ML20245F147
| ML20245F147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1989 |
| From: | Russell L BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908140172 | |
| Download: ML20245F147 (3) | |
Text
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BALTIMORE i
GAS AND l
ELECTRIC l
CHARLES CENTER. P.O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 LEON B. RUSSELL MANAGER CALVERT CLIFFB NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DEPARTMENT August 3, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1; Docket No. 50-317 & License No. DPR 53 Penetration Fire Barrier Special Report, Technical Specification 3.7.12s
Dear Sirr.:
Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12a, we hereby submit the following Special Report concerning penetration fire barrier, specifically a missing fire damper in the spent fuel pool exhaust duct.
Very truly yours, av LBR/CRS/rlz Attachmene.
cc:
D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A. Capra, NRC S
A. McNeil, NRC W. T. Russell, NRC V. L. Prichett/D. F. Limroth, NRC T. Magette, DNR
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o PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER SPECIAL REPORT BACKCROUND On June 30, 1989, while performing an inspection of Unit 1 fire barrier penetrations, with the Unit in Mode 5 at 0% power, the Fire Protection Engineer discovered that a fire damper was physically missing in the spent fuel pool ventilation system.
The Shift Supervisor was immediately notified and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7,12.a was entered due to an inoperable fire barrier penetration. As required by the Action Statement, operable fire detection was verified on at least one side of the inoperable barrier along with the implementation of an hourly fire watch patrol.
The inspection of fire barrier penetrations was a follow-up to a similar inspection performed on Calvert Cllffs Unit 2 (Docket No. 50-318).
The first step in each inspection was identifying the location of each penetration on Calvert Cliffs mechanical prints.
One of the penetrations identified was a fire damper in the spent fuel pool ventilation exhaust system, located on elevation 69 ft. in the electrical equipment room.
Physical verification of the damper required drilling inspection holes in the ventilation ductwork. Once the holes were drilled, it was discovered that the damper was physically missing.
This event was reported in a one hour report under 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B) and in Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-11 under 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B) because it represents a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.
EFFECT ON UNIT OPEPATION Upon discovery of the inoperable fire barrier penetration (damper), appropris.te actions were taken to satisfy the ACTION Statement for 1. S. 3/4.7.12
" PENETRATION FIRE EARRIER." At the present time Calvert Cliffs is in the ACTION Statement which permits continued operation of the facility indefinitely as long as the ACTION requirements are met.
This is based upon the premise that the continued operation of the facility is not restricted by the time limits of the ACTION Requirements and conformance to the Action Requirements provides an j
acceptable level of safety for continued operation. P.eliance on the ACTION Statement does not restrict Unit startup because T. S. 3.0.4 does not apply.
1 Thus, the inoperable fire has no effect upon Unit operation as long as the provisions of the ACTION Statement are satisfied.
TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE C0_MPLIANCJ The CCNPP Unit 1 T. S. 3/4.7.12.a ACTION Statement requires the penetration to be retutr.a to operability within 7 days or to issue a Special Report to the l
Commission with the next 30 days outlining specific actions taken, the cause of i
the inoperable penetration, and plans and schedules for restoring the fire barrier penetration to operable status. As described above, upon the discovery of the inoperable damper, T. S. 3/4.7.12.a ACTION Statement was entered.
This i
requires the verification of operability of smoke detection on at least one side 1
of the barrier with an hourly fire watch patrol.
It appears that a modification
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which installed a number of dampers as a part of CCNPP's compliance with Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 failed to identify this duct and therefore no damper was installed. The fire barrier penetration surveillance test was performed for both Units after a fire damper in a Unit 2 barrier was found in the closed position.
As of this time, most of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 barriers, including dampers, have been visually inspected.
An Field Engineering Change (FEC) request has been generated to install a damper in this ventilation duct.
It is anticipated that the new damper will be installed by October 31, 1989. Until the new damper is installed the Action Statement will remain in effect. Other corrective actions beyond the damper replacement are described in LER 89-11.
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