ML20245G120

Notice of Violation from Insp on 890309-0605.Violation Noted:Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Start Went Unnoticed by Operators for About 2 Hrs & Failure to Notice Changing Condensate Storage Tank & Suppression Pool Level Indication

ML20245G120
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	06/22/1989
From:	Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245G118	List: IR 05000440/1989007 ML20245G112 ML20245G120
References
50-440-89-07, 50-440-89-7, NUDOCS 8906290031
Download: ML20245G120 (2)

Text

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ __

NOTICE OF VIOLATION The Cleveland Electric Illuminating License No. NPF-58 Company As a result of the inspectiou conducted on March 9 through June 5, 1989 and in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C - General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (1987), the following violation was identified:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by the PNPP Quality Assurance Plan, Section 5.0, requires, in part, that activities affecting auality shall be prescribed by clear and complete documented procedures, instructions and/or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these documents.

Contrary to the above, three examples of procedures inappropriate to the circumstances were identified as follows:

1. Off-Nonnal Instruction (0NI)-R42-2, " Loss of DC Bus ED-1-B (Unit 1)," )

did not adequately identify that a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiation signal would result if disconnect no. 5 on distribution panel .

E0-1-B08 was opened. That signal causes various actions, among them j being the Emergency Service Water (ESW) and Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) pumps to receive start signals. On April 8, 1989, while using ONI-R42-2 to isolate a ground fault, Emergency Service Water Pump "A" unexpectedly started when operations personnel opened disconnect no. 5. ECC pump "A" was already running.

2. On April 17, 1989, before the licensee had corrected procedure ONI-R42-2, l personnel consulted it and deenergized distribution panel ED-1-B08 for an outage. This caused an unexpected PCIC initiation signal. The Emergency Closed Cooling Pump "A" also unexpectedly started. ESW Pump "A" received a start signal, but was already running. In addition, the ECC pump start went unnoticed by the operators for about two (2) hours.

3. Tag Out (TO) 1-89-1449 (which was associated with Work Order (WO) 88-9113) was inadequate in that it did not ensure that the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system Condensate Storage Tank (CST) suction valve (E22-F001) would remain shut while maintenance personnel opened an:1 closed the isolation valve on the HPCS test return line to the suppression pool. Consequently, on April 25, 1989, when WO 88-9113 was performed and E22-F001 was inadvertently opened, over 30,000 gallons of water drained from the CST to the suppression pool and caused it to overflow. This resulted in about 12 inches of standing water in the drywell before operations personnel closed the valves and secured the flowpath. In addition, control room operators failed to notice changing CST and suppression pool level indications.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) (50-440/89007-02). l l

8906290031 890622 ,

PDR ADOCK 0500 4 0 1

c-

\ ..

1, l" Notice of Violation 2-U Pursuant to the provisions ~of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit.to this-office within thirty days of the date of this Notice 'a written statement or.

explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1)correctiveaction taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid '

further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

l Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

5 '2 k 9 Dated Richatd C. Knop, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 i

_