ML20246G096
| ML20246G096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/10/1989 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2625, NUDOCS 8905150185 | |
| Download: ML20246G096 (14) | |
Text
7
- - -. =
= =.. --
t e
pae swa
^
W CERTIFIED COPY
/
DATE ISSUED: April 10, 1989 4
hy L W Dd "U
i
~
SUMMARY
/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS March 1-2, 1989 Bethesda, MD The ACRS Subcommittee on Occupational and Environmental Pro-tection System (0&EPS) met on March 1-2, 1989 at Bethesda, MD for a tutorial session on emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants.
This meeting was suggested at the 342nd ACRS meeting when it stated that the 0&EPS subcommittee hold a tutorial session with the NRC staff, FEMA, and Industry groups as appropriate to become better informed regarding Emergency Preparedness at nuclear power plants and develop recommendations for future ACRS actions. A visit to the NRC Incident Response Center located at the MNBB was made.
Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on February 16,1989(Attachments). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B.
A list of handouts kept with the office copy of the minutes is included in Attachment C.
There were no of-written or oral statements received or presented from members of the R
public at the meeting.
E. G. Igne was cognizant ACRS staff member for as g
the meeting.
@b o
Principal Attendees yy gSul Ei $
ACRS J. Carroll, Chairman I
C. Wylie, Member p r d d ichehpn; Mem %
pg37ggg7g ORIGINAL F.:Remick, Member
{
j;,
Certirseg 3 7
b6u d Od ek23
~
' Minutes / Occupational & Environmental 2
Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2,-1989 NCR B. Wiess W.' Travers E. Podolak D. Persinko T. McKen~na W. Reckley R. Priebe Others A. Nelson, NUMARC T. Tipton, NUMARC S. LaVie, Duquesne Light Co.
F. Pavlechio, Duquesne Light Co.
J. Sieber, Duquesne Light Co.
R. Brevig, Northern States Power Co.
W. Shamla, Northern States Power Co.
H. Specter, New York Power Authority C. Faison, New York Power Authority R. Rodgers, Northeast Utilities B. Lindgren, con Edison P. Loomis, Consumers Power Co.
J. Tyler, Michigan State Police G. Wright, Illinois Dept of Nuclear Safety M. Sanders, FEMA M. Heplen, FEMA J. Fairobent, DOE W. Wolff, DOE E. Warman, Stone & Webster P. Bradford, HSE /NII (U.K.)
J. Turner, HSE /NII (U.K.)
R. Gardner, Stone & Webster I. Tripputi, ENEL (Italy)
J. Devine, EPRI i
Highlights 1.
J. Sieber, Duquesne Light Co., presented an overview of nuclear industry support for emergency planning.
He stated that the Nuclear l
Power Stations at Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, emergency plans are also used as the basis for non-nuclear emergency, i.e., chemical spills, tornado, etc. Success in their emergency preparedness activities is attributed to being in partnership with the neighboring communities. Much effort and resources including grants for emergency i
I L
l l
l.
Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 3
l Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 equipment and training is a must for successful relations. He further 1
f stated that Duquesne interfaces well with state and federal agencies from the neighboring states of Ohio and West Virginia.
l 2.
W. Shamla, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, discussed on-site preparedness today.
In response to a question, W. Shamla stated that the IPE has been started at Monticello and that severe accident scenarios have been developed and factored into the emergency plans.
W. Shamla stated that some of the significant changes to emergency preparedness are the upgrade of emergency plans and procedures, construction and equipping of emergency response facilities and training program improvements. Management must promote a sense of commitment and program ownership especially to its surrounding communities. The utilities must also be sensitive to their needs in which their plants are located.
3.
R. Rodgers, Northeast Utilities, discussed the NUMARC/NESP study on the re-evaluation of emergency action levels.
From industry experience, three popular approaches have emerged for defining threshold; event-symptom, fission product barrier symptom, and hybrid / combination of the preceding.
He stated that NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, is difficult to apply because no basis are provided for initiating conditions, some EALs are misclassified and that some initiating conditions or events are missing. He further stated that similarity between NUREG-0654, unusual event and 10 CFR 50.*/2, non-emergency events are source of confusion and over classification.
Interpretation and adherence to NUREG-0654 IC lists varies by NRC
' Minutes / Occupational & Environmental 4
' Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 l
regions and NRC Headquarters. He suggested that the industry should take the lead in developing recommended changes. The NUMARC/NESP study is the outgrowth of this suggestion. During Phase I, plants (BWR & PWR) were visited in each region and operators were interviewed to obtain a representative sample of EALs which included a variety of approaches used, i.e., vent based, barrier-based, and others. Based on this information the study will recommend methodologies for developing or classifying emergency action levels.
Phase II of the study will develop example generic EALs for BWRs and PWRs that exhibit the following qualities and/or characteristics:
consistency, user-friendliness, ease of upgrading and downgrading, technical completeness, and logical progression in classification for combinations of multiple events.
T. Tipton stated that the results of the study has been documented and I
needs to be reviewed by an independent group. The NRC it was stated will cooperate in this work.
1 4.
W. Travers, NRC, presented a report on emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. He outlined the responsibilities of emergency preparedness and response at NRC headquarters and discussed the functions of AE0Ds Incident Response Branch, NRRs Emergency Preparedness Branch and NMSS Operations Branch.
I m_--_-.-__-.m__-_.
O
Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 5
' Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 1
Offsite aspects of onsite plans for low-power operation (Seabrook case) were discussed. The following are highlights of the rule I
regarding low power operation:
h Arrangements for offsite assistance onsite are defined.
Utilities should be in constant communications with state
)
and local officials.
Offsite monitoring systems and equipment are available onsite.
Training is available for offsite people regarding onsite emergencies.
The realism rule and policy implementation were highlighted. NRC will recognize the reality that, in an actual emergen.y state and local agencies will exercise their best efforts and in doing so they will generally follow the utility emergency plans.
He further stated that a license may be issued in spite of non-compliance with the standards if:
non-participation is the cause, utility makes good faith effort, and the emergency plan provides reasonable assurance.
W. Travers stated that the NRC relies on FEMA in the evaluation of the offsite aspects of emergency planning, and also relies on state and local participation in emergency planning, including the required biennial exercises with the utilities.
Regarding the exercises, he
'i I
' Minuter./ Occupational & Environmental 6
1 Protection System Subcom Mtg. Merch 1-2, 1989 c
t stated that generally recent offsite and onsite exercises have been good.
i
- 5. < M. Sanders, FEMA, discussed the background of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness program and its scope. The REP l
l program consists of federal guidance and technical assistance to state and local government, the evaluation of plans and exercises; training l
i of state, local and federal officials, and the development of federal j
response capabilities to respond to accidents, if needed. The FEMA REP program is defined by 44 CRR 350, the NRC-FEMA Memoranda of Understanding (M0U) and NUREG-D654/ FEMA-REP-1.
M. Sanders next discussed Executive Order 12657 which he stated is to provide yet another layer of assurance that plans and procedures are in place to respond to radiological emergencies. The executive order could be invoked when a licensee certifies to FEMA that state and local governments have declined or failed to prepare emergency preparedness plans that are sufficient to satisfy NRC licensing requirements or to participate adequately in the preparation, demonstration testing, exercise, or use of such plans. When the licensee makes such a certification, he is entitled to request federal assistance from FEMA.
i 6.
M. Heplen, FEMA, presented a status review of the alert and i
notification system. To date 68 sites have been surveyed and four i
plants (Shoreham, Browns Ferry, Seabrook and Watts Bar) are under j
)
l l
l I
i
, Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 7 l
Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 i
{
l active review by FEMA.
Projected completion date for the ANS review is the end of 1989. NRC has been notified of FEMA's ANS findings.
1 1
7.
B. 1.indgren and C. Faison, Con. Ed and NY Power Authority, respectively, discussed utility programs in support of offsite preparedness.
They stated that if planning for emergencies, whether natural or manmade, could be boiled down into one word, that word would be coordination, emergency planning regulations require a coordinated emergency preparedness program, They expanded on this theme by discussing coordination efforts with federal agencies, state and local organizations, the facility operator and private organizations such as hospitals, fire departments, and ambulance corps.
8.
J. Tyler, Michigan Department of State Police, discussed off-site emergency preparedness in support of nuclear power plants in Michigan.
He stated that emergency preparedness involves the effective, effi-cient utilization of available resources to protect the health and s6fety of the public and to protect property to the extent possible.
To accomplish this, planning, training and testing is necessary. This applies to both on-and off-site personnel.
In addition, emergency preparedness personi.el must provide for an interface of on-and off-site activities to ensure there are not conflicts or weaknesses that could result in problems during drills and exercises; and especially during a real event. The State of Michigan has developed a radiological emergency preparedness program consisting of those three phases, plus a comprehensive, ongoing interface with the three i
1 l
Minutes / Occupational & Environmental 8
" Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989
~
utilities that. operate the four nuclear pcwer plants in Michigan. All radiological emergency preparedness activities start with federal regulatory requirements, as well as state statutes. The program has-successfUlly demonstrated all objectives for emergency preparedness in l
accordance with FEMA's guidance.
9.
H. Specter, NY Power Authority, discussed the results of a NUMARC study on graded response.
He stated that the graded response strategy is for prompt evacuation of an inner zone (about 2 miles radius encompassing about 1 percent of the EPZ' population) and sheltering the outer zone (about 10 miles radius) as appropriate and to relocate, if warranted. This strategy fulfills conclusions of an independent DOE site analysis that determined the following:
early fatality risks decrease very rapidly with distance.
sheltering offers good protection, and prompt evacuation near the plant is very effective.
Likewise, NRC site specific analysis indicated that graded response results in near zero early fatalities even with very large releases even at highly populated site and that graded response strategy is much more protective than a massive evacuation.
It was stated by T. Tipton that no new regulations need be promulgated in order to use graded response. The NUMARC study on graded response has been completed and documentation is complete and should be available for review within a month. Ed Podolak, NRC, stated that Pennsylvania
_ = _ _ - - _
. Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 9
Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 is the only state that uses some form of graded response. They evacuate 360 degrees out 2 miles, and up to 5 miles downwind and shelter the other regions out to 10 miles.
He further stated that graded risponse is alive and well and used to some degree.
H. Specter and the subcommittee felt otherwise and considered it to be a problem of perception.
10.
A. Nelson, NUMARC, discussed factors aff*cting natural or techno-logical / industrial emergency evacuations. This NUMARC study reviewed principal causes of major evacuations due to natural or technological emergencies and its consequences.
In one case 700,000 people were evacuated with 4 injuries and no death. Of the 50 cases studies, it was determined that nuclear facilities and their neighboring communities do much more in the way of emergency preparedness than most of the communities studied.
11.
B. Wiess, NRC, discussed NRC's role during an emergency at a nuclear power plant.
In a nutshell NRC's role is to monitor, assist and inform.
Intervention in even a limited fashion to direct the j
licensee's on-site response is an unusual and very rare situation.
B.
Wiess, discussed lessons learned from the f.ull fledged, exercise (FFE)
{
performed at Zion nuclear power plant. The goal was to test Federal j
plans and procedures to determine if they were consistent with FRERP and also determine if the federal government can provide timely and i
effective support to state and local authorities in addition to carrying out federal responsibilities. There were approximate 1,000 people involved, 200 non-players (controllers, evaluators, etc.) and J
Minutes /0 occupational &' Environmental 10 Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 about 175 visitors. The length of the exercise was for three days.
Listed below are some of the_ major lessons learned from the FFE at Zion:
Coordination among participants worked well.
States and utility developed a better appreciation of federal capabilities and structure.
I Startup and transitions caused problems at some facilities'. Those with more training and experience performed best.
More federal preparation and emphasis are needed with respect to responding to congressional needs.
NRC needs to clarify NUREG-0654, Protective Action Guidance to better describe the agency's intent.
Federal field monitoring and assessment will be necessary.
Need to develop a uniform approach to sample collection and analysis.
12.
T. McKenna, NRC, presented an overview of NRC severe accident assessment. The basic radiation protection objr.ctives are to avoid or prevent early health effects doses, reduce doses above GPA PAGs (whole body, greater than 1-5 rem; thyroid, greater than 5-25 rem) and l
control long-term health effects.
l l
,l,
' Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 11 7
l Protection.' System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 1
~
NRC severe protective action guidance provides an action plan l.
. before a release occurrs based on constantly monitored plant j
L l
conditions. Some considerations are as follows:
j i
i 2-5 miles (plant specific) evacuation (all directions)
{
a
'and shelter 5-10 mile is most effective, i
l Modify for the plans short and predictable releases j
(venting),and I
Modify the plans if actions increase risk (evacuation during 1
i severe weather).
In conclusion, he stated that the NRC has formed a working grout composed of people from AE0D, RES and NRR to examine if advances in severe accident understanding provide a basis for a revision of the philosophy used by the NRC to assess the adequacy of public protective actions.
13.
J. Jolicoeur, NRC, discussed the emergency response data system (ERDS). The ERDS will provide direct electronic transmission of a limited set of parameters from a licensee computer to the NRC during an emergency at a licensed nuclear power plant facility.
Implementation is proceeding at a voluntary basis and efforts are l
being taken to minimize the burden on the participating facilities j
(four facilities with two more being negotiated). The NRC staff plans rulemaking of this matter if voluntary participation is not satisfactory.
. Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 12 Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 l
14.
J. Fairobent, DOE, discussed DOE's emergency preparedness activ-ities at headquarters and field activities. The function of DOE headquarters emergency operations center is primarily an information processiiig function, i.e., keep the secretary and senior officials informed and provide a central control and coordination center for headquarters.
The field officers are responsible for initiating and organizing radiological response and to alert and deploy national resources, for example personnel and equipment from other field offices, national laboratories and contractors. DOE coordinates federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment functions and ensures an orderly transfer of responsibility to EPA after a radiological emergency.
15.
R. Gardner and E. Warman, Stone & Webster, briefly discussed international emergency preparedness and response after Chernobyl.
The objectives of the study were to provide descriptions of emergency response plans and provisions (ERPP) in each European country in order to compare the various features and highlight any changes which have been adopted or are under consideration as a result of the Chernobyl accident.
The study indicates that, in general, there are no major re-visions of nuclear power plant ERPP as a result of the Chernobyl accident in the countries visited. Much activity is taking place to improve ERPP in the post-Chernobyl period, but the activities differ from country to country and may be described as evolutionary changes, many of which were under consideration before the Chernobyl accident
Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 13
- Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989
^
but were accelerated as a result of the accident. There is a tendency toward more, rather than less, centralization of basic decisionmaking.
- 16.. J. Devine, EPRI, briefly discussed emergency preparedness, the next generation. He stated that the advanced light-water reactor (ALWR) program is reexamining the basis for current regulations because of improved design and maturing of technical issues, i.e.,
source term.
He stated that the ALWR design does have an effect on the emergency planning zone (EPZ) because the ALWR is of an evolutionary and passive design. A quantitative impact effect on the EPZ does indicate that the EPZ at the site boundary is adequate to meet the current NUREG-0396 criteria.
17.
J. Turner, Deputy Chief Inspection, NII in the U.K., discussed emergency planning arrangements in the U.K.
.He stated that the agency covers factory and mine safety, but that the NII concentrates on nuclear safety matters.
The U.K. now has a PWR program that is similar in design to a 1200 MW(e) Westinghouse plant. One is under construction at Sizewell, one is subject to a planning inquiry now and there are proposals for two more nuclear power plants.
The EPZ was based on deterministic approach of the earlier Magnox reactors with steel pressure vessels. The accident scenario assumes the failure of one duct of the reactor cooling circuits followed by gross failure of fuel cladding in a fuel channel, and leading to oxidation of the fuel. By assuming an adverse weather condition with the given accident scenario a requirement of an EPZ of about 1.5 miles
Minutes /0 occupational & Environmental 14
' Protection System Subcom.Mtg. March 1-2, 1989 3
(2.4 km) was calculated.
In order to encompass the communities of Hinkley Point and Stogursey the detailed excavation planning zone was extended to 2.2 miles (3.5 km).
The subcommittee noted that the EPZs were larper in the U.S.
I In response to an on-site event, emergency arrangements would be j
called by the senior manager at the plant site. The emergency states
- 1) an on-site incident with no possible off-site consequences are (Alert), 2) an on-site incident which has the potential to develop such that significant off-site consequences may occur (Emergency Standby), and 3) an on-site incident with significant off-site consequences (Emergency Alert).
Mitigation or countermeasures to radiological emergencies include sheltering, evacuating distribution of iodine tablets and food and water restrictions.
l Subcommittee Discussions The subcommittee will present a subcommittee report to the full ACRS at the March 1989 meeting.
1 j
j l
NOTE:
A transcript of the meeting is available at the NRC Public
{
Document Room, Gelman 81dg., 2120 "L" Street, NW, l
Washington, D.C. Telephone (202) 634-3383 or can be 1
purchased from Heritage Reporting Corporation,1220 L f
Street, NW, Wa shington, D.C.
20005, Telephone (202) l
,~
628-4888.
1 u_____----___________
I