ML20246F253
| ML20246F253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/29/1989 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Carr, Curtiss, Roberts, Rogers, Zech NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| FRN-53FR16435, RULE-PR-50 ALAB-900, ALAB-901, ALAB-902, NUDOCS 8907130176 | |
| Download: ML20246F253 (8) | |
Text
/
o UNITED STATES g
[
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 1
k...../
JUN 2 91989 MEMCRANDUM FOR:
Chairman Zech Commissioner Roberts j
Commissioner Carr Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss FROM:
Victer Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
REVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS
Background
In a December 23, 1988 memorandum to the E00 from SECY, the staff was directed to review the
...NRC's emergency planning regulations and propose revisions designed to eliminate unclarity and ambiguity in the regulations to include what constitutes the exercise scope prior to the full ' power licensing (NRR)
(seeALAB-900)."
Proposed Candidates for Rulemaking The emergency preparedness regulations have been scrutinized by the staff, interveners, Boards and the Commission in the licensing process. Although several emergency prepr edness issues have been addressed by the parties and resolved, other issues could benefit from rulemaking clarification. The staff has reviewed the emergency preparedness regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 $$ 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix E and in 10 CFR Part 52 and identified the following areas that would benefit from clarification through rulemaking:
1.
Reasonable Assurance:
10 CFR 50.47(a) requires findings of "reaso'iable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 CFR 50.47(b) lists the 16 planning standards that must be met by onsite and offsite plans before the Comission can make a reasonable assurance finding under 10 CFR 50.47(a). However, interveners have argued that there is a separate " reasonable assurance" standard required by 10 CFR 50.47(a) over and above the 16 planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Further, they have argued that this h ly'JJ '
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" reasonable assurance" standard is higher or more rigorous than conformance i
with the 16 planning standards. Rulemaking could more explicitly forge the linkage between 10 CFR 50.47(a) and (b).
2.
Fundamental Flaws: Generally, litigation of the adequacy of emergency plans comes quite late in the hearing process. The regulations might be amended to provide that only matters material to licensing, i.e.,
" fundamental flaws" in emergency plans (and not only those " fundamental flaws" revealed in emergency planning exercises), can be litigated in the hearing process. The Court of Appeals and the Appeal Board have stated that the opportunity to litigate shortcomings in emergency plans shown in the exercises could be limited to those fundamental flaws. Union of Con-cerned Scientists vs. NRC 735 F.2d 1437, 1447-48 (D.C. Dir 1984); Lono Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB E, 28 NRC 499, 504-06 (1988). A fundamental flaw has been defined as an essential failing in a plan which could only be corrected through a significant revision in the plan.
Id.
3.
Range of Protective Actio_n_s: 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires that "a range s
of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public..."
Interveners have argued that every protective action (primarily sheltering and evacuation) must be available to each person in the EPZ at every point in time.
Interveners did not view the term " range of protective actions" as allowing the flexibility in protective action decisionmaking to consider:
(1) differences in circumstance, such as prisoners or hospitalized paticnts, or prisoners who might be sheltered rather than evacuated for low doses; (2) differences in physical facilities such as frame houses, houses without basements or the 'ack of concrete structures for sheltering beach goers; (3) distance from the plant; (4) offsite conditions such as ice, snow, flooding, or earthquake damage; or (5) accident conditions such as the source term, meteorology and plume location. Rulemaking could clarify that the tenn
" range of protective" actions is intended to communicate the concept that different protective actions might be necessary for various segments of the EPZ population for different types of accidents, recognizing that no particular type of protective action is necessarily appropriate for every accident or for every segment of the population.
4.
Monitoring of Evacuees:
Regarding implementation of the " range of protective actions" required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), the guidance in NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, lists as an evaluation criterion that there be a capability to register and monitor, within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period, all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers. During the Shoreham litigation the Appeal Board in ALAB-905 criticized FEMA's 20% planning basis (i.e., capability to monitor 20% of the population of the EPZ in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) as not being supported by testimony and remanded the issue for further consideration by the Licensing l
~
The Commissioners Board. Although this issue was. resolved for that plant in the "Shoreham Director's Decision" based on site specific capabilities, the issue is likely to arise again. Rulemaking could resolve this issue generically.
5.
Recovery: 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13) requires that " general plans for recovery and reentry are developed."
Interveners have argued that these plans need to be as sophisticated and detailed as the other aspects of emergency planning.
Increased resources are being expended by State and local governments, and licensees and applicants to develop and exercise these reentry and recovery plans and this is competing for resources with other more important emergency planning activities.
Interveners have also argued'that detailed recovery and reentry plans should be developed and implemented primarily by the utility and the State and local governments.
In fact, recovery and reentry would occur at a later point in time after the utility and State and local initial response has been augmented by.
outside resources including federal resources. Based upon the experience of the TMI' accident and the Full Field Exercise at Zion (FFE-II), recovery and reentry would be conducted with both substantial support and consider-able federal oversight. Further, regarding recovery, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.H simply requires that " Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described." Rulemaking for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13) could clarify that general " criteria" for recovery and reentry onsite and offsite need to be developed rather than elaborate plans and exercises.
6.
Realism: The " realism" rule in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) does not apply to operating plants although the concept would be applicable to situations where State or local governments withdraw from participation in emergency plans at plants with operating licenses (see discussion in Statement of Considerations for the realism rule 52 FR 42083) and could be used in connectionwitha50.54(s)(2) determination. Also, guidance in NUREG-0654/
FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, on implementing the realism rule was generalized to cover plants with operating licenses. Rulemaking could make the application of the realism doctrine to operating plants clearer by explicitly applying the extensd a of the " realism" concepts to plants with operating licenses.
7.
15-Minute Notification: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.Section IV.D.3 requires, among other things, that "The design objective of the prompt public notifi-cation system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes." This has become a rigid standard (i.e., 15.0 minutes) which is generally required by FEMA to be demonstrated at each offsite exercise. Rulemaking could open this issue for Commission scrutiny and perhaps better clarification of what is meant by the term "about 15 minutes."
.5-x The Commissioners 8.
Pre-Licensing Onsite Exercise: Recently the Commission amended 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1 to extend the interval for. the pre-l licensing offsite exercise from one year to two years prior to issuance l
of an operating license for full power. This was primarily due to the length of time for litigation of the offsite exercise. The interval for the ensite exercise remained one year.- Now it appears that the status of litigation of the onsite exercise may also be affected by the length of.
time for litigation of the offsite exercise. Rulemaking could extend the
. interval for the onsite exercise from one year to two years prior to issuance of an operating license for full power or could require that only one full participation exercise be held prior to issuance of an operating license for full power.
9.
Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs):
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV
. requires that the 50 called "ETEs" be included in the emergency plans.
ETEs are intended to be used to identify potential " bottlenecks" during the planning process so that effective traffic controls can be included in the plans. The ETEs are also intended to be used by decisionmakers during an actual emergency to detennine the best protective action (and the timing) based upon road conditions, time of day and seasonal varia-tions in population. However, interveners have interpreted the requirement to provide ETE's in the emergency plans as a requirement to meet some predetermined evacuation times. Also, the precision of the ETEs has been litigated to a degree beyond their intended purpose in planning or their utility during an emergency.
Rulemaking clarification could return the process of developing ETEs more in line with its original purpose, i.e.,
to aid planners and responders in deciding between alternative protective actions (primarily sheltering or evacuation) and in deciding the timing of evacuations (perhaps earlier for increased seasonal populations, inclement weather, or impending darkness).
- 10. Exercise Frequency: The requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.3 on full or partial participation by State or local govern-ments in the biennial (offsite) exercise are unnecessarily complicated.
The regulation has resulted in a relatively complicated description of the requirements for exercise participation by State and local governments who have offsite planning responsibility for more than one nuclear power plant. Rulemaking could simplify and clarify this requirement. The staff believes that the interval for an ingestion exposure pathway exercise should be changed from 5 to 6 years, and that the requirement that all states within the EPZ for a given site fully participate in an offsite exercise for that site at least once every 7 years should be deleted. The six year cycle is compatible with FEMA requirements and with the biennial exercise frequency, and FEMA has asked us to eliminate the 7 year return frequency requirement as burdensome to States such as Illinois which is within the plume exposure pathway for 7 sites.
,y F
The Commissioners l l11; 10 CFR Part 52 Emergency' Planning:
In a February 17, 1989 memorandum
-(enclosed), the staff identified a potential problem regarding t,0vernments withdrawing from participation in emergency planning, specifically' partici-pation in emergency planning exercises which would be required before licensing and periodically thereafter during construction and operation.
As discussed under item f6 above, rulemaking could clarify the application.
of the " realism" provisions of.10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) to plants with operating licenses.. Other changes may be needed to deal with the issue of State or
. local government withdrawal near the completion of construction. Another issue for which rulemaking may he needed relates to those portions.of the plan which cannot be exercised prior to issuance of the combined.
license. For example, although a' pre-licensing exercise could be developed to include the major observable elements of the onsite and offsite plans, some aspects of the plans would be difficult to demonstrate prior to construction of the facility (e.g., the control room and emergency response facilities).
If portions of the plans were exercised for the first time in post-licensing tests, the results might be subject to an opportunity for hearing relatively late in the process. Although these issues are relatively complex, the staff believes they are resolvable.
Resolved Emergency Planning Issues:
The staff believes that there are a number of emergency planning issues that have been scrutinized by the parties and resolved and would not benefit from rulemaking.._.One example is the issue in ALAB-900 giving rise to the December 23, 1988 SECY memorandum that initiated this review of the regulations, i.e., the scope of the 1986 Shoreham exercise. The scope of that exercise was limited (i.e., significant aspects of the offsite plan were not tested) based on the
- past staff practice of treating the pre-licensing or qualifying exercise in the same manner as a post-licensing exercise.
(Certain aspects of offsite plans for operating plants are only required to be demonstrated every six years.)
As a result of adjudicatory challenges to the scope of the 1986 Shoreham exercise, the' Licensing Board concluded that the regulations at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.Section IV.F.(1), require a substantially more thorough pre-licensing exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participa-tion..The. staff believes that this pre-licensing exercise requirement is consistent with other comprehensive pre-licensing testing and inspection requirements. Accordingly, FEMA guidance for the conduct of pre-licensing exercises has been changed to include all of the significant elements of the
. offsite plan in the scope of the exercise. The 1988 Shoreham and Seabrook pre-licensing exercises were conducted under the new criteria. These criteria are well understood and are consistent with the Shoreham Licensing Board's interpretation of the existing regulations. Tha staff plans to apply the criteria to the relatively few plants remaining to be licensed.
Another emergency preparedness issue which has been resolved involves the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) size.
Some plume exposure pathway EPZs extend several miles beyond the "about 10 miles in radius"
The Commissioners J described in 10 CFR 550.4.'(c)(2).
In some cases these EPZs were negotiated among the State and local governments, utilities, FEMA, and NRC.
In other cases licensing boards imposed these larger EPIs or FEMA initiated changes in EPZ size because of an internal policy designed to avoid splitting jurisdic-tions at the periphery of the EPIs. All of this was accomplished under the following provision of 10 CFR 550.47(c)(2): "The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a partic"br nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land charseteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." The Commission, however, clarified the intent of the regulations in the Shoreham proceeding by reversing the Appeal Board's admission of two contentions on whether the Shoreham EPZ should be expanded. TheCommissionstated[26NRC383(1987)]:
"Accordingly, we think the better interpretation is that the rule precludes adjustments on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is "about 10 miles in radius" and that Contentions 22.B and 22.C shou i on this ground be deemed 1,1 permissible challenges to the rule.
In our view, the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact size of the EPZ only on the basis of such straightforward administrative considerations as avoiding EPZ boundaries that run through the middle of schools or hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions.
The goal is merely planning simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the location of the boundaries. With such clarity, plans can be implemented with an understanding as to who is being directed to take particular protective actions."
The staff believes that this policy is now well understood by applicants, licensees, and FEMA. Althcugh FEMA and NRC do not intend to require reductions to EPZs which are larger than regulatory requirements, we will try to facili-tate any such negotiations initiated by a utility, State or local government.
The staff will also ensure that the Commission Policy is followed for new EPIs.
In view of this, the staff does not believe that it is necessary to open this issue to rulemaking.
Another issue which has been resolved is the issue of offsite medical services.
In a September 17, 1986 policy statement (51 FR 32904) the Commission stated its belief that 10 CFR 550.47(b)(12) required pre-accident arrangements for medical services (beyond the maintenance of a list of treatment facilities) for indi-viduals who might be severely exposed to dangerous levels of offsite radiation following an accident at a nuclear power plant. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated and remanded a previous Commission interpretation of planning standard (b)(12) which required only the development and maintenance of a list of treatment facilities on which post event, ad hoc arrangements for medical treatment would be based. Subject to general guidance from the Commission, the staff and FEMA developed guidance for State and local governments and licensees on the minimum necessary arrangements for medical offsite services. That guidance is contained in FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM)
p.
The Commissioners -
1 r
MS-1, " Medical Services" (November 13,1986). The staff believes that this policy is well understood by applicants, licensees, and FEMA._ Here again, the-staff does not believe that rulemaking would be advantageous. However, Guidance Memoranda do not have the status of rules and this memorandum could become the subject of a hearing challenge.
Staff Action The staff will initiate a rulemaking effort to address issues identified in this review of. the emergency preparedness regulations. We will be coordinating this effort with FEMA. The staff expects to have a proposal before'the Commission by early CY 1990.
Original signed by Victor Stello, Jr.
- Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
DISTRIBUTION:
Memo dtd 2/17/89 See next page cc: SECY OGC MEMO FOR CHAIRMAN
- See Previous concurrence
/4 /ga/s 0GC b R R O
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~ = - SAT e y ezek EMurley Stello 06/22/89 06 /89 06/ W 8Q [ /89 jg 4
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The Commissioners The staff believes that this policy is now well understood by applicants, licensees, and FEMA. Although FEMA and NRC do not plan to initiate a reduction to EPZs which are larger than regulatory requirements, we will try to facili-tate any such negotiations initiated by a utility, State or local government. The staff will also ensure that the Commission Policy is followed for new EPZs. In view of this, the staff does not believe that is it necessary to open this issuetorulemakingK Another issue which ha's been resolved is the issue of offsite medical services. y belief that 10 CFR 950.47(b)(y statement (51 FR 32904) the Comission stated its In a September 17,1986 polic
- 12) required pre-accident arrangements for medical services (beyond the maintenance of a list of treatment facilities) for indi-viduals who might be severely. exposed to dangerous levels of offsite radiation following an accident at a nuclear power plant. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colbmbia vacated and remanded a previous Comission interpretation of planning standard (b)(12) which required only the development and maintenance of a list of treatment facilities on which post event, ad hoc arrangements for medical treatment 'would be based. Subject to general gilidance from the Comission, the staff and FEMA developed guidance for State and local governments and licensees on the minimum necessary arrangements for medical offsite services. That guidance is co'ntained in FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM)
MS-1, " Medical Services" (November 13,'1986). The staff believes that this policy is well understood by applicantsk licensees, and FEMA. Here again, the staff does not believe that rulemak ng would be advantageous. l Staff Action \\ The staff has initiated a rulemaking \\ ,3 effort which will address the 11 issues identified in this reytew of \\the emerdelity preparedness regulations. We will be coordinating this affort With FEMA.\\ The staff expects to have a proposal before the Comission by earl CY 1990) \\ \\ \\ ( \\ \\\\ N Victor Stello, Jr. Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
DISTRIBUTION: Memo dtd 2/17/89 5ee next page MEMO FOR CHAIRMAN OGC DD:NRR D:NRR EDO SATreby JHSniezek TEMurley VStello 06/ / 89 06/ /89 06/ /89 06/ /89 ) RES s E. %ff SC:$fp:D,EP C
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Distribution: 5tello or '9,, UNITED STATES son NUCLEAR RCGULATORY COMMISSION g c f, WASHINGT08d, D. C. 30665 g February 17, 1989 l EBeckjord
- es*
I MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Each Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Carr Commissioner Rogers Q ) Commissioner Curtiss { FROM: Victor Stallo, Jr. Executive Director or operatio
SUBJECT:
PART 52 AND EMERGENCY PIANNING Introduction The Commission should be alerted to the fact that there is one significant licensing uncertainty which the draft final rule on standardization and one-step licensing would not remove.' The uncertainty was not the subject of the Part 52 rulemaking and should be addressed by further rulemaking after Part 52 is issued. In addition, there is an enclosure to this memorandum which recommends some clarifying changes to the provisions on emergency planning in Subpart A (Early site Permits) of the rule. Discussion The draft final rule goes a long way toward assuring that issues of quality assurance and offsite emergency planning, which have so plagued operating license hearings in recent years, would not become the subjects of prolonged hearings after construction under a combined license. With regard to emergency planning in particular, the rule would require that complete emergency plans be approved and exercised 1 before 1 he draft final rule does not explicitly require an T offsite emergency preparedness exercise before issuance of a combined license, but sec. 52.91(a) of the rule does say that, before issuing the license, the Commission shall make a finding that the applicabl= requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, among other sections of Part 50, have been met, and sec. 50.47(b)(14) in turn requires periodic exercises of the offsite plans. See also 10 CPR Part 50, App. E, Sec. IV.F., " Training". Thus, an initial exercise would be held before issuance of the license ~, and exercises would be held every two years thereafter until operation. The earlier exercises (Footnote Continued) Enclosure
- 4. ',
2 t.he combined license was issued. The rule would require applicants for combined licenses to make good faith efforts to obtain certifications from state and local governments that they believe the offaite plans are practicable, and that they would take part in offaite emergency preparedness exercises and execute their responsibilities under the plans. Where such certifications could not be obtained, the rule would provide for licensing on the basis of adequate utility offsite amargency plans. However, there is no provision in the draft final rule which confronts the situation in which governments which have provided such certifications then reverse themselves and oppose the plans and refuse to take part in the periodic . preparedness exercises which would take place during construction. The certifications would not legally bind these governments. Thus they would be free, in a worst case, to pull out of the last preparedness exercise before operation. Under this scenario, the exercise could not be held and thus a significant acceptance criterien would not be satisfied.2 The commission then would not be able to ar.ke the required finding that the acceptance criteria in the combined license had been met (see sec. 52.103(c)), and operation could not begin until a utility plan, or some other new plan, had been exercised and approved (possibly after a hearing on an amendment to the combined license to substitute a utility plan for the governmental plan). In my opinion, the possibility that operation could be delayed in this way is a principal cause of uncertainty in the present licensing process. Unless this major uncertainty is removed, we will not have brought as much reform to the licensing process, even with Part 52, as we could have. As to remedy, the uncertainty arises from the substantive requirement for periodic exercises that exists in 10 CFR Part 50. A procedural rule like Part 52 cannot remedy the uncertainty, and no public comment received on Part 52 has suggested that it could. Under direction from the Commission in Staff Requirements Memorandum 881221 (December 23, 1988, in connection with SECY-88-319), the staff will soon be reviewing the regulations on the offsite preparedness (Footnote continued) would involve a great deal of simulation of the licensee's role, since much of the licensee hardware and operational organization presumed by the plans would not be in place yet. JThe requirement for periodic exercises would be an . acceptance criterion in any combined license. O
I 3 ? exercise required before full power operation. Changes to the requirements for periodic exercises will be considered at that time. Whatever changes are made in this regard are, of course, bound to be controversial. 6 The office of the General counsel has reviewed this memorandum and has no legal objection to it.
Enclosure:
At stated l i I cc: SECY OGC e i l e j l 1 1
+ Enclosure RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE PROPOSED PART52(SECY-89-036) Upon further review of the sub. ject proposed final rule the staff has identified the need for modifications in sections dealing with emergency planning require-ments. Specifically, in Sections 52.17(b)(1) and (b)(2), which address the centent of application for Early Site Permits, the staff reconsnends changes to clarify the intent of the rule. A comparative text of these recommended changes follows: (b)(1) The application must-provide-4mformatten-suffis4ent-to-show-that the-a re a - su r rou n d in g -t h e -s i te-i s -ame nable -to -eme r ge n sy-pla nnin g -wh 4 sh-would provide-reasonable-assuranse-that-adequate-protest 4ve-measures-seuld-be-taken 4n-the-event-of-a-pad 4eleg4 sal-emergensy-at-the-site -given-the-sharaster4st4ss r ci-the-s44e-and-the-probable-emergensy-planning-nones-svereund4mg-the-site sush-sharacteristiss-4ns4Wder-but-4n-paF44 sular-sases-would-not-necessarily be-limited-tes-the-tepegraphy-and-meteepelegy-of-the-planning-senest-the-pre-fested-fusu re-peputat4en-prof 44e-of-the-planning-nonost-land-use-ins 4de-the planning-nenest-the-sheltering-sepas4ty-and-shelter 4ng-offest4veness-of butidings-4n-the-plume-emergensy-plann4mg-nonet-and-peten64al-routes-for evasustion-out-of-the-plume-emeFjensy-planning-noner should identify physical characteristics unique to the proposed site, such as egress limitations " rom the area surrounding the site. that could pose a significant impediment to the development of emergency plans. l (2) The application may also either (1) Propose emergensy-p46mning-parameters-for-review-and-approval-by-the j l NEG and-the-Federal-Emergensy-Management-Agensyt-the-parameters-may-4nelude eush-matters-as-the-enast-54ae-and-shape-of-the-emergency-pishn4Rg-nones,-er the-resourses-pequired-for-sheltering-or-evaeustient-conformanse-with-these i pa r ame te r s-by -the-eme rg e n sy -plan s-submi tted-by-en-s pp 44sant-for -a-semb ined 44 sense-op-an-speretton-44 sense-w(44-be-suff4 stent-to-show-the-asseptabllity cf-the-plans-with-respest-to-the-emergensy-planning-requirements-ref4ested 4n-the-parameterst-or maior features of the emergency plans. such as the exact sizes of the emergency f anning zones, that can be reviewed and approved by NRC in consultation witi FEMA in the absence of complete and integrated emergency plans. (ii) Propose complete and integrated emergency plans for review and approval by the NRC, in consultation with and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,inaccordwiththeapp(licableprovisionsof10CFR50.47.2)(1)ofthissubsection Underparagraphs(1)and include a description of any contacts and arrangements made with local, state, and federal governmental agencies with emergency planning responsibilities. Under the option set forth in paragraph (2),11) of this subsection, the applicant shall make good faith efforts to obtain from the same governmental agencies certifications (1) that the proposed emergency plans are practicable,
a .? ~2-q.. (ii) that these agencies are committed to participating in any further develop-ment of the plans, including any required field demonstrations, and (iii) that these agencies are committed to executing their responsibilities under the plans in the event of an emergency. The application must contain any certi-fications that have been obtained. If these certifications cannot be obtained, the application must contain information, including a utility plan, sufficient to show that the proposed plans nonetheless provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. In (b)(1) the recommended changes would make this section conform with current EP t m lations (Part 50, Appendix E II) and practice which focus on early identification of site factors which could negatively impact the development pla The changes would eliminate the implication that of effective emergency (e.g.ns., meteorology, populatio'n projections, and topography) site characteristics would be reviewed against acceptability criteria to determine NRC approval or disapproval based on a linkage of these site features with adequate emergency planning. Current practice assumes that, absent some significant negative physical feature, sites which meet Part 100 siting criteria can accommodate cdequate emergency planning. The recommended changes to b(1) also eliminate language which could indicate that an EP " reasonable assurance" finding needs to be made based on site characteristics. The reconnended changes to b(2) are relatively minor and focus on simplifying and making the language consistent with existing Emergency Preparedness terminology. If these changes are adopted, additional conforming changes elsewhere in the rule and the Statement of Considerations would be required. e
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- JHSniezek, NRR-
- SATreby, NRR
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