ML20245J951

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Forwards SALP Input for Yankee Rowe for Period of Apr 1988 - Jul 1989
ML20245J951
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 08/03/1989
From: Eselgroth P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Blough R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8908180238
Download: ML20245J951 (4)


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AUG ".31989 MEMORANDUM FOR: R. Blough, Chief, Projects Section 3A,-DRP THRU:1 ~R. Conte, Acting Chief, Operations Branch, DRS FROM: P. Eselgroth, Chief, Pressurized Water.Section, DRS

SUBJECT:

YANKEE R0WE - DRS OPERATIONS BRANCH SALP INPUT FOR PERIOD APRIL 1,1988 - JULY 31,1989 Attached ts the SALP input for the Yankee Rowe plant based upon inpections.

conducted by DRS Operations Branch personnel during the subject period. This report summarizes the SALP evaluation write-ups of .the individual inspectors.

The'DRS' Operations Branch coordinator for this report is Ed Yachimiak, X5389..

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/p P. se oth, hief f Pressu zed Water Reactor Section-Division'of Reactor Safety cc: R. Gallo, RI N. Blumberg, RI B. Boger, RI M. Fairtile,.NRR DRS Files (2)

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Summary of DRS Activities April 1, 1988 to July 31, 1989 Inspection Number Inspector Areas Inspected Inspection Hours 88-11 (OL) Yachimiak Operations N/A 88-18 (0L) Bissett Operations N/A 89-03 (0L-RQ) Prell Operations N/A 88-23 Dev Quality / Safety 89 89-05 Dev Quality / Safety 42 I

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1; Operations The licensee has made significant progress in upgrading its. licensed operator training program. Because of.these upgrades, all initial

. license applicants for Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator-(SRD) licenses (eight total) passed their respective examinations and were granted licenses. This can be' attributed to the addition of several new instructor positions in the training department, the establishment of more stringent and thorough training program requirements, and the

' implementation of a higher standard for the successful completion of the initial or requalification training program.

However, during the NRC's June 1989 requalification examination, three (3) senior Shift Supervisors failed various portions' of their respective examinations. Post-examination analysis of these failures did not

' identify training program inadequacies as the root cause. Instead, the poor quality of the plant's operating procedures were determined to be the primary problem. Specifically, plant procedures were inadequate in three(3) areas:' indexes were inaccurately-referenced and were not always correctly cross-referenced; procedural content and guidance was inconsistent depending upon whicn procedure was referenced; and finally, many procedures were poorly worded which resulted in confusion, misinterpretation, and misunderstanding.

This problem had originally been identified by the licensee, but a corrective action plan had not yet been implemented. It was not until additional concerns were identified by the NRC during the operator licensing requalification examination that the licensee's management

-committed to establish an Operations Support Group. This group has the responsibility to review and revise all operating procedures to be consistent with current plant design and operations. The group will consist of licensed operators and system engineers familiar with plant l design and operations. The licensee's willingness to commit to correct these deficiencies indicates that they understand the implications of inadequate operating procedures in both the operations and training arenas. Their commitment, if followed through with an appropriate amount of staff resources, should alleviate training difficulties and-ensure safe plant operations.

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2. Quality / Safety The licensee's conduct of safety evaluations related to 10 CFR 50.59 reviews of design changes and plant modifications has improved since the NRC Safety Assessment Team 1,sp : tion conducted during the last SALP period. In-depth analysis cf e.oblems and the associated corrective actions were provided in the safety evaluation reports. The individuals performing these quality control. activities were experienced,.well trained, and dedicated. There has been ample interface between the engineers at the site and at the corporate office, as evidenced by the availability of these personnel at the site during modification activities.

The QA/QC overview of the design changes and plant modifications is, however, limited in scope. Major QA/QC attentions are primarily directed towards NDE work and other refueling outage and plant restart activities.

The QA group does perform independent surveillance of selected design changes and plant modification activities. However, in most cases, the cognizant system engineers ensure that modifications and installations are adequately implemented in accordance with their approved procedures and instructions.

Nuclear safety-related materials and equipment were procured from approved vendors. Items were properly specified, purchase documents were adequately reviewed to include regulatory requirements, and receipt inspection activities were correctly conducted in a timely manner by the cognizant engineers to verify and resolve any nonconforming materials or conditions. The licensee's Commercial Grade Items Procurement program implementation is also adequate. Review and evaluation for dedication of commercial grade items for safety-related application were performed in accordance with approved procedures by trained and qualified individuals.

Management has not been aggressive in addressing the update of vendor manuals and information. Specifically, the licensee has not incorporated vendor manual information changes as required by Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.2.2, Vendor Interface. These concerns have been acknowledged by the licensee and appropriate corrective actions have been implemented.

This includes the review of vendor instructions and procedures by cognizant engineers and the subsequent review by the PORC prior to their implementation.

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