ML20246J658
| ML20246J658 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1989 |
| From: | Datta A NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Bidinger G NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905170132 | |
| Download: ML20246J658 (6) | |
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i MAY 0 21989 MEMORANDUM FOR:
George Bidinger, Section Leader Uranium Fuel Section Fuel Cycle Safety Branch Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS FROM:
Amar Datta Uranium Fuel Section Fuel Cycle Safety Branch Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT:
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, NUCLEAR FUEL AND COMPONENT MANUFACTURING FACILITIES, WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, MARCH 28-31, 1989 The narrow objective of this trip was to review the fire protection inspection program as applied to the facility.
The broader objective was to compare the requirements of the recently published Branch Technical Position on Fire Protection with the situation existing in a typical facility.
The acquired information should form part of the considerations for the formulation of documents, such as the Standard Format and Content Guides.
I accompanied Region II inspector David Ward in this trip and, therefore, had the benefit of knowledge of his concerns arising from open items from past inspections.
This report is an overview of the fire safety of the licensed operations of the facility.
The concerns expressed in it coincide with many of those expressed by the Region II staff.
The details follow:
I.
Fire Protection Assessment 1.
Building Construction The fuel manufacturing operations are located in the FM0/FM0X building, which is a structure fabricated of concrete blocks, aluminum siding over a structural steel framework, a concrete floor, and a built-up roof.
The aluminum sheet-metal siding is coated with an " insulating" paint, the fire resistance quality of which could not be determined.
The built-up roof consists of a metal deck and insulation, which is topped with asphalt and gravel.
An adjunct to the main building is a chemical / metallurgical (CHEMET) building, which is constructed of concrete slab siding, concrete floors and the same roof construction as the main building.
Another adjunct to the main building, in its north-west corner, is the solvent extraction (SX) building which is an enclosure of concrete walls and houses the solvent extraction columns and auxiliary equipment.
This enclosure is part of the uranium recovery system--the UPMP area.
The main building has a roof approximately 45 feet high, and the SX part is a storey higher.
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penthouses on the roof, housing some of the larger electrical transformers and HEPA filtration systems.
The SX and the CHEMET building walls, floors and roofs would qualify as fire-rated barriers of various ratings.
The aluminum siding, which constitutes the shell of the main FM0/FM0X building would have questionable fire rating, which means that in the event of a fire near this outer shell there is risk of operations in the adjoining area being exposed to the outside environment.
The mezzanine floor of the building in the UPMP area contains a control room, laboratory and a switchgear area.
All of this is separated from the dissolver dump area by the same aluminum siding as the outer shell.
The separation of processes involving fire hazard from potential sources of ignition, e.g. cables, switchgear, and areas of substantial combustible loading is a basic principle of fire protection.
The aluminum siding however hardly qualifies as a fire barrier, and probably was not intended to be as such.
A careful analysis of the fire safety of the area seems warranted.
2.
The Ventilation System I inspected the ventilation system control area and observed operation of the computerized control system, which maintains appropriate pressures and flow rates in each process area, so that the net flow is from the less to the more contaminated areas.
The control is achieved by remote operation of dampers in the duct systems.
There are a few smoke detectors in the ducts, but no auto-matic operation of dampers has yet been programmed as a response to the smoke detector signal.
I was informed that computerized control of the ventilation system is gradually being expanded.
This seems to be a step in the right direction.
3.
Fire Detection and Suppression Systems The building is equipped with sprinkler systems throughout, except for the FM0 powder warehouse and the fuel blender area because of nuclear criticality con-cern.
Sprinkler heads are installed both in the high-ceilinged areas and under the mezzanine floor.
Sprinklers are the only automatic fire detection system in the process areas.
(There is a fire detection and a halon extinguishing system in UPMP control room.) A fire would have to be large enough to melt the fusible plug of the sprinkler head above it, and cause actuation of the suppression sys-tem, for an alarm signal to be transmitted via the "autocall" system.
The sprink-ler heads in the high-ceilinged areas are at heights of 35 to 40 feet from the floor, and there may be a delay of several minutes from the inception of fire to the actuation of a sprinkler at that height.
This is especially so since the sprinkler heads are located several feet below the ceiling, where a hot layer would start forming in the event of a fire.
Given due consideration to the fact that the facility operates and is manned around-the-clock, there still remains some concern about timely detection of a fire and the ensuing suppression action.
The relatively more vulnerable areas appear to be those that have processes using natural gas or hydrogen-air flames, such as the GECO UF conversion area (the 6
GEC0 process was in a shutdown state at the time, however), the defluorination area, and the sintering area.
Given the vapor-ladened atmosphere of some of
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these areas, certain types of fire detectors may be unsuitable.
- However, certain other types, such as heat detectors, rate-of-temperature-rise types of detectors, and flame detectors, strategically located, may provide assurance of more timely detection of a fire.
My inspection of the main process control room (not the UPMP control room) revealed evidence of concern of the plant employees themselves about detection of potential fires in the control panels.
I noticed some smoke detectors of types available in department stores installed behind the panels.
This area has moderate combustible loading (mainly energized electric cables) and is shielded from the operators' eyes by the panels themselves, which extend to the ceiling.
While the employees' awareness of the specific fire hazard is commend-dable, a fire detection system, with appropriate detectors and indication of their status in the front of the panel and connected to the auto-call system, would have been much more desirable.
Thus systematized, it would be part of the maintenance program for the facility fire protection equipment.
Considera-tion may be given to installing an automatic halon suppression system for the area behind the panels, just as in the UPMP computer room.
I recommend that a careful survey be made of the fire hazards in each part of the building and the fire protection measures that exist, and that the above suggestions be then considered in that context.
4.
Manual Fire Fighting Portable extinguishers of appropriate type, capacity, and number have been provided throughout the building.
Tags attached to the extinguishers indicated that they have been inspected regularly on a monthly schedule.
I could never-theless spot a few extinguishers, especially the heavier ones, that were badly rusted and made one wonder if they would function in time of need.
No records of periodic recharging and hydrostatic testing of the extinguishers were avail-able for inspection, as required by NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Extinguishers.
The facility is served by a 10-inch fire water distribution loop with 8-inch take-offs to individual buildings and sprinkler systems within them.
A number of fire hydrants are located around the FM0/FM0X building.
Fire hoses are carried in an emergency response vehicle.
An " unannounced" fire drill was performed during our visit.
From the initial alarm to the assemblage of the emergency response crew and charging of a hose from the hydrant nearest to the fire, the time elapsed was approximately 8 minutes, which may be considered " average," and with practice can and should be improved upon.
The fire-fighters, who are plant employees, did not seem to have had adequate training in handling fire hoses.
The way these were charged could have caused injury from " pipe-whip" from the sudden straightening of the hose.
My inquiries elicited the response that the facility did not consider their emergency crew a " fire brigade," visualized their role as fighting only
" incipient" fires, and that they relied on the nearby Castle Hayne, NC, Volunteer Fire Department to come to their aid.
5.
Fire Protection Water System
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Water to the 10-inch fire main loop is supplied from a 300,000 gallon elevated tank, 150,000 gallons of which is dedicated to the fire protection system.
Fifteen deep wells with a pumping capacity of 1125 gpm are the source of water.
An alternative source is a 300,000 gallon ground level water retention t%.,in, from which water is pumped by a diesel-driven pump of capacity 1000 gpm at 100 psi.
I observed a demonstration of automatic start of the pump upon dropping the pressure in the fire main.
No deficiency was found in the water system.
6.
Fire Protection Equipment Maintenance Audits of the facility fire protection system are made annually by the nuclear risk insurance pool, represented by the Factory Mutual group.
Record-keeping however could improve vastly, particularly on periodic testing and inspection of the fire pump installation, the fire loop, hydrants, fire hoses, the sprinkler systems, halon systems, and portable fire extinguishers.
Testing procedures should be developed and kept in record, and maintenance personnel should be conversant with these procedures in their respective areas.
7.
Fire Emergency Planning There is a fire emergency plan, documented as part of the general emergency response procedures for the facility.
Other than that, the facility does not have a documented fire hazard survey of each plant area, matching them with the protection measures, assigning responsibilities for initial fire emergency readiness on the plant floor, etc.
I recognize however that the facility has not been required in the past to prepare such a detailed plan.
On the subject of readiness, my several brief interviews with plant personnel left me with the impression that many of them would not know in the event of a fire where the nearest " pull-box" is or, for those working in a specific area, which valve to shut in the event of a gas leak.
I should mention that I found the senior operators I interviewed entirely knowledgeable.
8.
The UF Cylinder Storage Area 6
I inspected the UF cylinder storage area in the yard and the nearby propane g
storage tanks.
ThG vulnerability of the cylinders to potential fire accidents, including BLEVEs (boiling liquid / expanding vapor explosions) involving one of the two 30,000 gallon propane tanks, has been a concern of the Region II staff.
The tanks are located approximately 150 feet from the nearest UF cylinders.
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appears to me that the probability of a BLEVE involving one of those tanks is slight, considering that a large spill and consequent exposure fire would be needed to cause a BLEVE.
Even if there were such an explosion and fire, unless there was simultaneously a high wind blowing in the direction of the UF cylin-g ders, 150 feet away, there would be little risk of overheating them.
Porely radiative heat transfer from the fire to an individual cylinder, too, would be negligibly small because of the small " view factor."
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MAY 0 21989 II.
The Ambient Condition in the Hydrolysis /Defluorination Area This is an incidental observation and probably an area of concern for the State of North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
There is a strong smell of ammonia in the area, suggesting that its concentration is at or above 50 ppm, which I understand is the level an average human can perceive.
Upon inquiry, I elicited the information that the maximum permis-sible value (not an OSHA terminology) according to OSHA regulations has been 50 ppm through 1988, with a possible revision to the lower value of 35 ppm currently.
III. Summary In summary, the complete coverage of the facility with automatic sprinkler suppression, except for two areas because of criticality concerns, is a positive factor in the fire protection of the facility.
There is however room for improvement in the following areas:
1.
The testing and maintenance procedures of the fire protection systems and equipment should be formalized so that unifordi procedures are followed in a timely manner.
Records of performance of testing and maintenance should be maintained.
2.
A fire hazard analysis should be performed by qualified persons for each area of the facility to determine the effectiveness of existing fire pro-tection measures in coping with credible fire scenarios.
Any deficiency should then be corrected by a judicious balance of facility modification and additional protective measures.
3.
A Fire Emergency Plan should be prepared, detailing responsibilities, procedure for handling fires in each fire area, procedure for shutting down processes or placing them on standby as appropriate, evacuation procedure, etc.
4.
Upgrading of the emergency response teaf s fire fighting capability from mere " incipient" fire suppression should be seriously considered.
The team cannot stand by for the outside fire department to arrive if the fire becomes somewhat more than incipient.
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5.
The readiness of all employees to act their respective roles in the event of a fire should be improved.
As a minimum, all employees should know how to raise alarm, i.e., hit the pull-box.
Periodical fire drills 4
involving each employee are a means of keeping up readiness.
6.
There is a possibility that the ambient air quality in parts of the facility will not meet OSHA standards OngblSigacMy Amar Datta Uranium Fuel Section i
Fuel Cycle Safety Branch
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DATE:5//4/89 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY i
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