ML20246L985
| ML20246L985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1989 |
| From: | Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RAR-89-32, NUDOCS 8905190007 | |
| Download: ML20246L985 (12) | |
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LCimmonwnith Edison -
C ound Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North j
--e Cordova. Illinois 61242 9740 g'
Telephone 309/654-2241 RAR-89-32 l
'May 1, 1989 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station PI-137 Washington, D. C.
20555 Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of April, 1989, for-Quad-Cities _ Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the. safety evaluations are being. reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.
Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.
Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR, POWER STATION hh_ j N
R. A.-Robey Services Superintendent RAR/vmk/djb Enclosure cc:
R. Stols T. Hatts/J. Galligan 8905190007 890501
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PDR ADOCK 05000254
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'0027H/0061Z
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Modification M-4-1(2)-87-002 A, B, C, D Description Pump cavitation and vibration in RHRSW pumps has been caused under size low pressure and high pressure pump impe11ers. This cavitation and vibration has reduced the service life of the pumps.
This modification is to replace the pump impe11ers with impellers sized to improve flow, reduce vibration and cavitation, to increase the service life of the pump.
Evaluation The modification will serve to improve the reliability of the RHRSW system.
A special test number 1-109 was performed to install the new impellers on the Unit 1A RHRSW pump to verify the installation as safe and effective.
The new impeller has performed as expected and now, under this mod, the other RHRSW pump impe11ers will be replaced.
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1 SPECIAL TEST 1-128 Special Test No. 1-128 was completed on April 13, 1989. The purpose of this test was to identify any missing or severely degraded balls in the ball check valve 305-115. At cold conditions with all rods fully inserted the control rod drive pump was turned off and results identified immediately.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safe Analysis Report is not increased because in Section 10.5 the CRD pump is simply to supply pressure for charging the scram accumulators. At cold shutdown with the rods fully inserted the accumulators were not required.
l 2.
The probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the CRD pump is shutdcwn as part of normal operating practice during refuel outages when not required.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because with the reactor in cold shutdown and control rods fully inserted, this test involving tripping the CRD pump did not reduce the margin of safety.
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Procedure Change QGA 100-1, 2, 3 Some minor format changes have been made.
The top of active fuel level has been changed from - 143" to - 142" to reflect the new fuel that has been installed.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the changes are either administrative or minor number changes because of design changes.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Fian1 Safety Analysis Report is not created because the changes are either format changes or reflect current plant design.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin is increased slightly be requiring certain actions 1" earlier (-143" to.
-142")
e Procedure Change QGA 200-1, 2, 3, 4 Some graphs have been changed due to new calculations from BWROG.
The containment is now vented regardless of release rates at 90 psig rather than 60 psig. A new section has been developed to control hydrogen concentration in the primary containment.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the changes that have been made are either administrative or they make provisions for reducing the consequences of any accident involving containment, i
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of e different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the changes made affect accidents beyond those addressed in the FSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety is increased by taking action to protect the containment.
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Procedure Change QGA 500-1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 I
These changes include format changes to the flow charts and valves that have been changed due to calculations performed by the BWROG.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the probability of an accident is not changed since these procedures were written to provide guidance for afte* the accident.
2.
The possibilit ror an accident or' malfunction of a different type than an-previously evaluated in the Fainal Safety Analysis Report is not created because the provisions of this procedure reduce the consequences of an accident beyond those evaluated in the FSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because more up to date data is being used for the valves that have changed.
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9 Procedure Change QIS 31-1 Increasing the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor alarm and trip setpoints for the Hydrogen Addition Modification.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the only design basis accident which takes credit for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors (MSLRM) is the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) and the increased setpoint does not affect the ability of the MSLRM to perform its intended safety function.
No other previously analyzed accidents or malfunctions, as addressed in the FSAR are involved.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this modification only adjusts the trip setpoint of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors and the increased setpoint does not affect the ability of the MSLRM to perform its intended safety function. The increased setpoint also has no effect on the capability of the station to detect noble gas releases from the reactor core.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis tor any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the change in the trip setpoint for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors (MSLRM) does not reduce the margin between the calculated dose rate from a Control Rod Drop Accident and the trip setpoint. The change offers significant benefits that enhance the margin of safety for operation with Hydrogen Water Chemistry by a water chemistry program which substantially mitigates ICSCC safety-related piping.
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Safety Evaluation #89-14, 15, 16, and 17 Resetting Time Delay Relays for ARI Automatic Reset Change the setting of the relay from 30.5 to between 35.9 and 37.8 seconds per W. B. Fancher letter to R. L. Bax dated January 12, 1984.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the setting is going to be more conservative allowing the full insertion of any particular rod before the ARI logic resets, thus permitting full Rod insertion.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis l
Report is not created because the FSAR references 30 seconds as the time for the relay to reset to allow for the scram air header to depressurize.
Changing the reset setting from 30 seconds to between 35.9 and 37.8 seconds is allowing more time for the header to depressurize and is more conservative.
1 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because no Technical Specifications are effected.
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l Safety Evaluation #89-177 Version 7.0 AAIS Software Distribution Enhancements were made to existing AAIS Software.
1.
The probability of an. occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because none of the enhancements made to this version of software affect anything that is evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Therefore, the enhancements made to this software cannot increase the probability of an occurrence, the consequence of an accident, or the malfunction of equipment important to safety.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the Version 7.0 AAIS Software is not associated with any safety related equipemnt. Therefore, there is no possibility of any safety related accident or malfunction being created.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because none of the unha, cements made to this version of software affect any of the calcu =tions performed.by the software. Therefore, the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced, l
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Safety Evaluation #89-141 HPCI Operation Without Turning Gear To evaluate the operability of HPCI when the turning gear does not engage upon coastdown at the completion of normal testing.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety es previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
is not increased because the malfunction of HPCI is not increased since the short time HPCI is run during testing (Approx. 1/2 hour) is not sufficient to raise the entire turbine rotor to equilbrium operating temperature, therefore the likelihood of bowing to uneven cooldown is significantly reduced. Additionally HPCI turbine has a short shaft and it would take significant bowing to cause blade rubbing.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because HPCI turning gear effects HPCI system only. The FSAR has analyzed Automatic Pressure Relief as a backup for the HPCI system.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the' basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the turning gear is not required for fast start of HPCI.
HPCI is still capable of providing design flowrates with design pressure bands.
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4 Safety Evaluation #89-149 LPRM Computer Program Installation A computer program is being installed to aid the Nuclear Engineer in determining LPRM calibration and in outputting the already calculated calibration currents for the Instrument Maintenance Department to input into the LPRMs. The program also will graph LPRM exposure verses calibration current as calculated by Core Monitoring Code.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety-as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the calibration of the LPRMs will still be performed in accordance with procedures designed to meet the intent of the FSAR.
.2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the change will only allow for additional methods for outputting the calibration currents calculated by Core Monitoring Code and for comparing RP and RCAL to determine LPRM calibration, the calibraiton process however is not changing.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the same criteria for deteJming LPRM calibration is being used.
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3 Safety Evaluation #89-150 Redundant Access Control System (RACS) Software Upgrade Upgrade the existing Redundant Access Control System (RACS) Software to correct miscellaneous problems in screen display and operator commands, correct card history file opening and enhance report generation features.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the reliability of the entire access control system will be enhanced by upgrading the RACS Software.
However, this would have no bearing on the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, since analysis take no credit for this security system.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a Jifferent type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this upgrade does not alter the description of any equipment or systems important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR installation of the software involves non-safety-related equipment which will be located remote from any safety-related system.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this upgrade does not alter or affect any equipment described in the Technical Specification. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
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