ML20245G889

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Concurs W/Recipient Position That Issues II.G.1 & 23 Re Pressurizer Equipment Electric Power & Threat of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Loca,Respectively,Resolved
ML20245G889
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/16/1989
From: Long W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Kintner E
ALWR UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE
References
PROJECT-669A NUDOCS 8906290302
Download: ML20245G889 (3)


Text

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June 16, 1989 j

I Project No. 669' DISTRIBUTION:

Cifntral. FTTem BGrimes Mr. E. E. Kintner, Chairman PDSNP Reading' ACRS (10)

Advanced Light Water Reactor NRC PDR Steering Committee EHylton GPU Nuclear Corporation WLong 100 Interpace Parkway OGC Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 EJordan

SUBJECT:

ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT - GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES ON USE OF PORYS AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS

Dear Mr. Kintner:

Your letter dated April 3,1989 provided additional information relating to outstanding issues in our review of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the Requirements Document. You indicated your belief that issues II.G.1 and 23 should be considered resolved for the ALWR.

Issue II.G.1 requires that electric power to pressurizer equipment such as relief valves, block valves and level indicators be provided from emergency power sources. Your basis for considering this issue resolved is the fact that PORVs will not be used in the ALWR. Noting that the ALWR will utilize its safety-grade Safety Depressurization and Vent System to perform functions normally performed by pressurizer PORVs, and that Chapter 3, para. 3.4.3.6, of the Requirements Document specifies 1E power for pressurizer level indicators, we concur with your position that this issue is resolved.

Issue 23 concerns the threat of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal LOCA under station blackout (SBO) conditions.

It is your position that this issue should be considered resolved in view of a commitment to use improved RCP seals which are purported to have the capability to leak no more than 8 gpm under 8-hour SB0 conditions (Byron-Jackson N-9000 design), and a commitment to revise the Requirements Document to demonstrate, by test, the seal's capability.

Based on these commitments and the Chapter 11 requirement to include a gas turbine standby power supply, which will greatly reduce the probability of an extended SBO, the staff considers GSI 23 resolved. The staff, in its review of safety analysis reports (SARs) submitted by operating license applicants or design certificate applicants, will review the test data ar.d results to verify that the seals are capable of meeting the SB0 leakage commitment.

In the event the test results are inconclusive, GSI 23 will be revisited in the SAR review, y

Cla{l Sincerely, f

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June 16, 1989 Project No. 669 Mr. E. E. Kintner, Chairman Advanced Light Water Reactor Steering Committee GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

SUBJECT:

ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT - GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES ON USE OF PORVS AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS l

Dear Mr. Kintner:

Your letter dated April 3,1989 provided additional information relating to outstanding issues in our review of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the Requirements Document. You indicated your belief that issues II.G.1 and 23 should be considered resolved for the ALWR, Issue II.G.1 requires that electric power to pressurizer equipment such as relief valves, block valves and level indicators be provided from emergency power sources. Your basis for considering this issue resolved is the fact that FORVs will not be used in the ALWR. Noting that the ALWR will utilize its safety-grade Safety Depressurization and Vent System to perform functions normally performed by pressurizer PORVs, and that Chapter 3, para. 3.4.3.6, of the Reo':frements Document specifies IE power for pressurizer level indicators, we colicur with your position that this issue is resolved.

Issue 23 concerns the threat of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal LOCA under station blackout (SBO) conditions.

It is your position that this issue shculd be considered resolved in view of a comitment to use improved RCP seals which are purported to have the capability to leak no more than 8 gpm under 8-hour SB0 conditions (Byron-Jackson N-9000 design), and a commitment to revise the Requirements Document to demonstrate, by test, the seal's capability. Based on these commitments and the Chapter 11 requirement to include a gas turbine standby power supply, which will greatly reduce the probability of an extended SBO, the. staff considers GSI 23 resolved. The staff, in its review of safety arelysis reports (SARs) submitted by operating license applicants or design certificate applicarts, will review the test data and results to verify that the seals are capable of meeting the SE0 leakage commitment.

In the event the test results are inconclusive, GSI 23 will be revisited in the SAR review.

Sincerely, h)

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William O. Long, Senior Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: See next page

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Mr. Edwin E. Kintner, Chairman Project No. 659 ALWR Steering Committee EPRI o

cc: Mr. John DeVine, Jr.

fluclear Power Division Electric Power Research Institute P. O. Box 10412 Palo Alto, CA 94303 I

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