ML20246B459
| ML20246B459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/05/1989 |
| From: | Podolak E, Travers W, Weiss B NRC |
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| ML20246B415 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8907070341 | |
| Download: ML20246B459 (14) | |
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i NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISES:
l A DECADE OF U.S. EXPERIENCE (1979-1989)
William D.; Travers, Bernard H. Weiss & Edward M. Podolak United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission James D. Jamison Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory United States q
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ABSTRACT l
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As a result of the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, extensive new emergency preparedness requirements were issued by-the U.'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss!.on and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Increased empharis was placed on cooperation between the nuclear utility and the 9ffsite authorities.
Periodic:
exercises, evaluated by Federal inspectors and critiqued by the participants, became a fundamental-component of onsite and offsite emergency programs.
This paper describes the evolution of the-exercise process'over the 10 years since the TMI accident. -It is principally- -focused on the onsite: aspects of emergency exercises and includes information on changes in exercise program emphasis,
- methods, and the types of observations recorded by exercise evaluators.-
Improvements in the U.S.
Federal capability to respond to a nuclear power plant accident are also discussed.
RtSUMt Suite A-l' accident du 28 mars
- 1979,
& Three Mile Island, de
.g nouvelles mesures d'urgence approfondies-pour l'dtat' sde preparation ont dtd stablies par la Commission de R6glementation Nucidaire et l'Agence Fdddrale de Gestion des Urgences des Etats-Unis.
On a insists plus sur la collaboration entre les centrales nucidaires de production et les autoritds exterieures aux sites.
Des exercises rdguliers dvaluds par des inspecteurs fdddraux et critiquds par les participants devinrent partie intdgrale des programmes d'urgence sur les sites des centrales et externes aux sites.
Ce document ddcrit l'svolution des exercices depuis-l' accident
&.TMI il y'a 10 ans.
Il se concentre essentiellement sur les aspects des exercices d'urgence aux sites et comprend~dgalement des information sur les changements des orientations, des mdthodes et des diffdrentes observations faites dans le cadre du programme d'exercice par ceux qui dvaluent les exercices.
On discute dgalement dem andliorations qui ont 6td faites' dans la capacitd fdddrale m fricaine
& faire face aux L
accidents des centrales nucidaires.
8907070341 890605 PDR ORG NRRBp i
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Introduction Before 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioa's rules on emergency I
planning and preparedness amounted to about 80 lines of text in the Code of j
Federal Regulations (CFR). Within 2 years after the Three Mile Island acci-j i
dent, the same regulations had been expanded in scope and detail such that they l
filled some 870 lines of text. The pre-1979 regulations contained only the l
general requirement that nuclear power plant owners make " provisions for testing, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to assure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific duties, and provi-J sions for participation by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency."
The frequency, extent, and level of the of' site authorities' involvement i
I in those periodic drills were not explicitly stoted.
Consequently, many nuclear power plant sites had never conducted realistic exercises of the integrated response of the nuclear utility and those local authorities with responsibility for offsite protection of the public. The drills conducted by 1
nuclear power plant owners during this period were generally limited in scope, focusing on relatively narrow in-plant aspects such as radioactive contamina-3 tion control.
Reactor operations activities, organizational responses,
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i communications and interactions with offsite authorities, and the development of protective action recommendations for the offsite public were seldom simulated or practiced in any realistic way.
Furthermore, no requirement existed for the nuclear power p%nt owner to perform a self-critique, document i
exercise findings, or take action to correct identified problems. Observation and evaluation of the drills by NRC inspectors was not standard practice and occurred infrequently.
j Planning for protective meesures including the evacuation of populations
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residing near nuclear plants was inconsistent, and in many cases entirely lacking. At the time nuclear power plant owners were required to designate a low population zone (about 2-3 miles in radius) in which it was reasonable to expect that protective measures for t.be public could be taken and to show that they had plans to notify and coordinate with offsite authorities. The existence of an effective emergency plan had not been a condition for granting a reactor operating license. Although offsite authorities could voluntarily submit plans to the NRC for review and approval, at the time of the TM1 accident, only a few had NRC-approved plans in place.
The numerous reviews and inquiries which were initiated following the accident identified areas of weakness in the preparedness of the nuclear utilities, the offsite authorities, an<1 the responsible Federal agencies to deal with major nuclear power plant emergencies. At each level of responsi-bility in the process, lessons were drawn from the record of events, and those lessons were translated into action plan specifics.
Improvements were ordered by the NRC in the qualifications and training of control room operators to enable them to recognize and deal with core damage accidents. Additional equipment and systems for monit'aring reactor and plant conditions were required, as well as improved procedures for clea11ng with plant conditions outside the normal operating ranac Organiza;ional changes were mandated to ensure that responsibilities for recqnizing, classifying, and responding to accidents were clearly defined and were vess.ed in persons with appropriate
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qualifications. The scope and content of emergency plans were specified in considerable detail in the regulations, and procedures to implement the provisions of the plans became a required part of the nuclear power plant owners' preparedness program. Additionally, nuclear power plant owners were required to plan cooperatively with the local authorities for the protection of populations in an emergency planning zone (EPZ) around each reactor site. An approximately 10-mile radius plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) and an approximately 50-mile radius ingestion exposure pathway EPZ were required to be established for detailed emergency planning around nuclear power plants. Methods of promptly notifying the cognizant offsite authorities of emergencies and recommending protective measures were required to be in place and periodically tested.
Finally, the requirement for periodic exercises to test the adequacy of plans, implementing procedures, emergency equipment, communications methods, and public notification systems was strengthened.
Exercises that tested the emergency response interactions of all the offsite organizations involved in the planning process were required, as was a sub-stantive self-evaluation by the nuclear power plant owners, leading to corrective actions and progra'n improvements.
Wi?.h the promulgation of new emergency preparedness requirements, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was assigned responsibility for determining the adequacy of the offsite authorities' emergency plans, and the issuance of operating licenses by the NRC was made contingent on FEMA's finding of adequacy. These new requirements also resulted in a major increase in the extent of the Federal inspection and auditing of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness programs. Teams of four to eight NRC inspectors conducted detailed onsite appraisals of ecch nuclear power plant's implementation of the new requirements and completed an evaluation of each emergency exercise. At the scme time, FEMA evaluated the plans and exercises of the offsite agencies involved ir emer ency response planning for the area surrounding eat.h reactor site.
InitioMy, p ior to completing a full review of the submitted plans, these exercises were used as the basis for a determination of the adequacy of offsite emergency planning. Subsequent exercise evaluations, conducted annually for the nuclear power plant and every 2 years for the offsite agencies, have provided the NRC and FEMA regular opportunities to assess the quality of the preparedness prngrams and their compliance wit < Ihe regulations
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and guidance. As nuclear power plant owners attempted to comply with this 1arge body of new regulations and guidance, improvement in some areas generally l
preceded others. NRC inspecticn observations served to focus attention on those areas that were perceived to be most critical, thus stimulating improve-ments in those areas. The following sections describe the evolution of the emergency preparedness programs at nuclear power reactor sites in the 10 years following the TMI accident, as evidenced by the changes observed in the exer-l cise process.
The Early Years {1979-1983)
As noted previously, the post-TM1 emergency preparedness regulations and guidance were far more comprehensive and detailed than those previously in l
place. The regulations, issued in 1979 and 1980, specify 16 fundamental l
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3 emergency planr.ing standards which must be met to demonstrate adequate emergency preparedness. The planning standards, applicable to onsite and/or offsite organizations include the following areas:
- Assignment of Responsibility
- Onsite Emergency Organization
- Emergency Response Support and Resources
- Emergency Classification System
- Notification Me bods and Procedures
- Emergency Communications
- Public Education and Information
- Emergency Facilities and Equipment
- Accident Assessment
- Protective Response
- Radiological Exposure Control
- Medical and Public Health Support
- Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Operations
- Exercises and Drills
- Radiological Emergency Response Training
- Responsibility for the Planning Effort Also in 1980, the NRC and FEMA jointly published a guidance document, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response ibns and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear power Plants", NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1 [1]. The guidance provided in this document included specific critaria for use by onsite and offsite organizations in developing their etergency plans to meet the 16 planning standards required by regulation.
Following the development of emergency plans based on the new regulations and the NUREG-0654 guidance, in late 1980, the NRC and FEMA began evaluating integrated emergency exercises conf ucted by nuclear power plant l
owners and offsite authorities. By April of 1982, owners of all operating nuclear power plants had conducted at least one NRC-evaluated exercise in accordance with their new plans. These exercises provided the first opportunity for the nuclear power plant owners to demonstrate the workability of their new plans and the greatly expanded role of the local authorities in emergency planning and response.
NRC evaluations of these first exercises tended to concentrate on the basic capabilities of the nuclear power plant owners to plan and conduct
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full-scale exercises. Areas of particular concern to the NRC staff included those relating to public protective actions since these had been found seriously deficient during the TM1 accident. Specifically, the areas of emphasis included the specification of the emergency organization and lines of authority, the ability to classify emergencies on the basis of plant conditions, and the ability to communicate with offsite authorities. Nuclear I
power plant personnel were now expected to act quickly and to recognize emergency ccnditions on the basis of plant indications, to classify these conditions using predetermined criteria, to notify cognizant offsite author-ities within about 15 minutes of classifying the conditions, to recommend 1
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During the first round of exercises, the identification of shortcomings by J
NRC inspectors in several general areas was fairly comon. The shortcomings included:
- Inadequate procedures to implement the emergency plan,
- Inadequate emergency equipment and supplies
- Scenarios of insufficient scope and detail to demonstrate all response capabilities, 1
- Insufficient training of personnel for their emergency response roles.
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These problems appeared to have the greatest impact on performance when 1
several factors combined to cause the failure of some aspect of the notifica-
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tion or communication process.
For example, personnel assigned to positions in i
the emergency response organization frequently found themselves working in a
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temporary emergency response facility with untested procedures and communica-l tions equipment ard completely different lines of communication and reporting than those to which they were accustomed. Marginal equipment (telephones, radios, public address systems), the need to link multiple facilities on a single communications channel, and the need to communicate continuously and reliably with several different offsite locations often combined to degrade the effectiveness of the nuclear power plant owners' efforts. Often, because of this complexity, the exact cause of a particular failure of the notification and communication process could not be determined uatil observations from a number of different observers had been 6ssembled, compared, and reconciled.
The exercise scenarios and control methods used in these early exercises l
often failed to adequately test response capabilities. The need to actually
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demonstrate as many parts of the response process as possible in an integrated
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manner was quite new to the nuclear industry.. Scenario data that depicted the i
plant transient causing the " accident" were often inconsistent with the
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scenario data describing the radiological conditions within the plant and the j
effluent release pathways. This situation resulted in confusion and incorrect 1
classification of scenario events. Often when a poor scenario misled emergency i
response personnel and caused unanticipated responses that threatened the completion of the exercise, the only means of recovery for the exercise con-trollers was to intervene and direct the desired response. This intervention uniformly detracted from the realism of tne exercise and made it difficult, if _;
not impossible, to judge some aspects of response personnel knowledge and
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performance.
Also, the participation of all the parties in a single exercise high-lighted differences in terminology and practice, such as the use of different maps and environmental sample point designations by the nuclear power plant
- Nuclear power plant emergency classification levels, in ascr: ding order of severity, are Unusual Event. Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.
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r owners and offsite authorities or their use of different conventions for j
stating the wind direction and the affected downwind sectors, as identified en the site map.
The Middle Years (1983-19861 This period evidenced a maturation of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness programs. After several annual exercises, nuclear power plant
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owners and the offsite authorities had progressed from struggling to conduct a J
minimally coordinated respense to being well drilled in their procedures and generally demonstrating proficiency in the technical aspects of response. The experience gained in repeated exercise planning meetings and exercises began to be evident as coordination improved between nuclear power plant owners and offsite authorities, i
Shortcomings in emergency plan implementing procedures which were identi-
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fied during exercises were addressed and resolved. The requirement that nuclear power plant owners conduct meaningful self-evaluations of their exercises, document any areas of weakness, and develop corrective actions facilitated the overall improvement. The NRC staff could observe not only the actual conduct of an exercise, but could also gauge the extent to which prob-lems were being identified and corrected by the nuclear power plant owners by observing the self-critique meetings and by examining records of corrective
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actions resulting from the nuclear power plant cwner's own findings.
As procedural and organizational problems were reduced in number and significance, the NRC staff inspections shifted toward the technical aspects of emergency response. Actions of control room operators, radiation dose projection, environmental monitoring, in-plant radiation protection, emergency facilities and equipment, scenario adequacy, and the technical expertise of emergency response organization members all received greater scrutiny from inspection and observation teams.
By using technical experts in various fields to conduct inspections and exercise evaluations, the NRC staff was able to assess the nuclear power plant owner's technical capabilities in more depth.
At the same tire, the increasing poficiency of plant staff required more de-tailed, technically correct, and challenging scenarios. To promote a higher standard of technical content in the scenarios, the NRC staff had all exercise scenarios reviewed by technical experts in reactor operations, radiation protection, and other fields. Nuclear power plant owners were also strongly encouraged to have their scenarios reviewed by plant personnel for conformity with their plant systems and parameters.
During this period, a guidance document was assembled to compile all the recommendations of NRC's technical experts on preparing technically accurate and challenging exercise scenarios. The guidance document titled Report to the NRC on Guidance for Preparing Scenarios for Emergency Preparedness Exercises at Nuclear Generating Stations," NUREG/CR-3365 [2], was published in March 1986.
Additionally, during this period, development of a formal appraisal process for emergency facilities and equipment was begun.
In 1981, the NRC had published the criteria that it intended to use in evaluating whether nuclear power plant owners met the requirements of regulations in a document titled l
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" Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," NUREG-0696 [3]
This guidance was subsequently superceded by requirements for emergency facilities that were detailed in " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Require-ments, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability," NUREG-0737, Supplement No. 1 [4). Nuclear power plant owners had met many of the post-TMI facility and equipment requirements in some interim or temporary way while permanent l
facilities and equipment were being designed, constructed, or procured.
Although many aspects of facilities cnd equipment readiness were being routinely evaluated by tb NRC staff during periodic exercises, the need for a more detailed and comprehensive evaluation was recognized. Therefore, special inspection procedures were developed and multidisciplinary team inspections were conducted to assure a rigorous assessment of the permanent facilities as they were placed in service.
I Major improvements in the response processes of the NRC and other Federal agencies were planned, implemented, and tested during this period. The NRC l
began a program of facility / equipment improvements, procedure changes, and
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intensive training for response staff at Headquarters and the five Regional 1
offices.
Exercises conducted by nuclear power plant owners were used to test j
the NRC's notification and communications processes.
At the end of 1980. FEMA published the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness / Response Plan for Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Accidents (Master i
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Plan). Later, FEMA coordinated a Federal interagency effort to develop the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) [S), which as an expansion i
of the Master Plan, broadened its scope to include all types of civilian radiological emergencies that might require a significant Federal response to a
support the immediate response of offsite authorities.
The FRERP, which was approved by 12 Federal agencies, was published in November 1985.
A major aspect of this plan for radiological emergencies at nuclear power plants is that the U.S. Department of Energy can establish a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) at the scene. This capability would supplement the technical personnel made available by the offsite authorities, f
provide state-of-the-art monitoring equipment, including aircraft, provide j
predictive and assessment capabilities and supplement communications.
j Although nuclear power plants had conducted numerous full-participation exercises that involved offsite authorities, until 1984 there had been almost no Federal participation in these exercises, other than by the NRC.
Following -
agreements by the the Florida Power and Light Company and the State of Florida to expand their regularly scheduled exercise at the St. Lucie power station, 1
the first Federal Field Exercise (FFE-1) was conducted in March 1984.
It allowed for comprehensive Federal participation and involved over 1,200 indi-viduals who represented emergency response organizations from several departments of the State of Florida, two counties, the nuclear power plant, 12 Federal agencies, and several private organizations. The Federal participation included the establishment of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assess-ment Center with a staff of over 200 individuals who coordinated the radiological monitoring activities of all the parties.
Assessments of the exercise indicated that the FRERP was appropriately tested and that the plan was adequate for such an incident. The participants agreed that the coordination of the Federal and local authorities exceeded expectations.
In addition, it was noted that the participation of Federal i
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agencies, which would be expected in an actual major incident, significantly changed tne character of the exercise. The current plans are to conduct a Federal Field Exercise every 3 to 4 years and continue to inform utilities and local authorities about the Federal response capabilities through training j
courses, tabletop exercises, and workshops.
Although a portion of FFE-1 was concerned with the recovery phase of the exercise, it was judged that sufficient emphasis was not given to this vital aspect of a response to a major radiological emergency. Therefore, the Federal agencies opted to conduct a large tabletop exercise that focused exclusively on the activitfes associated with an accident resulting in large-scale cratamina-tion of the environment. The tabletop exercise was conducted at the FEMA l
training facility in Emitsburg, Maryland, in December 1985 and involved 150 l
persons from :he Beaver Valley Power Station, local authorities, industry groups, and private organizations.
lhe second Federal Field Exercise (FFE-2), a 3-day event, was held in J
conjunction with the regularly scheduled Zion full-participation exercise in i
June 1987. The number of exercise participants was about the same as that for FFE-1, but the number of visitors, particularly non-U.S. visitors, was much larger because of the concerns raised by the Chernobyl accident. The complexity and technical accuracy of the scenario data was considerably improved over that of FFE-1. Reactor systems data was entered directly into the computer systems that were used by the various technical participants, including representatives of the licensee, offsite authorities, and the NRC.
In addition, accurate and realistic offsite contamination data was available.
Therefore, the realism of this exercise was considerably improved over routine nuclear power reactor exercises. Half of the exercise was concerned with issues related to recovery of the area and returning citizens to their homes.
There were a considerable number of lessons learned from FFE-2. Although it was found that sufficient resources and capabilities exist, this support was not always utilized, primarily because responders in many instances did not know it was available. Another finding was that the delays in providing assessed and corroborated data to the decisionmakers from the Federal assess-ment center caused considerable problems. Other concerns involved the need to improve the public information process, to emphasize international relations, to include additional Federal agencies, and to better train the individuals from all Federal agencies so that they can carry out their roles in an actual emergency and provide appropriate support to offsite authorities.
The Federal agencies are now planning a third Federal Field Exercise, FFE-3, which is expected to be held in mid-1991 in the Northeast United States.
This exercise is expected to emphasize the recovery aspects of a severe reactor accident and the international concerns that would be created by such an event.
The Federal agencies will again encourage international visitors to attend the Exercise. Additional information will be made available to the international conrnunity as the planning for this exercise advances.
The Current Phase (1987-1989)
The recent experience with nuclear power plant emergency exercises indi-cates that nuclear power plant emergency preparedness programs are relatively stable and mature.
In fact, in the United States, the nuclear power plant
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emergency preparedness programs are further advanced and are being used as modeb for those of other industries. Nuclear power plant emergency plans have actually been activated successfully on several occasions in response to non-nuclear emergencies in the vicinity of the nuclear plants. Currently, few exercises result in the identification of major onsite shortcomings. Scenario quality is relatively consistent, and most nuclear power plant owners have access to sufficient trained and experienced staff members to produce tech-nically accurate scenarios and to conduct the challenging exercises. Some nuclear power plants owners engage consultants to assemble the scenario or control the exercise.
One of the current major themes in emergency exercises is providing greater challenges and opportunities for in-plant personnel to diagnose and prevent or mitigate plant damage. One method used to achieve this goal is the use of a plant-specific, full-scope simulator to control the operations scenar-io. Where these simulators are available and located on the reactor site, this 4
l method offers a greater degree of realism for the control room operators. Al-though most simulators do not accurately model beyond-design-basis accidents, the highly accurate simulation that they do provide affords the operations staff the opportunity to address reactor problems by using their abnomal and emergency operating procedures with support from the rest of the emergency f-response organization. While use of a simulator can introduce artificial l
problems into an exercise because communications capabilities in a simulator 4
room may not be as elaborate as those in a control room, awareness and planning l
can overcome this problem.
Those nuclear power plant owners who do not have a simulator on the site will often prepare the reactor operations scenario by running the transient (accident) on a full-scope simulator while a, crew of operators responds in accordance with their emergency operating procedures. ~;he resulting data reflect, with a high degree of fidelity, the indications that the operators wno play in the exercise will see as they attempt to deal with the same transient using the same procedures, At the very least, the operations data and events can be keyed to the operator actions directed by the emergency procedures such that a realistic time-line and sequence of events are presented to ihe operator.
During this period, exercises became more sophisticated regarding inges-tion exposure pathway play, and recovery and reentry procedures.
Recovery and ~
reentry portions of exercises are largely conducted in a tabletop fashion, but i
ingestion pathway play often involves offsite authorities (to a 50-mile radius) who do not participate in the more frequent and smaller-scale 10-mile plume pathway EPZ exercises. Because Federal guidance was only issued in 1988, ingestion pathway exercises are still in the early phase.
Ingestion pathway exercise play focuses on the ability to implement procedures for protecting the public from ingesting contaminated foodstuffs. This includes decisionmaking on whether dairy animals should be placed on stored feed and implementing proce-dures for detecting contamination, for estimating the dose commitment conse-quences of uncontrolled ingestion and for imposing protective actions such as impoundment, processing, or product diversion and preservation.
Recently, the United States has had experience in conducting and evaluating emergency exercises where offsite authorities have refused to participate. The exercises in June 1988 at the Seabrook and Shoreham nuclear t.____
9 power plants were the largest such undertakings. At Stabrook and Shoreham the nuclear power plant owners supplied their own offsite plans and personnel to compensate for the lack of participation by the States of Massachusetts (Seabrook) and New York (Shoreham). These exercises each involved between 1,000 to 2,000 players, controllers, and evaluators supplied by the nuclear power plant owners and 100 to 200 Federal controllers and evaluators. A unique feature of these exercises, aside from the size, was the play of personnel who i
were trained by the nuclear power plant owners to facilitate the coordination between the nuclear power plant owners response and the response expected from offsite authorities during a real accident. The skills of these interface personnel were tested by Federal exercise controllers simulating the roles of offsite officials over the telephone. Both of these exercises were considered generally successful by both NRC and FEMA. Since then Shoreham has been licensed for full power operations, while the license for Seabrook is still pending.
The Future Reducing reactor accident risk by mitigating either the severity of accidents or the resulting radiation releases is the object of the NRC's accident management program. There is substantial interest by industry in the concept of more realistic emergency scenarios conducted in such a way that the actions of plant staff to correct problems can be objectively graded, raising the possibility that the players will actually terminate or significantly mitigate the event. This type of exercise is seen as having great promise as a method of developing and practicing procedures necessary to interdict accident scenarios in which multiple failures have occurred and normal success paths are not available. Such exercises may be useful in identifying innovative mitiga-tion strategies which have not previously been identified.
A few nuclear power plant owners have successfully demonstrated the practicality of conducting damage control-type drills as part of an emergency l
exercise. However, the prospect of players successfully terminating the acci-dent scenario may not be welcome if the exercise play of offsite agencies depends on the plant being seriously damaged.
For this reason, it is likely that any exercises in which the players have the opportunity to prevent the 4
condition of the plant from degrading to the point where offsite actions are initiated will have to be conducted in the years when offsite agencies are not i
participating to a major extent.
Summary Emergency preparedness in general and emergency exercises in particular have evolved and have been substantially improved in the past 10 years.
Exercises are a fundamental tool for training personnel who would be relied upon in an actual emergency, and for demonstrating the implementability and refining the adequacy of emergency plans. The success of any exercise depends on a number of factors including, management support, scenario realism, close l
coordination and cooperation between onsite and offsite emergency response erganizetions, objective exercise evaluations by the participants, emergency l
equipment availability and personnel training. The conduct of the U.S. nuclear i
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, power plant emergency. exercise. program is expected to continue to' evolve, and thereby provide assurance that appropriate steps will.be taken by onsite and offsite~ emergency response organizations.to minimize the-impact of any future 4
accident.
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e REFERENCES 1.
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Re-sponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,"
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Novem-ber 1980.
2.
" Report to the NRC'on Guidance for Preparing Scenarios for Emergency Preparedness Exercises at Nuclear Generating Stations, Draft Report for i
Comment," NUREG/CR-3365/PNL-4758, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1986.
I 3.
" Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," NUREG-0696, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1981.
4.
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability," NUREG-0737, Supplement No. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1983.
5.
" Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP)," Federal Register, November 8, 1985.
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Agreement by Author for the NEA/ CEC Vorkshop on TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF EMERGENCY PLANNING Concerning Publication of Papers by OECD 1.
'The undersigned understands that the OECD may publish a work based on papers presented at this Workshop containing some or all of the written and oral presentations, and that for legal reasons this agreement by the undersigned is required.
2.
The undehdgned ther-fure agrees that with respect to his (or her) paper :
a) The copyright in all countries and all proprietary rights in the proceedings of the Workshop, including all materials prepared for and presented in the proceedings by the undersigned, shall become me the sole property of OECD.- OECD shall have the sole right to
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publish the proceedings in whole or in part and to. adapt and use it as may seem desirable, and to authorise all translations and quota-tions1 therefrom; OECD shall be entitled to license its rights in whole or in part to any other person or body.-
b)Theundersignedreservesanon-exAlusivelicensetoreproduce, dis-tribute and use his (or her) individual papers either in full or ab-breviated form for his (or her) purposes.
c) Any necessary permissions have been obtained by the undersigned for 1:
OECD or any of its licensees to publish, use or adapt, as provided 1"
above, in any language free of cost to it, from any persons in whom k
any existing copyrights or proprietary. rights therein may be vested, f
and the undersigned agrees upon request to produce evidence to OECD; d-of such permission.
ni 3.
It is understood that significant abridgements or modifications of a contribution vill be submitted to the author for approval before publication and that the author may be identified in the publication.
Name of Author : Travers, Weiss, Podolak, Jamison
. Title of Paper : NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISES A DECADE OF U.S. EXPERIENCE (1979-1989)
Signature : /./ Ilm.
, An.A>t A./ :s Date.: June 1, 1989
.j'**T e
Agreement by Author for the NEA/ CEC Vorkshop on TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF EMERGENCY Pil.NIGNG Concerning Publication of Papers by OECD 1.
The undersigned understands that the OECD may publish a work based on papers presented at this Vorkshop containing some or all of the written and oral presentations, and that for legal reasons this agreement by the
~
undersigned is required.
2.
The undersigned therefore agrees that with respect to his (or her) paper :
a) The copyright in all countries and all proprietary rights in the proceedings of the Workshop, including all materials prepared for l
and presented in the proceedings by the undersigned, shall become the sole property of OECD. OECD shall have the sole right to publish the proceedings in whole or in part and to adapt and use it as may seem desirable, and to authorise all translations and quota-
[
tions therefrom; OECD shall be entitled to license Its rights in whole or in part to any other person or body.
b) The undersigned reserves a non-ex81usive license to reproduce, dis-tribute and use his (or her) individual papers either in full or ab-breviated form for his (or her) purposes.
- Uqi, c) Any necessary permissions have been obtained by the undersigned for j,h, OECD or any of its licensees to publish, use or adapt, as provided
[
above, in any language free of cost to it, from any persons in whom N
any existing copyrights or proprietary rights therein may be vested,
{;
and the undersigned agrees upon request to produce evidence to OECD~
of such permission.
3.
It is understood that significant abridgements or modifications of a contribution vill be submitted to the author for approval before publication and that the author may be identified in the publication.
t Name of Author :
Frank J. Congel TECHNICAL BASIS FOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE I
Title of Paper :
l UNITED STATES Signature :
h pf, (g
/
Date :
JUNE 1, 1989 i
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