coming out with the NRC's 24 version what they think it means. 25 OR. HOUSTON: I don't really see us doing that, but I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
50 i 1 my crystal ball is not clear. i 2 MR. BECKJARD: Cordell, with regard to the IPE a lot 3 of thought has been put into the question of what the 4 requirements should be, you know that, you all know that. One l 5 reason that -- one of the contributing factors to the length of j 6 time that it has taken to get the approval for the generic 7 letter which is getting close but we're not quite finished yet, 8 is to establish, you know, exactly how we're going to -- what 9 it is that we're going to require, so that the review process 10 is something which is not going to be, you know, terrifically i 11 consuming of our resources to do it. We intend to do it within j 12 the budgets. 13 We will be using some ex-contractors to help with ( 14 this. But we hope that what we are defining will be explicit I 15 enough so that the re'iew v does not have to be a, you know, 16 repetition of the same thing in parallel. 17 MR. REED: I won't prolong this, but what you get 18 from in-core methodology, I think you could check very easily, 19 they will all be along the same lines. But we're being 20 encouraged to do a full PRA, so that you can encompass many 21 other things. 22 MR. BECKJARD: They're being offered the alternative. 23 MR. REED: Being offered, right. That's a good way 24 of saying it. But all I'm saying is that we all do PRA's l 25 differently, and when you get the full PRA's you will not have l ( _ _ . _ _ . . . . _. .._._ . .. _ _ . . . . . . . _ . . . . , _ _ _ Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 t
51 1 an easy time evaluating those. 2 MR. BECKJARD: Tnat question came into consideration 3 rather late in the game; and not as much thought has been given 4 to the question of how we would handle a response with a PRA as 5 with the case of the IPE. 6 MR. BUSH: Certainly if you look at HAD and IC and 7 look at the gross differences, that's one of the ISAP's, that a 8 classic example you can run into. 9 DR. HOUSTON: My own view on this, Cordell, is that 10 we really should think twice before we jump in, say, imposed 11 regulatory requirements which puts unnecessary constraint and 12 possible bias on the conduct of the PRA. Because I think those 12 of us who have, and I guess you can count myself, the PRA i 14 analysts probably recognize more clearly than anybody, that 15 it's the doing of the FRA that is important and not the results 16 that you get. That is the bottom line numbers that you get. 17 It's the things that you learn about the plant as you 18 are doing it. Experience is -- licensees who do this correct, 19 they discover something and they correct it just like that. 20 And we would not, I think in my own view, we don't want to 21 inhibit that process. And how we achieve that, I'm not quite 22 sure. 23 MR. REED: A very enlightened end, Wayne. l 24 DR. HOUSTON: Well, I think so. 25 MR. REED: But then there are other people on the i'w+-M : Heritage Reporting Corporati"n (202) 628-4888
1
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l 52 1 other side'of the fence looking at our core melt frequencies 2 saying, gee, it's the wrong number you have to do something. .) l 3 DR. HOUSTON: I recognize that. J I 4 DR. TODREAS: I want to make a comment here and I 5 think it's directed to Eric as well, what I gather from this 6 ' discussion, though, is that the methodologies and the j 7 differences between them potentially are resolved; and-8 therefore there's a problem down the road. 9 MR. BUSH: I thitik so. 10 DR. TODREAS: And therefore that's a work itsm or 11 task item that needs to be considered by the office. 12 MR. REED: Neil, it's more of the phenomenon than the 13 methodology, I believe, j 14 DR. TODREAS: That's even tougher. 15 MR. REED: It's even tougher, right. 16 MR. BECKJARD: We're aware of it. 17 DR. TODREAS: Then, if you're aware of it, that helps 18 us. But then when we consider this again the question is, 19 what's the action? 20 DR. LEVY: I think he was making a point that there 21 is a momentum toward PRA's. The idea originally was that 22 everybody was going to come in with IPE's. And I can tell you 23 from testing the market that there is a fair number of people 24 who are going to go PRA rather than IPE's. 25 DR. HOUSTON: We're aware of that. I don't know that i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
L l' 53 I we know the precise numbers, but we're aware;of that.
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2 DR. LEVY: That's all I think you want to' recognize. 3 MR. BECKJARD: Let me say one more thing, this has l l l 4 taen -- I don't want to leave the impression that this- has not ! 5 been considered. It has,been discussed at some length and it 6 .has been a difficult discussion for the following reasons when. 7 the in-core effort on IPE started out, why the agency made a 8 commitment that that's the way it was going to be_done. 9' I think as was just said, there's a substantial 10 amount of fecling that PRA's are going to tell you more, and 11 that is the greater investment that would go into if PRA's.are 12 going to pay off. 13 I don't think there is serious dispute on that point. f i 14 But the problem we're stuck with is simply that, a commitment 15 was made and we're going to stand by that commitment. We are 16 offering the alternative for the people who want to go that 17 way. And what we intend to achieve in the end is when the 18 process is all over and you can look back on it, that the 19 results that will have been achieved by the.IDCOR IPE method 20 will be substantially the same as far as any-final decisions 21 are concerned with the PRA. 22 Now, that's out objective and we're going to try to 23 do that. 24 DR. TODREAS: Let me go one step further, I'm looking 25 toward May and coming out with comment. The way I hear the ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l L _ _ - ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
54 I 1 discussion, and I don't have the background personally to it, 2 is that the resources may not be in place relative to how 3 you're planning to handle the choice that will be made or may 4 be made winich is allowable to make. 5 MR. SECKJARD: That's correct.- 6 DR. TODREAS: And therefore, if we go through this in 7 May and we still have that issue that comes out as a comment. 8 And I'm bringing this up to highlight it, as we go into May you 9 are aware, at least that I'm thinking about it because I think 10 I recollect what's being put on the table, and we'll have to 11 close on this. 12 DR. HOUSTON: Continuing, I've already mentioned 13 this, I don't really want to spend any more time unless there t 14 is some interest in this particular subject area. It is the 15 fourth p.ge or more significant part of the.t program. 16 With respect to closures -- 17 DR. LEVY: Can you make a comment on that. Is there 18 anything published in this " Risk management development," or is 12 this just something you're doing internal through the NRC; I'm 20 trying to understand it. 21 DR. HOUSTON: Well, this is a reference to some code 22 development work that particular codes are called -- the ones l f , 23 that I've highlighted here, they're called SARA and (RAS. . 24 I'm not aware that we have any actual NUREG documents ) 25 published on that. These have been under development for a ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
[ - l l 55 v 1 couple of years. The SARA code is the primary one in the sense 2 of incorporating entries from existing PRA's. This ties to the 3 needs of existing PRA basic database, IRAS essentially a faulty 4 code. 5 Right now SARA exists with -- and it has been -- has 6 inputs for all the 1150 plants, draft 1150 that will have to be 7 modified with the final 1150. And it's under -- it's a test or 8 its developmental with the agency right now. And we're aware 9 that there similar activities in the industry were interested, 10 for example, in the NUS activity in this area. - 11 With respect to regulatory closure, there has been 12 already discussion of the mark-1, the performance issues 13 yesterday and I won't dwell on that. I 14 In addition, we have a set of issues that I will 15 mention briefly, hydrogen control. This was referenced here as 16 primarily to the unresolved safety issue A-48 as part of our 17 residual responsibility. You asked a very interesting question ! 18 yesterday, Neil, why wasn't it closed when the rule was j 19 published. When I came here in April that was exactly my 20 question. ] t 21 I think the answer to the question, if you're I 22 interested is that, the initial work done in A-48 preceded and 23 was going along in parallel with the rule making process. But ! 24 at a point in time or for quite a period in time it was not 25 clear whether the rule-making was going to end at a point in ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i i 1 56-
' l' time that you can clearly close out the generic issueont that 2 point.
3 So the plan was to set up with the lead' plants,1one- )
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4 for an ice condenser and one for- the ' mark-3 plants. And.the 5- events of the rule-making overtook that, but for some reason, I i
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6 don't really know the answer to that. question, the original j 7 plan was never changed to accommodate that. We'are1 currently 8 engaged in efforts of just closingLit out, but the rule was 9 published and the balance was the line, vertical line drawn-10 there; the implementation is'~also underway and that's;part of 11 that process. 12 DR. WILSON: I still don't quite understand, though, 13 after the rule is published what closing it out means. HIf it 14 means writing a paper describing what the rule is for the , 15 general public, fine. If it does mean changing.the rule, that 16 gets you into a little bit of trouble.- What-process do you-17 envision in that time? 18 DR. HOUSTON: To me the resolution is the staff 19 taking a position on it. That's the way I think of resolution. 20 Position may be the staff decides that.nothing needs to be done-21 as a result of studying the issue. It may.be that it's a 22 change in a standard review-plan, criterion or regulatory guide 23 or it may be a rule-making. 24 DR. WILSON: It might be changing the rule that needs 25 to be adjusted. ( . . _ _ . _ _ . . . . . - _ . . _ . . _ _ _ Heritage Reporting Corporation-(202) 628-4888
i 57 s 1 DR. HOUSTON: The changing of the rule itself is then 3 2 the closure, is the -- it's not the end of the issue, but it's 3 the resolution of the issue. And it's the staff coming to )l 4 grips with it. Now, the implementation has to follow and that ! 5 was discussed yesterday. j 6 Control room habitability'y, this is primary an 7 outgrowth of TMI-2 action plan item._ It implies that not all 8 of, what I might call, the desires of the staff with respect to 9 how the control room habitability system should operate the 10 function and carry out the testing and so forth. And it's a 11 residue that we're still dealing with. 12 The. source term issue is listed here, are a low l 13 priority item on the grounds that there is, at the present 14 time, work in the area of severe accident does not clearly lead 15 us to a determination with a TID source term, for example, a 5.0 16 percent iodine and ought to be 10 percent or two percent or 17 something of that. Some simplistic presumed such as that. 18 So in terms of source term efforts, it's a very minor 19 product. We have done a'little bit in terms of standard review 1 20 plan revisions to give credit to suppression; and we're in the 21 process of a change which is near findl for eliminating the-22 need for chemical additives and the spray systams for PWR's. 1 23 DR. WILSON: There's a generic thing on the source j l 24 terms which came out aft?r the turnabout, and I have not had a 25 clear answer from anybody, and that is, the time we're going i
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1 1 l 58 k 1 over the source term study all the chemists told us, well, this I 2 iodine is going to mostly come out and it's going to be in l 3 particular form and will settle out in the containment given j 4 enough time. 5 Then you suddenly find the only severe accident we 6 have really had is Chernobyl and then people find in Sweden and 7 other places of much with the idea in this case it is not in 8 particular form. And many say what we like about Chernobyl, a 9 different reactor than we've got, we would like to have that 10 sort of tied together just a little more before -- I mean, the 11 momant those two statements are in conflict. And I have never 12 seen any clear statement of that conflict. 13 DR. HOUSTON: It's not resolved. 14 DR. WILSON: Isn't that an important thing to work 15 on. 16 DR. H0JSTON: Yes. And that's part of the fission 17 product chemistry question mentioned earlier. It is not, let 18 me -- an oversimplification perhaps is, many years ago there 19 was an expectation on the part of many people that because of 20 the observations at TMI-2 relative to a little lodinc coming 21 out that, you know, the staff was quite wrong, both essentially 22 over conservative and also technically wrong in treating iodine 23 as being essentially all molecular iodine. 24 The subsequent research has shown that it is not 25 quite that simple. Iodine can undergo various chemical ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
V ~ t 59 I s 1 reactions within the containment, and it just isn't clear how 2 it come out. If you treat it LJ either an aerosol or as a true 3 vapor, it doesn't make a whole lot of difference in terms of, 4 for example, the effectiveness of containment sprays. It can 1 5 be impor' ant with respect to long-term hold-up in the system,
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6 as to if it gets too acidic, you will get more evolution, 1 7 presumably. 8 A lot of work has been done to try to understand to 9 complex chemistry and to provide a solution -- 10 DR. GLOYNA: Just a little bit of history. We were 11 melting the fuel elements in the old ANP research effort. The 12 item came out, deposited it, and then revolitalized, sometimes 13 within just a few feet. It was a periodic movement through the 14 deposition of altilization (ph). That's been there for a long 15 time. 16 DR. TODREAS: I think the point is registered. We 17 don't have the answer yet, but let's keep that on our near-term i 18 agenda, to go through the program to get the answer and to see 19 whether it is really there. 20 DR. HOUSTON: The last item in the slide is 21 respective changes in protective action guidance in the general 22 contacts of emergency preparedness. It is also part of our 23 docket, but it is essentially quiescent. We have had a'l'ittle 24 work done at Brookhaven Laboratory in the past year based on , 25 the 1150 protective action consideration. But we are still ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
60 ) k 1 trying to come to a better grip on the relevant advantages and 2 various protective action strategies in emergency planning 3 efforts. 1 4 But.it is not a major item -- j 5 DR.' LEVY: A. question before you leave that chart. ; l
'6 You have not described, except by mentioning it, ']
7 like, Melt-Core. These are very sophisticated, predictive 1 8 codes for a' severe accident that the NRC has. developed. Can 1 1 9 you make a few more comments? What shape will they be in at 10- the end of the fiscal year '887 What is the schedule by which 11 Melt-Core is going to run and you can put any faith in it, both 12 for PWR and a BWR7 l 1
, 13 DR. HOUSTON: Right now Melt-Core can be said to be
( 1 14 about 80 percent complete, in terms of its development. It is 15 much farther along for application to BWRs than for PWRs. As 1 16 an example, Melt-Core will be used in the South. That will be 17 its first use, and it is really displacing or replacing the 18 source-term code package in that effort. 19 The developmental effort and the validation effort on 20 Melt-Core should be pretty well complete, probably, by the end 21 of fiscal '89. There will probably be some residual tails on 22 that -- 23 DR. LEVY: Your definition of Melt-Core is not the i 24 same code with all the chemical reactions and all of that 25 business? ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
m . . . . . . q 61 s- 1 DR. HOUSTON: Melt-Core is the -- ] J 2 DR. LEVY: -- the Sandia developed? 3 DR. HOUSTON: Yes. 4 Charlie? 5 MR. KELBER: There may be a confusion on Melt-PROG. 6 Melt-PROG is the deterministic predictive code. 7' DR. LEVY: Okay. I'm looking for Melt-PROG. l
'l 8 DR. HOUSTON: Okay.
9 DR. LEVY: . What is the development of Melt-PROG, I 10 which is really the mechanistic code to describe these. 11 mechanisms? I don't see it any place here. I'm trying to 12 understand -- r 13 DR. HOUSTON: Well, when I was showing the hierarchy ( 14 of codes -- the mechanistic codes were at the top of my , 15 diagram -- Melt-PROG is one example of that. There are 25 or i 16 30 others that detail particular phenomenon. j 17 DR. LEVY: How about a feel for where Melt-PROG is 18 going to be at the end of '88 and at the end of '897 19 DR. HOUSTON: That.is a much more difficult question 20 for me to answer. Melt-PROG, by its very nature, is one that 21 could go on indefinitely, in terms'of making improvements on 22 it. It has to be tied in with the experimental program and the 23 budget and the need for it. 24 Primarily, the mechanistic codes, such as Melt-PROG, 25 are intended to be used to bench-mark the faster running codes i I Heritage Reporting Corporation l' (202) 628-4888
i 62 s 1 such as Melt-Core. It is at a state right now where it can do ] l 2 part of the job that is by now means complete. We simply do i l 3 not understand well enough the phenomena of melt progression to l ( 4 complete it, and we may never. I 5 And at some point, we will probably come to a halt in ; l i 6 the development of Melt-Core. Right now I can't forecast it l 7 for you right here today. 8 DR. LEVY: I just want to be sure that I understand i 9 your philosophy with regards to looking at five years. I am 10 not pushing for one way or the other. I am just trying to I I 11 understand where you are going. From what I hear you say, your 12 attitude towards mechanistic codes for severe accidents is now I i 13 not as strong as it might have been a year ago. I f 14 In other words, that was the wave of the future, and 15 it was going to tell us everything. q 16 DR. HOUSTON: The problem as I perceive it is the l 17 real problem of money.. It is good to project if you had all 18 the money that you needed to do all of the things that you felt 19 were necessary and desireable to do. We could spend a great 20 deal of money to further develop, further improve, codes like 21 Melt-PROG. 22 DR. LEVY: You also need a series of 23 experiments -- 24 DR. HOUSTON: And you need the experiments to go 25 along with it, that's right. So we are now in a situation ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
s 63 (- I where.we are looking more seriously at what we call' closure of g 2- a severe accident issues, recognizing realistically that we are 3 not going to be studying severe accidents forever in precent-4 plans. ] 5 We have to come to grips with it from a regulatory 6 point-of view, recognizing that there will continue.to be a lot 7 of uncertainties. But it's still c eesidual risk question. 8 DR. TODREAS: That's an issue that I guess I want to 9 make a comment on. I think this is again something that we 10 have to get into. I think it is really dangerous and it's 11 going to be a real issue of concern if you don't have an 12 underlying philosophy that defines when there is regulatory l 13 closure and when there isn't, first, independent of the 14 dollars. , 15 If your program goes out and says that you're going 16 to close this in five years, or whatever, you have to have i 17 criteria that you really believe in intellectually that say, l 18 "Okay, this is it." It's a kind of advertisement. It_ pushes 19 the whole agency into a position. If you don't really mean i 20 that, and it's going to drag on beyond it, it is very damaging 21 to start off that way. 22 As I go into the documents subsequent'to this 23 meeting, that's when I'm going to be looking for the 24 intellectual statemer.t that defines " closure. " Then I will go 25 back and look at the money and look at all the constraints on Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
3 . .; _ .- > 1 l 64 1 m 1 you. .But if you define " closure" by money and say, " Gee, it
.l 2 has to be five years without this thoughtful background behind-3 it," you can get into all kinds of trouble.
y i 4 DR. HOUSTON: Because of the discussion yesterday, ' 5 the last viewgraph I have here is'on the safety-goal questions. i 6 I will come back to your comments when I discuss that. ! 7 DR. MORRISON: Before we leave this issue, tell me, 8 is there a succinct summary somewhere of what the scope and 9 application of the individual codes are as well a their status 10 and acceptability? 11 DR. HOUSTON: It's a little out of date at the 12 moment. NUREG 0956 does have a fairly complete discussion of ) i 13 the codes -- ( 14 DR. MORRISON: What is it again? 15 DR. HOUSTON: NUREG 0956. I have forgotten the exact ; 16 title. It has source terms in the itle. And it gives a very 17 nice thumb-nail description of mechanistic codes and brief ; 18 descriptions of what they are and what purposes'they serve, and i 19 so forth. 20 DR. MORRISON: NRC, of course, is one of the ones 21 that pushes on QA of everything, to a major degroe. QA in the 22 code is one of the -- well, I wouldn't say it was impossible, 23 but when you get up to a few hundred thousand lines, it gets a 24 bit difficult. What do you people do? 25 The reason I am thinking of thinking of this is that ! ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 __m__ _ . , _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
l 1 65 this is one of.the areas where you can be attacked. legally at ! 1 1 2 some time. 3 DR. HOUSTON: Yes. .There has been, in connection i with NUREG 1150, for example, a specific quality-control l 4 l It cost several hundred thousand dollars to do. They
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5 effort. 6 have uncovered problems. We're in the process of solving those. J 7 problems. But there is a very explicit QC effort in' connection. ) l 8 with -- 9 DR. MORRISON: Okay. j l 10 DR. HOUSTON: It's a distinct problem, because.every l 4 11 person that works on a code has a better way of doing it. And 12 so although codes all have one name, there may be really 100 l 13 different versions of it, and it is very difficult to control. 14 It can be done, but it takes almost a monumental effort to fix-15 a code which has been fully verified,'QA-validated, and so l 16 forth, and ruled as standing as is. l 17 Charlie? 18 MR. KELBER: This question has of course arisen in 19 the context of the SDI effort. To put it in that context, 20 Melt-PROG is approximately 200,000 lines of Fortran. The SEI 21 master codes, if there is such a thing, would probably be 22 several million lines. As 1^r as strict verification and 23 validation in the typical sense, you have more than about 24 somewhere between twenty and 100 lines of Fortran. You can't 25 do it. ( Corporati~on
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< 1 DR. HOUSTON: I agree.
2 MR. KELBER: As a person who has used large codes 3 almost all of his professional life, I can tell you that the 4 real validation is a deep physical understanding of the 5 underlying processes and an ability to say when the code has 6 gone wrong without necessarily knowing the reason. i J 7 DR. WILSON: When we were doing the APS study, we 8 were told that the codes were working. It took.us six i 9 approximations -- six successive attempts -- to get input data ! 10 of one of the codes to that, so we can do a hand-calculation to 11 check some of it. The people that had those codes -- to be 12 nameless for the moment, because it's probably happening 13 everywhere -- just had forgotten what input data had gone into 14 them and other small things. j 15 When it even came to that report, the first picture 16 on the report wasn't the reactor they said they were 17 calculating. It's quite an effort. I'm just wondering if it's 18 improved very much. 19 MR. SHEPARD: Was that the fault of the code, or was 20 that the fact that the people didn't document very well? 21 DR. WILSON: It was the fault of the excessive 22 reliance on codes. 23 DR. LEVY: I think it you have a different problem. 24 I think you have code developers, and you have what you call 25 production codes. I thi'nk that the problem that you have is ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l l
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'67 l t 1 that you primarily have code developers. There comes a time l 2 when they have to return to production, full.QE, full 3 validation. 4
( 4 That step, really, I think is an important one for l 5 practically all the codes that the NRC uses. d 6 DR. WILSON: It.has to be done, though, by someone 7 who understands the -- 8 DR. LEVY: The industry is forced to do it, and.I-i 9 think -- d 10 'DR. HOUSTON: I cert /ainly agree with that. The one 11 added comment is that one should have -- and I think this gets-12 to Neil'.s comment a moment ago -- in this process you should 13 have a fairly clear idea of why you're doing this, and what r 14 your goals and objectives are -- how it might be used -- from a 15 our point of view and the regulatory process. 16 That's a very key consideration. 17 DR. SHOAF: Is there, in the NRC bank of documents, i l 18 some kind of report which gives each year a status of a l 1 19 particular code, its boundary conditions, where it is ). 20 appropriately used, and the caveats that are essential? We, as 21 Dick said, found people absolutely enchanted and enamcred of ; 22 their codes, and as long as they were internally consistent, ! 23 they were just so pleased, and they could go on and on and on 24 for hours and hours and hours. l 25 But -- ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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.x, 1 MR. KELBER: Internal consistency is not necessarily 2 considered necessary for being --
3 DR. SHOAF: But then when we got down to how these. 4 codes were to be properly used, how much confidence was to be 5 place in any of their results, what kind of phenomena were 6 truly-part of those codes, or any particular code -- that 7 seemed to us to be the most important part of it all. We seem 8 to have an extraordinarily difficult time getting coherent 9 information. 10 DR. HOUSTON: The answer to your initial question-is 11 "No." 12 (Laughter) 13 DR. TODREAS: Let me do this: We can have a flood of 14 subsequent comments on codes. I think you summarized it 15 perfectly. I think that will be on o6r agenda as we go 16 through. I guess I go a little further -- in the LOCA arec, 17 there is an example and a stat made which I think is positivt, 18 to try to fix this. We can make that data available; we can 19 review that. 3 20 Then the question will be the propagation of that, 21 and the test case of the propagation can be in this area. I 22 think as a committee we can keep this alive as a general issue i 23 by the specific questioning in this area and this suite of 24 codes. 25 DR. HO STON: I do believe, though, that the I ' Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 I i
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, 1 . complexity and the lack of understanding of the status of-codes q 2 really is a very inherent character of the issues we're dealing-3 with -- severe-accidents. And it is not like the LOCA situation where at least you are dealing with fixed geometry 1 4
5 situations. 6 In this case, as soon as you start to -- the outcome 7 of any accident is a broad spectrum of possibilities. We'will. , 8 never analyze all of them, because they are. infinite in i 9 character. But it would make a good point. It would be nice-
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10 to have that kind of thing. But I don't believe that it exists !
'l 11 today. It's something that should be better controlled. j 12 DR. TODREAS: I agree with you about the phenomena 13 and all, but the discipline, in terms of maintaining control of 14 the whole process, that can be systematized. 1 15 DR. WILSON: That's what we~need.
16 DR. BUSH: That's hard, though. At least one code l 17 will deliver more. It had 200 people working on it, and it's 18 up to 3 to 4 million lines at this stage. How you do a QA on a 19 thing like that is beyond me. 20 DR. TODREAS: Let me belabor that. That will be on 21 the agenda. Be sure to make a note in your own notes when you ; 22 write me this letter subsequent to the meeting. We want your 23 thoughts from this meeting written down. 24 DR. HOUSTON: We are up to.10:15, which is a little 25 longer than the hour. , ( i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 E-- -- --_- - -_-- - _ - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - -- --
70 < 1 Let me just highlight;some of the things that we do 2- -have: cooperative programs in, place, specially-funded' 3 research, this year about 200,000 educational. institutions. 4 .Last year, with the grants to non-profit, the buy and share of 5 that,.I think, was to the National Academy of Sciences. 6 We have been engaged with the cooperation'of 7 industry, ha' ring significant effects and impacts on our program 8 in understanding programs from the IDCOR, which no longer-9 officially exists because it was turned into NUMARC. The basic 10 research arm of NUMARC is EPRI, and we are engaged, as I' 11 indicated earlier, in cooperative programs focusing at least on 12 core-concrete interaction and natural circulation, and perhaps 13 some other items. 14 (Continued on next page) , 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ( Heritage Reporting ~ Corporation ------ - - - - (202) 628-4888
71 - 1 We are engaged in 4 lot of international cooperative 2 efforts on research and have something which wa call research 3 partners. It started out beir.g called Severe Field - Damage 4 Partners and that terminology is still existent. There are 12 5 countries listed there that are partners in this process and 6 Finland is about to join, we think. So, it should number about. 7 13. 8 It amounts to actually an augmentation from a budget 9 point of view. For example, in fiscal 1988, of the order of 10 three to three and a half million dollars of foreign funds that i 11 have come into the program. And, of course, they have -- some 12 may participate in the process of what is important to them and 13 what is important to us to work out details in a particular
, 1 14 portion of the program. l N \
15 We also cooperate with the 6DC NEA CSKI activity and i i 16 make available some of the results of our research directly to 17 the OECD member countries and participate in International 18 Atomic Energy Agency activities. 19 DR. WILSON: There is one country missing there which 20 has more fuel damage than all the rest put together. Is there 21 any chance of getting confirmation with the USSR 7 MR. BECKJORD:
- e. That is being negotiated right now.
23 There is supposed to be a protocol of understanding on research 24 cooperation on reactor safety. We worked on that right after 25 the Soviets were here in the fall. It is not a matter which is (
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72 s 1 unilaterally up to NRC. It is being negotiated as a ) l 2 government-wlde matter. And I think by March, that there will J 3 be an agreement. But I haven't-seen the latest draft. I 4 ' haven't seen a draft now since the end of the year. 5 DR. HOUSTON: We do expect to have a meeting in i
, Moscow in the latter part of June to -- on containment. It is 7 primarily on containment.
8 DR. BUSH: Your last slide. I think we have now'gone 9 through at least 100. acronyms there. I think I know 75 percent-10 of them. It would be nice to have a listing because it gets a 11 little bit complicated after a while. You know, they get 12 thrown around pretty thoroughly. , 13 DR. TODREAS: If you're asking for the list, we are
, i 14 in trouble. J
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15 DR. BUSH: I can appreciate other people because when 16 you look at those things, you thinks Who is it? What is it? 17 And so forth. 18 DR. TODREAS: That is a good comment. And you lapse 19 into the habit of referring to things by acronyms. That 1 l 20 impedes communications, quite often. Let's proceed. 21 DR. HOUSTON: Briefly, on safety goal policy and l 22 development of safety goal policy implementation. I just want 23 to make a few points related to the discussion yesterday on the 24 subject. Basically, we view our developments in this area as a 25 primary means of giving some definition to the use of Heritage Reporting Corporation 1 (202) 628-4888 1
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, _ 1 probabilistic risk analysis in the regulatory process. l 2 We should be aware that the safety goal policy ]
l 3 statement' issued by the Commission contained some qualitative 4 statements of goals and then a pair of quantitative health ) l 5 objectives. And, in addition, as was indicated yesterday, 6 something often. referred to as a large release guideline, which s 7 was published as part of the safety goal policy statement for 8 Staff consideration. ] 9 This large release guideline is also some might refer l 10 to as a general _ plant performance objective, but a quantitative 11 objective. This is the 10 to the minus 6 per reactor year of 12 frequency of a large release. And we are trying to come to 13 grips with what do we mean by a large release, in spite of the 1 14 fact that most everybody would agree: "I will know one when I 1
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15 see one." l 16 Plant performance objectives refers also to some. 17 potential quantitative objectives that would deal with 18 something like a mean core damage frequency number, 10 minus 2, 19 10 minus 4, what have you, as a target. It may. incorporate i 1 d 20 something like a containment performance objective or design 21 objective. 22 We have been' working with the ACRS since they had 3 23 produced a letter to the Commission last May which provided I l 24 their recommendation of a structure or skeletal framework on 25 which one could build an implementation scheme, i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l l __-___mA.__._m.m_ -.__- ___ . _ . _ _ . _ .-_______m_______
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, 1 One of~the main things I wanted to say, though, about 2 it of our present plans: The objectives are'not to be confused 3 -- I think this would be one of the most undesirable things-4 that we can do if we made, say, a core melt frequency of 10 to 5 the minus 6 per reactor year as-one of the requirements, and we 6 must do that. And ACRS makes it very clear that we should not 7' do that. There are too many uncertainties in the' calculations.
8 Let me depart -- no, let's go on. The intent here-is 9 to provide a complementary perspective, if you will, as an 10 input to potential modification of generic regulatory 11 requirements. There are several things I mean in that. 12 Normally, in the past, the Staf f has developed requirements cn1 13 an intuitive and engineering judgment basis, deterministic 14 analysis, et cetera. And that is the way that we have done 15 business. A very structured, very analytical schemes for doing 16 something like evaluating containment loads from design basis 17 modems, for instance. 18 PRA brings a little different perspective by cutting 19 across a plant horizontally, if you will, through all the 20 systems, looking at the interconnections between operating.and 21 support systems, safety systems, et cetera. And not a 22 replacement for that, but simply a different way of looking at 23 the safety or the risk associated with the plant. l l 24 The point here is that we should not be in the 25 process of making these quantitative probabilistic statements ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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~ 1 of objectives. We should not be making, turning those 2 immediately into requirements: that you must meeting a core 3 melt-frequency of "X" whatever "X" is. Or'a large release 4 guideline of "Y" whatever "Y" is.
5 What we should be-learning from PRAs and by using 6 ' bottom line numbers for simply comparative purposes, asking the 7 question of why does this plant seem to meet the objective, but j 8 another similar plant does not? What are the differences 9 between the plants and what might this mean with respect'to 10 potential modification of generic regulatory requirements which-11 can be rules. It can be regulatory guide positions. It can be- ! 12 standard review plan criteria. And it can go either way. 13 DR. WILSON: And you safety goals should not be i 14 requirements. 15 DR. HOUSTON: That's correct. 16 DR. WILSON: But if you think you have met the safety 17 goal, as we were talking about the 1150 things, yesterday: 18 most of them met them. Does that mean you don't have to worry 19 about the reactor any longer or does it have any use at all? 20 DR. HOUSTON: Well, the temptation is very strong to 21 deal in the question of: Does a particular plant meet a 22 particular safety goal or the whole set of safety goal 23 objectives, whatever. And something, which in principle, can i 24 be given a simply yes or no answer. And you are referring to a j 25 situation which -- the Draft 1150 shows that the so-called I i Heritage Reporting Corporation l (202) 628-4888 , l l 1
i 76 1 quantitative health objectives. 2 DR. WILSON: Right. 3 DR. HOUSTON: Which is the top part of what we are 4 talking about here appear to be. met by all five of those 5 plants. 6 DR. WILSON: Right. 7 DR. HOUSTON: Those plants -- and my answer to you 8 is: It depends not on that comparison but on whether or not 9 any future regulatory requirements will be backfit to.those 10 plans. And I don't know whether that will happen or not. My 11 point is that we regulate through a process. And that process 12 is in place. Our rules and regulations is a starting point. If 13 we change rules and regulations, go through the hoops of ( 14 justifying a change, it may effect some of those plants and it 15 may not. But the direct comparison of the safety goals is not 16 intended to be a basis for taking action on a particular plant. 17 Either way -- either imposing a requirement or asserting that 18 it is safe enough. 19 DR. WILSON: Well, what is it'used for?- I'm not 20 clear.
- 21 DR. HOUSTON: I'm not surpriped that it is not clear.
22 The objective is to use the safety goals as comparative targets ; 23 that you take from -- take one of the 1150 plants. Let's take 24 Peach Bottom, since it is not one of Cordell's. And you see, 25 for example, at the bottom line, it is a core melt frequency. ( , Heritage Rcporting -- Corporation -~~---- q l (202) 628-4888 ,
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. ,, 1- And maybe it is a fairly low number.
2 Now, you ask the question: .W hy 19..that such a low 3 number? We have done some PRAs and some other BWR 4 Mark 1 4 plants. They don't have the same. low numbers. Why the 5 difference? ; 6 And it is going back into the PRA and trying to 7 understand why Peach Bottom appears to be different from some l 8 other plant. 1 9 DR. WILSON: That's all good. But what does the 10 safety goal got to do with it. 11 DR. HOUSTON: I though I just answered that question. 12 DR. WILSON: You have told me that when I have done d I 13 -- I've compared the PRA between two plants. And I understand )
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14 why this one seems to be safer than that one and the one which ~1 15 seems to be less safe, then maybe I change a little. You I 16 haven't said where the goal'comes in. 17 DR. HOUSTON: Well, the goal comes in in the case 18 that with Peach Bottom, it appears to meet the goal. ! 1 19 DR. WILSON: That's right. l l 20 DR. HOUSTON: Okay. Now, you have another on which 21 appears not to meet the goal. 22 DR. WILSON: Okay. 23 DR. HOUSTON: That's one place where they come in. . 1 24 That starts you on a search for the question of: Why is that? 25 And there may be other plents that you can bring in and ask the ( Heritage- Report 1TIg Corporation' _. ~ . . . .._.- (202) 628-4888 : i i
78 1 same question. And, now, the problen. is : 'Does this mean that 2 we should change some of our regulatory requirements? -And this 3- is something we can deal with. If we change the' regulatory
- 4. requirements, let me hypothesize something. For example, Sna 5 deal with' station blackout.
l 6 GDC 17, our' general design criterion 17, generally 7 deals with the subject of off-site.and on-site DC power. Now, 8 when we deal with ,ation blac).out, you are postulating in 9 effect it goes beyond.what'our general design criteria deal
% 10 with; namely, the Icss of both on-site and off-site power.
11 So, the question is, the issue is: If the loss of 12 both off-site and on-site power -- the likelihood of that 13 occurrence is a significant finding by comparing PRA results. 14 It suggests that maybe we should look at GDC 17 and consider
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15 modifying it. That is one way we can do business. 16 It is the comparative thing that started the process. l l 17 At the end, then what the objective -- and here again is where l l 18 the safety goal objectives, one'should consider how can we l l 19 modify our rules, such as GDC 17 to give reasonable assurance 1 20 that the safety goal targets would be met? It is an easy 21 question with a tough answer. But that is the process, 22 DR. WILSON: You didn't quite say it,-but the way I 23 would have thought about it is that you. start thinking: If-it 24 is a plant which doesn't seem to meet the safety goal and you 25 start thinking you are going on to something more fruitful when ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
79 s 1 you have made enough changes to make the plant meet the safety 2 goal. But you have never actually said that. And I don't 3 understand where the actual number of the safety goal comes 4 into the process. You keep saying " comparison." The safety , 5 goal isn't a comparison. It is a goal. Period. l 6 DR. HOUSTON: But it should be viewed as a goal for 7 the regulatory requirements. 8 DR. WILSON: Okay. 9 DR. HOUSTON: Generic regulatory requirements. Not 10 as a goal for each individual plant. 11 DR. WILSON: Okay. 12 DR. HOUSTON: Does that help? 13 DR. WILSON: Okay. That helps. 14 DR. HOUSTON: Lt me talk a moment, if you wish to 15 take a little bit of time about relation to cost benefit and 16 safety enhancements, also an issue that came up yesterday. And 17 see if I can cast a little light on the question. 18 Some reference was made to a court decisicn not long 19 ago having to deal with some of the words in the Commission's 20 backfit rule, as a result of which, some revisions, editorial 21 revisions were made and it is out on the street, again, as a 22 proposad rule. 23 The distinction that one wants to calls attention to 24 is the difference between adequacy and enhancement. Adequacy 25 for safety and enhancement of safety. I have heard our ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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, 1 attorneys from the Office of General Counsel explain the 2 situation in the following way:
3- Each time that the Commission has issued a license to 4 operate a plant, going clear back to the beginning, a 5 determination was made by the Comnission and the Staff, in each 6 case, it met the rules and regulations and what was required of 7 that plant at that point in time was adequate for safety. It 8 produced a finding of no undue risk for the public health and 9 safety. And that has occorred. And each time a licensing 10 decision has been made, I am told by legal counsel that, at 11 least at the present time, until the Commission speaks l 12 otherwise, that is a legitimate legal interpretation of the 13 court decision. So that what is adequate for sarety is a plant 14 specific, site-specific thing and is not necessarily a generic 15 thing. 16 Now, the safety goal objectives that we are talking l 17 about here then are in my view more constructively applied not 18 to the question of what is adequate for safety, but what can be 19 justifiably done toward safety enhancements. And here is where 20 cost benefit comes back into the picture. And there should be 21 some consistency between the objectives that one sets and the 22 justification process going through cost benefit space. 23 To look at it in another way, one asks the question: 24 How safe is safe enough? 25 The answer is the sum of two parts. One is what is ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i 81 m 1 adequate or, just to emphasize, what is minimally active for ) l 2 safety, plus what can be justifiably done to enhance safety and 1 i 3 reduce risks. 4 And what we are dealing with in safety goal space 5 would be the latter rather than a definition of the former. j i 6 That may have to take some time to sink in. l
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7 DR. GLOYNA: Yes, it certainly does because the word I 8 is " justifiable," is rather -- f J 9 DR. HOUSTON: Well, the justifiable part of it, 10 because we have a process in place within the agency, cost q 11 benefit to justify safety enhancements. Now, maybe it is good, 12 bad or indifferent, but it is there. And that is what I mean
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I 13 justifiable by cost berefit considerations. And, of course, ! I 14 the question is then. Is our methodology for cost benefit { considerations appropriate, adequate,' sufficient, whatever. 1 l 15 i 1 16 DR. BUSH: So, that would be solely a basic link, 17 then, with CRGR with regard to it. That's the problem I had 18 yesterday. l l 19 Maybe for the review of generic requirements. They ) i 20 are the ones that says, this on a cost-benefit basis, the 1 21 following safety enhancement is not necessary or is necessary. 22 They don't initiate them. They either stamp it yes 23 or no. A rather powerful committee. 24 DR. HOUSTON: It is a management effort to control 25 ratcheting. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
82 ; [ 1 DR. TODREAS: Can we take what you have just said in l 2 terms of the philosophy and logic and assume that is the j 3 position of the Office? 4 DR. HOUSTON: What I have been saying now is not yet 1 5 the position of the Office or NRR or the Staff or the.whole ] 6 Staff or the Agency. What I am telling you is the' direction we 7 are now moving in. I think it probably will come out this way. 8 But it is not crystallized, yet. 9 DR. TODREAS: You are talking about the safety goal 10 and this is basically the presentation that you made and we I 11 discussed last week. 12 DR. HOUSTON: Similar, yes. 13 DR. TODREAS: But it is broader than.that. It is the 14 whole breakdown between adequacy enhancement and then it gets 15 into the cost benefit and the safety goal is kind of an example 16 that he pushed through. 17 MR. BECKJORD: To answer your question, assuming that 18 it was substantially as we have discussed with Vic Stello and 19 others and really over the past -- well, the discussions go 20 back some months. But I think that the outline which he has 21 given is close to being as accepted as the direction that we 22 are going to proceed in. f 23 DR. TODREAS: Let me just leave it this way. .I think 24 it is important because it goes through the whole philosophy of 1 25 the Office. And it is important that we have an understanding ( Heritage RepbYting ~ ~ Corporation ~-~ ~~
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- s. 1 of how you view this. And what I would suggest is if you would 2 just go back through the transcript very closely and construct 3 that logical argument, then we will pick that up. through the j I
4 spring and we'll know where you stand. I don't think we have { 5 to go back and debate it all based on what'you have said. But i i 6 I think it is important that we -- 7 DR. LEVY: There are some areas, though, that need ; 8 debate. 9 DR. TODREAS: That what? 10 DR. LEVY: That need to be debated. The idea that 11 safety goals apply to generic requirements rather than to 12 specific plants, somehow I think that needs to be debated. , 13 That is a key issue. And let me deal with a specific case, you I i 14 know, just to really drill the point home.- j
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15 You got Peach Bottom, which according to NUREG 1150 16 meets all the goals. Now, you may not like the numbers in the 17 REG 1150, but that's fine. You could go look at it. It meets , l 18 all the goals. The question that will come up is why should l 19 you mess around with its Mark 1 containment? Why are you j 20 studying it? It meets all the goals. 21 DR. HOUSTON: Is that a rhetorical question or do you 22 want me to answer it? 23 DR. LEVY: Let me raise a loaded question. 24 DR. HOUSTON: I will give you a tentative answer. 25 What assurance do we have that all BWR 4 Mark 1 look like Peach ( _ - _. ~. _ _ . - - - - ae e-- Reportius cm gvioison ;- (202) 628-4888
i 84 1 Bottom. i 2 DR. LEVY: That's not what I said. I said, 3 specifically: Peach Bottom. Why should you mess with the 4 Peach Bottom Mark 1 containment? I did say-all the -- I just. 5 raised the question. : 6 DR. HOUSTON: Are we? Are we? I don't think we are. 7 DR. LEVY: I don't know. 8 DR. HOUSTON: I'm not aware that we are. 9 DR. LEVY: I don't know. You may' impose a - 10 requirement on a Mark 1 containment. Does that mean it has got 'l 11 to be applicable to Peach Bottom? 1 12 DR. HOUSTON: They will either meet it already or 1 13 they don't. It depends on how the requirement'is structured I 14 and articulated. 1 15 DR. WILSON: Well, Iwouldkiketosayherealsothat 16 there is another aspect of it which even goes beyond this 17 office. Both safety goals are out in the Federal Register 18 somewhere. Aren't they? 19 DR. HOUSTON: That's part of what I am talking about. 20 The thing that I referred to as the plant performance I 21 objectives. 22 DR. WILSON: The safety goals, themselves, is in the 23 Federal Register. 24 DR. HOUSTON: It is more than that. It is an approved 25 Commission statement. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
85 1 MR. BECKJORD: What do you mean by the safety goal, I 2 itself? The qualitative statement? 3 DR.-WILSON: A statement'of what the safety goal is. 4 DR. HOUSTON: Well, there are two qualitative 5 statements and then they are supported by two quantitative 6 statements. 7 DR. WILSON: Correct. They are both in the Federal 8 Register. 9 DR. HOUSTON: They are in the Federal Register, 10 correct. 11 DR. WILSON: And they are out in the general public. ! 12 Now, let me go to the public hearing tonight in Massachusetts 13 about a certain particular Mark 1 BWR. Now, there are people 14 out there who will have read the Federal Register and they are 15 extraordinarily persistent in doing those things. And they 16 will quote from that and say, "What about -- does that mean 17 that one could get out there -- this plant meets the safety 18 goal. What are you worrying about?" 19 Sooner or latter that is the bottom line, i 20 DR. LEVY: I am just questioning. I am just trying 21 to highlight that it is not clear to me that as stated, there 22 are not areas of debate. I was a little worried all of a 23 sudden when the safety goals could not be used to clear 24 specific plants, which is the point he was raising earlier. l i 25 And I actually give you the specific example. And I don't know
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~. I what you are going to do with the Mark 1 containment, but I
~2 just try to drill the point home with an outstanding example.
3 DR. TODREAS: I think we ought to continue to discuss 4 this. By saying we didn't have.to discuss it, I didn't want to 5 . rehash what he said forever. 6 But once it's on the table -- I think there is a 7 logical inconsistency. Or not an inconsistency, necessarily, 8 but you're in a logical box if you take his question. 9 DR. HOUSTON: The answer is very simple. The way we 10 are proceeding now is that if an action were to.be taken with 11 respect to Peach Bottom, as a result of the Mark l's,-it should-12 be in the form.of some proposed new requirement, for instance, 13 not a require to do, you know, to meet.a particular i 14 quantitative safety goal objective if they already meet it. 15 That doesn't make any sense. 16 They will either meet that requirement already by 17 what they have in place or not. And it would be up to them to 18 determine. And maybe they can show very simply that they 19 already meet the requirement. My point is that the objective 1 20 of such a requirement would be to bring all of the Mark 1 l 21 plants up to some target level. But it all. hinges on what a l 22 requirement might be, if any. You don't follow that? 23 DR. LEVY: No, I don't buy that. 24 MR. BECKJORD: Let me give you an illustration of 25 what Wayne was talking about when he said, "Well, the problem ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
87 I with-using a bottom line number is there.is a lot of 2 uncertainty." 3 There are some cases at hand that different utilities. l l 4 use somewhat different approaches with calculated PRAs. And in 5 the course of the peer review that we had on the 1150 document, 6 -which was discussed yesterday, one of the people who was i 7 contributing to this review said, "Well, this is the way I do 8 PRAs, and I get numbers that are typically a factor of 10 9 higher than the way everybody else does it. And I-feel, you i 10 know, I'm satisfied with what my method tells me. I know it. ] 11 I understand it. I know how to apply it. 12 That makes the point that if, for example, you had 13 two different PRAs coming in -- let's assume that the plants ( 14 have an equivalent level of safety and one PRA has a level of a 15 factor of 10 higher than the other, how can you consistently 16 apply that to the safety goal? There has to be some l l 17 understanding of what the thrust of it is. I hope that 18 clarifies -- 19 DR. LEVY: Except that let me caution you. Peach 20 Bottom meets the safety goals with all your uncertainties 21 included. With all your uncertainties included. It comes 22 right under the line with all the uncertainties.. That.is the 23 point I am making. 24 DR. BUSH: I don't agree. 25 DR. LEVY: You may not agree to the uncertainties, (' Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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- m. 1 but those are NRC calculated uncertainties.
2 DR. BUSH:~ I don't' agree with the uncertainties, 3 then. 4 DR. TODREAS: Well, even if you do or you don't let's ~ q 5 assume that it meets it. 6 DR. HOUSTON: The question that it is interesting.but 7 not definitive as to whether a particular plant meets or does 8 not meet a safety goal. 9 By the same token that we should not take action 10 against a plant, if you vill, to meet a particular safety goal. 11 The other side of the coin, es I see it is that, "Yes, the PRA 12 appears to show that it meets the safety _ goal." Fine. I 13 But that doesn't necessarily -- that is not ( 14 necessarily the end of anything because the' process that this
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15 agency is involved in.is a regulatory process. And the safety i' 16 goal is an adjunct to the process and not the process. 17 DR. BUSH: One of the problems and I didn't like it 18 in the AEC days and I don't like it now is you begin -- you 19 look at little parts. Now, PRA at-least was a step forward in 20 the sense that now you begin to look at it. The trouble with 21 the PRA is that there.are some very critical aspects that i 22 aren't addressed. The human element is a critical one that may 23 overwhelm the whole stupid PRA. I can take two plants that 24 will both meet the records. And I wouldn't trust one iota 25 compared to the other one as a "for instance." So, there is an- ~~ ( '
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, 1 inherent limitation.
2 I think you have to look at a plant as'an entity. 3 You can't look at it as little bits of hardware. That is what 4 worries me. 5 DR. HOUSTON: There again, it depends on the 6 objective. It is nice to put in what you think you.know about. 7 human factors in terms of operating response for example.- But, 8 also, by and large for the very reasons you indicate, I think a 9 PRA is telling you more about design of the plant than it is 10 the operation of the plant. 11 DR. BUSH: But that is only one part of the story. 12 DR. HOUSTON: And it could be made purer in that I 13 respect if it never took any of the human factors in the 14 operation. i 15 DR. TODREAS: I think the question is on the table. 16 You have given an answer. I am not sure about carrying it 17 further. 18 MR. REED: I've been restraining myself thinking that 19 this is a -- I have four of those Mark l's and I have a keen 20 interest. But I thought this was an orientation session. i 21 DR. TODREAS: I don't want to suppress key issues. I l 22 would be willing to take another five minutes.on this. If both 23 you, Eric and Ernest have points to make, why don't we 24 recognize you in that order, make those points and let me see 25 after five minutes if I can cut it off. I'd like to, but I ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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i l 90 l - 1 want to go ahead a little bit longer. 2 MR. REED: My_ point. I think you-are on the right i 3 track. We can argue about Mark l's. The Mark i fixes were { 1 4 never brought to us on the bases that we didn't meet safety 5 goals, not even on the basis that they were cost beneficial. q 6 It was just that, gee, these are some things that you could 7 probably do that won't cost very much, why'not do them. They 8 may enhance safety. 9 But I think it is important to get the philosophy of
.i 10 safety goal, how it's applied and then we can understand why i 11 these things are being proposed.
12 DR. TODREAS: Let me say the reason I've.got it on 13 the agenda and want'to keep it there because'I think we've got 14 to understand that because then, that's the basis to review the 15 research plan and the activities. 16 MR. REED: I agree. 17 DR. TODREAS: So, we won't make it parochial to I i 18 specific plants or issues. They will be as examples. But we 19 have got to understand the philosophy. 20 MR. BECKJORD: We had a discussion or a presentation 21 yesterday, Cordeli, on the Mark 1 containment effort. And we 22 can bring you up to date on that separately. I don't think -- 23 there is probably nothing that was discussed there you're not 24 aware of. 25 With respect to Sol's point, what I would like to say ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 .~ _ _ . .
91 i .is that I understand exactly what he's saying. .You go back to 2 the Wash 1400 study. That. identified vulnerability of Mark'l' 3 containments to certain sequences and severe accident. 4 1150, which is not complete, but in its current state 5 is essentially going to. confirm the same general conclusion. 6 The Commission has asked about.this and has explicitly. 7 instructed the Staff to look into this question-and.to come. ] 8 back with a recommendation. And, so, that's what we are 9 working on now and we are going, in working out that f 10 recommendation, we are going to try and reconcile the various 11 requirements which have been articulated by the Commission. ; 1 12 And that is what is forthcoming. I think there will be a l l 13 pretty good outline of it in this April presentation. ] i 14 DR. TODREAS: Ernest? 15 DR. GLOYNA: Yes. This is a peripheral question 16 here, but your comments about the _.steracting procedures here i 17 and your special committees to deal with this problem is of 18 interest to me because as the Commission here begins to develop 19 the performance standards for radioactive waste, high level _ 20 waste disposal and performance standards as we have to -- ; 21 performance standards that are going to be developed for 22 compliance with the EPA guidelines. Will we be using these. ; 23 same procedures here? The same interacting procedures'and 1 l' 24 evaluation of these in dealing with radioactive waste that you 25 are with the safety goals? ( Heritage Reporting Corporation ; (202) 628-4888 l
z...-. 92 4 . 1 DR. HOUSTON: Right now, I don't -- as far as I am 2 aware, the safety goals are'really limited to nuclear power 3 plants. I don't know whether that is true or not, but I think 4 that is -- 5 DR. GLOYNA: Why wouldn't the same thing apply 6 because we are all talking about the same procedures and 7 concepts. 8 DR. HOUSTON: 'I think because they have been 9 articulated in a way to be specific.. For example,'they refer 10 specifically to other methods of energy generation, electricity 11 generation and the qualitative goals are there. 12 Now, you could bring waste disposal in as part of the 13 whole fuel cycle picture. But I think-in the safety goal i 14 policy statement, itself, I think the, Commission has explicitly 15 said, "This does not cover the whole fuel cycle." 16 So, I think you have a separate set of standards 17 which should not be incompatible or inconsistent, but because 18 of the unique characteristics of waste handling facilities, I 19 don't think you can profitably approach it from quite the same 20 direction. 21 DR. GLOYNA: I think it deserves a great deal of 22 attention. 23 DR. HOUSTON: As far as CRGR is concerned, I'm not 24 clear. Do you know, Bill? I think any of the standards or 25 criteria that are set up in that program also go through the ( l I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
93 cfG4 1 ERTRs. It is management effort to justify new requirements. 2 To be sure that the process has been followed. 3 DR. BUSH: With the precedent.of ACRS essentially 4 spinning off a high-level waste committee, it wouldn't' surprise 5 me, you know, because after all-CRGR is one of those things 6 that I think was developed as a control mechanism. And it is 7 quite possible that there could-be another one with maybe a 8 different name'that'would provide that function. 9 DR. HOUSTON: That could happen. I just don't know. 10 1 don't know of any plans to. 11 DR. BUSH: No. The precedent. After all, you aren't 12 very far along in that type of waste removal. 13 (Continued on next page.) i 14 . 15 16 u 1 17 18 19 20 l 21 22 23 l l 24 25 1 . ( . . _ . . . _ - - . . _ . . . . . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ , . . _ . . . . , , , _ . _ . _ Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
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94 ] 1 DR. TODREAS: We will take a ten-minute break and 2' start at 11 o' clock with Bill Morris. j
'l 3 (Brief Recess)'
4 DR. TODREAS: Can.I ask us to convene again, please?. 5 Bill Morris, Director or Regulatory Applications.- We 6 will proceed now, Bill. Thank you, and welcome. 7 (Slide) 8 DR. MORRIS: In the first slide, on page two of your- l 9 hand-out, I have tried to -- ! 10 (Pause) ) 11 DR. TODREAS: No, no. Just' proceed. Could you keep 12 it down just a little bit in the'back so that we can proceed? 13 DR. MORRIS: Okay. On page two of.the hand-out,,I 14 have tried to describe some of the perspectives from the point 15 of view of radiation protection and health effects that will .j 16 guide us in planning our program. Some of these items are 17 somewhat obvious, but I did want to use them as a basis for 18 giving you an idea about our assumptions. 19 The first item I want to mention is the fact that the 20 NRC licensees are engaged in a wide variety of activities that i 21 involve potential exposures to ionizing radiation with can be 22 hazardous to health. If you look on the next page -- we'll 23 come back to this in just a minute -- I-will just give you some 24 idea 25 I don't attest to the accuracy of these numbers at Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 95 1 this point in time, because they were derived from a document 2 published this year, but based on an enumeration from several 3 years past of the kinds of activities that the NRC licensees 4 that might involve handling the radioactive materials. 5 I sort of intentionally put power reactors down here 6 at the bottom of the list, not because they're not important, 7 but just to g j ve you the idea that there are many activities, 8 such as the nuclear medicine, which involve a large number of
? licensees of various calibers of expertise and the sizes of 10 those licensees. They are all handling radioactive material. ,
l 11 All of those licensees are subject to the regulations that we 12 impose for radiation protection. 13 They are either through direct licensing by the NRC, 14 or they are under the Agreement States Program. So the purpose 15 of this was just to give you an idea of the differentiations of 16 what goes on. We counted 55 power-reactor licensees involved , 17 with 108 reactors. We have situations where there might be 18 females exposed to aerosols or dust particles, and might be 19 ingesting small amounts of radioactive dust from aerosols, so 20 we had to be concerned about those special circumstances 21 related to the exposure of females who may become pregnant 22 during the time they are working there. 23 That's an issue that I will come back to. 24 Another point to make is that our work is done in a 25 context that involves a lot of activity by other organizations. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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. 1 EPA -- I didn't mention DOE, but DOE has a.large program _in
-2 radiation protection'and a lot of. activities where their own q
3 facilities are inherent to requirements'much like our's. l 4 Although they are not-licensed by NRC, they do have the'same 5 concerns. 6 There is a committee for inter-agency radiation 7 research policy coordination that reports to;the scientific
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8 advisor to the President. This group plays a_ strong role in- ! 9 looking into the affairs related to radiation protection. The i 10 International Commission on Radiation Protection periodically l 11 provides guidance and positions that are taken very seriously
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12 by most countries. As I will explain in a minute, the revision. 13 that we are looking at is based on ICRP-recommendations. n 14 Our own National Council on, Radiation Protection:is a l 15 key factor in how we do business in the senseLthat we have a ] 16 grant program. We give grant money to that group. They make-17 assessments of data that are then turned-into positions that l 18 they might take -- advice to us, advice to the country, as a l 19 matter of fact. 20 We're not the only group that is funding the NCRP 21 work. DOE might be funding part of that work, and also NCRP 22 will give us recommendations as to where they think new data 23 might be needed in order to shore up their ability to take 24 positions on radiation protection. 25 I just mentioned IAEA, but the UN also has a group ( Heritage Reporting Corporation ! (202) 628-4888 i
97 1 doing work in radiation protection. There are other foreign 2 groups such as the counterparts to the NRC and the NCRP in 3 other countries such as Great Britain. We pay a great deal of 4 attention to what they do. So, a lot of our work is 5 coordinated with and directed to be consistent with what is 6 going on in these other organizations. 7 In particular, I wanted to point out some of the 8 elements of the agency activities that this research supports. 9 A major part of what we're doing in the next few years is going 10 to be dictated by our effort to implement radiation protection 11 requirements both in the current version of 10-CFR 20 and the 12 proposed version that we expect to issue. The ICRP, in 1977, 13 issued new guidance on how to evaluate doses and a new set of 14 dose limitations that are much more complicated than what is 15 currently on the books. 16 They also included a basis for the development of 17 federal guidance. That federal guidance was developed 18 primarily under the direction of EPA, but other agencies such 19 as the NRC and DOE participated. The federal guidance 20 essentially adopted, under the President's signature in 1987, 21 many of the ICRP recommendations. We have published a proposed 22 rule on this, and are now working to try to get the final rule 23 out later this year. 24 If the Commission approves the rule this year, then 25 we would anticipate that it might be effective sometime in the ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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. 1 future. The new rule would adopt this new' method of dose j i
2 limitation. Let me just mention what that involves. In the current rule, primarily what we have is a l 3 4 whole-body dose limit plus some limitations on what you can : 5 inhale. Those are just air limits. What the new guidance . J I 6 would do would be to require that there be a combination of the 7 whole-body dose and the dose from internal deposition combined 8 into an effective dose equivalent. There is a complex way to ) i 9 make that combination that the ICRP recommended. That's whats 10 being incorporated. i 11 If we adopt that into the regulations and give the 12 industry some period of time.to conform, there is a lot of 13 homework that has to be done between now and then. We have to 14 get regulatory guidance out on the street that will give 15 acceptable ways to meet these new requirements, and there has 16 to be training of both our inspectors and the industry health 17 physicists on how to use the new dose limitation system. 18 So this is going to take up a lot of our effort, and ; 19 I will explain some of the specific activities that we are 20 going to be engaged in that are going to be engaged in that 1 21 will be directed towards implementing Part 20. As Part 20 22 stands today, there are some other activities that we need to ,1 23 engage in ts try to do a better job of implementing the current 24 dose limitation systems. I will mention that also. 25 The Commission has become interested in and'has < ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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- 1 recently directed the staff to develop a proposed policy that 2 would establish levels of radiation dose or_ radioactivity which 3 would be below regulatory concern. We use the term "below 4 regulatory concern" to mean a level of activity such that the 5 agency no longer need take steps to regulate that activity.
6 Let me give you some examples of already-existing radiation 7 release conditions that are of this nature. 8 Consumer products. There are consumer products out i 9 in circulation such as smoke detectors and a number of other 10 things that have radioactive substances in them. We have made 11 a judgement, based on our analysis, of the potential doses from 12 those products, that they don't constitute an unacceptable 13 hazard. 14 In fact, the hazard is quite low. That's the reason i 15 that we have allowed them to be circulated pretty much freely. ' 16 You look at the design of the smoke detector, say, to see 17 whether it is capsuled properly, and you look at how it would ; 18 be configured in the home, And then you make a judgement that 19 the doses that are going to accrue to individuals are going j l 20 to be small enough that we're not going to take any further 4 l 21 action such as requiring shielding, or something like that, for j l 22 the smoke detectors. i i 23 Another example would be in decommissioning. You get 24 ready to decommission a site -- either a reactor, a 25 fuel-fabrication facility, something like that -- you have to l l ( ..- - .- - _ _ . ~ . . . - , . . . . . . . . - _ . _ . . . . _ . . - . _ Heritage Reporting Corporation ] (202) 628-4888 ! i
I is l 100 ) d - 1 obtain a certain residual level of activity that can only have 1 2 produced an acceptably small health risk that comes from that. i 1 3 So what the Commission expects us to do is not only to develop 4 specific cases where we establish BRC levels for 5 decommissioning the safe release of material of equipment and ) 1 6 recycle that has been used inside a nuclear plant but now only 7 could give small doses to the public, if released. We have to 8 set criteria for that. 9 In addition, we have to develop if we can a generic I i 10 policy that would cut across these various activities and 11 establish something like, perhaps, a BRC dose limit, either an 12 individual dose limit or a collective dose limit. So that's ( 13 one of the things that we are going to be trying to do in the j 14 next few years. We are looking at what information we need to f q 15 get to help us do that. I 16 Maybe it would be useful to put into perspective for ] 17 a minute the relationship between various dose limitation 18 criteria. For workers, the dose limits are in the range of 5 19 rem per year in the new 10-CFR Part 20. You may have occasion 20 to allow something higher than that. In the case of the 21 public, though, those limits are somewhat lower. Currently in 22 Part 20 they are around 500 millirem, but they may go to a 23 smaller number in the future -- around 100 millirem. 24 Those are limits to what exposure can occur to people 25 who either work in a plant or are members of the public that Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 101 1 may be nearby the plant or come to visit the plant, or 2 something like that. If you look at requirements for fuel 3 cycle facilities, they are around 25 millirem. That is the 4 general level required for fuel-cycle facilities. Those come 5 from EPA requirements. The NRC has the responsibility of 6 enforcing those kinds of requirements. 7 We're talking about, in terms of BRC levels, the 8 levels at which we would allow releases to occur of materials; 9 land, after it has been decommissioned; low-level 10 waste -- we're talking about doses in the range oi' a few 11 millirem, compared to 25 as the goal for the fuel-cycle 12 facilities and 100 as the specific target for individuals. So 13 that just gives you some kind of perspective of the limitation l 14 system that obtains. , 1 l 15 In addition to this, there is something called ALARA, 16 the effort to achieve doses as low as is practically 17 achievable. When you have a limit such as the 5 rem limit, 18 say, for an individual worker, you also are supposed to have a 19 program that is to try to achieve doses below that limit, and 20 you're supposed to be taking a concerted and conscious effort 21 to do that. That's also part of the thing that we're trying to 22 implement in Part 20. 23 In addition, let's take on of the limits on 24 fuel-cycle facilities -- the 25 millirem limit for a fuel-cycle 25 facility. In addition to that for reactors, the NRC has an ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L----___---
102 1 ALARA rule called Appendix I which requires that the utilities 2 do what they can to reduce the doses below 25 millirems down to 3 a range of a few millirems. 4 So some of these terms I'll be going back to. Let me 5 move on, though, to the issue that we would expect to be 6 supporting safety-goal implementation. You just had a long 7 debate about the philosophy of safety-goal implementation. I 8 don't want to get back into that, certainly. 9 But we believe that probably somewhere in that we are 10 going to get a perspective about how well plants do and how 11 well our regulations do, one or the other, in terms of 12 performing PRAs to measure the risk. When you do a PRA, one 13 part of the PRA is once you calculated the release of 1 14 radionuclides to the public, you then have to calculate the 15 effect of those radionuclides on health. So one part of this 16 program is to come up with correlations that the agency can 17 accept that will give us a relationship between dose and health 1 i 18 effects. 19 We have a small program that is trying to come up 20 with the latest, best information that we can provide in that 21 area. 22 In the area of cost-benefit analysis, it turns out 23 that when Appendix I, that I mentioned before, was issued, a 24 figure of merit was used there of 1,000 dollars per t 25 person-rem averted. That is that the agency believes that it's ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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- 1 willing to require, generally, a measure to reduce dose if it i
2 doesn't exceed 1,000' dollars for every person rem that is 3 averted by that measure. ; a ' 4 That was a criterion or a figure of merit that was 5 used in Appendix I, which related to releases from reactors i i 6 during normal operation. Now, recently, as we have'done cost-
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7 benefit analysis, we also use in.the agency this figure. It's 1 8 just a figure to give us a perspective of judgement. I~ don't 1 i 9 want to say that there's a speed limit that necessarily is set 10 up here in using this' number. It's just one of.the things that-l 11 we use to give us a perspective as'to whether to require 12 additional measures in order to determine whether safety should 13 be enhanced above the minimally adequate requirements. 14 So what we're looking at now is.the question of what 15 health effects come from the.different ranges of radiation-16 level. The a person in the one person-rem accrued over a 17 population of 100,000 people has one average value if the 18 population goes to an individual. Yet if it is a four or five 19 person-rem that is accrued by an individual worker in trying to 20 install the equipment, that gives me another perspective of the 21 relative risk that is obtained when the worker installing 7the ! l 22 equipment or the individual in the public who might be spared i the extra radiation that might accompany the accident. j 23
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24 In any. case, one of the' questions that we're asking
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25 is whether this 1,000 dollars per person-rem is the correct ll lj ( i Heritage Reporting . Corporation (202) 628-4888-l
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. 1 , kind of number to.be using. How should one-reflect 1,000
.2 dollars cost averted in terms.of,Lfirst, cancer deaths, or just 3 illness that comes from.the exposure to the radiation?
4 DR. WILSON: If you. change that --:that number wr-- 5 the one number which came out from the federal government. 6 DR. MORRIS: If we would change it, it would be 7 ~through the federal -- it would be done openly and through a 8 process of public comment. A lot of thinking woul'd have'to be 9 done about this. 10 But we just believe that we ought to think about this 11 again. Let me go back to the issue of a low regulatory 1 12 concern. 13 When we tried to establish what would be a figure of 14 merit for below regulatory concern for consumer product 15 distribution or for low-level waste streams, or for 16 decommissioning, the question that comes'to mind is whether 17 that figure of merit that we would apply there should be the ] 18 same figure of nerit we apply in making decisions about.whether 19 to impose new requirements for reactor safety, or'the' figure of 20 merit that was used in' Appendix I. j 1 21 It is not clear to me that there should necessarily
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22 be the same number applied across the board,.but mayoe it i 23 should be. So, we want to think about that'again, j i 24 DR. TODREAS: What is that number that you are 25 referring to? j 4 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation !' (202) 628-4888 i
i i 105 1 DR. MORRIS: The-figure of merit?. 2 DR. TODREAS: Yes. 3 DR. MORRIS: 'One-thousand~dollarsiper person-rem. 4 In other words, the agency has stated that it. 1 3 5 believes that it is willing to impose a requirement if-the 6 requirement does not have a cost greater than 1,000 dollars per j 7 person-rem. 8 Doing that,.the agency, I think, had in mind 9 primarily cancer deaths. It didn't include the fact that you 10 might be averting long, significant illness by an individual. l 11 Another point to make is that that value is higher than is used l 12 in many foreign countries. So it may be conservative enough to 13 take into account a number of different things other than 14 cancer deaths. , 15 DR. MILLER: There's no limit on the rem part of i 16 this? In other words, no matter how low the dose is, it is j 17 still 1,000 dollars per person-rem? In other words, a billion j 18 people with ten to the minus nine -- ; 19 DR. MORRIS: As it's applied right now, it's applied 20 relatively simplistically. If we could establish, for
- 21 instance, an individual. limitation -- a generic BRC level'-- we 22 would be establishing cut-offs --
23 DR. MILLER: Okay. That's what you were trying to 24 relate to BRC. l 25 DR. MORRIS: We would be establishing a cut-off, and f . Heritage Reporting Corporation > (202) 628-4888
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, 1 perhaps you wouldn't count a person-rem.below that level.
-2 DR. MILLER: I understand.
l 3 DR. MORRIS: In'the proposed Part 20, we actually put l l 4 in the proposed Part 20 a cut-off of 1 millirem as'the cut-off 5 limit in evaluating population doses and deciding to spend more 6 money to avert radiation. 7 DR. MILLER: I understand. 8 DR. MORRIS: So, I am sort of looking at these as 9 being tied in together. I don't know yet how we're going to 10 tie them together and whether they should be. But we're doing 11 some thinking in that area now. 12 DR. WILSON: Who is "we?" Are you referring just to 13 in-house? 14 DR. MORRIS: The staff is trying to think about how 15 it's going to approach this and the terms of developing this 16 generic policy. We are planning to have an international 17 symposium sometime maybe in September at which we are' going to 18 try to get collective views of an international -- 19 DR. WILSON: I could call your attention to what was 20 said by the Commission when they located that thing fifteen 21 years ago. The next step was a general look at this from all 22 agencies of the federal government, including EPA and DOE. 23 DR. MORRIS: There was a liimited look at that to'see 24 whether the Appendix I number should have been revised. It was
'25 decided that there was no basis to do it for reactors. But we Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
107 , (. l 1 haven't yet taken a step of going beyond that. 2 DR. WILSON: It really:should go across the whole 3 federal government.
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4 DR.' MORRIS: I think'we should do it'across thel board 5 in terms of trying to develop this de minimis policy. We 6 should bring that thinking into play in trying to' establish the l I 7 de minimis policy. 8 As I mentioned before, the ALARA concept envisions 9 that licensees would be -- 10 DR. SHOAF: ALARA? 11 DR. MORRIS: ALARA. 12 -- as low as reasonably achievable. Those should be 13 as low as reasonably achievable below the limit. If you have 14 workers in your plant -- I am using the new 10-CFR-Part 15 20 -- it may be five rem in the future. The ALARA principle 16 would say that in addition,to this, you should try to drive 17 those doses lower where it's practical, where it's easy to 18 achieve, where it's reasonable to take engineering steps to do 19 that.. You should take that point. 20 And it's a part of our requirements. We monitor the 21 ALARA performance. I'm sorry -- I'll just keep on using l 22 "ALARA" because it's so much easier to say than "as low as 23 reasonably achievable." We will monitor that performance as an l 24 agency to see how well utilities are doing.. 25 MR. REED: In general, Bill, would you say that the ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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108 . 1 utilities have done quite well? 2 DR. MORRIS: Yes. 3 Mk. REED: I'm beating.this out of you, but ALARA is 4- something that we live by and not by the rules. I think we 5 found that we can beat the rules fairly easily. 6 DR. MORRIS: ALARA is in the rule, but there is a 7 wide latitude in what a utility can do and will do in order to 8 do that. The utilities will have different levels of' 9 performance in that area. So it's a performance monitor. 10 DR. BUSH: Bill, out of curiosity here, are they 11 retaining the quarterly dose intensity for'10-CFR 50, or are 12 they just going to the annual? 13 DR. MORRIS: Annual. 14 Let me go on. That line was primarily intended just 15 to sort of introduce some concepts. I want to now go on to 16 something more specific. 17 In terms of implementing the; radiation protection 18 requirements, we would like to be sure that we have identified 19 methods that would be acceptable to the agency to be used by 20 the licensees in administrative compliance with the radiation
. 21 protection dose limits. Specific sub-issues here are. listed.
22 Let me 0: 4 tion something about some of those. 23 Extremity, dosimetry and bioassay -- it turns out 24 that the licensees use the services of processors. Processors 25 are organizations who measure the response of detectors which ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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. I have been worn by personnel in the plant, or measure the 2 response from excreta from bioassay that have been obtained by 3 the licensee regarding their workers. It is our goal to 4 establish a third-party certification process that would assure 5 that these processors are doing a good job in feeding back 6 information on the doses that have accrued during those 7 workers' efforts.
8 In extremity / dosimetry, what you are doing is 9 monitoring the doses to the forearms and hands and ankles and 10 feet. So little dosimeters are attached there with tape or 11 something like that. The worker may be working in an area 12 where there is a high radiation field, and you take this to a 13 processing laboratory. There is a procedure for measuring the 14 radiation from the dosimeter, and then converting that into 15 dose to the individual. 16 In bioassay, you are taking samples of excreta and
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17 you are senting that to the processor. He is making an 18 analysis of the dose field that this particular -- I'm sorry, 19 it wouldn't be " dose field" -- the level of radionuclides in the 20 sample. From that one tries to deduce what doses to the 21 various organs might be occurring. 22 That's a complicated process, and some of our early T 23 attempts to see how well the industry was doing -- there seemed , 24 to be some wide variation and significant errors that were 25 being made by the processors. So we are trying to set up a ; ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ _ _ l
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- 1 DR. MILLER:- Oh, I.see. You're not certain that it's 1
i
- 2. being done.
3 DR. MORRIS: I'm not sure the standard is what we 1 4 could endorse, either. 5 DR. BUSH: Bill, how does this help in what: areas? I 6 recall in reading the INE information newsletters over the'last i' 7 five-six years that every once in a while one comes up'where 0 somebody cheats. You know, they send them there, and 9 effectively they all come out with the same reading, except 10 that they don't want to do anything.- j 11 Is that going to be an inherent part of the program, 12 too? 13 DR. MORRIS: Well, this would establish a process and ( 14 a procedure in the regulations. The adherence to the l 1 15 regulations -- how well that's done -- is another matter. I i 16 Setting the regulation doesn't always insure that everybody's i 17 doing what they're supposed to be doing. DR. BUSH: 18 I'm asking about the Part B" of'the 19 thing. Essentially you'can establish a standard or criteria 20 that must be met in the regulations. Then, when.you come in to 21' check it, they can meet it, but then they kind of throw it into l 22 the waste basket when you walk out the door. ; 23 DR. MORRIS: It's possible that if that happened,'the l 24 processor might lose the accreditation. 25 Air sampling is another issue. We feel that there is ( _ , _ , _ , . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . . Heritage Reporting Corporation ] (202) 628-4888 l l t
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1 1 110 1 program that would evaluate the adequacy of the standards and 2 algorithms that the processor were using, their measuring 3 techniques to.see how well they are capable of making'these 4 measurements, and once.we're satisfied that we have a 5 practical, workable system, we are would envision a rule-making 6 that would establish the accreditation system at the National 7 Bureau of Standar'ds. 8 DR. MILLER: I.believe it's the Society of Health 9 Physicists, I suppose. Don't they have a~ standard -- 10 DR. MORRIS: 'Yes, they do. They have drawn standards 11 in both these areas. We are trying~to evaluate now whether we-12 are comfortable with the standards as used by the processor. 13 So we are trying to evaluate'not only the standard itself, as'a ) ( 14 practical way to the calculations - 'the algorithms are 15 included-in the standard, the procedures -- 16 DR. MILLER: Well, I thought you were.-- 3 17 DR. MCRRIS: -- as welllas quality control'used by
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18 the processing laboratories. 19 DR. MILLER: Well, I thought you were saying that 20 various laboratories use different methodologies. j 1 21 DR. MORRIS: Well, once we get the rule in place -- l 22 right now, I think the laboratories could use different , L 23 methodologies. They probably should be using an industry i 24 standard. But we're not certain that that's being done across i 25 the board. 1 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 ! l i
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112 l 1 significant uncertainty in how air sampling should be done in a 2 room or inclosure in order to assure that a worker in that room 3 is not getting a dose above the limit. You can envision it as 4 a three-dimensional problem, essentially. The worker is here, 5 the air sampler is up there, source over here. You want to 6 make sure that the air-sampling process is one that is giving a 7 good measure of the dose that the worker might be getting. So 8 we want to do some work in that area. 9 An area that I think is a tough one to solve and a 10 challenge to us it his issue of calculating doses to the 11 embryo / fetus. This isn't in your hand-out. I just put this together to try to get an idea of the degree of uncertainty I 12 i 13 that we are facing here in this issue. .
]
i 14 In the new Presidential guidance, there is a dose 15 limit placed on the embryo / fetus. If a lady should become 16 pregnant while she is working at a facility where she could get 17 doses either externally or by ingestion of material, there is a , 18 concern that because of the fact that as the embryo develops, 19 there are certain crucial time periods in the development of 20 the embryo when doses of radiation can have a big impact on its 21 development. 22 So this new requirement involves a requirement not 23 only to measure the so-called deep-dose equivalent to the 24 declared pregnant woman -- that is, the kind of dose you would 25 measure from a film badge from external gamma radiation. You l l~- Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
113 _ 1- can assume when you make that measurement, because of the 2- shielding of the woman's body, that the embryo wouldn't get a 3- dose higher than what you are measuring generally from the-4 body. But there is an additional factor and that is'the 5 possibility of ingestion of materials. 6 Then the material is in the bloodstream'of the woman, 7 or in certain parts of the body. If it's in the bloodstream, 8 there would be a potential for transfer of those radionuclides 9 across the placenta. That's something we don't know much 10 about. We don't think anyone knows much about it, but it's in 11 the new Federal Guidance. It is something that is of concern. 12 If you look here, I just wanted to show you the 13 different words from the proposed rule, which went out for i 14 comment several years ago -- what we think we are going to put 15 into the issued rule. Originally there was a thought from the j d 16 individual who drafted this, that in the absence of any ) l 17 specific transfer parameters for the radionuclides involved, 18 two times the dose equivalent that would be otherwise 19 assessed -- the intake of radionuclides by the pregnant woman 20 should be assigned to the fetus. 21 Based on what we know today,-we don't think there is l i 22 any point in us putting "two times" in this rule. We don't 1 1 23 know enough to say that. All that we can scy now is that we j j 24 should take into account those parameters that may affect the 25 dose to the embryo / fetus differently than that of the declared ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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-114 1- pregnant worker. Between the' time this rule was: issued-and the'-
2 time it becomes effective, w6 believe that the agency has to 3 -have on the books some better' guidance than-this to give the-4~ licensee some method'for how they're going to do:this: job.- 5 So it's an urgent matter to get.that work done.- . l 6- ^Yes? 7' DR.. MILLER: I think'it's probably' time for me to 8 " fess up" here. I'm a. humble research administrator, and'there 9 is a fundamental thing that-I don't really know,;and I,just 10 will admit it now. There is something called a regulation. I i l 11 understand it. A regulation, right? 10-CFR is called'a 12 federal regulation. What is a rule? You said some things are l l 13 in here that you don't agree with.- How did they.get. proposed? j i ( j 14 DR. MORRIS: Let me explain.the process. -q 15 The Code of Federal Regulations for the NRC is a co'de .
.)
that starts with 10-CFR. 10-CFR has different parts to 1 16 17 it -- about twenty. 18 DR. MILLER: So when you use the expression " rule," 19 you mean parts of CFR? i 20 DR. MORRIS: Yes. ;
'21 DR. MILLER: Okay. That's:the first thing I wanted .
22 to understand. - 23 DR. MORRIS: Part 20 -- ; 24 DR. MILLER: But as to the word " rule," when you use -l 25 the word " rule," you mean a part of 10CFR? 4 o. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 _..______m_________. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____
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I i 115. ] 1 DR. MORRIS: Yes.- il 2 DR.' MILLER: Okay. That's'the first thing. Dj 1 3 ' Secondly, what did~you mean when you said that there were some 4 thingsfin the p oposed rule -- what are you saying here? The 5 final'one is what has been approved? 6 DR. MORRIS: Okay, let me explain. .I'm probably 7 going too fast. 8 The existing Part 20 is about twenty-years old' . So 9 it hasn't been revised in a major way in a long time. When the 10 ICRP came out with this new guidance on how to do the new dose 11 limitation, we though we were probably going to have to revise 12 that, and we knew that the Presidential guidance was being 13 developed at the same time. i 14 So we went out with the proposed -- 15 DR. MILLER: And what was the Presidential guidance? 16 DR. MORRIS: The Presidential guidance is a document 17 signed by the President. i 18 (Continued on'next page) l 19 20
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l 22 : 23 24 25 ( .l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
116-1 DR. MORRIS: ' EPA, they sort of chair a committee 2 involving NRC, . DOE, OSHA, groups like that. And they -- I don't 3- think the President worked very hard on this -- 4 We did that early '87, that was a signal to us'that 5 we were expected to go ahead and issue Part 20 of this 6 revision.- So, what you do when you are ready to change one of 7 the rules is you write up a draft revision. And the Staff does 8 this. It puts all these requirements in here. And all.the 9 subparts and everything, subpart of part 20, 22.08. Then it 10 puts down what it believes it should say and convinces'the CRGR 11 committee to review generic requirements and the ACRS, Advisory 12 Committee on Reactor Safeguards. And then if it gets all the 13 Staff together and convinces EDO, then we try to convince the 14 Commission. And then they put out a revised rule. It is 15 proposed for public comment. We get public comments back on 16 that. 17 I think there were 800 letters of public comment 18 received on part 20 when we issued it a couple of years ago. 19 DR. MILLER: So, when you use the expression and. 20 evaryone else uses the expression, "rulemaking," I can assume
- 21 that means change to CFR. Okay?
22 DR. MORRIS: Either in addition to -- it can be in 23 addition to, a brand new' rule, a revision in the old rule, 24 insertion of a new part. 1 25 MR. REED: How long have you had this proposed rule? ] [ Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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i, i 117 .- 1 Ever since 1 ran remember. 2- DR. MORRIS: I'm trying to remember when it went out q 3 for public question. I think it was '85. 4 MR. REED: I'm. thinking much before that time. 5 DR. MORRIS: I'm sorry I don't remember the exact 6 date. 1 7 DR. TODREAS: -You are'stil) on~the first issue. You I 8 have given us a good technical feel for what -ou are doing. 9 That's fine. I just want to keep you. moving through. i 10 -DR. MORRIS: Let me just ! go on. l 11 DR. TODREAS: The hot particle and the neutroning and q l 12 the quality factor, you may want to say something about it. I 13 don't want to exclude that. 14 DR. MORRIS: Well, I'm just.trying to give you a 15 flavor of the kinds of things we're thinking abcut. The 16 particle issue is one where you might have attached to-a 17 person's skin as he works in a plant, a smell particle emitting 18 beta radiation. And, as long as that particle is emitting beta 19 radiation, it is probably and.it stays in one place, it. 20 probably has very small health effects, we think. Ulceration a l 21 of the skin might be the worst thing that happens. We don't j i 22 think that that particle would cause cancer if it stays in one 23 place and only irradiates a small area. The skin tissue dies, 24 essentially. When the tissue dies, it can't incur cancer. 25 The problem is that as you try to measure the dose tc 1 ( . , - - , ~ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ , . _ _ _ _ ,_ Heritage Reporting Corporation. l (202) 628-4888 ;
e.- 1 l 118 1 the skin from that particle, you will get a very large number ; I 2 that makes it seem as though there is a very high risk from { l 3 that. But it is probably not -- the risk is probably minimal, I I' 4 but it still is costing. The licensees, we think, a good bit 5 of money, a good bit of time and even some exposure in trying 6 to go around and count workers to make sure -- " count workers," ] 7 I mean count the radiation counting of the workers. Try to 8 detect those particles and see what the skin dose is. 9 Much ado about nothing, perhaps. I'm not going to 10 make a commitment because the agency hasn't made a finding on 11 that. We sort of think that's the case. Utilities are 12 incurring high expenses just to meet a number in the j t 13 regulations that probably has no safety significance because of l l 14 the nature of this radiation. And we.believe we need to do 15 something to try to set this straight. It is a cost to the ) 16 industry. We are certain that the regulations are safe, but 17 they may be skewed in terms of the expense and efforts that's I i 18 being spent to avoid this. < 19 MR. REED: Quickly, Bill, we are just getting better 20 at measuring part particles. So, now we are discovering them a 21 lot, But it is the liability, you know. It's in the regs. l 22 Someone goes away and they sue you, two years. 23 DR. MORRIS: The quality factors -- currently, we are 24 using -- a neutron quality factor is a factor that is used to 25 give the relative effectiveness of different kinds of radiation Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
yg . p 1 119 1 in producing biological effects. Neutrons and alpha particles 2 are much more effective in producing biological effects than, 3 .say, gamma radiation or bata particles. 4 Currently, we use a factor of 10 for neutrons. That 5 is based on studies of animals.made some years ago. There's_a 6 ita base that's been used to decide on that factor of 10, but
~
7 the ICRP recently came out and saidLthat factor should be 20. 8 And the NRC has got to decide what we are going _to do about 9 'that recommendation of the ICRP, whether we believe it should 10 be adopted in the regulations or not, we have a feeling that 11 the CIRRPC, a member of that CIRRPC committee that I mentioned, 12 , reporting to the Presidential Science Advisor is going to take 13 a view that it may be 10 would be okay. We still believe that ( 14 thera should be some more animal studies done to help us 15 understand what the right thing to do would be. And that would 16 be one area of research. 17 How well is the industry doing in achieving ALARA and 18 what should they be doing to improve? We have a system, 19 radiation exposure information reporting system that I 20 essentially gets annual statistical reports,from the utilities i 21 and licensees and termination reports from workers terminated 22 and helpe us understand how well they are doing at achieving i 23 ALARA. 24 MR. FEECi But, Bill, to what end, though? Here we 25 are reporting to our industry organizations and by sending ; i (. Heritage Reporting Corporation ; (202) 628-4880 l 1
ly , ;n - . 120
--- 1 . another report-into the'NRC,;I. don't seelwhat*it is-going,to-2 achieve.
3 We meet a minimum regulation. Now, you'are talking: 4 about how well you are doing below that point.
- 5. DR. MORRIS:- The licensing staff believes that they 6 need to know -- they:-believe that ALARA is something that is' 7 regulated. That it is nht optional-as;partiof.the: regulation.
8 There is - a'. phrasing in-part 20 that says you shoul'd;do ALARA 9 and they want to. see how well it is- being done. . 10 This is o ne way that they get-an idea of how well-c 11 the industry is doing as:a whole'in meeting ALARA. - You are 12 debating whether it could be just as well reported voluntarily q 13 to another group or whether it'should be reported to the NRC E( . i 14 MR. REED: And being that it is being voluntarily. 15 reported to another group and I think effectively, that the NRC. , l 16 residents in the field observe practices, really, is the basic 17 thing to do. And I just don't know why monies-need to be spent i 18 to develop a paperwork system to send. data into Washington.- l 19 DR. MORRIS: I don't believe we are going to be able 1 20 to resolve that today. That's a good question. ; 21 MR. REED: Excuse'me. The scope lof what you are l 22 doing is develop a system by which utilities can' report -- 23 DR. MORRIS:- We.have the system. It isLjust a 24 reporting system. It is in effect, today. The reports are. 25 coming in already under part 20. Part 20 requires these l ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 m __ _____m__ ._a_-_-_. _Am_--_ ___.-__ _._____-__.__.m.m
w.- 1 l 121 . 1 1 termination reports. R 2 What you are suggesting would be that maybe part 20 4 3 should be changed. ] i 4 MR. REED: I guess I am confused. I thought.you were 1 5 -telling us areas where you have to do more research.in. order --- 1 6 DR. MORRIS: This is an ongoing activity. It really 7 is questionable whether it is research or not. It's'really 8 data gathering from the industry.~Okay? And we think that:the 9 agency has pretty much decided that it wants to continue this 10 activity. And, so, we are doing it under this program. It is 11 not a research. It is just part of the way to explain to you 12 one of the things that we do. 13 We do have the second item where we have a group at 14 Brookhaven that looks at the effectiveness of the various dose 15 reduction measures that are going on in the industry. That is 16 fed back to the licensing staff to give them some perspective 17 as to where the utilities might be doing better. There might 18 be some population of workers that are having a higher. dose 19 than others and they can take -- they have a basis for judgment 20 as to whether it is practical to achieve something better. 21 DR. TODREAS: On that second one, I would just -- 22 having listened, I really wonder why the research group 23 collects the information, why it just doesn't go to the 24 regulation group, the licensing group. 25 DR. MORRIS: I think it is just an institutional ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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. 1 tradition right now.
2 DR. TODREAS: Cleaning some of these anachronisms may 3 have a benefit. 4 MR. REED: Yes. That's my point. And the last thing 5 to even characterize what utilities are doing to reduce -- I 6 mean it is being done. It is being done very effectively in 7 other areas. And I just haven't seen the impact of what you , i l 8 can do with this information. l 9 DR. MORRIS: I think we have to get into the program, 10 some of the specifics in the program to be able to identify to i il you of what we think has been accomplished or could be l l 12 accomplished by it. l 13 MR. REED: Just tell me in rough numbers how much you 14 plan to spend in fiscal year 1988 for.this kind of activity. 15 DR. MORRIS: The expenditure the one program is 16 $300,000. The other program is about 150,000 to 250,000. 17 DR. TODREAS: Between now and May, we will get into 18 it with you and then we can elaborate it. We will team 19 somebody up, maybe, with Cordell. 20 DR. MORRIS: It's a good question. A couple of years 21 ago, the office proposed to cut that program and the Commission 22 told us to put it back in. We could go at it again. 23 DR. BUSH: You are actually running a data base for 24 NRR. That's really what it comes down to. It seems to me we l 25 might go beyond our charter there because if you want to do ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l L______________________________ - - - - - - - -
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1 l 123 1 something about that, you had better change the regulation. ! 2 That is the only way you're going to get out of that. i 1 3 DR. LEVY: No. I don't think that is the issue. I 4 think the issue is that this could be:done by NRR. I think 5 that is the point. R 6 I think the point here is whether it should be done j 1 7 by research. This is not research. It is just a d=ta base. 8 MR. REED: And it depends whether or not NRR can get 9 the information through means that exist today. l 10 DR. BUSH: Wait until Bill gets down further. You l 11 can say a lot of things that aren't research that get done. 12 DR. TODREAS: Okay. Let's listen to it. 13 DR. MORRIS: In the recent publication draft NUREG 14 1150, we found that there were -- there was a larger dose that 15 was coming from ALA A particles than we'had previously 16 expected. And we found that in our NUREG document that had' 17 been developed by the Harvard School of Public Health, we had 18 not included in there an adequate correlation of ALA A' particle 19 does to help that. One of the areas that.we are going to be 20 doing is to develop that. correlation so it could be included in 21 risk assessments in the future. 22 DR. TODREAS: Which bullet it that? 23 DR. MORRIS: That's that bullet there. 24 DR. BUSH: That's covering both external exposure and 25 ingestion? ( . . - - - - - - . _ - . . - . _ . . _ , . . . _ . - . _, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 1 124 q l DR. MORRIS: ALA A is primarily internal. t 2 The last bullet speaks to, again, back to this issue I d 3 of developing levels of radiation risk or exposure or j 4 contamination levels below regulatory concern. Those levels ; 1 5 are generally in the range of a few millirem. When we look at 6 the data that we have that correlates dose to risk, it comes 7 from the survivors of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki in a range that is l 8 above, well above a few millirem range. And what is done is an ) 9 attempt to extrapolate that data down to low-dose ranges. And l 10 that is done by making an hypothesis that there is a linear 11 relationship and it's a linear extrapolation that is done so i 12 that no matter how old th? 2" m ;ets, you use the same linear 13 ratio between dose and risk that you would use at a generally 14 higher range. . l 15 And we find that somewhat unsatisfactory. And we 16 think that it may be a case where there may be a large 17 expenditure of resources to try to reduce doses in that range 18 when there may be minimum benefit in health effects. But if 19 you take a large population, each getting one millirem, and you 20 say -- you might talk about a 1,000 person rim in that 21 population. But the changes of getting cancer from that may be ' 22 quite small and maybe less than this linear hypothesis which 23 suggests -- we believe there is a need to try to develop new 24 information in that area. We don't think it is going to come 25 from epidemiological studies because these range of a few Heritage Reporting Corporat* (202) 623-4888
l 125 1 millirem, in order to do an epidemiological study and determine i I J 2 the impact of cancers from a population from that kind of dose 3 is difficult because the natural background dose is several j i 4 hundred millirem. So, you are trying to discriminate a small 5 effect in a large background using statistics. And it is not 6 easy to do and we don't know how to place confidence in it. We 7 believe that there might be an opportunity to use some of the 8 new methods that are being developed to measure chromosome and 9 cellular and molecular aberrations and try to understand better 10 the relationship between such aberrations in dose and see if 11 there is any method to develop a correlation between those 12 aberrations and an incidence of cancer. 13 DR, MILLER: How do you bound that kind of problem 14 from the point of view of the mission.of the research arm of 15 the agency. Because, for example, as I am sure you know, the 16 Office of Health and Environmental Research of DOE has a f 1 17 significant program in this regard. One that is molecular l 18 biologically based and one that is human genetics based and so 19 does NIH. So, how do you -- 20 DR. MORRIS: We have an interest because off our 21 interest in trying to understand what to do about policy. How 22 do you bound it is we -- this project would be done in concert 23 with all those other groups. We're not going to start out and 24 reinvent the work being done by others. We are going to try to 25 see if that work can be used in some way to help shed light on i Heritage Reporting Corporation i (202) 628-4888
126 i 1 our problems. 2 DR.' MILLER: But from the point of view of-this 3 committee, when we have to make' recommendations on a balance of- f 4 a research program in this area, I mean it is a laudatory area 5 and it is a very interesting area. But it is an area that, 6 even with the NIH and DOE's budget is probably not enough going 7 into it and you -- we could put a lot of money _in this one. 8 DR. MORRIS: We envision that our role right now i 9 would be to try to act as a catalyst to focus interest on this 10 area in terms of our own agency interests to see how well they 11 meld with the other agencies that are doing work. And if we 12 find that it is feasible to do and it is not currently being 13 planned by those other agencies, we would try to interact and I l 14 get support among the other agencies to work with us to go ; 1 15 ahead and work on this project. 16 DR. MILLER: And I forgot to mention the National 17 Science Foundation which also has an interest. 18 DR. MORRISs We recognize we are only a small part of , i 19 this. We are only a small player in terms of money and we hope l 20 we might be able to wield some influence in trying to get our < 21 problem attacked by those other groups. And we would envision 22 that we would look at least studying first the feasibility of ( 23 this. So, our first funding of it will be something like a few 24 hundred thousand dollars just to look at the feasibility of , 25 getting a handle on this and we will be doing it by working ( . Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
127
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I with all those other groups, first. The'first task will be'to' 2 go and. find out what everybody else isi doing and.seeing how
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3 well we could put together a project with the others 1 4 participating that would attack this problem. 5 DR. MILLER: Who does this work for you?, j 6 DR. MORRIS: We haven't started.this work, yet. Most 1 I 7 of the other work that I described is directed primarily at 8 implementing the regulations in CFR 20 or something like that. 3 9 This work is new work. Just recently pretty much settled the , l 10 budget effort for 1988, only, and are now looking at '89. . The l 11 Commission has felt that it will support our budget at the 12 level requested for '89. This means we believe we should 13 proceed to try to put this project together now. 14 DR. TODREAS: Let me just make a comment then'to the 15 committee when we pick it up. What you have done is projected 16 a budget in the future based on an assumption-that you are 17 going to interact, see what is being done and then decide if 18 there is a synergistic project that makes sense that is not 19 being done. That's how I read what you say. It is pretty 20 tough, I think, to estimate how much that would cost. 21 DR. MORRIS: I agree. Our cost that we would propose 22 to be the NRC's share would not ever be large. 23 DR. TODREAS: But, just philosophically, 24 fundamentally, I don't see how you can make any estimate 25 because what you are doing is really first starting. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
~ 128 1 DR. MORRIS . I am really only estimating what'it.is 2 . going to take to get start. The feasibility study'might cost 3 us to get some very well qualified. individual to start looking 4 at this'and who knows all the players in the' game. 5 .DR. TODREAS: So, you make an estimate to buy two 6 people's time.for a year, it's going _to cost this much. .And'I 7 don't know what they are going to do,.but just to get their 8 attention, that's the check I have.to put on the table. 9 DR. MORRIS: I think that's correct. 10 DR. TODREAS: That's how you make an estimate. 11 DR. MORRIS: This is seed money here. This is not 12 the project. 13 DR. MILLER: It seems to me that-there ought to be 14 continually this small group of people that gives them the 15 window on the world of the molecular, biological and human 16 genetic community. That sounds perfectly. reasonable. But I 17 agree with'you, Neil, after that, it is almost impossible to' 18 suggest what would a research program be. 19 DR. MORRIS: I would'like to be able to define that 20 for you at a later date when we have had a chance to study it ] i 21 some. This is just the seed money. 22 DR. MORRIS: I think that I have already talked about 23 this issue of de minimis some. I will just mention to you that 24 it could have application for decommissioning, recycling 25 materials, consumer products, low level wast'e is already a .! I f I Heritage Reporting Corporation I (202) 628-4888 l l
129 1 de minimis or BRC policy for low level waste-reactors. And I 2 mention -- I have to'go into the last line for a moment. The 3 last element, I just wanted to indicate that in our budget we. < 4 have something that I am calling development of regulatory 5 guides. That is working on the regulatory guides. We don't 6 have a very'large staff. We've got a lot of work to do to get 7 these guides in place by the time the new rule becomes 8 effective. 9 Rulemaking-under radiators, radiography, bioassay, 10 and development of policy of the BRC. .That kind of activity I 11 would characterize as something we call technical assistance. 12 It's just getting helpers to help us to get these -- 13 consultants, experts to help us put together.the new 14 regulations or reg guides we are contemplating issuing and that 15 helps me. These are sort of roundedo 'ff. In this one heading, 16 you remember, there were a lot of issues that are being 17 developed. There may be various projects, but the total comes 18 up to this kind of level. Tney may be done at different 3 1 19 laboratories. j l 20 DR. BUSH: There is a basic question there. A few of j 21 those issues, I would estimate if they come the way I would 1 22 anticipate they would come out would' result in savings over the I 23 years that would represent quite a large number of millions of l 24 dollars to the utilities. It would appear to me that this is 1 25 an area where a sharing makes some degree of sense in there ; (. Heritage Reporting Corporation l (202) 628-4888
130 _ 1 because, quite frankly, it would end up putting a lot of money 2 in, quote, the utility pocket, if indeed you remove some of 3 these existing limitations. And I don't know. .Have you 4 explored that Bill or is that in the cards? 5 DR. MORRIS: I've thought about it. But all our 6 figures aren't large. 7 DR.. BUSH: I recognize that. 8 DR. MORRIS: So, we wouldn't be talking about a'large 9 cooperative program. One thought lt had was that by_ the time 10 you set up the cooperative program and got it going, you could 11 have almost have done some of these tasks and gotten them 12 completed. I don't know the latest status of it, but there is 13 some effort to recover some of the fee and the licensing fee I
-14 process will probably be recovering some of the funds for this l 15 kind of work by license fees. So, th"e industry is going to be 16 footing part of the bill for this in any case.
17 MR. HEED: Industry has done'a lot of work on de 18 minimis through the NES program and sent people to Washington 19 for almost two years and it is great recommendations. And I J 20 hate to see duplications-here. When I know that we are I 21 reporting to an agency that can be audited, through a 22 memorandum of understanding, that you can get your information, 23 I hate to see duplication. And I will articulate it to you, 1 l 24 Neil, in my notes. l l 25 DR. WILSON: Well, I worry about something a little i [ l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 o_________.________.___________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. . ]
I 131 I 1 worse than' duplication. Repetition with less competence'than 2 done the fiz.st time. And that is a -- it can be disastrous. -; 1 3 And that tends to happen'when you do something a second time, 4 you won't get the most competent people doing it. Possibly 5 because you will deliberately choose different people. 6 DR. TODREAS: The issue of duplication, that's been 7 made. I would like to just finish with Spence's comment. I 8 didn't quite follow the follow-on there. You were commenting 9 on industry sharing? 10 MR. REED: There are two things Spence made. Of 11 course, we have information that we can share with Spence. You 12 made a good point. Because of the liability of otilities in j 13 this area, and because of the work we do will not have the same 14 weight as I think with the NRC, that you will find the industry 15 may be willing to share on some of these important issues. 16 DR. BUSH: That's what I think. Because obviously, 17 if you remove a few of these collective pains, that's what they 18 are, really, you are generating a lot of paper for something,
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19 if nothing else, protect yourself from the possibility of a- ; 20 lawsuit down stream. That it would be to the collective { 21 -advantage to simplify the process. And, quite frankly, if that 22 is the case, then there should be a willingness to pay part of l 23 the toll. That's the way I look at it. l 24 DR. TODREAS: Something about this area, though, ; 25 strikes me that in terms of the conflict of interest or where l ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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132 ] I 1 there shouldn't be sharing. This area on health offects, 2 radiation standards, radiation levels, then in the rulemaking. , 1 3 I' guess it seems quite different to me than say aging and )i 4 extending life. There are regulations that come out of there, 5 too. 6 DR. BUSH: Well, I look at it in this light. If you ! i 7 put the money in the pot and you stir it around, quite frankly, j 8 when you reach in, you don't know the difference of the thing. 9 You then go out and get the best people you can who have no 10 axes to grind on the thing and you use them there and you try ) 11 to come up with the answers a little sooner than you would 12 otherwise because some of these things -- now, I think Bill is 13 cptimistic. Some of these will still be around four or five 14 years from now. I hope not, but based on precedent, there is a 15 v ty good possibility here that this wou]d be the case. 16 DR. MORRIS: 1 agree that some of them will be. 17 Some, we are going to have to make decisions on. 18 MR. REED: Unless we get more information on this 19 soon, the Unemployment Compensation judges are going to set our 20 -- they are setting those standards now. And they are setting 21 them for lack of technical information. And I understand what 22 you are saying, Neil. Maybe the industry may want to sway this 23 thing one way or another. I don't think that's the case. In 24 this case, we are going to end up before a judge and we are 25 gt ing to do what we can to have overwhelming backup to ( Heritage Reporting Corporation - ~ ~ - ~ - -" - (202) 628-4888 i
133i 1 whatever we come up with. 2 DR. LEVY: There should at11 east be a.way to ' 3 communicate all the.informat~on-you have and transferring it 4 and making.it available and:all of that with the hope that it 5 would speed up the process and there would not be-duplication. 6 MR. REED: .I think this is the one arearand'maybe. 7 Bill will agree, where the utilities are doing fairly.well. . We 8 are net. fighting and. fussing. It's not those' unrealistic 9 codes, but w's are all making a great effort to.. reduce q 10 radiation. We all want to know more about radiation effects-11 and I have a feeling we could really get together inLthis area.. 12 DR. MILLER: Well, are you funding, Cordell, within < l 13 the industry a research program, yourself? ( 14 MR. REED: EPRI. 15 DR. MILLER: E'PRI is. funding. l l 16 MR. REED: Not very much. 17 DR. MORRIS: Bob Alexander,1the branch chief here in l
- 18 this area says that EPRI doesn't put anything in this.
l 19 MR. REED: Nothing in this area? 20 DR. MORRIS: He may be exaggerating. We have been 21 unsuccessful in attempting to'get EPRI to get involved. .I 22 mentioned it earlier in this discussion, getting this 23 presentation right. 24 DR. LEVY: Well, there has been some effort, though, 25 by industry to develop this de minimis level. A very E l
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f% 134-1 substantial effort, which is just an effort to says Here is
- 2. how you would go about implementing it.
3 DR. TODREAS: That's one kind of category, though. 4 It is not research, though. 5 DR. LEVY: It's not research. 6 DR. BUSH: Well, it doesn't have to be research. But
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7 I think the thing one looks for is that you, among other 8 things, can you simplify the process? It is complicated enough 9 as it is by removing.what may be universally established as 10 ' unnecessary criteria. 11 DR. MORRIS: As' an exampl+., we ' heard recently that 12 EPRI is funding, I believe, an epidemiological study. We don't 13 know what value we are going to get out of that. Number (1) 14 because we don't know what value you can get out of 15 epidemiological studies versus some issues. They are just not 16 going to tell you much for the reason that I mentioned. . The 17 sample sizes have to be.very, very large in order to be able to 18 understand the effects of doses -- 19 DR. TODREAS: Let me stop you for a minute.-You don't 20 understand because you have had the discussion with them and 21 they haven't convinced you or because you haven't engaged, yet, , 22 to discuss? 23 DR. MORRIS: I jrst stated a belief, not a l 24 conclusion. 25 DR. TODREAS: Let me put it more simply. Have you ( 3 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i 135 j 1 talked to the proponents of the program at.EPRI? 2 -DR. MORRIS: No. J 3 DR. TODREAS: Okay. That is-step.1, then. 4 MR. REED: And, Bill, you know, sitting on the EPRI l 5 committee I would say:. Why aren't you off doing these studies ., 6 unless you get with the NRC and can get some credit for these l p 7 studies in the regulatory process. a 8 DR. MORRIS: Recently,:we haven't tracked down just i 9 what drove it, but NIH is starting a stu'y d to look at the 10 ' incidence of cancer around the nuclear power plant. I-am not 11 sure of the details of that. EPRI started a study. 12 DR. LEVY: That was started because of Senator 13 Kennedy requesting it for the Pilgrim Plant. s 14 DR. MORRIS: One of the first things I would do'under 15 our project and I am going to try to get started, we want to 16 get someone to give us an assessment of what you can learn from 17 epidemiological studies. I gave you a view that is a fairly 18 superficial and preliminary view about my feeling that you are . 19 probably not going to get very much out of it because of the. l 20 sample sizes. We would like to get some more scientific advice 21 on that. 22 DR. TODREAS: But what I get out of the whole picture 23 is, you know, you may go toward industry sharing down the road, i 24 but, basically, ycm haven't gone to first base yet in terms of 25 NRC and EPRI sitting down discussing the issue technically and .) I l ( Heritage Reporting ~ Corporation (202) 628-4888 i i 1
136 1 even exchange information. Then you move to sharing if it 2 makes sense. But you have got to start from home plate, first. 3 And I think it is -- 4 DR. LEVYi I would say it is a little more than EPRI. 5 He's not doing research. You have to be careful. And I think 6 you want to involve NUMARC or the industry, because a lot of 7 these things is: How do you apply these rules? And so on. 8 So, I am cautioning: EPRI is research oriented. But I believe 9 some of the stuff he is doing is to create like -- 10 DR. TODREAS: I agree. There is two directions to 11 this. One is a research direction and then the other is what 12 you and Spence were talking about which is: 13 DR, LEVY: Speed up the process of creating the 14 guides. 15 DR. BUSH: Some of it is rehearch. For example, what 16 you have obviously -- if I were doing it, I would pick someone 17 who is very important on ICRP and NCRP who has all of the 18 credentials. And I would put the money there because, quite l 19 frankly, the selling point on that would be something that came l 20 out of either NCRP or ICRP or preferably both that would ! l 21 establish this. Because, now, you have a real hope document l 22 that now will have an impact across not just NRC but others. 23 And let's face it. There are such people around and I think 24 that is the type of thing you want to do. 25 But ths amount of money up there, quite frankly, may 1 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4880
137 1 not be enough to accomplish what you want in a reasonable time. 2 DR. MORRIS: I call it a~Superstar. I think that is 3 what you are saying, someone who coulo command a great deal of 4 respect in the community and put together the progrem that we 5 envision. And we have not located that person. 6 DR. BUSH: Well, there are a heaf E doz a people who 7 I am familiar with who have done a lot o; work in this arena. 8 DR. TODREAS: Okay. What I would like to do is break 9 now and come back at one. I promised we would finish at 3:00. 10 So, we have to go a few minutes before 3:00, the way I 11 understand it. Does anybody else have to leave? 12 DR. BUSH: I have a 3:12 limo that has to leave 13 DR. TODREAS: Okay, so, most of us will te S re until 14 3:00. What I will do is go through some of the organizational 15 items relative to the future. And thhn I think we ought to 16 have a discussion relative of what we have heard and how we 17 coalesce it. 18 (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., a luncheon recess was 19 taken to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day, February 19, 20 1988.) 21 22 23 24 25 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
n~ ~-- 1136 1 A F T L 3 N O O 14 S C S'S I O.N 2 DP. TODEEAS: 'On the record.
;t ;
3 Uhat I'have.got. here, in. addition to this, in another 4 sheet, which is "umbrelle issue 6 " which: I think it .t.wve l 5 identified. Onderneath that is -" technical issues,"lmore.
- 6. spec 2 fic technical issues that I want te get up on the kcard. ;
7 And underneath'that are documents that we want to'get. That is 0 the easiest one.to handle while Mr. Shepard isn't here, cSo we 9 will defer that; he'll be back, 10 And ?. hen this le the second'easlect-one to handle. 11 So we could just go through this. On this note to.me,'as..a-12 result of the meeting, can you' start it off and indicate the 13 fist and second choices within the five functional areas? What l 14 I have in mind is that for this May neeting we will go over the 15 work plan for the next year an well ai the budget. We will 16 just split that up by these five functional steaa and probably , i 17 try to have two people on each area. , 1 1 18 The five functional areas come on this sheet that 19 Eric handed out. If you look at the five-year plan and just 20 read it from the front, the research prograta is organized in ] i 21 these five areast primary system integrity, core damage ; i 1 22 prevention, etcetera. Okay? 23 What I want to do is.to just line up people uhere 24 they want to be So make sure that your second choice is J 25 acenptable to you. 1 probably have to do a lot -- it's not , 1 1 ( Heritage Fepor-ting-Corporation ~.- -., _._ j (202) 628-4888 i l
4 I [ 139 1 going to be that easy. 2 Under containment, integrity, and radiation 3 protection -- Bill Morris really falls under that. They are 4 kind of generic -- l 5 MR. REED: They're not really. split the way your p 6 areas of interest might go. l 7 DR. TODREAS: Yes. But on the other hand, since we l-l 8 have to coves everything anyway, I don't want to address your l l 9 comments in twenty percent of the thing. I want you to l 10 concentrate on twenty percent, but look over the whole thing. 11 MR. BECKJARD: I think'it's right to concentrate on 12 those functional areas because'there may be. forthcoming some 13 further evolutionary changes in the organization. i 14 DR. LEVY: I don't mind concentrating on five a 15 functional areas, but if you look at those five functional i 16 areas, there is another mixed bag that you haven't assigned to 17 anybody, which is pretty large. ; i 18 DR. TODREAS: Which is? l 19 DR. LEVY: Which is generic issues, which is accident 20 management, which is human factors -- 21 DR. TODREAS: No, those are all subsumed under one or , i 22 the other. ! 23 DR. LEVY:' I don't believe so. 24 DR. MILLER: The problem is that it's a 25 three-dimensional -- (
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' 1' DR. LEVY: , Where are.genericiissues?
2 DR. TODREAS: Generic issues are:the'fifth. functional 23 area: Safety Issue Resolution and Rulemaking. : And Spiec's 4 (ph). job is -- see,.he's.a' deputy director. . His. responsibility 5- is the generic. issues. He goesLto whichever. division'or branch: 6 person that he needs:to'get.them. 7 DR. TODREAS: These-five things are a-bunch of. cats z .'l 8 and dogs'under some of them -- that's what I see as the. ] 9 problem, not that it'isn't a complete umbrella.
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10 DR. MILLER: Yes, it's a complete umbrella. 11 DR. TODREAS: But there are many ways to do it. That 1 12 is one area. The reason I go for it is that it maps'the way 13 their documentation is organized, which is.a' big' thing. 14 Otherwise you have to'-- 15 DR. MILLER: And it maps the way the money is going. 16 DR. TODREAS: Well, I'm not sure of that one. 17 DR. MILLER: Isn't that right? Or is that right, 18 Eric? 19 DR. SHOAF: Money goes from -- l 20 DR. MILLER: These are five program areas 'com the 21 I money point of view too, aren't they? 22 MR. BECKJARD: Yes, that's right. 23 DR. TODREAS: Well, the second point -- this is a 1 24 point of process. Once you have an area, just what I expect is
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25 that you just go after it during the spring. So when we get ( Heritage Reporting Corporation. (202) 628-4888
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141 1 together in May, I'll frame the agenda. But when we get i 2 together in May, it's basically you leading the reporting
)
3 discussion back to the Committee, versus for the first time you ) 4 getting the information. ] 5 We can schedule the agenda in May so that we talk 6 about the key questions in the area that you have really 7 brought up. That will bring the office director or the branch 8 chief up here, not to give us a presentation, but to answer 9 very directed questions. For that, however, is best to go 10 about it -- just decide. I just listed Bob -- I don't know if , 11 I spelled your name right. , 12 MR. SHEPARD: That's correct. 13 DR. TODREAS: Okay. I checked with Eric -- Eric said 14 that basically if you have to travel to go to a lab and see who 15 the performers are and see the program -- fine. So my point 16 ist just decide what you need to do, contact Bob, and work l 1 17 through him and do it. It is very decentralized -- I don't ! I 18 want to be in the middle. l 19 DR. GLOYNA: How about a case in point? 20 Let's suppose I want to develop a better 21 understanding of your overall waste management problem. I call 22 you, and then you put me in contact with the right people, or 23 you would take it from there and have them contact me and 24 arrange it? 25 MR. SHEPARD: Exaccly. That would be the way to do ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
142 1 it. I think that would be the most efficient way, recognizing 2 that depending on what those needs are, it very well could be 3 that the initial start might be to get better information from 4 the in-house folks here. That can be worked out based on our 5 discussion. 6 DR. TODREAS: I would start on the assumptian that 7 given an area, you know who the office director is. You're 8 just a facilitatory, not a guy who is going to get in-between 9 those two. So, Earnest, you know who the office director is. 10 You tell Bob that you're going to do it, and he does the 11 arrangements. But go after the office director. That's the 12 guy who is responsible for the program. 13 But I think -- well, I have this down in some other 14 place. One of the key things that was asked for us in our 15 charter is specifically: Are the best people doing the work? 16 That definitely requires knowing where the subcontracts are and 17 knowing who is doing it. So from one extent or another, 18 depending on you familiarity with the program, you have to see 19 who the contractors are. 20 Actually, this comes into another thing. I think one 21 of the biggest benefits -- I think it's a benefit to you, 22 Eric -- is that we are bringing your staff, I think for the 23 first time, before a group where they really get pinged on. 24 Okay, outside group, maybe; inside group, for sure. But they l 25 have to answer basic questions on direction, philosophy, an all l I ( Heritage Reporting Corporation ! (202) 628-4888
143 1 from the outside now. By going and talking to the contractors, 2 I'm sure we will. get to see a different perspective, too, and 3 'it will just all come together. 4 MR. REED: Are we encouraged to do that?. I think we 5 have to be careful, too. 6 MR. BECKJARD4 I thiri; the only limits on what you do 7 are e. matter of interpscting the guidance which was given by 8 the National Academy and what I said about your advice. If vou 9 want to talk to'the laboratories, that's fine by me. We.will
. 1 10 set that up.
11 The one comment I would make is that it seems to me 12 that the question of what you do ought to get a little bit of
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13 discussion, considering the matter of detailed program review j i 14 on the one hand, and the overall evaluation of whether the l 1 15 office is working on the right projects -- those general four l 16 or five questions that were articulated at the beginning. I 17 guess the feeling I have had is that if you get into detailed 18 program review, if you want to do a detailed review of every 19 program that we arc undulcaking, you may miss,.given the time 1 20 restraints, the larger questions. 21 On the other hand, I don't at all mean to suggest 22 that you shouldn't look at programs. I guess what I wculd 23 suggest is that you do some selective looking. For instance, 24 taking one of these. sites disposing of.something important. Do 25 a bunch of sampling to decide what you think is the most Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L________________________________________.______
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i .1 'important. That.would be;one kind of bet of' questions that-you-2 might ask. Another would be: 'Is the quality ofithe work' good? 3 DR.?SHOAF ':As almatter of courtesy, I:think that'if: 4 :we are arranging site, visits,-there?ought to be somefletter on 5 file e'ither to Eric or his designee because it is often. 6 difficult'for'the' laboratories 1to organize -- 7 MR. BECKJARD: Oh, I'll take care of that. 8 DR. SHOAF- The other part of,it-is that this is the. 9 Spring. That means that all of usfare: deeply' committed!to the 10 preparation of FDPS, 189s, whatever you want to' call them,-from-11 the FY '89 budget review, that. external. program reviews 12 and advisory reviews are going on in many of the contractor. 13 labs. 14 And even though our responsibility is to help out 15 this organization as much ae we can,11t is a little diplomatic 16 question to go in -- sometin.es this could probably be resolved 17 by sitting in the back of the room while somebody is going 18 through their standard 198 dog and pony show for their program i 19 monitors. I am sure-this could be arranged 20 Ours, for instance, are open to anybody.who can , l 21 express -- 22 MR. BECKJARD: I am glad to oblige. 23 DR. SHOAF: But it is sometimes very difficult for an
- 24. organization to decide whether they should respond with great ]
25 circumspection and highly ambiguous language,'or how candid 1 i ( Heritage Reporting _ Corporation. __..___._, __ (202) 628-4888 l I i i Eii______________________.__.______________ __ _
145 1 they should be with the visitor. 2 MR.-BECKJARD: Well, I'll tell them to tell it like 3 it is. 4 DR. SHOAF: But I think as a courtesy, there4 ought to 5 be something on the file that we are contemplating a trip 6 somewhere with an agenda.
- 7. DR. MILLER: I suppose all of us are associated with 8 organizations or have been that have a wide variety of adviso;y 9 committees, Neil included. It seems to me that we have to' 10 decide if we are an advisory committee like the one I am on at 11 MIT that comes for two days, every eighteen months, listens to 12 the presentations, and makes some judgments as subjective as it l 13 might be, and give advice and write a report?
14 Or, at the vast extreme, are we a peer review 15 committee that goes into detail on every proposal that'comes 16 into the NRC? Now, when Eric called me and asked me, I had 17 this image of the former, not the latter. I just have to j 18 candidly admit that I don't have the time to go through a vast l 19 information-gathering and go to labs to find the programs ; i 20 between now and May. 21 I can't commit that kind of time to this activity. 1 22 DR. TODREAS: First, Sal. 23 DR. LEVY: I personally think that we ought to first l l 24 decide ways that we should try to accomplish at the. Spring 25 meeting. I don't think that we can, by Spring, try to' answer (
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.1 all of the mission that was given to this committee. I figure 2 there is plenty to do between now andLSpring, which is dealing
. i 3 with the research side of the house, the budget the members are l 4 going to furnish us, and the remaining at the higher level, you 5 know, are they doing the right things? Are they working on the 6 right things?;
7- I think we have to save the looking at the people 8 doing the work for another time. I have this worry that one l 9 guy will go out and check the people as to whether they are ; l 10 doing the right work, and some other guy is going to remain at ( l 11 a different level. So, I think we ought to define what is the 12 objective of the Spring meeting. i 13 DR. SHOAF: I agree. ! 14 DR. LEVY: And you should do that. You ought to try- j 15 to do that. ; 16 DR. TODREAS: Let me tell you where I am. I am 1 17 pretty much there. What bothers me a little is for somebody to H 1 18 just get on board and understand the area that they are going 19 to review -- some of you may feel that you don't have enough 20 background, that you have to go out and dig to see it first 21 hand. j 22 I guess I don't want to exclude that, but on the i 23 other hand, I don't think that that's the modus operandi for. 24 everybody. Now, what you bring up is for those who do go out, 25 are we going to get an uneven application? ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l _________________U
147 1 DR. MILLER: Or, do we have an uneven image of what 2 we're trying to accomplish at' that meeting, or more generally? 3 DR. LEVY: I think right now we should only go out to 4 get a better-feel for what is the totality of the program, what 5 are the priorities, what are the objectives. I:think if you do 6 that in a much more narrow type of thing, and then go back 7' later about deciding whether the_ people are doing the right 8 kind of work -- there are several objectives we have-been 9 given. 10 DR. BUSH: Well, I would. tend to second what Sal 11 said. In one aspect you have been mentioning, that's a highly 12 subjective judgement. For example, I have followed HSST for 13 twenty years now, and obviously I could take this person from 14 someplace to be better than that person, and so forth. But on 15 a tota 13 ty, that's what you have to look at. It effectively is 16 an integration of a couple of dozen people with very specific 17 facilities in order to do it. 18 You saw the pictures yesterday -- there aren't many 19 places. How many places are going to be able to' test the 20 vessel that is six inches thick by twelve feet high and do the 21 complete picture? So I think we have to be very careful on 22 what I would call a subjective judgement on better -- or best. 23 MR. SHEPARD: The reason I responded to Earnest the 24 way I did is because of my background in NMSS. The reason I 25 said that you might want to take a more thorough look in-house I ( Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 i
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1 148 1 is because often times', when you get out to;the laboratories, 3 { 2 you' don't'have a' good picture:of what the regulatory process is l 3 all about. 4 'I think'in order for you to capture what the ] l 5 regulatory process is all about -- you have heard from the 1 6 directors, that's true. But we have some very good branch 7 chiefs and technical people in-house that do a lot of t 8 calculations and a lot of internal technical things. .I think 9 that there should be a syllogistic bridge that's built between 10 what is already going on in-house from a regulatory point of 11 view, and then at some later date, if that picture's'not clear, 12 you might want to link it with what the laboratory might'want 13 to add to that. 14 But I think for it not to be disjointed and 15 fragmented, I think the first level should be internal NRC at 16 the branch-technical level. So that's why I responded to 17 Earnest that way, and it's because of this regulatory framework 18 which is not always clearly understood by the laboratory folks 19 who are doing the work. 20 MR. BECKJARD: There is one other comment which maybe 21 I should add. As you know, the ACRS remains in the picture for 22 reviewing research work. I had some discussions with the full 23 committee and with the Chairman. The general agreement now, I 24 think, is that the ACRS will continue.as they do now, to carry 25 out detailed program reviews on certain programs -- seismic, ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l l
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.149 -j 1 for example, the thermo-hydraulics program. The fracture.
2 mechanics and embrittlement things'are programs that they are 3 looking at now. 4 And they expect to continue to do that. You may w. t 5 to have a chat with the Chairman sometime when-you are ready to i 6 discuss roles and how.you intend to operate. I think it.would 7 help. In fact -- 8 DR. TODREAS: Who is the Chairman? 9 MR. BECKJARD: Bill Kerr. d 10 DR. BUSH: You probably ought to talk to'the one 11 essentially responsible for'the review process. It wouldn't 12 hurt if you could catch them both at the same time'.- 13 DR. TODREAS:' I thought they.were backing out of 14 that. 15 MR. BECKJARD: Well, what they're backing out of is 16 the requirement to do an annual review of research. 17 DR. TODREAS: Oh, okay. 18 MR. BECKJARD: That's what they're backing out of. 19 They are doing programmatic reviews of issues that 20 are for one reason or another on their agenda, as connected 21 with their review of the regulatory-program. ' Decisions of 22 specific plants, or on classes of plants -- so they do detailed 23 program reviews. But they are highly selective, and they are l l 24 going to discontinue the review of the research budget. That's 25 my understanding. 1 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
t i 150 1 1 Some action has to be taken in Congress to change 2 the wording of the legislation. But the initiative has been 3 taken. 4 DR. TODREAS: On this, I think we have a collective 5 sense here. I guess what I ought to do is back up and go back 6 the other way and just ask if you think you need to go to the 7 field in your area. 8 MR. REED: I think there is a mid-way point in here. 9 I haven't been to Sandia, but the value of going to Sandia, I 10 believe, would be the interaction I would have with all of you j 11 all. You bring something to it. I would be afraid for one or 12 two to go -- I have may biases. But why don't we meet the next 13 meeting where we can spend a day and maybe learn a little bit 14 more about some of the issues we raised as to what the 15 management thinks of how it should be*run. 16 Maybe we can tie that with the opportunity, then, on 17 the second day or the evening, or something like that, to tour 18 the lab and to talk to various people. I 19 DR. SHOAF: Could I go back? Sal's remark -- to meet 20 our request for help in May, this separation of our large 21 charge into near-term and longer-term issues -- I think these 22 site visits are invaluable -- just invaluable. But to meet 23 some cbligation to be of help by me requires that we try to do
- 24 the best we can on the budget as a whole with perhaps not very l
25 fine grained analyses. , I l ( Heritage Reporting Corporation __ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . . . . . . _ . _ (202) 628-4888 l
I 1 1 4 151 1 Yesterday someone said that out of our four by five 2 matrix, the next level is 72 -- 72 separate areas that are 1 i' 3 identifiable ar.d tied to our specific FTE and budget. The 4 difference between five, twenty, and 72 -- I don't even know 1 5 what a suitable algorithm would be -- but that's a lot of work 6 by me. 7 To even do twenty by me in a responsible fashion -- I i 8 don't think there is any way we can go to the 72 level across I 9 the committee and do some kind of uniformly responsible job. 10 DR. TODREAS: Let me try to coalesce this as we go 11 on. I think I get the sense. I think for May we have to be 12 here because we basically have a day and half, and we have to 13 come back and say something collective about the whole budget. i' 14 I think in May we can decide if the next one -- to take your
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15 suggestion -- for that which would be in October. 16 I'd say in preparation for the meeting within the 17 function that you basically picked -- if you think you have to 18 go the field to get up-graded on it, just give me a call and 19 we'll discuss it. I'll just make sure that the trip to the 20 field is sort of informatic- gathering and not for the 21 subjective idea of directly digging in and upsetting the pace 22 of the committee as a whole. 23 But I would leave it open if somebody thinks that l 24 they are starting from a background where they need to go out l 25 there for information-gathering -- fine. Probably that will l - _.---Herit a ge - Report-ing Cerperstion . (202) 628-4888
1 l 152 l' just be a few' people.. { 2 Let me skip this term of membership. That's- 'l
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3 something you said -- I heard you in the back -- that ought'to 4 be taken up this afternoon if there's time. We'll come back to-5 it. That wasn't exactly my issue. 6 MR. BECKJARD: That is not a hard-hit -- 7 DR. TODREAS: Okay. My' issue is on the next thing. 8 Relative to.what we're trying to accomplish in May -- that's 9 what I am really hanging on. It is not fine-grained, in my 10 mind. The way I approach it, there are a couple of umbrella 11 issues that I thought we came up with that -- what I wanted to 1 12 do was talk about them and add to them. 'This kind of j 13 discussion on these things and where these things might lead, 14 budget-wise, may be the level that we can get at. i 15 But we can sensitize to this. I will let you read 16 this in a minute. I am purposefully not letting you read it. 17 I know what I'm doing. 18 (Laughter) 19 DR. BUSH: Give me a copy. 20 DR. TODREAS: No, no, no. It will come back. What I I 21 want to do is to give you the big picture before I lock in on a 22 big deoate here. 1 1 23 What I have here are specific technical issues that I ) I ( 24 thought were important enough as technical issues, which may or L 25 may not impact on the budget, that I want to put them up on the l 1 I .i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4889 l l
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'i 153 o i
1- board and again sensitize people to look into them. J ILthink 2 .they_were important. E q 3 MR BECKJARD:' By " steel containment," youLmean'the. 4 first one that Guy talked about?
~ l 5' DR. TODREAS: .Yes. We will come back to-that.
6 Let's do this first. What I'm talking about is.the- ! 7 goal here. Through this discussion'I guess we can all 8 calibrate each other, whether we're hitting ~this program and 9 consequentially.this budget at the right level. 10 Let me just tell you what I had in mind'here, and
- 11. then we can go into the. discussion. I heard a big discussion' 12 this morning relative to PRA areas, relative.to this resource allocation in terms of-what applicants are going'to send in. I 13 1
14 It's kind of a narrow question, technically, but to me it may ] 1 15 be a big budget perturbation. 16 To me, it was big enough-to put up here and think 17 about. The whole use of safety goals -- I have talked myself 18 blue in the face on that too in various forms -- but starting 19 with the safety goal and then the steps down, Wayne gave us an i 20 approach whether that's the office approach,.and then that's 21 going to have some impact on the whole program. I think that's ; 22 the kind of umbrella issue we shouldn't let go of. l 23 To me, I guess, even if we didn't' comment on your 24 budget, but if we put you, and particularly the office-25 directors and the branch chiefs through an intellectual Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i __m.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _
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. discussion checking their logic,-their consistency, their 1
] i 2 approach, we might even' carn our money that-way.. I donft want.
- 3: to let that one go'.
4 Third, the waste disposal issue - .I gues's my view <; 5' here:is that'before'you launch.off and adopt a taski that you d d 6 are going to license something for'10,000 years, you ought to. -] 7 step;back't.nd_ decide what the task for the NRC should'really' 8 be. -That'.s.another broad ~ issue. 9 The closure of the severe-accident issue -- 10 MR. REED: You mean the researchLtask? 11 DR.'TODREAS: Yes. 'These issues.in the. discussion' 12 and some view of them is going to affect the research' program 13 very generally. 14 The closure of the severe-accident' issue -- okay, I I I 15 made my speech on that this morning. "I think that's a real 16 trap. I think we have to talk and understand what_ people'mean 17 when they say this. 1 18 This last one is not'in this. category.. But it is ] 19 directions, or trends, that I perceive, that.in the. program, at l 20 least.in these two areas -- the fission product chemistry and 21 the low-dose effects -- they are both recognized af important, i 22 and.they could be growing contributions. I'think we ought.to 23 recognize items of that sort and discuss whether we have the 1 24 totality of things here that at least the office thinks,iand 25 then discuss what we think about this. 'They.can take up ( -! Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 l 155 i i 1 increasing pieces, 2 So it's this level of coarseness that I wanted to 3 direct us towards. l 4 (Continued on next page) l 5 6 7 9 I i 10 ) 11 12 13 14 j l 15 ! 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 , ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i i 156 1 1 DR. LEVY: Again, pursuing your point, I believe the i 2 research group has now put their budget together. They're ! l 3 going to have to put some kind of a document that explains it ] 4 and justifies it. I think they may do it in 72 pieces, but I ( 5 believe it has to be a top-tier document that says what is it I 6 they are trying to do in research, what are the most important 4 7 areas and why. 8 DR. TODREAS: Is that written -- 9 DR. LEVY: And how are they going to close them. I am 10 looking for a strategic plan, frankly. And I tell you, we had I I 11 a mixed bag. It was a mixed bag. There are some little things ) i 12 in there. There are some big things that obviously -- you and ! I 13 I discussed this. The strategy on severe accident has changed I i 14 considerably from what it was maybe a year or two ago. I'm not ) 15 saying it's bad, by the way, but I am'saying you have to decide 16 what is your basic strategy. Just like he's chasing waste l. 17 disposal. And the key issue there: Are we going to go for ) 18 10,000 year or are we going to go for less. And it is a major 19 difference in the research program. 20 My view, after reading the academy report, I think 21 that Eric's chances of selling this program, whatever it is for 22 next year's budget, I think it is going to need this top level 23 that says what's important in research, what are the strategies 24 being pursued. And then, after that, falls these 72 programs ] l 25 or 93 'r 96. First, you start with the top 5 and then go down ( Heritage Reporting--Corporation - _ - - - - - - - _ ._.l (202) 628-4888 1 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . . . _ . . _ _ _ .I
157 1 to 95th. But you know, we were not given this total packageLat 2 the top. What we have here is an amorphous research program 3 that we are-catching a transition. 4 DR. TODREAS: Well, we've got something that is 5 labeled that which is a five-year plan. The documents 6 identified and written, what you are talking about is its 7 adequacy. 8 DR. LEVY: It la not adequate in my view. You should 9 _ lay your strategy in each of these areas. That document 10 doesn't do that. 11 DR. BUSH: You need one more word, I think, is all. 12 What is important and why? Why is very important. 13 DR. LEVY: That's what I said. I'said, first, you 14 have got to decide what is important and why is it important. 15 What schedule you've got to close it 6n. These are the three 16 top things you have got to say, first. Then, having said that, 17 you say: Here's the strategy I am going'to pursue to close. 18 And I think if we can get Eric and his people to deal with that 19 issued -- I'm saying it's a rewrite of their five-year plan: 20 What are the most important areas, why. What schedule do we , 21 want to close. And then, really, the plan to do it. And what i 22 I mean by " plan" is strategic 1 23 DR. TODREAS: It's what, why and when. And when. j 24 DR. LEVY: When is very important. 25 MR. REED: I would think you would put the "who" in (
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158 1 there, too. Who is accountable. 2 DR. LEVY: Well,.I am assuming that ! will be "this I 3 director /that' director." But1you are'right.- .You have got;to 4 say who is-accountable for making it happen. I don't disagree' ] 5 with that point. 6 DR. MORRISON: It seems'to me.there ought to'be some 7 "how" in there because the broader' issue I see: -Are you-going 8 to do all this by codes? Are you. going to do it by separate 9 effects? 10 DR. : LEVY : That's what I call " strategic plan." How 11 you get there and how you are going-to do something. Are you 12 going to do some experiments or is it all analytical? 13 DR. SHOAF: This is growing like Topsy. . There is j 14 another boundary condition and that is Eric's legacy. He has i 15 institutional legacies. He has this transition from the ACRS l 16 functioning in one pattern whic affected the development and 17 operation of the research program in other years. He is in 18 transition now. He had an extraordinary budget' blow last year. 19 He has expectations for this year and luust be doing some 20 contingency planning. And while we are trying to help with the 21 '90 budget submission, we need I think as candid a discussion 22 perhaps in a letter to Neil which can be shared with us how 23 much leeway we must give him to deal with.these matters before 24 we get down to the heart of the matter. 'i 25 It is not very useful to the operation of a research-( l Heritage Reporting Corporation 4 (202) 628-4888 j 1 i ____________.___-._.m _ _ _ _ _ . _
1 159 < I organization to try to give advice without considering these j i 2 legacies and boundary conditions. And we need to know what the 3 controllable budget is, really. j i 4 DR. LEVY: I don't disagree with you. That top layer l 5 which says: There's a few things I've inherited. I'd put the 6 generic issues in there. They are actually generic issues were 7 forced on research. They are there and they are going to use a 8 certain amount of money for it. And, unless somebody changes 9 the organization, they are just going to eat up that kind of 10 money. And I don't think it is beyond our purview to say it is 11 the right place or not. l 12 DR. SHOAF: Oh, absolutely. But we need to know -- . 13 DR. LEVY: We need to know those things. There are a 14 lot of things that are just carry-over programs which you can't 15 turn off. So, what you are saying: The strategy here is we 16 started it and we are just going to finish it, period. And I 17 think you have to identify those in another bag over and above. 18 That is why I was looking for another bag beside the five bags. i 19 There are a few things that there is very little advice we can j j 20 give on. They are going to happen whether we like it or not. 21 DR. SHOAF: It is either item zero in each of the 22 five major categories. Or it is an item zero and then there l 23 are five categories. 24 DR. LEVY: But I believe we can help him quite a bit 25 on all that. i i ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
160 i l 1 MR..BECKJORD: I agree with everything you have all 1 2 said. 3 DR. TODREAS: You can help us on that, but do you q 4 really agree with what Sol said, which is almost like before we 5 can help y.ou -- 6 MR. BECKJORD: .You mean the what,-why how? 7 DC.-TODREAS: Yes. I'll'put it even more bluntly the j 8 way he said. Before ina can help you make some judgments, we 9 need a strategic plan vith the what, why, how, who, when. And 10 that is probably going to be a rewrite of the five-year plan 11 that you just put on our lap. 12 MR. BECKJORD: I have no problem with that objective. ; 13 -Last year, the agency, the chairman initiated a strategic plan. 14 And the five-year plan grew out of that. And essentially,.the 15 parameters of those plans were developed, the strategic plan -- j 16 one, by a working group for the strategic plan. And then 17 subject to that, the five-year plan was put together by the 18 budget office. And it drew on the strategic plan. And it kind , 19 of put it into a format and a pattern. 20 My personal opinion of those, having actually worked 21 quite a lot with strategic planning in the past and I have seen l 1' 22 both successes and failures. My personal opinion was that the 23 strategic plan got off to a good start. But what happened to l 24 it is I guess what happens in bureaucratic organizations. It ; 25 came to be used for more than the original purpose. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation , [ (202) 628-4888
161 1 The original purpose was to do a strategic plan. 2 The later purpose was to use it as'a response'to certain. 3 documentation that'is required in the budget process. And 4 that put it into a whole new clock and a whole new format,- 5 which frankly is not what I consider.to be really useful from.a 6 strategic planning point of view which addresses exactly the 7 things that you pointed out of what, why, how, when and'who. 8 I would like to do that. I' started to do that with 9 the budget submissions for last year. They got into the 10 five-year plan, which you can.see. If you look up at the front 11 of every one of those sections, there is about from a couple of 12 paragraphs to a page or a little over a page of a description 13 of what we are doin, and why we are working on it and why we 14 think it is important. Now, I admit it is imperfect, but that 15 is a start. Ane .e are going to improve on that. And *his 16 year, the idea is to work further down into the guts of the 17 budget work, itself, to do the same, kind of thing for the major 18 programs. What happened this time was there was an 19 introduction, but it did not get further down-into the program. 20 DR. TODREAS: But while we get a little' bit more 21 educated in the next couple of months, you will be working in 22 parallel to produce the document, then, which we can get enough 23 ahead of May so that'we can look it over and then comment at 24 that level in May. Is that okay? 25 MR. BECKJORD: Yes. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202)-628-4888 i
162 1 DR. TODREAS: Let me just tell you, though, one other
'2 thing that' bothers me a little is whether you really get the 3 help to produce a document like that at'the right level.
4 Because, frankly, some of the give and take for the last day 5 and a half when some of these questions were raised, people did 6 not just grasp the question at the level it was asked. And I. 7 am not confident that all the troops are marshalled to walk 8 right in there and write something like this. 9 MR. BECKJORD: Yes,.I grant that. This is a process. 10 It has to be an ongoing process. I think it was imporfect last. , li year. I think.it will be better this year. ) 12 DR. TODREAS But if it isn't done by May or even 13 before May, what are we really going to do when we meet in May l 14 and write a report. .) l 15 DR. MILLER: Let me comment'again. If l' were
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16 dictator of the day what it would be nice -- not that you are a 17 dictator. What I would rather see happen is that we really get 18 a very good strategic understanding like Sol is saying of what 19 Eric and what we, now, are trying to accomplish with this 20 research program. Cut in various ways. 5 x 4 matrices, 21 confirmatory, anticipatory, the National Academy asked about 22 universities, national labs. I mean there are so many clices 23 to take through the research budget to truly understand what it 24 is trying to accomplish that I would like to really understand l 25 what we are trying to do before we give advice on a budget. If ; ( Heritage Rcporting-Corporation -- -- - (202) 628-4888
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-1 I had my way, that is what I would prefer.n 2 I have'never felt comfortable with this-idea of in 3 May we have to' make . a. comment . on the budget without us: knowing. j 4 .this bigger picture Sol is talking about. So, if I had-it my l 5 way, we wouldn't comment on.the budget for fiscal year 1990 at 6 all'. You know, and we would wait.until the next time around.
7 I think it is driving us in ways that are not good for us,: 8 necessarily, in the long term as a committee. It is'getting us 9 to deal with issues -- J 10 DR, TODREAS: How about commenting on the strategic ) i I 11 plan? 12 DR. MILLER: Well, I think that would be trem3ndous. 13 In fact, that is what we should do -- that is number one in our l 14 list of five things that is listed in the committee's
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15 objectives: conformance of the NRC i well, in fact, it-is
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16 after that. But it implies that: Conformance of the NRC 17 Nuclear-Safety Research Program to the NRC philosophy of 18 nuclear regulatory research as stated in the Connission's. ; 19 Strategic Plan and to specific Commission. directions. That 20 implies to me, going through a process of understanding and t 21 help shape, hopefully, the'pnilosophy, the safety philosophy of ; 22 Nuclear Regulatory. Commission. , 23 DR. LEVY: Some of us, as Eric said,.have seen some ! 1 24 good strategic. plans and some bad ones. But, you know,-a 4 25 strategic plan has to highlight shift in strategies. There are ; i
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164 l 1 some major shifts in strategies. And I think that has got to- 3 2 come out of the strategic plan. A good strategic plan has 3 contingency plans. Youfknow, what if we are stuck with this-4 10,000 year on waste disposal. I believe it is " Mission 5 Impossible," frankly. -Maybe a few of us ought to.say that. l I 6 DR. SHOAF: Perhaps one can say that, but if we:are
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7 to be of help, then we need-to do -- to rise to that challenge { 8 which we are all told we were trained and educated to do; 9 namely, to bound a sensible question and to try to devise a way f
'O of getting to a useful answer. a 11 DR. LEVY: That's correct. We'll make an alternate 12 suggestion.
13 DR. BUSH: I was on the subcommittee to try to 14 respond to Congress' request or comment about the 1,000 years. 15 And I don't classify myself in there,"but there was some
-1 16 extremely good people with backgrounds in that and our 17 essentially unanimous opinion is that we could not 1
18 unequivocally respond to the 1,000 year statement which is I i 19 built right into the bill. Now, you multiply by 10. 20 DR. TODREAS: Pete, my view is very different from 21 yours. Strategic plan, umbrella issues, to me, those are going 22 to meld into the same thing and my view was we commant on the ; 23 big picture and then when you finish that paragraph, you have a 24 couple of lines that says And the '90 budget is in this 25 direction or that direction relative to this point or this ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
165 1 point and you make a comment on it. Rather than you start out 2 a document and say, "This is a comment on the '90 budget." And 3 you go down through it. 4 DR. MILLER: Yes, I think as I was trying to say 5 yesterday, if what we are talking about is making a very coarse 6 grain comment on the '90 budget, then that is fine. I don't 7 have a problem with that. But if we were -- you know, we 8 started this discussion by at least me getting the impression 9 we were going into fine-grained discussion of the 90 budget 10 and that bothers me without having understood this bigger 11 picture. 12 DR. TODREAS: I think we are on the track now, 13 commenting in May relative to the strategic plan that Eric 14 produces. And let's say that will be produced and in our hands 15 before May. Then we comment on that and then hit -- my idea is ; l 16 that within that comment if we can make illusions and 17 statements relative to what may happen over the next year or 18 two years, we put those in to the extent we can. But we don't 19 have that complete obligation. And it is structured that way. 20 You had a comment? 21 DR. BUSH: Just a suggestion. It is a buck passing 22 thing, but we made the point on the inherited issues. I am not 23 exactly sure what an' inherited issue is in this respect. And I 24 think that Eric is going to have to decide because there have L 25 been some that have been here for 20 years. Now, that doesn't ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
166 1 mean they are inheri.'ed, as such, because in fact, the program 2 is expanding rather than going the other way. But, somehow or 3 other, you are going to have -- if you are going to put these 4 up front, I don't think we can do it. That is_my personal 5 opinion. 6 DR. TODREAS: Put these? 7 DR. BUSH: The, quote, inherited issues. 8 DR. TODREAS: Yes. 9 DR. BUSH: The ones that you live with and, 10 therefore, you have minimal control over. l 11 DR. TODREAS: I didn't ask my question right. If we 12 put those up front -- 13 DR. BUSH: All I am suggesting is that we can't do 14 it. It is going to have to be done by Eric. That's the only
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15 point I am making. 16 DR. TODREAS: When Mary made that point, I assumed 17 implicitly that he got that message. 18 DR. BUSH: Well, I assumed so, but I wanted to make 19 sure. 20 DR. MILLER: The only additional thing I would say 21 about what you said, Bill, is in reality it seems to me that we 22 are talking about May, the five-year plan that we have now is 23 basically going to be the strategic plan. I can't imagine how 24 Eric can get really consensus on a strategic plan in the next i 25 two months. This is what we would be talking about. Am I ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 being tuo pessimistic? 2 UR. BECKJORD: I don't think we are starting fror. 3 zero on it. I'm sorry. Consensus within the agency? 4 DR. MILLER: Within RES. Among all your people on 1 5 some of these very important issues, how, who, when and all of 6 that. I mean I would hate to see rush through a strategic plan ) 7 just because May 30th this committee is meeting. And have it 8 not be something that you and your people are really happy 9 with. 10 MR. BECKJORD: I have to produce a budget document 11 that goes in and explains what we are asking for, what the , 1 12 program is, what the budget is and explaining the ! 13 accomplishments and so on. 14 So, this is what I would plan to give you because I 15 don't want to write two documents. I mean I can't write two. 16 But along with that is going to-be an explanation on the 17 program level of what, why, how. And then we will also do an 18 overview, you know, an introduction which leoks at it from the-19 point of view of the entire research office. And I think that 20 that can do many of the things that a strategic plan would do. 21 A good strategic plan has a lot of analysis in it of business. 22 You know, the business climate and it name.s alternatives and it 23 evaluates alternative strategies. I don't think it is going to 24 be complete like a strategic plan, but I think it can go -- it 25 certainly ought to give the rationale for what we propose to do ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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168 1 and why and how it is. going to accomplish something. 2 DR. TODREAS: But not.just a one-year bite, though. 3 MR. BECKJORD: No. 4 DR. TODREAS: Do we want to call'it'a strategic plan?
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5 DR. SHOAF: We want to call it the' concordance to the 6 strategic plan. 7 MR. REEOs I avoid those buzz words like mad because 8 along with it is all of the other bsloney you have to do. What 9 we want, I think, is really your polAcies and your objectives 10 and some long range planning. 11 DR. TODREAS: We need a na'ne for.what you are going 12 to provide us. And I don't think it ought to be "stretegic - 13 plan." I think perhaps long-range planning is what we are 14 looking for. j
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i 15 DR. GLOYNA: A direction' . l 16 DR. TODREAS: Okay. I think we are pretty much l 17 together, though, on what we need. l 18 MR. BECKJORD: It is really the rationale of the 19 badget that I think you are asking for. Right? Maybe that's 20 not the right word. It's a fairly full explanation. 21 DR. TODREAS: I'm past that point. You will come up 22 with a name. But I guess I just wanted to render -- I am 23 pretty clear what level you are going to get a response in Mr'. 24 I want to make sure you are clear. And it is not going to be 25 like this committee .adorses things on a fine-grained or even ( Heritage Reporting' -Corporation -- ------- --+ (202) 628-4888
i 169 ) 1 .the total number. q
-l 2 DR. MILLER: Necessarily.
3' DR..TODREAS: Or necessarily. And I really'think it , . 1 4 is. healthy for us not to get boxed. 1 5 Here, what'I guess 1 would like to get everybody. ]
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6 going on when you sit down ;arxi go through your' notes is to j 7 generate your. idea of-these umbrella issues that you.have come l 8 up with. I would like to get those out on the table, okay? 1 1 9 DR. MILLER: Add to the list. -l 10 DR. TODREAS: Add.to the list, change the list, and . 11 then I will pull it together. If it is worth taking some 12 discussion here.now, we can do it. If you want to think it 13 through. 14 DR. GLOYNA Those are good examples. Item 4 there, 4 15 for example, this is the ultimate of the regulatory. effort. J 16 NRC. And fission product chemistry, of course, to~many ofqus l 17 is very important. And low dose effects. But is it even . 18 conceivable that you as a regulatory agency could have an 1 19 impact on the development of a low dose when you'have got'all i 1 20 these other operations from NIH to' EPA to everything in oetween ' 21 that haven't been able to come to grips.with thattone little l 22 problem. ! 23 DR. TODREAS: Let me state: What I've got up here or 24 the way I look at it, I recognize that there is new emphasis in 25 this office in these directions. And the question is to-be f: RbportTfrq _ ... _ ...,_._,.MYItage corpDTEti~on " 1 (202) 628-4888 1
j 170 l 1 1 thrown back and examined. Is.it. doable? That's'what I am { l 2 asking. We have.all.those'"W's." j(l
-DR. MILLER: So, the question you'are asking now, j 3 ,
4 Neil, you're not asking to comment, us to corment on each of- l S. the issues and give our opinion. You are just making the 6 comment that we should sit-down and add to or modify your list. 7 DR. TODREAS: Yes. . We need an agenda of big [ issues I 8 that we will chew on for a year or a year and a half.. And I J 9 would just like to collect your wisdom on that.- And I put this j 10 up as stimulation. _I 11 DR. MILLER: Let me just comment. I think on No. 4, I 12 a broader comment I think than your comment ist How do you 13 somehow limit anticipatory research? You can put everything i 14 you want to under that if you would like and call it a 15 regulatory agency. Why are doing this? "Well, I'am j 16 anticipating that 10, 20, 90 years from now we might need this 17 information." 18 A.ad what is the policy,'what kind of policy statement l 19 could Eric have that would say, "Yes,'we do anticipatory 20 research, but we are not trying to create the NSF or' recreate 21 the NSF. How does he do that? I think that is an. interesting 22 issue. 23 DR. GLOYNA: Let me give you an' example of the reason 24 I asked the question. Is because over here at the EPA, they 25 now over the last several years have moved from, you know, how Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
171
'l to make things
- fishable" and " swimmable" to how to take care P
2 of the long-term health effects.. See. It's a hell of a' big 3 shift. And the fact is that they are.not set up to do the-
<4 long-term health effects, although they have put an MD in 5 charge of their R&D. That doesn't solv 9 it. They.are putting ' 6' some money into a lot of things on cancer effects and this sort 7 of thing. That.doesn't solve it.
8 My: question is: Is this agency here with its 9 predisposed umbrella have any hope of ever being able to do the 10 type of research that is relevant for establishing low-dose 11 effects? I am just asking the question. 12 MR. BECKJORD: Well,-that's a hard question to answer 13 because my own view of that is it is a very long-range effort 14 for the reasons that were already cited. It is very 15 controversial. And whenever the subject is brought up, there 16 are a lot of people who get into it and express an opinion. 17 There is some action underway, attention to it on an 18 international front. And there is going to be a symposium.or 19 an international meeting sometime this' fall on the de minimis 20 question. And some people ara putting together a program now 21 to get the experts in it together and to get everybody's view. 22 The idea is that from that perhaps a direction will be defined 23 which will lead eventually to agreement of what de minimis 24 levels are. 25 From a research point of vicW, I think it is very ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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d 1 difficult. My understanding of that area,_which is not great, :l l 2 but I know enough about it to know it is very_ difficult. That J 1 3- is probably the most difficult thing there is to do.in terms of ! 4 time because you are working with very small numbers'and you f d 5 .are trying to pick out effects which are in or barely above the. 6 noise. So, research-wise, I think it is.a long-range effort. i 7 DR. TODREAS, The other point here, these: to me are i 8 more technical issues. These are the things I wanted to ) 9 identify for Eric. I guess they are my own hobby horees, okay? 10 I think we all have them. They will come'out. 11 The way I look at these, if I had one of these five 12 areas, these are sort of meaty or important technical issues 4 13 that I thought came up over the last day and a half that I 14 would sort of like to ride to understanding and then maybe they 15 are translated into the research progra:n. 16 For ext;tple, on this steel and concrete containment, 17 I have heard enough before and seen enough yesterday to whet my 18 appetite that I know something important has been done. I am 19 not exactly sure how it is going to be used, what the next step 20 is and how it really fits into either an ongoing research 21 program or rulemaking. And the answer I thought I heard on j i 22 this was: Well, it just builds up our confidence of 23 conservatism. And that galls me a little because I live with, 24 let's say the Appendix K, and we went through 12-15 years with 25 that same kind of rationalization building up, never doing r ( ' Heritage Reporting Corporation I l (202) 628-4888 i I
173 1 anything about it. And I think that's the wrong train to get 2 on. We should take the result and use it. As I say, that's my 3 own hobby horse, but that is why I put that one up here. 4 DR. GLOYNA: Excuse me. You haven't gone far enough. 5 You've been thinking about reactor. Go over to the waste 6 disposal operation and see what sort of containment you are 7 going to put into that. 8 DR. TODREAS: Well, you've got a few here, too. 9 This second one I don't think is at all the same like 10 this. It is a technical discussion that we have got to carry 11 on that is real important that we all understand each other so 12 we can help a program that is committed. And to me, this is 13 important enough, we shouldn't leave it unresolved. We should 14 talk about it. 15 DR. BUSH: I have written three pages on it. 1 16 DR. TODREAS: And we should talk about it and discuss 17 it because this office is heavily into it. 18 Now, 3 gets sort of back to 1. Let's see, if I go 19 down here, first. On the NSC codes and the severe accident 20 area, I guess, Dave, you really asked for this document. I've 21 got that on the next page. But I think a number of us want to 22 know the logic and the strategy for how the branch chiefs and l 23 all decided what codes to launch, what codes to stay with, how 24 the packages fit together and, effectively, whether it all 25 ankes sense. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 l
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174 1 The point I have got above here, the validation' i 2' plans, we. talked about that earlier. But to me the issue is: 3 Is the NRC taking its own medicine? The^ laboratories which are 4 developing these codes for the'NRC,;are they really held to the- j 5 same standard, which I think is right that everybody else is 6 being held to? And we paid for this daily through track .3 7 relative to ECCS, before. 'And so we ought to revisit'that. 8 That is kind of a crosscutting issue..Maybe that is an umbrella 9- issue. Maybe it isn't. Since these were my hebby horses, 10 particularly, I gave them this label and downgraded them a step 11 from umbrella issuos. 12 (Continued on next page.) 13 1 14 15 16 17 , i 18 , 19 20 21 22 23 i 24 25 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L________._
175 1 MR. REED: I am wondering if there is another major i 2 area, though,.we ought to pursue before we get down to that. l
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3 In terms of overview. You have launched us off at the ) 1 4 philosophy'of what we are doing. 5 Another major management task I think we have to do 6 is to assess the effectiveness of th9 research that is being 4 7 done and has been done. I mean.we read these line items and j i 8 partJof the problem, I think,fis assignments have been given to i 9 people, to labs, whatever. Have they been done? Have they ] 10 been done effectively? Have they been done on time? If I want i 11 to report back in a major overview, that's one of the things I i 12 would have.done before I worry about too much the specific 1 13 technical facts. I 14 DR. TODREAS: You said effectiveness of the research. 15 DR. BUSH: I know of no better way there than 16 examples. There are some classical examples that have had 47 profound impacts where the research by one reason or another 18 has been implemented and there's been a major payoff. .These 19 are the kind of things I think it would help to put some of 20 these down. Now, we can do with them as we see fit, but I 21 think they would tend to focus. 22 MR. REED: But, Spence, we want those examples. I 23 think we also want examples -- we've spent $10 million in steam 24 explosions and if we spent 10 years and there has not been any 25 sort of conclusion or people haven't produced over the years, I ( . _ . - . . - . . - - . . . . , . . _ . . . . ~ . - . Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
176 1 think we want those examples, also. j 2- DR. MORRISON: Cordell, I think I am hearing two i 3 different things. You are talking from a performer and you are 4 . talking from a user. ) 1 5 DR. BUSH: I'm talking of the fact that if you look i 6 at - if you could show where there has been a payoff from the 4 7- performance point of view. In other words, that it has taken l 8 over and it's had a major impact for the user, whether it.could 9 help or hinder the utility, I won't argue that. A good example 10 and one I am very familiar with is the research that led.to the 11 option that the utility has for removal of your pipe whipped ~ 1 12 constraints and also a major number of your snubbers. 'Now, the l l 13 payoff, I estimate the payoff for reactor.per year is probably J 14 in the vicinity of a few million dollars. That's big bucks. 15 The thing is that at the same time we have shown that by doing 16 it, we have probably made the system inherently safer. 17 MR. REED: I'll give you another number. We're 18 removing 1200 snubbers from the south. 19 DR. BUSH: Amen. I have been fighting that issue for 20 20 years. 21 MR. REED: That will probably save us four weeks or , ? 22 five weeks in our refueling outages. 23 DR. BUSH: That's what I mean. And a million dollars 24 a day is a big figure. Big bucks. 25 MR. REED: But that's a good example. On the other ( -. . . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _- _ - Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l i i 1 o 177 1 1 hand, I have a feeliing there are some examples where we have 2~ poured money in'and we've poured money in and we have poured 3 money in without getting results. It may be to.a certain i 4 research organizations, it may be bece.use of a certain 5 management style. It may because we are not demanding. But I 6 think we have got to see if we are getting value for the. money J 7 'that.is being spent here. 8 DR. TODREAS: Let me frame the whole thing. My 1 9 listing of these. technical ideas,.it's a kind of list I don't 1 1 10 want to forget. But I agree with you in terms of the timing on i 11 it. These are the foci we talked about the first day relative
.12 to the 0ctober meeting. And the response document that you 13 have got to the NAS Panel involves a lot of things here. For 14 example, one is staffing and staff training issues, peer 15 review, publications, university research. There is a whole 16 bunch of things independent of the specific technical program.
17 So, relative to this label, probably effectiveness of i 18 the research is probably subsumed in these itema as well.. 14y ; 19 idea here was to basically take this NRC document. It should , 20 be issued soon. And, basically, revisit that in the October . 21 meeting and then comment on this whole picture. And under here, ; l 22 there is about maybe seven or eight meaty items. ; 23 I don't know if effectiveness of the research was 24 listed that way, but it certainly is in there. 25 MR. REED: Yes. I think going that path -- ( Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) v28-4888 ;
178 1 'DR. MILLER: It is in there as kind of sub-bullets 2 to me_like whether the best people:are doing the work in the 1 3 best places, appropriateness of the longer range research l 4 program. There are lots of things that all. fit into 5 effectiveness. And, so, I think you are right.- We'd have to 6 go another grain. lower than the word " effectiveness" and get ; 7 some of these issues that arelin the response, all of which 8 impact effectiveness. 9 DR. TODREAS: I guess I am a little concerned about 10 all of the items that are there relative to this. We have to 11 pick these out. I asked Eric this morning to think about if we I 12 had some time. I'm not sure whether we do. To address this 13 for us for maybe 15 minutes or a half hour before 3:00, if we 14 had the time, looking forward toward this. 'Now, let's just put 15 that on ice for a minute. I just want to draw from you any 16 other thoughts. j 17 I think we are settled on May in the strategy. And 18 now you have reminded us and drawn us toward the bigger picture 19 of where we are going subsequent to that. l 20 DR. BUSH: When you say settled on May, did you put ! 1 21 bounding limits on the May? Because earlier yesterday, you ] 22 talked about from a teaching point of view. Thus, the best 23 part would probably not be available. j 24 In other words, if you can shorten the envelope or l 25 contract the envelope. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation _ (202) 628-4888
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O ~ l i 179
.i 1 DR.'TODREAS:- What I was proposing ist-- I talked to
.2 Eric about this earlier relative to his dates. lSomething likei 3' 'the -- two days out of the following-package: 25th, 26th, 4: 27th; Wednesday, Thursday or Friday, maybe Tuesday. Or'ifLthat )
15 fails,-the subsequent week.~ I was-trying.to stay'away from i 6 . Monday and.the day after the holiday sogyou.would have to i l' 7 travel from the West Coast.on. Sunday, which must get to be a , 8 drag lafter-a while. 9 The week of the' 15th? The week of the 23rd or'the
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10 30th was my idea. 11 DR. BUSH: Joe Hendry expressed his regrets for not 12 being here and also expressed a. strong desire to be at'the next j 13 meeting and wanted to be. factored into the dates-. If we tie'it-14- down, that's fine. The problem is if we don't tie it down, you 15 know, things begin to -- : I 16 DR. TODREAS: Why don't you make a note 25, 26. If . !, 17 that winds up specifically -- i
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18 (Discussion regarding dates' ensued by various-19 participants.) i 20 DR. TODREAS: Let.me'just ask then on-the subsequent i 21 week, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday; 1st,.2nd, 3rd.- Is=that open j 22 for people? 23 (Discussion regarding dates ensued by.various 1 24 participants.) j 25 DR. LEVY: One final comment on the May meeting. We i I I Heritage Reporting. Corporation ; (202) 628-4888 , I
180 1 started with these subgroups. I guess we have gone to the big 2 picture and I think you still wanted the subgroups to dig into 3 t. heir area between now and May? 4 DR. TODREAS: Yes. Did I confuse anybody at all? 5 DR. LEVY: I was just trying to reverify. I was just 6 trying to make sure -- that's an extra task. Correct? 7 DR. TODREAS: Well, you can understand the big 8 picture if you know something about the technical base of the 9 details. 10 DR. BUSH: To do that, what is the turn-around time 11 for the decision as to whether you end up with first choice or 12 second choice. Because, actually, it sounds like a fair amount 13 of time, but it isn't. It is a very short time to get ready. 14 DR. TODREAS. There is no question what your first 15 choice is going to be. 16 Ernest, can you just circulate a piece of paper: 17 1st, 2nd choice. 18 (Discussion ensued among participants.) 19 DR. TODREAS: Bob, this is more for you. And I want 20 to just put this up for everybody. I think you need to send us 21 the safety goal statements. The matrix that was handed out, 22 Eric, you said you had to update it slightly. j 23 MR. BECKJORD: Well, I left the PRA off and we will 24 correct it and we will get it to you. 25 DR. TODREAS: If you can add some big dollar blocks ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l. 181. f I 1 on that. This is a small item. ) I 2 DR. MORRISON: Could you do two things on that? Rows j l 3 and columns. 1 1 4 MR. BECKJORD: There are rows and columns. Yes, but if he had the' dollars on the
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5 DR. MORRISON: 6 rows and the columns, it would be easier. q 7 DR. TODREAS: Well, each block, I was thinking. 8 Then Dave, in answer to one of Dave's questions about 9 codes, NUREG 0956 was mentioned. That would pin down the 10 codes. I I 11 MR. REED: Do you want him to send us the entire 12 NUREG or ask Bob to send us what Dave asked for? And that's i 13 the list of the codes. 14 DR. TODREAS: That's why I am bouncing it off. 15 Can you extract the code part from that? : 16 DR. SHEPARD: Yes, we will. ! 17 DR. TODREAS: And be careful about Bush and Levy. 18 On the TMI 2, the scenario report for EG&G, I guess I 19 would like you to send that to Wilson. He's on TMI 2 when he l 20 last left it and there has done a lot relative to the scenario. 21 MR. BECKJORD: That's the report that we saw this 22 fall? 23 DR. TODREAS: Yes, right. IJow, does anybody else 24 want that? 25 DR. MORRISON: What is it? b- . _ . _ . ~ . . . . , . _ . . . . . . _ . . . . . , . . _ . . . . . . . . _ . _ , _ _ . . Heritage Reporting ' Corporation (202) 628-4888
e . 182
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1 DR. TODREAS: It's the later' ' on what was the 1
.2- scenario in TMI 2 and how hasethat scenario been determined by 1
3 a combination of' calculations and verification of' data. It is 4 only.needed in my mind if you turn around and'think,'TMI 2 it's- i 4 not of much use to the severe accident program and, therefore, I 5 l 6 we shouldn't do anything with it. If you start with that base, 7 then I think you ought to read.this to start with an'd then .I 8 argue from that base. l 9 DR. MILLER: Let me ask -- l 10 DR. TODREAS: It is this' thick. 11 MR. BECKJORD: I was thinking of that stack that' Jim 12 brought. 13 DR. TODREAS: The scenario report. 14 MR. BECKJORD: I would also send you a copy of the 15 letter that I sent for Commission approval to approve.gettingf ; 16 the samples. It's about a two-paged-letter. And also the ; 17 brief on the selling the program to the OECD which will be a ! 18 packet. It might run 10 or 12 pages of view graphs and things 19 which will be general information explaining what we are going 20 to do on that program and by when. 21 DR. TODREAS: Why don't you send'Eric's OECD-and the 22 two pages to everybody. But the scenario report only to Dave, l 23 Pete and Dick Wilson. ; 24 MR. BECKJORD: Okay. That's three. , 25 DR. SHEPARD: Could you go back up to the codes. The f Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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l, 183 1 codes.go to who? 2 DR. TODREAS: Everybody except Sol and Cordell and 3 Spence. And what you send to us is not NUREG 0956, but an 4 extraction from that relative to the codes, to the code 5 discussion. 6 DR. BUSH: Now, this TMI 2 scenario that you talked 7 about is which one? 8 DR. TODREAS: It's a report by EG&G. 9 DR. BUSH: This is the incident or the event -- 10 DR. LEVY: The accident. 11 DR. BUSH: I just wanted to be sure I knew which one 12 you were talking about. It is their best reconstruction of what I 13 DR. LEVY: 14 happened. Plus some predictions. . 15 DR. TODREAS: WASH 1150. ; i 16 DR. BUSH: NUREG. 1400, maybe. 17 DR. TODREAS: We are going to be dealing with this i l 18 over a period of time. I guess I for one don't have a copy, 19 but I don't want the whole -- 20 DR. BUSH: Three volumes? 21 DR. TODREAS: Well, first we talked about a meter and 22 then we talked about three volumes. 23 DR. BUSH: Just the summary. 24 DR. TODREAS: I would think we should start with the l ! 25 top level document, whatever that is. Who doesn't need that? ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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;j 184
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1 1 DR. LEVY: I don't need it. !
.2 'DR. BUSH: I' don't need it.
3 DR. SHOAF:- I don't need it. I have it. 4 MR. BECKJORD: It's everybody except' Mary'and Spence 5 and Sol-and Cordell. 6 DR. TODREAS: Whatever you.have got down for Dick 7 Wilson, add Tom Sheridan. I think they are probably at about 8 the same -- 9 MR. REED: On'NUREG 1150,'I am just wondering: In 10 order to put that document in focus, if it would be due. 11 diligence to also send a couple of.the more germane comments.on 12 NUREG 1150. I would just hate.for you to read that document 13 without the benefit of. reading a few people who have really 14 done some real thoughtful comments on,it. 15 DR. LEVY: Let me make a suggestion. Why don't we f 16 get the comments come to Commonwealth Edison sent. 17 MR. REED: I think EPRI - I'm trying to remember. ] 10 Their comments were not those -- I thought they were thoughtful 19 and professional and useful. 1 20 DR. TODREAS: Can we do this? 'Can we delegate it to 21 your judgment. _ i 22 MR. BECKJORD: We will put a package together, but 23 not the whole smear. l l 24 DR. TODREAS: Comments, just a few to get the , t 25 balance. Then let me skip this one for a minute. This ( ' Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 ;
'185 1 bibliography that.somebody mentioned - :I guess'you mentioned-L 2 you had.- Again,71 am not sure that needs to go to everybody'.
l 3 DR. GLOYNA: Bibliography of what?' 4 'MR. BECKJORD: 'It is essentially a 10-year record _of. 1 5 the publications that went to peer' review' journals plus.a bunch 6 of other stuff in ANS-journals. 7 DR. GLOYNA: 'I1would like to-see that'. 8 MR. BECKJORD: .It's about 100 pages.. It is organized by branch and there are 14 branches.. So,z you can. single out 9 10 right away which ones to look at. 11 DR. TODREAS:- Let-me get the people, the exclusion. 12 Who doesn't need that? Cordell,-Pete. Cordell and Pete. 13 The acronyms-thing, I guess you can just throw that 14 in. You can tell I am always thinking one-half step. 15 Then the other thing, I'm not sure I want it, but I 16 am looking ahead to is how -- what is the easiest way to know 17 who are the research performers in different areas. 18 MR. BECKJORD: Tou mean~the' people or the 19 laboratories? 20 DR. TODREAS: The laboratories,.let's start with.
'21 MR. BECKJORD: That's easy.
22 DR. BUSH: If you want-that bound as to who-the 23 people are, that gets a little more difficult. 24 DR. TODREAS: It is easy, though,-if you.look through 25 all the 189s or are you talking about tables? ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
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187 1 DR. BUSH: Yes.- 2 DR. GLOYNA: 1 don't have a copy of that. That was 3 mailed to us? 4 DR. BUSH: Yes. It should have been. That's the 5 EPRI list, but here is the list and it tells who does it. 6 DR..TODREAS: Why don't we just wipe out my. request 7 which I didn't make yet. 8 MR. BECKJORD: .Yes, it would be somewhat -- it's 9 about two years out of date. 10 DR. TODREAS: It is close enough until we start. 11 DR. SHEPARD: Who wanted the acronyms? Everybody? 12 DR. TODREAS: Yes. l 13 MR. BECKJORD: I think.everybody wants those. 14 DR. TODREAS: What I was going to do is ask Eric to 15 just comment on this bigger list of issues here. We didn't 16 spend any time talking about it. It was a major part of this 17 report. My view, as long as we've got 25-minutes, it is a good 18 thing to hear about. If there is something more important-to 19 talk about, tell me. 20 DR. MILLER: There is only-one thing, Neil, before 21 you start. Isn't it too difficult to try to pin down the 22 s October date'? l 23 DR. SHOAF: I've got an IAE. 24 DR. MILLER: See, already, I can't come to the May 25 meeting. I am going to Japan during that period. And it would ( .. . ~ , . _ . . _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . .. _ Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i j l 186 ] 1 DR. BUSH: No, no. It's all in one document. 2 MR. BECKJORD: You want the --- 3 DR. TODREAS: I'm not sure I want it. I'm just 4 asking because we may not~want to start on that. 5 MR. BECKJORD: Well, I can give you a one-pager on 6 who our major contractors, national labs and contractors. Now, 7 if you want to know what they are doing, then it is going to be 8 a little bit more than one page. If you wantito know who is ) 9 working on it, then, we are getting.back down to something like 10 the 72 activities. 11 DR. TODREAS: No. I started with, if you block the 12 funct!.ons against the' performers. I was think that, but I'm q 13 not sure whether we need that now. j 14 DR. LEVY: Why don't you go,for the one page. 15 MR. BECKJORD: I would take a few of the major j 16 projects. I can tell you on a page, for example, who is , I 17 working on severe accidents, who is working on 1150. 18 DR. TODREAS: Because I didn't see that. I don't 19 remember seeing that. 20 DR. BUSH: Right here in the back of this. It is out j 21 of date by a year, but it hasn't changed that.much. 'j i 22 DR. TODREAS: What is this? 23 DR. BUSH: In the back, there it tells organization i 24 and program. 25 DR. GLOYNA: Is that the NAS document? l ( Heritage Reporting Corporation ; (202) 628-4888 ___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____w
188 1 be really nice to have the October dates now so that I can go 2- back and scratch them out and have them. 3 DR. SHOAF: Because I've got an IAEA meeting I don't 4 even know when the date is in October. 5 DR. BUSH: I am negotiating some dates for some other' 6 meetings and I would like to scratch this cne. 7 (Discussion ensued regarding dates by participants.) ! 8 DR. TODREAS: Just repeat what you said, Spence. 9 DR. BUSH: Well, for example, selfishly, I will be in 10 New Orleans through the 5th and I could be here 6-7. This is 11 October. The next week I'm in New York. It would be very easy ( l 12 to come up the night of the'12th, which would be the 13-14 as a (
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13 for instance. The following week, as of now, is clean. J I 14 But you have an IAEA someplace in there? j 1 15 DR. SHOAF: Right. And it either starts on Wednesday l 16 the 19th or on Wednesday the 26th and they haven't figured it 17 out yet. 18 DR. BUSH: How about the 13th and 14th? 19 DR. SHOAF: I could come the 13th and-14th. 20 DR. TODREAS: Is the lith and the 12th? 21 DR. BUSH: The lith and 12th, I am chairing a , j 22 committee in New York. And that one might take precedence, I l 23 think, because that is the bteering Committee on Piping. 24 DR. TODREASs And the 19-20th is out? 25 DR. BUSH: Not for me. Heritage Reporting Corporation ; (202) 628-4888
189-1 DR. SHOAF: I' don't know yet. 2 DR. MILLER: The 19th-and 20th was'okay for me. 3 DR. TODREAS: How about the next week? 4 DR. BUSH: The next week,.I'm gone.from the 23rd 5- -through the 28th. 6 DR. GLOYNA: .What was wrong with the 19th? 7 DR. BUSH: We don't know. 'It may be~all right. 8 DR. TODREAS:. Okay. . Why don't you just mark that? 9 DR. BUSH: You want to put a tentative hold on those-10 dates?- I can always do that. 11 (Continued on next page.) 12 13 14 , 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 l l 24
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.1 MR.:TODREAS: 'Okay, so we've got.-- iftwe just write l
2 19th - 20th of October, 25th, 26th of May, or 1st, 2nd June. J 3 No -- the Autumn NFTA safety meeting is scheduled,for the 24th, 4 and the ANS meeting is the next. week; and November -- how about 5 .the week of November 7th as a fall-back? :Let me look. 6 MR. BUSH: 'In November from my point of. view, I'm 7 N y until the week of the 27th, 8 MR. TODREAS: When will your date be established, in 9 October? 10 DR. SHOAF: Next week. So I'm almost -- almost - - 1 11 MR. TODREAS: Could you give me a call when you know 12 that and I'll pick up. 13 MR. BUSH: You want to put a tentative hold on the
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14 week of November or someplace? Or not? 15 MR. TODP.EAS: Well, if you do it the week of November 16 7 -- can we put dovr the 8th and 9th? 17 MR. BUSH: The 8th is Election Day. The lith isn't a 18 good day. I vote absentee ballot three times out of four 19 anyway, so -- 20 MR. TODREAS: Is that a problem? 21 DR. SHOAF: And Friday is better? 22 MR. BUSH: And when's. Super Tuesday? That's the i ' 23 important one. 24 So.it's the 8th and 9th of November, is that what ; l 25 you're -- l l ( k Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 m
~' 191 1 MR. TODREAS: Yes , ye.s . .That's-tentative. 2 MR. BUSH: Okay, an absentee ballot will be a 3 creative way for us to go,.I thought that'd be real good. 4 MR. TODREAS: I can't make it the tenth in that, but 5 what is that Tuesday? 6 MR.-LEVY: I'r going to leave as long as the Chairman 7 makes no more assignments. 8 MR. BACKJARD: Or before he does. Good to see you 9 Sol. 10 Shall I start? 11 MR. TODREAS: Yes,'go ahead. 12 MR. BACKJARD: Well, if you all have that report, it 13 starts -- let me start somewhere around page 4. The report 1 14 itself is divided into -- there'are four chapters. There is an 15 introductory chapter; there's a chapter on the general 16 principles for safety research; the third chapter is on the i' 17 technical -- their technical comments; the fourth chapter is on 18 I think it's removing barriers to the research programs. 19 And that second chapter treats with -- I think a very , l 20 good explanation of what they call the general principles for j 21 structuring a research program and getting the support from the 22 constituencies for it. Who should pay for the program? Who
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23 should carry it out; and so forth. ; 24 And the I think that's self-evident. I don't have 25 any comment on it. I agree with what they've written in their ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 .
192 1 treatise on putting a good program together; I would say that 2 the real situation with regard to cooperative research is a 3 good bit more complicated than one would gather simply from 4 reading the report. I know that they were aware ' ci- that f act-5 when they prepared the report. But I think they felt that it 6 would be useful, nonetheless, to sit down and treatise it, I 7 think it is. t If I -- let me go on to page -- part II, which :is on 9 page 5. And I should say that this, the response to the 10 recommendations here does not come in the saro order as the
'll recommendations were made'in the report. f 12 There's e table in the back of this document. It's 13 the third page from the back and it's' called Table No.l. And .
I 14 as you, if you're looking through the, report, you can track, or 15 I can at least point out, where the recommendations are, to l 16 which we are retponding. 17 And we responded to them in the order of questions I l 18 that were addressed to recearch; that's in that first group j 19 shown in Table No.l. And it shows the number in our response 1 20 compared to the number in the report itself. And then there is i 21 our comment on the recommendations addressed to the Executive 'l i 22 Director for Operations; and then, finally, those directors of 23 the Commission. j 24 So let me get on into the substance of it a bit now. f 25 The first recommendation, which is on page 5, "NRC should bring a (' Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l ,
'_g?- ~p 193 1 high-caliber researchers to bolster management." When I 2 received this report, I undertook to carry that out.. I figured 3 it would be important to show early response to some of the l
- l. 4 recommendations'that were made by the national academy.
1 5 I developed a list of about 40 names that I 6 considered'for director of one of the divisions. That is, to 7 start with, I would bring in somebody from the outside, 8 somebody from the laboratories-or from the University -- one of 9 the universities. 10 MR. MILLER: You mean for a term? A four-year term?- 11 MR. BACKJARD: I was, when I began on this, _in my own 12 mind, I was prepared either to go with a. permanent appointment,. l 13 or with a term appointment. 14 To make a long story short,.I actually offered the 15 job -- oh, and I should say one -- well, I guess not. I should 16 say this in a closed-session. I'll mention this in a closed 17 session on another occasion. 18 But in any event, I offered the job to about, I think 19 it was 12 people. Several of them I offered it to on a 20 permanent basis because in the course ut the conversation there 21 were two people who, for whom a permanent position would have 22 been of interest.- Whereas a term was not of interest. 23 I got no takers in 12 offers, for a variety of 24 reasons. I think most of them are explained in the paper. But 25 it had to do with teenage children who would have to move out l ( - . - - - . . . . . - . _ _ _ . . . - , . _ _ __ _._ Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 w ___=___ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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q l 194 1 of high' school, and teen-aged children who were:having some' i 2 difficulty as it was. z 3 bd .in quite' a number of cases, in fact in more -- 4 fthis applied to more people -- it was the largest' group of a 5 people -- there were two career spouses in the family, and for 6 various reasons it just wasn't going to be workable. 7 For a couple of others it was that this just. happened 8 to be a very inopportune time in their~ career when they were 9 either finishing something or something had not come to.the 10 proper conclusion. 11 So and in a couple of cases.it was a very important 12 consideration was the cost of moving from an area where housing. 13 is relatively depressed to a place where.it is not at the 14 highest but considerably elevated. , 15 So for all of these were the reasons that were given 16 to me and I have no reason for thinking that there was anything 17 else involved. But I did conclude that it was very difficult. 18 to attract -- these were all extremely well-qualified people -- 19 I concluded it was extremely difficult to attract people to 20 this job at thic time. 21 Now, this would have been the job that was proposed 22 was one of the divisions, and I really dropped this approach. 23 I gave it up in August and decided to work on something else, 24 which would be a concept which is explained in the response of 25 a kind of a staff fellowchip, of bringing people in from
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J 195 l 1 universities who are laboratories, on a term assignment with no j 2 management. responsibility,.but whose job would be.to find 3 variously and to look at a specific research program,.to give j 4 me advice on it; analyze it; and.give me advice on improvements 5 or restructuring and that type of' thing. 6 Or.it doesn't have to be that. In other cases it l- 7 could be son.ebody who is assigned to the. program to work with l 8 the people who are directing it -- I mean,' managing it, on a 9 day-to-day basis with various things. 10 The first person -- that has been much more 11 successful already. There is a man that's almost settled now 12 who has, was, a professor at Stanford and who will be coming 13 here in April. I'd tell you his name, except not all of the ! 14 details are complete, , 15 And he will be with us for about six months. And 16 what I have in nind is that he will take n hard look et the 17 severe accident program, and in particular, the experiments in 18 the codes -- Corde11's progression area. He's been work.ing 19 along this line as it turns out fer a while now. 20 Then -- what? Right, when you know. No. no. 21 Then, we are in the process of lining.up others 22 later, but that seems to be a n'ich more workable route, and I 23 think it may, in fact, be a better solution for what.we need, i 24 because the management distractions are - JI should say the i j 25 number of things that the directors have to get involved in 1 1 ( Heritage Reporting Corporation l l (202) 628-4888 L. - _ _ _ _ _ ___-__ ___
1_...-- . X 196 1 because of the machinery-and'whatiI call the clockwork ofithe. 2; Agency-because the clocks-that ring.alarmLbells aticertain 3 times,';that.certain things have~to be done, and.it would.be 4 very difficult for somebody coming in, and'it is: difficult for.
.somebody-coming in at"a senior level to learn'all about i this,
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5 6 and at.the'same time, be doing a technical job, and I think. 7 probably it's not very sensible for somebody coming in~on a 8 one- or two-year assignment to do that.- 9 MR. REED - Eric,'what is the objective?. AreLyou ;
.q 10- trying to make your managers, give them more lab experience,_or 11 are you trying to enhance the management ~ ability of your people 12 here?-
13 MR. BACKJARD: It's a response to-the National' 14 Academy, whose criticism was, "You need to bring more people l 15 who are well-qualified researchers into the management of the 16 work." It's in the report. pie can -- I don't know if we got 17 -- 18 MR. REED: I read that, and I -- ; 19 MR. BACKJARD: .Well, okay, i 20 MR. REED: That's one of the things. To addra little 21 focus, too. ; L 22 MR. BACKJARD: Well, it's in response to that, with~a i l l 23 little bit of my own interpretation of it. i . I 24 MR. BUSH: I would comment, in the' case of ACRS, it ; 25 was, has been, and still is, highly successful. That's the-i ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888. l
. - - -i i
197 1 approact of bringing the people in. 2 MR. BACKJARD: 'Yes, well-it works in a lot of places ! 3 NSF, and to just two -- but other, you know the Defense 4 Department agencies do that' a 1ot. 5 MR. BUSH: The Opera uses it. 1 6 lHR. BACKJARD: And then another aspect of it is l 7 sending people, and there is a second person coming to us very -{ l 8 soon from Brookhaven, who will be coming on a term assignment 9 and will be working in an area where Dr. Speese kind of -- some l i 10 of the interfaces on the resolution of each engineering issun.. 11 so that will be an ongoing program. 12 Staff exchanges, we're going to start that on a low-13 level and see how it goes. It's been done before; there are 14 some complications to it. I think it,'s a good investment, and 15 it is a way of -- that the shoe on the other foot, or it'a 16 turning the thing around; it's sending our people out to get i 17 better understanding of how the laboratories work. ; 18 That's what I mean in this section. If I turn to 19 page 9 on the research philosophy, I guess I don't really have I 20 time to go through that in detail, but take another look at it. ; 21 I think this is our -- this was the best cut that the other 22 office directors and myself Onuld make a year ago at defining 23 what this program should be about, and I think it's stood the j l ) 24 test of time pretty well.
]
25 There are some points I've added. And as a ( ; Heritage Reporting Corporation .) (202) 628-4888 i 4 l
198 1 consequence of a discussion with Commissioner Rogers,'who's 2 taken a great deal of interest with this. And in particular, 3 he felt it would -- he wanted that we should add some 4 statements about excellence in the program, and so we did, and 5 it did not previously say that on page 9 on the middle 6 paragraph. It says, 'Because of the reliance placed on the 7 research products, the NRC intends that its research program 8 achieve first-rank excellence." 4 9 And it also says comething about the quality of the { 10 contract -- of the people working on contract research; and 11 also the research managers. That's important. That's a -~ we 12 aren't going to achieve excellence in all areas over night. l 13 It's certainly a long-range goal, and it's going to continue to l 1 14 need a lot of support of the Agency and the Commissioners to 15 maintain, you know, to acquire adequate funding to carry these 16 things out. ; i 17 MR. REED: Eric, have you defined." excellence?" Is , l l l 18 there a measurement standard that you have? j 19 MR. BACKJARD: Yes, I would say it's really in two l 20 areas: problem solving is one area; and that's more of an l 21 engineering end; and the other measure of excellence, I would 22 say, would be recognition peer-review journals; articles that 23 come out of the more purely-research topics -- prizes, i 24 recognition -- I mean, I could name a handful of people pre-25 eminent in the field in the U.S. recognized in the world- whom ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
199 1 I would say I would offer these people up as our candid -- you 2 know, these represent research excellence. 3 The recognition of the international community, by 4 the way, is something that I added to the list. The programs 5 in research have been criticized,but I will tell you one thing: 6 that the foreigners beat their path to the door of this Agency, ) i 7 and more specifically, of Nicholson Lane on Severe Accidents; 1 8 on Source Term Code Package; on PR8; you name it and I've got 9 people coming in all the time; the Germans; the French; the q 10 British; the Japanese; and the Russians know what we're doing. I 11 And a lot of the work that goes on there is, I'm ) 12 satisfied, it's good. 13 MR. REED: Okay, I guess you -- you know, I think in 14 terms of dollars per conclusion, or some measurement of j 15 excellence that you'll know when you're there,.and I think it's I i 16 difficult to try to translate these, and while we're examining 17 all of the mission statements, how did yet translate that into 18 some measurement standard that you can come back in a year and 19 you can see if you are progressing to? 20 MR. BACKJARD: Well, I should give you a more 21 specific answer, but the Appendix K revision is an example of 22 that, which is just lining up, and Neil knowb a lot about that. 23 Sol does. And you know, that has really brought to near l 24 conclusion many, many years of work on the loss of coolant l l 25 accident problem. And I would say that I think, as I said l ( -.. -, . - . - - - - . - . . . . _ . _ . . . . Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
g.7,- . ,
+ u..
q 1
-200
-1 yesterday, and.I truly believe'it, that program has.been a
.2 tremendous success, both from an' engineering point ofLview and .;
3 .from a scientific point of view, and-I think the -- am I
-4 prejudging?
I SL I think the report, it's going to be' evident.from the i I 6 report that that's. going to be the case. 7 MR. MILLER: Well, I assume, Eric, I know you l 8 understand this,'but the quality and the excellence of the 1 9 people in.the prc7 ram are very, very much: intertwined 11nto the 10 research policy, the stability of:the funding, the perceived 1 11 micro-management at the research program,.all of these are so-12 linked together that it's all very complected. And so I know 13 you know it, because you've had to administerJresearch programs 14 at National Laboratories and you understand that. 15 And back to what Cordell is saying, measuring 16 excellence of research is a tough -- i 17 MR. REED: That's true, but you know it when you see 4 18 it. 19 MR. MILLER: You know it when you see it, but to 20 quantify it, the National Science Foundation has struggled with ; l 21 things like peer review; and a lot of criticism of the peer 22 . review program -- 23 MR. BACKJARD: Well, I think it ought to be a little 24 more broadly based than on just' peer review. That's.why I , i
~
25 mentioned these other things. And I think the international Heritage Reporting . Corporation (202) 628-4888
7 -:
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l 201 i i 1 recognition is very important, because this is reallyfanother j 1 2 kind of peerage, and these guys are good, you know? i 3 MR. MILLER: So it would have to be a combination of
]
4- effectiveness in the sense of meeting the needs of the user and 5- excellence from the point of view of the peer review. l 6 MR. BACKJARD: Okay, let me go on. The planning 4 7 process, we've talked about and I intend as best I can t;o ) 8 respond to what Mary was suggesting and what Neil and Saul were 9 asking for, so I won't comment more on that. 10 Recommendation 5, ladies and gentlemen, here you'are, 11 and that's the peer-accepted research at CNI. 12 MR. MILLER: We're really glad you're here. l 13 MR. BACKJARD: In a group like this I really don't 14 have a high level of concern. . 15 Recommendation 6 and 7, the "f air and competitive 16 process for contracting for research," the report pets a lot of , 17 emphasis on universities and private research contractors. I 18 am satisfied in my own mind that the committee did not mean 19 that we were to stop work at the National Laboratories. 20 Because I talked with Bob Frosh, the Chairman, about that, and 21 that certainly, well, I know, that was not his intent. , i 22 What they were suggesting is a diversification of j 23 work to include more at the universities and to go find some 24 good private contractors. And in my mind, thin would mean a, { 25 you know, over a period of a couple of years, it might mean a ; r : Heritage Reporting Corporation ] (202) 628-4888 1 j
i I i 202 1 shift of maybe something like ten percentage points and where j 2 our work is going. Now, so there is no question but in a
.i 3 sense, the budget is a zero-sum game, so what doesn't go one i i
4 place -- what goes one place is not going to go somewhere else. i j 5 But if we get an adequate funding level in the long 6 run, I don't think that will be a problem. We certainly do 7 have a problem now because with a 20 percent budge, production l J 8 this year, you know, what you have to, you know, you have to 9 save what has to be saved. And it's very difficult to make a ] i 10 new start. i 11 However, we are making some new starts this year, in 12 both human factors and accident management. But it will bu 13 impossible to meet the goals I had originally intended last l
, l 14 summer for diversifying. But I think.that's all I'll say about )
l 15 that.
]
16 Recommendation 8, " Annual Review of the Program with 17 a Principal Performers of Research," we've done that a couple 18 of times on an official thing. We're really moving toward a 19 more informal way -- I should have said, informal method, of 20 doing it. We're moving toward more informal methods of holding 21 those meetings, and they tend to be topical, and I think that's 22 a better way to do it, rathe.r than to get everybody together. 23 I mean, we've had a couple of meetings on the severe 24 accident program, researchers on 1150 and we'll be meeting in 25 that way, I think, from here out primarily. ( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
203 1 Peer review we talked a lot about. Publication 2 policy. I_ guess the -- oh, let me point -- on page 26 of the 3 Programmatic Recommendations, I've answered those in terms of, 4 you know, responding by the five categories of work to the 5 recommendations made in the National Academy report. 6 I think the most important thing that they pointed 7 out which I certainly agree with, was the failure toifollow i 8 through on human factors. Because that was an evident-1 l 9 shortcoming in the research program and I certainly agree with 10 that. 1 l 11 The other recommendations, I don't think, are a 12 surprise, and don't really represent a, you know, does not 13 require a major response of ours, in changing direction. 1 14 I have said already that we are, as I outlined the . 15 important initiatives to you, certainly human factors and ; 1 16 maximum management. 17 MR. TODREAS: Eric, let me just -- I want to keep my 18 slate clean about 3:00, and I know there are a few people. 19 MR. BACKJAnD: Except for just one last -- 20 MR. TODREAS: Yes. 21 MR. BACKJARD: They do call out here make a statement 22 about standards and the problem -- the NRC should considor 23 separating the functions of standards development and research.- 24 And of course, what they say here applies probebly in an order 25 of magnitude greater in importance to the matter of generic and ( ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ' - R6p6FE~iny~~ Co'rpora t'ibri~~~ ~~~ ~~~ Heritage (202) 628-4888 i
I i l f i 204 1 1 end-result safety issue, which has been added to the job scope, a 2 so to whatever extent standards represent a problem, the i 3 generic issues are of greater responsibility. ] i 4 So it's a question there, I think, of the problem j 5 which I stated to the Commissioners when we met on generic I j 6 issues last fall, was that we were going to work a high ) l 7 priority on generic issues, because we understood the l I 8 importance of doing that, and I said my concern, frankly, was j l 9 that responding adequately in t:iat area was going to use up j l 10 people and money resources which could only be at the expense l a 11 of the research program. 1 12 And I said, I have very great concerns about that, i l 13 and I still have great concerns about that. No less than they 14 were or greater than they were. 15 MR. REED: Will we have an opportunity to give a view j 16 on this once we get a little more information as to how much j 17 management attention and money does it take all of this? 18 MR. TODREAS: Yes, we'll either take this -- 19 certainly take it up certainly in October, but whether we can t 20 fit it in in May or not, I don't know. 21 MR. REED: Just so it's on our laundry list. 22 MR. TODREAS: Oh, yes , this is on our list to sit 23 down and go through this. 24 I think we ought to stop at this point. 25 There was just one other thing. Do any of you want a I (
.. .__. ~HeYIfscfe~ Rep 5ftiiig7orporatIbn (202) 628-4088
205 1 copy of the transcript? I presume you did, Cordell, for 2 yesterday? 3 MR. REED: Yes, it would be helpful if I had a copy. 4 MR. TODREAS: And Mary, do you want one? 5 DR. SHOAF: Yes. 6 MR. TODREAS: Okay, you can always get it. 7 [Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m. the hearing was concluded.] 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 l 15 I 16 l l 17 18 19 20 1 21 22 23 24 i 25 l ( l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
j _ i I CERTIFICATE 1 2 ;
. 'l 3 This 1s-to certify that the' attached proceedings before the 1 1
4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the, matter oft a General' NUCLEAR SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW COMMITTEE:
~
5 Names Meeting 6 ) 7 Docket Number: 8 Place: Bethesda, Maryland . { 9 Date: February 18, 1988 j 1 10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original' 1 11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 3 12 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by-me and, 13 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction 14 of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a 15 true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings. ) 16 /S/ > % .- l 17 (Signature typed): Joan Rose 18 Official Reporter. 19 Heritage Reporting Corporation i 20 t 21 22 23 24 25 ( Heritagc Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888' i
=j
?.
- l PRESENTATION TO NRC PUCLEAR SAFETY.RESEARCH REV!FW COMMITTEE ON THE RADIAT!0F PROTECTION AND HEALTP EFFECTS RESEARCH PROGRAM 1
FEBRUARY 18, 1988
)
BY J J PILL MOPRIS, DIRECTOP q DIVIS10N OF REGULATORY APPLICATIONS,'RES t i n v
y l RADIATION. PROTECTION AND HEALTH EFFECTS PROGRAM PLANNING PERSPECTIVE 1 NRC LICENSEES ARE ENGAGED IN A WIDE VARIETV 0F ACTIVITIES j INVOLVING POTENTIAL EXPOSURE OF WORKERS AND PUBLIC TO LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION WHICH COULD HAVE SERIOUS HEALTH ) EFFECTS.
. b ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS EPA, CIRRPC', ICRP, NCRP, AND.IAEA PLAY f
A KEY ROLE IN ESTABLISHING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY OR POSITIONS ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND HEALTH EFFECTS ISSUES. RESEARCH IN RADIATION PPOTECTION AND HEALTH EFPFCTS SUPPORTS
'THE FOLLOWING NRC ACTIVITIES. -
j. IMPLEMENTATION OF RADIATION PRnTECTION REQUIREMENTS IN CURRENT AND RFVISED 10CFR20. ; bt"ELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY / POSITIONS ESTABu'9HING LEVELS OF RADIATION DOSE OR RADIOACTIVITY WHICH.A,RE BELOW REGULATOPY CONCERN. SAFETY GOAL IMPLEMENTATION (HEALTH EFFECTS CALCULATIONS FOR PRAS). COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN DECISIONS ON WHETHFP INCREASED J SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ARE NEEDED.. l I J
- - MONITORING LICENSEE PERr0RMANCE, I i
( l
- COMMITTEE FOR INTER /GENCY RADIATION RESEArCH POLICY COORDINATION.
?
SCOPE OF NPC LICENSING LICENSED ACT_1VITY # LICENSEES I NUCLEAR MEDICINE DIAGNOSIS AND' RADIATION THERAPY 6412 MANUFACTURING AND' DISTRIBUTION l?l9 ACADEMIC, RESEAPCH AND DEVELOPMENT 8P.2 INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION 560-INDUSTRIAL RAD 10GRAPHERS 1008 GAUGING DEVICE'AND GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY lISERS 5}}9 IRRADIATORS 205 WELL LOGGING - 831 llRANIUM MINING, MILLING, UF PRODUCTION, 36 6 FUEL PROCESSING AND FABRICATION RESEARCH AND TEST REAC' TORS 54 , POWER REACTORE 55 (108) LOW LEVEL WASTE AND FUEL STORAGE P3 l [ _ _.... ~._ _ ,...__ _ _ _ _. _ . __ 2-A
1 l KEY ISSUES ADDRESSED BY- ) RADIATION PROTECTION AND 1 HEALTH EFFECTS RESEARCH q i WHAT. METHODS APF ACCEPT.ABLE IN DEMONSTPtTING. COMPLIANCE WITH l RADIATION PROTECTION DOSF LIMITS FOR l l EXTREMITY DOSIMETPY BI0 ASSAY AIR SAMPLING l CALCULATING DOSES TO EMBRYO-FETUS CALCULATING DOSES FROM BETA FMITTING " HOT" P/.PTICLFS NEUTRON FXPOSURE (QUALITY' FACTORS)? f i HOW WELL IR THE INDUSTRY DOING Ih' ACHIEVING ALAPA, AND WHAT SHOULD THEY BF DOING TO IMPROVE? PADIATION EXPOSURE INFORMATION REPOP. TING SYSTEM. ) EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS.0F DOSE REDUCTION MEASURES. WHAT HEALTH EFFECTS AND PISKS SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS RADIATION DOSE LEVELS? SPECIFICALLY FOP. 1 HEA'LTH EFFECTS FROM HIGH DOSE LEVELS FROM REACTOR ACCIDENTS. EFFECTS AT LOW DOSE LEVELS WHERF INSUFFICIENT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DATA EXISTS TO REDUCE UNCFPTAINTY IN DOSE TO RISK CONVERSION FACTORS (IS A CORRELATION BASED ON STUDIES OF CELLULAR AND MOLECULAR FFFECTS FEASIBLE?). ( . _ 3
'l i
]
OF WHAT. BASIS SHOULD BPC/DE MINIMIS LEVELS OF DOSE OR I RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVITY BE ESTABLISHED 7 GENEP!CALLY FOR DECOMMISSIONING LANDS'AND STRUCTURES j RECYCLE OFTMATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT j CONSUMER PRODUCTS LOW LEVEL WASTE 1 DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY GUIDANCE REGULATORY GUIDES IMPLEMENTING REVISED 10CFR?0
- RULEMAKING ON IRRADIATORS, RADIOGRAPHY, BIDASSAY AND EXTREMITY DOSIMETRY BRC RULEMAKING AND POLICY--DEVELOPMENT i
l 4 ( i
- m. 1 ll RADIATION PROTECTION AND l HEALTH EFFFCTS'RESEARCH I
BilDGET- -! l FY88 FY89 FY90 ACCEPTABLE METHODS FOR 490 1000 1000 DEMONSTRATING COMPLIANCE WITH PADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS-IMPLEMENTATION OF ALARA '450 500 500 CORRELATION OF HEALTH EFFECTS 170 Ron R00 1T) DOSE LEVELS BRC/DE MINIMIS 300 300 300-TECHNICAL ASSISTA,NCE ON 150 300 550 DEVELOPMENT OF PEGULATORY GUIDANCE i TOTAL 3560 2900 3150 I ( t 5
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